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SAMUEL M. KATZ'S

TIII [I,IT[THE EiRIPPINEi TRUE EiTORY OF

ISRAEUS SEtrRETtrO U NTERTERRT] RISiT U N IT_TH EME]ST DEADLY FIEiHTING FERtrE

IN THE WORLD

,4ssoalt on Green Islarud'

At 01:38 hours, Lieutenant Bar ordered his men tor"#r. t-t.it ait pip.s and slowly rise orrt of the;;;;n&;i dtpitt't. itom beneaih the tower and,irk*ur,-t*E"ty figrrttt emerged-from the Red Sea';?r'i#'id;-uit"-rs or theii Uzis and AK-47s,rr*rr"a t&ard the sentries' As Lieutenant Bar andtri; ;;;i"d;; of the force clutched their weapons;ffiIr, Ilan Egozi suddenly

"o1i"".d. a sentry

:l*:1",1d;,H'iHffi'Ialt'":::fi f i'lil'"il,tiffiil;ifr.;.-Immeoiatifv, Green Island was ablaze;;;h il;o ineurrio iti the deafening blasts of,"i"*"ii"-n* "The navat commandos hurled;;f;-sr"rades toward Eevqtfn .machine gun;;il, Uiinoi"g their sights while .the first wavemaOe it out of the water to engage the enemy' ' ' '

AND

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Available from Pocket Books

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$5.50 U.S.$8.s0 cAN.

Books by Samuel M. Krtz

The Night Raiders: Israel's Naval Commandos at WarFire & SteelThe Elite

Published by POCKET BOOKS

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IERAEUS NAVALTEMMANDEEi

AT WAR

EAMUEL M. WXTZ

POCKET BOOKSToronto SYdneY TokYoNewYork London

The sale of this book without its cover is unauthorized. ll you purchasdthis book without a cover, you Bhould be aware that it t^6s rilported tothe publlshor as "unsold and destroyed..' Neither the authd nor thepublisher has recei\red payment lor the sale of this ,,strippod book.,'

Dedicated to the anonymous warriors who traveled todestinations unknown and depths uncharted, andwho sacrificed their lives so that others could live . . .

An OriginalPublication of POCKET BOOKS

POCKET BOOKS, a Oivisfi''O(Simon & Schuster Inc.1230 Aveaue of the Americas, N\w yorlq Ny 10020

Copynght @ 1997 by Samuel M. Katz\

All rights reserved, including the right to reprodu&this book or portions tlereof in any form whatsoefer.For information address Pocket Books, 1230 Avetueof the Americas, New Yorlg NY 10020ISBN: 0-671-@234-l

First Pocket Books printiug May 1997

1098765432tPOCKET and colophon are registered trademarks ofSimon & Schuster Inc.

Flont cover photo by IDF Spokesman

Printed in the U.S.A.

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Author's Note

As a writer who has spent nearly a decade covering bothmilitary and law enforcement special, forces around theworl( -from the NYPDs Emergency Service Unit to theRopl Jordanian Special Forces, lhave had the privilege andhoior of having a secretive world opened to me- Sometimes, I was allowed directly into that world-certain unitsembriced me with open arms" considering me a friend anda trusted confidant, and t was even allowed to come alongon ops. Other times, as in certain European nations thatwill iemain anonymous, I have been treated as a nuisance,"the ugly Ameri@D," the temporary intruder, who was tobe provided with only the bare minimum. When I began myresearch on Flotilla 13, a unit that continues to live in thecloak-anddaggerworld of covert special ops,I was neitherembraced noimistreated (not initially, at least). I simply

a resident of the never-never world of Israel De-Forces bureaucracy-my lequest was caught !e!Y.ee.n

responses of "No *ay, wt'll never authorize this" towe'll try, you never know." I was always a phone

iway from waiting another day not to find out!My orperiences with the Israelis, of course, should haveen dilferent from a oroiect. let's sav, with the Frenchbeen from a project, let's say, with the French

GIGN or the New Zealand Special Air Service. I have beenvll

AUTIIOR'S NOTEwriting on the Israel Defense Forces for nearly ten veas-written over a dozen boo*s and articles u"o d&ii-".'r6rJscripts on the Israel Defense Forces, anO-fiaO-it oiniilotmyself as wett versed in the art of tealing witii-tli'b-fy.g: T..oo,{d be expected. I had_already Uee-n ingraiiateO inwnat can be coined as the Israeli routine and fuO haonilvaccepted it-the ..routine,,' it has been said,ls parGT-th;national charm.

Th-ere ap many in the Israeli naval special nxarfare com-pu'ntty_.who were instrumental in the-production of thisDook. tsrst and tbrcmost" I am grateful to Rear Admiral(Ret.) Ze'ev Almog for his time, hii trust, niJ nienOsniffiOrus rafhrn tqrs project. Ze'ev Almog is the type of oommand_er mat "workers" love' soldiers respect, ariO stacters, tho0ejust alo-ng lor mp ride, tend not to gei'aiong-*ftfi all:especially those in.his oommand. ThE true tdt of tiJ-mettfep ?.qp.cifl operations oftcet beyond any rputation, is iiltact that the unifs most decomte4 heraliled.and suci:essfuloftoers revere him simply.as *tnti notiua;'a" iGil;bGglepnJ of the.umt]g foirt, itr present, its itraracter, inO miscale ofprofbssionalism that the unit strirres to mairitain lonearter Zte'ev's retiremernt. Thanlcfrrlly, I was able to intervidmanyof thece remarkable warriorq and f ore them aCeUi digratitude for lettitg me into their w:orld. I would like to ndn];Herzl lavon;_Yisrael Asaf; yisrael Dagai; Izzy Rahav; UziLrvnat; rtio Egozi; and the late yoctrai Bin-Nun, the frstoommander of both Ftotilla 13 and the IDF/Navy.

Obviously, there are a great many inOiviAuaft who deserve thanks but because of the nature of their work (pastand present) qu{ {em?rn anonymous. They know who'fireiare, and I am indebted to theii kindness ahO trust._ I qrt alfq, er.t firl to Rear Admirat 6es.y ami A1,aton, aunarrior of incledible @,urage, ski[, and guile qfiq'lilce fiismentor Rar Admfual Almog would go oi to oomiaod theflotilla and the IDF/Navy (aT u,e[ as-ttre tsraeti SeorcaSfi:ice),-for authorizing mir pnoj."t. I owe a specia wlra ofthankstoColonel Irit Atzmon at the IDFSpofesman'sOfficgas rvell_as 0o tlajor Natan Rotenberg; tDFspokesman Assis.tance Branch, for their ga[anq incessant- and suocessfuIp$brts.og my- behalf. To borrow a term from the NypDNatan is *goodpeople" and someone Ioonsideragood frien-d.

AUTHOR'S NOTBI c/ould also like to thank the crew at the IDF Cernsor'sOfre for the rwierp of the I know this wasn't easyfor them. There was a time, in the not+distant pasf,

that the words "Flotilla 13" wer considered state secreits ofthe higheet orderand the only materials published on the unitwere-"aocordingto foreigr report" blurbs in magazine articlesand history books. lt 1992, whern I published-an article onFlotilla 13 for the U.S. Naval Acaderny's Procedings Mqoziru, lam !ilre I caused a flurry sf ,ngina attack in fueensot's ofrce. There were those who toldme then that *if ityerc gp to therr, they wouldn't have permitted the article tobe published." Others, namely a certaih Maior y. who was anofficerthough certainly no genfleman, were iess oordial ("gaiqpall gf the Israeli routine). Thankfulty, there c,Ere ehore[individuals in the censot's ofrce to see that the times havl,indeed,_changod, andpublic knowledge in Israel (and theara6World for that matter) no longer fas to be treateO as statsecrets as far as the rpst ofthe wodd is ooncerned.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank RearAdmiral Irv "Chuck" LeMoyne ai USSOCOU for his timeand efforts,_Lieutenant Commander (Ret.) Mike Walsh,U.S. Navy SEALs, for his unique insight bnO increOiUt6expertise, Major M., British SBS; for his tutorial help in theA-teZs of naval special warfare, as well as oftce'rs (vouknowwhoyou are) in the U.S. Navy SEALs, German KSI!Argentine Buzos Thcticos, and Norwegian Marinejegers foitheir kind assistance. Thanks also to noted noielist andHollywood screenwriter Steve Hartov, for his insight andfriendship.-

I -owe a very special thanla to my agent, Al Zuckerman"for his faith in me and my wortq a;d-for iaking me to th6

'next^level," a_nd my editors Faul McCarthy and especiallyTlis Coburn for making sure that the .hext tet'ef' gotiqHisned.

fuSly,^? very special word of thanks and appreciation tomy wife;tlgi, a true inspiration and the definition of love,tnendship, pttie,@q understanding, and supnort.

All opinions ano@ my own!Samuel NI:KarEit---New York, May 1996

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"What we are about t9 sludy is one op in a long war thatren)rote the way people like us do business. Tiese blokesn9t only transcended the art of surprising the enemy,they. . . basically. . . proved that guts afu determinb-tion are the most important tools that operators canbring to bear on an op. What we are aboit to study isone.of the most important missions in the history ofunderwater commando warfare. As important ani st[-nifuant as the ltalians, and their Ptg!, in Alexandiiaharbor in 1941. These men proved thai they were lil

Som*cl M. Koacruel world of the operational vernacular, pathfinders aremore commonly referred to as "trip-wires." They are thecommandos who come ashore first, tightly armed, anddetermine whether or not an innocent-looking beach is aprqper landing zone or an ambush-and disaster-waitingto- happen. Unlike their comrades who usually are a klic[offshore in a Zndiac or Cigarette speedboat, the trip-wiresswim to theLZ. They deploy their body's enormous powerto slice through the murky waters and navig3te through thedarkness to reach the right point on a map and ensure thatthe mission, whatever that mission may be, commences asplanned.

