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1997

Russian Orthodoxy and Human RightsPaul ValliereButler University, pvallier@butler.edu

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Recommended Citation"Russian Orthodoxy and Human Rights," Religious Diversity and Human Rights, ed. Irene Bloom, J. Paul Martin and Wayne L.Proudfoot (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 278-312.

II

RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY

AND HUMAN RIGHTS

PAUL VALLIERE

This essay describes the sitUation and orienration of the Russian Orthodox Church with respect co human tights. Along the broad spectrnm of rights I focus mainly on the civil righrs of individuals and nonstate associarions rarher than the subsistence rights and rightS to social services mat figure so promi­nently in socialisr meories of rights. By this I do not mean co suggest mat me rights wim which socialists are concerned are ofsecondary importance. It is sim­ply a question of accepting me demands of my subject. Ever since me disestab­lishment and disenfranchisemenr of me Russian Onhodox Church as a result of me Russian Revolution the rights wim which the church has been concerned are the rights of individual believers and of the church as an institution. These concerns were stimulated nor by theology or ideology bur by the harsh facts of life in the Soviet petiod: widespread persecution of religious believers and the vittual absence of civil rights respecting teligion. TIle extem to which prerevo­lurionary Russian Onhodoxy may have helped to prepare the ground on which Soviet socialism was built is an issue that exceeds the scope of mis essay.

Whether the Russian Orthodox Church is concerned abour human tights at all has been a matter ofdebate. The view that me church is little more than a tOol in the hands of whatevet state governs Russia at a given rime is wide­spread in the West and may not be much affected by the qualification that "Russian Orthodox Church," in this essay, means not JUSt the hietatchs who represem the church on the national or inrernationallevel but the whole com-

Russian (

pany ofOrthodox believers who accept the as rheir own. But even sympathetic ob: Church would agree rhar the church !has be ical terms, and more subservienr co rhe sta in modem times. In recem years the con example of the Roman Catholic Church 0 lish itself as a kind of surrogate civil socier the zone of Sovier hegemony.

To explain the relarive passivity of the observers have poimed co special charactG ers to the legacy of the tsarisr srare church the church by the Sovier scare in the 1920S imporram, alrhough the last deserves ate, obvious cause of the social and polirical v day Russia.

In 1914 the Russian Orthodox Church' the world after the Roman Catholic Chu churches. Ie supporred 68 dioceses, over deacons and psalmiStS, almost 100,000 ml monasreries, 57 theological seminaries, an The vast majoriry of the Russian empil Ukrainians, and Belarusians as well as sig ples were baptized members of the Orthoe

This huge church was also an insriru reform movemenr had begun in the early acquired new strength after the February I of rhe Patriarchate of Moscow in Noveml two cenruries was rhe signal accomplishmc disestablishmenr of rhe church by decree 0

1918, the dislocations of the civil war and I chy and clergy in rhe early 1920S left the rime Patriarch Tilmon died in 1925. The r allow the church [Q hold a national co deceased parriarch furthet weakened the i alty to the Sovier state in 1927 by me loCI

Merropolitan Sergii, brought rhe churchl a schism in rhe Orthodox community. W1 consumed in the general holocaust of Orthodox Church was one of rhe weakes no head, no diocesan administration, fev very few functioning patishes,

)RTHODOXY

AN RIGHTS

RE

and orientation of the Russian Orthodox hrs. Along the broad spectrum of rights I ndividuals and nons tate associations rather 1m ro social services that figure so promi-By this I do not mean to suggest that the

rned ate ofsecondary importance. It is sim­mds of my subject. Ever since the disestab­: the Russian Orthodox Church as a tesuIr with which the church has been concerned and of the church as an institution. These ology or ideology but by the harsh faCts of I persecution of religious believers and the ing religion. The extent ro which prerevo­lve helped to prepare the ground on which that exceeds the scope of this essay. Church is concerned about human rights le view that the chutch is litde more than e governs Russia at a given rime is wide­: much affected by the qualification that s essay, means nor JUSt the hierarchs who Ot international level but the whole com-

Russian Orthodoxy and Human Rights 279

pany ofOtthodox believers who accept the church of the Patriarch of Moscow as their own. But even sympathetic observers of the Russian Orthodox Chutch would agree that the church has been more passive in social and polit­ical terms, and more subservient to the state than many churches in the West in modern times. In recent yeats the COntrast has been highlighted by the example of the Roman Catholic Church of Poland, which managed to estab­lish itself as a kind ofsurrogate civil society in a Communist state well inside the zone of Soviet hegemony.

To explain the relative passivity of the Russian Orthodox Church some observers have pointed ro special characteristics of Eastern Orthodoxy, oth­ers ro the legacy of the tsarist state church, still others to the btutalization of the church by the Soviet state in the 1920S and 1930S. Each of these faCtors is important, although the last deserves attention first because it is the most obvious cause of the social and political weakness of the church in presenr­day Russia.

In 1914 the Russian Orthodox Church was the largest Christian church in the world after the Roman Catholic Church and the largest of all national churches. It supporred 68 dioceses, over 50,000 priests, more than 60,000 deacons and psalmiSts, almost 100,000 monks and nuns in more than 1,000 monasteties, 57 theological seminaries, and 4 graduate schools of theology. I The vast majority of the Russian empire's 100,000,000 Great Russians, Uktainians, and Belarusians as well as significant numbers of minority peo­ples wete baptized members of the Orthodox Church.

This huge church was also an institution struggling to renew itself. A reform movement had begun in the early yeats of the twentieth century and acquired new strengrh after the February Revolution of 1917. The restoration of the Patriarchate of Moscow in November 1917 afrer a lapse of more than two centuties was the signal accomplishmenr of the movement. However, the disestablishment of rhe church by decree of rhe Sovier government in January 1918, rhe dislocations of rhe civil war and the violent repression of rhe hierar­chyand clergy in rhe early 1920S left the church in a stare of disttess by the time Parriarch Tikhon died in 1925. The refusal of the Sovier governmenr to allow the church to hold a national council to elect a successor to the deceased patriarch furrher weakened the instirution. The declaration of loy­alty to the Soviet state in 1927 by the locum tenens of the patriarchal office, Metropolitan Sergii, brought the church no secular benefits and precipitated a schism in the Orthodox community. What remained of the institution was consumed in the genetal holocaUSt of the 1930S. By 1939 the Russian Orthodox Church was one of the weakest churches in Christendom. It had no head, no diocesan administtation, few ptiests or bishops at liberty, and very few functioning parishes.

280 Paul Valliere

The revival of the Russian Orthodox Church began during World War II. It was a spontaneous phenomenon at the local level as well as the result of the warrime government policy of fostering traditional Russian patriotism. Metropolitan Sergii was elected pattiarch by a small meeting of bishops in 1943, and after Sergii's death in 1945 Metropolitan Aleksii of Leningrad was chosen to teplace him. Diocesan adminisrration was rescoted, and a few the­ological schools and monasteries were reconstimted. The rescored church was not comparable in size, much less in power, to the prerevolutionary church. 2 Nevertheless, the posrwar simation represented a dramatic change fot the better.

Unforrunately the church's gains proved vulnerable co the caprices of Communist policymakers. In the early 1960s the Khrushchev government launched a new antireligious campaign that led ro the closing of about half the patishes reopened during the war. After Khrushchev's fall in 1964 the govern­ment disconrinued the campaign but did not resrore what had been wrested from the church. In this sense the campaign was a vicrory for the state. Howevet, it produced an unintended and unprecedented side effect; the Orrhodox rights movement.

The Orthodox rights movement is a natural focal point for the discussion of Russian Otthodoxy and human rights. However, co appreciate the sigifi­cance of the movement one must consider the ecclesiastical and civil contexts in which it arose. The ecclesiastical context was shaped by Eastern Orthodox tradition. The civil context was shaped by Soviet law.

ORTHODOX TRADITION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Historically Eastern Orthodox tradition has been less disposed to defending human rights than Roman Catholic or classical Protestant traditions. ihe Roman Catholic Church, while often antagonistic ro individual liberty, has always defended its rights as an international ecclesiastical polity standing above secular polities and having cerrain claims on them. The church's claims serve co limit the power of the state ovet persons in Roman Catholic coun­tries. Protestantism. while lacking the international structure and legalist genius of the Roman Catholic Church, provides a hospitable ground for the cultivation of rightS by according individual conscience a central tole in the religious value system. The configuration of values in Eastern Orthodoxy shares something with both Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, but not those aspects that most prompt an intetest in rights. Like Roman Cathol­icism, Eastern Orchodoxy propounds a highly corporate and sacramental view of salvation and so does not encourage individualism on religious grounds.

Russian (

Like Protestantism, however, Eastern Orth ChriStianity is a religion of grace, not lao counter-secular legalism of Roman Catho: concepmality less promising for the cultiva Western Christian ttaditions.

Yet it would be wrong CO deny the possil in Eastern Orthodoxy. Like all great faith concepts of human dignity which can at II sarily generate, the idea of human tights. F historic challenges people often find new n while some of the most important ideals individuals from viewing themselves as til munity, and discourage the community fr the state. these ideals did not prevent a livel: developing in the very untraditional circur

The Orthodox view of the relation of th been profoundly shaped by the ideal ofwhc vation in Christ comes about through in community, the church or "body of Christ inition through its liturgy, dogmas, and cal mystical wholeness which these forms ate "the church" means the whole company whole of humankind and reconcile it wid word for this wholeness is sobornost'. It COl

"Conciliarity" and "catholicity" are speci, the term. Sobor also means "cathedral," wI ture of sobornos( One imagines a crowd of of life gathered for liturgy under the do unfolds, the choral music, the colorful icoI

incense and wax and the hieratic vestment clergy conspire to induce a powerful sense sating whole. Indeed, the Orthodox litu sobornost'; it actualizes it.

Orthodox thinkers are careful to disting egalitarianism. They see the church as a CI

unique contriburion to make to the whol close to sobornost' in the Otthodox hier;! example, in the group porrraits of traditiQI typically accords ro each individual some d fure, exptession, posture, or function. 5 ihe the laity ample opportunity to ditecr their:

I

)dox Chutch began during World War II. at the local level as well as the result of

. fostering traditional Russian patriotism. ltriarch by a small meeting of bishops in ~5 Metropolitan Aleksii of Leningrad was Iministration was restored, and a few the­""ere reconstituted. The restored church 1 less in power, to the prerevolutionary situation represented a dramatic change

I1S ptoved vulnerable to the caprices of ~arly 1960s the Kbrushchev government gn that led to the closing ofabout half the .frer Khrushchev's fall in 1964 the govern­lt did not restore what had been wrested ~ campaign was a victory for the state. :led and unprecedented side effect; the

is a natural focal point for the discussion rights. Howevet, to appreciate the sigifi­I1sider the ecclesiastical and civil COntextS ;ontext was shaped by Eastern Orrhodox ed by Soviet law.

fAN RrGHTS

:ion has been less disposed to defending : or classical Protestant traditions. The n antagonistic to individual liberty, has ~rnational ecclesiastical polity standing ain claims on them. The church's claims over persons in Roman Catholic coun­:he international structure and legaliSt ;h, provides a hospitable ground for the iividual conscience a central role in the ration of values in Eastern Orthodoxy ::::atholicism and Protesrantism, but not nterest in rights. like Roman Cathol­a highly corporate and sacramental view .ge individualism on religious grounds.

Russian Orrhodoxy and Human Rights 1.81

Like Protestantism, however, Eastern Orthodoxy never tires ofpreaching that Christiani ty is a religion of grace, not law, for which reason it rejects the coumer-secular legalism of Roman Catholicism.3 The result is a theological conceptuality less promising fOt the CUltivation of rights rhan one finds in the Westetn Christian tradirions.

Yet it would be wrong to deny the possibility of a rights orien tation arising in Eastetn Orthodoxy. Like all great faith tradirions, Orthodoxy comprises concepts of human dignity which can at least sUppOrt, if they do not neces­sarily generate, the idea of human rights. Furthermore, under the pressure of historic challenges people often find new meaning in traditional ideals. Thus, while some of the most important ideals of Orthodoxy tend to discourage individuals from viewing themselves as rights-bearers over against the com­munity, and discourage the community from viewing itself as distinct from the state, these ideals did not prevent a lively Orthodox rights movemem from developing in the very untraditional circumstances of the Soviet Union.

The Orthodox view of the telation of the individual to the community has been profoundly shaped by the ideal ofwholeness. In the Orthodox vision sal­vadon in Christ comes about through incorporation intO his sactamental community, the church or "body ofChrisr." The church achieves public def­inition through its liturgy, dogmas, and canons; but its essential quality is rhe mystical wholeness which these forms are meant ro embody. For Orrhodoxy "the church" means the whole company of saints seeking to embrace the whole of humankind and reconcile it with the whole cosmos.4 The Russian word for this wholeness is sobornost'. It comes from a root meaning "gather." "Conciliarity" and "catholici ty" are specialized ecclesiastical translations of the term. Sobol' also means "cathedral," which suggests perhaps the best pic­ture of sobornost'. One imagines a crowd of worshipers of all ages and srations of life gathered for liturgy under the dome of a cathedral. As the liturgy unfolds, the choral music, the colorful icons of saints and angels. the smell of incense and wax and the hieratic vestments, postures, and processions of the clergy conspire to induce a powerful sense of incorporation into a great, pul­sating whole. Indeed, the Orthodox liturgy offers more than a picture of sobornost'; it actualizes it.

Orthodox thinkers are careful to distinguish sobornost' from collectivism or egalitarianism. They see [he church as a community of persons, each with a unique contribution to make to the whole. Lichnost', "personhood," stands close to sobornost' in [he Orthodox hierarchy of values. It is reflected, for example, in the group portraits of traditional iconography in which the artist typically accotds to each individual some distinguishing feature of dress, coif­fure, expression, posture, or function. 5 The structure of the liturgy, roo, offers the laity ample opportunity to direct their attention to individual needs, con­

282 Paul Valliere

cems, and sources of inspirarion. Srill, in classical Orthodoxy rhe individual is nor regarded as the telos of the communiry. The idea of lichnost' suggesrs per­sonalism bur nor individualism. To rhe Orrhodox mind rhe whole appears grearer, more esrimable, more secure than rhe parts. G The rendency of Orthodox thinkers is to synrhesize, nor analyze; w integrate, not isolate. This is especially true of modern Orthodox thinkers, who have had w defend the Orthodox er1lOs againsr material and spiritual threats from the Wesr. 7 Most Russian Orthodox thinkers in modern rimes, such as Khomiakov, l(jreevsky, Dosroevsky, Leonriev, Fyodorov, and Solzhenirsyn, have held a community based on sobornost' and lichnost', wholeness and personhood, ro be ethicaHy superior to a community based on rhe social contract and individual righrs. Hand in hand wirh this view went a "tradirion of rhe censure oflaw" in Russia, an ami-legal prej udice which inevitably impeded the development of modern conceprions of human righrs.8

If the ideal of wholeness discouraged individuals from viewing themselves aparr from rhe community, ir also made the Orthodox Church slow to dis­ringuish itself from the state. The polirical dependency of the churches in the Orthodox Easr conrrasts sharply with the partern of chutch-State relarions rhat developed in the West. Since rhe Reform Papacy of the eleventh century the Roman Catholic Church has defined itself juridically as a countersrate or supers rate distincr from secular sovereignties. While Rome was by no means always successful in enforcing irs claims, the ideal wok root. Also, r11e need to arbirtare between ecclesiasrical and secular sovereignties was one of the chief morivarions for rhe development of law in the West, including rhe language and methodology of rights. Among rhe theological disciplines canon law played a particuJarly dynamic role. In the Orthodox Easr, by contrast, the par­tern of church-Stare relarions wok shape much earlier, in the fourth and fifth centuries, and embodied rhe ideal of harmony (sympho7lia) rather than dual­ism. Church and srate were seen not as competing jurisdictions but as twO aspecrs, sacramental and lay, ofan organic whole. The ideal left litrle room for concepts of conflict or propheric rension between church and srare. Canon law was a conservative discipline.

To be sure, there were conflicts between church and stare in rhe Chtistian East, including fierce confrontations such as the Iconoclastic controversy in eighth-century Byzanrium and the Schism (Rasko/) in seventeenth-centuty Muscovy. But these episodes did nor inspire creative new concepts of church­stare relations. The chief effect of the Russian Schism, for example, was ro weaken the established church and cause it w accept an even more subservient role in the Russian state system on the eve of modern rimes.

The ascerical ideal also presents an obstacle ro a righrs orientarion in Orthodoxy. The mosr esreemed form of religious virruosity in Orthodoxy is

Russian (

nor thar of rhe prophetic emissary, milirar bur rhat of rhe monk. The monk is a kind individualism is inspired by rhe call ro leave ideal played a fareful role in the srrucru Orthodoxy the parish cletgy are mostly m monks. While this arrangement has its ad\ not been the divisive issue in Orthoda Catholicism), ir has unquesrionably limi mobilize in defense of the secular rights of d too enmeshed in rhe economic and familial lenge it in rhe name of the nexr.

