Saiva on External Objects

Abstract This article examines how the Kashmiri non-dualistic Saiva philoso-

phers Utpaladeva (tenth century) and Abhinavagupta (10th–11th centuries) present

and criticize a theory expounded by certain Buddhist philosophers, identified by the

two Saiva authors as Sautrantikas. According to this theory, no entity external to

consciousness can ever be perceived since perceived objects are nothing but internal

aspects (akara) of consciousness. Nonetheless we must infer the existence of

external entities so as to account for the fact that consciousness is aware of a variety

of objects: just as a mirror takes on a variegated appearance only by reflecting a

multiplicity of objects that remain external to it, in the same way, phenomenal

variety can be explained only by assuming the existence of various objects external

to consciousness. In I�svarapratyabhijñakarikas I, 5, 8–9 and their commentaries,

Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta endeavour to criticize this theory, which challenges

their own idealistic principles: according to them, the Sautrantikas’ inference is

neither legitimate nor even possible. The passage is particularly telling as regards

the strategy developed by Pratyabhijna philosophers with respect to their Buddhist

opponents: they make use of certain arguments propounded by Dharmakırti in

defense of Vijnanavada in order to criticize the Sautrantikas’ inference, but they

also exploit this discussion to underline the superiority of their idealism over that of

the Vijnanavadins.

Keywords Utpaladeva � Abhinavagupta � Pratyabhijna � Vijnanavada �Sautrantika � Consciousness

I. Ratie (&)Institut fur Indologie und Zentralasien wissenschaften, Schillerstraße 6, 04109 Leipzig, Germanye-mail: [email protected]

123

J Indian Philos (2011) 39:479–501

DOI 10.1007/s10781-011-9143-y

Can One Prove that Something Exists BeyondConsciousness? A Saiva Criticism of the SautrantikaInference of External Objects

Isabelle Ratie

Published online: 7 June 2011

� Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Introduction—Why Prove (or Refute) Externalism?

This article is an attempt to understand how two Saiva philosophers, Utpaladeva

and Abhinavagupta,1 have answered the question: can one prove that objects

exist outside of consciousness? At first sight though, this question hardly seems

relevant: why should we undertake to prove (or refute) the existence of objects

outside of consciousness? When perceiving an object, we experience the presence

of an entity immediately acknowledged as distinct from our consciousness; ob-

jects of perception are apprehended as external to the subject who becomes aware

of them. There are nonetheless circumstances in which we do not consider our

awareness of objects as the genuine experience of an external reality: thus when

dreaming, we are aware of objects apprehended as external to us, and yet, when

we wake up, we judge that these objects were in fact various internal forms in

which our consciousness was manifesting itself. Similarly, according to the

Buddhist Vijnanavadins, all perceived objects are mere aspects (akara)2 that

consciousness takes on, and since consciousness only manifests objects by

manifesting itself in the form of objects, we can never have access to a reality

that would be genuinely external: whatever we perceive is nothing but con-

sciousness taking the form of a particular object of perception. The Vijnanava-

dins conclude from this that nothing exists independently of consciousness, and

this conclusion appeals to Utpaladeva, since his main goal is to justify philo-

sophically the idea, already dogmatically asserted in some Saiva scriptures, that

nothing exists apart from a single, omnipotent and all-encompassing conscious-

ness called Siva. Utpaladeva thus makes use of arguments already put forward by

some Vijnanavadins so as to refute various theories (whether Buddhist or

Brahmanical) according to which perception is consciousness’s direct encounter

with an external object;3 but he also has to confront another, more subtle—and

1 Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–975) is the author of the IPK, on which he himself wrote two commentaries: a

Vr: tti and an almost entirely lost Vivr: ti. Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975–1025) wrote the IPV, a brilliant

synthesis of Utpaladeva’s auto-commentaries, and the IPVV, which mostly comments on Utpaladeva’s

Vivr: ti. The text of the IPV quoted here is that of the KSTS edition, but several manuscripts (and the

Bhaskarı edition) are also quoted within brackets whenever an emendation is proposed (‘‘p.n.p.’’ means

‘‘the passage is not preserved in...’’).2 On the distinction between theories according to which consciousness takes on aspects (sakaravada)

and theories according to which it is devoid of aspects (nirakaravada), see e.g. Hattori (1968, p. 98); on

the Pratyabhijna philosophers’ position in this debate, see Ratie (2010a).3 See Ratie (2010a).

480 I. Ratie

123

less easily refutable—kind of externalism4 that Abhinavagupta attributes to the

Buddhist Sautrantikas.5 According to this theory, although we can never have

any direct access to external objects (because whatever we perceive ultimately

amounts to an internal aspect of consciousness), we must nonetheless infer the

existence of an external reality in order to account for the variety of con-

sciousness’s aspects. Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta consider that this inference

of an external reality is neither legitimate nor even possible, and the present

article examines their refutation of inferential externalism while evaluating the

originality of their criticism: in what measure does it depart from the arguments

already formulated by the Vijnanavadins?

The Saiva Presentation of the Sautrantikas’ Thesis

The Sautrantika portrayed by Utpaladeva shares with the Vijnanavadins the opinion

that we cannot step outside of consciousness so as to experience external reality

independently of consciousness, since we only experience what consciousness

manifests:6 the external object remains in itself absolutely inaccessible to per-

4 By ‘‘externalism’’ I mean any theory according to which consciousness’s objects are related (through a

relation of identity or causality) to something considered as external to consciousness. The editors of this

special issue of the journal rightly pointed out to me that the word yields a different meaning in some

discussions related to analytical philosophy, ethics or semantics, and they fear that my use of this term

here might lead to some confusion on the reader’s part. However, ‘‘externalism’’ is understood differently

according to whether it is used in the context of analytical philosophy, ethics or semantics; and considered

in its broadest sense (i.e. a sense that can be found in such various contexts as analytical philosophy,

semantics, ethics, psychology, history and philosophy of art, etc.), the word can apply to any kind of

theory that explains a given event as (at least partly) determined by external factors, however this

determination (and externality) may be understood. It therefore seems to me that it offers the least

unsatisfactory translation of the Sanskrit bahyarthavada (‘‘the doctrine [according to which] the object is

external’’) while enabling us to avoid some more seriously misleading terms such as ‘‘realism’’ (the

opposition realism/idealism could hardly apply to Indian philosophy, since a number of Indian ‘‘ideal-

isms,’’ including that of the Pratyabhijna, consider the phenomenal world as perfectly real).5 See e.g. IPVV, vol. I, p. 170: nanu sautrantikah: sam: vidi nıladipratibimbam upayanti. ‘‘But the Sau-

trantikas acknowledge that there is a reflection (pratibimba) of [objects] such as blue, etc., in conscious-

ness!’’ Although the term ‘‘Sautrantika’’ is often used by late doxographers and modern scholars to refer to

one of the four representative schools of Indian Buddhism, little is known as regards the Sautrantikas’

identity and beliefs. See Kritzer 2003a, b and Kritzer (2005, pp. XXVI–XXX): the term seems to appear first in

the Abhidharmakosabhas:ya, and Vasubandhu seems to be ‘‘inserting Yogacara ideas into the Abhidhar-makosabhas:ya under the guise of the Sautrantika’’ (Kritzer 2005, p. XXVIII). Having shown that ‘‘there is a

close relation between Vasubandhu’s Sautrantika ideas and the Yogacarabhumi’’ (Ibid., pp. XXVIII–XXIX),

Kritzer concludes (Ibid., p. XXX) that ‘‘in the Abhidharmakosabhas:ya Vasubandhu uses the term Sautrantika

to designate positions in the Yogacarabhumi that he prefers to those of orthodox Sarvastivada. [. . .]Vasubandhu [. . .] adjusts the traditional Sarvastivadin abhidharma so that it no longer conflicts with the

central theories of Yogacara [. . .]. Attributing an opinion to a Sautrantika may simply be Vasubandhu’s way

of claiming that it is based on a more valid interpretation of sutra than its Sarvastivadin counterpart.’’ The

evolution of the meaning of the term between Vasubandhu and Dharmakırti (and his commentators) is still

obscure; however, by the time the Pratyabhijna philosophers were writing, the Sautrantikas were considered

to hold a philosophical system of their own, and one that was opposed to the Yogacara/Vijnanavada. On the

sources of this Saiva description of the Sautrantikas’ position, see below, fn. 10.6 Cf. Arnold (2008), who considers that in fact, the expression ‘‘epistemic idealism’’ used for instance by

J. Dunne to qualify Dharmakırti’s Vijnanavada (see e.g. Dunne 2004, p. 59 ff.) equally applies to the

Sautrantikas.

