RWY Incursion Hazards and Mitigation Strategies Meetings Seminars and Workshops... · and local...

© Flughafen Zürich AG| | EUR/NAT Regional Safety Seminar, Istanbul1

RWY Incursion Hazards and Mitigation Strategies

1 Safety Office at Zurich Airport2 Number of Runway Incursions3 Zurich Airport Hazards4 Zurich Airport mitigation measures5 Conclusion

6.11.2013


Zurich Airport’ Safety Office

Marc KeuschATPL, Lic. Economics at University of Zurich

1997 – 2004 Airline Pilot MD80, F100, GLF-IV2005 – 2006 Swiss CAA2007 – today Safety Office Zurich Airportsince 2011 Head Safety Office Zurich Airport

6.11.2013

- Zurich Airport is certified according ICAO Doc. 9774/ICAO Doc. 9859- Recertification by Swiss CAA takes place every 3 years- Safety Office is responsible for the functionality of the SMS at the airport- Safety Office was installed in 2006 and is directly linked to the

Accountable Executive of Zurich Airport- Zurich Airport’s Safety Office consists of 4 employees


Zurich Airport’s Runway Incursion statistics (I)

• Since 2001 every single runway incursion incident has been takenup to the statistics and since 2007 every runway incursion incidenthas been investigated by the local runway incursion investigationteam (members of the airport, ANSP and Airlines)

• If possible, the involved parties (cockpit crews, vehicle driver, ATCOs, Apron Controller) are being interviewed by a member ofthe local runway incursion investigation team on a voluntary base

• The reports of the runway incursion investigation team are beingforwarded to the authorities (CAA, AAIB) in a de-identified format

• Exchange with other local runway incursion investigation teamsand local runway safety teams is an on-going process

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Zurich Airport’s Runway Incursion statistics (II)

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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013Inc/Y 2 10 6 4 8 6 2 11 4 5 8 4 7 5Rate ZRH 0,61 3,24 2,13 1,48 3,00 2,24 0,77 4,07 1,47 1,85 3,08 1,45 2,46 1,72Rate ECAC 1,63 1,55 2,64 3,73 3,3 3,4 4 4,2 4,8 5 5,5

0,00

0,50

1,00

1,50

2,00

2,50

3,00

3,50

4,00

4,50

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

Incu

rsio

n R

ate

per 1

00'0

00 M

ovem

ents

Num

ber o

f Inc

ursi

ons

Runway Incursions

ZRH

© Flughafen Zürich AG| |

Pilot Deviation66%

Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviation

24%

Operational Errors10%

EUR/NAT Regional Safety Seminar, Istanbul55

Zurich Airport’s Runway Incursion statistics (III)

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0

2

4

6

8

10

12

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Kategorie A Kategorie B Kategorie C Kategorie D

Categories with regards to severity (acc. ICAO Doc. 9870)

Types of runway incursions:


Zurich Airport design hazards Crossing of 2 active RWY’s

Several dependencies between all 3 RWY’s

Several TWY’s crossing RWY’s (120’000 runway crossings per year)

Complex TWY system

2 remote deicing pads (C and F)

A380 Operations with restrictions

Responsibilities TWR/Apron

TOWERAPRON (North)APRON (South)

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→ Reduction of number of RWY X-ing→ Every RWY X-ing must be safe!

RSTZ


Zurich Airport Design Mitigation Strategies

6.11.2013 EUR/NAT Regional Safety Seminar, Istanbul7

Extension of runway 32 Runway-crossing free

long-haul departures

By-pass 28 taxiwayReduction of

runway crossings

Extension of runway 28 Long-haul landings on

westerly runway 28

Rapid exits runway 28 More stable operation /

extended capacity


Runway Collision Risk evaluation (quantitative approach)

EUR/NAT Regional Safety Seminar, Istanbul8

• Use Runway 28 more frequently in the future• Assess the associated risks with landings/departures on runway 28• Show the difference between ICAO Compliances/Non Compliances

(Study took place from 2008 – 2010)

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RWY 28: Hazard Scenarios

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Overall Risk

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

Present situation ICAO Compliance

Risk

per

app

roac

h

OverrunRunway crossing collision Lateral veer-offGo-around after the OCHUndershootApproach (visual segment)Approach (instrument segment)

2 x 10-7

6 x 10-7

7 x 10-7

5 x 10-7

4 x 10-7

3 x 10-7

10-7

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Risk Scenarios


00.10.20.30.40.50.6

OverrunLandung 28

Overrun Start28

Runwaycrossing

Runwaycrossing

Risk per 1 million aircraft movement (total damage)

landing 28 collisionlanding 28

take/off 28 collisiontake/off 28


Risk categories for runway 28


Scenarios state Risk of a fatal accident

Overrun

today 106 years

With EMAS 144 years

extension 28 (400 meters) 380 years

Collision due to taxiingaircraft on therunway

today 27 years

By-pass 28 taxiway 121 years


Optimization of runway 28 (in Mio. USD/year)


