Samuel Scheffler - Moral Independence and the Original Position.pdf

7/29/2019 Samuel Scheffler - Moral Independence and the Original Position.pdf

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Moral Independence and the Original PositionAuthor(s): Samuel SchefflerSource: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the AnalyticTradition, Vol. 35, No. 4 (May, 1979), pp. 397-403Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4319301 .

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SAMUEL SCHEFFLER

MORAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE ORIGINAL POSITION

(Received 27 February, 1978)

In the first section of this paper I maintainthat there is a seriousconflictbetween John Rawls' account of the relationbetween personal dentity andmoral theory in 'The Independenceof MoralTheory',and his own argumentagainst utilitarianism n A Theoryof Justice. In the second section I exploretwo ways of trying to resolvethe conflict, and examine the implicationsofeach of these possibleresolutionsfor Rawls'work as a whole.

In 'Later Selves and MoralPrinciples',Derek Parfitsuggests hat the plausibi-lity of differentmoral theoriesmay depend to some extent on the natureofpersonalidentity. Parfitidentifies a 'SimpleView' and a 'ComplexView' ofpersonalidentity. On the ComplexView, suchidentity just consistsin certainbodily and psychologicalcontinuitiesand connections (e.g., relations of me-mory, intention, and character),' which continuities and connections canthemselves hold to varyingdegrees.On the SimpleView, personal dentity isa further, independentfact beyond the holding of the relevant continuities.Parfit maintains that if we adopt a ComplexView, we acquire wo beliefs ascorollaries. He says we come to believe that the identity of a personis in itsnature a less deep fact than the SimpleView takes it to be, and that it cansometimeshold to reduceddegrees.And he goes on to argue hat, in view ofthe corollariesof the ComplexView,moralprinciples hat relyheavily on theseparatenessof persons will seem less weighty or importanton the ComplexView than they do on the SimpleView (he also suggeststhat they may bethought to have a different scope). For example, distributiveprinciplesthatplace constraints on maximization n the name of fairnesswill be seen as lessimportant than the Simple View takes them to be, and utilitarianprinciplesfavoringmaximizationwill be regardedasmoreplausible hanthey would beif a Simple View werecorrect.Philosophical tudies35 (1979) 397-403. 0031-8116/79/0354-0397$00.70Copyright ? 1979 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.


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398 SAMUEL SCHEFFLERThus Parfit's argument,described very generally, is that utilitarianismseems more plausibleon a ComplexView of personal dentity thanit does ona Simple View, and that what may loosely be called 'Kantian'normative

theories seem more plausibleon a Simple View than they do on a ComplexView. As Parfit himself recognizes,however, this argument, f correct, in noway foreclosesthepossibilitythat Kantian heoriesmay still be moreplausiblethan utilitariantheories, even on a ComplexView. Nevertheless,his argumentraises the interestingquestion of whetherKantiannormativetheoriesare infact compatiblewith a ComplexView of personal dentity.2

In the course of a generalattempt to show "the independence of moraltheory", John Rawls comments on Parfit'spaper.3 Rawlswishes to defendthe view that "the conclusions of the philosophy of mind regarding hequestion of personal dentity do not providegrounds or acceptingone of theleading moral conceptions rather than another". He beginsby identifyingthe ways in which Kantiantheories and utilitarian heoriesmust each makeuse of some criterion of personalidentity. And he concedes that althoughboth types of theory observe certain shared constraints on any adequatecriterion of personal identity (which constraintsinclude an agreement hat"any criterion of personal dentity is basedultimately on empiricalregulari-ties and connections"5), nevertheless within those constraints "the utili-tarianconceptionhas less need for a criterionof identity than a Kantianview;or perhapsbetter, it can get by with a weakercriterionof identity". 6 In con-trast, "aKantianviewis moredependenton personal dentities; t relies,so tospeak, on a strongercriterion".' Kantians"must conceive of identities asstretchingover muchlonger intervals".