Saiva Criticism of a Sautrantika Inference 481

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ception, because perception is the mere awareness of an aspect (akara) that con-

sciousness bears.7 Nonetheless, contrary to the Vijnanavadins, the Sautrantika

refuses to draw from this the conclusion that there is no such thing as an external

reality. He points out that we are aware of a multiplicity of objects and that there

must be a cause for this phenomenal variety. The Vijnanavadins consider that this

cause is a mechanism of residual traces similar to that which, left by previous

experiences in a dreamer’s cognitive series, produces the variety of objects expe-

rienced in a dream;8 but the Sautrantika argues that this cannot be the case, since

either these impregnations (vasana) are distinct from consciousness – but then they

are external entities, so that the Vijnanavada is an externalism in disguise; or they

are not distinct from consciousness, in which case their variety is inexplicable, so

that they cannot account for consciousness’s variety of aspects.9

The Sautrantika depicted by the Pratyabhijna philosophers10 concludes from this

that just as a mirror can bear a multiplicity of appearances by reflecting a multiplicity that

is external to it, in the same way, consciousness, which is in itself undifferentiated,11

7 Cf. Hattori (1968, p. 98).8 See Ratie (2010a).9 See IPK I, 5, 4–5 and their commentaries (quoted and translated in Ratie 2010a).10 This description of the Sautrantikas’ position apparently originates from Buddhist sources that Utp-

aladeva and Abhinavagupta present as belonging to the Vijnanavada (such as Dharmakırti’s works, and

possibly Sa _nkaranandana’s works, which Abhinavagupta often quotes: see Ratie (2010a), fn. 28 and 29),

but also from Brahmanical sources (such as the NM, which Abhinavagupta sometimes seems to para-

phrase in these discussions: see e.g. Ratie 2010a, fn. 66). Later Brahmanical doxographies present this

theory as the core of the Sautrantikas’ doctrine (see e.g. SDS, p. 19, which mentions the Sautrantikas as

the proponents of the ‘‘inferability of the external object’’ bahyarthanumeyatva).11 See IPV, vol. I, p. 165: iha bodhas tavad abhinnah: , prakasamatram eva hy asya paramarthah: ,prakasadhikam: yadi *nılam asya rupam [Bhaskarı, J, S1: nılasya rupam KSTS, L, P, S2, SOAS; p.n.p. D],tarhi tad aprakasarupam iti na prakaseta. atha tathaprakasatvam evasya rupam, pıtaprakasah: katham:syat? athapi kramikanılapıtadiprakasarupam eva tasya rupam, nıladyabhasasunyo’ham iti prakasah:svapadyavasthasu na syat. tasmat prakasah: prakasa eva, an:umatram api na rupantaram asyastıty abh-inno bodhah: . ‘‘[– The Sautrantika:] In this world, undoubtedly, consciousness is undifferentiated (abh-inna), for its real nature is nothing but pure manifestation (prakasamatra). [For] if [consciousness] had

‘blue’ as its form, [and if this form were] distinct from manifestation, then, since this form would not be

manifestation, it would not be manifested! But if [one said, rather,] that the form of [consciousness] is

simply the fact that it is manifest thus, [as ‘blue’], how could there be a manifestation of yellow[, and not

only of blue]? And even if [one said that] the form of [consciousness] consists precisely in the successive

manifestation of blue, yellow, etc., the manifestation [that can be formulated as] ‘I am devoid of the

manifestations of blue, etc.’ would not occur in such states as sleep, etc. As a consequence, manifestation

is nothing but manifestation (prakasah: prakasa eva): it possesses no other form, however minute.

Consciousness is therefore undifferentiated.’’ (Concerning the emendation above, the Bhaskarı edition

bears the KSTS reading, but Bhaskarakan: t:ha obviously had the J and S1 reading; see Bhaskarı, vol. I, p.

210: asya – bodhasya).

482 I. Ratie

123

must reflect an external multiplicity:12 although external objects can never be per-

ceived, they must be inferred in order to explain phenomenal variety.13 And just as, in

the case of the mirror, there is a correspondence of forms between reflected objects and

12 See IPK I, 5, 4: tattada kasmikabhaso bahyam: ced anumapayet / na hy abhinnasya bodhasya vi-citrabhasahetuta // ‘‘If [a Sautrantika objected that] the manifestation of this or that [particular object],

which is [apparently] devoid of any cause, must lead [us] to infer an external [objective reality], because

consciousness, [in itself] undifferentiated, cannot be the cause of [its] various manifestations...’’ Cf. IPV,

vol. I, pp. 166–167: tasya cabhinnasya kadacin nılabhasata kadacit pıtabhasateti ye vicitrabhasas tatrakaran:atvam: hi yasman nopapannam hetav abhinne karyabhedasyasam: bhavat, tasmat sa sa vici-tranılapıtadirupa akasmiko’jñatapratyaks:asiddhahetukah: san bahyam: vijñanagatapratibimbatmaka-svasvabhavasam: padakam aucityavasan nijarupasadr: sam: kramopanipatadrupabahutarabhedatmakam:jñanat sarvatha pr: thagbhutam anumapayatıti sam: bhavayate bahyarthavadı. ‘‘And [consciousness,]

which is undifferentiated, cannot be the cause of the ‘various manifestations’—i.e., [it cannot be the

cause] of the fact that it is sometimes manifestation of blue, sometimes manifestation of yellow, [etc.];

because when a cause is undifferentiated, there cannot be any difference in [its] effect. For this reason, the

[manifestation] that is ‘such and such’—[i.e.,] that consists in various [objects] such as blue, yellow,

etc.—, [and] that is ‘[apparently] devoid of cause’—[i.e., we] do not know any cause of it that would be

established through perception – leads to infer ‘an external (bahya) [objective reality]’; [i.e., phenomenal

variety leads to inferring the existence of an entity] which causes [the appearance of] its own nature in the

form of a reflection (pratibimba) within consciousness; [this entity] is similar to its own form [reflected in

consciousness]—because it is appropriate [that a reflected object should resemble its reflection]–, it

consists in many differences, the forms of which occur successively, [and] it is completely distinct from

consciousness. Such is the hypothesis formulated by the externalist.’’ Cf. the presentation of the

Sautrantikas’ thesis in NM (K), p. 300 (see Ratie 2010a, fn. 17).13 See IPV, vol. I, p. 164: tatra prakasasyavicitrasya kramen:a vicitratakaran:am: pratibimbatmakam;tatpratibimbasajatıyam: yat tad eva nıladirupam: bahyam, tac ca yady apy anumeyam, tathapıdam: nılamiti pratyaks:en: adhyavasayad adhyavasayapran: itatvac ca praman:asthiteh: pratyaks:avyapadesyam: *bha-vis:yatıti [SOAS: bhavis:yati KSTS, Bhaskarı, J, L, P, D, S1, S2] bahyarthavadikathitam *idam: hetvan-taram [conj.: iti hetvantaram KSTS, Bhaskarı, J, L, P, D, S1, SOAS: idam iti hetvantaram S2]anumıyamanam: bahyarupam asan_kyamanatvena darsayati. ‘‘[Utpaladeva] is now presenting this other

[possible] cause [for phenomenal variety] as an objection—namely, an external [reality] (bahya) that is

inferred (anumıyamana), [and] that is thus presented by the externalist: ‘in that regard, the cause of the

fact that the manifesting consciousness (prakasa) possesses a variety [appearing] in a certain order

[although it is in itself] devoid of variety is a reflection (pratibimba). The [reflected] double of this

reflection is precisely the external [object] that has as its form blue, etc.; and although this [external

object] is [only] an object of inference, it can nonetheless be called an object of perception, because of the

determination (adhyavasaya) as an object of perception [that takes the form] ‘this is blue’, and because

the establishment of [perception as] a means of knowledge depends on this determination’.’’ The end of

the passage is an allusion to the Buddhist theory according to which in order to become expressible (and

therefore useful in the practical world), the raw sensation of a singular presence must be determined

(adhyavasita), i.e., conceptually transformed (so as to be grasped as ‘‘the perception of blue’’ for instance)

through a process of exclusion of all perceptions of what is not blue: only thus does perception become

strictly speaking a means of knowledge (see e.g. NBT: , pp. 83–85, cf. Ratie 2010b, fn. 7). Abhinavagupta

alludes to this theory e.g. in IPV, vol. I, p. 213: bauddhair apy adhyavasayapeks:am: praka�sasyapraman: yam: vadadbhir... ‘‘And the Buddhists too, who say that the manifestation [that is perception] is a

means of knowledge insofar as it depends on a determination (adhyavasaya)...’’ In the Sautrantikas’

perspective, this theory implies that perception can rightly be said to be the perception of external objects(although in fact it presents nothing but an internal aspect of consciousness) because it is determined as

such, and because without this determination, perception would be useless in the vyavahara.