Trip-wires, as they like to point out, have an unforgivingjob-they are the first to swallow and the last to spit out.Usually deployed in small teams (the exact size of which isconsidered classified toFsecret by the IDFA.{avy) where theheaviest weapons they carry are AK-47s, they have to testan enemy beach, many miles from friendly lines, in searchofany trip-wires, sentries, or unwanted troop presence. Itdoesn't matter if the mission that night is a reconnaissanceforay against a terrorist training camp, a covert patrol, orthe placement of explosives under a bridge. It all begins-and can end-with the trip-wires. They know that being thefirst ones to emerge onto a hot beach is a dangerous way toearn a living. In the good-case scenario, they encounterabsolute fear and a brain-swelling rush of adrenaline power-ful enough to tug a locomotive. If need be, they'll eliminatea sentry with a well-placed slice of their dagger across anunknowing guard's carotid artery, or launch a 9mm roundfrom a silenced weapon into the center of an enemysoldier's brain. In the bad case scenario, and there are manybad case scenarios in this line of work, they'll find them-selves up against overwhelming firepower fighting fortime-and desprately little else-until an escape plan canbe formulated before the ammo runs dry. Since they areusually on secretive missions meant to be absolutely denia-ble, the larger forces waiting in the waters at 500 meters orso away cannot always come to their aid. Since theirmissions are deniable-and missions that got fucked are

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THE NIGI{T RAIDERSmore deniable than others-it is likely that their bodieswon't be returned for a proper Jewish burial; if they areunfortunate enough to be taken as prisoners (special forcespersonnel usually are honored with specially brutal brandsof torture), it will be years-if at all-before their govern-ment will be able to secure their release.

Trip-wires live by a three-tier set of standard operatingprocedures: Don't get caught, don't get killed, and pray thatthe intel is accurate!

If tripwires hate anything, it's a last-minute mission on amoon-filled night. On such a night, when the lunar glowilluminates much of tle Mediterranean @ast, a team oftripwires emerge from the Mediterranean surf. It is cold,freezing in fact, and thel-Z is a rocky enclave where the surfliterally chisels the rock into grotesque series of sharp.angled figurines. The sound of the waves crashing againstthe rocks is perfect cover. It masks the noise of the menremoving their weapons from their waterproof sealers andmufles the digitized beeps and squelches of highly sophisti.cated and highly classified communications gear makingcontact with the force waiting offshore. Black neoprene wetsuits adorn their short, lanky physiques, and buoyancyvests, communications and night-vision gear, and water-proofweb gear are tightly fastened to their torsos. The frigidwaters, uncharacteristically cold even by Mediterraneanstandards, makes the pulmonary systems of the pathfindersrace much faster-hearts pound louder and chests inflatebeyond their normal girth taking in all the oxygen possible.

The lead tripwire, a stocky sergeant in his early twentieswhose blue eyes shine through the slots of the black neo-prene balaclava covering his face, removes a pair of night-vision binoculars from his web gear and gazes across therocky landscape. The cloudy green image produced by thedevice reveals a quiet IZ. No enemy soldiers, no hot trailsof lit cigarette butts or traces of a jeep engine still warmfrom a sergeant's ride around the compound, not even abarking dog. It looks good. Slowly the trip-wires spread out.One remains close to the beach, a 40mm grenade launcherattached to his Soviet-built AK-47 7.62mm assault rifle atthe ready in case any "heavy" fire-support is required.

3

Sdmael IlI. KotzAnother crawls forward along a path where rock and sandconverge and aims his AK along a 270-degree field of firere.ady to striko down any.unwelcome visiior. Other tripwires c-rawl on their guts in search of mines or trip-wiristhat will ignite a claymore or set off a barrage of flaies.

None are found though ordnance hidden in the moistsand beach can be hard to find and act in a ternperamentalfashion.

Seven minutes have passed since the trip-wires cameashore. The commander, determining that tieLZ is cold,removes a blinker light from his pouch and flashes itwestward, toward the sea. "ft's a go," moans the missionCO from his perch inside a black Zodiac rubber inflatablelobbing up and down in the choppy sea. "Let's move it!,,Theoutboardngrnes are fired up, safeties dully switched tosemi-automatic, and weapons ilutched tight, raised andaimed toward the approaching beachhead. fhetwo Zodiacsmake it to the shoreline in less than two minutes. The sprayof the craft htrgging the waves at twenty knots has immerseithe commandos in a shimmering film of sea water, andgoggles are worn to protect everyone's eyes from the blind-ing salt spray. Even before the Zodiaci have reached therocks, the commandos find themselves already in the water,racing in with the waves onto theLZ already secured- Themission commander, a cocky captain of few words andbuilt like the chiseled rocks defiantly standing guard onthe shore, marches at a brisk pace inland. He never looksback. Never utters a word. He just races inland, followed bya contingent of men in black, some carrying RPG-7 anti-tank rockets. Each commando carries approximately twen-ty kilos in gear and equipment on his back. It is a cumber-some load, especially while wearing soaking-wet fatigues inthe cutting winds of a night-time temperature hoveringaround 44 degrees Fahrenheit. But there is neady a kilo-meter and a half to negotiate and terrain is rocky andrough. Barbed-wire concertina covers much of the inlandroute, as do trenches and pillbox batches ofanti-personnelmlnes.

Tonight's operation is an ambush. A statement of resolvemeant to deter terrorist traffic along the coastal highway,

THE NIGHT RAIDERSand at the same time possibly even snare a terrorist chief-tain traveling to his barracks or returning from a rendez-vous with his Syrian or Iranian handlers. The AK-47s andFN MAG light machine guns carried by the force areenough to turn any vehicle into a peppered remnant of itspristine showroom appearance-7.62mm rounds can dothat to the aluminum bodies of Mercedes sedans andToyota pickups. One force of operators positions itself upon a rocky embankment, about twenty yards from thecoastal highway, in perfect concealed firing position. TWoRPGs are trained at the roadway, as are two FN MAGs-they are to fire at any vehicle deemed a definite target (atank, APC, or 4x4 in camouflage markings). A squad ofoperators lies closer to the roadway ready to assault anyvehicle deemed suspicious-civilians are to be avoided atall costs and not harmed under any circumstances. Laserdesignators indicate whether the shots will miss or hit theirmark. An operator caressing the wooden stock of his FNMAG 7.62mm light machine gun depresses the trigger justenough so that one more milligram of pressure will beginthe evening's festivities.

_

Once the operators are in place and ready for anythingthe sound ofajeep's ignition being fired up cuts through thesilence. It is Lieutenant Commander R., the section's CO,and the grin on his face, as he glances at his digitalstopwatch, indicates a measure of dissatisfaction. It is,fihirty-three minutes and counting since the tripwires cameashore and fifteen minutes sincelhe Zodiacs have toucheddown on the beach and the operation's simulated assaultI .has scored its first kill. "Not bad," barks the squadron,commander, "but certainly not good, either." His voice,one sanded coarse by nicotine and saltwater, has a confident

,, soft-spoken cadence. No words other than those absolutely

..necessary are spoken. "You have all done this before inl,ebanon and you know what it takes. We need to be inposition before there is even a hint of our presence. Withoutbeing able to just simply appear, we will never have thechance to just disappear. We've got two hours more untildaylight, and seven more hours before we head south forthe parachuting exercise. Do it again and let's get it right

9on*al M. Kotz

before we become a spectacle to the first buses heading toHaifa."

It's been just another early morning work out at a place-where earlymorning is midnight. Welcome to Atlit! One ofthe most remarkable places in the world and the Mecca forIsraeli naval special warfare.

Atlit is the type of geographic landmark that appears onvery few maps. Most lsraeli tour maps don't mention thesmall seaside town, and it isn't the location that theMinistry of Tourism-or the Ministry of Defense for thatmatter-wants many people to visit. Although it is nestledalong the southern approach to Haifa, Israel's bustling porton the Mediterranean and the nation's third laqgest city,Atlit isn't as much a suburb as it is a curious footnote. Onthe road to Haifa from Tel Aviv, in fact, as one can look onto the west to view the roaring Mediterranean, the approachto Atlit isn't indicated by numerous trafrc signs or bill-boards offering seaside seafood at bargain rates. The ap-proach to Atlit is a series of military watchtowers,impassable rows of barbed-wire concertina, and a forebod-ins seabankins series of cliffs that invite the rush of the seatoiit the rockiwith incredible, almost angry, ferocity. Atlit,as those who know it will g;rudgingly admit, is a place whereman comes to be one with the sea.

Atlit is one of those many places on the Israeli landscapethat seems to be home to lots of military trafrc, and littleelse. The small interchange offthe main highway is usuallybustling with sandy-gray painted military trucks ferryingsupplies in and out, staff cars racing to an{ from staffm66tings and training maneuvers, and the odd helicopterflight sl'icing through itre salty air e! route to ? landing stripwdl-obscured from public view. Occasionally, young sol'diers, wearing the khaki Class-A fatigues and navy blueberets of the. IDHNavy, will stand on the main coastalhighway near the interchange attempting to hitch a ride tothe mysterious location. If picked up by a motorist, thehitchhiking soldier will, by element of incessant training,not divulge anything about his military service-what unithe is in, lxacily where his base is, and what's he's been

TI{E NIGI{T RAIDERSdoing for the past six months. Even a novice to the Israeliroadiays and the Israeli military realizes that this is noordinary "sailor." Parachutist wings are worn over-his rightbreast pocket, an odd-looking bat-wing insignla adorns thespace above his left breast pocket, Th9,"sailor" is not armedwittr ttre American-made M-t6a'Z 5.56mm assault rifle thethas become a mainstay of the IDF, but rather he carries aweapon in the AK-47 family, perhaps a weapo-n made in theformer Soviet Union or perhaps made in North Korea.There is an elite status to be owned by a soldier who servesin a unit where the weapon issued is one captured from tlteclutches of the dying hands of a vanquished enemy. Thgre isa certain charismf that the soldier possesses. A definiteconfidence most soldiers just can't carry' It is clear that he ispart oPan elite class of warrior.- It is the warsr-kept secret in Israel but Atlil is the homebase of Shayeta Shlosh-Esrai, the Hebrew name for theIDFA.Iavy's special warfare unit, known in English as"Flotilla-13."-In fact, Atlit has been the epicenter Israelinaval special warfare for nearly fifty years. One does notthink ofthe State oflsrael as a great naval power, nor shouldthe fact that the fledgling Jewish State had-on paper-anavy before it had any seaworthy warships convince-anyo-neto tLink otherwise. For a military, that during its fight forindependence in 1948 had soldiers without uniforms and.commandos without guns, to

-even co.ntPnlplate a sea arm

inas an impressive example of optimistic-induced fantasy.,But what ihe born-in-battle Israeli military did have, insurprising abundance, was a multitude of young men will-inglo volunteer for missions that, even on a good day, w-erekahikazelike. Israeli built its navy on the courage of a few

who were determined to compensate for a lack of shipsequipment with sheer guts and dedication. Those menr the seeds from which Flotilla 13 blossomed. Flotilla

3 became an example which the entire Israeli Navy wouldulate. Although the IDF/Navy HQ was in Tel Aviv, andlargest port was Haifa, Atlit became the Mecca for Israelipower-a hidden alcove along the Mediterranean coastie special men could be trained and special missions

be prepared far from prying eyes.,f/

Saawcl .fuL Kotz

As home base to one of the premier units in the Israelim{itary (qnd, acording to one operator, ..The best damnediqfantry force Israel ever fielded"2) and one of the trail-blazing special warfare units in the world, Atlit is strikinglymodest. When compared to the sprawling Coronado NABin the wake of the San Diego coasi, homelo the U.S. NavySEALs, or the quaint splendor of Poole, home base to thLqrftish SBS, Atlit is anticlimactic. It is a place dedicated tothe business of naval special warfare and little else. On itscompact grounds, a foreboding enclave of rock and sandfacing the shimmering waters-of the Mediterranean, thesounds of automatic fire and explosions are oonstentlyheard. War is conducted 365 days ayear atAtlit. Squadronisof operators hone such uniqrie skilh as cold-ki[ing ofsentries, waterborne assaults, and night-time insertion-andextraction operations. Operators, wearing black neopreneoutfits, often enter the icy depths of the Yam Ha'Tichon (theHebrew name for the Mediterranean) carrying odd-lookinggear resemblmg the booty taken at a James Bond yard sale,94y to emerge exhausted hours later at a point severalklicks away from the base. The roar of truck and jeepsngines are often muted by the whining power of Zidiaccraft and specialized Cigarette speedboats. Helicopters of-ten hover above the base and its off-limit wate*, as doDabur patrol craft and larger Sa'ar-class missile boats.