Project depreciation Rate ofinterest maintenance Total cost

Willingness to payfor avoidance offatalities

EMAS -0.5 -0.6 -0.2 -1.3 +0.3

Runwayextension -8.3 -9.4 -3.0 -20.7 +0.8

By-pass 28 taxiway -8.3 -9.4 -3.0 -20.7 +29.0

Conclusion:• From a cost/safety benefit perspective only the by-pass 28 taxiway mitigation measure

will generate a positive net present value (total cost vs. willingness to pay for avoidance offatalities)


Zurich Airport Design Mitigation Strategies

6.11.2013

Summary:By-pass 28 taxiway:- will cost around 180 Mio. USD- Not implemented before 2018- Will not eliminate all runway

crossings (inbound/outbound)- Hotspot is not eliminated

(taxiing aircraft with taxi instructionwithout planned runway crossing)


Design Mitigation Strategies: De-icing pad south of RWY 28

EUR/NAT Regional Safety Seminar, Istanbul15 6.11.2013

With a deicing padsouth of runway 28the number of crossingscould be decreasedby around 6000 (5%).


Zurich Airport Operational Hazards

- Users which are not familiar with the airport- No/inadequate ground/taxi preparation- Overroutine (correct readback, wrong taxiing)- «Special» ground vehicle users (police cars)- Use of runway stopbars («departure runways», H24)- Usage of a runway as a taxiway (after landing on runway 28)

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Zurich Airport Operational Mitigation Measures

- Local runway safety team (recommendations, implementation ofEAPPRI 2.0.)

- Runway Incursion Prevention campaigns

- Runway Status Lights

- Surface Manager

- Definition of Protected Area

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Runway Safety AwarenessContent• Runway Safety Reports 2008, 2011• Runway Incursion Investigation team• Awareness Posters• RWY Incursion Prevention DVDOutlook 2014• Runway Safety Report 2014• Update of DVDs

6.11.2013


RWY Status Lights


LSZHLSZH


Surface Manager



Zurich Airport Communication Hazards

- Non-Standard ICAO phraesology (taxi forward to…)- One runway – one language – one frequency- English Voice (fire brigade, maintenance personnel)- Runway Crossings on different frequencies (Tower, Ground)- High Number of frequency changes / headdown topic- Headdown issues by ATC/Apron Control personnel

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Zurich Airport Communication Mitigation Strategies

6.11.2013

- Non-Standard ICAO phraesology (taxi forward to…)→ strict adherence to ICAO phraesology- one runway – one language – one frequency→ on going issue (not fully implemented)- English Voice (fire brigade, maintenance personnel)→ on going issue (not fully impemented: RFF, Airfield Maintenance)- Runway Crossings on different frequencies→ evaluation/expert judgement by ANSP- High number of frequency changes→ not a reduction, but at least less talking (monitor…, standby on…)


Zurich Airport Construction/Visibility Hazards

Construction Hazards:- not familiarized personnel of contracted companies- Delegation of responsibility to third party companies with regards to

driver training (out of control)- Lack of information with regards to construction areas

Visibility Hazards:- disorientated vehicle drivers- too many transponder signals for Apron Controller- Deviation from established processes at the airport- Partial LVP areas at the airport- Cat. I and Cat. II/III runway stopbars

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Zurich Airport Construction Mitigation Strategies

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- Communication, training, discipline→ involved parties have to be informed

(through briefings, committees, campaigns)→ project leaders have to take their responsibilites (accountabilities)- If safety cannot be assured:→ control/in-source, supervision by our construction safety department


Visibility Mitigation Strategies

6.11.2013

- Hazard of disorientated vehicle drivers→ through training, no blame culture- Hazard of too many transponder signals for Apron Controller→ Not solved, has to be evaluated with the help of safety assessments- Deviation from established processes at the airport→ Strict adherence- Partial LVP at the airport→ LVP is in use for all areas- Different runway stopbars→ stopbar harmonisation→ compliant with AMDT 10 Annex 14


Conclusion

- Dealing with design/layout hazards is essential- Design mitigation strategies are costly but effective- Runway crossings will always be there («every runway crossing

has to be safe, no unnecessary runway crossings»)- Technical solutions are not always the best solution from a safety

perspective (»Human Factor»)- Training, communication, strict adherence to procedures is key- Runway Incursion Awareness towards management must be kept

high («it can happen tomorrow»)- Every airport has its own history and specific topics- Overall safety level vs. topic-related safety level

6.11.2013

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