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http://bos.sagepub.com/ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists http://bos.sagepub.com/content/70/2/75 The online version of this article can be found at: DOI: 10.1177/0096340214523565 2014 70: 75 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Hans M Kristensen and Robert S Norris Russian nuclear forces, 2014 Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com On behalf of: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists can be found at: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Additional services and information for http://bos.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Email Alerts: http://bos.sagepub.com/subscriptions Subscriptions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Permissions: What is This? - Mar 3, 2014 Version of Record >> by guest on May 10, 2014 bos.sagepub.com Downloaded from by guest on May 10, 2014 bos.sagepub.com Downloaded from
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Page 1: Russia Nuclear Weapon

http://bos.sagepub.com/Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

http://bos.sagepub.com/content/70/2/75The online version of this article can be found at:

 DOI: 10.1177/0096340214523565

2014 70: 75Bulletin of the Atomic ScientistsHans M Kristensen and Robert S Norris

Russian nuclear forces, 2014  

Published by:

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Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

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Bulletinof theAtomicScientists

IT IS 5 MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT

®

Nuclear notebook

Russian nuclear forces, 2014

Hans M Kristensen and Robert S Norris

AbstractRussia has taken important steps in modernizing its nuclear forces since early 2013, including the continueddevelopment and deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), construction of ballisticmissile submarines, and development of a new strategic bomber. As of March 2013, the authors estimate,Russia had a military stockpile of approximately 4,300 nuclear warheads, of which roughly 1,600 strategicwarheads were deployed on missiles and at bomber bases. Another 700 strategic warheads are in storage alongwith roughly 2,000 nonstrategic warheads. A large numberÑperhaps 3,500Ñof retired but still largely intactwarheads await dismantlement.

KeywordsICBM, nonstrategic weapons, nuclear forces, Russia, SLBM, Strategic Rocket Forces, strategic weapons,warheads

Since our last Russian Notebook inearly 2013, Russia has taken sev-eral important steps in moderniz-

ing its strategic and nonstrategic nuclearforces. These include continued devel-opment and deployment of new inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),construction of ballistic missile submar-ines, development of a new strategicbomber, and deployment of tactical bal-listic and cruise missiles and fighter-bombers. While much of this develop-ment continues well-known programsthat have been under way for manyyears, other developments are new.Combined, the steps contribute to grow-ing concern in other countries aboutRussian intentions and help justifynuclear modernization programs and

political opposition to reductions inother nuclear weapon states. Thosedevelopments are not in RussiaÕs long-term interest.

As of March 2013, we estimate thatRussia had a military stockpile ofapproximately 4,300 nuclear warheads,of which roughly 1,600 strategic war-heads are deployed on missiles and atbomber bases.1 Another 700 strategicwarheads are in storage along withroughly 2,000 nonstrategic warheads. Inaddition to the military stockpile foroperational forces, a large numberÑper-haps 3,500Ñof retired but still largelyintact warheads await dismantlement.2

Col. Gen. Sergei Karakayev, the headof the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces,explained in December 2013 that Russia

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists2014, Vol. 70(2) 75–85! The Author(s) 2014

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needs approximately 1,500 warheadsfor its strategic missiles and bombersÒto resolve tasks of strategic deterrence.ÓThis force level keeps approximateparity with the United States whilealso taking into consideration Òthe levelof strategic forces of other nuclearpowersÑthe United Kingdom, France,China and nuclear weapons of newnuclear powersÑIndia, Pakistan andothers,Ó Karakayev said (Interfax, 2013).

ICBMs

Russia deploys an estimated 313 ICBMsthat can carry approximately 976 war-heads. The ICBMs are organizedunder the Strategic Rocket Forces inthree missile armies with a total of 12divisions.

