Sakdalism and Philippine RadicalismAuthor(s): David R. SturtevantReviewed work(s):Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Feb., 1962), pp. 199-213Published by: Association for Asian StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2050522 .Accessed: 28/08/2012 11:08

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Sakdalism and Philippine Radicalism

DAVID R. STURTEVANT

On the night of May 2-3, I935, 65,ooo partially-armed peasants shattered the tranquility of the countryside surrounding Manila.' Between sunset and sunrise

dissident bands seized three communities and threatened ten others in Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna, and Cavite.2 Throughout the night confusion mounted. Hard-pressed Constabulary units from the provinces and Manila fought three engagements with Sakdalistas, picked up persistent reports of an impending attack on Manila, and heard recurrent and highly disturbing rumors that Japanese aircraft, equipped with arms and ammunition for the rebels, would fly over the trouble zone at dawn.3

By mid-morning of May 3, the situation appeared to be getting beyond the con- trol of law enforcement agencies. After a bloody clash at Cabuyao the Constabulary commander in Laguna issued frantic calls for more reinforcements and iooo addi- tional rifles.4 When this appeal appeared in Manila newspapers beside reports that the governor of Cavite had been captured, near panic developed in the rural areas around the capital city.5 Prominent families throughout the rebellious district fled their homes for the comparative safety of Manila,6 and Malacafian alerted American military units for possible action.7

By evening, however, the crisis had begun to ease. Constabularymen in the provinces reported that rebel bands had vanished as rapidly and with as little trace as they had formed.8 Provincial and municipal authorities restored severed telephone lines, rounded up known Sakdal leaders together with other radicals, began the in-

The author is Associate Professor of History at Muskingum College, New Concord, Ohio. Research for this paper was conducted in the Joseph R. Hayden Papers at Ann Arbor, Michigan with the assistance of a Foreign Area Training and Research Grant from the Ford Foundation.

1 Estimates of Sakdal membership ranged as high as 300,000 at the time of the uprising. No more than 65,ooo, if that many, however, participated in the insurrection. Acting Governor-General J. R. Hayden, Preliminary Report on the Sakdalista Disturbances, Manila, May 7, I935, p. 4. Hayden Papers. Cited here- after as Hayden, Preliminary Report. Documents from the Hayden Papers will be labeled HP.

2 See G. C. Dunham, L. J. Van Schaik, F. W. Manley, and E. G. Chapman, Report of the Committee Appointed by Acting Governor-General 1. R. Hayden to Investigate the Uprising of May 2 and 3, 1935,

Manila, May 2I, I935. HP. Cited hereafter as Sakdal Uprising Report. 3 J. R. Hayden, The Philippines: A Study in National Development (New York, I942), p. 39I. Cited

hereafter as Hayden, The Philippines. 4 Manila Herald, May 3, I935. 5 Sakdal Uprising Report, Appendix III, "Action of Municipal Authorities," pp. I-I4.

6 The influx of well-to-do rural refugees placed a severe strain on Manila's hotel facilities. Manila Daily Bulletin, May 4, I935.

7 Richard Ely, the ranking official at Malacafian during the disturbance, filed a memorandum im- mediately after the uprising explaining the alert: ". . . early yesterday morning there was a possibility that the Constabulary would not be able to control the situation and I thought it might ultimately be necessary to call on the Army." Ely to Hayden, May 4, I935. HP.

8 Hayden, Preliminary Report, p. 4.

199

200 DAVID R. STURTEVANT

terrogation of captured insurgents, and turned in preliminary reports on the pattern of the uprising,. Early findings indicated a sobering set of circumstances. During fifteen turbulent hours municipal and Constabulary police power had been tested to. the breaking points.9 Suppression of the brief but widespread outbreak resulted in death or severe wounds for more than one hundred men. In Cabuyao a determined force of three hundred ill-equipped Sakdals attempted to hold the stone wall sur- rounding the churchyard against a Constabulary attack. During the engagement more than two hundred dissidents managed to flee the scene of carnage. Seventy-nine, however, remained behind to defend the wall. Seven emerged physically unscathed. Twenty-two suffered serious wounds. Fifty were killed.'0

These were the principal events of May 2-3, 1935. For the most part, the uprising together with its prelude has either been ignored or its significance has been missed by students and observers of Philippine affairs.1' Some tend to lump Sakdalism with the other inefTective and shadowy progenitors of the Hukbalahap. Like the ceaseless efforts of the hydra-headed Colorum sect, the flamboyant Intrencheradista episode, the abortive Tangulan uprising, and the poorly organized operations of lesser secret societies and messianic movements, the Sakdalistas usually receive a curt nod in passing from chroniclers hurrying toward the genesis of contemporary radicalism in the Socialist-Communist United Front of I938.12 Efforts to classify Sakdalism reveal the confusion surrounding the movement. Gregorio Zaide labels the Sakdals a "Communist-type" organization."' But Luis Taruc calls them tools of Japanese imperialism and castigates Benigno Ramos, the Sakdal supremo, as a combination "labor racketeer" and "agent of Japan." 14 The purpose of this paper is to linger briefly with this intriguing group of dissenters in order to suggest some implications of the movement which all too frequently have been overlooked.

Origins of Sakdalism

Prior to I930 agrarian protest movements tended to follow a well-established pattern.15 Bitter taos, walled in by usury and illiteracy, turned to any leader who promised escape. Periodically, at the behest of unlettered or unsophisticated local radicals, they executed poorly-conceived and disorganized uprisings. Almost without exception provincial rebels based their insurrections on the naive assumption that an isolated flare-up would ignite a general conflagration in tension-ridden Central

9 All available Constabulary reserves except I 14 men at Manila headquarters were committed to action. If the insurrection had lasted a few more hours or spread to neighboring provinces the reserve would have been exhausted. Sakdal Uprising Report, Appendix II, "Action by the Constabulary," pp. I-3.

10 Three of the wounded died within twenty-four hours. Sakdal Uprising Report, p. 8. 11 Typical of the treatment accorded the Sakdals by Filipino historians is that of Gregorio F. Zaide.

