Saudi Arabia and the ConflictAuthor(s): David HirstSource: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Winter, 1974), pp. 186-189Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2535824 .

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186 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

" 'Nor must we reject negotiations, the way some Palestinian splinter groups, especially George Habash's Popular Front, are doing, even before we are invited to negotiate. Following the meeting of our organization's leaders on November 4, we defined the conditions under which we will agree to participate once the world community invites us to this historic conference.'

"Mr. Hawatmeh's Democratic Front, according to reliable sources, will insist on at least four conditions for taking part in the peace talks.

"1. The Palestinian people must be represented by resistance leaders and not by King Hussein.

"2. King Hussein's plan to set up a United Arab Kingdom including the West Bank should not be on the conference agenda.

"3. Recognition that the people living along the West Bank and in Gaza have the right to self-determination (they should be given the right to set up a sovereign and democratic state).

"4. Finally, Israel should agree to evac- cuate all territory seized in June 1967.

"If the Palestinian organization based in Syria - al-Sa'iqa - also rallies to the idea of a peace conference, which seems highly probable since Syria favours a settlement with Israel, then more than 90 per cent of the Palestinian resistance would be represented at the conference. Fedayeen leaders acknowledge that this surprising turn has come about due to the 'untiring effort, support and friendly advice of the Soviet Union.' A memo which the Kremlin recently sent to Pal- estinian leaders appears to have played a decisive role. The note said that the Soviet government formally recognized the Palestinian resistance as the sole legitimate authority representing the Pal- estinian people.

"It had been agreed in principle with Mr. Kissinger, Moscow said, that there

should be a settlement not only on the basis of Security Council Resolution No. 242, but also one 'respecting the rights and interests of the Palestinian people.' The note went on to add: 'We call upon representatives of the resistanc.e to adopt a realistic and constructive attitude, es- pecially on the issue of the return of the territories lost in 1967.'

'Israel,' a Fateh leader said, 'is now in a position to realize the dream it has nursed for half a century, which is to obtain simultaneous recognition from the Arab belligerents and from the Palestinian representatives, and to conclude a settle- ment with all those who went so far as even to deny its existence. The moment of truth has come. The Jewish state should now indicate clearly whether it prefers peace to war, domination and territorial aggrandizement.' "

SAUDI ARABIA AND THE CONFLICT

Saudi Arabian policy on Palestine had frequently been underestimated on the international scene, as became apparent when Saudi Arabia used its oil resources as a political weapon in the Arab-Israeli conflict. David Hirst, in an article in the Guardian Weekly (November 24, 1973), supplied the background to this decision.

"In February 1945 in the Great Bitter Lake, that the Israelis now encircle, an ailing President Roosevelt met King Abdul Aziz, King Faisal's father, aboard the USS Quincy. He promised two things: he, as President, would never do anything hostile to the Arabs, and the US govern- ment would make no basic change in its Palestine policy without consulting both Arabs and Jews beforehand.

"Within two months Roosevelt was dead and within a year his successor, President Truman, summoned unhappy American ambassadors in the Arab world and annulled both promises with the words: 'I am sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands of

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VIEWS FROM ABROAD 187

people who are anxious for the success of Zionism. I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents.'

"The deep bitterness which this breach of faith produced in Saudi Arabia has been overlaid for 28 years by the other interests - the efficient exploitation of about 38 per cent of the world's provein oil reserves and Faisal's crusade against communism - which the two countries have in common. It looked to a great many people, Arabs as well as Americans, as though nothing would break that relationship.

"The Americans took Faisal for granted; countless Arabs considered him beyond the pale. Faisal's oil war has therefore come as a shock to the Americans and a gratifying surprise to many Arabs. But here in Saudi Arabia the main surprise is the surprise of the outside world. For Faisal, they say, has never forgotten that celebrated encounter on the Bitter Lake and its painful aftermath. It is very much in his mind at present. For him it is proof not merely of what he considers to be America's abject subservience to Zionism but also of the steadfastness of Saudi devotion to the Palestine cause.