Fiorthe soldiers who serve in and support Flotilla 13, Atlitis an island a world away from the resf of Israel-a universeunto itself where the smell of diesel fuel and gun greasecompetes with the saltwater mist flowing about with thesouthern winds. The overall picture of the IDF is laryelyignored in Atlit, as is the larger picture of the Middt,Eastern geopolitical map. Atlit is concerned with its littleslice of the map of special ops and little else. As a result, gut-wrenching pulses of anxiety and stress permeate throughoutthe base. Atlit is on a pennanent war footing. It isdt thefirll-scale-war footing that was evident at Pearl Harbor orPortsmouth, during the Second World War, where men andvessels are constantly entering and exiting their port. Atlit'swar is low-key, it's constant and permanent. The kind ofconflict waged late at night by a small group of men who

THB NIGI{T RAIDERSscore a big victory when news of their actions never makesit to a wire-service story or CNN World Report.

As a result, Atlit isn't the type of base where wives andgirlfriends often come to visit, and there are never thechildren of the unit personnel coming to visit Daddy atwork. Instead, visitors to Atlit tend to be deputy defenseministers, generals, intelligence operatives, and other anon-ymous cloak-and-dagger faces carrying attach6 cases, rolledup maps and charts, and hand-tooled Jericho 9mm autc.matics tucked into waist holsters. Also visiting Atlit on afairly common basis are small and select group of operatorswho carry AK-47s and carry the unmistakable swagger ofmen in possession of a life's supply of confidence andchutzpah. Yet these men wear the olive khakis of the regularIDF, the ground army, and the red beret and red jump bootsof the Israeli Parachute Corps. Sometimes, even, the visi-tors will be men of lanky construction who speak neitherHebrew nor English, yet seem to share a common languagewilh the operators of Flotilla 13. And, according iopSSQCOM officers, those who pass through the heavilyfortified front gate are English-speaking muiclemen sport-ing American accents and who wear the Trident on iheirClass A's, and call places like Little Creek NAB, Coronado,Fort Bragg, and MacDill home.

Since the early 1950s, Israeli naval commandos have beencalling Atlit home, and remarkably there have been "Israe-li" naval commandos operating in the waters of the Medi-terranean (plus the Red Sea, Sea of Galilee, Dead Sea, andothers) for over flfty years. The unit has evolved from a

" semi-guerrilla sabotage unit into the most batfle-experienced naval special warfare unit in the world. Flotilla

. 13's history has mirrored the turbulent history of the Stateof Israel, its actions, courage, and sacrifice have made

Ssmd M. Ketutechnical force of operators in the Mediterranean, butmanaged to sink the Egyptian Navy flagship in the process.In 1956, they fought in Sinai, in the years to follow, theycharted the beaches of "unfriendly" coasts along the Medi,terranean from Minat el-Biada to Alexandria. In the 1967War, they "attempted" to wage war against Arab shippinglanes; during the 1967-70 War of Attrition, the flotillarewrote the book on how naval commando units operate,perform, and wage a war "deep" behind enemy lines.During the 1973 War, Flotilla l3 took the war straight to theenemy-attackrng enemy harbors in mission-impossibleraids that resulted in the destruction of dozens of enemycraft*from patrol boats to missile corvettes. From 1974 to1996, from the coast of Tyre to "reportedly" the plushsuburbs of Tlrnis, Flotilla l3 has been the world's dominantcounter-terrorist commando force. In the words of oneformer member of the U.S. Navy's SEAL Team SIX, whohad trained and worked with the flotilla on several occa-sions, "Thene isn't a unit like them in the wodd. They haveseen it all and done it all, and done it better than anyoneelse!" And, it should be remembered, SEAIs tend to shyaway from complimenting anyone not wearing the tridenton his chest.

While the U.S. Navy SEALs might have had Vietnam as acertified baptism of fire to inaugurate its special brand ofnaval special warfare into the fold, it did so with an entirefleet and massive infrastructure behind it. The SecondWorld War might have been the testing ground for thecanoe-paddling commandos of the SBS, but the unit wasbrought into existence as part of a military organization, theRoyal Marines, that were in existence since the mid-1600s,and had an army, navy, and Royal Air Fbrce to support itand help it deploy. Flotilla 13 never had such luxuries at itscreation. It had no Israeli fleet behind it because there wasno Israeli Navy when the unit was born; there was no Israelat the time. Flotilla 13 was born out of the guerrilla struggleagainst Hifler in the dark days of German victories in theMiddle East, the Mediterranean, and North Africa in 1941,and the Jews' struggle for an independent state against theBritish at war's end. Flotilla 13 is probably the only naval

meager and unimpressive starting point.Those humble beginnings, offiy unit veterans siay, are

part of Flotilla l3's charm and character. Others, however,note that it is a symptom of a commando unit forced to fightand die with little else than a dagger, homemade explosives,and balls larger than life! It is a unit that from its inceptionhas been at the cutting edge ofthe nation's covert opera-tions and special warfare capabilities. It is a unit that fromday one has never known a moment's peace.

Israel's history, like that of many units in the IsraelDefense Forces, can be measured by the wars it has fought.Flotilla l3's history is not as simple to @tegorizo. It is asbusy in peace (the Middle East version of peace, that is) as itis in war. Rather, Flotilla 13 is an entity that can bechartered by the character of the men who don the wet suitsand slice their way toward enemy harbors in swimmer-dglivery vehicles for the last fifty years, and by trro periodsof time, thinking and operational expertiss the years beforeZe'ev Almog and the years after. From its inception as anunderwater sapper force to the 1967 War, when a frogmanteam was captured in Alexandria by Egyptian forces priorto them mounting a raid on tle harbor, Flotilla I j wasviewed as nothing more than an underwater sabotage unit.Its men were adventurous, @urageous, and capablq but,they were misunderstood and underutilized by the IDF/.Navy and the IDF General Staff. When Ze'ev Almog wasappointed the commander of Flotilla 13 in 1968, he wasldamant, almost meticulous, in his master plan of trans-,forming the unit into the IDPs busiest and-most capable

THE NIGHT RAIDBRSspecial warfare unit in military history to boast such a

g the umt rnto the IpFs busiest and most capableoperations force. He was the first unit commander to

politic and lobby the General Stafffor work for his men. Hean aura ofprofessionalism and adherefa,e to detail

the unit meant to foster a disclpline and tightly rungge of men who would swim fastet shoot better, and

rform miracles under the most impossible of situations.the chief of staff said it couldn't be done, the Flotilla 13

was determined to volunteer for the mission.tenant Commander Almog knew how to harness talenthow to deploy it. From Green Island in 1969 to ttre

10 ll

Sarwo, M. KoE

coast of Tlre in 1996, he provided the unit with a soul, itsstubborn iron will, and its unflinching mission.

In October 1993, during the opening ceremonies forFlotilla l3's fiftieth anniversary celebration held at Atlit(one ofthe few "parties" held at a base built for business),veterans from all of the urit's wars and operations getheredunder a cool autumn sky for a night of reminiscing booz-ing and tearful memories. There were veterans from the1948 fighting, survivors from the failed 1967 Alexandriarai4 and men who, as a result of their operations behindenemy lines with the flotilla, now sport glass eyes, prostheticlimbg and hearing aids. Before the frrst round of bee,rs wasdrunh at the onset, Rear Admiral Ami Ayalon, the IDF/Navy oommander and former commander of Flotilla 13,came to the podium in a striped polo shirt and with theapprchensive shyness of a man whose entire career has beenoul of the spotlight. lnoking at the men assembled for thefcstivities, some of whom he had fought with years ago, hisdesire to get off the stage and not give a speech becameobvious. "I had hoped that it would rain tonight and thisevening would be can@led," Rear Admiral Ayalon brcWhtout" ashe sought an opening for what he wanted to say. "AllI have to say," Ayalon continued as he tugged at his muscle-bound neck and swept back his bald hea4 "Command atsea in naval special warfare and the essence of Flotilla 13 isbut one man and that is Ze'ev Almog. And that's all I haveto say." The commander who didn't want to say anythinghad simply said it all. The assembled men burst intoap'plause. As Captain (Ret.) Gadi Shefi, formercommanderoi-Flotilla 13, said, "It was 7*'ett that put the unit on therlrlp."3

In the profession of naval special warfiare, betng on t!9map is reserved for an elite group ofwarriors who have paidtheir dues in sweat and in blood. But just as ttre unit'shistory can be examined by the period precedilg andfollowing the War of Attrition, it is the men of the unit,from the flotilla's inception to the present day, that havecarved out the for@'s incredible battle record and legacy.Throughout its history, there have been standout individu-

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TIIB NIGHT RAIDBRSals who have oome to earn Israel's highest decorations ofvalor and have rieen through the ranks of the IDF/Navy andbeyond. More than mere veterans, the men gathered at thecelebrations wert survivors. They had survived the gruelingflotilla selection prooess, survived the nearly two years ofintensive back-breaking training, and they had survivedoperations whc,rc anyone less than "the best" would notmake it. They had good reason to feel proud. Good reasonto kick bask and let loose with their emotions and memo-ries.

