SAVING EUROPE: POWER AND JUSTICE IN A DIVIDED CONTINENT

Alexander Morgan Betley Page Count: 58

IS 392 May 1, 2017

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“People of Thebes, my countrymen, look on Oedipus. He solved the famous riddle with his brilliance, he rose to power, a man beyond all power. Who could behold his greatness without envy? Now what a black sea of terror has overwhelmed him. Now as we keep our watch and wait the final day, Count no man happy till he dies, free of pain at last.”

-Sophocles, Oedipus Rex

“For I was hungry and you gave me something to eat, I was thirsty and you gave me Something to drink, I was a stranger and you invited me in.”

-Matthew, 25:35

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An Attunement on Vision

In what follows, I hope not so much to offer a systematic treatment of the crisis in Europe

(indeed, such an account would require a tome, much less an undergraduate thesis) but to reflect

on various elements of it in light of my own education and experience, seeing if it is not possible

to arrive at a clearer view of the various political decisions that will have to be made regarding

the continent’s future.

My original proposal for this essay was simple. I sought to recount the crisis in Europe in

terms of its historical, economic, social, and political underpinnings and to offer a new vision for

a unified Europe moving beyond the limitations of its post-war foundations. As I began to

review much of the recent literature on the topic, it was clear to me that, though minute

differences of opinion undoubtedly existed about the facts, the diagnosis of Europe’s ills has

been relatively well established: the Eurozone has restricted growth and extended economic

depravity in European peripheral states; the negatives of globalization, such as worker

dislocation, growing inequality, and the more limited role of the nation-state, have had profound

political impacts in European democracies; global migration has put intense pressure on the

post-war liberal consensus of free and equal societies; the renewed military and defense spending

of Russia, as well as the rise of China, have challenged the short-lived post-Cold War unipolar

hegemony of the United States-- the impact having understandable repercussions to the

transatlantic alliance and NATO. Among other issues, these themes recur endlessly.

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Of course, it is always easier to make diagnoses than to offer a prognosis. Even more

difficult than offering a prognosis is providing an adequate vision for the future. Many of

today’s scholars and analysts seem to be offering, perhaps understandably so, a prognosis-- how

matters will turn out, given what we know-- rather than supplementing this prognosis with

vision. This is more than the age-old difference between “what is” and “what ought to be.” In a

way, these are two visions unto themselves whose outlets are manifested in two psychological

approaches to political and social issues. The “what is” camp routinely resigns itself to

complacency, shrugging its shoulders with figuratively tied hands. Those, such as the 20th

century Protestant theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr consistently refer to “all of human history” and

“group pride” as evidence to the unchanging realities of human affairs. In regards to the

“moralism” of his day’s liberal idealists, Niebuhr writes that “they do not see that the limitations

of the human imagination, the easy subservience of reason to prejudice and passion, and the

consequent persistence of irrational egoism, particularly in group behavior, make social conflict

an inevitability in human history, probably to its very end” While more will follow on Niebuhr 1

later, it is enough to say here that while Niebuhr takes adequate aim at overzealous idealism in

human affairs, his perception on the “fallenness” of humanity significantly limits his vision,

despite what he would otherwise contend. Ultimately, this self-deprecating view almost always

results in a perpetuation of the injustices and power hierarchies of the past. It pays heed to the

ideal, but views it as utterly impossible. In this way, “what is” provides a paradox one might

refer to as “visionless vision” or “conservative vision.” The conservative nature retreats from

conflict as the inevitable tragedy of contending power relations, moving radically beyond the

1 Reinhold Niebuhr. Moral Man and Immoral Society, In Reinhold Niebuhr: Major Works on Religion and Politics, Edited by Elisabeth Sifton, New York, NY: The Library of America, 2015, 146.

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grinding process of healthy social change to a psychology of total inertia and lack of human

capability. Its feet are always stuck in the mud of a tainted humanity. Its vision is visionless

because it consistently fails to see ahead, instead retreating to a myopic and stagnant view of the

world. Change, when it occurs, must be gradual and calculated. Thus, conservative vision is a

largely reactive phenomena indicative of leading European leaders’ current approach, known

simply as “muddling through,” or an unwillingness to act with vision. 2

On the other side, “what ought to be” idealists naively stress a liberal vision of consistent

“human progress.” They often believe that just a “little more toleration” or a “little more

understanding” or a “a little more equality” or a “little more love” will solve human society’s

most deep and troubling issues. At other times, romantic idealists justify endless violence in the

name of the ideal. When the ideal becomes completely possible, it either becomes passive or

destructive, but always remains unrealistic.

Despite the unreal nature of an ideal, the ideal still functions in various, important ways.

It provides an unachievable benchmark in which we can always measure our current state of

affairs. It provides the goal, though we will undoubtedly fail, which international society must

aspire to. In this sense, it is a profound guiding light to which we, as a society, must always

2 An early, and I think relatively definitive, conception of “muddling through” has been expounded by Charles Lindblom. Also known as “incrementalism” or “gradualism,” Lindblom’s observation of “muddling through” was that “democracies change their policies almost entirely through incremental adjustments. Policy does not move in leaps and bounds.” Referring to the United States’ supposed nature of incremental change, Lindblom supported his views with the inference that “the two major political parties agree on fundamentals… both parties favor full employment, but they define it somewhat differently… both favor unemployment compensation, but not the same level of benefits” (Lindblom, 84-5). Lindblom’s related article, written in 1959, may simply be indicative of the times. Indeed, one readily recalls Dwight Eisenhower’s beliefs in regards to New Deal programs. Writing to his brother in November, 1954, Eisenhower explained, “It is quite clear that the Federal government cannot avoid or escape responsibilities which the mass of people firmly believe should be undertaken by it… Should any political party attempt to abolish social security, unemployment insurance, and eliminate labor laws and farm programs, you would not hear of that party again in our political history” (Eisenhower, 1-2). The problem with this approach in today’s Europe is that there is no well-recognized cross-continental consensus. Thus, “muddling through” only perpetuates and extends existing problems embedded into European institutions and conscious.