Volume II of his standard history contains only three sentences pertaining to Sakdalism. G. F. Zaide, The Philippines Since the British Invasion (Manila, I949), p. 289. An excellent popular survey of Philippine affairs dismisses the Sakdalistas as "part crackpot, part idealistic, part socialist and part fascist . . ." David Bernstein, The Philippine Story (New York, I947), p. I20.

12 A recent monograph on agrarian unrest in the Philippines continues standard misinterpretations by lumping the Colorums and Tangulan into one movement and by glossing over the armed revolt of the Sakdals in "I934." A. H. Scaff, The Philippine Answer to Communism (Stanford, California, I955), pp. I47-I48.

13 Zaide, The Philippines since the British Invasion, p. 289. 14 Luis Taruc, Born of the People (New York, I953), p. 29.

15 See D. R. Sturtevant, "Philippine Social Structure, and Its Relation to Agrarian Unrest" (unpublished doctral dissertation, Stanford Univ., I958), pp. I05-I53.

SAKDALISM AND PHILIPPINE RADICALISM 201

Luzon. Between I93I and I94I, spontaneous challenges to authority gave way to co- herent agrarian movements led by members of the urban middle class. Sakdalism marked the transition from blind rustic protest on the one hand to the later well- organized and near-successful rebellion on the other.

Benigno Ramos, the dynamic founder of Sakdalism, typified the metamorphosis in leadership. Cut from a different mold than the traditional rural agitator, Ramos was the son of a minor provincial bureaucrat.16 Born in I893 and educated in the town of Bulacan, Ramos served his intellectual apprenticeship as a village school teacher before gravitating to Manila. In the capital he wrote impassioned nationa- listic poetry for obscure Tagalog literary journals and worked on the staff of several newspapers. In ig2i, he entered the civil service via the clerical ranks of the Philippine Senate. Rising rapidly, he became in I928 the director of a bureaucratic division on the Senate Staff. Moreover, his way with words attracted the attention of Naciona- lista leaders. They began to use his fiery patriotism and flair for oratory to rally the faithful at minor party functions in Manila and Bulacan. These appearances gained for Ramos a small but devoted personal following. This pleasant and promising career came to an abrupt end in I930. Permitting his emotions to overcome his subservience to party discipline, he joined an unsanctioned strike by teachers at a Manila High School.17 This action led Senate President Manuel Quezon to request his resignation. Ramos complied but in the process dedicated himself to an anti- Quezon, anti-Nacionalista crusade.

With his own savings and the financial assistance of Manila friends Ramos established a newspaper. Called Sakdal, meaning "to accuse" or "to strike," the vitriolic weekly quickly gained a degree of notoriety. In each issue Ramos cast verbal brickbats at the majority party, accused its leaders of every political crime imaginable, fanned the flames of class antagonism, and tried to capture the independence issue from the party which had used it as a rallying cry for a generation. Furthermore, Ramos opened his editorial columns to anyone who wished to vent his spleen against Quezon and his followers. To the delight of the village population, extremists like the Tangulan Patricio Dionisio seized the opportunity.18 Circulation mounted in the provinces, where Ramos became known as a champion of the poor, an advocate of the "Filipinos of heart and face," and an enemy of those he called "rich," "fat,'> "so- called leaders," who "promise as much as the Americans and deliver as little."'19 His cavalier treatment of the libel laws, together with his affinity for agitators with se- ditious intent, drew the attention of the postal authorities who temporarily withdrew Sakdal's mailing privileges.20 This involvement with officialdom merely strengthened Ramos' reputation in the barrios as a persecuted spokesman for the downtrodden.

After tapping the reservoir of discontent in the villages, Ramos exploited his

16 Biographical information on Ramos' early career can be found in R. M. Stubbs, "Philippine Radi- calism: The Central Luzon Uprisings, 1925-35" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Univ. of California, Berkeley, 1951), pp. 130-35.

17 Hayden, The Philippines, p. 382. 18 For an analysis of the Tangulan Movement and Ramos' connection with Dionisio, see Stubbs,

"Philippine Radicalism," pp. 94-125. 19 Stubbs, "Philippine Radicalism," p. 135. 20 Constabulary records indicated that the abortive "Tangulan uprising . . . was precipitated by the

influence of the 'Sakdal' publications . . ." G. B. Francisco, Chief of Staff, Philippine Constabulary, The ,Sakdal Party, Manila, May 7, 1935, p. i. HP.

202 DAVID R. STURTEVANT

popularity by forming a political party in I933. Opportunity for minority action came with the appearance of a bitter controversy among Nacionalista leaders concerning ratification of the Harc-Hawes-Cuttinb Act. While both Quezonistas and followers of Sergio Osmefia and Manuel Roxas assailed one another over the best route toward Commonwealth status, Ramos' lieutenants carefully prepared the way for Sakdal's editor to enter the political arena. On October 29, provincial delegations led by professional men assembled at an inconspicuous convention in Manila.2' They quickly elected Benigno Ramos party president, designated other functionaries, and adopted a hastily constructed platform which combined all the disconnected causes Sakdal had been advocating for three years.22

Sakdalism and Party Politics

With the party formally launched Ramos and his aides prepared strategy for the I934 electoral campaign. As a means of publicizing the chief plank in the Sakdal platform, Ramos sailed to America for an eleventh hour effort to achieve immediate independence.23 While the absent supremo's pronouncements occupied the headlines, editorials in Sakdal continued to level verbal barrages on both camps of the badly-split Nacionalistas. In the provinces a full slate of Sakdalista hopefuls quietly filed petitions for the June election and activists went to work in the villages. Sakdal organizational techniques became apparent in April and May when the pre-election debate reached fever pitch. Followers of Quezon and Osmefia travelled the well-worn Nacionalista campaign routes and vilified one another before assembled voters in major towns and provincial capitals. Sakdalista orators, however, visited remote barrios to harangue delighted taos by the light of flickering oil flares.24

The Sakdals organized their appeal around issues which were clearcut and mean- ingful to the peasantry. Party speakers accused the Nacionalistas of hypocrisy on the issue of national freedom and promised that Ramos would acquire "complete and absolute" independence for the Philippines by December 3I, I935. They guaranteed also that when the Sakdal Party acquired control of the government it would abolish all taxes. To these political appeals Sakdal orators added the issue of caciquism. Calling for equal or common ownership of land they proclaimed that all large holdings should be divided and distributed to the poor. They also launched vitriolic attacks on the religious orders for operating vast estates and amassing wealth "through dishonest means."25

But Sakdals did not limit their campaigning to rhetoric. They supported verbal ac- cusations of Nacionalista chicanery with fraudulent evidence. Party speakers linked dignified depictions of Ramos' exemplary character with lurid descriptions of Manuel Quezon's private life; moreover, they circulated two snapshots to prove their point.