The outdoor patry was decorated with flowers, hangingcolor lights, and adorned by the sounds of champagnebottles beiug cracked opened. A cloud of cigarette smokeraced toward the darkened star-filled sky, just as on manydark nights ],ear6 ago on nameless shores far from home,clouds of smoke and cordite engulfed the air and the sprayofwater and blood splashed around.

The drinking rcminiscing, and storytelling went on wellinto the night. Before the last bottle was put to bed and theliast "Remembr when we tossed the grcnade down thebunker shaft in Lebanon" was uttered by past generationsof the flotillq the current generation was waking up. It wastime to go to work. Preparg train, study, and head offintothe Mediterranean for a training assigrrment or a real op, amission, far from the national boundaries. As the laststalwart storytellers stumbled over the last bottles of badIsraeli vodka, the sounds ofthree Bell-212s flying overheadproduced a moment of introspection as they recalled whemthey were back in the fold waking up groggy-eyed after atwo.hour night sleep fora raid against an Egptian fort oraPalestinian trorist compound. *The bat wings become abadge ofyour soul," claimed one teary-eyed veteran. "Youare never really out oftle unit, even years after you are tooold for reserve duty, because this unit becomes a big part ofyou, part of your skin, part of your brain, part of yourexistence!"

For the last fifty yearg Israelis have, in one form oranother, been safeguarding their elongated frontier with theMediterranean and professing Israeli security interests wittr

t2 l3

Sontttd M. K*tu

a smalt navy spearheaded by an energetig @urageous'innovative, aiO host capable naval special warfare elementconsidered to be among the world's finest-clearly theworld's most battle-tested. They have, through trial anderror and the ballistic impact of fire-fights and detonatingenemy shipping, written the book on how naval comman-dos sf,odd

-be deployed during a full+cale w-ar and dqringthe less certain ind more volatile times of "peacetime"covert ops. Flotilla l3's first fifty yean havebeen character-ized by iemarkable achievemenls, remarkable technologioaltools, and some remarkable men.

This is their remarkable story-out of the shadows andout of Israel's toPsecret files.

CnemBn ONr

The Early YearsIsraoli Nnval Corumamdos: 1lM0 to 1953

Plt,esflNE rN r94r wAs A ppcsst RE-cooKER wArrINc ro el(-plode. Overwhelming panic didn't electrify the air, but thenumbing sense of anxiety and desperation gnawed at everyone's gut, from British servicemen to Jewish refugees toArab freedom fighters. The Second World War had comedangerously close to the Holy Land, and it appeared as ifbut a matter of time before the German and Italian armieswould mmch thrcugh the gates of the Old City of Jerusalemen route to conquering the entire Middle East. The VichyFrench controlled Lebanon and Syria, General ErwinRommel's Afrika Korps was advancing unhindered throughthe vast Egyptian desert, Italian warships routinely attacked

, British shippingalong Palestine's Mediterranean coast, andwarplanes from Mussolini's air force regularly bombedrefineries in Haifa and power plants near Tel Aviv. Withtens of thousands of Allied troops in Palestine (Brits,ANZACs, Poles, Indians, Czochs, French, and South Afri-

,, cans), the small sliver of land between the Suez Canal andirthe Jordan River became less a base of operations for theAllied Middle East war effort and more of a pocket of a last-ditch defense that was growing smaller by-the day. Many

, ftigh-ranking British officers began preparing the evacuationr'of Palestine througb a boat armada escaping from Haifa.

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Sa.mwl M. KfrBThe se+ond coming of Dunkirlq many joked, with a Levan-tine flair.

Palestine in 1941 was also embroiled in an undergroundcivil war between Arabs and Jews over ownership of thattiny sliver of land. As civil wars go, it was a viciousbloodletting with the added element of religion and legitimacy thrown in. From 1936 to 1939, full-scale rioting brokeout between the small Jewish population, who sought anindependent Jewish State of one sort or another in theirbiblical homeland, and the Palestinian Arabs, who wantedto eradicate their land of the forergn Jewish presenceimported from Eastern Europe half a century ago. Bothsides had oftcial promises from the British, lord and masterof the territory following the First World War, that theirside was right and would be granted independence, andboth sides had fought the British to prove that theirclaims were right. There were no winners, only losers andsuffering. The intransigence of ancient beliefs, claims, andfears.

Yet Palestine in l9zll was also a refuge of last resort forthousands of Jews fleeing Nazi tyranny in the first actualstages of the Final Solution. Jewish migration to Palestineaccelerated in 1933 with Hitler's rise to power. Between1936 and 1939, tens of thousands of German Jews fled NaziGermany for sanctuary in any country that would havethem-few wanted them. These Jews made it to the UnitedStates, to some countries in Western Europe, and manymade it to Falestine-illegally!

Bringing the Jewish refugees to British Palestine, underthe restrictive immigration protocols of the infamous WhiteFaper(a governmental decree meant to placate theArabs bycutting offJewish entry) required skill, courage, guile, andthe ability to find holes in the enemy's security-the sameprerequisites needed to be a commando. Yolunteers fromHaganah, mainly from the seaside Kibbutzim (agriculturalcollectives), were mobilized for these nightly attempts tosmuggle a boatload of refugees onto the shores of Haifa,Atlit, Ness Ziona, and Tel Aviv-many only seconds aheadof Royal Navy guns and British military patrols. Workingthe refugee ships was dangerous work. Getting caught could

TI{E NIGHT RAIDERSmean a fifteen-yearprison sentence or deportation. tt couldalso mean a death sentence. Therefore, the cornerstone ofeach operation was simple: Donl get caught!

Because the* Hagana& ferrymen werelightlyarmed (onelirrkish-era Mauser in a ten-man squad was considered aheavily armed formation) and could not hope to engageBritish forces and "survive," silence became their mosteffective weapon. Special buoyancy vests made ofraincoatsand scrap rubber were pieced together in Kibbutz work-shops, to help bring the wooden rafts and small vessels tothe refugees faster, and they could double as life vests incase exhausted refugees found themselves chest high in theMediterrhnean. The ferrymen conducted elaborate recon-naissance patrols ofvirtually all the beach-front property inPalestine in order to select only the most advantageouslanding zone possible. Once ashore, the Haganah operatorswould have to assume protective details and ensure that thehuman wave of refirgees coming ashore would vanish intothe night before arriving British forces could make arests.

' ftogmen squad. "We weren't like the Lebanese who couldlitrace their routes to the Phoenicians, nor were we Spaniardsor English with a history of sea exploration. We were Jews

lriand we made do with what we had-ricketyboats and a fewcourageous men!"I

.',, These smuggling vessels would, inevitably and so remark-tt. ably, become the cornerstone of the future Israeli Navy. Thejji need for such ships acquainted the Haganah, Israel's pre-i, independence underground army, with the experience of}ifl,i]y ship procurement, plotting sea routes and covert dropil' points, and, inevitably, a hands-on look at the most profes-ffi sional navy in the world, the Royal Navy. "We Jews didnl

have a great seafaring tradition," recalled Rear Admiral(Ret.) Yochai Bin-Nun, the first commander of the IDF s

l- The British always possessed a grudgrng respect for the'Haganah\ "naval" effort. The boats were piloled by brave

who, if they were smarter, would never have boardedrust-buckets in the first place. British sentiment fol-rd, the men and women who met the vessels in midwat-

were of equal gumption. But, they were the enemy. And,encountered they were to be arrested and possibly shot.

t6 t7

Sottutcl M. Katz

In the months following the start of World War II, however,when Great Britain's interests in the Middle East suddenlybecame center stage, the Jews were no longer pesky nui-sances with a cause-they were potential allies. Britainneeded feadess men eager to participate in the war effortand capable of achieving a lot with very little. TheHaganah, quid pro quo, was eager to get in on the wareffdrt, too. They were eager to get combat experience fortheir men, get them arms and training and to gain legitima-cy and a bank account's worth of favors from the Britishtf,at they could withdraw from at a later date. The qarriagebetweeri the British and the Haganah was a natural'

Many senior British commanders in the Middle East weredead s6t against any cooperation with the Haganah-theJews and the Arabs were the enemy, pure and simple, andnot foreigrers to be coddled like other elements of thecolonial effort mobilized against the Axis. Such sentimentswene even stronger in the ranks of the Royal Navy-theyconsidered the Jews nothing more than pirates and crimi-nals. Yet Britain's covert war in the Middle East was not runby stufr shirt admirals and generals, bg! b_y eccentrics,piofessors, visionaries, and commandos. The Special Oper-itions Executive (SOE) was the body running much of theintelligencs and special operations war i4 the region, andBritaii's spies had a lot of work for the Haganah.

In early 1940, the British SOE set up shop irl-a smallpension in the Mediterranean pgrt clty of Haifa as anispionage OP (observation post) of sorts tg qeCiP eatleri1eanA anayzing'data on the Germans and Italians in tlteMediterrinean. Great Britain at the time was in the middleof one its most disastrous seasons of the Second WorldWar-defeat, retreat, and the Battle of Britain were thecurrency ofthe day. The war in Europe had headed south tothe out6r perimet6r of the British Bmpire in North Africaand the Mediterranean, and it was clear to the British HighCommand that the Middle East would become an inevita-ble battleground in this global conflict. For the British, the-loss of th6 Middle East, and the Suez Canal, meant loss ofempire. Should the Germans reach Palestine, for the Jewsthii contingency sigrraled the end of a race. Although the

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Jews of Palestine and the British had been at odds as a resultof migration prior to the outbreak of the war, both partieshad obvious reasons to set aside regional issues and concen'trate on the task of survival. To the British, there was theparamount realization that everythingthat could be done inine nght against the advancing German forces neededtobedone. The British, for so long masters at manipulatingstrategic alliances in order to advance the interests of theempire, were now thinking in terms of weeks and months.Whiteha[ realized that there would be trouble later on andthat training and arming the Haganah-officers from whichrrere rounded up by the authorities only days earlier-was adouble+dged sword that might come back to haunt theempire in biting fashion. But British commanders on theground especially intelligence officers in the SOE andForeign Office, realized that the Jews were the sole indige-nous ally that the British had from the Mediterranean to thePersian Gulf. Of the Arabs, King Farouk of Egypt was arGerman sympathizer who hoped for a Nazi victory and theliberation of his country. Haj Amin al-Husseini, the GrandMufti of Jerusalem, spent the war in Berlin as a guest ofHitler and the Waffen-SS; in Jerusalem, the Palestiniansopenly awaited their liberation by Abu Ali, the affectionateeraUil name for General Erwin Rommel, the Desert Fox.2Only Emir Abdullah of Tians-Jordan and his nephew

THB NIGI{T RAIDERS

dul-Illah of traq remained staunchly pro-British.lhe Bedouins ofTians-Jordan, however, could not poseEuropeans or even German soldiers in a fifth-column

$ffort should Palestine become the epicenter of the Middletheater of operations. The British needed the

and, as a result, and only as a result of thisdesperate need, a new and uncomfortable alliance was

From their modest hotel room with a view (eventuallypanded into a suite and then a floor) atop Mt. Carmel in

overlooking the bustling port of Haifa, the SOE set uptheir objectives, to assemble intelligence, catchn espionage agents from the Abwher, and harassenemy lines. The SOE crew dispatched to Palestine

an eccentric lot, to say the least; many Hagancft ofrcers

18 I9

Semuel M. Kotx

who worked with them viewed them as nothing short ofodd. They included Arnold Iawrence (T. E. Lawrence'sbrother), almost as eccentric as his legendary brother,"Lawrence of Arabia"; Nicholas Hammond, a Greek histo-ry professor at Cambridge; and Henry Barnes, an eccentricsoul with a wild and expansive imagination. From theirhotel room, the three, and the staff they'd soon assemble,attended to their intelligence-gathering tasks by interview-ing the thousands of recent refugees from Europe whoprovided these trusting souls with insight into German railstations and seaports, as well as a virtual library oftraveldocuments and forms-all of which would later be repli-cated by MI-10 (British Military Intelligence) and the SOEto be used by Allied agents that would later be transplantedinto Europe. The SOE oftcers also established a specialtraining camp, code-named Me-102, where German-speaking Jewish agents could be trained for later infiltrationback into Nazi-occupied Europe.