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orient ourselves. But this orientation, while necessary, cannot dominate our every action. We

must recognize the constraints of human society. Such ideals, though always historically,

economically, and socially contingent in their own ways, have given birth to many modern

political and social movements-- both good and the bad. The utopian Marxism which bore the

humanitarian horrors of the USSR shares one immensely important characteristic with the

democratic revolutions of the late 18th century: both were motivated by visions of a more ideal

society. The nature of historical materialism’s guiding light, though grounded, using Trotsky’s

terms, in “blood and iron,” envisioned a perfect world if only that vision could be achieved. 3

The neverending means justified the impossible utopian vision, resulting in tremendous suffering

and horror. Thus, the guiding light of idealism has the dangerous tendency to corrupt and

misguide human action when it justifies unscrupulous means.

The crisis in Europe today demands neither of these absolutist perspectives. Rather, it

requires a forward-looking synthetic vision cognizant of the possibilities, constraints, and

necessities of modern society as they have emerged over time. Though limiting the egoistic

impulse of humankind is necessary to avert tragedy-- to realize we do have limits-- it is

fundamentally the human imagination and spirit which gives rise to a better world; and I do take

it as my central contention that a better world is possible. As will be elaborated further in the

essays that follow, the forces of power and justice and social relations must be navigated both

clear-eyed and by the guiding light mentioned above. This vision is not to be regarded as a type

of middle-path between “visionless vision” and dangerously optimistic idealism. Instead, it

hopes to transcend these paradigms by providing a sober and honest view on the realities and

3 I am, of course, cognizant of the fact that Marxist orthodoxy requires that its vision will be achieved due to tenets of historical materialism.

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tendencies of states in our modern international order, their duties to the current task at hand, and

how Europe might overcome the devils of a lesser nature in pursuit of a better world. Whether

or not state actors will overcome the devils rests on this vision.

One final note is worth mentioning. From time to time in these essays, I will speak of

justice in terms of Rawls’ “justice as fairness.” Due to the nature of these essays, I will not seek

to explicate or evaluate Rawls’ theory at length, however, I will spend a brief moment here

clarifying the basic tenets of justice as fairness. 4

Rawls’ view is one both contractarian and deontological in nature. He proposes that in

determining, in any given situation, what justice would require, we need only carry out a brief

thought experiment. Rawls assumes that a group of people are placed into the “original position”

of complete equality corresponding with the “state of nature” of past thinkers such as Rousseau

or Hobbes. In this original position, the interests of certain parties are all controlled for. As

Rawls writes, “It seems reasonable and generally acceptable that no one should be advantaged or

disadvantaged by natural fortune or social circumstances in the choice of principles.” It is in 5

this position, behind a “veil of ignorance” in which no one is aware of what their birthplace, race,

social status, economic status, or political status will be in the societal structure to be determined,

that an agreement on justice is reached. Additionally, it is assumed these people are all rational

and mutually disinterested. Therefore, no perverted individual will imbue the decision-making

process with his perversions. Rawls expects two principles of justice to consistently emerge.

The first is that each person is to have an equal right to the same basic liberties as others. The

4 For a further explication on Rawls’ theory, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999. 5 John Rawls, “A Theory of Justice,” In Ethical Theory: An Anthology, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, 584.

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second, and more importantly perhaps for this paper, is that “social and economic inequalities are

to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and

(b) attached to positions and offices open to all.” Therefore, if inequalities are to exist, they 6

must be justified by their benefit to all (the difference principle).

It is my general contention that justice as fairness provides the best barometer possible in

determining what justice might require in any given situation. At least in the cases I will discuss

in the following pages, the theory, in my view, fits as a standard. While Rawls himself did not

believe that this ideal would always be met in practice, he did believe in the ability to move

toward the ideal, and that a more ideal society might be achieved. I tend to agree with this

possibility, but am much more skeptical of power to exercise undue influence by any means

necessary, and therefore potentially cement unjust relations between people and social groups.

This, in a Niebuhrian sense, is often the tragedy of social, economic, and political relations

between groups of people.

6 Ibid., 586.

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Works Cited

Eisenhower, Dwight. "Letter to Edgar Newton Eisenhower." Teaching American History.

Accessed April 23, 2017.

http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/letter-to-edgar-newton-eisenhower/.

Lindblom, Charles E. "The Science of "Muddling Through"." Public Administration Review 19,

no. 2 (1959): 79-88.

Niebuhr, Reinhold. Moral Man and Immoral Society, In Reinhold Niebuhr: Major Works on

Religion and Politics, Edited by Elisabeth Sifton, New York, NY: The Library of

America, 2015.

Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University

Press, 1999.

Rawls, John. “A Theory of Justice.” In Ethical Theory: An Anthology. ed. Russ Shafer-Landau.

West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.