123

their reflections, in the same way, to each phenomenon must correspond a distinct form

outside of consciousness.14

The First Assault on the Sautrantika’s Inference: An Inferred CauseMust Have Been Previously Perceived

Utpaladeva’s criticism begins thus:

anumanam anabhatapurve naives: t:am...15

No inference can be admitted as regards that which has never been manifested

previously.

The goal of an inference is to establish the existence of an unperceived object, and if

we did perceive that object, we would have no need to infer it; however inference

necessarily regards an object that has already been perceived. Thus in order to infer

that there is a fire on a mountain seen in the distance from the smoke floating above it,

we must have had previous experiences of both smoke and fire, because according to

Dharmakırti’s explanation of causality (which Utpaladeva adopts),16 the very notion

of causality arises from five ‘‘perceptions and non-perceptions’’ (pratyaks: anup-alambha): when we perceive fire, smoke, imperceptible so far, is then perceived; when

we do not perceive fire, we do not perceive smoke either.17 Without this set of

14 See IPVV, vol. II, p. 89: vijñanantarvartı nıladyakarah: sadr: sam arpakam apeks:ate pratibimbatvaddarpan:apratibimbavad. ‘‘The aspect (akara) of blue, etc., that resides within consciousness requires

something that projects [it] (arpaka) [and is] similar (sadr: sa) [to it], because it is a reflection (prat-ibimba), just as a reflection in a mirror [requires an external cause projecting it and similar to it].’’ On the

term arpaka, cf. e.g. PV Pratyaks:apariccheda 247b–d, which formulates thus the Sautrantika doctrine

(see Eltschinger 2009, p. 201): grahyatam: viduh: / hetutvam eva yuktijña jñanakararpan:aks:amam //‘‘Those who are versed in reasoning consider that to be an object consists in being a cause capable of

projecting (arpan:a) an aspect (akara) onto consciousness.’’15 IPK I, 5, 8a.16 This adoption (typical of the Pratyabhijna’s strategy regarding Buddhist logic: cf. Torella 1992) aims

at showing that Dharmakırti’s explanation of causality makes sense only if consciousness is a unitary

enduring subject (and not, as the Buddhists contend, a series of discrete momentary cognitions). See IPK

I, 7, 4: pratyaks: anupalambhanam: tattadbhinnam: sapatinam / karyakaran:atasiddhihetutaikapramatr: ja //‘‘Perceptions and non-perceptions (pratyaks: anupalambha), which [respectively] concern [only] this or

that aspect distinct [from the relation of cause and effect], are the cause of the establishment of the

relation of cause and effect [only] thanks to the single unitary subject.’’17 See e.g. HB, p. 4 (cf. Lasic 1999): idam asyopalambha upalabdhilaks:an:apraptam: prag anupalabdhamupalabhyate, satsv apy anyes:u hetus:v asyabhave na bhavatıti yas tadbhave bhavas tadabhave’bhavas capratyaks: anupalambhasadhanah: karyakaran:abhavas tasya siddhih: . ‘‘The relation of cause and effect

[between A and B], that is, the presence [of B] when A is present, and the absence [of B] when A is

absent, the establishment of which is made thanks to perception and non-perception (pratyaks: anup-alambha), is established thus: when there is a perception of A, B, for which the conditions of perception

are fulfilled, [and] which was not perceived until then, is perceived; [whereas] even when some other

causes [of B] are present, when A is absent, [B] is not present [either].’’ Abhinavagupta, following a

number of Buddhist commentators, understands that the relation of cause and effect is established through

a set of five experiences comprising two perceptions and three non-perceptions (see e.g. IPVV, vol. II, p.

345: pratyaks:advayam anupalambhatrayam: ceti pratyaks: anupalambhapañcakam, ‘‘five perceptions and

non-perceptions—that is, two perceptions, and three non-perceptions’’), but other commentators have

understood Dharmakırti’s text differently (see Inami 1999).

484 I. Ratie

123

experiences, we could not consider smoke as a logical reason for inferring fire as its

cause; and accordingly, in order to infer an external object as the cause of this or that

particular cognition, we need to perceive the external object in itself, independently of

the object’s cognition—but precisely, such a perception is impossible:

dhumagnyor anupalambhav agner upalambho dhumasyanupalambho’gnyup-alambhad uktad *anantaram eva [conj.: eva KSTS] dhumasyopalambha ityevam: pratyaks:advayenanupalambhatrayen:a ca sakr

�d eva karyakaran:ata

vyavasthapyate. tatrapy anupalambho’py anyopalambha eveti pratyaks:a-vyaparad *eva karan:ata [corr.: evakaran:ata KSTS] vyavasthapyate bhavas-iddheh: . na ca bahyo’rthah: pratyaks:a iti tena saha kasyacid api nakaryakaran:abhavasiddhir iti tasminn anumeye na jñanam: karyahetuh: .

18

The relation of cause and effect is immediately established thanks to two

perceptions and three non-perceptions, thus: the two non-perceptions of smoke

and fire, the perception of fire, the non-perception of smoke, and immediately

after the [already] mentioned perception of fire, the perception of smoke. Even

if [causality is partly established through non-perceptions,] since even non-

perception is [in fact] nothing but the perception of some other [entity], it is

thanks to the sole activity of perception that causality is established, because

of the establishment of the presence [of this or that entity]. And since the

external object is not an object of perception, one cannot establish any causal

relation between this [external object] and anything else; as a consequence, the

cognition [of this or that object] is not the reason [consisting in] an effect

(karyahetu) as regards this [external object] that must be inferred.

One cannot infer from the experience of an effect the existence of a cause

external to consciousness, because no causal relation can be established without

having recourse to a set of experiences which, by definition, cannot involve an

external object. Besides, the Sautrantika’s model of the mirror is inadequate, be-

cause in the case of the mirror, the reflected object and its reflection are not strictly

speaking in a relation of cause and effect,19 but also, more importantly, because in

the case of the mirror, we can perceive both the external object and its reflection in

the mirror, so that we can at least determine a relation of similarity (tulyata)

between the reflected object and its reflection; whereas we can never perceive the

external object in itself. Determining any relation (be it of mere similarity) between

18 IPVV, vol. II, p. 160.19 IPVV, vol. II, pp. 158–159: samarpyasamarpakata ca darpan:agajayos tulyakalakr: taiva. tata eva naparamarthikah: karyakaran:abhavo’yam api tu bimbapratibimbavyavaharah: . ‘‘Moreover, the mirror and

the elephant [reflected in it] become [respectively] that onto which [a form] is projected and that which

projects [a form] exactly at the same time; for this very reason, it is not a real relation of cause and effect,

[which implies the cause’s anteriority], but only the mundane experience of a reflected object and its

reflection (bimbapratibimbavyavahara).’’


123

an external object and a cognition is therefore perfectly impossible: the mirror

model is irrelevant as regards consciousness.20

So far the reasoning is very similar to that of the Vijnanavadins; thus the famous

Dharmakırtian argument of the sahopalambhaniyama (‘‘the necessity of being

perceived together [for the object and its cognition]’’)21 enables the Vijnanavadins

to demonstrate that any attempt to infer an external object is vain, because the

impossibility of experiencing the external object independently of cognition pre-

cludes the establishment of any relation (be it of causality or of mere similarity)

between the external object and the cognition.22

The Sautrantika’s Riposte: The Argument of the Sense Organs

The Sautrantika then puts forward a new argument:

nanu bhavatu pratyaks:ato dr�

s: t:e’numane sam: katheyam: samanyato dr�

s: t:e tu kim:vaks:yasi yatharthopalabdhyendriyanumane?23

Fine—let us accept this speech [of yours] as regards an inference with respect

to what has been apprehended through a direct perception (pratyaks:ato dr�

s: t:a).

However, in the case of an [inference] with respect to what has been appre-

hended through a generality (samanyato dr�

s: t:a), what will you say—for in-

stance, in the case of the inference of the sense organs (indriya) from the

perception of their object?