Another one of the primary SOE objectives during thoseearly dark days of World War II was to harass the YichyFrench occupation of Lebanon and Syria. To achieve thisobjective, the SOE established a powerful transmitter atopMt. Carmel from where French-speaking de Gaulle loyalistsspread propaganda into the barracks ofYichy troops serv-ing in Beirut, Tyre, Tripoli, and Damascus. On the opera-tional level, the SOE sent French and Arabic-speakingHaganah operatives into the Levant to gather intelligence,sabotage roadways, and set up the basis fora pro-Allied fifthcolumn. There were tremendous fears inside the policy-making hallways at Vfhitehall in London that the AfrikaKorps wotrld sail into the port of Beirut and move onPaleitine in a thrusted pincer movement from the northand south. Operations in Lebanon became a British priori-ty, though they couldn't be overt military moves that wouldraise red flags in Berlin. A covert war was noeded, and thatmeant the Jewish operatives.

Two men who would engineer the military and intelli-gence cooperation between Jewish and British special oper-ations elements were as diverse and separate on thePalestine equation as could be. One was Yitzhak Sadeh, a

Hasanah special operations commander and burly Crime-;ffi;ffi kno*ri as much for his egalitarian genDs as he;;r i; his tall tales of wrestling beals in the Crimeanfo*tit. iis partner was the SOn officer in charge. ofi;ur":Ji""lne'r Squadron Leader Major william Parkins'ififfi; *iie oriimitar suspicious mindsets: Sadeh, borni" E-*titt Russia, had mistrust born into him; Parkins' a;;-h"lailg member of the "Old Boys' Network," wasn'tthe tvDe to trust a man like Sadeh (noi to mention to inviteilili5ifi officer's club for a glass of sherry)' Nevertheless'llt*i",o*"" knew that they sLared a common foe and thatia"t

"i"O"O the other-fuiure considerations of a fight for

independence were not even considered'-Aio"g the most pressing priorities facing the SOE wastrr"-cripif ins of the' vichy -eionomy-an economy driveni;;Jffi;;hine fueledibv the massive oil refinery alongih. co*t at Tripoli. But Tripoli wasn't solely an economrci"r""t. ft had ulirastrategic inilitary importance as well'-ff-th;timi the raid' on Tripoli was being plaSn{'Cir*a" interhgence agents had fUygd a major role in theb-l;;&;il"r"eptit ti wq, in ira[ in which the.pro-Naziil.hia-mi

"t-ciuitani seized power in Baghdad' Pro-

i{*iit-ct t"b"is uttu"k"d British forces in country.andh"o" Uutif"t broke out throughout the country, especially;;;";airg the ultrastrategic -Habaniyah ai:base where-the

THE NIGHT RAIDERS

b;ish--fid"d themselves- surrounded' The -co-up also"io"nt.O the

Germans with unique opportunities in sreat-il;;-;;;a iront in the Near-Easf against the British'ei"rt* oitne Abwher, Getman military ,.,t"lliq":""::T!

, ;i;;;;.i ittoit"q ti, help spread and intensifv tl'g ?ry"qI*iii"rJi, ""0 it" I-uftwitr6 began bomblng

British-fuelJ"*o"

"ir*"nition stores, and Iirfields. The British High

e;;;ild i;red that if the Luftwaffe could obtain the use;i;;itfi"id, such as one in Palmyra or Damascus, andiitui, alo""rized supply of fuel,-such as those punlp$..gtl!bv the Tripoli refinery, British forces in lraq and Bntrsniritei"sts ii Persia coutd be severely threatened*5ir"" litii"i"

""0 Vl"f,y France weren't yet involved in

ruff-scAe ngnting (let alone small-scale hostilities), a sabqtaie raid, 6ne feipetrated by deniable frogman, seemed

20 2t

ig:q; pinc rhr *. ;:f, ,:::rhad been training asmall force of Jewish frogmen.in Tet Aviv,s Exhibition p#k,situated just nolt]r 9f [h9 city center. frc training waiyligentary and fairly primitive, though Oesigned fdUothrnreurgence a-nd sabotag eperations. British instructors,dive masters from both- the Rbyal Navy and noya Uarinis,taught.these Jewish volunteers the A-io-Zs of riaval rp*ilioperations-long_-range swimming, canoeing, undenryaterdemolitions, cold-killing map work, navigation, as well asoth_er aspects of espionage aciivity. As pai6stine',"as a*al[wrth espionageagents tg+ utl sides (from I bwher agentstoArab mercenaries to po_lish military intelligence ageits whou'er9 proactively anti-Jewish), thd trainiig at ElhibitionPark was carried out with incredible secuiity. Only thosei^nv.9!ved with the project were allowed in airA out'of ttitacllity, and the Jewish volunteers participating in thetraining were forbidden from telling fainitv mimbeirs wheretley yere and obviously what i-hey w6.e ooini-&intlpugh many of the votunteers lived liut a few btocis fromwhere they urcre being trained.

In all, forty men were trained for the raid on Thipoli. Theywere eager, zealous, and capable. The brunt of their instruc-tion was in the demolitioris sphere; the planting ;f ;p6-sivel 1!re hiding. of explosives,'euen^ tfri iLproviseOproduction of explosive rnaterials. These men were to besaboteurs in the classic sense of the word. They were tocome ashore secretly, reach their targets, plant 6xplosiveicharges, and return to their mother vessel before the instal_lations blew up. Classic sabotage. Classic World War iI@mmando work. But not formally being part of an army31d .1ot being.in TIfg*, these men ris[ed a very certaiifhteif captured by Vichy forces. They were all indo&rinatedrn the type of torture they'd receive and all knew thatlapture meant certain execution. Although never con-firT"9, some reports_indicate that they were"iisued cya"iOicaplgts'Just in @se" capture was imininent...

It is. believed (still never confirmed by the British, though)that this force was not

-being trained iolely for operatiSn6against fichy targers in Lebanon_the frugil Britdh i;na;dnot to invest such sums in forces witti'only a timiiiJ

T}IE NIGHT RAIDERSregional operation ability. Instead, the frogmen were-bein-gorEoped fbr operations

-in the Adriatic (with the British'SpeiiA Air Servica) and even possibly for western andnorthern Europe. Tliere could be no future missions with-out one in the bag and the raid on Tripoli was slated for thespring of 1941 atlhe height of the Allied covert offensive inLebaion. The British were adamant about the use ofindigenous forces for the operation to-somehow convincethe Vichy and Germans that a guerrilla and fifth-columnarmy was laying in wait.

F6r the Sritish High Command, the "forty" were qconvenient and expendable force. Little rumblings woul{be made in Whitehall should the force be eliminated, andsording Jewish volunteers was a lot more cost effective thansendfi Royal Marines or other Commonwealth units. For*e nagandh, however, this was an opportunitY tqperfonq:experiient, and strike a blow againgt the Axis Powers. Itwas an opportunity not to be missed.

The ofiier in chirge of the "twenty-three boatmen" was astriking English officer and a gentleman, Major AnthonyPaher] a riiing star in the SOE. Palmer was everything theHaganah volunteers were not. Oxford-educated, Palmg!waipolish to the volunteers' swagger and zeal..Palmer couldalwa:vs be located at the Exhibition Park training ground bythe iweet aroma drifting out of his mahogany pipe, and heworked twenty-hour diys supervising the instruction andmeeting wittr SOf representatives concerning intellige.ncereports-obtained aboui possible targets in Tripoli. Affection-ati of the Jews and their energies, Palmer didn't considerthe Haganahvolunteers a footnote at all. He admired theirdesperite energy. It was,an energy he felt was contagious.-

Fbr the fort{ Haganah volunteers on this dangerous andsecretive dutyagainst the Axis, working with Palmer andthe British wis nothing new. Since the riots of 1936, whenPalestine erupted into a civil war of Arab guerrilla raids,Jewish proacfive responses and the Commonwealth forcesstuck id the middle,-a covert arrangement existed betweenthe Jewish and British forces that the Palestinian Arabs, forlack of better words, were a common enemy that needed tope dealt with through unconvent.ional means. Unconven-

22 23

Sawwl M. Kotutional means for the British mant Captain Orde Wingate, ayeteran of rhe Eritrea campaign anaL man witt a frtioithe eccentric and a geni,r.i fjr ttricoGi that made theBritish think him jusimad,"orgn to **i ni_ to

",oit inpalesrine; his dedicatio, t" th;-8-iblr,;;'th" Children ofIs^rael, would convince nasanai co;;;;d"rr, mistrustfuli!:l,i&f !:fiEc'H,iH:'l**,:iiri**lr"gxHa'Yedid, "The Friend.'; ing wittr nriii.f,lina, anO rifles,he organized.ajo!ry British-Jewish riiJiu't-o.y patrol knownT th? Special Night Squad, o, SNS.- i-de'SNS ;; ;remarkable creation-a joint counter-t"riorirt tast'foGwith the British Armv anir rhe una;;d;;J'nasiiin. Bi7Ying?tg was a remarftabt m"n_u, drririJu'irr *irro;fiihim, "A man of geni'rs w_!9.might very,*iiiur" become amanof destinv.'tn"im-*ii;ffiil,iil;it'n*ip-ri,iiGt]called him -Liwrence orruo"al';f lil **-li ood chap withs11ko of insanity laced with zealous UiUticat Oevotioir