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Injustice and Power in the Eurozone “The fate of the Union matters, it matters a great deal. Over 500 million people live in the EU states. What happens in Europe is world-historical in terms of its importance. The stakes are high indeed”

-Anthony Giddens 7

Of Politics and Economics

It has been said that, despite it being a monetary union, the Eurozone has not so much

been an economic project as a political one-- the next necessary step in European integration and

transcontinental solidarity-- and therefore the problem of politicians. But the decisions 8

politicians make have immense economic ramifications. It is a now well-recognized fact (as it

was, indeed, in the past by many economists) that the monetary union lacked the necessary

political integration to withstand a serious economic crisis. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 was

in many ways a product of its time: the Reagan-Thatcher years of neoliberalism enveloped and

came to dominate the economic thinking of the post-1980’s world. This has today been

embodied in the TINA doctrine (There Is No Alternative), which accuses fiscal stimulus as an

irresponsible excuse for the real tough budget-cuts necessary to get economies back on track.

The Eurozone’s structural reforms and inflation mandate are indicative of such thought. 9

Additionally, this politico-economic ideology was boiled down to a simple “more market”

approach. As Jesper Jespersen has said, “The phrases More Europe and More market became

more or less synonymous.” Moreover, “One (European) currency came to be seen as an

7 Anthony Giddens, Turbulent and Mighty Continent: What Future for Europe, Cambridge: Polity, 2014, 5. 8 Markus Brunnermeier, Harold James, and Jean-Pierre Landau, The Euro and the Battle of Ideas, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2016, 9. 9 Ibid., 145.

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instrument to promote both ideas,” becoming, “One Market, One Money.” Coupled with a post 10

Cold War optimism ushering in renewed vigor for the European project, neoliberal

politico-economic doctrine, dominated by neoclassical models emphasizing free and unfettered

markets, perfect information, privatization, and optimizing agents, knew few limits, namely

those of market imperfections. Writing on this, Andrew Moravcsik has said that, “European 11

leaders promised higher growth due to greater efficiency and sounder macroeconomic policies,

greater equality between rich and poor countries within a freer capital market, enhanced

domestic political legitimacy due to better policies, and a triumphant capstone for EU

federalism,” “Yet for nearly a decade,” he continues, “Europe has experienced just the

opposite.” 12

The ideology, flawed though it was, allowed for political leaders to sidestep the economic

necessities of a Eurozone-wide central bank prepared to spur growth in times of crisis. In the

early 1990’s, such a bank appeared a mere political hindrance in the grand scheme of the “United

States of Europe.” Indeed, the commitment the would-be Eurozone’s states would have had to 13

make to charter a central bank tasked with deficit spending and fighting unemployment in times

of economic crisis would likely not have been approved. The financial burden associated with 14

fiscal stimulus would require bearing by all of the Eurozone. Due to national interests, this was a

step some countries and financiers were not willing to take. But the Euro was pushed on,

10 Jesper Jespersen, The Euro: Why it Failed, Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, 7. 11 Joseph Stiglitz, The Euro: How a Common Currency Threatens the Future of Europe, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2016, 48-9. 12 Andrew, Moravcsik, "Europe's Ugly Future," Foreign Affairs 95, no. 6 (Nov, 2016): 139-146, https://search.proquest.com/docview/1832180659?accountid=351. 13 "Winston Churchill: Calling for a United States of Europe," European Union, Accessed April 25, 2017. https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/winston_churchill_en.pdf. 14 Jespersen, 25.

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nonetheless. With a rather delusional optimism, European leaders believed that any crisis would

necessarily further European integration. Crisis would be met with a unified Europe prepared to

take the steps necessary to save integration. Charged with the vision of this united Europe, 15

European leaders went ahead with the monetary union despite the lack of appropriate political

integration necessary to stimulate an economy in times of economic crisis. Coupled with the

European idealistic dreams of European politicians, this was easy enough to push through by

employing the aforementioned ideology-- with perfectly functioning markets, why should

governments worry about anything more than price stability?

Although it would be dishonest to merely discount such obviosities with a meek

proclamation of “hindsight is always 20-20,” it is true that important lessons have been learned

through the Euro experiment. For one thing, the self-interest of European nation-states is not a

thing of the past, and so long as nation-states retain their sovereignty and identity, they will seek

what appears to be best for them, at times no matter the effects on others. Germany’s

unscrupulous behavior throughout the handling of the Euro crisis is a case in point here. We 16

have also learned that monetary union must be taken seriously, and if nation-states are to be

bound together by such a union, the appropriate politico-economic integration must exist.

Lastly (and not unsurprisingly), we have learned that, contrary to the beliefs of the Eurozone’s

founders, economic crisis by no means guarantees further integration. The rise of eurosceptic

parties across Europe is indicative of just how profoundly incorrect this assumption was. 17

15 Matthias, Matthijs, "Europe After Brexit: A Less Perfect Union," Foreign Affairs 96, no. 1 (Jan, 2017): 85-95, https://search.proquest.com/docview/1858034494?accountid=351. 16 However, whether or not their behavior is really beneficial in the long run will be discussed somewhat below. There is evidence to suggest that Germany’s continued policies of wage suppression, anti-inflation, and surplus balance of payment may actually hamper their growth in the long-run for quite logical reasons. 17 Yascha Mounck, "Pitchfork Politics: The Populist Threat to Liberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (Sep, 2014): 27-I, https://search.proquest.com/docview/1559077033?accountid=351.