The hierarchy, on the orher hand, while I the government of rhe chutch in "this" wod this responsibility in posirive retms. Pracrie expense of the church, so to speak, Orthoe oppression by secular authorities as a rest < Commenting on this informal "cooperati< Vladimir Zelinsky rightly observes that "in the will as such but precisely a zealous pief} less submissiveness."9

Along with a weak parish clergy went a Russia the Orthodox parish was a sleepy, unl much a part of irs environmenr. Religious , cally identical. The local priest usually inhe wife's buher. The concepr of the patish as a sionary mobilization rarely arose, and the (I

tary association did nor arise at all. These ide period, too, although for the opposite reason were wo shatply divorced. Because gathering prohibited, people who prayed wgether had I talk together. Also, since open churches were shipers usually did not ger w know each od Orthodox parish became an impersonal ane fervent piety which no observer could fail w

The ideal of national religious establishm sivity of rhe Orthodox Church roward the establishment dulled the church's awareness cap rive of the srate sysrem. The Russian Revc ment bur nor rhe culrural and ecclesiastical day mosr Russian Orrhodox clergy and laiC) church. Russian Orthodox people do nor thin

till, in classical Orthodoxy the individual is nmunity. The idea of lichnost' suggests per­10 the Orthodox mind the whole appears ecure than the parrs. 6 The tendency of > not analyze; ro integrate, not isolate. This dox thinkers, who have had ro defend the nd spiritual threats from the West'? Most iern times, such as Khomiakov, Kireevsky, nd Solzhenitsyn, have held a community 'holeness and personhood, ro be ethically me social contraCt and individual rights. "tradition of the censure oflaw" in Russia, ably impeded the development of modern

aged individuals from viewing themselves made the Orthodox Chutch slow to dis­olirical dependency of the churches in the ,ith the parrern of church-state relations le Reform Papacy of me eleventh century :fined itself juridically as a counterState or ereignties. While Rome was by no means ims, rhe ideal rook root. Also, rhe need ro secular sovereignties was one of the chief Flaw in the West, including the language 19 the theological disciplines canon law n rhe Orthodox East, by COntrast, the pat­hape much earlier, in the fourth and fifth ,f harmony (symphonia) rather than dual­Jt as competing jurisdictions bur as two 'ganic whole. The ideal left little room for nsion between church and state. Canon

erween chutch and state in the Christian s such as rhe Iconoclastic Controversy in Schism (Raskol) in seventeenth-century inspire creative new concepts of chuTch­

he Russian Schism, for example, was to lUse it ro accept an even more subservient le eve of modern times.

; an obstacle to a righrs orien ration in n of religious virtuosity in Orthodoxy is

Russian Orthodoxy and Human Rights 283

not that of the prophetic emissary, militant reformer, crusader, or preacher, but that of the monk. The monk is a kind of religious individualist, but his individualism is inspired by the call ro leave the world, not transform it. This ideal played a fateful role in the structuring of the Orthodox clergy. In Orthodoxy the parish clergy are mostly married men, bur bishops must be monks. While mis arrangement has its advantages (e.g., clerical celibacy has nor been the divisive issue in Orthodoxy rhat it has been in Roman Catholicism), ir has unquestionably limited the capacity of rhe clergy to mobilize in defense of the secular rights of the church. Parish priests have been too enmeshed in the economic and familial nerworks of "this" world ro chal­lenge it in the name of the next.

The hierarchy, on the orher hand, while bearing the chief responsibility for the government of the church in "this" world, has all roo often failed ro value this responsibility in positive rerms. Practicing ascetical renunciation at the expense of the church, so ro speak, Orthodox hierarchs have often accepted oppression by secular authorities as a test of parience rather than of power. Commenting on rhis informal "cooperation of tradition and oppression," Vladimir Zelinsky righcly observes that "in Orthodoxy it is not weakness of the will as such but precisely a zealous piety thar demands a spirit of bound­less submissiveness."9

Along with a weak parish clergy went a weak parish srructure. In tsarist Russia rhe Orthodox parish was a sleepy, unpropheric place because it was roo much a part of irs environment. Religious and social community were basi­cally identical. The local priest usually inherited his position from his or his wife's father. The concept of the parish as a unit of social, political, or mis­sionary mobilization rarely arose, and rhe concept of the church as a volun­tary association did not arise at all. These ideas were absent during the Soviet period, roo, although for the opposite reason; religious and social community were too sharply divorced. Because gatherings of believers outside liturgy were prohibited, people who prayed together had little opportunity ro work or even talk together. Also, since open churches were few, tar apart, and crowded, wor­shipers usually did not get to know each other or their clergy very well. The Orthodox parish became an impersonal and diffuse community despite the fervent piety which no observer could fail ro note. 10

The ideal of national religious establishment also contributed to the pas­sivity of the Orthodox Church toward the state. In tsarist Russia religious establishment dulled rhe church's awareness of the extent to which it was a captive of the srare system. The Russian Revolution swepr away the establish­ment bur nor the cultural and ecclesiastical mentality underlying it. 10 this day most Russian Orthodox clergy and laity cherish the ideal of a national church. Russian Orthodox people do not think of rheir church as one denom­

284 PauL VaLLiere

ination Q[ sect among othets but as the Chmch of Russia. a chmch whose des­tiny is tied to that of the Russian people. II This view disposes the O[[hodox community co be more patiem with the Russian people and theit state than religious groups that see themselves as a prophetic minority.

The cominuing hold of an establishmemarian, amisectarian memality helps co explain some of the episodes of accommodation co the state in the Soviet period beginning with Metropolitan Sergii's declaration of loyalty in 1927. Fathet Joh n Meyendorff has wri[[en abom this comroversial event:

The goal of Metropolitan Sergii was TO preserve not himself, but the church. with

all its liturgical order, buildings and central administrative organs. He consciously

refused co limit his thinking to "the salvation of the minority. not the majority," as

was done by Bishop Damaskin and others who went "underground." In his view

the Church-wirh its essential apostolic succession in the episcopate and its (some­

times burdensome) heritage of divine services, theology and canons-could not

exist for long as a secr. The historical example of the Russian Old Believers had

confirmed this. 12

Such an imerpretation of the chutch's accommodation co the state is more satisfying than one focusing on political terrOr, moral cowardice, or the infJ­rration of the hierarchy by state agents, for it takes the Orthodox value system imo accoum. Metropolitan Sergli was speaking about Orthodoxy, not other churches, when he asserted that "only impractical dreamers can rhink that such an immense community as our Orthodox Church, with all its organiza­tions, may peacefully exist in this country while hiding itself from the gov­ernment." 13 One may question the wisdom ofMerropolitan Sergii's policy on tactical grounds, for it brought the church no real gains. Bur one can scarcely fault the Orthodox Church for trying co remain itself.

At the same time, the ideal of a national church can make a positive con­tribution co the consciousness of rights in a country co rhe extent that it fos­ters a sense of legitimacy on the part of the religious community. The sense of legitimacy is typically long-lasting. To pUt it another way. if rhe negative side of Orthodox patience is passiviry in the face of oppression, the posirive side is endurance. Despite decades of Communist propaganda and repres­sion, countless Russians petsist in the conviCtion thar the Onhodox Church has a righ rful place in their land and a self-evident claim co itS alienated monuments. These people may not express theit view in legalistic terms. Moreover, the tights at stake are not generalizable: we might call them "his­roric rights" rather than "human rights." Nevertheless, the view that Orthodoxy has rights in the Russian land is a key facrot in the behavior of the Orthodox Church in present-day Russia and was also an important, if

Russian I

ambiguous, resource for the Soviet huma! discussion of hiscoric rights later.

SOVIET LAw ON RELIGION

On Occober I, [990, the Supreme Soviet 0

of the USSR adopted a new law on r, Conscience and Religious Organizatior Supreme Soviet of the Russian tepublic (J oflegislarion, the Law on Fteedom of Rei overturned previous Soviet legislation on rc of Russian Orthodoxy and human tights musr examine the earlier legislation.

Soviet law on religion embodied two c vidual believers had rights; chutches ar Second, the right of believets co ptactice d of rituaL

These principles stood our clearly in rh teligion. the decree of the Soviet of People Church from the State and the Schools fj

The dectee revoked ali civil restricrions c and mandated rhar "in all official docume! gious affl1iation or nonaffiliation shall be right co "confess any religion or profess no gious rires ... as long as it does nor disturl rights of citizens of rhe Soviet Republic," religious instruction privately."

Religious associations, however, wete de privileges connected with religious establ oaths, sancrification of public ceremonies births. The decree bar ted teligious associa nizing schools, and going co law. It stated religious associacions "do not have the rig!

The only concession concetned access I

"Buildings and objects intended especiall} over, by special decision of the local or cel of charge for use co responsible teligious appeared in the article nationalizing the (Article (3) it clearly meant ro distinguish the article left the granring of use of srare {

the Church of Russia, a church whose des­leople. 11 This view disposes rhe Orrhodox :h rhe Russian people and rheir srare rhan ; as a propheric minoriry. ablishmenrarian, anrisecrarian mentaliry des of accommodarion ro the srare in rhe :opoliran Sergii's declararion of loyalty in ~rinen aboUT rhis comroversial evem:

to preserve nOt himself, but the church, with

entral administrative organs. He consciollsly

Jvation of the minority, not the majority," as

,chers who went "underground." In his view

ic succession in the episcopate and its (some­

: services, theology and canons-could not

I example of the Russian Old Believers had

Irch's accommodation ro the state is more tical terror, moral cowardice, Ot the infil­ltS, for it takes the Orthodox value system 'as speaking about Orthodoxy, not Other nly impracrical dreamers can think thar Onhodox Church, with all irs organiza­

Dunrry while hiding itself from the gov­l'isdom of Metropolitan Sergii's policy on hurch no real ga..ins. Bur one can scarcely g [Q remain itsel£

ational church can make a positive con­hts in a counuy ro rhe exrem rhat it fos­t of the religious community. The sense g. To pUt it anOther way, if the negative y in the face of oppression, the positive of Communist propaganda and repres­e convicrion rhar rhe Orrhodox Church ild a self-evidem claim ro irs aliena red [ express rheir view in legalis ric rerms. generalizable: we mighr call rhem "his­righrs." Neverrheless, the view rhar land is a key factor in the behavior of

y Russia and was also an imporranr, if

Russian Orrhodoxy and Human Righrs 285

ambiguous, resource for rhe Soviet human righrs movemenr. I re£urn to rhe discussion of histOric righrs larer.

SOV1ET LAw ON RELIGION

On October I, 1990, rhe Supreme Soviet of the Congress of People's Depuries of rhe USSR adopred a new law on religion, rhe Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations. Larer in the same momh rhe Supreme Sovier of the Russian republic (RSFSR) passed a comparable piece of legislarion, rhe Law on Freedom of Religion. 14 These fWO laws complerely ovenumed previous Sovier legislarion on religion. To understand the situation of Russian Onhodoxy and human rights in the Soviet period, however, one must examine rhe earlier legislation.

Soviet law on religion embodied fWO cardinal principles. First, only indi­vidual believers had rights; churches and religious associarions did nor. Second, the right of believers to pracrice their religion was limited to the area of ritual.

These principles srood out clearly in the first piece of Soviet legislation on religion, the decree of the Sovier of People's Commissars on Separation of the Church from the State and the Schools from rhe Church of January X9t8.15 The decree revoked all civil restricrions connected with religious affdiarion and mandated thar "in all official documents every memion of a citizen's reli­gious affiliation or nonaffiliarion shall be removed." It granted cirizens rhe right to "confess any religion or profess none at all," "free performance of reli­gious rires ... as long as it does nor dismrb public order or infringe upon the rights of citizens of the Soviet Republic," and the right "ro receive and give religious insuuction privarely."

Religious associations, however, were denied vinually all righ tS, not just the privileges connected with religious establishment such as adminisrration of oaths, sanctification of public ceremonies, and registrarion of marriages and births. The decree barred religious associations from holding properry, orga­nizing schools, and going to law. It stated categorically that ecclesiasrical and religious associations "do not have the rights of a legal entiry."

The only concession concerned access ro property designed for rimal use: "Buildings and objecrs inrended especially for religious rites shall be handed over, by special decision of rhe local or cenrral governmental authorities, free of charge for use to responsible religious associations." Since this provision appeared in rhe arricle narionalizing the properry of religious associations (Article 13) it clearly meanr ro distinguish use from ownership. Moreover, as the article leEr rhe gran ring of use of STare property ro rhe "special decision" of

I

286 Paul Valliere

the state authorities, it could scarcely be interpreted [Q imply a firm right ro such use. Finally, the use of stare properry by believers was granted specifically for the performance of rituals. Social service, missionary work, political action, religious publishing, and orher rypes of religious activiry outside the rirual sphere were nor menrioned at all.

It is inreresring to note that rhe decree of the Soviet of People's Commissars made no mention of atheism. The righr ro profess no religion covers the case of atheism but extends also to agnosticism, free-thinking, and deism. Furthermore, the decree did not accord special privileges to nonbelievers or systems of nonbelief. Yet atheism played an integral role in the formation and evolution of the Soviet Union as an ideological state, and eventually it fouod a privileged place in Soviet fundamental Jaw. The constitution of 1977, con­tinuing in rhe rradition of its predecessor (1936), granted a kind of establish­menr to arheism in so far as it accorded the leading role in Soviet sociery ro "the Communist Parry atmed with Marxist-Leninist doctrine" (Article 6).16 It also gtanted an advantage to atheists in the marter of propagating their faith: "Freedom of conscience is guaranteed to citizens of the USSR, that is, the right to confess any teligion or to confess none at all, ro perform religious cults or ro conduct atheistic propaganda" {Article 52).17 In othet words, atheists had a constitutional right to spread their wotd; believers did not.

The most detailed piece of legislation on religion in the Soviet period was the Law on Religious Associations of 1929.18 The law introduced the distinc­tive mechanism for the regulation of teligion in the Sovier Union, the dvadt­satka, or "group of !Wenry." The decree of January 1918 provided that build­ings and cult objects could be handed over for use ro "tesponsible religious associations." The problem for the state was how to implement this policy without appeating to extend tecognition or privileges to actual ecclesiasrical instirutions, such as conciliar bodies, the patriarch, bishops, assemblies of clergy or patish councils. The Law on Religious Associations came up with a solution: the authotities at the ciry or district level would lend state property (Q groups of nor fewer than !Wenry believets who accepted formal registration as a religious association and responsibiliry for the property temporarily entrusted to them. The dvadtsatka was an ad hoc group, nor a corporate body. The rights oflegal entiry and the right of assembly without the permission of the local authoriries were denied ro it. Needless to say, the dvadtsatka did nor correspond to the canonical inStitutions ofany chutch. Strictly speaking, with the introduction of the dvadtsatka the Russian Orthodox parish as well as all ecclesiastical institutions beyond rhe parish level ceased to exist as entities enjoying recognition or protection under public law.

As long as state policy aimed at the destruction of the church me Law on Religious Associations corresponded ro realiry and assisted the implementa-

Russian I

tion of policy. The change of ditection d duced a contradicrory situation. The Rus and even encouraged ro reconstitute itsel canons. On the local level this meant the clerical rector at its head. The regulations (i.e., Narional) Council of [he Russian ( acknowledged the dvadtsatka but stipllia head i[.19 The "religious association" of192 not with the sanction of Soviet law.

The contradiction lasted until the Kill rhe religious settlement of the war years. ] the Russian Orthodox Church approved chairmanship and membership of parish ( from parish government.20 The bishops ( well as relieving priem of burdensome seCl fot pastotal work. In facr the hierarchs wer a strict interptetation of the dvadtsatka 01 1971, the fusr national council of the chur the arrangements of 1961, nor did the am Associations in 1975 change it in any f Gorbachev reforms of the mid-198os was that Soviet law on religion needed ro be cl

THE ORTHODOX RIGHTS MOVEMENT

The Orthodox tights movement was pan ment and developed along parallel lines. ment dates from the Consticution Day dl Square on Decembet 15, 1965, by intelli! wtitets Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuly Daniel. for the accused. The protesters believed tI be!Ween the lener of Soviet law and its "RespeCt the Soviet Constitution!" was th

On the same day the Orthodox righrs ter ro N. V Podgotny, chairman of the Pre USSR, written by rhe Moscow ptiests GI The priests ptesented a detailed brief alleg gion by the state authorities. Two days ea Patriarch Neksii I arguing their case in thl both letters to the entire Russian Orthodo

ly be interpreted ro imply a firm tighr to 'perty by believers was granted specifically ,cial service, missionary work, political her types of religious activity omside the all.

:cree of the Sovier of People's Commissars ight ro profess no religion covers the case gnosticism, free-thinking, and deism. cord special privileges to nonbelievers or lyed an inregral role in rhe formation and ideological stare, and evemually it found ~mallaw. The consriturion of 1977, con­;essor (1936), gramed a kind of establish­rded the leading role in Soviet society ro ~arxist-Leninisr doctrine" (Article 6).16 Ir ; in the marrer of propagaring their faith: :ed to cirizens of the USSR, rhar is, the lfess none at all, [0 perform religious culrs :Arricle 52).17 In other words, atheists had word; believers did nor. tion on religion in the Soviet period was f 1929.18 The law imroduced the distinc­. religion in the Soviet Union, rhe dvadt­:ree of January 1918 provided that build­ed over fOt use to "responsible teligious stare was how to implemem rhis policy ition or privileges to actual ecclesiastical :s, the patriarch, bishops, assemblies of n Religious Associations came up with a r district level would lend state property dievers who accepted formal registration msibility fot the property temporarily LS an ad hoc group, not a corporate body. It ofassembly withom the petmission of :. Needless ro say, the dvadtsatka did not lOS ofany church. Srricdy speaking, with e Russian Orrhodox parish as well as all e parish level ceased to exist as emities lder public law. le destruction of me chutch me Law on ro teality and assisred the implemema-

Russian Orrhodoxy and Human Rights 287

tion of policy. The change of direction during the war years, however, pro­duced a conrradictoty siwation. The Russian Orrhodox Church, permirred and even encouraged ro reconsriwte itself, naturally followed its tradirional canons. On rhe local level rhis meanr rhe reconsriwrion of the patish wim a cletical rector ar its head. The regulations on parish life adopred by the Local (i.e., Narional) Council of the Russian Orrhodox Church in January 1945 acknowledged the dvadtsatka bur stipulared that the clerical rector should head ir. 19 The "religious association" of1929 became a "parish society," rho ugh not wirh the sanction of Soviet law. .

The comradiction lasred umil rhe Khrushchev persecution, which undid the teligious setrlement of the war years. In July 1961 a council of bishops of me Russian Orrhodox Church approved me elimination of me clergy from chairmanship and membership of parish councils, effecrively removing mem from parish governmenr. 20 The bishops claimed to be remedying abuses as well as relieving priests ofburdensome secular duties ro allow them more time for pasroral work. In fact rhe hierarchs were bowing (0 state pressure ro resrore a strict interptetarion of the dvadtsatka of 1929. The All-Russian Council of 1971, me first national council of the church held after 1945, did not abrogate the arrangements of 1961, nor did the anlendmems [0 me Law on Religious Associations in 1975 change it in any fundamental way.2! Nor until the Gorbachev reforms of the mid-198os was there a him in any official source that Soviet law on religion needed [0 be changed.