",fiowas one of the most underrared miliE thinters of liil1T-.: Hir superiorg more thln

""ytf,irig r'dght of him asbzarre and a loose cannon. fven lewisTi daAirs were urervof his rypged penchall fo, #eil;;;;h;;;#'ilfitfeelcy diplomat Abba Eban er"o *rit"s

"i" f.r-A meet_ing in which he found_ Wingate, siiti-ng-ii'nis froief dmstark naked, stroking his b6dy'do;;-'wi;h-a coarse hairH*h..-31!,TI1h, f,owener, fter" tnat oniyWingate was

i[r',Hr#q.ffi s:*#[l$"dl{*$i*:ffiithem the very fabric needed t" **pi"ir.rO commando!tougFt,

-and ;rn etaic olcommand ;ffi;#;b,gilil fi;into the heart of many. yolpg Uaeiii "&-ur6.rr, 1tr"l3::_y13.y9_r1g,qurgeirri:tof tr,i8"ef iir-iriitnirii-viro.wmgarc taught his troopers to use the enemy's naarinbss asth_e attacker's strength-an emptrasis G;i";"d d;ig;I,rt_tlme operations. platoon comriranders *rie gireo inc6lii_ble independence undel $ngat.,-"rJ ji'rrits were to beled into baule with rhe hishdiranli;;;'ffi; charging at

ffi r*H:Ttr;xr$rla[*t1,11*:;";i"hffi

THE NIGHT RAIDERSoperations mounted achieved two all-important militaryobjectives-they made a quantitative disadvantage on thebattlefield evaporate into a qualitative edge, and they in-stilled fear and trepidation in the heart of the enemy.

Among Palmefs forty volunteers were many veterans ofthe SNS.5 Palmer wasn't as eccentric as Wingate, and not ascharismatic. But he was a British officer who possessed therespect and admiration of the men he commanded. Al-though the raid on Tiipoli was to be the first strike in thecommando force's operations, Palmer did test out hiscombatants with several smaller sabotage missions in Greekports, and against German shipping in Crete.6 The missionsin the Aegean were meant to see firstly if the Jewish frogmenwere up to the task at hand and secondly to see ifany ofthemen he saw as owning unique potential were also equippedwith the elements of command. The operations in Greeceand Crete also served as a "hot LZ" dress rehearsal for themen. If these missions could succeed, then so, too, couldTripoli. In fact, rather ambitious plans were thought of forthe SOE s force of Jewish frogman. An energetic plan tohave the Jewish seaborne sappers disrupt German supplyefforts was penciled in, calling for the force to sink aRomanian freighter in the Danube. Other plans called forPalmer's force to act as kayak-racitrg squads inflicting asabotage spree against river targets throughout German-occupied Europe. For the mission against Lebanon, Palmerknew he had to check his notes and caleulations carefully.Equipped with an old coast-guard launch, the H.M.S.

^SeaLion was large onough to barely hold twenty-four men.British intelligence and operations staffanalysis called for

the raid to be carried out sometime in May l94l-D-daywas set for May 18, 1941. In the weeks prior to the raid, thetraining intensified, too. Swimming trials went from push-ing the envelope of endurance to smashing through it. Smallarms training began to intensiff, as well, as did instructionin how to remove a sentry with a dagger, boulder, piece ofwood, or fist. French was taught at a brisk paoe, as wasArabic with a specific Lebanese flair; most of the volunteersarlready spoke t}te colloquial Arabic as well as their Palestin-'ian neighbors. The training was provided to all involved-

24 25

tumtcl M. Kmeven the H.M.S. Sea Lpy\..pi19t,,, Katriel yafa, a first_generation seafarer ana naga;;i *iil;; and rhe shio,smachinists and engine drivErs, b.*il;-Lhiii;dffi Hil:mandos.

A week before the ship was set to depart palestingYitzhak Sadeh was secretty ;rrdfud-iil their rrainingfacility-to see the men_m-any ofinon, ti knew hed bepejng for the last ti-". rni grofi;-;;;rc their filthvfatigues stained with perspirati[], fi*;;, aie g"ft;Eiresidue,assembtodnfu etypicarir'rf"fi;*;;ritii"T":"iil,iground with their tegs groiseO, *fth S;a;i, affecrionarelvcatled "The oro rrin,;; sia-ntil1ilffffi;ilXT:ff;;i.:'i"f;f,H,H[,:ffii**ir*i*llrfhip, and then sqid, .Tir:tlt tou

"r"r;i *r"""t"d to any$oup or org;anization- yor_^*: qolng oui withil;;i,identity cards or document.. lf,'CoE-foriii,-vou get caught,you mustn't reveal who you are o, wtro seniy6u. The BritishArmy wilt denv anv rn&teoge oiv." *i rJlrnofitanil frfolvou. you will n6t Uecome-pOd.. y;;ili be consideredspies, and suffer with what we at t"*iiriirjens to spies inwaftime."?Sadeh was a boisterous man whose speeches werc usually

t!-.rt""jg. wi{h jokes, **" otr-*tor,'u]ii'ilato ca[s roarms. This time, however, he *"r'ror"U"i and deadly.seriouq. Spies arresteq were tortui;, ffi;;, ttren shot orhung. No_trials, no prison, no pOW

""rirp. rhO Red Crosspackage. The silence in tfre room *as ffi?; the sound ofa cigarette's paper burniTg ;;;h. il; ilir" heard- Atteyes focused on Sadeh *,itt-, turrrii ri;-io; [i"*eO foronlythe most dire situations. ..we "r not iiiiji*iLo eyeryoneknows-here u/hat the dangers are,- Sud"t*ntioued, *but

we all know the imoortande of the op-eraib"]ir*" i.r.*id,it wilt be a harsh blowtothe c"r-il;;;; ire same timeplove oJu -ilit"w abilities. Conditions in tilC naa *iffG

1,^lo.lgh * rhey can bg byt ttre orOer is-to iar.y out theffi:Ti,l:1ffiy,ll,ff":1"'s exacuv wnat vouit ao and

For the next two days, the twenty-six-year-old palmer

THE NIGHT B.AIDERSmade his final selection-only those who could swim thefastest, shoot tle best, and were most comfortable with theidea of carrying around with them ten-kilogram packs ofTNT werc selected. Secrecy was absolute and securityaround their departure facility the tightest it had ever beenat the Haifa facility. It bothered many of the volunteers thatthey couldnt write home, or even hop in a lorry for a quickride home to say goodbye to their parents, siblings, andsweethearts; some, even, lived only a few blocks away in thenorthern suburbs of Tel Aviv. It cast a cloud over themission and created a morale problem. L,ess than twenty-four hours before the Sea Lion wx to set sail for the shoresof Tlipoli, Sadeh returned to Haifa. He ordered each of thetwenty-three volunteers into a conference hall and inter-viewed each of them individually. "The chances of return-ing from the mission you are about to ernbark on areminimal. Do you still volunteer?" Sadeh received twenty-three responses of "I volunter."

The H.M.S. Sea Lion set sail for the Lebanese @a$t onthe night of May 18, 1941. It departed the Palestineshoreline silently and slowly and with no fanfare. It nevermade it to Tlipoli, it never radioed in a mayday, and it wasnever heard from again. SOE operations ofrcers, followingthe charted progression of the vessel, were aghast withanxious fear about what happened to Major Pdmer and hisJetilish frogmen. At first, they ferired the boat had explodedas a result of an accident involving the load of highorplosives carried by the frogmen. Then, as the daysstretched into weeks, the fear came over the SOE s PalestineHQ that the ship had been boarded and the operatomseized. Indeed, rumors soon filtered through the lcvantinepipeline tlat several Palestinian Jews and a British ofrcerwere tried and executed in a Gendarmerie facility in Tiipo-li. The most logical explanation of the SeaLion's disappear-ance was that an Italian submaring patrolling the shores ofPalestine (as Mussolini's Navy often did), encountered theship and simply placed a torpedo asross its bow.

Fior months, the families of the twenty-three were kept inthe cruel world of military secrecy. They were not inforrred

26 27

TIIB NIGHT RAIDBRSSmtol M. Keuthat their loved ones were missing nor wefe they eveninformed that the men wett no longer in Palestine. Theywere told nothing and expected to remain silent. Only inNovember 1942, more than eighteen months later, were thefamilies discreetly told that the men were considered mrss.ing. Even to this day, what exactly happened to the tsrcnty-three Jewish commandor and Major Palmer rcmains amystery historians are still tryrng to figure out. Although noremains wene ever foun4 there were reports that tvrcnty-three Jewish sailors were soen in the southern ttalian FOIVcamp by other Allied prisoners. Fiollowing the Allied inva-sion of Sicily, the POWs were moved north and thentransferred to the hands of the German military, who, it isbelieved, murdered the surviving membem of the crew.While this rcmains only a theory about what happened toMajor Palmer and his crew, it is mpported by evidence-including eyewitness a@ounts. Trwo years after the shipdisappeare{ the head of the political office of the JewiahAgency, Moshe Sharett, vnote his liaison in British intelli-gence a lettor that included the folbwing

.SEA LION'' OPERATTON.A Maltme soldier, of ttre name of Thomas CASTOR"

whowas aprisoner-of-war in ltaly and escaped, arrivedin ALEXANDRIA about three to four weeks ago andinquired there whether there were any Palestiniansoldiers from TBL AVIV about. He met a PalestiaianJew, of the name of Bzra ROZEN, who is serving withthe Royal Navy in ALEXANDRIA, and told him thatin this prisoner-of-war camp where he was detained,No. 65 H.P.M. 3454, there were twenty-one Palestiniansailors who, for some noason, wore civilian's clothes,and were treated with considerable more harshnessthan the other prisoners. In partioular, they weneallourcd no oontact with the outside world, eittrerthrough the Rod X or any other method. CASTOR gavealso a detailed doscription of the senior member of thatparty, and the description t4llies with that of theSkipper of the *SBA LIOM' 10.6.43.t

The sam of the Sea Lion was a bitter beginning for theuiiinair naval effort and one that remains a source ot;Effi;il* i" tni. *w day. The oourage of the crew andffiJuor.ioi.t'oitine-misiion'cannot be lost in the fact thati;rarl's-fr*t attempt af naval special warfare had endeddisastrously.-Tn"

"rrii,i"t of the twenty-three

-loatmgn.is a sad onelaced with'mystery, and it is especially tragic.in-light of th,efact that tw6 days before the men set sarl tor rnpo&?i;h"k Sadeh ainounced the creation of-the HagaruhEJrii":sit*Jcomfanie*" ot Pal'mach, p thJy were knownil H"b;;;:ft;Fri;iach na* evervthls that Major ?al-mer's commandos weren"t-an "overt" statement ot Jew-ffi';d-Btitith speciat forces cooperation aeainst thc A'dg;"G-. i-uJb-titisn, fearing defedt in Egvpt, had begun-toSJiii*-piiti P"t;iAh" beiming tle qext

-T99' Yjd*:I ffiiirn- u":tu"ep*c. The min-and women-of theffi;;.rt, ;;tnf otngr hand, tro y.uq .sn*il! -]

San*cl M. KoEploRle-, and underground groups like the Stern Gang evenoffered their services to theGerman and ltalian intefigenceservices.