Retirement of all Soviet-era ICBMs iswell under way and scheduled for com-pletion in 2022. Deployment of the first-generation SS-27 Mod. 1 (Topol-M) iscomplete, deployment of the second-generation SS-27 Mod. 2 well underway, and development of a follow-onversion is in progress. Despite the mod-ernization, the ICBM force is expected toshrink to 220 to 250 missiles by 2022,depending on production and deploy-ment rates for the new missiles. Becausethis force is significantly smaller than the400 ICBMs the United States plans toretain, Russian planners compensate byincreasing the share of the ICBM forcethat is equipped with multiple warheadsfrom 35 percent today to approximately70 percent by 2022. Although Russia by2022 will deploy fewer ICBM warheads,roughly 90 percent of them will be mul-tiple independently targetable reentryvehicles (MIRVs). That trend isunhealthy for strategic stability becauserelatively few warheads on more US

ICBMs can threaten many warheads onfewer Russian ICBMs.

SS-27 (Topol-M)

Russia deploys two versions of the SS-27missile: the SS-27 Mod. 1, a single-war-head missile that comes in eithermobile (RS-12M1) or silo-based (RS-12M2) variants, and the SS-27 Mod. 2(RS-24), a road-mobile missile equippedwith MIRVs. Deployment of the SS-27Mod. 1 was completed in 2012 at a totalof 78 missiles: 60 silo-based missiles withthe 60th Missile Division in Tatishchevoand 18 road-mobile missiles with the 54thGuards Missile Division at Teykovo,northeast of Moscow.

All new Russian ICBM deploymentsare MIRVed SS-27 Mod. 2 ICBMs, orRS-24 (Yars). Following deployment ofthe first two regiments with a total of 18missiles at the 54th Guards Missile Divi-sion at Teykovo, preparations are underway to deploy the RS-24 at four to fiveother missile divisions: Novosibirsk,Nizhniy Tagil, Irkutsk, Kozelsk, and pos-sibly Dombarovsky.

In late 2013, one regiment with nineRS-24 road-mobile launchers wasplaced on Òexperimental combat dutyÓwith the 39th Guards Missile Divisionat Novosibirsk, and another regiment(initially only with six launchers) withthe 42nd Missile Division at NizhniyTagil. A second RS-24 regiment isplanned for each base in 2014, replacingSS-25 launchers deployed there. Eachdivision will probably be armed withthree to four regiments. After Novosi-birsk and Nizhniy, deployment of theroad-mobile RS-24 will follow at the51st Guards Missile Division at Irkutskto replace SS-25s currently deployedthere.

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Following completion of the deploy-ment of silo-based SS-27 Mod. 1 s, prep-arations are now under way to begindeploying silo-based RS-24s with the28th Guards Missile Division at Kozelskin 2014 to replace the remaining SS-19 s. Itis unknown how many of the original 60SS-19 silos will be converted to RS-24.

Once deployment at Kozelsk is com-pleted, RS-24 deployment in silos mightfollowat the 13th Missile Divisionat Dom-barovsky to replace the remaining SS-18 scurrently deployed there. A statement byRocket Forces commander Karakayev inlate 2013 left some uncertainty aboutwhether the missile to be deployed atDombarovsky in the future will be theRS-24 or another missile (Itar-Tass, 2013).

SS-18 (RS-20 V)

The SS-18 is a silo-based, 10-warheadheavy ICBM first deployed in 1988. Themissile is being gradually retired withapproximately 46 SS-18 s with 460 war-heads remaining in the 13th Missile Divi-sion at Dombarovsky and the 62ndMissile Division at Uzhur. The SS-18 isscheduled to remain in service until 2022.

SS-19 (RS-18 or UR-100NUTTH)

The silo-based, six-warhead SS-19entered service in 1980 and is graduallybeing retired. We estimate that a total of30 missiles remain in service with 210warheads with the 60th Missile Divisionat Tatishchevo and the 28th Guards Mis-sile Division at Kozelsk. The SS-19 isscheduled to be retired in 2019.

SS-25 (RS-12 M or Topol)

Russia has been retiring SS-25 missilesfor several years, each year removing

between one and three regiments (nineto 27 missiles) from service. Duringthe past few years, six SS-25 regimentshave been retired, leaving 117 launchersin five divisions. Dismantlement hasbegun at Yoshkar-Ola, and SS-25 regi-ments at Novosibirsk and Nizhniy Tagilare being replaced with RS-24s. The lastSS-25 s will be withdrawn from servicein 2021.