21 Of the thirteen men elected to subordinate positions in the party, four were lawyers, three former government employees, two merchants, one a school teacher, one an ex-judge, and one a dentist. Stubbs, p. I55.

22 A summary of the Sakdal Party Platform can be found in Francisco, Sakdal Party, p. i. 23 Ramos spent more time in Japan and California building political fences than he did in Washington.

For an account of his trip see Stubbs, pp. 157-I59. 24 "They appealed to people whom the local leaders of the dominant parties often disdained, ignored,

or patronized." Hayden, The Philippines, p. 384. 25 Campaign techniques are described by Francisco, Sakdal Party, p. 2.

SAKDALISM AND PHILIPPINE RADICALISM 203

The first pictured Quezon enjoying the company of an American movie queen; The second portrayed Benigno Ramos in earnest conversation with President Roosevelt. Sakdal spokesmen, of course, did not inform their rustic audiences that the Quezon photograph was a standard Hollywood publicity shot while the statesmanlike por- trayal of Ramos was a cleverly-devised composite.26 Te sharp contrast between the two pictures clinched the argument for many taos. Distrust of Nacionalista leadership spread in the wake of Sakdalista orators and an intense hatred for Manuel Quezon developed in many villages.

The rural peregrinations of Sakdalista organizers together with the inflammatory content of their speeches were ignored by everyone in official circles except the Argus- eyed Philippine Constabulary. When returns for the elections began to roll in, how- ever, amazed Nacionalistas discovered that Sakdalism had become a force to be reck- oned with. All three Sakdal candidates for the House of Representatives won re- sounding victories. The people of Marinduque elected a Sakdal governor of their province. In Laguna, Bulacan, Rizal, and Cavite, the party's candidates for municipal offices made remarkable showings and won more than a score of important posts.2T The outcome demonstrated the effectiveness of the Sakdal appeal and bore witness to the degree of discontent in the provinces. In a post-election statement a triumphant Benigno Ramos denied the growing Nacionalista accusation that his party advocated violence. After restating Sakdalism's peaceful objectives the ex-senate clerk concluded his remarks on a note of qualified optimism, "We fight only for things that are reasonable," he said. "Given the chance we hope to make good."28

Ramos' confidence, however, proved to be ephemeral. Quezon and Osmefna, rec- ognizing that their debate over independence laws had opened the door to a poten- tially dangerous opposition, followed time-honored precedent and ended their feudV" The majority party obediently closed ranks behind them. Almost overnight Ramos and his followers found themselves confronted by the same overwhelming majority against which minority parties had been dispersed for a generation. Moreover, the reconstituted Nacionalistas moved efficiently to exploit the political advantages of the Tydings-McDuffie Law and the Commonwealth status it promised. In July I934,

Filipinos went to the polls again to select delegates for a Constitutional Conven- tion. The Sakdalistas boycotted the election and labeled the whole procedure a thinly-disguised technique to perpetuate oligarchic controls on a foundation of American bayonets.30 Their protests, however, went unheeded. The duly elected delegates, whom Ramos dismissed as a collection of "half-breeds and betrayers,"8' assembled on July 30, I934 and began the deliberations which concluded with the adoption of an organic act on February 8, I935. President Roosevelt signed the Con- stitution in March and called for a plebiscite to be held on May I4, I935.

The mending of the split in Nacionalista ranks, together with the pell mell race

26 Bernstein, The Philippine Story, p. 121. 27 Election results are summarized in Francisco, Sakdal Party, p. 3. 28 Hayden, The Philippines, p. 388. 29 Following the rapprochement, an editorial succinctly summarized the history of the Nacionalistas

as "a record of mergers, consolidations, coalitions, and reconciliations." Manila Daily Bulletin, April 30, I935.

30 Hayden, The Philippines, p. 388. 31 Stubbs, p. 173.

204 DAVID R. STURTEVANT

toward autonomy under majority party auspices, constituted a political disaster for the Sakdalistas. Unity among the established leaders made a rapid rise to majority status of the new opposition group inconceivable. It also precluded action as a fulcrum in a delicately balanced legislature. Last but not least the three Sakdal members of the House of Representatives could not possibly frustrate the Nacionalista drive toward Commonwealth status. Some Sakdals advocated the formulation of more realistic party goals to meet radically changed conditions.32 Ramos and his principal aides found themselves caught between the grindstones of their own demagoguery and Nacionalista exploitation of the widespread desire for self-rule. The painful squeeze left only two alternatives for the Sakdal leaders: (i) a major modification of their platform including the primary objective of immediate independence; or (2) an all- out campaign to frustrate the plebiscite.

Ramos spent several uncomfortable months squirming under the pressure of his party's situation. Exactly when he decided to block the plebiscite is not clear, but in November I934, he set forth on his travels again. Before leaving he announced that he was bound for Washington to fight for repeal of the Tydings-McDuffie Act. He made no effort, however, to carry the views of his followers to the United States. In- stead, he journeyed directly to Japan where he began negotiations with Pan-Asia elements.33

While Ramos discussed his plight with Japanese extremists, Sakdal leaders in the Philippines fought a frantic rear guard action against a wave of Nacionalista cam- paigners advocating Commonwealth status. Vituperation alone, however, could not check the ground swell of sentiment in favor of the Constitution. In March I935, Sakdal organizers in the provinces initiated a determined counteroffensive and prob- ably began covert preparations for an uprising. By the beginning of April, officials in Manila began to express concern over Sakdal activities in the region surrounding the capital.34 Nacionalista speakers attempting to parry Sakdal attacks on the Constitution encountered a wall of hostile silence or jeers and catcalls from the taos of Laguna. In Bulacan municipal police arrested a Sakdal orator at an anti-Commonwealth rally, but had to fight their way through an aroused mob of his supporters before they could place their prisoner behind bars.