THE ORTHODOX RIGHTS MOVEMENT

The Orthodox rights movemem was part of the Soviet human rights move­ment and developed along parallel lines. 22 The Soviet human rights move­ment dates ftom the Constitlltion Day demonsuation in Moscow's Pushkin Square on Decembet 15, 1965, by intelligentsia protesting the arrest of rhe writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuly Daniel. The key demand was a public trial for me accused. The protesters believed that publicity would expose me gap between the letter of Soviet law and its adminiStration by the authorities. "Respect the Soviet Constiwtion!" was the slogan of the day.23

On the same day me Orrhodox rights movement surfaced in an open let­ter ro N. V Podgorny, chairman of the Ptesidium of the Supteme Soviet of me USSR, written by the Moscow priests Gleb Yakunin and Nikolai Eshliman. The priests ptesented a detailed btief alleging violations of Soviet law on reli­gion by me state authorities. Two days earlier the ptiests had sem a lerret ro Patriarch Aleksii I atguing meir case in theological terms. They sem copies of both lerrets to the entire Russian Ormodox hierarchy.24 While there had been

288 Paul Valliere

other protests by Orthodox clergy and lairy in 1965 regarding rhe state of affairs produced by the Khrushchev persecution, the witness of Yakunin and Eshliman was especially important because of its connection with the wider Soviet human rights movement.

The number ofclergy and lairy involved in the Orthodox rights movement was small. It was a movement of heroic individuals, as was the Soviet human rights movement generally. As for the hierarchs, they made a practice of dis­ciplining activist clergy and keeping their distance from dissident laity.25 Yakunin and Eshliman, for example, were removed from their parishes and banned from exercising priestly office (although nor defrocked) following the open letters of 1965.

There were numerous links between rhe Orthodox acrivists and the wider human righrs movement. The first human rights organization in the Soviet Union, the Initiative Group for rhe Defense of Human Rights in rhe USSR, formed in 1969, counted the Orthodox lay hisrorian Anaroly Levitin-Krasnov among irs founders. The Committee for Human Righrs in rhe USSR, formed in 1970 by Valery Chalidze and others, rook a lively interest in religious rightS cases.26 Orthodox publicists contributed frequently ro the samizdat literature in which the Soviet dissident intelligentsia conducted irs debares. 27 The grear­esr publicisr of the period, the Orthodox layman Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, publicly embraced rhe Orthodox rights movement in his "Lenten Letter" to

Patriarch Pi men in 1972. The leuer appeared in rhe Wesrern press shortly after Solzhenirsyn's first major interview wirh Western reporters in many years in March 1972.28 The interview marked the beginning of the explosive period of Solzhenitsyn's acrivism, culminating in the publication of The Gulag

Archipelago in December 1973 and his expulsion from the Sovier Union rhe following February.

The Moscow Helsinki Warch Group, which announced its program in May 1976, found its Orthodox counterparr in the Chrisrian Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Religious Believers in the USSR, although Orthodox Christians were also to be found in the leadership of rhe Helsinki Group. The Christian Committee, founded in December 1976 by Father Gleb Yakunin and orhers, was a watch group specializing in religious cases. 29

Irs interdenominarional concern wirh the rights of all believers, not jusr Orthodox, reflected the extent to which rhe Orthodox rights movement had been shaped by the general human righrs movement. The Chrisrian Committee also followed rhe lead of the Helsinki Group in promoting the internarionalization of the struggle for human rights on rhe basis of the Helsinki accords of1975. In October of that year Father Yakunin and the lay church hisrorian Lev Regelson addressed an open letter to rhe delegates of the Fifth Assembly of the World Council of Churches meeting in Nairobi

Russian

in which rhey put forward the idea of aJ gious rights, in essence the idea that the to serve a year later. 30

During the repressions of the late 19 rights movement suffered the same fate ment. The attack on the leadership of tI arrest of many of itS founding members il ing Yury Orlov, Anatoly Shcharansky an Ginzburg. The repression of the Christian invasion of Afghanistan and the exile < (December 1979-January 1980). Fath, November 1979, and most of rhe other Ie, months. In 1980 Yakunin was sentenced r< years of internal exile.

The association of the Orthodox righ righrs movement was nOt JUSt pragmatic I ology. The distinguishing characterisric of in contrasr to other dissident tendencies ( mount concern wirh law and the culrivati ery. In the words of Pavel Litvinov the m<

not only a rebirth of goodness and mercy. bl

society. For rhe firsr time rhe incelligencsia rf

in spire of all its imperFections, is a fundamcn

dignity as citizens, on paper deFends human

discovered a powerful lever ofsocial transFocn

attencion of rhe Soviet bureaucracy as well as

the lack ofconFormity berween rhe conduct (

Soviet legislation, and also to rhe many inre

human rights which the Soviet Union has ral

execution as ro its own international reputatj

The same attention [Q law was typical Yakunin and Eshliman's bter ro Podgorr the earliesr examples of the new legal cons rer protesred the policies of the Council fe of the Council of Ministers of the USSI supervision of rhe Orthodox Church.32 T policies violated borh the principles and I

gion. In the introduction to the letter, f council for condu(."ting most of its busine

Y' and laity in 1965 regarding the state of v persecution, the witness of Yakunin and . because of its connection with the wider

nvolved in the Onhodox rights movement :coic individuals, as was the Soviet human

the hierarchs, they made a practice of dis­ing their diStance from dissident laity.25

Ie, wete removed from their parishes and ice (although not defrocked) following the

veen the Orthodox activists and the wider . human rights organization in the Soviet : Defense of Human Rights in the USSR, dox lay historian Anaroly Levitin-Krasnov :e for Human Rights in the USSR, fOtmed ers, took a lively interest in teligious rights )uted frequently to the samizdat litera~ure

~entsia conducted its debates.27 The great­"thodox layman Aleksandr Solzhenirsyn, 19hts movement in his "Lenten Letter" to

ilppeared in the Western ptess shordy after with Western reporters in many years in d the beginning of the explosive period of ring in the publication of The Gulag his expulsion from the Soviet Union the

;roup, which announced its program in nterpart in the Christian Committee for gious Believers in the USSR, although 'e found in the leadership of the He'1sinki

:, founded in December 1976 by Father ch group specializing in religious cases. 29

.vith the rights of all believers, no t just hich the Orthodox rights movement had nan rights movement. The Christian of the Helsinki Group in promotililg the Ie for human rights on the basis of the :r of that year Fathet Yakunin and the lay .ressed an open letter to the delegates of :ouncil of Churches meeting in Nairobi

Russian Orthodoxy and Human Rights 289

in which they pUt forward the idea of an interchurch effort to defend reli­gious rights, in essence the idea that the Christian Committee was formed to serve a year la ter.30

During the repressions of the late 1970S and early 1980s the Orthodox rights movement suffered the same fate as the general human rights move­ment. The attack on the leadership of the Helsinki Group began with the arrest of many of its founding members in February and March 1977, includ­ing Yury Orlov, Anatoly Shcharansky and the Orthodox layman Aleksandr Ginzburg. The repression of the Christian Committee began on the eve of the invasion of AfghaniStan and the exile of Andrei Sakharov from Moscow

(December 1979-January 1980). Father Gleb Yakunin was arrested in November 1979, and most of the other leaders were detained in the following

months. In 1980 Yakunin was sentenced to five years in prison followed by five years of internal exile.

The association of the Orthodox rights aCtivists with the general human rights movemeut was not JUSt ptagmatic but extended to values and method­ology. The distinguishing characteristic of the Soviet human rights movement in contrast to orher dissident tendencies (especially nationalism) was its para­mount concern with law and the cultivation of respect for law in Soviet soci­ety. In the words of Pave! Lirvinov the movement represented

nor only a rebirol of goodness and merc)', bur rhe birrh of a sense of law in Sovier sociery. For rhe firsr rime rhe inrelligenrsia recognized rhar the Soviet constiTUrion, in spire of all irs imperfections, is a fundamental law which in irs lener prorecrs rheir digniry as cirizens, on paper defends human righrs. The hnman rights movement

discovered a powerful lever ofsocial rransformacion, namely law, when ir turned Ole anen rion of the Sovier bureaucrac)' as well as ofsociery and Ole resr of rhe world [Q

rhe lack of conformiry beTWeen Ole conducr of rhe regime and the constirution and Sovier legislarion, and also ro [he many inrernarional convenrions and rrearies on human rights which rhe Soviet Union has rarified nor so much wirh a view [Q cheir execution as ro its own international repurarion.)l

The same attention to law was typical of the Orthodox rights movement. Yakunin and Eshliman's letter to Podgorny is a good example, indeed one of the earliest examples of the new legal consciousness cited by Lirvinov. The let­ter protested the policies of the Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs

of rhe Council of Ministers of the USSR, the state agency responsible for supervision of the Orthodox Church.32 The priests charged that the council's

policies violated both the principles and the particulars of Soviet law on reli­gion. In the introduction to the letter, for example, the priests faulted the council fot conducting most of its business otaUy. "The very method of using

290 Paul valliere

unofficial oral decrees, which the leaders and representarives of the Soviet for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs chose as a means of sysremaric interference in the internal life of the Orthodox Church, is a violation of the principles of the Law. "33 In rhe body of the letrer the authors discussed eight cypes of vio­lations of Soviet law on religion: registration of clergy as a means of interfer­ing with their placement, mass closing of churches and monasteries and ille­galliquidarion of religious societies, registration of baprisms and Other sacra­mental acts, restriction of ritual practices, violation of rhe principle of freedom of conscience with respecr to children, interference in the financial life of church communiries, limiration of the number of members of a religious soci­ety to the group of twency, and limitations on the sraffing of clerical positions.

The argumentation in all of rhese cases was deliberately legalis ric. The priesrs rook rheir stand on rhe decree on Separarion of the Church from the State and the Schools from the Church, the Law on Religious Associarions, and other relevant legislarion. In many particulars rheir arguments were quite compelling. Ir was difficult ro deny, for example, that the registration of bap­tisms by local governmenral authorities amounted to official documentarion of religious affiliation, specifically excluded by rhe dectee on Separation of the Church from the Stare and rhe Schools from the Church. The priests also made a good case when they argued that the cusromary limitarion of the responsible membership of religious associarions to twency individuals was nor warranted by rhe Law on Religious Associarions, which required only that associarions be composed of "not fewer" than twenty citizens. The authors exposed anorher unwarranted inference when they argued that legal liquida­tion of a prayer house by local authorities should not automatically signify the dissolution of the teligious association that occupied it.

From the beginning the Soviet human rights movement wrestled with the tension between respect for Soviet law and the need to change it. In the area of religious rights this tension was especially severe because of the paucicy of rights accorded to religion in the first place. In theit letter to Podgorny, Yakunin and Eshliman held firmly to the theme of respecting and enfotcing existing Soviet law. As the tights movement gained momemum, however, its critique became more radical. The internationalization of the snuggle for rights after the Helsinki accords of 1975 also tended to sharpen criticism of Soviet realicy. In 1977, when a nationwide discussion of rhe draft of rhe new consriturion was taking place, the Christian Committee ventured ro raise the issue of the pref­erential rreatment of atheism in the constiturion in a letter to Brezhnev.34

To be sure, there was no comradicrion between pteaching respecr for law and attempting to change it at the same time. The new legal consciousness embraced both causes. Almost no one in the Sovier human rights movemem advocated working for change by violent, exrralegal means.

Russian I

The Otthodox rights activists reptesenr, as to rhe state. They did not question the It as some Russian Orthodox splinter group rhe policy of peaceful accommodation wi. rion rhe church's acquiescence in policies I

one-sided relationship of dependence p church, and rhey challenged the ParriarcJ aggressive role in contesring such policies.

Again, Fathers Yakunin and Eshliman s Patriarch Aleksii I in 1965, incorporating r Podgorny, lent theological and ecclesiastic spirit the lettet was prophetic rather thaI against pracrices in the earthly, everyday ch scendenr reaJicy of the church.

The lerter consisted of rhree parts. In th( a theological as well as a legal principle was G

righrs. Ciring the words of Jesus, "Rendel Caesar's, and UntO God the rhings that at< argued rhat these words "PUt an end to rh dominion over man," which is why "for t

docrrine proclaimed the infinite value ofhu pan of the letter the authors discussed a J

Podgorny: the pterogatives of the parish pr Orthodox canon law the authors argued tf bishops in 1961 to remove priests from th( grandy uncanonical state of affairs at the Ie and offended the dignity of the ptiestly om the Jetrer pur it poignantly: "the hireling is the last pan of the letrer the authors review the Orthodox Church in Russian history an< patriarch to lead the chutch our of its bond sary ar the price of his own security. "The John the Forerunner, the friend of the Bridel the puriry of the bride."36 More particularly: a widely represenrarive national council of which would meer ro tesrore the canonical r

Patriarch Aleksii I did llOt take up the d dissident priests. The next national council tl and met for the purpose of electing his succe: mems of 1961. The new patriarch, Pi men, howevet. In his "Lemen Letter" of 1972, A

lers and represen rarives of the Soviet for )se as a means of systematic interference hurch, is a violation of the principles of :he aUthors discussed eight rypes of vio­.tration of clergy as a means of interfer­g of churches and monasreries and ilk­egisrrarion of baprisms and other saeta­:es, violation of the principle offreedom en, interference in the financial life of ~ number of members of a religious soci­:ions on rhe sraffing of clerical positions. e cases was deliberarely legalistic.. The on Separation of the Church from the

'ch, the Law on Religious Associations, y particulars theit arguments were quire Jr example, thar rhe tegistration of bap­,es amounted ro official documentation :uded by the decree on Separation of rhe lois from the Church. The priests also I that [he customary limitation of the associations to rwenry individuals was s Assooiations, which tequired only that wer" than rwenry citizens. The authors ce when they argued that legaV liquida­ties should not automatically signify rhe 1 that occupied it. nan rights movement wrestled with the and the need to change it. In the area of lly severe because of the pauciry ofrights In their letter to Podgorny, Yakunin and respecting and enforcing existing Soviet lomentum, however, its critique became on of the struggle for rights after the [0 sharpen criticism of Soviet realiry. In If rhe draft of the new constirurion was e venrured to raise the issue of rhe pref­IOstitution in a lerter to Brezhnev.34

:rion berween preaching respect for law lme rime. The new legal consciousness ~ in rhe Soviet human rights movement enr, extralegal means.

Russian Orthodoxy and Human Rights 291

The Orthodox righrs acrivists represented a challenge to rhe church as well as ro the state. They did not quesrion the legirimacy of the Patriarchal church, as some Russian Onhodox splinter groups did. They did not even question the policy of peaceful accommodation with rhe Soviet srare. They did ques­tion the church's acquiescence in policies rhat rurned accommodation into a one-sided relationship of dependence prejudicial to the integrity of rhe church, and they challenged the Patriarch and the bishops ro playa more aggressive role in conteSting such policies.

Again, Farhers Yakunin and Eshliman srated the case besr. Their lerter to Patriarch Aleksii I in 1965, incorporaring the legal case made in rhe lerter to

Podgorny, lent theological and ecclesiastical perspective to their cririque. In spitir rhe letter was prophetic rather than legalisric. The priests cried out against practices in the eanhly, everyday church which contradicted the tran­scendent realiry of the church.

The letter consisted of three parts. In the firsr the aurhors pointed our that a theological as well as a legal principle was at srake in the violation of religious rights. Citing rhe words of Jesus, "Render untO Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God rhe things that are God's" (Matk 12:17), the priests atgued that these words "put an end to rhe claims of a pagan state to toral dominion over man," which is why "for the firsr time in history Chtisrian dOCtrine proclaimed the infinite value of human personaliry."35 In the second part of the leerer the authors discussed a matter not raised in the letter to

Podgorny: the prerogatives of the parish priest. With copious citarions from Orthodox ca.non law the authots argued tbar rhe decision of the council of bishops in 1961 to remove priesrs from the parish councils produced a fla­grantly uncanonical state of affairs at rhe local level of Orthodox church life and offended the digniry of rhe priestly office. An epigraph ro this section of the letrer put it poignantly: "the hireling is not a shepherd" Uohn lO:n). In rhe Ia..~t pan of the letter rbe authors reviewed rhe glories and tribulations of the Orthodox Church in Russian history and concluded wirh an appeal ro the parriarch to lead the church our of its bondage to secular authoriry, if neces­sary at rhe price of his own securiry. "The patriarch is appointed to be like John rhe Forerunner, the friend of rhe Bridegroom, who lays down his life for the puriry of rhe bride."36 More particularly they called on Aleksii to summon a widely representative national council of the Russian Orthodox Church which would meer to restore the canonical norms of church life.

Patriarch Aleksii I did not rake up rhe challenge addressed to him by the dissident priests. The next narional council took place after his death, in 1971,

and met for the purpose of electing his successor. It did not undo the arrange­menrs of 1961. The new patriarch, Pimen, soon faced a similar challenge, however. In his "Lenten Lener" of 1972, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn cited the

292 Patti Valliere

examples ofYakunin and Eshliman seven years earlier and implored Pimen to

rake rhe iniriarive in rhe suuggle ro free rhe church from bondage even ar the price of personal martyrdom. "Do nor ler us suppose, do nor make us rhink that for the archpasrors of the Russian Church earthly power is higher rhan heavenly power, earthly responsibility more fearsome than responsibility before God."37

Nor all Orrhodox rights activists approved of rhe cacric of challenging rhe patriarch and bishops ro confront the srare aurhorities ar any price. One of the responses elicired by Solzhenitsyn's "Lenten Letter" provided evidence of divided opinion. Ir came from the pen of Father Sergei Zheludkov, a priest in rhe ciry of Pskov with a long record of involvement in rhe struggle for Orthodox rights and close ries ro the dissidem intelligentsia. He rook excep­tion ro Solzhenirsyn's all-or-nothing approach, arguing rhar it would lead ro martyrdom and an underground church. He held that the legal church "can­nor be an island of freedom in our strictly and homogeneousLy organized soci­ety run from a single Center." He approved of rhe hierarchy's policy "some­how [0 sign intO the system and for the time being [0 make use of the oppor­tunities permined by ir. "38 Bur in spite of disagreements over rhe hierarchy's aCtual or porential role in the srruggle for righrs, mosr Orthodox dissidents agre,ed rhat the patriarchal church was rhe Russian Orthodox Church on whose behalf rhey were fighring. This consensus in itself resrified ro a consid­erable degree of good will [Oward the church on rhe parr of the acrivisrs. Their rolerance demonstrared Christian parience and love. It also refleCted a recog­nition that rhe real anragonisr of the human rights movement was not the Orthodox Church bur the Soviet stare.