Rawls then interpretsParfit as maintainingthat the "shiftingand some-times short-termcharacterof mental connections"9 gives support to utili-tarianism,with its 'weaker'criterion of identity. In response, Rawlsarguesthat "no degree of connectedness... is natural or fixed", 10 and that theactual continuities that bind the lives of personsdepend on whatmoral con-ceptions have been realizedin the societiesin whichthey live. Thus, he main-tains, if a society that fosters strongintrapersonaldentifications is feasible,it is no count against Kantianismthat such identifications might not bepresent in a society ordered by a different moral conception. Since factsabout the connections that hold within livesarealways"relative o the social-ly achieved moral conception",l then so long as a moralconceptioncan berealizedin society, thereis no way that facts about the connectednessof lives

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MORAL INDEPENDENCE 399can give any reasonto accept or reject that conception. Thusin responsetothe question whether Kantianismis compatible with a Complex View ofpersonalidentity, Rawls suggests that it is, provided t is possible to fosterstrong empiricalconnectionswithinlives.

Although I have reservationsabout the adequacyof Rawls' argumentas aresponseto Parfit,Iwishto focushereon a different featureof that argument.If no one degreeof connectednessis natural,andif a 'Kantian ociety' anda'utilitarian ociety' 12 are equally feasible,then Rawls'own argumentagainstutilitarianismn A Theoryof Justice 13 appears o be undermined.Therehemaintainsthat "utilitarianism oes not take seriouslythe distinctionbetweenpersons".14 That it does not is alleged to be important in choosing prin-ciples of justice that will regulatesocial institutions (and throughthem, theconduct of individuals),because "the correct regulativeprinciple for anything dependson the natureof that thing". 15 Hence,he says, if we assumethat "the plurality of distinct persons with separatesystems of ends is anessential eatureof humansocieties,we shouldnot expecttheprinciplesofsocialchoice to be utilitarian". 6 And indeed, he argues,utilitarianismwould notbe chosen by the partiesin the originalposition, for they know that eachofthem has some rational plan of life, plus a long-term nterest in strivingtocarry out that plan and in maintaining elf-respect.And they arepersuadedthat utilitarianismdoes not sufficientlysafeguard hese interests.

But if Rawls'argument n 'The Independenceof MoralTheory' s correct,it does not seem that people in the originalposition canknow that they havelong-termlife plans and interests, which they must know if this argumentagainstutilitarianisms to succeed. For, ex hypothesi, people in the originalposition "do not know the particular ircumstances f theirown society". 7And so, if Rawls'argument n responseto Parfitis correct,they presumablydon't know if their society has fostered strong, Kantianidentificationsinthem, or only weak,utilitariandentifications.1 Theydon't know if they areKantianpersonsor utilitarianpersons;they might be either. Moreover, heydo know that they might be either, if that argumentis correct. For theargumentis based on the purportedgeneralprincipleof social psychologythat societies ordered by different moral conceptions will create differentkinds of continuitiesand interestswithin persons.19 And sincepeople in theoriginalposition know the generallaws of human psychology,20 they pre-sumablyknow this law too. They know that "no degreeof connectedness...is natural or fixed". They know that they may or may not have long-term



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400 SAMUEL SCHEFFLER

interestsn the fulfillment f a rational ife plan.In A Theoryof Justice,Rawlsargueshatutilitarianrinciplesgnore he distinctions mongpeoplewithlong-termnterestsn the fulfillment f a rational lanof life (Kantianpeople).But in 'TheIndependencef MoralTheory',he concedes hattherecan be otherkindsof people.It is not unnaturalor a personnot to be aKantianperson.Onecanjust as easily ack a long-termnterest n the ful-fillmentof a rational lanof life ashavesuchaninterest.Soif peoplentheoriginalpositionare to chooseprincipleso regulatehumanconductinsociety,and f "the correctregulative rincipleoranythingdepends n thenature f thatthing", nd f peoplehaveno uniquenature, ow cana rationalchoiceof principlesn the original osition verbe made? 1II