On April ii, with political storm signals fluttering on all sides, members of the insular government moved to end the mounting turbulence. The Secretary of the Interior ordered municipal authorities to require permits for public meetings; he also specified that permission should not be granted until applicants had filed an ac-

32 Basilio Valdes, "Peace and Order in the Philippines," The Philippines Herald Year Book I935, III (November, I935) p. I41. Gonrado Benitez suggested that the independence issue be set aside in favor of the more worthy social and economic objectives. Conrado Benitez, "Sakdal," Philippine Magazinie, XXXII (I935), p. 240.

33 Ramos' contacts with Japanese extremists were established by Matsumoto Kumpei, a member of the Seiyukai Party and an erstwhile representative in the Diet. Matsumoto, who had imbibed the doctrines of Kitta Ikki and other Japanese expansionists, introduced Ramos to personal friends and acquaintances, including Toyama Mitsuru, and urged them to grant aid to the Sakdal leader, New York Times, May 5, I935.

34 Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce Eulogio Rodriguez informed the Acting Governor-General of the situation in a confidential memorandum and suggested that "irresponsible speakers" guilty of "defamatory and seditious denunciations" be arrested on the grounds that such a course would "stop this campaign of exaggerated misrepresentation." Rodriguez to Hayden, April 2, I935. HP.

SAKDALISM AND PHILIPPINE RADICALISM 205

ceptable program.35 The Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce called upon depart- mental agents in the provinces to enlighten villagers concerning government activi- ties and services.36 In spite of official restrictions and heightening "educational" efforts, dissidents kept on holding meetings in the barrios and the editorial pages of Sakdal continued to scream defiance. On April 23, the Director of Posts revoked the news- paper's mailing privileges on the grounds that it was "publishing libelous matter in- citing to rebellious conspiracies, stirring up the people against lawful authorities, and tending to disturb the peace of the community."37 With an efficient Nacionalista sup- pression campaign in full swing, and with the strident voice of the party organ stifled, officialdom in Manila settled back confidently to watch the storm clouds dis- perse. Comparative calm characterized the last week of a turbulent April, but petitions from Sakdal groups in the provinces protesting the restrictions on their right to assemble descended like a gentle snowfall on the Governor-General's office in Malacafian.38

Nacionalista repressive efforts, however, did not end Sakdal propaganda. It ap- peared in new forms from an unexpected source. Large numbers of Filipinos, in- cluding some prominent politicians, received personal letters signed by a Japanese artillery officer stationed on Formosa.39 The letters accused Manuel Quezon of in- sincerity in regard to independence and labeled the Senate President a traitor to the Philippine nation. After parroting the Sakdalista line the letter concluded with as- surances of Japanese sympathy toward the Filipinos in their hour of need.

The second result of Ramos' machinations in Japan had more far-reaching impli- cations. On the eve of the uprising activists passed out thousands of copies of Free Filipinos, a propaganda sheet printed in Japan, smuggled into Luzon, and covertly distributed in Sakdalista barr-ios.40 The four-page tabloid, complete with photographs, continued the violent tradition of Sakdal but added several inflammatory improvisa- tions to the verbal assault. The front-page featured a statement in Japanese entitled "An Appeal to the Japanese People" which recited a long chronicle of American abuses and broken pledges in the Philippines. While few, if any, provincial Sakdal- istas could decipher the characters they did not have to be linguists to draw the de- sired conclusion that the Japanese Empire supported their organization.41 Other

35 Conrado Benitez considered the order a violation of the new Constitution and warned that a policy of suppression would result in "explosion and violence." Benitez, "Sakdal," p. 253.

36 Department of Agriculture and Commerce, Office of the Secretary, General Circular #11, April i2,

1935. HP. 37 "News Summary," Philippine Magazine, XXXII (I935), p. 270. 38 See George A. Malcolm, The Commonwealth of the Philippines (New York, 1936), p. 282; and the

Manila Daily Bulletin, May I, 1935. 39 The existence of the letters, signed by Major Hiroshi Tamaru, came to the attention of the Gover-

nor-General's office shortly after the uprising. Inquiries despatched to the American Embassy in Tokyo revealed nothing other than the fact that Major Hiroshi was attached to the Headquarters Staff of the Imperial Army on Formosa. Hayden to Grew, May 8, 1935; and Grew to Hayden, May 9, 1935. HP.

40 A rare copy of Free Filipinos is included in the Hayden Papers. The following quotations are from this source.

41 The exact role of Japanese nationals in the uprising is difficult to evaluate. Sakdalistas captured dur- ing the encounters of May 2-3, believed that arms and air support would be supplied by Japan. Such a development, of course, did not take place. In fact, there is no evidence of any ties between Ramos and Japanese government circles. Interviews conducted in Tokyo immediately after the uprising with eight responsible Imperial officials revealed that only one had ever heard of Ramos. Grew to Hayden, May 13,

I935. HP. Moreover, Japanese diplomatic personnel vigorously denied any connection between their

206 DAVID R. STURTEVANT

columns, in English, Spanish and Tagalog, anticipated the themes of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Calling for the "revival of the Filipino oriental family tradition, oriental culture and civilization, and for the attainment of a strong and eternal union between all countries of the Far East," Free Filipinos emphasized the advantages of Asian solidarity in the face of Western political and economic domina- tion.