New ICBMs

The Strategic Rocket Forces apparentlyare working on developing several newICBMs, although some may be modifica-tions of existing versions. A lightweightversion of the RS-24Ñtentatively knownas Yars-M, RS-26, or RubezhÑhas beenflight-tested and might be deployedwithin the next two to three years. Themissile was tested at intercontinentalrange in 2012 and intermediate rangelater in 2012 and in 2013Ñas were otherICBMs (Kristensen, 2013). The RS-26apparently weighs 40 tons less than the120-ton RS-24, carries a modified war-head payload, and might be deployed in2015 (RIA-Novosti, 2013a).

In 2014, Russia is also expected to beginproduction of the liquid-fuel Sarmat orheavy ICBM intended to replace theSS-18. With a rumored throw weight ofabout five tons, the Sarmat would beable to deliver a similar number ofMIRVs as the SS-18, or an advanced pay-load with countermeasures against mis-sile defenses. The Sarmat is scheduledfor deployment in 2018 to 2020 but willfirst have to undergo a series of flighttests. Soviet liquid-fuel ICBMs such asthe SS-18 were produced in Ukraine, andgiven the reliability problems with theBulava SLBM, it remains to be seenwhether Russia can develop and produce

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a new liquid-fuel missile or whether theSarmat will be a modified or life-extendedversion of the SS-18.

Six ICBMs were test-launched in 2013,well short of the 11 ICBM launches offi-cially predicted for the year in January2013 (Interfax-AVN, 2013); the testsincluded the first-ever launch of a silo-based RS-24.

SSBNs/SLBMs

Technical problems continue to hampermodernization of the Russian nuclearsubmarine fleet. After two decades ofdesign, development, and constructionof the Borei-class boats (Project 955),half a dozen flight-tests of the SS-N-32(Bulava-30) missile, and transfer of thefirst two boats to the Russian navy, theBorei/Bulava weapon system is still notoperational. A Bulava malfunctionedduring a test-launch from the AlexanderNevsky on September 3, 2013, furtherdelaying the program. After the failedtest, Russian defense minister SergeiShoygu reportedly ordered an additionalfive Bulava flight-tests (RIA-Novosti,2013c).

On December 30, 2013, the first twoBorei-class boatsÑYuri Dolgoruki andAlexander NevskyÑarrived at the North-ern Fleet base at YagelÕnaya (Gadz-hiyevo). The base is also the homeportof RussiaÕs fleet of Delta IV nuclear mis-sile submarines and includes a submar-ine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)depot and underground warhead storagefacility. The Yuri Dolgoruki will be per-manently based at YagelÕnaya, while theAlexander Nevsky will be transferred tothe Pacific Fleet nuclear submarine baseat Rybachiy (near Petropavlovsk) in late2014 or 2015 to begin replacing the DeltaIII boats at the base.

A total of eight Borei-class nuclearsubmarines are planned, each armedwith 16 SS-N-32 (Bulava) SLBMs thatcan carry up to six warheads apiece.The third boat, the Vladimir Monomakh,was launched in late 2012 and is undergo-ing ship-builder sea trials. Handover tothe navy has been delayed until later in2014 as a result of the problems with theBulava missile. This boat will also bebased in the Pacific Fleet.

The fourth and subsequent Borei-class submarines will be of an improveddesign known as Borei-II (Project 955A).The first improved Borei, expected to benamed Knyaz Vladimir, began construc-tion in July 2012 and is scheduled to enterservice in 2015 to 2017. The keels for thefifth boat, the Alexander Suvorov, will belaid in late 2014 for possible completionin 2018. The schedule of the last threeboats means that the eight-boat programwill probably not be completed until theearly 2020s.

There is considerable uncertaintyabout how the improved Borei submarinewill be armed. Numerous articles over thepast several years have reported that eachBorei-II will be equipped with 20 missiletubes, four more than each of the firstthree boats (Interfax-AVN, 2012a). But inFebruary 2013, a senior defense industrysource told RIA-Novosti that the numberof tubes would not be increased. ÒTheProject 955A differs significantly fromthe original Borey (Project 955) but notin the number of missiles carriedÑtherewill still be 16 on board,Ó the source wasquoted as saying (RIA-Novosti, 2013b).