By M?I !94!, ju.s1 as the H.M.S. Sea Lion was preparedto set sail, the British High Command in palestindreilizedthat the White Pqper was buying them more grief thansjqtegg dep1h, Th9 Germans were nearing the gates ofCafuo,theAbwher, German Military Intelligeirce, was para-chutingagenls into the Judean desert equippedwith'goldbars and orplosives to start an indigenous pilestinian EftUgolq*.p!*ed for an_Afrika Korps invasion, and HajAmin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, was iguest of Hitler in Berlin. British oftcers were sanctioned toprepg^e evasuation plans for the garrison in palestine, andan airfie-ld atop Mt. Carmel and the nearby port of Haifawere primed as stagrng points for a Holy-Iand Dunkirkdeparture.

The British needed to buy time; they needed help andqey realizejl that they needed the Je*iish fighters of tneHaganah. The Je.wish Agcncy, the quasi-political bodyorerseeing affairs in Palestine, had lobbied t6e British for ifull-fledged Jewish Brigade-a conventional trained forcethat could assist the forces ofthe crown in the defense ofPalestioe. The BritistL not wanting to train an army theymight have lo face after the war, balked, though ag6eO ti,spgnsor, train, and equip a Jewish guerrilla force tnat coutOdefend the "Jewish interests" in Falestine from Arab andNazi attack. The force would become known as thePal'mach, the Hebrew acronym for ..Strike Companies,"and was formed on May 14,1941. For both the Brilish andthe Haganah it would become a truly Middle Easternmarriage of convenience. The British i+ould have at itsdisposal-a force of highly motivated individuals who, be-cause of their superb language abilities, could becomesconts, spreg and sabotelrs, andthe Haganaft would get themilitary training, experience, and back$ound needel laterfor the fight for Israeli independence. ihe pal'mach wouldtrain three times as many men and women as the Britishauthorize( and for every weapon issue( the pal'mach

TI{B NIGHT RAIDERSwould steal two from British armories; additional weaponswere liberated from Free French bases, as well as fromCommonwealth units, like the Australians, who wer,e fondof the Jewish cause and whose friendly and gregariousnature made them favorites of the locals.

The man who was charged with leading the Pal'machwasYitzhak Sadeh, and Sadeh designed the "Strike Compa-nies" along guerrilla lines-the largest Pal'rnacft unit was tobe a company with six companies altogether. Palntachcommandos were trained in lightning assaults, demolitions,cold-killing reconnaissance, and espionage work. Less thana month after the Strike Companies were formed, theyfound themselves in the of the British invasion ofSyria and Lebanou preceding the Allied etrort with night-time reonnaissance and sabotage forays to destroy bridgesand other Vichy communication lines. When, on June 8, theAllied inrrasion of kbanon was launched, tbe Pal'machwasattached to the Australian 7th Division and served withdistinction as s@uts, translators, and demolitions expert&Many of lsrael's future leaders began in the Pal'rnachincluding Moshe Dayan, who lost an eye to a Vichy rifleround.

The Pal'mach would also field special operations unitswithin its framework-language-based units meant fordar-ing missions deep behind enemy lines. These units includedHa'Machlalu Ha'Aravit, or "Arab Platoon," a force ofvolunteers made up of Jews from throughout the MiddleEast who were taught to act, think, behave, and operate likeArabs. Their mission was intended to be deep-cover anddangerous. A "German Platoon,'o Ha'Machlal

Sanwel M. Kaasolely with German weapons such as the Mauser rifle andMP-38 submachine gun, and were taught Wehrmacht slangwith retigious conviction, and expected to know everythingabout being a soldier-from rank and insignia to salarywages and even the location of the most popular brottrels inGermany. For many inthe Haganah, itwas odd to sanctlonthese Jewish refugees disappearing into the woods for a fewweeks only to have them come out as Deutscher Soldaten,but the novel approach was wildly successful. Some of thebrightest pupils of the o'German Platoon" went on beyondthe borders of Palestine. They served with Captain DavidStirling's SAS and Long Range Desert Platoon in the NorthAfrican desert conducting hit-and-run commando attacks,intelligence-gathering raids, and even an audacious plot toblow up Field Marshal Rommel's desert HQ. Other'German Platoon" volunteers \ilere sent to Allied POWcamps where they were mingled with actual German sol-diers in order to gather intelligence on German units andtroop locations.

A "Balkan Platoon" was also formed and it saw actionalongside British SAS and SOE units operating in theAegean Sea and in Yugoslavia. A "Romanian Platoon" wasalso rumored to have existed, sanctioned specifically andsolely for a commando raid against the massive Ploesti oilfields.

As the Pal'mach grew and expanded so, too, did thescope of Yitzhak Sadeh's growing overt underground army.By 1943, the Pal'mach had managed to train over 1,000fighters and equip them with issued, confiscated, and stolenweapons. It was clear to many in the Hagailah hierarchythat the Pal'mach had become a military elite and anembryonic seed of what would eventually beome theIsraeli military. The Pal'mach, thercfore, needed to benurtured and expanded into a multipurpose arm. A fledg-ling air arm of the Pal'mach was created in 1943; known asthe Pal'Avir, the small volunteer force consisted of gliderpilots and a few Palestinian-Jewish RAF pilots. A naval armof the Pal'machwas also sanctioned. Known asthe Pal'yam,or "Sea Companies," the force had no warships or coastalartillery. In fact, t}l,e Pal'yam wasn't a defensive entity at all.

THB NIGIIT RAIDERSIt was a strike unit desigrred to hit at sea with the onlymuscle the Jews had at the time-brave men armed withexplosive charges. They had no underwater equipment tospeak of, and wet suits were heavy woolen sweatem andknickers coated with a concoction of thick motor oil andhardened chicken fat. They also had no conventional explo-sives that they could deploy in battle; their equipment was apotpourri of homemade gear and volatile ideas put togetherin basement bomb factories. Pal'yam commanders hadhoped for missions against German and ltalian targetsthroughout the Mediterranean. Instead, in 1943, the Brit-ish, no longer needing the Jewish strike companies in a warthe Allies were now winning on their own in a theater ofoperations that had suddenly taken a back seat, ended theirrelationship with the Haganah and demanded that thePal'mach return all its arms. An underground-henoeillegal-organization, the Pal'yam braced itself for theinevitable war of independence it would be waging againstthe British and the Arabs. The cut of its mettle would betested against the mightiest navy in ttre world at the time-the Royal Navy.

When dealing with a state yet to be born, and an army yetto be established, the leaders of ttrc Haganah realized thatthe best they could do in 1943 was to lay the foundations ofa conventional military entity on paper and in the field, andlet due @urse and divine intervention take care of the rest.A naval service was needed, as Palestine's elongated coast-line dictated that a future Jewish State would need to have apowerful navy to safeguard the coast from Gaza to RoshHaniqra slicing into the kbanese border. But naviesneeded ships, and the Pal'yam had but a few seagoingvessels; it was a volunteer force, but according to one of thefounding members of the forcn,lzzy Rahav, *If they neededyou, you were volunteered into the unit."e [t was a meagerstart, but the Haganah would learn an invaluable lessonabout naval warfare bythe very fact that it was pitted, in thesubsequent campaign to smuggle in refugees under Britishblockade, against the Royal Navy.If there is one trait that the "have nots" all have incommon is that they know how to maximize their meager

32 33

Son*el M, Ka.e

rernurcs in an efficient, effective, and innovative manner.In this aspect, the Haganah was truly a "have not" that waseager to learn. Haganah ammanders realized that theRoyal Navy would have to be neutralized on two importantfronts once the Second World War ended-easing theirblockade against Jewish immigration and finding gaps intheir defenses, so that ships carrying arms and ammunitioncould make it to Haifa harbor. It was a daunting task and achallenge that the German Navy, the Kreigsmarine, had notdone effectively, and, Haganaft cpmmanders pondered, theNazis had scores of submarines. Studying tle naval cam-paigrr of the Mediterranean as best they cortld, Haganahoftcers soon realized that there was only one Axis nav} tozuccessfully deploy special warfare operators against theRoyal Navy and that was the ltalian's famed UnderwaterSabotage Unit, the legendary Decima Flotiglia MAS. Tllreloth Flotilla MAS beiame legendary and Pal'yam ofrcersbegan studying their tactics and abilities with great interest.Ominously and luckily for the Haganah, the Pal'yam hadopted to emulate one of the world's most innovative andefective naval special warfare units to ever strike againstconventional shipping in the history of modern navalwarfare.

By March 1945, the war in Europe was grinding to itsinevitable end as German fiorces were pushed east by theadvancing British and American armies in Belgium andHolland, and west by the unstoppable legions of the SovietRed Army. The horrors of the Nazi Final Solution soonbegan to become evident as concentration camps, deathcamps, and forced labor camps were liberated. The survi-vors, tlose liberated from the doorstep of death and nowcalled "Displaced Persons" (or DPs) by the Allies, soughtany and all routes away from western Europe. Many foundrefuge in the United States, many more sought for a stake inthe building of a Jewish homeland. A homeland in Pales-tine.

On V-E day, as hundreds of thousands gathered inLondon to hear Prime Minister Churchill announce the endof the war in Europe, David Ben-Gurion, in London for a

TIIB NIGHT RAIDERSJewish Agency Executive Council, marked the day as a verysad one.to Of the seven million Jews who had lived in Nazi-occupied Europe during the war, only one million hadsurvived and there was little being done by the Allies tobring the survivors to Palestine. Ben-Gurion demanded thatthe British grant emergency entry visas to 100,000 of thesurvivon, but his call fell on deaf ears.

The only way to get the refugees into Palestine was byguile, by stealth, and by breaking through the Britishblockade. That meant the use of force. Former wartimeallies were about to become enemies.