1980-1988: THE MILLENNIUM ARRIVES

In many ways rhe outlook for human rights in the Sovier Union seemed bleaker in 1980 rhan it did in 1965. The repressions of the late 1970S closed down the Soviet human rights movemem and confirmed the doubrs of many concerning rhe prospecrs for changing rhe Sovier sysrem by legal means. Orthodox activists experienced these doubrs as acutely as rheir secular col­leagues. Legalism seemed to have led ro a dead end. The way was open for reconceiving rhe struggle for Orthodox righrs along mote radical lines, such as an underground ch urch or an alliance wirh righr-wing Russian narionalism.

Yakunin, as ever rhe leading Otthodox dissident, announced his break with the legalisr approach in a report on "The Present Siruarion of rhe Russian Orthodox Church and the Prospecrs of a Religious Renewal in Russia," dared Augusr 15. 1979.39 In ir he advocared the crearion of a "caracomb church"

Russian I

rhrough secrer (rhough canonical) ordin: underground clergy wouLd minisrer ro Orthodox Christians whose needs wer restricted Moscow Pauiarchate. If the Pa setting up such a network, as it almost sun ing to a sister Orthodox church, such as for assistance.40 The pracricality of such contexr of the human righrs struggle, hov Yakunin had lost confidence in his own IT

Yakunin's pessimism toward the Mosc( wem so far as to assert thar "if the freedol were suddenly granred in our countr Patriarchate would be incapable of pn Ironically, rhe one servant of the patriarch favorable judgment, Father Dmitry Dud munity a few months larer with a nation~

in rhe human righrs suuggle of the 1970s. ing uicks on Yakunin.

And so it was, though more benignly t imagined in the dark days of 1979-80. Fe via dolorosa of prison, exile, or capitulatil church-scate relations and in rhe Soviet ~

produced a mote favorable environment f than ar any time since the Bolshevik revo eration of rhe Orthodox Church's vindi Russian land enhanced rhe visibility of ch rhe accession to power of a group of rel Gorbachev in 1985 opened rhe way ro a r: in all spheres of Sovier life.

The improvement of the church's histo accession to power. In the lare 1970S and rerm strategy of loyalty to rhe state beg before, ar leasr for the central church insri studenrs doubled between 1971 and 198I.4~

Patriarchate increased its staff and manage in cemral Moscow to accommodare work A large consrrucrion projecr was aurhori buildings and grounds of the Danilov Mo named for Sr. Daniil, a medieval grand pi est monasrery. The restoration of the facil presence to rhe capiral for the firsr rime in I

l seven yeats earlier and implored Pimen co ) free the church from bondage even at the not let us suppose, do nor make us think

isian Church earrhly power is higher than bility more fearsome than responsibility

s approved of the ractic of challenging the le state authorities at any price. One of the l'S "Lenten Lerrer" provided evidence of Jen of Father Sergei Zheludkov, a priest in :ord of involvement in the srruggle for le dissidenr imelligentsia. He took excep­g approach, arguing that it would lead to lurch. He held that the legal church "can­Cticrly and homogeneously organized soci­approved of the hierarchy's policy "some­the time being to make use of the oppor­

pite of disagreemems over the hierarchy's ;gle for rights, mosr Orthodox dissidents I was the Russian Onhodox Church on lis consensus in itself tesrified to a consid­e church on the parr of the acrivists. Their atience and love. Ir also refleCted a recog­be human rights movement was not the ne.

~ES

nan rights in the Soviet Union seemed The repressions of me late 1970S closed mem and confirmed the doubts of many ging the Soviet system by legal means. ;e doubts as acutely as their secular col­:d ro a dead end. The way was open for :lox rights along more radical lines, such nce wirh righr-wing Russian nationalism. )dox dissidem, announced his break with I "The Present Situarion of the Russian of a Religious Renewal in Russia," dated ~d the creation of a "catacomb church"

Russian Ormodoxy and Human Rights 293

through secret (though canonical) ordinations of bishops and priests. The underground clergy would minister (0 the far-flung masses of Russian Onhodox Christians whose needs were nor being met by the severely resrricred Moscow Parriarchate. If the Patriarchate refused to collaborate in setting up such a nelWork, as it almost surely would, Yakunin advocated cum­ing to a sister Orthodox church, such as me Orthodox Church in Ametica, fOt assistance.40 The practicality of such an approach was debarable. In the context of me human rights struggle, however, me impOrtant poim was that Yakunin had lOSt confidence in his own movement.

Yakunin's pessimism roward the Moscow Patriarchare was unrelieved. He wenr so far as to assert mat "if the freedom to conduct religious propaganda were suddenly granted in our counrry, the members of the Moscow Patriarchate would be incapable of profiting from this opportunity.,,41 Ironically, rhe one servant of the patriarchal church on whom Yakunin passed favorable judgment, Famer Dmitry Dudko, scandalized the dissident com­munity a few monms later with a nationally tdevised recantation of his role in the human rights struggle of rhe 1970s.42 It seemed as if history were play­ing tricks on Yakunin.

And so it was, though more benignly than he or his colleagues could have imagined in the dark days of 1979-80. For even as me dissidents walked me via dolorosa of prison, exile, or capitulation, changes were in the making in church-state relations and in the Soviet state itself which by the mid-1980s produced a more favorable environment for human rights in the Soviet lands rhan at any time since the Bolshevik revolution. On the one hand, an accel­eration of the Orthodox Church's vindication of its historic rights in the Russian land enhanced the visibility of the church in Soviet society. Second, the accession to power of a group of reform Communists led by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 opened me way to a rapid advancemem of human rights in all spheres of Sovier life.

The improvemem of me church's historic rights began before Gorbachev's accession to power. In the late 1970S and early 1980s the Parriarchate's long­term srrategy of loyalty to the state began to payoff more palpably than before, at least for the cenrral church institutions. The number of theological srudents doubled between 1971 and 1981.43 The Publishing Department of me Parriarchate increased its Staffand managed ro get a new building consrructed in central Moscow ro accommodate work on an expanded range of projects.44

A large construction project was authorized in 1983 with rhe return of the buildings and grounds of the Danilov Monastety to the church. The Danilov, named for St. Daniil, a medieval grand prince of Moscow, was rhe city's old­est monastery. The reStoration of the facility broughr an Orthodox monastic ptesence to the capital for the first time in decades as well as providing a highly

294 PauL VaLLiere

visible residence for the pauiarch and a sear for the Holy Synod and some other units of the Patriarchare.

The church in the provinces did nm benefIt to the same extent as the cen­tral institUtions, ahhough there were some improvemenrs. There was a mod­est increase in the building and reopening of churches in some pans of the counrry starting in the late 1970s.45 At about the same time deanery and diocesan conventions of clergy, indispensable to the rebuilding of the Orthodox Church on the provincial level, began to be held again after a lapse of almost three decades.46

The gains fOt the Orthodox Church in me early 1980s, while small com­pared w the expansion at the end of the decade, were exceptional in [WO respects. First, they exceeded earlier gains by an appreciable margin. Second, they occurred during a time of unprecedented lassitude and decline in the Soviet Union as whole. Indeed, the Orthodox Church was about the only instirution in the counrry w show any vigor in the late 1970S and early 1980s. To explain this phenomenon one should probably reckon with a number of facwrs ranging from the hand of Providence ro the machinations of atheist bureaucrats. The timing of the concessions to the church, for example, makes it tempting to suspect that they were inrended as a reward ro plianr hieratchs at a time when harsh punishment was being meted Out to Orrhodox rights activists. But the gwwth in the church's strength could also be seen as an example of the countercyclical capaciry of religion to show vitality when sec­ular power structutes fall inro decline.

In any case, the Orthodox hierarchy won real gains, not just cosmetic improvemenrs, during the petiod. The bishops showed particular skill in their manipulation of a date ofgreat symbolic importance in Russian history: 1988, the miJ lennial anniversary of the baptism of the people of Kiev under Prince Vladimir in 988. In the struggle for historic rights, historic occasions playa key role. By declaring their inrenrion to celebrate the millennium in a gtand way the Orthodox hierarchy was able to wage a more or less open campaign to enhance the visibility of the church in Soviet sociery. In this effort the church probably benefIted not a little from the suPPOrt it enjoyed among some of the more nationalistic members of the Soviet establishmenr.

Bll[ the decisive change that allowed the Moscow Spring of 1988 to happen occurred nm in the church but in the ruling elite of the Soviet state. Coming to power in 1985, MikhaiJ Gorbachev and his associates promptly set about implementing an ambitious reform agenda: first gLasnost', Ot freedom of expression; then perestroika, or the restructuring of social, politicaJ, and eco­nomic institutions. In terms of rights issues the most promising aspeCt of the reform effort was the idea of "a state based on law" (pravovoe gOJll.darstvo) and the caHs for upgrading the legal profession, making legal services more avail-

Russian C

able w ordinary citizens, and establishing tf That the immediate somce of these ideas Soviet human rights movement was toO p had won its case, albeit posthumously.

In the spting of 1988, vitrually on the e reform process took a great leap forwan declared its inrenrion to create a new nar! People's Deputies. Elections to this body 'h

the first time in June. Similar parliaments v level. A substantial body of human rights I on freedom of religion mentioned above, 'h

plishments of the new parliamentary instit Before 1988 the Communist reformers 1

gion. Their silence left the religiously orien about the reform process. In May 1987 a g clergy and laymen tied to the Orthodox r matter w a head in open letters to Ch. Pimen.48 They called on Gorbachev to ex", religious sphere by granring believers me r gious literarute, to be heard in me mass m tion oflegislation affecting religious life, tC service-in short, to participate openly ane the nine called fOt a consistent policy: "We restructuring that lies ahead. But the ptOC our country is essentially indivisible. The be left OUt of it."

To the patriarch the nine declared that freedom to be any easiet to achieve in th large: "Immobilized, mute and timid for i

learn all ovet again how to walk and talk." "not to let slip the unique histOrical oppc our Homeland and our Mother Church."

Despite the lack ofofficial statements, ~

conditions of religious life was already un sidenrs, including Father Yakunin, were Yakunin's sacerdotal functions were restol assigned to a parish in the Moscow area.49

tutions was openly discussed by official s parents preseming child ten for baptism, : asked to show their domestic passpOtt beD rite was no longer subject to civil registra'

rrd a seat for the Holy Synod and some

lOt benefit to the same extem as the cen­,some improvemems. There was a mod­)ening of churches in some parts of the 5 At abom the same time deanery and rdispensable to the rebuilding of the level, began to be held again mer a lapse

rch in the early 1980s, while small com­)f the decade, were exceptional in two ;ains by an appreciable matgin. Second, recedemed lassitude and decline in rhe Orthodox Church was abour the only y vigor in the late 1970S and early 1980s.

mid probably reckon with a number of )vidence to the machinations of atheist ;sions to the church, fOt example, makes intended as a reward to pliam hierarchs as being meted om to Orthodox rights rch's srrengrh could also be seen as an ty of religion to show vitality when sec­

chy won real gains, not JUSt cosmetic : bishops showed particulat skill in their lic importance in Russian histoty: 1988, ism of the people of Kiev under Prince lisroric tighrs, historic occasions playa to celebrate the millennium in a grand to wage a more or less open campaign eh in Sovier society. In this effon the e from the sUppOrt ir enjoyed among ~rs of the Soviet establishmenr. :I the Moscow Spring of 1988 to happen ruling elire of the Sovier state. Coming and his associares promptly set abom

agenda: first gLasnost', or freedom of tructuring of social, political, and eco­ssues the most promising aspeCt of the !Sed on law" (pravovoe gosudarstvo) and sion, making legal services more avail-

Russian Orthodoxy and Human Rights :1.95

able to ordinary citizens, and establishing the independence oflegal counsel.47

That the immediate source of these ideas was the "legalist" thinking of the Soviet human righrs movemem was toO plain to be missed. The movemem had won its case, albeit posthumously.

In the spring of 1988, virtually on the eve of the church millennium, the reform process took a great leap forward when Gorbachev's government declared itS intention to create a new national parliament, the Congress of People's Deputies. Elections to this body were held in March 1989; it met for the first time in June. Similar parliamems were later created on the republican level. A substantial body of human rights legislation, including the 1990 laws on freedom of religion mentioned above, was one of the most notable accom­plishments of the new parliamemary insritutions.

Before 1988 the Communist reformers made no public sratements on reli­gion. Their silence lefr the teligiously otiemed public in a state of uncertainty about the reform process. In May 1987 a group of nine prominent Orthodox clergy and laymen ried to the Orthodox righrs movement tried to bring the mattet to a head in open letters to Chairman Gorbachev and Patriarch Pimen.48 They called on Gorbachev to exrend glasnost and perestroika ro the religious sphere by granting believers the right to publish scriptures and reli­gious literatute, to be heard in the mass media, to participate in rhe prepara­tion oflegislation affecting religious life, to engage in philanthropy and social service-in short, to participate openly and equally in Soviet society. In effect the nine called for a consistem policy: "We wish to believe in the reality of the restructuring that lies ahead. But the process of democratization going on in our country is essemially indivisible. The Russian Orthodox Church cannot be left out of it."

To the patriarch the nine declared that they did not expect the tenewal of freedom to be any easier to achieve in the church than in Soviet society at large: "Immobilized, mme and timid for so many years, [rhe church] has to learn allover again how to walk and talk." The group imploted rhe patriarch "nor to let slip the unique histOrical opportunity which the Lord is sending our Homeland and our MOther Church."

Despite the lack ofofficial sratements, however, a gteat libetalization of the conditions of religious life was already underway by mid-I987. Religious dis­sidents, including Father Yakunin, were released from exile or deten rion. Yakunin's sacerdOtal functions were restored by the Patriarchate, and he was assigned to a parish in the Moscow area. 49 A program to upgrade Jewish insti­tutions was openly discussed by official spokesmen. 5o Adult baptisands and parems preseming children for baptism, ar least in Moscow, were no longer asked to show their domesric passpOrt before receiving the sacramem, i.e., the rite was no longer subjecr to civil registrarion. 51 As we have noted, this prac­

l

296 PauL VaLLiere

tice was long singled Out by critics as an affront to religious conscience and a flagrant violation ofSoviet law. Another sign of improvement was the series of three international scholatly conferences on Russian Orthodox history and tradition commemorating the millennium of the baptism of Russia. 52 The conferences marked the first time that the ch urch was allowed to sponsor international meetings on a subject other than ecumenism or world peace. The second and third conferences in the series featured participation by dis­tinguished Soviet scholars from secular institutions as well as clergy and the­ologians. The open collaboration between secular and ecclesiastical scholars was another "first" for the postwar period.

As for rhe legal statUs of religion, there was evidence that new legislation was being prepared at the highest levels. In the January 1986 issue of the JournaL a/the Moscow Patriarchate thete appeared a mysterious last page enti· cled "Our Legal Advice: The RightS and Obligations of Religious Societies."53 In actualiry the page did not relay "advice" from any ecclesiastical source but ptesented eight dtaft paragraphs of a secular law code employing the termi­nology, but departing from the substance, of the Law on Religious Associa­tions of 1929. The draft explicitly recognized religious associations as legal entities with the right to make COntractS and act as plaintiff or defendant in a court of law. It granted religious associations the right to purchase (nor merely take on loan) and hold tirle to various kinds of property including titual objects, means of transport. and buildings. The right of religious organiza­tions to employ temporary or permanent staff on cOntract was also recog­nized. In short, the "Advice" subverted the entire tradition of Soviet legisla­tion on religion. Since such a publication could not have appeared at the time withour official approval, it encouraged hopes for a breakthrough to religious liberry in the USSR. The unanswered question was whether the principles of "Our Legal Advice" would be written into state law; and if so, when?

The intentions of the Communist reformers with respect to religion were publicly clarified in April 1988 when Chairman Gorbachev held an unptece­dented and highly publicized roundtable meeting with the senior hierarchs of the Russian Onhodox Church. 54 The rone and substance of his remarks were conciliatOry even though he felt obliged to declare that Lenin's 1918 Dectee on the Separation of the Chutch from the State and the School from the Church was a measure that "opened the way for the church to pursue its activities without any son of outside intetference." He conceded that "mistakes" were made with respect to the church and religious believers in the t930S and there­after, observed that the errors were being corrected, wished the church well on the eve of its millennium and invited the Orthodox communiry to col­laborate in the wotk of perestroika on the grounds that "we have a common history, one Fatherl and and one future." The laSt point was especially

Russian'

poignant in that it was a major ideologica envision religion as having any son of fun.J Most importantly, Gorbachev announced on freedom of conscience is being devisel organizations as well as othets will be ref!. was now official.

When the church observed its miUenn a spirit of confidence and independenc church council composed of the hierarch sentatives. The gathering was only the th Orthodox Church in the Soviet period (t was the first to be held fOt a purpose 0

deceased patriarch. In the atea of rights the most imponan

tion of a fundamental Statute fOt the R firmly on Orthodox canon law and the al statute formally ended the bondage of th the Law on Religious Associations of 1925 cit of 196r. It went much further than the tures of aurhoriry and decision-making ir tions ar the diocesan, episcopal, and nad church's newly won sovereignry over its al course. the statUte contradicted existing S to the contrary placed at the head of th explain why the church delayed forr Neverrheless. the text circulated freely an menred immediately following the counc

Thus the millennium passed amidst a the Bolshevik revolution, the Russian C Babylonian exile to claim "a future and a

RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY AND HUMAN R

The annus mirabiLis of 1988 marked the er: and the beginning of a new period in tn Church. The new era is without precede perous periods of its life undet the tsatS, freedom of action that it possesses toda) freedom-how it will respond to the ch lization, how it will deal with the religic

as an affront w teligious conscience and a ther sign of improvement was the series of tences on Russian Onhodox hiswry and ennium of the baptism of Russia. 52 The that the church was allowed w sponSOt t other than ecumenism or world peace. n the series featuted participation by dis­liar institutions as well as clergy and rhe­etween secular and ecclesiastical scholars leriod.