In addition, the propaganda effort linked demands for immediate freedom from the American yoke with agrarian conditions and reminded the villagers of their her- itage of protest. Two photographs of the Tayug Incident of I93i awakened bitter memories of the unsuccessful Colorum uprising.42 One, taken before the disturbance, portrayed the innocent faces of three Filipina schoolteachers who had helped defend the covento at Tayug. The other, taken after the insurrection, pictured dead Colorums at the feet of steel-helmeted constabularymen. The caption read as follows:

Land-grabbing, pauperization system [sic] are the striking characteristics of American domination in the Philippines. The uprising in Tayug, province of Pangasinan . . . was only one of the direct consequences of the people's stifled rights. Women assumed the leadership of this people's revolt, and these pictures show that they preferred death than [sic] to see their country still agonizing under American domination. Their bodies are no more but their defeat in unequal struggle, their bravery and courage had open [sic] the eyes of the people in order to see the naked truth that even if there are Filipinos in this government, it is not Filipino government, but American government, the enemy of Filipino welfare.

Sakdal abuse brewed by Japanese typesetters blended to produce a volatile mix- ture. If syntax suffered, provocation did not. In regard to the Tydings-McDuffie Law Free Filipinos asked, "How many 'Ten Years' does the U. S. government need to kill our independence and . . . confiscate all the lands of the Filipinos? How many 'Ten Years' does this very benevolent government need to Hawaiianize our country?" Rising to descriptive heights an editorial warned that anyone who opposed the law would automatically be labeled "a demagogue, an agitator, an outlaw, a rabble-rouser, a self-styled leader, etc., and they the promise breaker [sic] and the great 'forgotter' [sic], are saints, perfect people, great statesmen, honorable men, honest, earnest, purest." Continuing familiar Sakdal accusations of American duplicity and Nacional- ista treason, the paper assembled a rogue's gallery of monsters for reader edification. It described Governor-General Frank Murphy as a "Frankenstein," and characterized Speaker of the House Quintin Paredes and Governor Juan Calles of Laguna as "good

government and the rebels. New York Times, May 5, I935. Students of the Sakdal movement agree that the Imperial Government was in no way responsible for the upheaval. See Hayden, The Philippines, p. 392;

and Stubbs, "Philippine Radicalism," p. I83. Matsumoto Kumpei, however, admitted that he introduced Ramos to members of patriotic societies. Later he intervened to prevent the Sakdal leader's extradition to the Philippines. Matsumoto's activities, together with Major Hiroshi's letter, and the issues of Free Filipinos which circulated among "Pan-Asia" elements in Japan, indicate that private individuals and groups definitely associated themselves with the movement. The only conclusion which can be safely drawn is that the connection between the Japanese and Sakdalism resulted from covert activity by a few extremists who hoped to embarrass the United States and thus contribute to the growth of antagonism toward the West among the colonial peoples of Southwest Asia.

42 The Tayug uprising took the lives of five constabularymen. Five Colorums, including two women, died during the engagement; twenty suffered serious wounds. See Stubbs, "Philippine Radicalism," pp. 60-87.

SAKDALISM AND PHILIPPINE RADICALISM 207

Frankenstein Slaves." In a final assault on majority party leadership, Free Filipinos called Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmenfa "Super-Servants of the Americans" and supplied readers with a grotesque photograph of the two men which could have been used to discipline unruly village children.

In spite of Free Filipinos' explosive contents, not a single copy fell into the hands of suspicious authorities until after the abortive rebellion. The fact that seditious propaganda of foreign origin could be disseminated in the face of official concern and constabulary surveillance of Sakdal activity was but one indication of the breakdown of government security measures. On April 27, acting Governor-General Hayden, fearing Sakdal demonstrations on traditionally difficult May Day, consulted respon- sible officials on this potential danger. After being reassured that there would be "no disorders in the immediate future,"43 he left the capital for an inspection of remote Mountain Province. As predicted, May Day came and went with no untoward inci- dents. In fact, the parade in Manila on May i, I935, was a model of civic solidarity and obedience.44 Law-enforcement authorities in the capital breathed easier and settled back for a brief period of relaxation before the plebiscite. On the evening of May 2, Brigadier General Basilio Valdes, Commander-in-Chief of the Constabulary, left the sultry city aboard an inter-island steamer to inspect conditions in the Visayans.45

The surreptitious success in distributing Free Fili'pinos while calming official anxieties was equaled by Sakdalistas in their covert preparations for violence. On May i, I935, organizers informed their primed followers that the endeavor to achieve independence would begin the next night. They reassured the faint-hearted by guaranteeing that the struggle would not be difficult. Unsophisticated villagers heard their leaders proclaim that constabularymen and Filipino Scouts had secretly joined the cause of freedom and would not fire on their fellow-patriots. Furthermore, in the remote event of vigorous government action, Sakdal activists promised that the Emperor of Japan would send aid in the form of arms and air support.46 In all

43 Hayden, Preliminary Report, p. i.

44 A partial explanation of the peaceful celebration appears in a memorandum from Secretary of Labor Ramon Torres: "There was no red demonstration on account of the refusal of the city mayor to grant the necessary permit to the radicals. But even if they were granted the permit they would not have been able to muster many followers in Manila and would have had to bring them from the provinces." Torres to Hayden, May 2, I935. HP.

45 Other important figures away from the capital at that time included Governor-General Murphy, who was convalescing from an operation at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia; Manuel Quezon, who was on official business in the United States; and Major General Parker, the Commander of American forces in the Islands, who was on leave in China. New York Times, May 3, I935. This absence of senior gov- ernment personnel further indicated the lack of anticipation of any major difficulties. The departure of General Valdes, however, appears to spring from somewhat different motives. On the morning be- fore the uprising, Valdes notified Colonel Manley, the Superintendent of the Constabulary, that trouble was brewing. In part, the confidential memorandum reads as follows: "X reported to me this morning that the Sakdalistas last night were preparing an uprising against the government to be held to- night . . . One thing queer on this supposed . . . movement is that no Sakdalista leaders could be located in their houses the whole day and night yesterday. X could not tell me the definite plans of attack . . . but he insisted in telling me that this is a very serious situation." Valdes to Manley, May 2, 1935. HP. That the General left Manila the evening of May 2 aboard a vessel lacking a radio, indicates that Filipinos, like old-line sheriffs in the American South, recognize the political advantages of "going fishing" at critical junctures.