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In addition to these important lessons, it is also useful to ask for how long the injustices

of austerity imposed upon Europe’s debtor states (namely Germany) will be tolerated. In his

far-reaching essay, The Crisis of the European Union: A Response, Jürgen Habermas correctly

recognizes that these inequalities, if institutionalized or unrectified in the near future, severely

threaten a common European identity key to future integration efforts. Countries like Greece, 18

despite their willingness to stay in the Eurozone, may find it in their own best interest to exit the

Eurozone if injustices persist. Though arrangements in the European Monetary Union give up a

country’s monetary sovereignty, it does not give up most of their sovereignty. Greece remains an

autonomous nation-state and may leave the Eurozone if necessary. This will have not just

European-wide effects, but world-wide effects, as an exit of a Eurozone member always runs the

risk of threatening global financial stability and confidence in the Euro. Additionally, such an 19

exit sets precedent for other member states to leave in times of crisis.

Therefore, in regards to the Euro, the question facing Europe today is twofold: is the

currency worth saving, and if it is, through what method can it be saved? In this essay, I won’t

seek so much as to rehash the causes of the Eurozone crisis threatening European integration

today. Rather, I will seek to highlight the existing injustices the current state of affairs

propagates-- injustices that must be openly and politically addressed in order for the Eurozone to

save itself. Though no one seriously expects intra-European warfare to return anytime soon, the

vision of a united Europe tasked with promoting peace and prosperity for all its peoples is

valuable in and of itself. The political vision of the common currency is but one way of

18 Jürgen Habermas, The Crisis of the European Union: A Response, Cambridge: Polity, 2012, 53. 19 See Brunnermeier, James, and Landau, 226-33.

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advancing this transnational solidarity. Thus, the Euro is worth saving, but only if it is part of

shared European prosperity.

Political Experiments and European Dreams

The design of the Euro was flawed from the start. In the decades leading up to the 20

launching of the currency, economists had devoted significant time to researching what

arrangements might be necessary for monetary union between states or regions. Robert Mundell,

eventually winning a Nobel Prize for his theory on optimal currency areas, would ask in his 21

famed 1961 essay: “Supposing that the Common Market countries proceed with their plans for

economic union, should these countries allow each national currency to fluctuate, or would a

single currency area be preferable?” As with any discussion of economic integration, currency 22

matters. Mundell’s work sparked new debate on the topic, prompting an entirely new body of

literature on the subject. Paul Wallace provides a sufficient summary of the findings of this 23

field, which he describes as an attempt to “create an economic cartography.” This cartography

carves its lines along factor mobility and similarity between economic regions.

20 Paul Wallace, The Euro Experiment, Cambridge University Press, 2016, 30. Wallace’s chapter entitled “Defective Design” offers an appropriate grounding in the limitations the Euro faced from the start. 21 "Robert Mundell - Facts," Nobelprize.org, Accessed April 25, 2017, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1999/mundell-facts.html. 22 Writing in 1961, Mundell ironically assumes that most readers will consider his discussion of common currency areas politically unfeasible and that national currencies will never be abandoned. Interestingly enough, Mundell considers himself primarily with regions rather than traditional nation-states. Despite the expression of sovereignty a national currency carries with it, interregional fluctuations (primarily marked by limited interregional mobility factors) in demand pose problems for the actions of that currency’s central bank. For example, a spike in demand of Region A will generate price increases in that region, while the relative lowering of demand in Region B will increase unemployment in that region. In such a situation, the central bank can increase the money supply, thereby boosting employment in Region B while aggravating inflationary pressures in Region A. On the other hand, the central bank could raise interest rates and limit the money supply, thereby suppressing inflationary pressures to the benefit of Region A, all the while aggravating unemployment in Region B. They key to Mundell’s article, however, is the recognition that an optimal currency area must have high factor mobility. See Robert Mundell, “A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas,” American Economic Review 51, no. 4 (1961): 657-65. 23 Wallace, 33.

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Firstly, intensity of trade matters. The higher the level of trade, the more useful a

common currency becomes. Secondly, the degree to which economies move in sync plays a

role. Assets such as mortgages respond differently to monetary policy depending on whether or

not the mortgage is fixed or floating. Thirdly, degrees of flexibility, namely in labor markets,

should be harmonized in a currency zone. Lastly, if a country’s economy is adequately

diversified, it will withstand sectoral shocks more easily, thereby limiting the effects of those

shocks on other members in the currency zone. In all, “The greater a country’s cross-border

labour mobility, trade intensity, labour market flexibility and economic diversity, the better

suited it will be to life within a currency union.” Even before consideration of a common fiscal 24

policy, these standards beg the question of why the Eurozone incorporated countries as diverse

as Germany and Greece, Italy and Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands.

Yet it was the development of a centralized monetary union without common budgetary

capabilities that was the largest mistake of all. Economists at the time were aware of this issue.

Many knew such an arrangement, constrained by the inability to undertake the necessary deficit

spending programs in times of crisis, would threaten the economic well-being of the currency

zone. 25

Most commentators attribute the going-ahead with the Eurozone to the demands of

politics over sound economic theory, proving once more that, despite the dreams of the most

radical neoclassical economic thinkers, no economic system operates independent of the political

world. A Euro with the lack of a central bank prepared to undertake fiscal stimulus resulted from

both political bargaining and various national interests. Germany had the most to lose through

24 Ibid., 33-5. 25 Dermot Hodson, Governing the Euro Area in Good Times and Bad, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 10.