, there was evidence that new legislation levels. In the January 1986 issue of the lere appeared a mysterious last page enti­md Obligations of Religious Societies. "53

advice" from any ecclesiastical source but a secular law code employing the termi­stance, of the Law on Religious Associa­'ecognized teligious associations as legal 'acts and act as plaintiff or defendant ,in a ciations the right w purchase (not merely ious kinds of property including ritual lildings. The right of religious organiza­lanent staff on contract was also recog­ted the entire tradition of Soviet legisla­Ition could nOt have appeated at the time ;ed hopes for a breakthrough to religious d question was whether the principles of :1 into state law; and if so, when? t reformers with respect to religion were Chairman Gorbachev held an unprece­

able meeting with rhe senior hierarchs of e tone and substance of his remarks were ;ed to declare rhat Lenin's 1918 Decree on le State and the School from the Church V for the church to pursue its activities nce." He conceded that "mistakes" were religious believers in the 1930S and there­leing corrected, wished the church well vited the Orthodox community to coI­n the grounds that "we have a common uture. n The last point was especially

Russian Otthodoxy and Human Rights 1.97

poignant in that it was a major ideological retreat for a Communist leader to envision religion as having any SOrt of future, never mind the same as his own. Most imponandy, GOtbachev announced that "at the present time a new law on fteedom of conscience is being devised in which the interests of teligious organizations as well as othets will be reflected." The long-rumoted prospect was now official.

When the church observed its millennium in June 1988, then, it did so in a spirit of confidence and independence. The main event was a national church council composed of the hierarchy and elected clerical and lay repte­sentatives, The gathering was only the third national council of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Soviet period (the others were in 1945 and 1971). It was the firSt to be held for a putpose other than electing a successor to a deceased patriarch.

In the area of rights the most important action of the council was the adop­tion of a fundamental statute for the Russian Orthodox Church. 55 Based firmly on Orthodox canon law and the abrogated precedent of 1945, the new statute formally ended the bondage of the church to the pattern dictated by the Law on Religious Associations of 1929 and the humiliating pseudo-coun­cil of 1961. It went much further than the statute of 1945 in spelling out struc­tures of authority and decision-making in the church. A tiered set of institu­tions at the diocesan, episcopal, and national level was set up to exetcise the church's newly won sovereignty over its affairs. At the time of its adoption, of course, the statute contradicted existing Soviet laws on religion despite a nOte W the contrary placed at the head of the document. The discrepancy may explain why the church delayed formal publication of the statute. 56

Nevertheless, the text circulated freely and its provisions began w be imple­mented immediately following the council.

Thus the millennium passed amidSt a great liberation. Seventy years after the Bolshevik revolution, the Russian Orthodox Church emerged from its Babylonian exile ro claim "a future and a hope" Oeremiah 29:10).

RUSSIAN ORTHODOXY AND HUMAN RIGHTS SINCE 1988

The anrlUs mirabilis of 1988 marked the end of the long struggle for civil rights and the beginning of a new period in the history of the Russian Orthodox Church. The new era is without precedent. Never before, not even in pros­perous periods of its life under the tsars, did the Russian Church enjoy the freedom of action that it possesses today. What the church will do with its freedom-how it will respond to the challenges of a complex modern civi­lization, how it will deal with the religious pluralism of POst-soviet society,

298 Paul Valliere

what positions it will take with tegard ro the state, rhe schools, ptivate prop­erry, and the whole tange of modern rights issues-all of these are open ques­tions. The answers will come, some soon, Others more slowly, as the Russian Orrhodox communiry brings its rich tradition of piery and rheology to bear on them. One safe prediction is that rhe new situation will Stimulate a gteat deal of fresh theological reflection.

In terms of Russian Orthodoxy and human rights the period since 1988 has been shaped by thtee developments: rhe rebuilding of church institutions, rhe codification of legal tights, and the emetgence of rights issues quite different from those which occupied the church in rhe Soviet period.

The rebuilding of the Russian Orthodox Chutch has proceeded with remarkable rapidiry and on a larger scale than even the friends of the church expected. In rhe period 1985-1987 the church opened or reopened a tmal of 29 parishes, a tespectable numbet by prereform srandards. In 1988, however, 809 new parishes were registered; in the first nine months of the following year, 2,185. In roughly the same period a half dozen new theological schools and a dozen new monasteries wete opened.57 The repossession of historic monu­ments large and small-from the Kiev Caves Monastery to street corner chapels and rural pilgrimage sites-also proceeded rapidly in all areas of Orthodox settlement. The boom continued in the 1990S. By late 1993 the number of new and reopened parishes in the Moscow Patriarchate surpassed 7,000, bringing the total number of patriarchal parishes w more than 14,000. In other words, the Patriarchate doubled in size in a five-year period. In the same period the number of monasteries rose from about 20 to more rhan 200; the number of theological schools, from four to 38.58 The numbet of historic Orthodox monumenrs rescored during the period is incalculable.

The scale of the Orthodox renewal in Russia and the othet countries of rhe Moscow Paniarchate would appear w make it the largest revival of hiswric Ch tistianity in the twentieth centuty. At the very leaSt the rebuilding of Orthodoxy has dramatically alteted the Russian landscape. Russia is begin­ning ro look like an Otthodox counrey again.

To be sure, one would have to examine the spititual dimensions of the Orthodox revival in ordet co evaluate it ade qua rely. But rhe material facts alone prove at leaSt a couple of things. They prove that rhe Orthodox Church's claim to possess historic rights in the Russian land enjoys a good measure of popular support. Second, they show rhat the Moscow Patriarchate, whatever its failings, possesses greater reserves of energy and imagination than its Soviet-era detracwrs allowed. When Father Yakunin wrote in 1979 that "if rhe freedom to conduct teligious propaganda were suddenly granted in out coun­try, the members of the Moscow Patriatchate would be incapable of profiting from this opportuniry,"59 he scatcely imagined rhat the hout would come

Russian (

when his proposition could be verified. BI tion turned out to be wrong.

The codification of the civil rights of t other religious associations in the Soviet tal of laws on religious freedom by rhe legisla in Ocrober 199060 The AlI-Union law cea the USSR at the end of 1991. The 1990 F POst-soviet Russian Federation.

The All-Union (USSR) law carried th (1986) to rheir logical conclusion. It recogr entities (Article 13) and their righr to acqu erry (Articles 17-20). It recognized as "rel congregarions bUt "directorates and centra brorherhoods, missionary societies (missio ciations of religious organizations" (Auid gious organizations to establish ties wirh USSR, the right of believers ro leave rhe religious purposes (Articles 9, 22, 24), thl raise childten in a religion (Article 3), and t sue religio us education "in the languag together with others" (Article 6). It tecogr tions to condUCt religious services and oth gious cenrers, private homes, cemeteries ;; Services in hospitals, prisons, and home admitted "ar the request of citizens" inhab organizations having the right to solicit Sl

The law granted religious organization triburions of money and orher properry, I

taxation (Article 18). The right of religit enterptises (e.g., publishing, restoration, a vice institutions such as hospitals and sl from such enterprises were declared taxabl itable or educational ends (Article 23)· [ income were eliminated (Article 26).

The RSFSR law tecognized all the aro allowing considetably wider latirude to Union law. The law explicitly recognized zens on Russian soil (Article 4). It author: the request of mass religious organizations declaration of great religious holidays a.!

(Article 14). It recognized the tight of rl

·d to the state, the schools, private prop­rights issues-all of these are open ques­soon, others more slowly; as the Russian l tradition of piety and theology to bear the new sitUation will stimulate a great

d human rights the petiod since 1988 has :he rebuilding of church institutions, the mergence of rights issues quite different :h in the Soviet period. )nhodox Church has proceeded with cale than even the friends of the church church opened or reopened a total of 29 refotm standatds. In 1988, however, 809 ~rst nine mon ths of the following year, alf dozen new theological schools and a Y The tepossession of histotic monu­:.fev Caves Monastery to street corner -also ptoceeded tap idly in all area-s of nrinued in the 1990s. By late 1993 the s in the Moscow Patriarchate surpassed arriatchal parishes to mote than 14,000. lIed in size in a five-year period. In the :s rose from abOUt 20 to more than 200; m four to 38.58 The number of histOric ~ the period is incalculable. in Russia and the othet countries of the ) make it the largeSt revival of historic y. At the very least the tebuilding of ~e Russian landscape. Russia is begin­r agam.

lmine the spititual dimensions of the ~ it adequately. But the material facts lhey prove that the Orthodox Church's ~ussian land enjoys a good measure of lat the Moscow Patriarchate, whatever of energy and imagination than its

ther Yakunin wrote in 1979 that "if the cia were suddenly granted in our coun­rchate would be incapable of profiting imagined that the hour would come

Russian Orthodoxy and Human Rights 299

when his proposition could be verified. Bur the hour came, and the proposi­tion turned oUt ro be wrong.

The codification of the civil rights of the Russian Orthodox Church and othet teligious associations in the Soviet lands was achieved with the adoption of laws on religious freedom by the legislatures of the USSR and the RSFSR in October 1990.60 The All-Union law ceased to apply after the dissolution of the USSR at the end of 1991. The 1990 RSFSR law remains in effect in the post-soviet Russian Federation.

The All-Union (USSR) law cattied the principles of "Our Legal Advice" (1986) to their logical conclusion. It recognized religious otganizations as legal entities (Article 13) and their tight ro acquire and hold various kinds of prop­erty (Articles 17-20). Ir recognized as "religious organizations" not JUSt local congregations bUt "directorates and central institutions, monasteries, religious brotherhoods, missionary societies (missions), religious schools and also asso­ciations of religious organizations" (Article 7). Ir confirmed the right of reli­gious organizations ro eStablish ties with groups outside the territory of the USSR, the right of believers to leave the country for pilgrimages and other religious purposes (Articles 9, 22, 24), the right of parents and guardians to taise children in a religion (Article 3), and the right of all Soviet citizens to PUt­sue religious education "in the language of their choice, individually or together with others" (Article 6). Ir recognized the right of religious organiza­tions to conduct religious services and other ritUals in houses ofworship, reli­gious centers, private homes, cemeteries and crematoria without conditions. Services in hospitals, prisons, and homes for the elderly and invalids were admitted "at the request of citizens" inhabiting the inStitUtions, with religious otganizations having the right to solicit such requests (Article 21).

The law granted religious organizations the right to solicit voluntary con­ttibUtions of money and other property, exempting such contributions from taxation (Article 18). The right of religious organizations to fOtm business enterprises (e.g., publishing, testoration, agricultural concerns) and social ser­vice institutions such as hospitals and shelters was also recognized. Profits ftom such enterprises wete declated taxable (Article 19) unless applied ro chat­itable or educational ends (Anicle 23). Discriminatoty tax rates on clerical income were eliminated (Article 26).

The RSFSR law recognized all the aforementioned tights and rhen some, allowing considerably wider latitude ro religious expression than the A11­Union law. The law explicicly recognized the religious libetty of foreign citi­zens on Russian soil (Article 4). It authorized the Russian government "upon the requesr of mass religious organizations ... to make decisions regarding the declaration of great religious holidays as additional nonworking holidays" (Article 14). Ir recognized the right of registered religious organizations ro

I

~oo Paul Valliere

offer instruction in schools and O[her educational instirurions "on an optional basis." & for the milirary, the All-Union law provided only rhar "the com­mand of military units will nO[ prevem military personnel from taking part in religious services or performing religious rituals during their free time" (Article 21). The RSFSR law pur the maner in more posirive terms, speaking of ''rhe right to conducr and participate in religious rites in military units of all branches of service" and charging militaty administrations actively to assist citizens with arrangements for religious observance (Article 22). The RSFSR law also provided for conscientious objection to the bearing of arms by means of an alternative service option (Article 7).

Another area in which rhe All-Union and RSFSR laws differed was that concerning the moniroring of religious organizations. Under the All-Union law, registration with the stare authoriries was required of all religious organi­zarions seeking recognition as legal enrities. 10 supervise the process the law provided for "a state organ on religious affairs" to be formed by rhe Council of Minisrers of the USSR (Article 29), i.e., a body much like the Soviet-era Council for Religious Affairs. The responsibilities of the "organ" included liai­son with analogous bodies on rhe republican level, information gathering on religious activities and on implementarion of rhe laws on religion, offering expert advice ro organs of administration and rhe courrs, assisting religious organizations in negotiations with state aurhorities and promOting under­standing and toletance between religious confessions in the coumry and abroad. Such a broad mandate clearly envisioned the conrinuation of an active, even interventionisr, role for rhe state in religious affairs.

The RSFSR law broke with the Sovier tradition of monitoring religion when ir declared that "executive or administrative organs of srate authority and state job posirions specially intended to resolve issues telated ro the exercise of citizens' rightS to freedom of religion may not be instirured on the rerritory of the RSFSR" (Article 8). Implementation of the law on reli­gion was assigned to the Ministry ofJustice and local law enforcement agen­cies. The Council for Religious Affairs was duly abolished in the RSFSR on January 1,1991. On the other hand, the RSFSR law preserved the same reg­istration requirement as rhe All-Union law. It also followed the All-Union law in providing for an "expert" council of"represematives of religious orga­nizations, social organizations, state organs, religious experts, legal experts, and other specialisrs in the sphere of freedom of conscience and religion" to conduct research and give advice on issues involving religious organizations under the auspices of the Comminee on Freedom of Conscience, Religion, Charity, and Philanrhropy of the Russian parliament. While a council of experts is a far cry from the Council for Religious Affairs with its plenipo­tentiaries, the RSFSR law still envisions a degree of collaboration between

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governmental and religious authoriries sought to avoid.

In the past, of coutse, state imen prompted mainly by ideological consi atheism and discourage religious belief. equal footing with other attitudes towar free to confess any religion or none at a to propagate their views. The new laws agare their views and barred the state fro or religious activities. In terms of the c( disestablishmenr of atheism was perhap the new legislation. A year before its der

With the adoption of the 1990 laws exercised the Russian Orrhodox Churc1 menr during the long years of captiviry of the new rights will take time, and ther But the old issues are unlikely to rerum taking their place.

One of rhese came into view even be were finalized: the role ro be played by rJ process itself. During rhe Soviet period church to play in the legislative arena. I legislative process is presumably respollS church's role, and that of other religiow

The Russian Orthodox episcopate v sions of the draft of the All-Union law ( publish critical commenraries on the dr ning a number of changes to their likin ers.6l For example. rhey urged deletion tion of church and state providing rhat ZJtions and employees may nO[ be acco riruals and ceremonies.,,62 The provisic the way for blessings, prayers, and oth. formed on stare occasions. So, for exan rated as the first democratically elected parriarch of Moscow took part in the ce and making a speech exhorring the pres; each other's burdens, and rhus ... fulfi column, the bishops proposed wordin! tion could be given "in the [public] sc basis." Patriarch Aleksii, a member of [

reducational inSticutions "on an optional Jnion law pwvided only that "the com­nt military personnel from caking part in :Iigious tituals duting their ftee time" matter in more positive terms, speaking late in religious rites in military units of military administrations actively to assist )us observance (An:icle 22). The RSFSR bjection to the bearing ofarms by means :Ie 7).

1ion and RSFSR laws difFered was that lUS organizations. Under the All-Union 'ities was required of all religious Ofgani­ntities. To supervise the process the law us affairs" to be formed by the Council I), i.e., a body much like the Soviet-era )onsibilities of the "organ" included liai­'ublican level, information gathering on tation of the laws on religion, offering Hion and the COUITS, assisring religious tate authorities and promoting under­gious confessions in the country and rlyenvisioned the continuation of an le state in religious affairs. ;oviet tradirion of monitoring religion dministrative organs of stare authoriry ended to resolve issues related to the 1 of teligion may not be insticuted on g). Implemenration of rhe law on reli­ustice and local law enforcement agen­s was duly abolished in the RSFSR on 1e RSFSR law preserved the same reg­m law. It also followed rhe All-Union :il of "representatives of religious orga­lrgans, religious experts, legal experts, i-eedom of conscience and religion" to

,sues involving religious organizations on Freedom of Conscience, Religion, ssian parliamenr. While a council of for Religious Affairs with its plenipo­illS a degree of colJabotarion berween

Russian Orthodoxy and Human Rights 30r

governmental and teligious authorities which a more precise law might have sought to avoid.

In the past, of course, State intervention in the religious sphere was prompted mainly by ideological considerations. The aim was to promote atheism and discourage religious belief The new laws placed atheism on an equal footing with otber atticudes toward religion. Soviet citizens wete always free to confess any religion or none at all, but only atheists enjoyed the right to propagate their views. The new laws granted all citizens the right to prop­agate their views and barred the state from financing either atbeist propaganda or religious activities. In terms of the constitutional history of the USSR the disestablishment of atheism was perhaps the most significanr achievement of the new legislation. A year before its demise the USSR became a secular state.

With the adoption of the 1990 laws on religion most of the issues which exercised the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet human rights move­ment during the long years of captiviry passed into history. Implemenration of the new rights will take time, and there will be complications along the way. But the old issues are unlikely to recum to center stage. New issues are already taking their place.

One of these came into view even before the 1990 laws on religious liberty were finalized: the role to be played by the Orthodox Church in the legislative process itself. During the Soviet period, of course, there was no role for the church w play in the legislative arena. But in a democratic Russia, where the legislative process is presumably responsive to civil sociery, the question of the church's role, and that of Other teligious forces, naturally arises.