Indeed, we usually infer entities that have been previously perceived; but the

Sautrantika is here pointing out that this is not always the case. Thus Indian phi-

losophers consider that our sense organs (indriya) are inferred whereas we never

perceive them as such. This does not mean that we must infer the existence of our

eyes, for instance—for we can observe these elements of our body (even though

indirectly, in a mirror), touch them, etc. Nor does it mean that we should infer our

20 See IPVV, vol. II, p. 159: darpan:apratibimbe hi bimbam apy upalabdham iti niscitam: sadr: syamatre;iha tu bimbasya namapi navagatam iti katham etattulyata bhavet? ‘‘For in the case of the reflection

(pratibimba) in a mirror, the reflected object (bimba) is also perceived; as a consequence, it is determined

[as being a reflected object] from the point of view of the mere resemblance [with the reflection]; whereas

in the case [of the external object and the cognition, we] do not grasp anything that would belong to the

reflected object (bimba). Therefore how could there be any similarity of this [imperceptible external

object with the cognition]?’’21 See PVin I, 54a (quoted in IPVV, vol. II, p. 78, see Ratie 2010a): sahopalambhaniyamad abhedonılataddhiyoh: . ‘‘Because of the necessity [for blue and the cognition of blue] to be perceived together,

there is no difference between blue and the cognition of blue.’’22 For similar reasonings attributed to Vijnanavadins in Naiyayika and Mımam: saka texts, see Ratie

(2010a, fn. 22).23 IPV, vol. I, pp. 187–188.

486 I. Ratie

123

visual faculty, because this faculty is self-evident: to see is to know that one sees.24

But why is the eye ordinarily considered as the instrument thanks to which we can

see? For an eye never sees itself seeing: although we can perceive our eyes, ears,

nose, skin and tongue, their instrumentality in perception remains imperceptible to

us. According to Buddhist as well as Brahmanical philosophers, this instrumentality

must be inferred: in order to explain the fact that we are perceiving, we must assume

the existence of some imperceptible entities (whether they are conceived as atoms

or as rays, and whether they are thought to enter in contact with their object or

not)25 residing inside what we ordinarily consider as our visual organs, and con-

stituting the real instruments of perception—the real sense organs.

However this inference does not establish the existence of an object that would

have been directly (pratyaks:ato) perceived at some point in the past, since the

indriya-s are by nature imperceptible: it only establishes the existence of an object

apprehended in a general way (samanyato). Thus, when witnessing various actions,

we apprehend the invariable concomitance between these actions and the instru-

ments thanks to which they are exerted; and from the generality or the universal

(samanya) of instrumentality (karan:ata) thus grasped, we become capable of

inferring the sense organs—that is, we assume by analogy26 that we possess some

imperceptible instruments having a causal role in the act of perceiving.27

The Sautrantika portrayed by Abhinavagupta thus explains:

tena ca yady api vyaptir na gr: hıta, tathapi karyavyatireken:eti kadacitkatayayad idam: karyam: nılabhasam: vijñanam: tat tathabhutam adhikam: hetum: vinanopapadyata ity evam: niyamavato vyatirekat samanyamukhenapy anvayah:sidhyaty eva.28

24 This is the reason why I did not translate indriya as ‘‘sense faculty’’ or ‘‘capacity;’’ the indriya of sight

is not the power of seeing (for that power is self-revealed). Eli Franco has rightly pointed out to me that

the term ‘‘organ’’ might be misleading insofar as the indriya of sight for instance is more than what we

usually consider as the visual organ (i.e., the visible body parts called ‘‘eyes’’). But provided that one

keeps in mind that etymologically, an organ is a bodily ‘‘instrument,’’ and that sense organs are not

limited to the perceptible body parts called ‘‘eye,’’ ‘‘ear,’’ etc., it seems to me that this latter translation

remains the least unsatisfactory, given that the indriya-s are the karan:a-s of perception (see e.g. NM, vol.

I, p. 348, quoted below, fn. 27).25 See Preisendanz (1989), particularly pp. 147–149.26 See Nenniger (1994).27 Cf. NM, vol. I, p. 348: samanyato dr: s: t:am: tu yatra sam: bandhakale’pi lin_gisvarupam apratyaks:am:nityaparoks:am eva samanyato vyaptigrahan: ad anumıyate, yatha sabdadyupalabdhya srotradi karan:am.indriyan: am atındriyatvan na kadacit pratyaks:agamyatvam. atha ca cchedanadikriyan: am: parasvadhadi-karan:apurvakatvena vyaptigrahan: ac chabdadyupalabdhikriyan: am: karan:apurvakatvam anumıyate. ‘‘As

for the [inferred object] that is apprehended through a generality (samanyato dr:s: t:a), it possesses an

inferential mark, [but] it is not directly perceived, [i.e.,] it is always imperceptible, even at the time of the

relation [between the inferred object and its inferential mark; and it is] inferred from a generality

(samanyato) thanks to the apprehension of an invariable concomitance—for instance, an instrument

(karan:a) such as the hearing organ [is inferred] thanks to the perception of words, etc. Because sense organs

(indriya) are [themselves] beyond [the realm of] sense organs (atındriya), [they] can never be directly

apprehended. And yet, because there is an apprehension of the invariable concomitance of such actions as

cutting with the fact of being preceded by instruments such as an axe for instance, the fact that actions such

as sound perception must be preceded by some instruments, [i.e., sense organs,] is inferred.’’28 IPVV, vol. II, p. 161.


123

And even though the invariable concomitance [between the cognition] and this

[external object] is not grasped through the [five experiences that enable us to

establish a causal relation,] nevertheless, [it is grasped] because of the absence

of the effect [if the cause is absent] (karyavyatireka): the effect that is the

cognition having the aspect ‘‘blue,’’ which [only exists] occasionally, cannot

logically take place without a cause distinct [from the effect and] that is, like

[the effect, occasional]. The positive concomitance (anvaya) is [therefore]

perfectly established, albeit through a generality (samanya) [and not through a

direct perception], from the negative concomitance (vyatireka) that implies the

necessity [just expounded].

When inferring that a hill is on fire from the smoke seen above it, we identify the

inferred fire with previously witnessed fires, whereas when inferring the existence of

the instruments thanks to which we perceive, we do not identify the inferred cause with

some particular entity perceived in the past: we assume the existence of this cause in a

general way, as an entity only particularized by its being distinct from its effect (i.e.,

perception), because if we did not assume its existence, we could not account for the

fact of perception. In the same way, we must account for the fact that consciousness is

not eternally the consciousness of blue for instance: phenomenal variety exists, and

since it is not caused by the nature of consciousness, which is in itself undifferentiated,

we must assume the existence of an imperceptible cause conceived in a general way as

distinct from the cognition of this or that object, i.e., the external object.

Utpaladeva’s Answer: In the Case of the Sense Organs, Causalityis Directly Perceived

Utpaladeva could reply by arguing, as Dharmakırti does, that there is another possible

explanation for phenomenal variety—namely, the theory of impregnations (vasana).29

However this argument would be irrelevant here, since the Saiva philosopher has

already shown (in the guise of a Sautrantika) that impregnations cannot cause con-

sciousness’s diversity. Utpaladeva therefore makes the following answer:

29 See PVin I, 58d (cf. Krasser 2004, pp. 142–143): ... bahyasiddhih: syad vyatirekatah: // ‘‘The external

[object] could be established through the absence [of a certain effect if a certain cause is absent] (vyatireka),’’

and the auto-commentary ad loc. (p. 43): satsu samarthes:v anyes:u hetus:u jñanakaryanis:pattih:karan: antaravaikalyam: sucayati. sa bahyo’rthah: syad yady atra kascid upadanavises: abhavakr

�tam: karyavy-

atirekam: na bruyat. ‘‘When all the other causes capable [of producing a cognition] are present, the non-arising

of the effect which is the cognition indicates that some other cause is missing; and this [missing cause] could

be the external object, if in this regard, somebody [—i.e., a Vijnanavadin—] did not explain that the absence

of this effect is due to the absence of the particular material cause [which is a particular impregnation].’’

Abhinavagupta quotes this passage (see IPVV, vol. II, pp. 128–129) and obviously considers it as a refutation

of the Sautrantikas’ contention that the external object must be established through karyavyatireka. In the NM,

the Vijnanavadin, who quotes this verse (see NM(K), p. 300), also shows that the Sautrantika’s theory is not

compelling since the mechanism of residual traces can also account for phenomenal variety. See NM (K),

p. 298: svacchatvaj jñanasya kalus:yam anyakr: tam iti cet, avidyavasanakr: tam: tad bhavis:yati. ‘‘If [the

opponent says] that because consciousness is [in itself] limpid, the fact that it is stained [by phenomenal

diversity] must be produced by something else, [we Vijnanavadins answer that] this can [also] be produced by

the impregnations (vasana) [produced by/responsible for] nescience.’’