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giving up its currency. Not only is Germany the Eurozone’s most populated country, but up until

the Euro, its currency had by far the strongest record of price stability of all Eurozone countries.

This led Germany to seek strong anti-inflationary policies, as well as the prohibition of

mutualizing debt across Eurozone countries. With its historic track record of sound economic

performance, Germany did not want to be made responsible for financing the debt of other

countries. In addition to this, there seems to be a German psychological dilemma in which the 26

national consciousness has “rewritten history to believe that it was inflation, not high

unemployment, which had brought on Hitler and fascism.” Despite the need for a flexible 27

central bank with deficit spending capabilities, Germany’s economic, social, and political

interests blocked any such bank. Thus, Germany was able to secure both restrictions on

excessive budget deficits by Euro-member countries, as well as a no-bailout clause protecting

member states from assuming the debt burdens of other members in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.

28

Nonetheless, it was also French political imperatives, fueled by the desire to check a

newly reunified Germany’s growing power, that led the drive towards central monetary union.

In addition, Mitterand saw the expansion of the single currency as a means of expanding French

centralization and “French statism.” The French made the necessary concessions to a unified 29

Germany in order to bring the currency union into existence: “It was politicians, driven by

26 Ibid., 6. 27 Stiglitz, 358n3. I have found in my own time spent in Germany that the national guilt from the horrors of World War II and national socialism is still alive and well. Especially in regards to the refugee crisis, Germans I interviewed as part of a paper I would write during my time in Denmark almost unanimously discussed Germany’s past injustices. I find it by no means surprising that political and economic aspects of the march to national socialism would continue to weigh on the consciousness of Germany in the modern era. 28 Ibid., 7. 29 Brunnermier, James, and Landau, 43.

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nationalist worries as much if not more than European aspirations, that brought the single

currency into existence.” Thus, “despite the disavowal of history and politics that imbued

optimal-currency-area theory, it was history and politics that propelled Europe towards a

monetary union and that were responsible for its flawed design.” 30

The social and political antagonisms of the 20th century would propel much of Europe

into a currency union it was by no means prepared to undertake. Both German Chancellor

Helmut Kohl and Francois Mitterand justified the arrangements of the euro by invoking the need

for European peace. In 1992, Mitterand would declare, “Yes, I believe in Europe because I

passionately desire peace. Peace on the continent itself.” Roughly six years later, in speaking to

the Bundestag, Kohl proclaimed, “The euro strengthens the European Union as a guarantor of

peace and freedom.” Tragically, as Wallace also writes, “In a sad irony, the euro rekindled 31

nationalist resentments.” This nationalism is most marked by the rise in popularity of today’s 32

radical euro-sceptic parties across the continent: Marine Le Pen’s Front National, Italy’s Five

Star Movement led by Beppe Grillo, and Alternative for Germany just to name a few. The 33

misguided and tragic underlying assumption was that Eurozone members would somehow make

the currency union work. It was never really about initial optimality. As Stiglitz comments,

“The debate surrounding the eurozone has, however, not been about whether it was an ‘optimal’

grouping. It is about whether it is a grouping that can be made to work.” 34

30 Ibid., 38. 31 Requoted from Hans-Werner Sinn, The Euro Trap: On Bursting Bubbles, Budgets, and Beliefs, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 32 Wallace., 57. 33 Sinn, 17. 34 Stiglitz, p. 345n4.

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As will be discussed in the next section, the striking feature in commissioning the

Eurozone was the forgoing of monetary sovereignty while each member maintained full fiscal

sovereignty. The 3% budget deficit and 60% debt-to-GDP caps made national fiscal stimulus

impossible. It may be true that countries who are sufficiently similar, such as Europe’s Nordic

countries, can share a currency without a common fiscal policy. Such a monetary union would

be hit by the same shocks and affected in sufficiently similar ways. “In such a situation,” Joe

Stiglitz writes, “the cost of forming a currency union may be low.” However, the countries 35

who comprise the Eurozone are by all accounts an economically broad and diverse group. 36

Moreover, as the title of Paul Wallace’s book, The Euro Experiment, suggests, the monetary

union was an experiment. Nothing like it had ever been done before. It was urged on by the

optimistic political dreams for a unified continent with a common market. The lack of political

integration, however, has brought the Euro zone to its knees, and the primary cause has been lack

of an aggressive central bank tasked with securing growth and full employment in member

states.

The ECB Mandate and the Financial Crises of 2008-2009

Despite today’s Eurozone’s largest issues being unemployment and continued stagnation,

the European Central Bank’s mandate is to control for price stability alone. As mentioned 37

above, this was primarily due to German national interests. However, it was also justified by the

neoliberal ideology dominant before the economic crises of 2008-2009. Among other things, it

was believed that for macroeconomic stability, all a central bank needed to do was control for

35 Stiglitz, 87. 36 Wallace., 31. 37 Stiglitz, 145-7.

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prices. True, other economic policies might be considered, but these other policies would not 38

be permissible unless price stability had been secured first. It was clear from the beginning that

inflation was king 39

The global financial crisis proved this theorem horrifically wrong. Markets showed not

to be perfectly efficient, crisis occurred, and the response of European institutions has resulted in

abysmal outcomes for Eurozone states. Despite the Troika’s attempts at so-called “structural 40

reforms” (really a fancier name for austerity measures), year after year of disappointing

performance in many Eurozone countries has gone unabated. Stiglitz’s chapter entitled

“Europe’s Dismal Performance” highlights the worst of these effects. In 2015, real GDP in the

Eurozone was merely 0.6% higher than its 2007 level. Cumulative real GDP growth from 41

2007-2015 in various Eurozone countries shows just how disastrous the last near-decade have

been. By this metric, Spain sits near -4.0%, Greece at just over -25 %, and Portugal at over -5%.