For the remainder of this decade, themainstay of RussiaÕs nuclear submarineforce will continue to be the six third-generation Delta IVs built between 1985and 1992, each equipped with 16 SLBMs.All Delta IVs are part of the Northern

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Fleet and based at YagelÕnaya Bay on theKola Peninsula. Since 2007, Russia hasbeen upgrading the Delta IVs to carry amodified SS-N-23 SLBM known as theSineva. Each missile carries up to fourwarheads. All six boats have now com-pleted an overhaul and conversion toSineva. The Yekaterinburg was damagedby a fire in December 2011 and will notreturn to service until 2014 at the earliest.As a result, only four of the six Delta IVsare currently operational.

There are also rumors of a modifiedversion of Sineva, called Layner or Liner,that will be deployed on the Delta IVs overthe next several years. One unnamedNavy General Staff official reportedlysaid that Òwhile the Sineva can carry fourwarheads, the Layner will carry 10Ó (Izves-tia, 2012). But another source in the Rus-sian General Staff said that the Layner isnot a new missile but a modified Sineva:ÒIt is in fact a Sineva. Only the warhead isnew.Ó The Layner has an improved pene-tration capability achieved by, amongother things, Òa greater number of re-entry vehicles (boyevoy blok) in the war-head [sic]Ó (Interfax-AVN, 2012b). Insteadof more than twice the number of war-heads, it seems more likely that the mod-ified payload includes modified warheadsand additional penetration aids.

Three Delta III nuclear submarinesremain in service on the KamchatkaPeninsula as part of RussiaÕs PacificFleet. Each boat is equipped with 16SS-N-18 M1 Stingray (RSM-50) SLBMswith three warheads each. One ofthe Delta IIIsÑthe Georgiy Pobedono-setsÑlaunched an SS-N-18 on October30, 2013. In preparation for the PacificFleetÕs upcoming transition from DeltaIII to Borei SSBNs, Russian defense min-ister Sergei Shoygu visited the PacificSSBN base in April 2013 and said the

modernization Òwill significantly in-crease the possibilities for utilizing sub-marines in the context of strategicdeterrenceÓ and is of Òspecial significancein maintaining strategic stability and Rus-siaÕs military security in the Far East.ÓDuring the visit, Shoygu also visited theDelta III submarine Podolsk (RussianFederation Ministry of Defense, 2013).

An Itar-Tass news agency report inJune 2013 quoted an unnamed source inthe Russian General Staff saying thenavy would expand its strategic submar-ine patrols, starting in 2014. According tothe source, once the Borei-class boatcomes into service, the navy Òwill notonly continue the patrolling of theArctic, Atlantic and Pacific Oceans,Ó butalso return to the regions in the southernhemisphere that were patrolled by Sovietsubs until the dissolution of the USSR inthe 1990s. ÒThis would serve to solve thetasks of strategic nuclear deterrence notonly across the North Pole but also theSouth Pole,Ó the source was quoted assaying (Russia Today, 2013). It is notclear that the Soviet Union ever operatedits nuclear submarines south of the equa-tor, but exposing Russian subs to thewear, tear, and risks of operating so farfrom their bases makes no sense. More-over, there is no strategic need for suchoperations; Russian SLBMs can reach allcontinents from northern waters. We sus-pect Itar-Tass misunderstood the source.The Russian Navy declared in 2012 thatcontinuous nuclear submarine deterrentpatrols would resume by mid-year (RIA-Novosti, 2012), but so far we have seen noindication this has happened.

Strategic bombers

Russia operates two types of nuclear-capable heavy bombers: the Tu-160

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Blackjack and the Tu-95MS Bear H. Bothtypes can carry the nuclear AS-15 Kent(Kh-55) air-launched cruise missile(ALCM)3 and possibly gravity bombs;4

the Tu-160 can also carry the nuclearAS-16 Kickback (Kh-15) short-rangeattack missile.5 A new long-rangenuclear cruise missile, designated theKh-102, is under development.