488 I. Ratie

123

... indriyam / abhatam eva bıjader abhasad dhetuvastunah: // abhasah: punarabhasad bahyasyasıt katham: cana / arthasya naiva tenasya siddhir napyanumanatah: //30

[Before being inferred,] the sense organs have indeed been manifested through

the manifestation of a real entity which is a cause, such as, for instance, a seed,

[which is the cause of a sprout,] but the manifestation of an object external to

manifestation could not occur in any way. Therefore there can be no estab-

lishment of this [external object]—not even through an inference.

When inferring the existence of our sense organs, we only infer a cause ingeneral capable of explaining the fact that we perceive, and Abhinavagupta explains

that this general feature of ‘‘causality’’ (karan:ata) by which the inferred object is

characterized is directly perceived:

ucyate tatrapi vikalpena yatha so’rthah: spr: syate tathanumeya iti sthitih: . vik-alpas ca nendriyadikam artham: kenacit *sam: nivesavises: adina vises: atmana[Bhaskarı, J, P, S1, S2, SOAS: sam: nivesavises: atmana KSTS, L; p.n.p. D]spr

�saty api tu kim: cid upalabdheh: karan:am ity amuna svabhavena, sa ca

svabhavah: karan:atalaks:an:ah: pratyaks:agr�

hıta eva.31

[To the Sautrantika’s objection, Utpaladeva] replies: even in that case [where we

infer an object grasped through a generality (samanyato dr�

s: t:a),] it is established

that the inferred object must be such as any object grasped through a concept

(vikalpa); but a concept does not grasp its object—such as the sense organs for

instance—as having some particular nature comprising a particular configura-

tion, etc.; rather, [it grasps it] as this nature [only]: ‘it is some cause of per-

ception’—and this nature, characterized by causality [only,] is indeed grasped

through a direct perception (pratyaks:a).

The latter statement is somewhat surprising: how can causality be directly per-

ceived, as we perceive blue or yellow?

According to the Buddhist logicians, we are aware of the causality of fire with

respect to smoke thanks to a series of perceptions and non-perceptions. However

these experiences only produce the awareness that a particular fire is the cause of the

particular smoke seen above the mountain; so where does the general notion of

causality come from? One could consider that it is inductively formed from the

particular past experiences of the seed and sprout, of the threads and cloth, etc.

According to the Pratyabhijna philosophers though, this is not the way we acquire

the samanya of causality, because if this general notion were not first known in

some way, the process of generalization would remain impossible: the term ‘‘cause’’

would remain inextricably attached to the sole particular entities perceived by us.32

30 IPK, 5, 8b-9.31 IPV, vol. I, p. 188.32 Cf. IPVV, vol. II, p. 156 : anyathaikatra bıje karan:asabdah: sam: ketito na mr: tpin:d: adau sam: ketitobhavet. ‘‘If it were not the case, the word ‘cause’ would be associated by convention to one [single entity

such as] the seed: it could not be associated by convention to a lump of clay for instance[, although the

latter is a cause with respect to the pot].’’


123

The synthesis through which, gathering the various perceptions of fire and smoke

mentioned by Dharmakırti, we are capable of saying ‘‘fire is the cause of smoke’’ is

possible because each of these perceptions already contains in some way the notionof causality. Thus, according to Utpaladeva, any particular entity (svalaks:an:a) is in

fact the singular combination of a multiplicity of elementary phenomena (abha-sa)33 which ‘‘behave like generalities’’ (samanyayamana).34 This particular fire

seen here and now is therefore a unique synthesis of elementary phenomena: time,

place, existence, fire in general, which in turn can be analyzed into a series of

general features, including the fact of being the cause of smoke.

The Buddhists could object that this analysis is a conceptual activity posterior to

perception; but according to Utpaladeva, the very fact that we are capable of such an

analysis shows that these various elements are already present, albeit in an implicit

form, in the pure sensation preceding the verbal analysis. As a consequence, these

general aspects—which include causality—are not a secondary and purely artificial

construction, contrary to what Dharmakırti claims: they are the ultimate elements of

perception and any particular object of perception is made of their synthesis.35

This theory of perception enables Utpaladeva to state that causality in general has

already been grasped in countless perceptions (as a component of perceived fires,

seeds, etc.),36 so that the sense organs too, although imperceptible as such, are

nonetheless perceived in some way, insofar as they are inferred as a ‘‘cause

in general’’ already perceived in innumerable everyday experiences.37

Abhinavagupta concludes:

tasmat karan:atvabhasasamanyam: purvapratyaks:asvıkr�

tam. tatas tatra yuktam:vikalpanam.38

Therefore [the subject] has appropriated the generality (samanya) of the

phenomenon ‘‘causality’’ through direct perception before [inferring the

existence of the sense organs]; so in this case, the conceptual construction is

correct.

The Sautrantika wrongly assumes that in the case of the sense organs, the inferred

object has never been perceived (so that it is all right to infer an external object by

33 See IPK II, 3, 7 and their commentaries, quoted and translated in Ratie (2010b, fn. 36).34 See IPK II, 3, 2cd and its commentaries (quoted and translated in Ratie 2010b, fn. 35). This verse is

explicitly mentioned by Abhinavagupta in his explanation of Utpaladeva’s criticism of the Sautrantika’s

inference (in IPV, vol. I, pp. 188–189).35 See Torella (1992, pp. 332–333); (2002, fn. 3, pp. 89–90).36 See IPV, vol. I, pp. 189–190: iti karan: abhaso vises:asunyah: parigr: hıta eva bıjad an_kura iti pratıtau.yad yasya niyamam anuvidhatte’vyatiriktam: tat tasya karyam iti pratighat:am: mr: ttikadirupasya hetut-advanmatrasyabhasat. ‘‘As a consequence, in the case of the cognition ‘the sprout comes from the seed’,

the phenomenon of cause (karan: abhasa) devoid of particularities (vises:asunya) has already been entirely

grasped [in the form] ‘that which invariably receives its restriction from [something] is the effect of that

[thing]’, because in each pot, something that is merely [particularized as] possessing this [generality] of

cause (hetutadvanmatra) is manifest in the form of clay, etc.’’37 See Vr

�tti, p. 22: indriyam apy anumıyate kim: cinmatram: nimittam: tac ca bıjadyabhasad abhasitam eva.

‘‘Even the sense organs are inferred as a mere something (kim: cinmatra) that is a cause, and this has

necessarily been manifested [previously] thanks to the manifestation of the seed, etc.’’38 IPVV, vol. II, p. 156.

490 I. Ratie

123

definition impossible to perceive): in fact, the object of the sense organs’ inference,

causality in general, is already known through perception.

Is Utpaladeva Providing an Argument Against His Own Theory?

This strategy is very risky though; for the argument could be used just as well in

favour of the Sautrantika’s thesis. Thus according to Utpaladeva, the inference of

the sense organs is valid, although nobody has ever perceived the indriya-s, because

it regards a ‘‘cause in general’’ of perception, which is a component of countless

perceived objects; but then why not consider that accordingly, the inference of theexternal object is valid, because it regards the ‘‘cause in general’’ of phenomenaldiversity? Utpaladeva’s reasoning apparently legitimates the externalist’s inference

instead of refuting it.

Although this problem is not clearly stated in the Vr�

tti or the IPV, Utpaladeva and

Abhinavagupta were perfectly well aware of it. Thus, commenting on Utpaladeva’s

lost Vivr: ti, Abhinavagupta explains:

yadi tavad adhikam: hetumatram: sadhyate tat kapilabhyupagatasam: vinmatra-svabhavadhikam: sam: vidaisvaryam icchatmakam urarıkr: tam eva karan:atayasvatantryam: nameti siddham: sadhitam: syat. athapi sam: vidbahyatavisis: t:am:tadadhikam: sadhyate. tad anupapannam: , sam: vidbahyasya svapne’py ana-bhatasya vikalpyatvayogad anumeyatanupapanna yatah: .

39

If, on the one hand, [the Sautrantika’s inference] establishes a mere cause

(hetumatra) that is [simply] distinct [from the other perceived causes of

phenomenal variety,] then here is what [this inference] should ‘‘establish:’’ the

sovereignty (aisvarya) of consciousness, which is distinct from the nature that

the followers of Kapila [the founder of Sam: khya] attribute to pure con-

sciousness (sam: vinmatra), [and] which consists in will (iccha)—[i.e.,] what is

called freedom (svatantrya) must necessarily be acknowledged as the cause

[of phenomenal variety]. If, on the other hand, [the Sautrantika says] that [his

inference] establishes [a cause] that is particularized (visis: t:a) by externality

with respect to consciousness (sam: vidbahyata), [that is to say, a cause] which

is distinct from [consciousness]—this is impossible; because that which is

external to consciousness, [i.e.], that which has never been been manifested,

even in a dream, cannot be inferred, since it cannot be conceptualized.