Germany and the Netherlands have all experienced positive cumulative growth over this time

period-- but the positive growth they have “championed” would be considered near-stagnation

by most observers in regular times. Germany’s 6.8% growth over this period comes out to a

mere 0.8% annually. The Netherlands’ shows 5% growth, lower than Germany. Worse, at 42

only two points in quarterly growth reports since 2008 has the Netherlands reported real GDP

growth over 1.0%. Over the same 2007-2015 time period, on the other hand, Ireland grew 43

38 Ibid., 147. 39 Hodson, 23. 40 The Troika refers to the tripartite grouping of the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Together, this grouping holds immense influence over the future of Eurozone countries. See Kabir Chibber, "Who are the troika that Greece depends on?" BBC News, October 04, 2011, Accessed April 25, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/business-15149626. 41 Stiglitz, 66. 42 Ibid., 66. 43 "Netherlands GDP Growth Rate, 1988-2017," Netherlands GDP Growth Rate | 1988-2017 | Data | Chart | Calendar, Accessed April 25, 2017, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/netherlands/gdp-growth.

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cumulatively near 10%, significantly outpacing the aforementioned countries. Despite this 44

strong case of growth, however, the austerity policies thrust upon Ireland resulted in over five

years of double-digit unemployment up until early 2015, resulting in immense strife and lost

opportunities for so many in that country. 45

Stiglitz compares the growth of Eurozone countries with non-Eurozone countries after

the shock of the global financial crisis. Having maintained both monetary and budgetary 46

sovereignty, these countries would be more flexible in their approach to deficit spending in times

of crisis. Not unsurprisingly, non-eurozone countries cumulatively grew at just over 8% during

the same 2007-2015 time period in which the Eurozone as a whole grew a lowly 0.6%. For a 47

non-European comparison, the United States (the origin of the crisis itself) boosted output

between 2007-2015 by nearly 10%. Moreover, in the case of the United States, official 48

unemployment peaked at 10% for a period of a month in 2009 during the Great Recession. 49

States which maintained the ability for deficit spending fared substantially better than states in

the Eurozone. Despite all the austerity measures, the Eurozone has continued to stagnate as a

whole. The great tragedy, however, is that it doesn’t have to be this way.

Commonsense Proposals and the Powers that Be

The founders of the euro were right about one thing-- it does possess the possibility to

unite Europe. Unfortunately, it has divided Europe instead. While many scholars have written

44 Stiglitz, 64. 45 Ibid., 178. 46 It is important to note here that in his analysis, for various reasons, Stiglitz leaves out the transitional countries of central and eastern Europe. 47 Ibid., 67-8. 48 Ibid., 68. 49 Ibid., 178.

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about the underlying issues of the Eurozone, none has put forward as comprehensive a vision for

the future as Joe Stiglitz. I will briefly outline some of his insights and suggestions here.

Firstly, the status-quo is unsustainable. The Troika claimed that the structural forms

would spur growth in the Eurozone. As the statistics above pay heed to, nothing of the sort has

occurred. Many economists knew this ahead of time, but in order that debt not be shouldered

across the Eurozone, the ECB pushed them nonetheless. It is true that countries such as Greece

and Spain facing solvency crises in their banking sectors agreed to the terms of the Troika, but as

Stiglitz notes, “the government of the crisis country always accedes to the demands… with

effectively a gun at the head: the feared consequences of not doing so are simply too great not to

accede.” 50

But even given the current status-quo, there were other routes that could have been taken.

Eurozone policies could have pushed new country-by-country industrial policies so that member

states could adequately restructure for a changing economy. Promoting equality, both 51

economic and political, between member states could have been advanced. A progressive

property tax, in Greece, for example, would’ve raised the revenue to help cut down the deficit,

all the while limiting the economic power of Greece’s famous oligarchs. Additionally, these 52

oligarch’s maintained control of Greece’s largest banks, receiving the most benefit from the

“restructuring” of the financial sector. Due to their size and mobility, they were easily able to

move assets out of Greece while Eurozone members spoke of haircuts on the Greek debt.

Meanwhile, small and medium-sized firms were severely undermined due to lack of access to

credit. A direct fund intended to lend to smaller firms would have spurred growth and

50 Stiglitz, 222. 51 Ibid., 224. 52 Ibid., 227.

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recapitalized Greece’s faltering economy. These are just a few of the practical ways (even with 53

the TINA approach of the Troika) that could have helped raise countries like Greece out of their

economic hardships. The reality is that in any economic situation, various measures should be

tested and tried. One cannot say for certain whether or not one will work better than the other,

which is precisely why matters such as these should also be up for democratic debate.