46 Insurgents eagerly scanned the skies as they marched on the presidencias in a futile search for Japanese aircraft. Hayden, The Philippines, p. 39I.

208 DAVID R. STURTEVANT

probability, they concluded their last-minute appeals with the not too subtle slogan that independence would "appear magically like the burst of a sunrise."47

The Demise of Sakdalism: Its Causes and Consequences

At the appointed hours, thousands of taos armed with clubs, bolos, and occasionally with pistols and homemade shotguns collected at pre-arranged assembly points.48 Fervent with patriotism, in some cases experiencing the light-hearted exhilaration which came only at fiesta time, the peasants marched on the municipalities expecting to be welcomed with open arms. When the constabularymen who were supposed to join them sent well-aimed rifle fire into their ranks, confidence and animation turned to astonishment followed quickly by panic. One of the survivors of Cabuyao expressed the disenchantment of his comrades when he said, "If every day of independence will be like this, I go out and hide."49

Given the futility of the whole affair, why did Ramos and his aides stage the up- rising? Sixty-five thousand peasants equipped with a motley array of weapons could not possibly overthrow a nation of twelve million people supported by the military might of the United States. While Sakdal leaders recognized this fact, they could not extricate themselves from the dilemma posed by their party goals and the realities of the political situation. Unquestionably, they hoped to achieve partial success as a step toward a larger objective. Widespread violence could frustrate the plebiscite, hinder the establishment of the Commonwealth, make manifest the opposition of a large group of Filipinos to the Tydings-McDuffie Law, and perhaps lead the United States to modify its views on Philippine independence. The party's position on the issue made such a course of action almost inevitable. During an interview in Tokyo after the uprising, Benigno Ramos summed up the problem with a fatalistic shrug, "We know the American Government in the Islands is so strong that revolt against it means suicide. But what else can we do?"50 Suicide it had been. When the smoke of battle cleared away Sakdalism as an effective protest movement was as dead as the twisted corpses in the churchyard at Cabuyao.51

Self-destruction, however, can exert long-term influences. Sakdalism's tragic demise caused much soul-searching among Filipinos. Initially Nacionalista spokesmen to- gether with the Manila press attempted to discount the movement in the traditional manner by tracing it to demagogues, racketeers, and religious fanatics. But a few prominent members of the government pointed to socio-economic factors as the source of discontent and called for reforms to ease the villagers' lot. This latter viewpoint

47 Taruc, Born of the People, p. 29. 48 At Santa Rosa, Laguna, eleven Sakdalistas yielded two paltiks (homemade shotguns), one pistol

and "several daggers and bolos" to Constabulary captors. Sakdal Uprising Report, Appendix II, p. 2. Since Filipinos were forbidden to bear arms, the manufacture of paltiks constituted a never-ending problem for the authorities. The Constabulary made periodic efforts to restrict their production. Hayden, The Philip- pines, pp. 9I6-917.

49 Sakdal Uprising Report, Appendix I, "Field Reports on Individual Participants in the Sakdalista Uprising," p. 7. These revealing interviews, together with others not incorporated into the final report, can be found in Sturtevant, "Philippine Social Structure," pp. 2I9-228.

50 New York Times, May 5, I935. 51 While Sakdalism continued to exist throughout the period leading up to and including the Pacific

War, it ceased to function as the leading organization in the area of agrarian dissent. During the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines, Sakdal remnants under the guidance of Ramos engaged in flagrant col- laboration with the conquerors. The history of Sakdalism after the uprising deserves careful study.

SAKDALISM AND PHILIPPINE RADICALISM 209

quickly gained the editorial support of responsible journalists. Unanimity did not characterize the demand for social amelioration; but the fact that a select group of politicians and editors shunned cliches and sought valid explanations contributed to the creation of a new attitude of understanding toward the peasant and his plight.52

Public and confidential statements by Nacionalista leaders presented a case study in changing outlooks. Speaker of tht House Quintin Paredes, enunciating the time- honored interpretation, found the loss of life "deeply regrettable," but hoped that "the tragic occurrences will be a blessing in breaking up these fanatical movements."53 Secretary of Labor Ramon Torres, however, expressed a more sympathetic view. After interviewing Sakdal prisoners in Bulacan and Laguna he reported no evidence of cults or cultists. Instead the Secretary traced the difficulties in Bulacan to iniquitous rents demanded of tenants on the Buenavista Estate.54 In Laguna the effects of the depres- sion and natural calamities in the form of severe typhoons led him to conclude "that hard times are at the bottom of the trouble."55 While Torres' remarks were not sensational they marked a startling departure from the party line.56

The interpretations of the Secretary of Labor were reinforced by the findings of an investigating team sent into the field by Acting Governor-General Hayden. Their formal report attributed the uprising primarily to political factors,57 but their final remarks stressed the role of unhealthy social conditions:58

The government was more or less out of touch with the pulse and thought of the barrio people who basically are good citizens. The conidition of the lower strata of them has not changed materially since I898. They eat out of the same common bowl. They are protected against the worst epidemics . . . they have some chance for a little education if they are not too poor, and they are afforded some protection in the matter of civil rights. But they do not see or feel much change except that they watch the middle and upper classes, whose standards have risen, ride in automobiles, live in better houses, and possess more than formerly. Their poverty and grievances make it possible for unscrupulous or misguided men to lead them.

52 Practically every Sakdal arrested after the uprising was sentenced to prison. Maximum terms ranged from two to seventeen years. While these sentences may not seem mild they compared favorably with the maximum terms of seventeen to forty years meted out to survivors of the Tayug affair. Furthermore, pardons were quickly granted to many Sakdal prisoners. On November I5, I935, in his last official act, Governor-General Murphy pardoned the vast majority of the Sakdalistas remaining behind bars stating that he wanted "to set an example of tolerance where differences of opinion are concerned." "News Summary," Philippine Magazine, XXXII (I935), p. 597.

53 New York Times, May 5, I935. 54 Torres to Hayden, May 7, I935. HP. Shortly after this report, the Buenavista Estate, consisting of

27,408 hectares, was among church lands purchased by Governor-General Murphy for redistribution to tenants. San Ildefonso, the scene of a bitter encounter on the night of May 2-3, was the largest community on the estate.