"It is more in sorrow than anger that Faisal is proving that devotion again - at America's expense and the world's. For Faisal, however offended, still wants to preserve his special Ielationship with America. His view of the world is still a Manichean one. Russia and communism represent evil, and if the US is not good, it is very much the lesser of two evils.

"Faisal is trying to diversify his relations with Western countries - particularly a iehabilitated France and Britain - but for him the US still appears to be the ultimate bastion against communism.

"He wants to take no irrevocably anti- American action. He does not want to nationalize Aramco. His officials have summoned leaders of the American business community and told them that they, their

persons and property, has e nothing to fear. Elaboi ate security is provided. But the future American friend of Saudi Arabia - Saudi officials insist and American diplomats acknowledge - is going to have to be an America cured of Zionism. 'There is no permanence in American support of Israel,' an official confidently claimed, 'and we are going to change America.'

"In resorting to the oil weapon to bring this change about, King Faisal, almost in spite of himself, has achieved a personal apotheosis. The 'Tenth of Ramadan War,' as it is known here, is in a very real sense King Faisal's war. At a time when Sadat seems to be drifting back into the compromising morasses of 'no war and no peace,' Faisal is not faltering. As Sadat renews relations with America, Faisal, 'the reactionary and American stooge' of his critics, continues stoutly to defy it.

"Whereas, before October 6, it was widely assumed in the Arab world that, if oil supplies were threatened, the Amer- icans might have to intervene to keep a pliant Faisal on his throne, it is now being suggested that he, as a would-be Dr. Mossadegh, might have to be deposed.

"Faisal has also struck a great blow for the traditionalist Arab camp which he heads, for their conception of a common Arab strategy which, based on non- interference in one another's affairs and the natural ties of nation and faith, can bridge the ideological gulf [with the] rad- icals. He is proving that the Algerians and arch-conservatives like himself are all patriots together when it comes to Palestine.

"It is a great gain and it is symbolized in particular by the Saudi-Egyptian en- tente, that marriage of money and man- power which is becoming the central axis of inter-Arab politics.

" 'Silent diplomacy' is a Saudi catch- phrase too, but Faisal makes other prac- titioners of it look like garrulous windbags. One might expect that, under a rule as

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188 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

absolute as his, the organs of opinion, such as they are, would at least be per- mitted to pay ritual tribute to the ruler. But since the wat began not a single newspaper editorial has called on King Faisal to throw the oil weapon into the fray, nor even praised him when he did. He abhors such vulgarity, and official censors have been installed in newspaper offices to ensure that a heavily self-censored press observes this and other prohibitions.

"The object is -also, of course, to pre- vent the creation of expectations which Faisal might not care to fulfil. These are high enough.

"If Faisal had failed to use the oil weapon, it would, for all his personal ascendancy, have counted badly against him. But now he has the Saudis behind him in a way he never had before. They are perhaps all the more impresred in that they have to learn of their ruler's achievements from the BBR and a Babel of Arab radio stations - to which they listen avidly - rather than from their own.

"They are proud to have moved to the forefront of the Arab cause even if it is only the accident of oil wealth that enables them to do so. The hundreds of millions of pounds that the government is pouring into Egypt and Syria for making good war damage and purchase of Soviet - and atheist - arms is matched by a remarkable private largess. In every city fund-raising committees and donation centres have been set up on an almost Zionist scale.

"If Faisal is slow to act, he can - as his expulsion of a hundred thousand Egyp- tians showed - be obduracy itself once he has decided to do so. Faisal knows what he wants. He has two objectives - a vicarious one and one that he regards as peculiarly his own.

"The vicarious one is to help the front line states, particularly Egypt, to recover their occupied territories. Here - as he explained to the Americans - he will

demand no more than Egyptians demand for themselves. If, theoretically, Sadat were satisfied with half Sinai he would be too. His own special concern is Jerusa- lem. Here, as a devout Muslim and guar- dian of the holy places, he will not accept what Jordan accepts if that falls short of the complete restoration of Arab sover- eignty.