The Russian Orthodox episcopate was deep~y involved in official discus­sions of the draft of the All-Union law of 1990. The bishops wen t so far as w publish critical commenraries on the draft before and aftet its adoption, win­ning a number of changes to their liking and failing to get their way on oth­ers.61 For example, they urged deletion of a sentence in the section on separa­tion of church and state providing that "the activities of state organs, organi­zations and employees may not be accompanied by divine liturgies, religious rituals and ceremonies."62 The provision was in fact deleted, which opened the way for blessings, prayers, and othet overtly religious actions to be per­formed on state occasions. So, for example, when Boris Yeltsin was inaugu­rated as the firSt democratically elected presidenr of Russia in July 1991, the patriarch of Moscow rook part in the ceremony, blessing the new officeholder and making a speech exhOrting the presidenr and people of Russia "to take lip each other's burdens, and thus ... fulfIll the law of Jesus."63 In the negative column, the bishops proposed wording guaranreeing that religious instruc­tion could be given "in the [public] schools on a voluntary extra-curricular basis." Pattiatch Aleksii, a membet of the Soviet parliament at the time, vig­

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302 Paul Valliere

orously supporred rhe amendment; bur ir was rejecred by a vote of303 to 46.64 The All-Union law did nor explicitly bar religious instruction from the schools, however; and, as we have nored, rhe RSFSR law was hospitable to it. In fact many Russian schools currently accommodate religious instruction, usually conducted by clergy or itineram missionaties. The decision [Q allow or disallow rests with local school administrations.

Another deficiency in the All-Union law from the bishops' poim of view was its treatmem of Orthodox parish communities as legal emities distinct from the church as a corporare body. As the bishops saw it, the legal entity of parishes should derive from that of the church as a whole because "in the [Orthodox] Church there cannot be 'religious communities' which ate inde­pendent from the hierarchical cemer and from each other."65 The practical issue was the degree of latitude to be enjoyed by local Orthodox churches in relation to the central church administration. The Moscow Patriarchate faced vigorous challenges from competing Orthodox jurisdictions in the late Gorbachev and early pOst-soviet years and feared secessionist movemems in its ranks (with good reason). The bishops wan ted to ensure that any Orthodox parish that abandoned the Moscow Patriarchate would lose its property and rights of legal entity.

The theoretical issue was the degree to which the "self-understanding of the Church," as the bishops called it, should be taken into account by secular lawmakers. Secular law aims to treat all religions equally, bur this is easier said than done. A law that tegards local teligious communities as autOnomous entities, for example, has a diffetent meaning for chutches with congrega­tionalist polities (e.g., Baptist chutches) than fot a church with an episcopal­sacramental polity.

The prominence of the Orthodox hierarchy in the legislative debates of 1990 pointed to an even latger issue: the role to be played by the Orthodox Church in the POst-soviet Russian state. Religious minotities as well as athe­ists and secularists worry that the chutch is bent on securing a ptivileged posi­tion fot itself in the new Russia. The sheer size of the Orthodox Church and its thousand-year tradition ofstate establishment are certainly grounds for the minotities' fears. So is the display, episodic bur ftequent, of the symbols and clerical petsonnel of Orthodoxy on all SOrtS of official occasions. So ate the innumetable cases of ditect church-state collaboration, including pooling of funds, which can be documented throughour Russia tOday.

One may cite the reconsftuction of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in central Moscow as a case in point. This church, once the largesr in Moscow, was built in the nineteenth century ro commemorate Russia's victory over Napoleon. In 1931 it was dynamired by the CommuniSt city government. In January 1995 the parriarch and the mayor of Moscow laid the cornerstone of a

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replacement srtucture, which is being b· Naturally the finished product will nor shrine or Baptist or Adventist prayer he

Privileged treatment of rhe Orthodo of its oflJ.cial regisrration as a legal entil The formal act of registration had to be II's pilgrimage to the Holy Land al Meanwhile, othet religious organizal Mormons, Baptists, Seventh-Day Adv registered by the republican authoriti returned home and went to register I received from the hands of the Ministe rich in symbolism; the number 1.

In short, the blurring of distinctions in present-day Russia and will remain! Clearer legislation, in turn, depends Russian civil society as a whole, inclu, words, the issue of church-state relatior a long time to come.

Foreign expertS can playa useful ro countries to the attention of Russian scholars; but in the end the issues of tel setded in a way that makes sense to th, dition represents a synthesis of univers totical conditions and commirmenl American critics of Russia has been to c the particular. Bur in Russia as elsewhe

In the present case respect fOt the p penertation of the modern history of cl naire approaches. Because the mentalir ored by a long tradition of teligious e: religious establishment is viewed wid rightS theorists, the application of hum Orthodoxy can quickly degenerate iure But if the job of thinking about hum, change the world but to undetstand ir othet Otthodox chutches) is a rich sub

The study of religious establishmer establishment, which is a vastet phen< one of the most negleCted subjects in t special pathos of the Russian church il

64

y bar religious insuuc£ion from rhe :I, the RSFSR law was hospirabJe [Q if. Y accommodate religious insuuction, ,missionaries. The decision co allow or 'trations. 1 law from the bishops' poine of view communities as legal encities distinct ) me bishops saw it, the legal emicy of Ie church as a whole because "in rhe :Iigious communiries' which are inde­nd from each other. "65 The practicall ljoyed by local Ormodox churches in ation. The Moscow Pauiarchate faced Orehodox jurisdictions in rhe late wd feared secessionisr movemenes in s waneed to ensure rhat any Orehodox riarchate would lose irs propercy and

ir was rejected by a vore of303 co 46.

co which rhe "self-undemanding of auld be taken inro accoum by secular :eligions equally, bur this is easier said igious communiries as auconomous leaning for churches with congrega­than for a church with an episcopal­

ierarchy in rhe legislarive debares of e role co be played by the Orthodox Religious minoriries as well as athe­is benr on securing a privileged posi­

:er siz.e of the Orehodox Church and ishmenr are certainly grounds for me :iic but frequem, of rhe symbols and ;orrs of official occasions. So are rhe . collaborarion, including pooling of ;hout Russia coday. he Cathedral of Christ rhe Savior in church, once the largest in Moscow, commemorare Russia's viccory over :he Communisr cicy governmenr. In of Moscow laid rhe cornersrone of a

Russian Orthodoxy and Human Rights 303

replacemene suucture, which is being built wirh heavy reliance on state funds. Naturally the finished product will nor be a hiscoricaJ monumenc or milirary shrine or Baptisr or Advenrist prayer house, but an Ormodox church.66

Privileged rreatrnenr of me Orehodox Church was evidene on the occasion of irs official regisuation as a legal encicy in the RSFSR in the spring of 1991.

The formal act of regisrration had ro be postponed because of Pattiarch Aleksii II's pilgrimage co the Holy Land and Other scheduling complications. Meanwhile, other religious organiz.ations including Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, Baptisrs, Sevench-Day Advencists, and Buddhists were officially registered by the republican authorities. Nevereheless, when the pauiarch returned home and wenr co register his church, the official documenr he received from rhe hands of me Minister of]ustice bore a regisuation number rich in symbolism: the number 1. 67

In shore, rhe blurring of distincrions between church and state is pervasive in presenr-day Russia and will remain so uncil clarified by more precise laws. Clearer legislation, in turn, depends on rhe clarificarion of attitlldes in Russian civil sociecy as a whole, including the Onhodox Church. In orher words, me issue of church-state relations will remain a lively one in Russia for a long rime co come.

Foreign expens can playa useful role by bringing rhe experience of orher counuies co rhe attencion of Russian legislacors, church leaders and legal scholats; but in the end rhe issues of religion and policy facing Russia must be serded in a way mar makes sense co rhe Russians memselves. Every legal [fa­dition represenes a synchesis of universal notions of rights wirh concrete his­torical conditions and commitmenrs. The tendency of European and American criries of Russia has been co concenrrate on rhe universal and ignore rhe particular. But in Russia as elsewhere the parricular demands irs due.

In rhe presenc case tespecr for me parricular means making a sympathetic penetrarion of rhe modern hiscory of rhe Russian church and resisring docui­naire approaches. Because me memalicy of Russian Orthodoxy is deeply col­ored by a long tradition of religious esrablishmenc, and because rhe idea of religious establishmem is viewed wirh suspicion by mosr modern human righrs theorisrs, rhe application of human righrs rheory co me case of Russian Orthodoxy can quickly degenerare inco polemies and simplisric dichocomies. But if the job of rhinking abour human righrs is in rhe first instance not to

change the world but to undersrand ir, the case of Russian Orehodoxy (and orhet Orehodox churches) is a rich subjecr for the invesrigaco[.

The study of religious establishmenr-panicularly de facto sociocultural esrablishmenr, which is a vasrer phenomenon rhan the juridical variecy-is one of rhe mosr neglecred subjecrs in the compararive study of religion. The special parhos of the Russian church in the twemierh century is also scanrly

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304 Paul Valliere

appreciated. The Russian Orthodox Church was not disestablished by a constitutional process but by a cruel and arbitrary powet determined to

eradicate the church altogether. Far from living "at ease in Zion," the lead­ers of the church trod the parh of persecution and martyrdom.68 Thar rhe blood of rhe martyrs is the seed of the church is a rruism of church history. What is not so widely recognized is that the principle applies JUSt as much ro priestly church establishments as ro prophetic minorities. The aura of sanctity abour the patriarchal church was enhanced, not diminished, by Communist persecution.

The mentality of establishmenr is not confined to church circles. The Russian srate is as inrerested in promoring close church-srate relarions as the episcopate, and wirh good reason. Present-day Russia is nor a peaceful, pros­perous, or productive country. Devasrated by decades of oppression, Russian civil society must be rebuilt from the ground up. In these circumstances no Russian government, particularly not a democtatic one, can afrord to draw a cordon sanitaire betWeen itself and the largest and hest organized institurion of Russian civil society.69

Interreligious, intercommunal, and internarional relations are orher arena..~

in which complex rights issues are emerging for Russian Orthodoxy. Mosr of the faith communiries of pOst-soviet Eutasia are experiencing genuine reli­gious liberty for the firsr time, and thete is confusion abour whar ir means. There is a real danger that rhe free marker in religion will spawn violent eth­nic and religious conflicrs. In Ukraine, for example, no fewer rhan three sep­arate Eastern church jurisdicrions-Ukrainian Orthodox (Moscow Patri­archare), Ukrainian Autocephalous, and Ukrainian Catholic-vie for a share of the rich ecclesiasrical patrimony of rhe region. Compecing Orrhodox juris­dictions also distutb the peace of the church in rhe Russian Federation.

The growrh of nontraditional Chrisrian seers and exotic non-Christian or pseudo-Christian cults in Russia represents an even more baflling challenge to Orthodoxy. The Russian Orthodox community has long been used to dealing with Muslim Tarars, Buddhisr Mongols, and orher peoples of the Russian Federarion whose religious orientation is a matter of historic rradition. It has a harder rime coming to terms wirh Russians who embtace nontradirional religious options. Orthodox sensiriviries in this regard have been greatly exac­erbared by the ridal wave of foreign missionaries that has washed over Russia since 1988. The church views most of the newcomers as interlopers whose vocation is to rustle rhe Russian people away from its true shephetds. The irony is that the foreign missionaries operate under the wartant of the 1990 law on religious liberty which the Orthodox Church helped set in place.

Refusal to accept this irony for what it is led the senior hierarchy of rhe Russian Orrhodox Church to launch what can be termed its mosr controver-

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sial initiative of the 1990S relative to h 1990 legislation on religion in such a w, gious activities of foreigners on the tel amended law was in fact adopted by the 1993, only to be vetoed by President Ye ment also turned OUt to be a dead letter the parliamenr in the bitter conflict 0

issue has not been laid to resr. Another r discussion in the Duma since 1994. At h Patriarchare let ir be known that it sri acriviries of foreigners in RussiaJo

The Patriarchate's campaign dtew a and prompred rhe inrervention ofW International conferences on the issue 'i\ proposed limitations on religious activi violating the inrernational human ri Declaration, the Helsinki Final Act, (1989), and other instrumenrs to which to suppose thar rhe monitoring of reli post-Communist states will cease any human rights groups are well organize politically. Russian church leaders will will a democratically oriented Russiar nance violations of trearies ro which it ment in which rhe Russian OrthodQ) been inrernationalized.

The outlook for relations betWeen Western religious and rights organizati Srrong inrernationalist cutrents have among the hierarchy. An inreresring fea tary on the AlI-Union law of 1990, for inrernarional human rights instrumen law as rhe first piece of Soviet legislat: principles of the Universal Declaration Conference on Security and Cooperati( reached by participating government Helsinki process."72

Even more important as a stimulus of rhe patriarchal church itself. Always I the Moscow Parriatchate became a rrul~

following the breakup of the USSR in 1

Church was not disestablished by a ·1 and arbitrary power determined ro rom living "at ease in Zion," the lead­rsecution and martyrdom. 68 That the e church is a truism of church history. hat the principle applies juSt as much to prophetic minorities. The aura of h was enhanced, not diminished, by

•not confined to church circles. The tjng dose church-State relations as the .em-day Russia is nor a peaceful, pros­lted by deeades of oppression, Russian ground up. In these citcumstances no l democratic one, can afford ro draw a argest and best organized institution of

imernational relations are other arenas rging for Russian Orthodoxy. Most of :<-urasia are experiencing genuine rei i­ere is confusion about what it means. ket in religion will spawn violent eth­for example, no fewer than three sep­Jkrainian Orthodox (Moscow Pani­d Ukrainian Catholic-vie for a share le region. Competing Orthodox juris­lUrch in the Russian Federation. tian sects and exotic non-Christian or :ms an even more baffiing challenge ro lmuniry has long been used ro dealing ,Is. and other peoples of the Russian is a maner of hisroric tradition. It has ~ussians who embrace nontraditional • in this regard have been greatly exac­.sionaries that has washed over Russia the newcomers as interlopers whose e away from its true shepherds. The petare under rhe warrant of the 1990 :>dox Church helped set in place. r it is led the senior hierarchy of the hat can be rermed its mosr conrrover-

Russian Orrhodoxy and Human Rights 305

sial initiative of the 1990S relative to human rights: agitation to amend the 1990 legislarion on religion in such a way as to bar or otherwise limir the reli­gious aCtivities of foreigners on the territory of the Russian Federarion. An amended Jaw was in faCt adopted by the Russian parliamem in rhe summer of 1993, only ro be veroed by President Yelrsin. A revised version of the amend­mem also turned our to be a dead lener following Yelrsin's forcible dispersal of the parliament in the birrer conflicr of September-Ocrober 1993. Still. rhe issue has not been laid to resc Another revision of the 1990 law has been under discussion in the Duma since 1994. Ar hearings on the mattet in early 1995 the Patriarchate let it be known that it still favors limitations on the religious activities of foteigners in Russia.7°

The Patriarchare's campaign drew a good deal of international anention and prompted the intervention of Western-based human rights activists. International conferences on the issue were held in 1994 and 1995 at which the proposed limitations on religious acriviry in Russia were roundly criticized as violating the international human rights norms stated in the Universal Declaration. the Helsinki Final Act, rhe Vienna Concluding Document (1989), and other instruments ro which Russia is a parry.7 t There is no reason ro suppose that the monitoring of religious conditions in Russia and other post-Communist stares will cease any rime soon. Western missionary and human rights groups are well otganized, well financed, and well connected polirically. Russian church leaders will not be able [0 ignote them. Even less will a democratically oriented Russian government find it easy to counte­nance violations of rreaties to which it is a signarory. In effect, the environ­menr in which the Russian Orrhodox Church carries out its ministry has been imernationalized.

The outlook for relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and Wesrern religious and rights organizations should not be painted [00 darkly. Strong internationalisr currems have long existed in the chutch. especially among rhe hierarchy. An interesting featute of the Russian bishops' commen­tary on the All-Union law of 1990, for example. was theit commendation of international human rights insrruments. The bishops hailed the AlI-Union law as the first piece of Soviet legislation rhat "answers [0 rhe fundamental principles of the Universal Declararion of Human Rights, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the other agreements reached by participating governmenrs in the course of implementing the Helsinki process. "72

Even more important as a stimulus to inrernarionalism is the composition of rhe parriarchal church irself. Always more cosmopoliran than irs repurarion. the Moscow Patriarchate became a truly inrernational community of churches following the breakup of the USSR in 1991. Preeminent not just in Russia, the

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patriarchal church is the largest church in Ukraine and Belarus, one of the largesr in rhe Baltic countties, and a significam presence on the religious scene in all fifteen pOst-soviet states. The church also has close, if no longer juridi­cal, ties ro a daughter-church in North America, the Onhodox Church in America. The leadership of rhe Patriarchate is deeply committed ro holding this diverse community of churches rogether ro the extent possible in the face of ethnic, political, and ecclesiastical pressures to rhe contrary. Many chutch­men surely recognize rhar the interests of rhe Pattiarchare and its huge flock in rhe Near Abroad and elsewhere will be bener protected in rhe long run through reliance on international human rights norms than by religious pro­tecrionism, ad hoc political pressures, or other artificial arrangements.

Crirics of me Moscow Patriarchare view irs effortS to preserve irs organiza­tion in rhe Near Abroad as a dangerous manifestation of neo-sovier "empire~

saving. "73 The accusarion should not be dismissed lightly, since rhe alienation ofsome twenty-five million Russians from rhe Russian state is certainly a polir­ical earrhquake rhar will send aftershocks rhrough rhe region for years to come. But it is equally important to recognize thar rhere is an ecclesiastical principle ar stake in rhe ambitions of rhe Moscow Patriarchate. Sectarianism, splinter­ing and the proliferarion ofjurisdictions are not rhe final word in church polity from an Orthodox point of view. Nor is there any theological reason for the church to mirror the polirical divisions of the age. It may be a good thing for post-soviet Eurasia ro divide into erhnically based democratic republics. But rhe Russian church is nor a republican entity any more rhan ir was a tsarist or Sovier enrity. Its citizenship is in heaven. Like the cross of Christ in which ir glories, rhe Orrhodox Church srands "rowering o'er the wrecks of time."

NOTES

I. For s[3risrlcs on prerevolurionary church insrirurions, see Igor Smolirsch, Geschichte tin rus,l'ischen Kirche, 1700-1917, vol. 1 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1964): pp. 705-13.