But even these small fixes, though practical, can’t save the Eurozone. This requires

much further-reaching measures. A few steps are outlined below: 54

1. Creation of a Banking Union.

2. The mutualization of Debt

3. A Common Framework for Stability

4. Clear Convergence Policies

5. An ECB tasked with growth and full employment

6. A Commitment to Shared Prosperity

A banking union with common deposit insurance structured like the FDIC in the United

States can ensure capital assets in risky markets such as Spain and Greece. Without such

common deposit insurance, it will become more and more likely that assets will flee these higher

risk countries, further exacerbating the already existing and protracted economic downturn. 55

Sadly, as Paul Wallace notes, the attempts at such a banking union have already failed due to the

interests of Northern creditor states. Creating joint deposit guarantees across the Eurozone was

abandoned as politically unfeasible to domestic constituencies in countries like Germany:

“Northern creditors nations feared that their depositors (and behind them their states) would do

53 Ibid., 229. 54 See Stiglitz’s chapter “Creating a Eurozone that Works,” 239-71 for more details on this list. 55 Ibid., 241-2.

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the guaranteeing, while southern depositors would do the claiming.” Thus, despite the need for 56

such common deposit insurance, the power and state interest of Germany and other Northern

creditors will likely block the enactment of such a reform.

The mutualization of debt has been met with resistance by those claiming the Eurozone is

not such a “transfer union.” This has always been Germany’s worst fear, which is precisely why

the ECB was mandated with price stability alone from the beginning. Nonetheless, the fears of

some mutualization are severely overstressed. These fears overstate that debt will not be paid

back. Once debt is spread out and mutualized at low interest rates, countries like Greece will

boost growth and more easily service their debt. The irony of the existing arrangement is that so

long as there exists no debt mutualization, countries like Greece will almost certainly continue to

default on nonperforming loans-- hurting the financial sector of creditor countries even worse. 57

One way to achieve this goal would be to issue Eurobonds underwritten by the Eurozone as a

whole. Different attempts at designing such a plan have been proposed by economists like John

Muellbauer at Oxford University, these mostly hinging upon flexible terms determined by

performance. However, yet again, Germany and Merkel ruled out such proposals. The power 58 59

of the Eurozone’s most important and decisive actor struck again.

The common framework for stability is probably one of the most important reforms that

should be pushed through in order to save the Eurozone. This framework would include

elements such as a common fiscal policy, automatic stabilizers such as unemployment insurance,

more flexibility in issuing credit (particularly to small and medium-sized enterprises), a clear

56 Wallace, 138-9. 57 stiglitz., 244. 58 Wallace, 104. 59 Ibid., 105.

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policy aimed toward deflating speculative bubbles before they get out of hand, and, lastly, across

the board investments in infrastructure and education. Yet again, such policies would require a 60

high amount of coordination between Eurozone member states. While it does not always come

down explicitly to a duel between Germany and Greece, the creditor-debtor relationship between

these two extreme examples is instructive. Would Germany be willing to agree to these far

reaching policies for low-performing economies such as Greece? Again, despite the fact they

would likely ensure transcontinental growth (including in Germany, whose growth has not been

all that spectacular in the first place), not to mention political solidarity, it seems that unless the

current status-quo is broken this stability mechanism will never be achieved.

The strongest move toward a Eurozone favoring convergence of member states rather

than divergence would be discouraging surpluses, in Germany and elsewhere, going forward. A

basic accounting identity, for every surplus there must be a deficit. This means that major deficit

trading partners surrounding Germany will continue to become more and more indebted to

Germany due to its surplus (unless, of course, these countries can offset their German imports by

exporting to other regions. Nonetheless, the point still holds true for the global economy as a

whole: the numbers must add up, and some countries and groups of countries are going to be in

the red so long as surpluses are run). Deficits must be financed, and if it determined a country or

its major firms might default on debt, credit can dry up in a split. If credit-issuing is stopped in 61

deficit countries, it will result in decreased aggregate demand and economic contraction. In the

60 Stiglitz, 244-51. 61 One of the more interesting aspects of the Eurozone crisis is that beforehand, only underdeveloped countries were considered at serious risk of defaulting on their debt. The concept of a sovereign debt crisis in countries in reputable grouping such as the Eurozone was completely unheard of. The most recent financial crisis has changed this assessment, severely altering lending practices in Europe. See Silvia Pepino, Sovereign Risk and Financial Crisis: The International Political Economy of the Eurozone, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, NY, 2015.

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long-run, such withholding of credit may damage surplus creditor nations as well. The resulting

contraction in deficit countries due to the drying up of credit will result in more limited absolute

foreign consumption, that is to say, fewer imports from the surplus nation. In the last ten years,

Paul Davidson of the New School has put forth specific international proposals which not only

limit surpluses, but require surplus nations to shoulder the burden of correcting their

advantageous position in the international balance of payments. Davidson is not the first to 62

suggest such a mechanism. Indeed, it was Keynes himself who proposed taxing surplus

countries in order to discourage a positive balance of payments. At any rate, in addition to 63

other mechanisms to create convergence, such as expansionary wage and fiscal policies in

surplus countries (thereby making Germany slightly less competitive and equalizing the

Eurozone playing field), it may actually be in Germany’s best interest to run a more-neutral

balance of payments. While common household wisdom suggests that more money in the bank

is always better, basic Keynesian macroeconomic theory proves otherwise.

As elaborated in the previous section, the ECB mandate was designed to control strictly

for price stability. Per the requirements of optimal currency areas (and just common wisdom and

macroeconomic theory), central banks should also be tasked with fiscal stimulus, including the

maintenance of growth and full employment. The ECB has provided some liquidity like the

Federal Reserve has done in the United States, however much of this has not gone to real

investments like infrastructure or education. Instead, much of the expanded liquidity has gone to

fixed assets or to banks which then simply hold the reserves, resulting in continued liquidity

62 Paul Davidson, “Reforming the World’s International Money,” In real-world economics review, issue no. 48, 6 December 2008, pp. 293-305, http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue48/Davidson48.pdf. 63 Ibid., 254.