I see two waysin whichRawlsmight ry to resolvehe conflict o whichIhave calledattention theremaybe otherways).Thefirst nvolves esistingthe ideathatthe connectednessf lives s altogetherocially elative, nd husstrivingo retain he argument gainstutilitarianism hilesurrenderingheargumentor moral ndependencen its present orm. Thesecond nvolvesgenerally oncedinghe relativity f intrapersonalonnections, ndconsider-ably modifying laimsaboutwhatthe argument gainstutilitarianismssup-posed o show.Thefirstattemptat resolutionmightproceedalong hefollowingines.Itcertainlydoesappearo be the casethat the degreeof empiricalonnected-ness within ndividualivescanvaryfromsocietyto society, depending tleastin parton variationsn the sociallydominantnstitutions, raditions,ideologies,mores,andso on. It would be hardto deny thatthe degree owhichpeopleareconcernedwithplanningheirownindividualuturesandreflecting n theirownpersonal asts s culture-dependent.t wouldbe idleto pretendhat therewasno difference,nthisconnection, etween rowingup in Scarsdale ndgrowing p in Shanghai. evertheless,t alsoappearsobe the case that in everysocietywe knowof, certain indsof empiricalon-nectedness of memory, ntention,character,ndthe like - hold to at leastsomegreater egreewithinmost ndividualives han heydoamongdifferentlives. This suggests hat certainkindsof distinctive mpirical ontinuitieswithin ives are resistant o the typesof socialvariationwith whichwe aremost familiar.



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MORAL INDEPENDENCE 401So long as some facts aboutthe connectedness ithin ivesappear o beindependentf thesefamiliarultural ariations,nemight ry to arguehatthesefacts are relevanto the choiceof a moralconception ntendedo re-gulatethe conductof peoplein the wide rangeof societieswhere he facts

hold. Rawlsmight try in particularo showthat these factssupport headoptionof his two principles f justice in the originalpositionovertheadoptionof utilitarianism.o do this, however, e wouldhaveto say some-thingaboutthe relationbetween he facts in questionand the suppositionthat the partiesn the original osition achknow hattheyhavesomeratio-nalplanof life. In particular,e wouldhaveto showthatthese actsrenderthat supposition lausibleatherhanmerelyquestion-begging,nd t is notclearhoweasyit wouldbe to show his. Forsomeonemightarguehatwhilethe distinctive mpiricalonnectionswithin ndividualivesmake t plausibleto suppose hatpersonsn a widerangeof societiesdistinguishetween heselfand others n certain ontexts, t remains nopenquestionwhetherhatdistinctionplaysa central olein determininghe endsthey pursueandtheways n which heyallocate heirenergies. ndeed,onemightarguehat t ispreciselyat thispointthat the socialvariations lludedo by Rawls n 'TheIndependencef MoralTheory'becomecrucial. f that sright,hen t mightplausiblybe maintainedhat, despitethe distinctive mpiricalonnectionswithin ives,the argumentn A Theory f Justice,withitsassumptionf in-dividualife plans,showsnothingmoredecisive han that Kantianpeople,preferringo live in a Kantian ociety,would chooseKantian rinciplesfjustice.Thesecond maginedesolutionwouldbe appropriatef it proved mpos-sible to resist the idea that the connectionswithin ives aresubstantiallyvariable.Rawlsmight hen retain he argumentor moralndependence,ndconcedeboth that the partiesn theoriginal ositionmustbe conceived sknowinghattheyhave ong-term lans thattheyareKantian eople),andthatthisknowledges, inviewof thevariabilityf intrapersonalonnections,highlysubstantivendprejudicialf theparties'ventualhoiceof principles.Whilehe wouldthen haveto concede hat anargumentgainst tilitarianismthattakes he formof showinghatKantianersonswouldchooseKantianismover utilitarianisms philosophicallyndecisive, e mightnonetheless rguethat t retainsome nterest.But the remainingnterestof the original ositionconstructionwouldbeas a modelhighlightingertainbasicfeatures ndpresuppositionsf an deal



