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SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

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SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong. Professor Peter Cameron Previously COS Prince of Wales Hospital Chinese University of Hong Kong. Background. Aware of Reports of Atypical Pneumonia in Guangzhou Reported 305 cases and 5 deaths and then information ceased Thought that it was probably worse - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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SARS Outbreak in SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong Hong Kong Professor Peter Cameron Professor Peter Cameron Previously Previously COS Prince of Wales Hospital COS Prince of Wales Hospital Chinese University of Hong Chinese University of Hong Kong Kong
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Page 1: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

SARS Outbreak in SARS Outbreak in Hong KongHong Kong

Professor Peter CameronProfessor Peter CameronPreviouslyPreviously

COS Prince of Wales HospitalCOS Prince of Wales HospitalChinese University of Hong KongChinese University of Hong Kong

Page 2: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

BackgroundBackground

• Aware of Reports of Atypical Aware of Reports of Atypical Pneumonia in GuangzhouPneumonia in Guangzhou

• Reported 305 cases and 5 deaths and Reported 305 cases and 5 deaths and then information ceasedthen information ceased

• Thought that it was probably worseThought that it was probably worse• ? Chlamydia? Chlamydia• A couple of unusual cases admitted to A couple of unusual cases admitted to

HK hospitals – died, no secondary HK hospitals – died, no secondary spreadspread

Page 3: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Index Case Prince of Index Case Prince of WalesWales

• Admitted Ward 8A, March 4, 2003Admitted Ward 8A, March 4, 2003• 26 yo ethnic Chinese, symptoms of high 26 yo ethnic Chinese, symptoms of high

fever, myalgia, and coughfever, myalgia, and cough• One ED attendance 4 days previously for One ED attendance 4 days previously for

fever and myalgiafever and myalgia• Diagnosed with pneumonia and treated Diagnosed with pneumonia and treated

with augmentin and clarithromycinwith augmentin and clarithromycin• Improved over one weekImproved over one week• No unusual featuresNo unusual features

Page 4: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Recognition of OutbreakRecognition of Outbreak

• Staff of 8A noticed a number of medical Staff of 8A noticed a number of medical and Nursing staff sickand Nursing staff sick

• ? Influenza – Discussion regarding isolation? Influenza – Discussion regarding isolation– Area with separate ventilation, entry from main Area with separate ventilation, entry from main

wardswards– ? ED Observation Ward? ED Observation Ward– Discussion with CEO, Prof Medicine and EDDiscussion with CEO, Prof Medicine and ED

• Establish FactsEstablish Facts– 15 medical and 15 Nursing staff sick15 medical and 15 Nursing staff sick– 5 ED docs and 3 nurses5 ED docs and 3 nurses– Other pts and visitorsOther pts and visitors– Medical studentsMedical students

Page 5: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

ResponseResponse

• Symptomatic staff isolated to ED Symptomatic staff isolated to ED Observation WardObservation Ward

• Not all staff compliedNot all staff complied– ?over reacting?over reacting

• CEO called council of war next morning CEO called council of war next morning of service chiefs – then twice dailyof service chiefs – then twice daily

• Hospital continued normal services Hospital continued normal services initiallyinitially

• 2-3 days to recognise internally the 2-3 days to recognise internally the extent of the problemextent of the problem

Page 6: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

ResponseResponse

• Community aware that PWH had a Community aware that PWH had a problem within 2 daysproblem within 2 days

• Thought to be internal and Thought to be internal and government supported this viewgovernment supported this view

• Did not ban visitors initiallyDid not ban visitors initially• Balance between Balance between

panic/service/managing an outbreakpanic/service/managing an outbreak

Page 7: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Staff getting sickerStaff getting sicker

Page 8: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

EDED

Page 9: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

ScreeningScreening

Page 10: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

WardWard

Page 11: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

UnknownUnknown

• Nature of organismNature of organism• Mode of spreadMode of spread• Extent of spreadExtent of spread• OutcomeOutcome• Likely epidemiologyLikely epidemiology

– ?world pandemic?world pandemic

Page 12: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

QuarantineQuarantine

• Intense lobbying by senior cliniciansIntense lobbying by senior clinicians• Staff afraid to go home at nightStaff afraid to go home at night• VisitorsVisitors• Patients Patients

– ElectiveElective– SpecialistSpecialist– EmergencyEmergency

• Possible casesPossible cases– Home vs ward isolationHome vs ward isolation– Screening proceduresScreening procedures

Page 13: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Reported Clinical Reported Clinical FeaturesFeatures

(Inpatients)(Inpatients)• Incubation period – 2-7 days but ?16 daysIncubation period – 2-7 days but ?16 days• SymptomsSymptoms

– Fever 100%Fever 100%– Chills/rigors 73.2%Chills/rigors 73.2%– Myalgia 61%Myalgia 61%– Cough 57%Cough 57%– Headache 56%Headache 56%– Dizziness 43%Dizziness 43%

• Also N&V, diarrhea, abdo pain, coryza, sore thoat Also N&V, diarrhea, abdo pain, coryza, sore thoat ~20%~20%

Page 14: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Initial Symptoms at a Initial Symptoms at a Screening ClinicScreening Clinic

SARS -SARS -SARS+SARS+

• FeverFever 37%37% 81%81%• ChillsChills 21%21% 52%52%• MalaiseMalaise 20%20% 34%34%• MyalgiaMyalgia 12%12% 27%27%• RigorRigor 4%4% 12%12%• CoughCough 72%72% 64%64%• URIURI neg predictorneg predictor• LOA/Vomiting/DiarrhoeaLOA/Vomiting/Diarrhoea Pos PredictorsPos Predictors

Page 15: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

CT ChangesCT Changes

Page 16: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

EpidemiologyEpidemiology

• Contact tracingContact tracing• Health department processes not Health department processes not

adequateadequate• Expertise?Expertise?