"Does that mean that Faisal will not I est till he has seen that Israel is physically abandoning the towering apart- ment blocks that now ring the Old City? That was a question I put to Saudi officials, such as Prince Saud al-Faisal, deputy oil minister and quietly eloquent American- educated son of the king. They appeared to think that it did mean this, or, if it did not, then the Israelis would have to renounce Israeli citizenship to remain there. 'You can be sure of one thing' I was told, 'the Israelis will regret what they have done in Jerusalem.'

"Officially, according to the Arab oil ministers' declaration, the oil sanctions will remain in force, with a 5 per cent increase every month, until the complete evacuation of all Israeli forces from all occupied Arab territories. Do the Saudis, who dominate Arab oil counsels, really see themselves sticking to this drastic course ?

"There was no clear answer. One detects a readiness to consider an easing of the embargo in response to really concrete progress on the peace-making front. Thus the Saudi cutback, which reached more than 30 per cent, has now been brought into line with the generalized 25 per cent agreed on in Kuwait.

"The Saudis can afford it - 'for the world now knows we mean business.' Few doubt, however, that without such piogress Faisal will go to the bitter end come what may, even if that includes American efforts to keep the oil flowing by threat or by force.

"The Americans are unlikely to try

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VIEWS FROM ABROAD 189

that so long as James Akins, the newly appointed American Ambassador, has anything to do with it. And he, as one of the few Americans who, to general indifference or scorn, warned of the dangers that have now come to pass, is expected to get a respectful hearing in Washington - and from Dr. Kissinger himself.

"But what would happen, I asked Prince Saud, if America did resort to force? He seemed surprised there could be any doubt about it. 'The oilfields would of course be destroyed.'

"Whatever happens, Faisal's war is still far from over."

PRINCIPLES OF RECONCILIATION

In an article in the American Report (October 29, 1973), a biweekly published by Clergy and Laity Concerned, Israel Shahak offered a dissident Israeli per- spective concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflicL.

"I want to argue here a most paradoxical and improbable principle: The possibility of lasting concord between Jews and Palestinians in particular, and between the Jewish community and the Arab com- munities of the Middle East in general. Though it is a heresy to the so-called 'specialists,' I am convinced not only that such concord is possible but that the way to it is really very simple.

"I believe that the principle of 'equal justice to every human being,' if taken seriously, and not as a slogan, is the minimal humanistic principle to establish such a concord. The distinction between slogan and principle must be stressed. A slogan is shouted in a demonstration, but not adopted as a guide to conduct. After shouting a slogan people return home and act in many ways contrary to what they have shouted. People never try to criticize themselves, their friends or their allies in the name of their slogans - only their enemies.

"But when I speak of principle, I refer to

something that will cause men to reform their own lives and traditional opinions, something on which they will base their arguments, something that asks their fidelity.

"At present, only very small minority groups in the Middle East do believe in equal justice for every human being, as a principle. Therefore, I see my first task here in ruthless and detailed criticism, directed at both sides. Of course, the lords of napalm and the military governors do not have any principles anyhow; it is those who want to abolish oppression who must adopt the way of principle - because it is the right way, the only way, because experience has shown quite convincingly that nothing can be achieved with muddled thinking.

"In the light of the principle of equal justice, I want to examine three particular problems - the problem of terror, the problem of conditions for any 'political solution' in the Middle East and the problem of allies.

"When I speak of terror, I mean any in- discriminate act of power, on behalf of anybody, either a state or a group or a movement, which causes death to civilians. As an Israeli citizen I am quite conscious that the Israeli government is responsible for the greater part of the deaths caused by terror in our area. I have not remained silent, either at home or in this country, about these acts of ternor. For example, in this country last April during the Beirut raids, both on radio and television I condemned those murders as war crimes and expressed the hope that those responsible would be brought to trial. This is my opinion still.

"Therefore, in the interests of honesty and truth, I must make it clear to you that I condemn also, on the same terms, any and every act of indiscriminate terror carried out by Palestinian organizations.

"Many times when Israeli forces have committed an act of terror against a Palestinian or Arab population, and the

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