There is an essential difference between the sense organs’ inference and the

external object’s inference. In the first case, one infers, from the fact of visual

perception for instance, a cause in general that is distinct from the other causes of

perception (i.e. light and the perceived visual form).40 In the second case, however,

39 IPVV, vol. II, p. 161.40 See IPVV, vol. II, p. 155: indriyadr: s: t:aprabhr: ti na kenacid vi�ses:arupen: anumıyate’pi tu samanyenadr:s: t:arupalokadhikam: kim: cit karan: am iti. ‘‘An [entity] such as the imperceptible entity that is a sense

organ is not inferred in any particular form (vi�ses:arupa); rather, [it is inferred] as a generality (samanya),

in the form: ‘it is some cause that is distinct from the perceived form and light’.’’


123

the cause inferred is not conceived as a cause in general, since it is particularized

(vi�sis: t:a) by externality: the Sautrantika does not claim to infer just any cause, but

rather, a cause that possesses the singular property of being external to con-

sciousness.

Admittedly, any inferred cause is thus subjected to some kind of particulari-

zation: we infer the existence of the seed that causes a sprout as being distinct

from the other causes contributing to its production, such as water or earth—or

the clay that causes a pot, as being distinct from the potter’s stick or wheel;41 or

the sense organ causing perception, as being distinct from the perceived form

or light. In the case of the external object though, the Sautrantika does not infer

from the cognition bearing differentiated aspects (sakara) a cause in general that

would simply be distinct from a pure consciousness devoid of aspects (nirakara);

for if that were the case, he would infer the sole freedom (svatantrya) of

consciousness as the cause of phenomenal variety (thus agreeing with the

Pratyabhijna philosophers’ main thesis),42 since this creative spontaneity at the

heart of any conscious state is distinct from the passive, undifferentiated mani-

festation that the Sautrantika describes as the normal state of consciousness.43

But the Sautrantika refuses to identify the cause to be inferred with conscious-

ness’s spontaneity: he wants to infer a cause distinct from consciousness itself.This additional particularization44 dooms the Sautrantika’s inference to failure,

because one cannot picture an entity distinct from consciousness, even through

the wildest act of imagination (‘‘even in a dream,’’ says Abhinavagupta): the

objects of our concepts are general features that have been extracted from some

previous perception, but there can be no perception of what is by nature abso-

lutely alien to consciousness—so that there can be no concept of the external

41 Cf. IPVV, vol. II, p. 155:tatra mr: jjalayoh: sam: nihitayor abhavann an_kurah: , sa hi sati bıje bhavan,dan:d:acakrayoh: sator asan ghat:ah: , sati mr: tpin:d: e bhavan, tadadhikabıjahetukas tadadhikamr: tpin:d:ahetukaiti kramen:a pratyaks: anupalambhajo niscayo jayate. ‘‘In this regard, the certainty produced by the per-

ceptions and non-perceptions (pratyaks: anupalambha) arises progressively in the form ‘when earth and

water are present, the sprout does not exist; for [only] when the seed [too] exists does the [sprout] exist;

when the [potter’s] stick and wheel are present, the pot does not exist; [for only] when the clay lump [too]

exists does the [pot] exist. [Therefore the sprout] has as its cause the seed, which is distinct from [earth

and water]; [and] the [pot] has as its cause the clay lump, which is distinct from [the potter’s stick and

wheel]’.’’42 On this thesis, see e.g. Ratie (2010a).43 Abhinavagupta points out here that insofar as the Sautrantika considers that consciousness is in itself

undifferentiated, he agrees with certain Brahmanical conceptions of consciousness (such as the Sam: -

khya’s) presenting it as the passive and undifferentiated mirror of an ontologically independent reality.

Utpaladeva refutes this conception in a famous verse: see IPK I, 5, 11 (cf. e.g. Alper 1987; Torella 2002,

p.118; and Ratie 2007, fn. 59, pp. 339–340), which shows that consciousness, far from passively

reflecting its objects, actively becomes aware of itself, and that this dynamic grasp (vimarsa) is the very

essence of manifestation.44 See IPVV, vol. II, p. 165: karan:atasamanyapr: s: t:he bahyatatmakam: vises:an: antaram: t:an_kayitavyam.‘‘[If we follow the Sautrantika’s reasoning,] another particularity (vises:an: antara), namely, externality

(bahyata), must be cut on the back of the generality of causality!’’

492 I. Ratie

123

object. Thus in the IPV, Abhinavagupta, after explaining how the sense organs

can be inferred, adds:

abhasad bahyah: punar anabhasarupah: , sa cabhasata iti vipratis: iddham.anabhase ca nasti vikalparupasyanumanasya vyaparah: .

45

However, an [entity] external to manifestation consists in a non-manifestation

(anabhasa), and it is absolutely impossible that it may be manifest! And there

is no inferential activity—[since] an inference has as its nature a concept

(vikalpa)—as regards a non-manifestation.

The Ambiguity of the Concept of Externality (bahyata)

Nevertheless Utpaladeva’s opponent refuses to concede defeat, and in the IPVV, he

formulates a new objection:

gramad darpan: ad gr: had dehat sam: vedanad bahyam iti *bahyatasamanyam[conj.: bahyatah: samanyam KSTS]46 ekam, tac ca gr

�had bahyam iti pratıtau

siddham. tatas ca samarpakam: *darpan: ad iva bahyam: [conj.: dar-pan: adibahyam: KSTS] sam: vedanad api setsyati kramikabhasavaicitryaddhetoh: .

47

It is one [and the same] generality of externality (bahyatasamanya) [that is

present in these various cognitions:] ‘‘[this is] external (bahya) to the village,

to the mirror, to the house, to the body, to consciousness;’’ and this [generality

of externality] is established in the [mere] experience ‘‘[this is] external to the

house.’’ And as a consequence, just as [one can establish the existence of

something] external to the mirror [and] projecting [its particular form] onto it,

one can also establish [the existence of something external] to consciousness,

for the reason that is the diversity of successive phenomena [experienced by

any conscious being].

The Sautrantika is arguing that according to Utpaladeva’s own theory of per-

ception, conceptualizing the external object is no problem at all: just as we perceive

causality (karan:ata) as a general feature present in countless perceptions, in the

same way, we must perceive the general feature of externality (bahyata) in our

everyday experiences—when seeing a pot outside a house for instance; Utpaladeva

must acknowledge that just like causality, externality is part of our perceptual

45 IPV, vol. I, p. 190.46 Cf. the long marginal annotation in the SOAS manuscript of the IPV (folio 119, upper right

corner) which quotes this sentence (cf. also fn. 248 in the KSTS edition of the IPV, vol. I, p. 190,

almost identical to this marginal annotation): gramad darpan: ad gr: hat sam: vedanad bahyam itibahyatasamanyam ekam: ...47 IPVV, vol. II, p. 165.