There is growing uncertainty aboutthe number of bombers and their oper-ational status because Russia and theUnited States no longer disclose thenumber of aircraft counted under armscontrol treaties. Our current estimate ofroughly 60 deployed nuclear bombers isbased largely on commercial satelliteimages, which show an average of 51 to54 bombers typically present at the twostrategic bomber bases (Engels andUkrainka). Another 23 to 26 bombersare typically present at the Ryazan train-ing base, the Kazan production plant, andthe Zhukovsky design plant, for a totalinventory of 74 to 80 bombers. Thisnumber is probably a little high becausesome of the visible bombers may havebeen retired and because the satelliteimages were not all taken on the sameday. Nevertheless, by averaging thenumbers visible on all of the images wecan arrive at a rough estimate of 72nuclear-capable bombers in service. Inaddition to the 51 to 54 deployed bombersnormally visible at Engels and Ukrainka,another half a dozen or so aircraft fromthe bases might be on training flights ortemporarily at other bases, for an esti-mated force of perhaps 60 deployednuclear bombers.

The 60 deployed bombers would onlybe counted as 60 weapons under theNew START counting rule, but the air-craft could in fact carry a maximum loadof 676 weapons (all 72 bombers could

carry an estimated 810 weapons). Theweapons are not loaded on the bombersunder normal circumstances, and mostbomber weapons have probably beenmoved from the bases to central storagefacilities. We estimate that only a smallnumber of the air-delivered nuclearweaponsÑperhaps 200Ñmight be pre-sent at Engels and Ukrainka. Thisdeployment would be similar to the USdeployment of a few hundred nuclearweapons at its bomber bases.

The Russian Air Force in November2013 approved the conceptual design ofa replacement heavy bomber. The newdesign, currently known as PAK-DA,apparently is a subsonic stealthy flyingwing aircraft designed by Tupolev (Rus-sian Aviation, 2013). The new bomber isintended to replace the Tu-160 and Tu-95MS sometime in the 2020s, butupgrades continue to be made to theold bombers.

Russian heavy bombers continuedtheir long-range training exercisesduring 2013, with periodic sorties flownover the Arctic, North Atlantic, andNorth Pacific, where they were inter-cepted by NATO and Japanese fighteraircraft in scenarios reminiscent ofthe Cold War. The most noticeable Rus-sian deployment occurred in October2013, when two Tu-160s from EngelsAir Base deployed to Venezuela andNicaragua.

Nonstrategic (tactical) weapons

We estimate that Russia has approxi-mately 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear war-heads assigned for delivery by air,naval, and various defensive forces.6 Aswith the US government, the Russiangovernment does not provide any infor-mation about how many nonstrategic

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nuclear weapons it possesses. We esti-mate that the Russian inventory isdeclining and will continue to declineover the next decade with or without anarms control agreement. The Russiangovernment has repeatedly stated thatall its nonstrategic nuclear weapons arein central storage.

We estimate that RussiaÕs tactical airforces are assigned approximately 730AS-4 air-to-surface missiles and bombs.Tu-22M3 (Backfire-C) intermediate-range bombers can deliver both the mis-siles and bombs, whereas Su-24 M(Fencer-D) and Su-34 (Fullback)fighter-bombers deliver bombs only.Russia is modernizing some of its Fen-cers, but the aircraft will be replaced bySu-34 (Fullback) fighter-bombers;deployment of the Fullback has startedat bases in western Russia. It is possiblethat other types of fighter-bombers alsohave nuclear capability, but we have notfound authoritative information to thateffect.

The approximately 700 warheadsassigned to RussiaÕs naval nonstrategicdelivery platforms arm cruise missiles,antisubmarine weapons, anti-air mis-siles, torpedoes, and depth bombs. Thefirst new nuclear-capable Severod-vinsk-class (Yasen-class) nuclear-pow-ered guided-missile attack submarine(SSGN) was delivered to the Russiannavy in December 2013. A second sub isunder construction, and the keel of thethird sub was laid down in July 2013. Atotal of eight to 10 Yasen subs areplanned. The submarine is equipped fornonstrategic nuclear weapons, includingantisubmarine rockets, and has eight ver-tical launch tubes for cruise missiles.