World opinion supported the Jewish survivors in theirquest to reach Palestine, but Great Britain wasn't as con-cerned about world sympathy as it was with its crumblingempire, especially as chunks of the realm disintegrated intoindependent entities on virtually a daily basis. Palestine, tothe British, wasn't as strategic as it was a tinderbox, and theBritish were determined to keep the 100 million Arabs in itsempire complacent. Complacency, of @urse, meant thatJewish refugees were not permitted entry in Palestine andthis policy of exclusion needed to be public. Destroyers,-cruisers, and coast guard craft of the Royal Navy sealed offthe Mediterranean shores of the mandate with a virtuallyhermetic blockade. Ships, or rickety contraptions of weldedsteel and paint meant to pass themselves off as ships,chartered by the Haganah to ferry the survivors to Palestinewere often intercepted on the high seas, boarded, andusually forced to land in Cyprus. In Cyprus, the refugeeswere huddled into outdoor detention camps, closed in bybarbed wire and guards carrying rifles and patrolling perim-eters with dogs, where conditions cruelly resembled thegeographic characters of Auschwitz, Bergen-Belsen, andDachau. Warehousing the survivors in concentration-camplike conditions outraged the Haganah High Command andit prompted them to take immediate and decisive action.Pal'maih founder Yitzhak Sadeh, "The Old Man," hadthought of mounting attacks against patrol craft in Haifa, inthe nbrth, and in Jaffa,just south ofTel Aviv. Sadeh did notwant the Pal'mach operators to carry any side arms or evenknives fiust in case they were stopped by a British patrol),

34 35

9am*el M. Ksajust homemade incendiary devices that would destroy aship. Ttvo volunteers entered Jaffa harbor, found a smallspot

-t9 enter the water where a searchlight or guard was notwatching and placed an improvised eiplosivi device nearthe stern of two British patlol vessels. -The job complete,].!9f .e^1neryed frgm the water and went to tne tiendy'Kasit" cafe on Tel Avit's fashionable Dizengoff Street toreport the success of the mission to their local commanders.-

The_next morning radio reports confirmed the destruc-tion of two vessels in Jaffa harbor. Sadeh was so pleasedwith the raid that he ordered the pal'mach and pal;yam toraise an underwater sabotage unit. On November i, 1945,with no swimmers, no fast boats, no underwater gear, andan improvised explosive factory that even the mosioptimis-tic Pal'mach oftcers were sure would blow up it anyminute, the Pal'mach entered the naval speciai warfaribusiness on a full-time basis.^

On the shores just due south of the old Roman city ofCaesarea, located south of Haifa along the Mediterraneancoast, the Haganah established a speiial sub-unit of thePallam

_that would, in essence, ileclare open warfarea4inst the Royal Navy. War against the Royal Navy meantsabotage, and that meant men brave enough to pit the*-selves against the mightiest navy in the worli. The unit thatt_\e

_Hagana& secretly created on paper was known asYechidat Ha'Habala Ha'yamit 1or ,aUirderwater Sabotage:Urlit), and the one man brave'enough not only to attalkBritish shipping, but also lead the unit-that would conduct anaval

-campaigr of sabotage and destruction egainst theRoyal Navy, was a tall and lanky foot soldier nam-ed yochaiBin-Nun.

Yochai Bin-Nun was born tolead, many ofhis contempo-raries would later comment. He was quiet, confident, andcapable-the prerequisite in the Halanah cirterja for aman destined- to go places. Born in Haifa in 1924, Bin-Nunvolunt:;e-red fgr llaganah service at a very young age andwas a full-fledged operator in the pal'maci ii tgiZ sirvingin the- uppe^r Galilee area and Jezreel Valley. In 1944, upoihis release from active duty while en route home to his^flatin Jerusalem's Beit Ha'Keiem neighborhood a friend con-

vinced him to "try out" for a new unit beine formed alonsthe beach near Caesarea. A week later, a maiwho had beeideemed to be one of the most capable infa;iry ;d;eIeaders inthe pal'mach,but more imirortaniiy, a, Bin-ifu;wouldlaterrecall, ..I w.as a sappff witir a keen1no*t-.0g" oiexplosives." He would leaveifre relative comroii ;a;ight:l,g" ryd: and.fire.fights ro soon immerse himseliin;rA;"li9 9Il: learning hov to protect his body against the-frigidDlte ot the cold sea. He was a man who had-been convert-edand would remain in

-..naval service" for the next thirttyelp, llinq to the rank of commander of the IDF ;r.'The "Underwater Sabotage unit', was a motley ass"rrrtl,of fishermen, swimmers, aid advent*e*:tii.'"dri"iii1qrs, s.om9.in.the Haganalz hierarchy woutO oUserve,-Uoi_oereo on the rnsane in terms of the risks they were willing to!ake. The men assembled under great secredy and with littlelo_gistics, and even fewer suppfiEs. NearUi"tiabz tii---riiplied them with food. Localtiothing

.urrirf""trrer, near6ylsnrng $llageq, and stolen suppliei prouiO"O them witfrtheir rafts, suits, and basic underwa'ter equipm"rrt,

-i.H:e:"o!!, Yeapory and e-xplosives worksliopi providedthem with improvised explosive devices_the to6ls of thetrade by which the war of revenge and respect would beyagg{ against

_the Royat J.l3vy, {nli-shipping limp"t;;"r,the kind that Italian an$ n_gtisfr frogmln t-"0 ii"""riiuirygsgd $uri_ne the Second World W#, were not stored inPalestine by the British Army, and

"r'a ,"i,rti

"ould not be

ll,ot",E yjt operarors ,.foraging', British Uases foi sup-pues. Lrmpet mlnes were such a select item that Haganihagg$t working in Europe,_had trouble in stealing td;;;;I_"1L A:

" ....ytj the explosive devices to be used 6'y tf,i ,i"ii

I-1d_1o1{.llilt by scratch, prepared in HaganahworkshopsDy part-ttme volunteers who in their regular civilian jobspi+!.h"r...peen anything from account#is to bakers. Thelracrtronal llmpet-was a remarkable example of destructiveingenuity. A metal plate fastened to six ,,fdt *usrr"tic lees(many called them "explosive cockroaches"), linipets weii.to be attached, by theif six small *ue.ii. t6ls. to the hlllDe.attached-, by their six small magnetic legs, to the hull

a snlp and then activated, with a delayed acetone fuse, forer detonation. The Americans, Biitish, ftJians, anA

TI{E NIGHT RAIDERS

36 37

Srmwl M. KatzGermans-and every_other nation that built lirnpets_gqplovgd facets of industry to proOuce itri Oevices-undersare and regulated circumstances. ..The Hasanah was iusil:lglj9lII "r3rch explosives and mateiial to proOiicirne o.amn thlngs,,, once commented the IDF,s chiefhistori-

. an. "Safety checks and product control was not even a partof the equation.,,_

Bin-Nun was less concerned about the safety of thedgvices as he was about their retiiUifitv;-Iinger was, afterall, an element of the job tt at "acf,

of ifr"-Oi*r, knew andunderstood. Reaching a Royal Navy vessel and evadinsBritish sentries was h"af the 6attte ario piil;g;;";#;Tthe bow of a destrover only to nauJit-noi-elpfoOe was ascenario to be avoidld at ati *.tr.. f]though officially a sub-unit of the pa|rnafi\ 4thBat_ranon, the one reserved for special operations andintelligence-gathering, the underwa["r ruUoiie" unit was bvpure oetrnrtron an indepenrtnt entity. Tidining for tn6ffi 'lffifl,;Til*'ffi :t,il,,rt"[lrl,;*l:kltlxipurcnased underwater equipment, unit -divers had to en-dure the unforgiving surfoitte la"aiiirruo.* and swimgreal orstances rn order to reach palyam vessels offshoribeing used.as practice targets. In order to uiO u ,"nrioi::ill"I_tq Te training^exercises, as if swimming unaerwatiiwtn tn lclqgrams of unstable explosives w6n,t realistic$gyqh, Bin-Nun ordered the maneuvers in waters thatIritith co-as-t_guard craft rourinelv p"tiofr"O. f"o*i;i A;the Royal Navy was gsuafly ,"iiUy t;;'tir" divers in_creased incentive to stic-k totle opdralonal plans ;d;reach their target. quickly anO u".iet"iteA. fo add to themasquerade, the ..tarset" ship was actually a fishing vessel.Iir-h *r4t that day in traiiiing weie taieieaten back atr-aesarea. tt was all very pragmatic_all very Haganah.As Bin-Nun and corirfan! trained and-ierfected theirskills, the British scored a major success agaiirst tilgr;Gnumber of Jewish refugees being smuggl"eO-l"to pilestinEwlen theRoyal ryqvy se-ized the Ft"giiffisiii nert Katzen_e$on, a flckety old freighter that had seen bitter days andsurely an easier cargo. The British U.ougt iifre sfripijHuiia

THB NIGHT RAIDERSand then transported its human cargo, nearly 2,0(X) refu-gees, to intermeut camps in Cyprus. The 4th Battalion-respo:rded by attacking British police and radar facilities,but the attacls only strengthened the British resolve to seizemore ships and intern more refugees. By the summer of!946, the number of Jewish refugees being intemed by thePritiqh-i1r Cyprus swelled to nearly 20,00d; almost *eekly,Royal Navy_ vessels were stoppCd, turned around, and9.r9".ght.to pyprys. The succesiful transport of the ifegalsQlg,lapilim)-to- Palestine required breaking through -theBritish naval blockade, a task assigned to {he falfam. l,major training facility was established at t

Sa*wl M. Kqa

]S1.l".ftlryr: a tunnel,.and he had figured out a way tosail up _the coast in order to reach the target. But, unfoitu-

nalgly Qr_.Bfn-Nun, the raid was eventuatjv-scrubbed.,

The "Night of-the Bridges," as the iaid'of funi-fi wasKnown, sparked the B4tish into full_fledged action. On wtaibe91me knoqrn as ..Black Sabbath,i'-Eritirf, Orces andpolice agents anrsted most -of tt

" itagaiii;, top iJ"iil

lllp,,_Jrlgtf cTpplins_underground icti"itv againsi tteI,nusn-mand,ate tbrces. The only unit still operatlional wasle lgl'ygm (whose leaders naO eraaeO ttrJ'rounduo) andtrrn-Nun's underwater unit. After all, as one of the^squadyg*j 3t31ry:j9.st because the top borsi. ",ere

i" fisi;(uon't mean that the survivors wouldn,t be coming.'ryith g" -help of increased nava assets assignE to tneeastern Mediterranean and additional radar sfitionJ uuiri

along the coast, the