2. There were approximarely 15,000 functioning Orrhodox churches in rhe Sovier Union by the end of World War II, many of them in rhe newly incorporared rerrirories. Aner rhe Khrushchev persecurion there were abour 6,000 or 7,000. The besr recenr sources of informarion on rhe Russian Onhodox Church prior ro rhe expansion of the lare 1980s are Narhanid Davis, A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History o/Russian Orthodoxy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); Jane Ellis, The Russi.an Orthodox Church: A Contemporary History (Bloomingron and Indianapolis: Indiana Universiry Press, (986); Dimirry Pospidovsky, The Russian Church Undfr the Soviet Regime 1917-1982, 2. vols. (Cresrwood, N.Y.: Sc. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1984); and William C. Flercher, Soviet Believers: The Religious Sector o/the Population (Lawrence: The Regents Press oflGmsas, 1981).

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3. The primat."y ofgrace was the theme of0 sermons, Metropoliran Hilarion's "Sermon 01 Russian (non-Greek) merropoliran of Kiev i Serge A. Zenkovsky, Medieval Russia's Epics Dutton, 1974), pp. 85-90.

4. Evgeny Barabanov sums up the view Q

when he wrires: "The Church is not defined j' and tradition. In essence and idea she is thar, nor be divided. Ovet againsr rhe Church SGUl

of the world, bur in all being there does nOr deepesr level, if nor in our ideologized conscio Church is the emerging solidariry of all rhit everyrhing divided and broken. All of us are which has nor yet become part of het, every enreted inco her. For we know rhar nowhere, of whar God has revealed in His Body­Samosozanie: shornik ,.tatei, ed. P. Lityjnov, ~

York: Khronika Press, 1976), p. 2.6. 5. The uniqueness of persons is connored

(sing.) is also used as a collecrive noun referri tisters, as in the exp ression prichislit' k liku s; saints," i.e.) co canonize.

6. For a somewhat different interpreta[jon freedom" in Byzanrine sociery in Alexandet Power in Byzantium: An Introduction to Mo, Dumbanon Oaks Center for Byzantine SrucL

7. One should nor forger thar "rhe righrs points of Napoleon's bayoners.

8. See Andn.ej Walicki, Legal Philosophit Press, 1987), ch. r: "The Tradirion of rhe Cer galism among Russian Orthodox rhinkers w~

whose COntribution ro legal consciousness ane lyzed by Walicki in ch. 3: "Vladimir Soloviev: the 'New Libetalism.' "

9. Vladimir Zelinsky, Prikhodiashchie v tse ro. See [he penerrating discussion of rhis p

Pp·46-47. II. In the fall of1990 a jonrnalisr asked nt'l

Russian Orthodox Church needed to repenr ~

His answer illustrares the organic, establish! Russian Church sinned againsr rhe Rnssian Church jf nor this same Russian people vie~

the Russian Church as a whole rhere is no sin people." The parriarch went on ro defend Mel loyalry to the Sovier state in 192.7 which I diSCl

1990, p. 9·

in Ukraine and Belarus, one of the ficam presence on the religious scene ch also has close, if no longer juridi­America, rhe Orrhodox Church in late is deeply committed to holding cher to the extem possible in the face isures to the conrrary. Many church­f the Pauiarchate and its huge flock be better protected in the long run rights norms than by religious pro­

other artificial arrangemenrs. w its efforts to preserve irs organiza­nanifestarion of neo-soviet "empire­lismissed lightly, since rhe alienarion I the Russian state is cenainly a polit­hrough the region for years to come. lar there is an ecclesiastical principle Patriarchate. Sectarianism, splimer­'e not the final word in church polity there any rheological reason for the .rhe age. Ir may be a good rhing for lIy based democratic republics. But :iry any more rhan ir was a tsarisr or Like rhe cross of Chrisr in which it ·ering 0'er the wrecks of rime."

Jtions. see Igor Smolitsch. Geschichte tier Irill, 1964): pp. 70 5-13.

ming Ormodox churches in rhe Soviet

:m in the newly incorporated terrirories. Ir 6.000 or 7,000. The besr recenc sources

I prior ro rhe expansion of the lare 1980s mtemporary History ofRussian Orthodoxy ~ssian Orthodox Church: A Contemporary ana University Press. 1986); Dimitry

?t Regime '9J7-1982, 2 vols. (Crestwood. Villiam C. Fletcher, Soviet Believers: The tegents Press of Kansas. 1981).

Russian Orthodoxy and Human Rights 307

3. The primacy ofgrace was the theme ofone of rhe earliesr and mosr celebrated Russian sermons, Metropoliran Hilarion's ~Sermon on Law and Grace." Hilarion became rhe first

Russian (non-Greek) mctropoliran of Kiev in 105'. For a partial English translation see Serge A. Zenkovsky. Medieval Russia's Epics, Chronicles, and Tales, rev. ed. (New York:

Dutton. (974), pp. 85-90. 4. Evgeny Barabanov sums up the view of many modern Russian Orthodox rhinkers

when he wrires: "The Church is nOt defined just by her sanCtuary and lirurgy. her rheology

and tradition. In essence and idea she is rhat Absolure Reality whose being is not and can­nor be divided. Over againsr the Church stand evil and deam, the falsehood and darkness

of the world. bur in all being mere does nor exjsr a positive reality or grace which on irs

deepest level, ifnor in our ideologized consciousness, could be opposed ro the Church. The

Church is rhe emerging solidarity of all things, and her essence lies in joining together

everything divided and broken. Ali of us are called ro build the Church our ofeverything which has not yet become parr of her, everything which has not visibly and perceptibly

emered inco her. For we know thar nowhere. nOt on any paths, will man reach the hLUness of what God has revealed in His Body-the Holy Church." "Pravda gumanizma. n

Samosozanie: sbomik slatei, ed. P. Lirvinov, M. Meerson-Aksenov; and B. Shragin (New

York: Khronika Press, 1976), p. 26. 5. The uniqueness of pelsons is connoted by the root word of iichnoJt': iik, "face." Lik

(sing.) is also used as a collective noun referring to me company of saints, angels, or cho­

risters, as in rhe expression prichisiit' k iiku sviatykh, "to reckon among the facers] of the saints," i.e.• to canonize.

6. For a somewhat different interpretation see the discussion of "individualism without

freedom" in Byzantine society in Alexander Kazhdan and Giles Constable. People and Power in B)'zantium: An Introduction to Modern Byzantine Studies (Washingron. D.C.:

Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies, 1982). 7. One should not forget rhar "the rightS of man and citizen" came ro Russia on me

pointS of Napoleon's bayonetS.

8. See Andrzej Walicki. Legal Philosophies ofRu.r.<ian Liberalism (Oxford: Clarendon

Press. 1987). ch. I: "The Tradirion of the Censure of Law." A norable exception ro antile­galism among Russian Orthodox thinkers was Vladimir Sergeevich Soloviev ([853-1900),

whose comriburion to legal consciousness and the theory ofhuman rightS in Russia is ana­

lyzed by Walicki in ch. 3: "Vladimir Soloviev: Religious Philosophy and the Emergence of the 'New Liberalism.' "

9· Vladimir Zelinsky, Prikhodiashchie v tserkov' (Paris: La Press Libre, 1982), pp. 47, 54· ro. See the penetrating discussion of this problem in Zelinsky, Prikhodiashchie v tserko1J;

PP·46-47. II. In me full of1990 a journali5[ asked new Parriarch Aleksii II whether he believed the

Russian Orthodox Church needed ro repem for any of itS actions during the Sovier period. His answer illustrares me organic, establishmemarian view we are discussing. "Has the

Russian Church sinned against the Russian people>" he asked. "But what is the Russian

Church if nor this same Russian people viewed in terms of their spiritual aspirarions> In

the Russian Church as a whole rhere is no sin which is separare from the sin of the Russian people." The patriarch wem on to defend Metropolitan Sergii's controversial declaration of

loyalty to rhe Soviet stare in 1927 which I discuss below. Literatumaia gauta. November 28,

1990. p. 9·

I

308 PauL VaLLiere

12. John Meyendorff, "The Russian Church After Parriarch Tikhon," St. Vladimir's TheoLogicaL Quarterly t9, no. I (1975): 40.

13. Quoted by Meyendodf, "The Russian Church After Parriarch Tikhon," pp. 39-40,

from Patriarkh Sergii i ego dukhovnoe nasLedstvo (Moscow, 1947), p. 62. The text of Metropolitan Sergii's t927 encyclical is included in the laner source.

14. The All-Union law, "0 svobode sovesri i religioznykh organiucsiiakh," was pub­

lished in Pravda, Ocrober 9, 1990, p. 4· The RSFSR law, "0 svobode veroispovedanii,"

was published in SovetJkaia Rossiia, November 10, 1990, p. 5, and in VedomoJti s"ezda nar­odnykh deputatov i VerkholJnogo Soveta RSFSR, no. 21 (1990), Stat'ia 240. For furrher com­

ment, see note 60.

15. English rranslarions of the decree on Separation of the Church from the State and the Schools from the Church may be found in William B. Stroyen, Communiu Rlmia and the Russian Orthod.(Jx Church 1943-191'f2 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, Inc., (967), pp. Il7-I8; and in Richard H. Marshall, Jr. et al., eds., AJpem ofReligion in the Soviet Union 1917-1967 (Chicago and London: University of Chicago

Press, 1971), pp. 437-38. I quote from Stroyen's translation, excepr rhat I have changed the word "government" ra "sr.ate" in the ride of the decree.

[6. Konstitmsiia (Osnovnoi 2akon) Soiuu Soverskikh Sotsialistichesk..ikh Respublik

(Moscow, (977), Stat'ia 6. The corresponding arricle of the constitU(ion of 1936 is Arricle

1l6. The language of 1977 is more doctrinaire. For an English translation of the constitu­tion of [977, see The SOIJiet Union Through Its Lows, ed., rrans. and wirh an intra. by Leo

Hecht (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 17-60. For a rransladon of rhe constiturion of 1936,

see Basic Laws on the Structure of the Soviet State, trans. and ed. by Harold J. Berman and

John B. Quigley, Jr. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, [969), pp. 3-28. A rranslarion of the two constirurions may also be found in David Lane, PoLitics and Society in the USSR (New York: New York University Press, 1978), Appendix C!J-l.

17. Konsrirursiia SSSR, Stat'ia 52. The corresponding article of the constitution ofr936

is Atticle t24. 18. English rranslations of the Law on Religious Associations may be found in Stroyen,

Communist Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church, pp. 121-27; and in Marshall et al., eds.,

Aspew ofReligion in the Soviet Union, pp. 438-45. [9. Polozhenie ob upravlenii russkoi pravoslavnoi rserkvi, PraIJoslavnyi tJerkovnyi kaien­

dar' na 1946 god (Moscow, 1946), pp. 58-60. An English translarion may be found in Stroyen, Communist Russul and the Russian Orthodox Church, pp. 136-40. Articles 39 and

40 perrain ro the dvadtJatka. 20. The text of the measures approved by the council of bishops in 1961 was published

in ZhurnaL mOJkovskoi patriarkhii, no. 8 (196[): 15-17. See also the summary of rhe concil­

iar discussions on pp. 9-15. 21. An English translation of the 1975 amendments to the Law on Religious Associations

along with the articles which they replaced may be found in Pospielovsky, The Russian Church Under the Soviet Regime, 2: 493-500.

22. The best general account of rhe Sovier human rights movemenr is Ludmilla

Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary MOIJemenrs fOr National, ReLigious, and Human RightJ (Middlerown, Conn.: Wesleyan Universiry Press, 1985). Detailed discussions of Orthodox rights aCtivism may also be found in the works by Jane Ellis and Dimitry

Pospielovsky already cired.

Russian

l3. Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent, p. 275· 24. For a complete English translation of rh

the hierarchy see "Documems: Appeals for Rei

Seminary Quarterly 10, nos. l-2 (1966): 67­

Bourdeaux, Patriarch and Prophets: Perserotion 0. York and Washington: Praeger, 1970), pp. 189-2 the Soviet period including the letters coauthor

Gleb Yakounine. Un pretre seul au pays des fOvi preface by Olivier Clement (Limoges: Editions

25. There were a few bishops, however, who

cized the council of [961 and supported Orth< dissidenrs, Ermogen (Golubev) of Kaluga (earli,

(Golyshev) of Novosibirsk, were eventually fore

are described by Ellis, The Rttrsian Orthod. Pospielovsky, The Russian Church Under the Sc

also the materials on the case of Archbishor

Prophets, pp. 238-54. 26. For example, the case of the believers c

Deftnd Thm Rights: Human RightJ and the Sovit Random House. 1974), pp. [99-208. Updated Orthodox Church, p. 295.

27. For a fairly representative sample of d human righrs movemenr, see Michael Meersc

Politico'!, SociaL, and Religious Thought ofRu.f. Nickolas Lupinin (Belmom, Mass.: Nordland,

28. For an accoum of the interview, with exCi

Lemen Letter," rranslated by Ludmilla Thorne,:

sec. 4: 18. A translarion by Alexis Klimoff rna

Haugh, and Alexis Klimoff, eds., Akxandn SoL Materials (Belmom, Mass.: Nordland, (973), pp

29. See AJexeyeva, Soviet Dissent, pp. 255­

pp. 373-81.

30. English translations of Yakunin and Rej Aksenov and Shragin, eds., PoLitical, Social and Father Gleb Yakunin and Lev Regelson, Letters. in the USSR, ed. by Jane Ellis (KeslOn: Keston C< Communism; San Francisco: H. S. Dakin, 1978

31. Pavel Litvinov, "0 dvizhenii La prava chel,

(New York: Khronika Press, (976), p. 86.

Jl. The Council for Russian Orthodox Churc for Religious Affairs.

33. "To the Chairman of the Presidiulll of d Socialist Republics," St. Vladimir's Seminary Qu

34. See Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, I

35. "To His Holiness, rhe Most Holy Patr Vlo.dimir's Seminary Quarterly IO, nos. 1-2 (196<;

I

urch Mer Patriarch Tikhon," St. Vladimir's

Church Mer Patriarch Tikhon," pp. 39-40 , ledstvo (Moscow, 1947), p. 62. The text of :led in the laner source. :sci i religioznykh organizatsiiakh," was pub­e RSFSR law, "0 svobode veroispovedanii," er 10,1990, p. ), and in Vedomo,rti s"ezda nar­

?, no. 21 (1990), Stat'ia 240. For further com­

;eparation of the Church from the State and n Wil1iam B. Stroyen, Communist Russia and

shingcou, D.C.: The Catholic University of l Richard H. Marshall, Jr. et al., eds., Aspects

hicago and London: Universiry of Chicago l'S translation, except that I have changed the ne decree.

za Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik ~ article of the conscinJtion of t936 is Article ~. For an English rranslarion of the constitu­J Laws, ed., rrans. and with an intro. by Leo For a translation of the constitution of 1936, ate, trans. and ed. by Harold J. Berman and liversiry Press, 1969), pp. 3-28. A cranslauon David Lane, Politics and Society in the USSR , Appendix C/I-2.

'esponding arricle of the conscicucion ofr936

gious Associacjons may be found in Stroyen, ?ureh, pp. 121-27; and in Marshall et al., eds.,

-45· ;/avnoi tserhi, Pravosl.avnyi tserkovnyi kalen­

I. An English translation may be found in rthodox Church, pp. 136-4°. Articles 39 and

:he council of bishops in 1961 was published : 15-17. See also the summary of the concil­

dmencs to rhe Law on Religious Associations nay be found in Pospielovsky, The Russian

'iet human rights movement is Ludmilla mzents for National, Religious, and Human

ersity Press, 1985). Detailed discussions of d in rhe works by Jane Ellis and Dimirry

Russian Orthodoxy and Human Righrs :J09

23· Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent, p. 275. 24. For a complete English translation of the tWO lereers along wirh the cover letter to

the hierarchy see "Documenrs: Appeals for Religious Freedom in Russia," St. Vladimir's

Seminary Quarter~y 10, nos. 1-2 (1966): 67-lJl. Large excerpts appear in Michael Bourdeaux, Patriarch and Prophets: Persecution ofthe Russian Orthodox Church Today (New York and Washingcon: Praeger, 1970), pp. 189-223. A flne edition of Yakunin's writings iu the Soviet period inclllding the lerrers coauthored with Eshliman ha-~ appeared in French: Gleb Yakounine, Un pretre ,reul au pays des sovi(-'tS, presented by Fran<;ois Rouleau with a preface by Olivier Clemenr (Limoges: Editions Criterion, 1984).

2). There were a few bishops, however, who resisted the antireligious campaign, criti­cized the council of 1961 and supported Orthodox dissidents. The most vocal episcopal dissidents, Ermogen (Golubev) ofKaluga (earlier, ofTa-~hkent and Cenrral Asia) and Pavel (Golyshev) of Novosibirsk, were eveurually forced out ofservice. Their activities and fates are described by Ellis, The Rus;ian Orthodox Church, pp. 17, 68, 235-44; and by Pospielovsky, The Russian Church Under the Soviet Regime, pp. 327, 393-94, 421-22. See also the marerials on the case of Archbishop Ermogen in Bourdeaux, Patriarch and

Prophea, pp. 238-54. 26. For e.....ample, che case of the believers of Naro-Fominsk. See Valery Chalidze, To

Defend These RightJ: Human Rights and the Soviet Union, trans. by Guy Daniels (New York: Random House, 1974). pp. 199-2,08. Updated informarion appears in Ellis, The RusJian

Orthodox Church, p. 295. 27. For a fairly representative sample of dissident samizdat from the period of the

human righrs movement, see Michael Meerson-Aksenov and Boris Shragin, eds., The

Political, Social, and Religious Thought ofRussian aSamizdat"; An Anthology, trans. by Nickolas Lupinin (Belmont, Mass.: Nordland, 1977).

28. For an account of the interview, with excerpts, see New York Times, April 3, 1972. "A Lemen Letter," cranslated by Ludmilla Thome, appeared in New York Times, April 9,1972, sec. 4: r8. A translation by Alexis KJimoff may be found in John B. Dunlop, Richard Haugh, and Alexis KJimoff, eds., Alex£wder Solzhenitsyn: Critical E5Sa.ys and Documentary

Materials (Belmont, Ma-~s.: Nordland, 1973), pp. 472-77. 29. See Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent, pp. 255-59; Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church,

pp. 373-81. 30. English translations of Yakunin and Regelson's lener may be found in Meerson­

Aksenov and Shragin, eds., Political, Social and Religious Thought ofRussian "Samizdat"; Father Gleb Yakunin and Lev Regelson, Lettwfrom Moscow: Religion and Human Rights

in the USSR, ed. by Jane Ellis (Kesron: Keston College Cenrre for the Study of Religion and Commuuism; San Francisco: H. S. Dakin, 1978).