123

world, so that we can rightly infer the existence of an object particularized by its

externality to consciousness.48

Abhinavagupta thus sums up the answer given by Utpaladeva to this objection in

his lost Vivr: ti:

nedam: bahyatvam: ghat:asya gramac ca sam: vedanac caikam. sam: vedanadbahyam: hy asam: vedanarupam: , na tu gr: had bahyam agr: harupam. evam: sati higr: haikadesah: kut:yadir gr: hantarvarty api ca ghat:adir gr: habahyah: syat; nacaivam. gr: hasam: nikr: s: t:am: ca yadvad bahyam: gr: hat, na tadvad evasam: vedanat tasyamurtasya sam: nikars: adidesavyavaharyatvabhavat. tatah:*sabdasamya-[conj.: sabdasamanya- KSTS]49 matren: edam: sadhyam ekam:pratibhati.50

The externality (bahyatva) of the pot is not one [whether it be considered] with

respect to the village or with respect to consciousness; for that which is

external to consciousness consists in that which is not consciousness

(asam: vedanarupa), whereas that which is external to the house does not

consist in that which is not a house! For if that were the case, a particular

element of the house—such as a wall for instance—or a pot for example,

although it is situated inside the house, should be external to the house, [since

they are not the house itself]; and it is not so. And whereas that which is

48 Cf. fn. 248 in the KSTS edition of the IPV, vol. I, p. 190 (reproducing a text similar to the marginal

annotation mentioned above, fn. 46): tatha catra purvavyavastha sphut:am eva dr: syate, yathacaks:uradivises:apariharen:a *bıjadyanubhavat [conj.: yatha va bıjadyanubhavat KSTS; yatha bıjadya-nubhavat SOAS] karan:atasamanyam [conj.: karan:asamanyam KSTS, SOAS] anubhutam evoktam, tathasarırad gr: had gramader va bahyasyanubhavad bahyatvam api samanyenanubhutam eva, jñanavises:en:abahyatvananubhavoktau va caks:urader api karan:avises:asyananubhutapurvatvan na syad anumanam: tatkatham: nanumanasya vyapara ity uktih: . ‘‘This is [the Sautrantika’s] discourse: ‘And in the same way [as

in the case of the sense organs], in this case [too], one sees very obviously that [externality] is already

established: just as[, in the case of the sense organs’ inference, Utpaladeva] has said that the generality of

causality (karan:atasamanya) has been experienced without taking into account the particularities of the

organ of vision, etc., through the experience of the seed and [other perceived causes], exactly in the same

way, [in the case of the external object’s inference,] externality (bahyatva) too is indeed experienced as a

generality (samanya) thanks to the experience of [this or that particular object that is] external to the

body, the house or the village; alternatively, if [Utpaladeva] answers that there is no experience of

externality thanks to a particular cognition, [then,] since the particular cause that is the organ of vision for

instance has not been previously experienced either, there cannot be any inference [of the sense organs

either]; therefore why wouldn’t the inference apply [in the case of the external object as well as in the

case of the sense organs]?’’49 Cf. the parallel passage in the IPV (vol. I, p. 190) quoted below. One could rather consider that it is the

text of the two editions of the IPV that is corrupted. However all the consulted IPV manuscripts (J, L, P,

S1, S2, SOAS; p.n.p. D) bear the KSTS and Bhaskarı reading; and the context seems to require this

conjecture, since sabdasamanya would make sense if Abhinavagupta said that the generality of exter-

nality (bahyatasamanya) is a generality that is only verbal; but he states that this generality of externality

appears to have a unity only thanks to something else. Besides, sabdasamya is found elsewhere in the

IPVV, e.g. vol. III, p. 194: nanu tatra ghat:an_kuradau sabdasamyamatram: . ‘‘[—An objector:] But in

the case [that you are invoking,] there is only a verbal similarity (sabdasamya) between the pot and the

sprout for instance, [which are both called ‘effects’, but are different insofar as the first is the product of a

conscious intention].’’ Cf. also PV Praman:asiddhipariccheda 12, quoted below. Admittedly, Dignaga

deals with sabdasamanya, but in a different context (see Pind 1991).50 IPVV, vol. II, p. 165.

494 I. Ratie

123

external to the house is next to (sam: nikr�

s: t:a) the house, it is absolutely not the

case as regards that which is [external] to consciousness, because of the

impossibility for [consciousness]—which is devoid of any material form

(murta)—of having any spatial relation whatsoever such as proximity

(sam: nikars:a). Therefore this [externality] that must be established appears to

be one only thanks to a verbal similarity (sabdasamya).

The same argument is found in the IPV (although in a condensed form, and

without the objection to which it responds):

gramagr:had astu yad bahyam: tad agramadirupam: nocyate pratyekam:vat:anupakut:yatulader bahyatvaprasan_gad api tu *tatsam: nikr:s: t:am [J, L, P, S1,S2, SOAS : sam: nikr: s: t:am KSTS: tatsam: nikat:am: Bhaskarı; p.n.p. D].51

When one acknowledges that something is external to the village or the house, one

does not mean that this [thing] consists in that which is not the village or the

[house]; for [if it were the case,] there would follow respectively the externality of

the graden and the river [with respect to the village, whereas in fact they are in the

village,] or of the wall and a beam in the roof structure, [whereas in fact they are in

the house], etc. Rather, [we say that something is external to the house or the village

when we mean] that it is next to it (sannikr:s: t:a).

Utpaladeva’s answer to the Sautrantika’s last objection consists in pointing out

the fundamental ambiguity of the term ‘‘externality.’’ Thus when we talk about an

object external to consciousness, we mean an object ‘‘the nature of which is not

consciousness’’—in this case, externality means non-identity: an object is said to be

external to consciousness if it is considered as alien to consciousness; whereas when

we say ‘‘the pot is external to the house,’’ we do not mean that the pot is not the

house (just as when we say that the pot is inside the house, we do not mean that the

pot has the house as its nature): in this case, we don’t have in mind a pure and

simple otherness, but a spatial relation of proximity—and such a relation cannot

apply to consciousness, since consciousness is not a material form, a body situated

in space.

So it is a mere verbal similarity or homonymy (sabdasamya) that enables us to

talk about an object external to consciousness, and, as Abhinavagupta specifies,52

not a vastusamya, a similarity regarding the real entities denoted by the word: while

the generality ‘‘externality’’ that we experience is a certain relation between two

entities that are both manifest as spatially determined, the externality mentioned by

the Sautrantika is a pure otherness between two radically different entities, one of

which is absolutely unmanifest, whereas the other is the manifesting consciousness

itself—and we never experience such a relation.

51 IPV, vol. I, p. 190.52 See IPV, vol. I, p. 190, quoted below.


123

What Differentiates the Pratyabhijna’s Criticism from the Vijnanavadins’?

This notion of sabdasamya is probably borrowed from Dharmakırti, who states (albeit

in a very different context)53 that an inference is invalid if it rests on a reason that only

has a verbal similarity (sabdasamya) with something that could be a valid reason,

whereas the real entities (vastu) designated by the same expression are different:

vastubhede prasiddhasya sabdasamyad abhedinah: / na yuktanumitih:pan:d:udravyad iva hutasane //54

The inference of [something] well known is not right [when it occurs] on

account of [something else] that [seems to have] no difference [with a valid

reason] due to a [mere] verbal similarity (sabdasamya), whereas [in fact] there

is a difference as regards the real entities (vastu) [designated by the same

words]—for instance, [the inference] of fire on account of [the presence of] a

white substance [is not right, since smoke and snow, while being both called

‘‘white substances,’’ are different].

And that the Pratyabhijna philosophers are alluding here to Dharmakırti’s notion

of sabdasamya seems to be confirmed by the way Abhinavagupta concludes the

whole discussion in the IPV:

tasmad gramabahyam abhasabahyam iti ca sabdasamyamatram etan na vas-tusamyam. evam: ye vikalpe vastu nabhatıti manyante tes: am api tavadanumanavikalpo na bahya upapannah: . asmabhis tupapaditam adhyavasayasyapyabhasamanavis:ayatvam: bhrantitve cavasayasyeti sutre. tenanumanavi-kalpatmanapi prakasena yady anavis: t:o nıladir arthas tan nanumita eva syat.athavis: t:a eva, tarhi prag ivartho’prakasah: syad iti nyayena prakasamatras-vabhava eva, na bahyah: . tena bahye sadhye yat kim: cit praman:am anıyate, tadabahyatam eva pratyuta *sadhayati [Bhaskarı, J: prasadhayati KSTS, L, P, S1,S2, SOAS; p.n.p. D], iti viruddham eva.55

Therefore [the expressions] ‘‘external to the village’’ and ‘‘external to mani-

festation’’ only have a verbal similarity (sabdasamya) [and] not a similarity as

regards the real entities (vastusamya); thus, even for those who consider that

no real entity (vastu) is manifest in a concept, in any case, the concept

[established through an] inference cannot concern [something] that is external

[to consciousness]. As for us, we have [already] demonstrated in verse [I, 3, 5,

which begins with] ‘‘and if determination were erroneous...,’’ that even

determination (adhyavasaya) has an object that is being manifest. As a con-

sequence, if an object such as blue, etc., is not pervaded by the manifesting

consciousness (prakasa), even in the form of a concept [established through

an] inference, then it cannot be inferred at all. But if [the opponent replies] that

[this external object to be inferred] is indeed pervaded [by the manifesting

53 See Krasser (1999).54 PV Pram�an:asiddhipariccheda 12.55 IPV, vol. I, pp. 190–191.

496 I. Ratie

123

consciousness], then, according to the principle [formulated by Utpaladeva in

verse I, 5, 2, which begins with] ‘‘the object would remain devoid of mani-

festation (prakasa), just as before...’’, [since] its nature is necessarily nothing

but the manifesting consciousness, it is not an external [object]! Therefore

whichever means of knowledge [we may] use as regards the external [object]

that [we are] trying to establish, on the contrary, it is the non-externality

(abahyata) [of this object with respect to consciousness] that this [means of

knowledge] establishes; it is therefore necessarily contradicted [as soon as it

applies to the external object].