55 Ibid. 56 Senate President Quezon at first attempted to dismiss the uprising as unimportant. In a press con-

ference at his hotel suite in New York City, Quezon called Ramos an "irresponsible demagogue," and maintained that the Sakdal movement was "operated on a purely racketeering basis." Manila Daily Bul- letin, May 4, I935. Within twenty-four hours, however, Quezon, who apparently was able to judge in- finitesimal shifts in the political winds from a distance of IO,OOO miles, adopted a new tack and traced the uprising to the depression and the threat of American import quotas. New York Times, May 5, I935.

57 "Generally speaking the actions of the individual [Sakdal] were governed by political and purely patriotic considerations which led him to believe that immediate independence was, for a number of in- tangible reasons, highly desirable." Sakdal Uprising Report, p. 3.

558bid., p. I3.

210 DAVID R. STURTEVANT

Press response followed a similar pattern. During the confusion surrounding the upheaval, newspapers expressed fear of a general uprising and called upon all Filipinos to respect constituted authority.59 With the dispersion of the dissidents, however, an effort to lampoon the whole affair replaced the climate of fear. One of the better at- tempts to portray Ramos as a confidence man and his followers as ignorant if un- fortunate dupes appeared in the New Philippine Republic. The last stanza of a Kiplingesque rendition of the uprising versified:60

0 the blood of Sakdalistas It has dried upon the sod. But the funds of Sakdalistas Whence and whither, 0 my God!

The same periodical tried to link Sakdalism to the unorthodox religious movements of the past. In Bulacan, according to the satirical account, "about ioo fanatics went to the hills, led by a i7-year old girl mystic whose chief claim to divinity was that she could turn the bark of trees wrapped in paper into guns.""6 But the editors of the New Philippine Republic did not permit efforts to poke fun at the Sakdals to interfere with their displeasure toward the government's policy of "complacent forebearance" in regard to "radicalism."62

Other molders of public opinion saw nothing funny about the incident. Newspapers owned by hacenderos held the government responsible. The Manila Herald, for ex- ample, placed the ultimate blame on democracy for its tendency "to pamper the masses."63 Peasants, complained a Herald feature, behave "like spoiled children . . . demanding more and more." Echoing the age-old lament of threatened elites, the newspaper maintained that the taos no longer knew their place: "Belief in injustice, fancied or factual nerves the masses to heights to insolence if not revolution. The ... Sakdal uprising is an unfortunate example. Impudence . . . usually precedes violence, be it in the individual or in the mob. As long as our masses harbor the belief that they are being persecuted they will be sullen and insolent." 64

While the majority of the press dismissed the movement in the accustomed man- ner, a few journalists dissented vigorously. A. V. H. Hartendorp of the influential Philippine Magazine queried, "Exploiting landlords, bloodsucking money lenders, stupid and callous local officials, the indifference of those in better circumstances . what better grounds could agitators desire?"" Attacking superficial explanations he admonished his readers:68

We cannot brush the matter aside by stating that the Sakdal movement is instigated by racketeers or that it is due to a temporary economic depression. Its roots go much deeper . . . into a substratum of class conflict that is present here as elsewhere in the world. It is

59 Under a photograph of two dead Sakdals appeared the following warning: "The government must be respected and those who would destroy it will share the lot of these two." Manila Herald, May 3, I935.

60 New Philippine Republic I (I935), 4. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Manila Herald, June 15, 1935. 64 Ibid. 65 A. V. H. Hartendorp, "The Sakdal Protest," Philippine Magazine, XXXII (935), p. 233. 66 Ibid.

SAKDALISM AND PHILIPPINE RADICALISM 211

a movement of the dispossessed, of the exploited, of those who are given no chance . . . The only answer is to give these people a chance. The political party that can arrange that will be the political party of the future.

Hartendorp's interpretation came to be widely accepted in the months and years following the uprising. Consequently, Sakdalism exerted profound influences over the course of Commonwealth affairs. The effort to avoid another Cabuyao manifested itself in different forms. Nacionalista leaders, hoping to frustrate future violence, forced their party to adopt a program of social reforms. Caciques, fearing that their days of affluence and influence were numbered, organized private armies and emphasized co- operative efforts to restrict the activities of peasant movements. Agrarian leaders, stunned by the bloodshed and death of May 2-3, re-examined their assumptions and sought more effective means to organize the rural population. These contradictory tendencies created a provincial atmosphere heavy with class tensions in the years leading up to Pearl Harbor.

Without question President Quezon's Social Justice Campaign grew in part out of his desire to win back alienated rural elements. In an early address before the Na- tional Assembly, Quezon called upon the representatives to grapple with basic ques- tions. "The problem involved in the relationship between tenants and landlords," he said, "whether within large or small estates, owned by individuals, or corporations, public or private, transcends in importance all other social problems of the Philip- pines."67 Despite hacendero domination of the legislature, a remarkable degree of success crowned Quezon's attempts to initiate reform.88 Parliamentary victories in Manila, however, did not add up to a conquest of misery in the municipalities. Block- ing tactics by provincial governors and local authorities hindered the application of social justice. Quezon and his advisors, persistent and determined efforts notwith- standing, never discovered an effective means for implementing their program at the barrio level. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth President had taken a series of signifi- cant steps toward a more equitable order. His speeches and actions further exposed the ugly social schism revealed by the Sakdal uprising.

Much of Quezon's difficulty came from cacique determination to maintain the status quo. Relying on tried and tested techniques, rural conservatives organized new landlord associations throughout Central Luzon.69 The governor of Cavite recruited and equipped a sizable private army called the "National Volunteers."70 When prominent Nacionalistas objected to his martial preparations Governor Samonte de- fended his men by declaring, "During the abortive Sakdal uprising, they more than

67 Quoted in Bernstein, The Philippine Story, p. I48. 68 Quezon carried forward the program of estate purchase and land redistribution begun by Governor-

General Murphy. At his urging the National Assembly established resettlement projects in the Koronadel Valley of Mindanao for the depressed and crowded population of Central Luzon. In addition, the as- semblymen created the National Rice and Corn Corporation to provide badly needed storage facilities for small farmers. The legislators provided for public defenders to protect peasant interests in provincial court proceedings, and gave unions the right to organize and bargain collectively. They also established the Court of Industrial Relations to mediate labor disputes.