3I. Pavel Lirvinov, "0 dvizhenii za prava cheloveka v SSSR," Sarnosozanie; sbomik statei

(New York: Khronika Press, 1976), p. 86. 32. The Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs was later replaced by the Council

for Religious AflJ..irs. 33. "To the Chairman of the Presidium of rhe Supreme Soviec of the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics," St. Vladimir's Seminary Q1.Idrter/y ro, 110S. 1-2 (1966): 68. 34. See Ellis, The Rus,rian Orthodox Church, pp. 255-56. 35. "To His Holiness, the Most Holy Parriarch of Moscow and of All Russia," St.

Vladimir's Seminary Q1.Idrter/y 10, nos. 1-2 (1966): 79.

310 Paul Valliere

36. Ibid., p. I04. 37. "Vserossiiskomu Pauiarkhu Pimenu: velikoposmoe pis'mo," Vestnik ru.'skogo stu­

dmcheskogo khrisri.amkogo dvizheniia I03 (1972): 148-49. 38. "Pis'mo A. Sol1.henirsynu," Vesmik russkogo studencheskogo khristiamkogo dvizheniia

103 (1972): 157. 39· The original Russian texr is in Arkhivsamizd.ata, no. 3751 (October 26,1979). In rhe

preparation of this essay I have used the French transladon, "La situation actuelle de l'Eglise orthodoxe russe et les perspectives d'un renouveau religieux en Russie," in Gleb Yakounine, Un pretre .feul au pays des soviets, pp. 137-74.

40. "La siruarion actuelle de l'Eglise orrhodoxe russe," pp. 166-74. 41. lhid., p. 151. 42. For Yakunin's praise of Dudko, see "La siruarion actuelle de l'Eglise orthodoxe

russe," p. 148. A derailed discussion of Dudko's recantation appears in Ellis, The Russian OrThodox Church, pp. 430-39.

43· Ellis, The RltsJum Orthodox Church, pp. 120-21. 44. PospieLovsky, The Russian Chureh Under the Soviet Regime, 2; 427-31. 45· Pospielovsky, The R~sian Church Under the Soviet Regime, 2: 404-6. 46. Ellis, The Rwsian OrthodfJx Church, pp. 93--94. 47· See, for example, rhe article by V Savitsky, "Prestiz.h advokatury," Pravd.a, March

u, 1987, p. 3. 48. The nine were Farher Gleb Yakunin, Father Nikolai Gainov, Andrei Bessmermyi,

Valery Borshchov, Vikrar Burdiug, Vladimir Zelinsky, Evgeny Pawkhin, Vikror Popkov, and Vladimit Poresh. The lerrers were released ar a news conference in Moscow in May 1987. The lerrer ro Gorbachev was published in rhe Paris newspaper Russktlia mys/', no. 3676 (June 5, 1987), p. 6. The lerrer ro Parriarch Pimen was published in no. 3682 (July 17,

1987), pp. 6-7· 49· New York Times, June 8, 1987 and Augusr 23, 1987, sec. 4:(. Yakunin was subse­

quendy elecred ro rhe parliamenr of rhe Russian republic. In 1993, however, the Parriarchare banned its clergy from standing for public office. Running for a seat in rhe posr-soviet Duma at Ihe rime, Yakunin refused ro comply and was defrocked.

50. See the account of Konstanrin M. Kharchev's visir ro New York, New York Times, Ocraber 30,1986. Kharchev was chairman of rhe Council for Religious Affairs ar rhe rime.

5!. This is one of rhe changes nored by rhe group of nine in rheir open lerrers ro Gorbachev and Patriarch Pimen (see above, nore 48).

52. The conferences were held in Kiev, July 1986; Moscow, May 1987; and Leningrad, February 1988.

53· The Journal ofthe Moscow Patriarchate, 1986, no. I: 80 [English edirion]. The ririe in the Russian edirion is "Nashi iuridicheskie konsul'ratsii: Prava i obiaz.annosti religioznogo obshchesrvol.'· The reference is the same.

54. See rhe repon in Pravd.a, April 30, 1988. 55· "Usrav ob upravlenii Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi," Pornesmyi sobor Russkoi

Pravoslaunoi Tserkui. Troitse-Sergiroa Laura. 6-fJ iiurtia /988 god.a. Materialy, Kniga pervaia (Moscow: lzdanie Moskovskoi Pauiarkhii, 1990), pp. 24-49. The UStav was adopted on June 8, 1988.

56. Prior ro formal publicarion in 1990 (see note 55) the statute was published in rype­scripr formar in rhe newslerter of the Parriarchate's Deparrmem of Exrernal Church

Russial

Relarions: "Informatsionnyi biulleten' ord Moskovskogo Parriarkhata," 1988, no. 7-9 (Ot srature reads; "This Srarute has been composed i gious culrs and may be changed or supplement( Mr. Alexis Liberovsky, archivist of the Orthod with a copy of the "Informarsionnyi biulJeten' "

57. Metropolitan Vladimir of Rostov, "The Church After rhe Adoption of the New Statut nos. 2-3 (1990) :tl7-39. See also Kyrill, archbi Church in Relation [Q Society Under 'Pereslro originally appeared in Zhumal moskovskoi patri,

58. The data are given in "Ko dniu tewimel Tserkvi," Zhurnal moskovskoi patriarkhii, no. 2 semation of rhe dara on the size and marerial c( since World War II, see Nathaniel Davis, A LoTo ofR~'sian OrthodfJxy (Boulder: Westview Press,

59. "La situarion actuelle de I'Eglise orrhodc 60. See above, nore 14. AlI·Union law, "0,

iakh"; RSFSR law, "0 svobode veroispovedanii my own rranslalions. Quorarions from the RSF tion prepared by rhe Foreign Broadcasl Inform.; Religion," JPRS-UPA-90-071, Decembet 1~

Commerce, Narional Technical Informacion Deborah Jones, Librarian of rhe Hudson Inslin

61. "Zaiavlenie Pomesrnogo Sobora Russkoi proekta Zakona SSSR '0 svobode sovesri j J

mo,-kouskoi patriarkhii, no. 9, (1990): 9-Il; and svobode sovesri," ibid., no. 2 (1991): 2-5.

62. "Zaiavlenie Pomesmogo Sobora Russkol 63. Quoted by Dimirry V. Pospielovsky,

Posrcommunisr CIS," The Potitics ofReligion i, Michael Bourdeaux. Inrernarional Polirics of E1 ParroH, vol. 3 (Armonk, N.Y. and London: M Sworn in as Russia's Leader," New York Times, J

64. "Zaiavlenie Pomesrnogo Sobora Rw "Verkhovnyi sover SSSR odobril zakonoproekt

5, 1990, p. 20. 65. "Zaiavlenie Pomesrnogo Sobora Ro

"Opredelenie 0 priniatorn Zakone SSSR 0 svo~

66. The cosr of the projecr is esrimated ar $2

York Times, April 24, 1995, p. A{. The projecr is ing Orrhodox intelligenrsia who see it as mi applied to rebuilding the church at rhe parisi vygodnym," Nezauisimaia gdzeta. April], 1994, Khrisra Spasitelia prevrashchaersia v banal'nuit p. 2. The host of a relevision show on Orthodt

: velikoposwoe pis'mo," Vesmik russkogo stu­72): 148-49.

sskogo studencheskogo khristianskogo dvizheniia

samizdata, no. 3751 (Ocrober 26, 1979). In me :rench translation, "La situarion actuelle de run renouveau religieux en Russie," in Cleb pp. 137-74· odoxe russe," pp. 166-74.

"La siruation aCtuelle de I'Eglise orrhodo.xe ko's lecantation appears in Ellis, The Russian

p. nO-H.

ter the Sovier Regime, 2: 42 7-31. fer the Soviet Regime, 2: 40 4-6.

P·93-94· ~jtsky, "Pleslizh advokarury," Pravda, March

Father Nikolai Cainov, Andrei Bessmerrnyi, Zelinsky, Evgeny Pazukhin, Viktor Popkov,

ed at a news conference in Moscow in May I in the Paris newspaper Russkaia myst, no. :h Pimen was published in no. 3682 (July 17,

Igust 23, 1987, sec. 4:1. Yakunin was subse­Russian republic. In 1993, however, rhe for public office. Running for a seat in the d ro comply and was defrocked. archey's visit co New York, New York Times, :he Council for Religious Affairs at rhe time. the group of nine in their open letters co ore 48).

y 1986; Moscow, May 1987; and Leningrad,

[986, no. I: 80 [English edition). The title in nsuJ'tatsii: Prava i obiazannosri religioznogo

;lavnoi Tserkvi," Pomestnyi sobor Russkoi ~ iiunia I988 gOda' Materialy, Kniga pervaia 10), pp. 24-49. The Ustav was adopted on

note 55) the starute was published in rype­rchate's Department of Exremal Church

Russian Orthodoxy and Human RightS 311

Relations: "lnformatsionnyi biulleten' otdela vneshnikh tserkovnykh snoshenii Moskovskogo ParriaIkhata," 1988, no. 7-9 (October 4, 1988). A gloss on the tirle of the statute reads: "This Starute has been composed in harmony with existing legislation on reli­gious cults and may be changed or supplemented in the event of new legislation." I thank Mr. Alexis Liberovsky, archiviSt of the Orrhodox Church in America, for supplying me with a copy of the "Informatsionnyi biulleten' " edition of the srature.

57. Metropolitan Vladimir of Roscov, "The Current State of the Russian Orrhodox Church After the Adoprion of the New Statute," Sf. VWimir's Theological Quarterly H, nos. 2-3 (1990) :1I7-39. See also Kyrill, archbishop of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, "The Church in Relation to Sociery Under 'Perestroika,' " ibid., pp. 141-60. Both documents originally appeared in Zhumal moskovskoi patriarkhii, 1990, no. 2.

58. The data are given in "Ko dniu tezoimenimva Predscoiarelia Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi," Zhumal moskovskoi patriarkhii, no. 2 (1994): 9. For a scrupulously careful pre­sentation of the data on the size and material condition of the Russian Orrhodox Church since World War II, see Nathaniel Davis, A Long Walk tQ Church: A Contemporary History ofRussian QrthotUixy (Boulder: Wesrview Press, 1995).

59. "La situar;on aCtuelle de l'Eglise orthodoxe russe," p. 151. 60. See above, nore 14. All-Union law, "0 svobode sovesti i religioznykh organiursi ­

iakh"; RSFSR law, "0 svobode veroispovedanii." Quotations from the All-Union law are my own translations. Quotations from the RSFSR law are taken from the English transla­rion prepared by the Foreign Broadcast Informarjon Service: "RSFSR Law on Freedom of Religion," JPRS-UPA-90-07I, December 19, 1990 (reproduced by U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Va.). I rhank Ms. Deborah Jones, Librarian of rhe Hudson Institute, for retrieving the last-named source.

6t. "Zaiavlenie Pomesrnogo Sobora Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi v sviazi s publikatsiei proekra Zakona SSSR '0 svobode soveSti j religioznykh organi~arsiiakh,' " Zhttrnal moskovskoi patriarkhii, no. 9, (1990): 9-1I; and "Opredelenie 0 priniatom Zakone SSSR 0

svobode sovesti," ibid., no. 2 (1991): 2-5. 62. "Zaiavlenie Pomesrnogo Sobora Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi," p. 10. 63. QuoIed by Dimitry V. Pospielovsky, "The Russian Orrhodox Church in rhe

Postcommunist CIS," The Polities ofReligion in Russia and the New States ofEurasia, ed. Michael Bourdeaw:, International Polirics of Eurasia series, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce ParlOrt, vol. 3 (Armonk, N.Y. and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 49. See also "Yelrsin Sworn in as Russia's Leader," New York Times, July 11, 199I.

64. "Zaiavlenie Pomesrnogo Sobora Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi," pp. 10-11;

"Verkhovnyi sover SSSR odobril zakonoproekt 0 svobode sovesri," Russkaia my!!', October

~, 1990, p. 20. 65. "Zaiavlenie Pomesrnogo Sobora Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi," p. 10; cf.

"Opredelenie 0 priniatom ZakDne SSSR 0 svobode sovesti," p. 4. 66. The COSt of the projecr is estimared at $200 million; see "A Rebirth in Russia," New

York Times, April 24, 1995, p. A4. The projecr is nor popular with the intelligentsia, includ­ing Orrhodox intelligentsia who see ir as misdirecting resources thar would berter be applied to rebuilding the church at rhe parish level. See "Pobianie [Q2he m02her bye' vygodnym," NezalJisimaia gazeta, April 7, 1994, p. 6; and "Lichnyi narodnyi khram: khram Khrista Spasirelia prevrashchaetsia v banal'nuiu udaInuiu srroiku," ibid., January 10, 1995, p. 2. The host of a television show on Orthodoxy and Russian culture recently said of Ihe

312 Paul Valliere

challenges facing contemporary Russia: "the main thing is [Q build the spiritual carhedral of Sf. Sophia, nor the crude marerial cathedral of Christ rhe Savior; rhe main rhing is to create the spiritual foundations of democracy." "Imperiia kul'tury, iii 0 pravoslavnykh storannikakh demokraticheskoi Rossii," Literatumaia gaura, April 26, 1995, p. 15.

67. NeZtlVisimaia gazeta, June I, 1991. 68. Writing of the early Soviet decades, Vladimir Zelinsky rightly observed: "The furure

historian will by no means jndge those rimes to be the worst in rhe life of the Russian epis­copate. One cannor deny it: individuals to whom fate seemed to have guaranteed a peace­ful existence under [he wing of tsarist Orthodox Russia did not go ro pieces when faced with arresr, prison, and concentrarion camps. Some were even able ro die in joy with a prayer for their executioners on rheir lips, as in apostolic times. Should the age of persecu­tion rerum again, the majority of our bishops would find rhe strength ro walk rhe same path as their predecessors." Prikhodiash<"hie v tserkov', p. 104.

69. No less an authority than James H. Billingron offered the following assessment in mid-1994: "With the collapse of rhe world's first atheisr srate, the historic religion of Russia has emerged as the central culwral force in rhe COUntry's new national self-consciousness. As a cohering ideology, Orthodoxy has replaced communism as rhe lodestar of Russian society. Along with the army, the Church is one of [he few national institutions thar is srill respected." "The Case for Orthodoxy," The New Republic, May 30,1994, pp. 24-25.

70. Coverage of rhe issue in [he mainline RussiaJI press has generally been unsympathetic ro the protectionist cause. See A1eksandr Nezhnyi, "Kra boirsia cheloveka s evaJlgeliem," Izvestiia, July 15, ]993, p. 5; and "Vse religii ravny ... No esr' bolee ravnye?" Literatumaia gazetLl, February 22, 1995, p. 2. Debares on the issue have appeared in "thick" journals, e.g., "Spor 0 svobode sovesti," Novyi mir, no. 9 (1993): r56-7I; and "Svoboda sovesti, religiia, pravo (marerialy 'kruglogo srola')," Voprosy filosofii, no. I2 (1994): 3-r8. For an overview of the issue since r988, see Michael Bourdeaux, "Glasnost and dIe Gospel: The Emergence of Religious Pluralism," The PoLitics o/Re/igion in Russia and the New StLltes o/Eurasi.a, pp. II3-27. For the course of events in 1994 and early 1995, see Lauren B. Homer, "Laresr Legal Developments Affec[ing Religion in Russia," East-Wm Church &Ministry Report 3, no. I (WinrerI995): 1-4.

71. For an excellent exposirion of the criricisms see W Cole Durham, Jr.. Lauren B. Homer, Pierer van Dijk, and John Wirte, Jr., "The Furure of Religious Liberty in Russia: Report of rhe De Burght Conference on Pending Russian Legislarion Resrricling Religious Liberty," Emory Intemational Law Review 8, no. I (Spring, 1994): 1-66. The essay includes an English rranslalion of the proposed amendment of ALIgust 27, 1993 (Appendix A). I thank Ms. Lauren B. Homer, President, Law and Liherty Trust, and Mr. Scon M. Ellsworth of rhe J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, for directing me ro rhis and relared sources.

72. "Opredelenie 0 priniarom Zakone SSSR 0 svobode sovesti," ZhumaL moskovskoi patriarkhii, no. 2 (t991): 2. See also rhe precise cirarion of [he Vienna Concluding Documem in argumentation for changes in the draft of the 1990 law in "Zaiavlenie Pomesrnogo Sobora Russkoi Ptavoslavnoi Tserkvi v sviazi s publikarsiei proekra Zakona SSSR '0 svobode sovesti i religioznykh organizarsiiakh,' " ibid., no. 9 (1990): roo

73. See John B. Dunlop, "The Russian Orthodox Church as an 'Empire-Saving' Insritution," The PoLitics 0/ReLigion in Russia and the New States 0/Eurasi4, ed. Michael Bourdeaux. pp. 15-40.

MUSLIMWO:M

HUMAN RIGH

ISLAMIC Nom

MIRIAM COOKE /J

None of the three major ropics [0 be addr while we hope [0 open up new perspecl illumining barh differences and converE begin with rhe knorry bur pivotal [Opic of

Can human rights be universalized b( conrexts? Or have they come inro prominc cisely because they do mark a specific if e wirhin rhe world sysrem from generaliu bipolar conflict in the cold war, and no"," the contexc of Wesrern global hegemony find expression excepr as a reflex of powe accounr for irs own interesrs, bur only for

These are the questions rhar elites rhn rhey remain unanswerable as long as rhe oncilable opposires. Instead of ralking ab who is concerned about human righrs. 1 sors in a majot American universiry, wh benefits of concern for human rights. ~

despite good intentions, we recognize th~

elites, and not the views of all strata of benefits are diffuse and conjectutal: as el