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402 SAMUEL SCHEFFLERof the personand of justicewhichhas great ntuitiveappealandcohereswithmanyofourdeepest onvictions.And heremainingnotinconsiderable)interestof the argumentgainst tilitarianismn the original ositionwouldbe as anexplanation f whya commitmento those basicfeatures ndpre-suppositionss incompatiblewithutilitarianism.heoriginalpositioncon-struction, nthisview,wouldnolongerbeclaimedo have ndependentusti-ficatory orce. Inotherwords,Rawls ouldretainhatconstruction, utonlyby concedingwhatmanyof hiscriticshaveurged nothergrounds: that hepresumptionsf the contractmethodRawls mploysarerather trong,andthattheoriginal ositionhereforeffers ess ndependentupport o hiscon-clusionshanat firstappears".2 Thisconcessionwillseem essdamagingfone believes hat "over he long termthis bookwillachieve ts permanentplace n the literature f political heorybecauseof thesubstantiveoctrinethat t developsoeloquently ndpersuasively".3I do not of courseknowwhether itherof the twokindsof resolutionhave imaginedwouldbe acceptable o Rawls,but I thinkthat thereis agenuineproblemposedby the conflictbetweenhis two arguments,nd hatsome resolutions required.Universityof California,Berkeley

NOTESParfit'sarticle s contained n: PhilosophyandPersonalRelations,ed. by AlanMonte-fiore(RoutledgeandKeganPaul,London,1973), pp. 137- 169. For Parfit'sprecisedefi-nitions of 'continuity'and'connectedness',eepp. 139-140.

2 I am grateful o DerekParfitfor correcting ome of my earliermisinterpretationsfhisviews on thesetopics.3 In 'Theindependenceof moraltheory',Proceedings nd Addressesof the AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation XLVIII (1975), pp. 5-22. Referredto hereafteras IMT.IMT,p. 15.5 IMT,p. 19.6 IMT,p. 19.IMT, p. 19.8 IMT,p. 19.9 IMT,p. 19.10 IMT,p.20.IMT, p. 20.2 IMT,p. 20.13 HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge, 971. Referred o hereafteras TJ.



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MORAL INDEPENDENCE 40314 TJ,p. 27.'s TJ,p. 29.16 TJ, p. 29.17 TI, p. 137.18 Simply givingthe partiesthis bit of informationwould of courseappear o prejudicetheir choice of principlesof justice. Towardthe end of the paper,I discussthe impli-cationof giving hemthisinformation ven so.19 InIMT, Rawls imaginesa 'utilitarian ociety' as one in which the people are 'hedo-nistic and individualistic'. p. 20) This is a bit odd, since t is Rawlshimselfwho tells usin TJ that, despitewhat is usually thought, "utilitarianisms not individualistic, t leastwhen arrivedat by the more naturalcourseof reflection,in that, by conflatingall sys-tems of desires, t applies o society the principleof choice for one man".(p. 29) If utili-tarianisms not individualistic,why would people in a society whereutilitarianismwasthe sociallyachievedmoralconceptionbe individualistic?20 TJ,p. 137.21 Rawlshimself uses this kind of argument o rebut the claimthat it is inappropriatefor principlesof justiceto be at allcontingenton the kindsof general actsaboutsocietythat the parties n the originalposition are saidto know.Denying hemthisknowledge,he says, "amounts o supposing hat the persons n the originalpositionknownothingatall about themselvesor their world.How, then,canthey possiblymakea decision?" TJ,p. 159) This is precisely he kind of problem am callingattentionto in connectionwithpersonal dentity. If intrapersonal onnectionsvary from society to society, and if theparties n the originalposition don't know what sort of people they are,how can theymake any decision about principlesof justice? But, on the otherhand,how can they begiven this knowledgewithout prejudicing heirchoice of principles?The secondhalf ofthis dilemmasupposedlydoes not arise n the case of the generalknowledgeof societythat the partiesare said to have, for that knowledge s allegedto be "trueandsuitablygeneral". TJ,p. 1601)22 T. Nagel, 'Rawls on justice', n: ReadingRawls,ed. by N. Daniels BasicBooks,NewYork), p. 15.23 Ibid, p. 15.

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