69 The first effective organization of this type was the Batung Maputi or "White Stone" which flourished in Pampanga during the late twenties. Openly dedicated to resisting tenant "encroachments," its by-laws included a dedaration that "members . . . should not accept as tenants those who have deserted another member of the association without reasonable cause." Serafin E. Macaraig, Social Problems, (Manila, 1929), p. 257.

70 Manila Tribune, August io, I937.

212 DAVID R. STURTEVANT

once showed their ... capacity to handle delicate situations." 71 In Pampanga, Gover- nor Sotero Baluyot organized a "conservative labor union,"72 the Cawal ning Capaya- pan or Knights of Peace,73 to seek a reconciliation between landlords and tenants through "understanding."74 Provincial legislatures passed laws to restrict peasant po- litical activity,75 and hacenderos did everything in their power to strengthen munici- pal law enforcements agencies.76

Quezon's recognition of the need for social amelioration and the frantic cacique efforts to thwart further peasant uprisings were not the only tributes to the implica- tions of Ramos' effectiveness as an agitator. The Sakdal supremo's successful ex- ploitation of the widening chasm between classes in the Islands attracted the grudging admiration of more sophisticated Filipino radicals. Close examination of the short-lived but militant movement revealed to them unlimited possibilities for uniting dispossessed villagers behind ilustrado leadership. It also disclosed the confines in which successful challenges to authority could occur. In five years Ramos constructed a vigorous mass movement on a ramshackle foundation of disconnected causes. By stressing the shop- worn national freedom theme he undermined his precarious handiwork. More acute men in Manila and Pampanga ignored the defunct independence issue, stressed eco- nomic and social objectives, and forged the tenant farmers of Central Luzon into disciplined agrarian unions.

When the mantle of peasant leadership fell on the emaciated but competent shoulders of Pedro Abad Santos the trail of dissent blazed by Ramos was converted into a highway leading toward social revolution. With the vision of the bloody churchyard at Cabuyao constantly before him, the Socialist leader de-emphasized sporadic violence and attempted to win concessions through strikes and political ac- tivity. In addition he resisted efforts of his more enthusiastic disciples to attribute charismatic qualities to his person. Reminding his followers of the fate of the mag- netic Ramos and his worshipful retinue, Abad Santos dismissed Sakdalism as "es- sentially hero worship"; he also warned them that the adoration of Ramos smacked of fascism, and wryly concluded, "we don't believe in such silly stuff."77 As for the

71 Ibid. Governor Samonte had reason to respect "delicate situations." Captured by a Sakdal band during the uprising he avoided danger by joining the rebels declaring, "I am with you heart and soul"; later that night he signed a deposition stating that the Sakdals who seized him had gathered in the town of Tanza to hold a meeting and not to create a disturbance. After this capitulation his captors set him free. Sakdal Uprising Report, Appendix HII, p. 8.

72 Manila Daily Bulletin, July 30, I939.

73 The Manila Tribune, doubting that the Cawal was dedicated to peace, maintained that the associa- tion's existence was "predicated on its ability and intention to use force." The organization offered free legal services as an inducement for enrollment; thereby convincing many observers that the Cawal was designed to operate as a "'private army." Manila Tribune, March IO, I938.

74 Harlan Crippen, "Philippine Agrarian Unrest: Historical Backgrounds," Science and Society, X (I946), 355.

75 The "Tambuli Ordinances," passed in I938 by the Pampanga Legislature over Quezon's objections, typified provincial restrictions; the tambuli, or meeting horn, laws forbade the "gathering of two or more people after dusk." Manila Daily Bulletin, October 3, I938.

76Mounting activity on the part of Socialists and Communists in Central Luzon brought forth again the spectre of a peasant uprising. In 1938 land-owners and businessmen in San Fernando, Pampanga, purchased a truck for the municipal police to "facilitate the transportation . . . of patrols during emer- gencies." Manila Daily Bulletin, April x6, I938. The governor of Bulacan, in the same year, advocated that municipal police forces in his province be increased by six hundred men. Manila Tribune, January 22, 1938.

77 Manila Tribune, February 6, I938.

SAKDALISM AND PHILIPPINE RADICALISM 213

government, Abad Santos avoided vilification and hoped only for a tolerant attitude; in return he guaranteed that he would not initiate violence :78

What we expect is a sincere and unprejudiced approach to the masses, a sympathetic hearing of their complaints and grievances, without bias and deceit. The laborer's actions are justifiable, their demands reasonable, and the government should take no cause for alarm over the prospect of the masses rising in armed resistance against constituted author- ity. We call this brand of suicide, "Pooch," and I assure the public that so long as the Socialist Party is dominant in Pampanga there will be no Cabuyao . . . incidents in this province.

The Sakdal uprising, thus, marked the end of innocent spontaneity and the begin- ning of sophisticated protest. For generations frustrated taos had donned anting-anting to ward off the powers of evil and turned to wonder-working bandits, religious prophets, and leaders of outlandish secret societies in their desire to escape the grim conditions of their existence. As a consequence, peasant energies were dissipated in a series of unrelated movements and spent in abortive uprisings. Ramos smashed the pattern. Combining rustic discontent with middle class leadership he quickly created a potentially powerful instrument of dissent. Bitterness, ambition, and political mis- calculation led to the extinction of his movement. Nevertheless, his career established the ground rules for a new generation of agrarian leaders. By avoiding the errors of Sakdalism and emphasizing its achievements, radicals in Central Luzon formed the alliance which later grew into the Hukbalahap. Benigno Ramos' indirect legacy to Filipino Communists, therefore, probably equaled, and perhaps exceeded, the value of their direct inheritance from Karl Marx and his latter day apostles.

78 Ibid.