Abhinavagupta first notices that because there is only a verbal similarity between

the externality that we can witness and externality with respect to consciousness,

‘‘even for those who consider that no real entity is manifest in a concept’’—that is,

even for Dharmakırti’s followers, and not only for the Saivas—the Sautrantika’s

inference cannot be valid, since Dharmakırti himself acknowledges that an infer-

ence is invalid if it rests on a mere sabdasamya.

However, in the same passage, Abhinavagupta also underlines a crucial differ-

ence between Dharmakırtian and Saiva epistemologies—56 namely, the fact that

the Saivas refuse the Buddhist logicians’ dichotomy between perception understood

as the immediate revelation of a singular real entity (vastu) and concepts understood

as the artificial construction of a generality: according to Utpaladeva, the general

feature that a concept makes known is also a real entity present in any immediate

perception—and conversely, at the very moment of conceptualization, this general

feature must be immediately manifested in some way.57 As a consequence, in the

Pratyabhijna system, whatever is external to consciousness not only cannot be

proved to exist, but cannot be thought about at all, even in a purely abstract and

conceptual way, because whenever we try to think about an external object, as

Abhinavagupta remarks here, this object is bound to be pervaded by the con-

sciousness that manifests it.

56 Cf. Bhaskarı, vol. I, p. 234: nanu bauddhair vikalpasya vastvasam: sparsa evoktas tvaya tu tenaivasarvam: sadhyata iti kim etad ? ‘‘But the Buddhists state that a concept has absolutely no immediate

relationship (sam: sparsa) with a real entity (vastu), whereas you [consider that] everything is established

through this [immediate relationship with a real entity]—what about this [difference]?’’57 See IPK I, 3, 5 (to which Abhinavagupta alludes in the passage just quoted): bhrantitve cavasayasyana jad: ad vis:ayasthitih: / tato’jad: ye nijollekhanis: t:han narthasthitis tatah: // ‘‘And if determination were an

illusion (bhranti), this [illusion], which would be insentient (jad:a) [with respect to the object], could not

produce the establishment of the object; [and] if [the Buddhist opponent replies that determination] is

sentient, [since according to him, it is sentient only as regards itself and its representation (ullekha)], it is

confined to itself and its representation, [so that] it cannot [either] lead to the establishment of the object.’’

To sum up, according to Abhinavagupta, Utpaladeva is targeting the Buddhist logicians’ notion of

determination (adhyavasaya, i.e., the conceptual thought that determines the ineffable content of a

perception as being this or that); and his goal is to show that determination cannot be a mere error and yet

enable us to deal with objects in our mundane experiences: the ‘‘establishment of the object, [i.e.,] the

power of transforming [an object] into an object for mundane activity’’ (vis:ayasya vyavasthapanam:vyavaharyatvasam: padanasamarthyam, IPV, vol. I, p. 103) implies that the object is somehow being

manifested not only when it is perceived, but also at the very moment of its conceptualization, and this

manifestation cannot be reduced to an illusory phenomenon.


123

Abhinavagupta’s final remarks thus suggest that because in Dharmakırti’s sys-

tem, ultimately, concepts never concern a real entity, Dharmakırti cannot really

make sense of the distinction (to which he nonetheless has recourse) between

sabdasamya and vastusamya:58 while this entire discussion is intertwined with

Dharmakırtian concepts that Utpaladeva appropriates, Abhinavagupta’s conclusion

hints that only the Saiva system can fully explain why it is impossible even to form

the concept of an external reality, because only the Saiva system can give its full

meaning to the Dharmakırtian distinction between a verbal and a genuine similarity.

Conclusion—What Does Utpaladeva’s Refutation Prove?

When refuting the Sautrantika’s contention that external objects can be inferred,

Utpaladeva obviously borrows much from Dharmakırti’s conceptual arsenal: the

argument according to which any karyahetu inference must rest on a set of per-

ceptions belongs to the Buddhist logician; so does the distinction between sab-dasamya and vastusamya with which Utpaladeva eventually defeats his opponent.

But Utpaladeva also presents his system as the only one capable of challenging the

Sautrantikas’ argument that some inferences (such as that of the sense organs) do

not rest on any perception. Not only does the Pratyabhijna system justify this type of

samanyato dr�

s: t:a inference thanks to its theory of perception; it also explains why

external objects cannot be proved to exist through such an inference, by demon-

strating the impossibility not only of perceiving, but also of conceptualizing any

external reality: the Sautrantika can talk about the external object thanks to a

‘‘verbal similarity,’’ but his words remain inexorably empty, because he is incapable

of actually forming such a concept. And Abhinavagupta points out that this

impossibility can be justified only in the Pratyabhijna system: Dharmakırti, who

considers all conceptual thought as purely artificial, paradoxically leaves open the

possibility for a speculative externalism that concedes the impossibility of per-

ceiving the external object but claims to build its concept; in contrast, according to

Utpaladeva, any conceptualized object must somehow be manifest to the con-

sciousness that conceptualizes it, so that speculation is limited by an impassable

boundary: the impossibility to even think about an object external to thought.

Abhinavagupta concludes that whatever the means chosen to demonstrate the

existence of the external object, it can only establish the object’s ‘‘non-externality’’

(abahyata), because all means of knowledge, be they perception or inference, must

58 One could suspect that Abhinavagupta is being unfair here, since Dharmakırti does account for some

kind of link between the objects of (some) concepts and real singular entities (see Katsura 1991, p. 143

and Tillemans forthcoming on this causal approach of apoha according to which concepts are causally

conditioned by residual traces left by some direct perceptions of singulars), and causal efficiency (art-hakriya) could be considered as the basis of the sabdasamya/vastusamya distinction: one could argue that

in Dharmakırti’s system, a concept rests on a vastusamya only when the various particulars subsumed

within it have the same arthakriya (whereas fire and snow, although both conceptualized as ‘‘white

substances,’’ do not have the same efficiency). Nevertheless, according to Dharmakırti’s principles, the

vastusamya which supposedly legitimates the use of a concept is also the fictitious product of a process of

mental exclusion, since real entities, being absolutely singular, cannot have anything in common (even a

similar efficiency), so that ultimately, all similarities seem bound to be merely verbal.

498 I. Ratie

123

transform their object into an object for consciousness. But what does this ‘‘non-

externality’’ mean? Admittedly, Utpaladeva seems to achieve much less than he

hopes to: instead of proving that there are no external objects, he only proves that

one cannot prove the existence of external objects. And yet, obviously he does not

consider that his reasoning might lead to some kind of scepticism: he does not

merely conclude that we cannot know whether there is something outside of con-sciousness, but rather, that nothing is external to consciousness. One might suspect

that he is thus confusing (consciously or not) a mere epistemological restriction with

an ontological negation. But one might also consider that Utpaladeva does not even

envisage scepticism as an option, because scepticism would still entail the spatial

representation of consciousness, the inadequacy of which he has pointed out: stating

that we do not know whether there is something outside of consciousness or not

would still amount to postulating some kind of empty space outside of conscious-

ness that might be filled (or not) with some external entities. From this point of

view, one of the most interesting aspects of Utpaladeva’s strategy in this discussion

is the fact that he claims to demonstrate that there is nothing outside of con-

sciousness not merely by pointing out the impossibility of knowing what is external

to consciousness, but rather, by questioning the very meaning of the distinction

between externality and internality with respect to consciousness.

Acknowledgement I would like to thank Alexis Sanderson, who kindly invited me to read the IPV inOxford in 2005 and to whose vast erudition the following pages owe so much; Alex Watson, whoattended some of these readings, for then pointing out a problem that this article attempts to solve; TomTillemans, for sharing some unpublished works of his on apoha; the organizers of the 14th WorldSanskrit Conference, where I presented an earlier version of this paper, and the editors of this specialissue, Shoryu Katsura, Mark Siderits and Kiyotaka Yoshimizu, who read this paper with great care andmade many helpful suggestions. I am also very much indebted to Raffaele Torella, whose remarkableworks on the Pratyabhijna system have been a constant help in understanding Utpaladeva andAbhinavagupta’s texts, and to Vincent Eltschinger, whose friendly and attentive reading of this paper ledto many improvements. Mistakes, of course, are mine.

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