We estimate that Russia maintainsaround 430 warheads for air defense, bal-listic missile defense, and coastal

defense forces. The warheads are usedin Gazelle ballistic missile defense inter-ceptors at five sites around Moscow, inparts of the S-300 air-defense system,and in the SSC-1B Sepal coastal defensesystem. The ballistic missile defensesystem (A-135) is being upgraded, andRussia has begun introduction of S-400air-defense regiments (with about eightlaunchers and 32 missiles each) aroundMoscow to replace the S-300 system.There is considerable uncertainty aboutwhich of the S-300 air-defense inter-ceptors (SA-10, SA-12, SA-20) arenuclear-capable, whether the new S-400 also has a nuclear capability, andhow many warheads are assigned toeach unit.

Despite RussiaÕs declaration in 1991and 1992 that it would eliminate allground-launched nonstrategic nuclearwarheads, it has not done so. We esti-mate that approximately 170 warheadsare assigned to SS-21 Scarab (Tochka)and SS-26 Stone (Iskander) short-rangeballistic missiles. The SS-26 will replacethe SS-21 completely over the nextdecade, eventually arming 10 tacticalmissile brigades.

Rumors resurfaced in 2013 suggestingthat Russia had deployed SS-26s in theKaliningrad region. The German maga-zine Bild claimed the deployment wasrevealed by satellite images, but did notshow any (Solms-Laubach, 2013). Thereport was wrong, and President Putinlater stated that Russia had not made adecision on whether to deploy the mis-sile in Kaliningrad. At the same time, hereiterated that such a deployment poten-tially could become a response toNATOÕs missile defense system: ÒWehave said many times that the missileshield threatens our nuclear potential,and so we must respond. One possible

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response would be to station Iskandersin KaliningradÓ (RIA-Novosti, 2013d).

The New York Times reported in Jan-uary 2014 that Russia had test-fired a newground-launched cruise missile thatmight constitute a violation of the 1987Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF)treaty (Gordon, 2014). While hardlinerscalled the test a violation, the UnitedStates has not formally declared Russiain violation of the INF treaty. The testprobably involved the R-500 cruise mis-sile being developed for the Iskanderlauncher. The 2013 Ballistic and CruiseMissile Threat report by the USAFNational Air and Space IntelligenceCenter (NASIC) did not list a RussianINF-range cruise missile.

FundingThis research was carried out with grants from theNew-Land Foundation and Ploughshares Fund.

Notes

1. The New START aggregate data from March2013 attributes 1,480 warheads on 492deployed launchers. The number is lowerthan our estimate because it does not countweapons stored at bomber bases, but insteadattributes an artificial number of one weaponper bomber. In reality, Russian bombers cancarry six to 16 nuclear weapons each.

2. We estimate that Russia stores its nuclearweapons at 48 permanent storage sitesacross Russia, including about 10 national-level central storage sites (Norris and Kris-tensen, 2009). Other essential references forfollowing Russian strategic nuclear forcesinclude the general New START aggregatedata that the US and Russian governmentsrelease biannually; the Open Source Center(www.opensource.gov); Pavel PodvigÕs web-site on Russian strategic nuclear forces(www.russianforces.org); and the Russiaprofile maintained by the James MartinCenter for Nonproliferation Studies for theNuclear Threat Initiative (www.nti.org/country-profiles/russia/nuclear/).

3. The Tu-95MS is equipped with the AS-15Aand the Tu-160 with the AS-15B, which hasa longer range. Depending on aircrafttype, Russian bombers can carry up to 16weapons; hence, it would be possible for 72bombers to be loaded with 820 warheads butonly be attributed 72 warheads under NewSTART.

4. One normally well-informed source saysthere are no nuclear gravity bombs for theTu-95MS and Tu-160 aircraft (Podvig, 2005).