Page 17: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Epidemiology Amoy Epidemiology Amoy GardensGardens

Page 18: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Graphic of epidemiologyGraphic of epidemiology

Page 19: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Infection controlInfection control

• Droplet spreadDroplet spread– Mask, glove, cap and gownMask, glove, cap and gown– Surfaces/fomitesSurfaces/fomites– Hood/visor for proceduresHood/visor for procedures– Viral filtersViral filters

• Other modes of spread?Other modes of spread?– Definite evidence of faecal/urine viral loadsDefinite evidence of faecal/urine viral loads– No evidence of airborne – negative pressure No evidence of airborne – negative pressure

unnecessaryunnecessary

Page 20: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Airborne SpreadAirborne Spread

• NebulisersNebulisers• Non Invasive VentilationNon Invasive Ventilation• Continuum between aerosol and Continuum between aerosol and

dropletdroplet

Page 21: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

EngineeringEngineering

• VentilationVentilation• Toilet layoutToilet layout• Sewage Sewage • Negative pressure roomsNegative pressure rooms• Ward layoutsWard layouts

Page 22: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

TreatmentTreatment

• Empiric treatmentEmpiric treatment– Antivirals - ribavirinAntivirals - ribavirin– SteroidsSteroids– Cytokine inhibitorsCytokine inhibitors– Convalescent serumConvalescent serum– Traditional chinese medicineTraditional chinese medicine

• Ethics?Ethics?• Political pressurePolitical pressure

Page 23: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Staff MoraleStaff Morale

• Service chiefs – daily updatesService chiefs – daily updates• Staff forum dailyStaff forum daily• Web site updatesWeb site updates• Daily ward round by senior staffDaily ward round by senior staff

• CEO of hospital and Hospital Authority CEO of hospital and Hospital Authority contracted diseasecontracted disease

• Face to face meetings – danger of cross Face to face meetings – danger of cross infectioninfection

• HKSAR CEO perceived badly for not being on HKSAR CEO perceived badly for not being on sitesite

Page 24: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

FamiliesFamilies

• Important aspect of staff moraleImportant aspect of staff morale• Should staff stay in quarters – Should staff stay in quarters –

increased risk for staffincreased risk for staff• Isolation of staff from familiesIsolation of staff from families

– Possibility of monthsPossibility of months– Send family away – increased risk to Send family away – increased risk to

other communitiesother communities– If staff go home – what precautions If staff go home – what precautions

needed?needed?

Page 25: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Outcomes in PWHOutcomes in PWH

• 20-30% of all pts in ICU20-30% of all pts in ICU• No nursing or medical staff at PWH No nursing or medical staff at PWH

dieddied• >100 staff and med students affected>100 staff and med students affected• Initial mortality ~5% but case fatality Initial mortality ~5% but case fatality

rate >10%rate >10%• In elderly >50%In elderly >50%• Long Term?Long Term?

– Pulmonary fibrosisPulmonary fibrosis

Page 26: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Outcomes in HKOutcomes in HK

• ~ 1700 cases~ 1700 cases• ~300 deaths~300 deaths• Outbreak over in less than 3 monthsOutbreak over in less than 3 months• ~25% cases staff~25% cases staff

Page 27: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Graph of case fatalityGraph of case fatality

Page 28: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Community ResponseCommunity Response

• HospitalsHospitals– Initially PWHInitially PWH– Other hospitals became involvedOther hospitals became involved– Infectious disease hospitalInfectious disease hospital

• OverloadedOverloaded

Page 29: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Community ResponseCommunity Response

• schoolsschools• Tourist and economyTourist and economy• GovermentGoverment

Page 30: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Schools?Schools?

Page 31: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Tourists + economy?Tourists + economy?

Page 32: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Street sweepingStreet sweeping

Page 33: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Living Life with a maskLiving Life with a mask

Page 34: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Governments?Governments?

Page 35: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Wu and wenWu and wen

Page 36: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

MicrobiologyMicrobiology

• Uncertainty about organismUncertainty about organism• Tests actually caused problemsTests actually caused problems

– Not properly trialled for accuracyNot properly trialled for accuracy

Page 37: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Serologic confirmation of Serologic confirmation of casescases

• Coronavirus confirmed in virtually Coronavirus confirmed in virtually all those with classic courseall those with classic course

• Very few cases with no symptoms Very few cases with no symptoms and CoV serologyand CoV serology

• Reason for immunity?Reason for immunity?– Mucosal barrierMucosal barrier– IgAIgA

Page 38: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Lessons LearntLessons Learnt

• Politics of Infectious disease uglyPolitics of Infectious disease ugly• Little is known about infectious diseaseLittle is known about infectious disease• Basic infection control worksBasic infection control works• Basic Infection control is not done wellBasic Infection control is not done well• Hospital workers are at riskHospital workers are at risk• Authorities are always behind in Authorities are always behind in

managing disastersmanaging disasters• Don’t try to predict natureDon’t try to predict nature• Life Returns to normal quicklyLife Returns to normal quickly

Page 39: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Life Returns to normal Life Returns to normal quicklyquickly

Page 40: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Picture of front linePicture of front line

Page 41: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

VenepunctureVenepuncture

Page 42: SARS Outbreak in Hong Kong

Mona lisa with maskMona lisa with mask


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