5. There are rumors that the AS-16 may havebeen retired or placed in storage.

6. A US Embassy cable stated in September2009 that Russia had 3,000 to 5,000-plus non-strategic nuclear weapons (Hedgehogs.net,2010), a number that comes close to our esti-mate at the time (Kristensen, 2009). US Prin-cipal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense forPolicy James Miller stated in 2011 thatRussia was estimated to have 2,000 to 4,000nonstrategic nuclear weapons (Miller, 2011).We estimate that the number is at the lowerend of that range with the rest awaitingdismantlement. For a more in-depth over-view of Russian and US nonstrategicnuclear weapons, see Kristensen (2012).Some analysts estimate that Russia has sig-nificantly fewer warheads assigned to non-strategic forces. See, for example, Sutyagin(2012).

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bm—pi‘t hdeq hlqelphblz— nomuepp

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RIA-Novosti (2012) Russian strategic subs to resumeroutine world patrols. February 4. Available at:http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20120204/171127327.html.

RIA-Novosti (2013a) Jmknjeip p LBP PQ26nj‘lhoreqp~ nmpq‘bhq{ l‘ defropqbm b 2015 cmdr

[RS-26 missile scheduled to be put on duty in

2015]. December 18. Available at: http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20131218/984844440.html.

RIA-Novosti (2013b) Later Borey class subs to carryonly 16 missilesÑsource. February 2. Available at:http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20130220/179588098/Later-Borey-Class-Subs-to-Carry-Only-16-Missiles”Source.html.

RIA-Novosti (2013c) RussiaÕs troubled Bulava mis-siles returned to makerÑofficial. September 16.Available at: http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20130916/183500925/Russias-Troubled-Bulava-Missiles-Returned-to-MakerÑOfficial.html.

RIA-Novosti (2013d) Putin says no Iskandersdeployed in Kaliningrad. December 19. Availableat: http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20131219/185723285-print/Putin-Says-No-Iskanders-Deployed-in-Kaliningrad.html.

Russia Today (2013) Russian nuke subs to patrolsouthern seas for first time since Soviet era.June 1. Available at: http://rt.com/news/submar-ines-nuclear-partol-seas-116/.

Russian Aviation (2013) Tupolev design bureau willdevelop an advanced long-range bomber. March 5.Available at: www.ruaviation.com/news/2013/3/5/1552/.

Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (2013) Theminister of defense paid a working visit to PacificFleet troops and forces stationed in Kamchatka.Press Service and Information Directorate, April10. Translation by Open Source Center via WorldNews Connection.

Solms-Laubach F (2013) Putin stationiert Raketen fu¬rAtomsprengko¬pfe [Putin deploys missiles fornuclear warheads]. Bild, December 14. Availableat: www.bild.de/politik/ausland/nuklearwaffe/putin-stationiert-raketen-fuer-atomspreng-koepfe-nahe-polnischer-grenze-33848846.bild.html.

Sutyagin I (2012) Atomic accounting: A newestimate of RussiaÕs non-strategic nuclear forces.Occasional paper. Royal United Services Institute,November. Available at: www.rusi.org/publica-tions/occasionalpapers/ref:O509A82F347BFC/.

Author biographies

Hans M. Kristensen is the director of theNuclear Information Project with the Federa-tion of American Scientists (FAS) in Washing-ton, DC. His work focuses on researching andwriting about the status of nuclear weapons andthe policies that direct them. Kristensen is a co-author of the world nuclear forces overview inthe SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford University Press)

84 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 70(2)

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and a frequent adviser to the news media onnuclear weapons policy and operations. Hehas co-authored Nuclear Notebook since 2001.Inquiries should be directed to FAS, 1725DeSales St. NW, Sixth Floor, Washington, DC20036; (202) 546-3300.

Robert S. Norris is a senior fellow with theFederation of American Scientists in Washing-ton, DC. A former senior research associatewith the Natural Resources Defense Council,his principal areas of expertise include writingand research on all aspects of the nuclear

weapons programs of the United States, theSoviet Union and Russia, the United Kingdom,France, and China, as well as India, Pakistan,and Israel. He is the author of Racing for theBomb: General Leslie R. Groves, the ManhattanProjectÕs Indispensable Man (Steerforth, 2002)and co-author of Making the Russian Bomb:From Stalin to Yeltsin (Westview, 1995).He co-authored or contributed to the chapteron nuclear weapons in the 1985”2000 editionsof the SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford UniversityPress) and has co-authored Nuclear Notebooksince 1987.

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