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scarcity. It is true, this allows the holding banks to remain capitalized, but such practice 64

doesn’t guarantee full employment or boost growth. Going forward, the ECB would not only

need an expanded charter, but this charter would also have to include specific instructions on

ways to make absolutely certain that fiscal stimulus would be spent on meaningful and real

investments, such as lending to small and medium-sized enterprises, infrastructure, industrial

policies, or education-- not fixed assets such as land.

Stiglitz’s last suggestion is broad in scale, but holds significant political and ideological

weight: a commitment to shared prosperity across the Eurozone. He begins by recognizing that

one of the major problems of the developed world today is growing inequality. Despite other

public intellectuals, such as Robert Reich, spending their entire careers on behalf of advocating

for greater equality, it took Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century to really set

the grotesque (and growing) levels of inequality in the developed world on most people’s radar. 65

There is no doubt that this inequality must be addressed, and it can be addressed in a

commitment to broad-based prosperity across the Eurozone.

Stiglitz lays out the central problem in regards to this issue: “Free mobility of capital and

goods without tax harmonization not only can lead to an inefficient allocation of capital but it

can also reduce the potential for redistributive taxation, leading to high levels of after-tax and

transfer inequality and in some instances, even market income inequality.” Both Stiglitz and 66

Piketty have recognized that capital flight due to corporate tax competition threatens to

compound growing inequality. Just as Piketty does, Stiglitz highlights the realities of today’s

64 Stiglitz, 256. 65 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century,” Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014. 66 Stiglitz, 260.

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globalized economy: “Given the easy mobility around the European Union, the major

responsibility for redistribution must lie at the EU level.” While Piketty’s main proposal is a 67

global tax on capital holdings (though he suggests the European Union would be a good place 68

to test this), Stiglitz simply proposes an EU-level tax on incomes over a certain threshold. No 69

matter the method, the main point is to advance an agenda that would unite Europe in combatting

inequality. Perhaps more than anything, this serves to unite Europe in a time of globalization,

worker dislocation, chronic unemployment, and, altogether great division.

That challenge going forward for the Eurozone will be whether or not they can enact

some of these major reforms. Such overhauls will by no means be easy, but if the Euro is to

survive, they may very well be necessary.

Justice and the Future

Throughout these essays, I have routinely referred to Rawlsian justice as a baseline for

looking at what justice would require in any given situation. In the case of the Eurozone today,

the answer seems clear. No rational agent behind a veil of ignorance would suggest setting up a

Eurozone without a common central banked tasked toward full employment, strong growth, and

broad-based prosperity for all. Average Greeks and Spaniards and Italians and Cypriots did not

ask for the economic storm the Euro brought them-- that was the result of political

decision-making, and as shown in previous sections, that political decision-making overrode the

best economic self-interests of many Eurozone countries from the beginning.

67 Ibid., 261. 68 Piketty, 505-8. 69 Stiglitz, 263.

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The tragic reality of politics, however, is that we do not live in the idealistic contractarian

world of Rawls. Though we can always return to the original position to determine what justice

might require, power in the world often asserts itself in malevolent ways. Additionally, despite

whatever evidence might pile up on behalf of injustice-- the lost lives of so many youth seeking

employment, the protracted growth across the Eurozone, the austerity, the reawakening of

degrading, inaccurate, and scapegoating stereotypes such as “greedy Germans” and “lazy

Greeks”-- power will find ways to justify itself, perhaps until it consumes itself in ignorance and

hypocrisy or perhaps until prophetic truth beacons so loudly one can no longer ignore injustice.

One certainty today is that Germany’s insistence on structural reforms and austerity have not led

to prosperity. The ethic of thrift, a necessary duplicity for Germany to advance its own agenda,

has only led to widespread suffering.

The dream of European integration was well-founded. Today, it seems to be hanging by

a thread. In this time, the failed conventional wisdom of a previous age simply won’t do. It is

possible the European project can survive without the Euro, but the failure of the Eurozone

would be an indisputable setback. The currency is worth saving, and we know how this can be

done. No reasonable person today is calling for one, massive, monolithic European state-- such

proposals are clearly much too idealistic. Practical steps, however, as listed above, can be taken.

But it will require a new vision for a new age. It will require a commitment of nations to

transcontinental peace and prosperity. It will require a partial forgoing of national egotism and

pride, a reawakening to proven and principled economic theory, and an embrace of humane

politics. Ultimately, this change is possible. However, whether or not it is probable is an

entirely different question. Such is the tragic reality of our world.

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Works Cited

Brunnermeier, Markus, Harold James, and Jean-Pierre Landau. The Euro and the Battle of Ideas.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016.

Chibber, Kabir. "Who are the troika that Greece depends on?" BBC News. October 04, 2011.

Accessed April 25, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/business-15149626.

Davidson, Paul. “Reforming the World’s International Money.” In real-world economics review,

issue no. 48, 6 December 2008, pp. 293-305.

http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue48/Davidson48.pdf.

Giddens, Anthony. Turbulent and Mighty Continent: What Future for Europe? Cambridge:

Polity, 2014.

Habermas, Jürgen. The Crisis of the European Union: A Response. Cambridge: Polity, 2012.

Hodson, Dermot. Governing the Euro Area in Good Times and Bad. Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2013.

Jespersen, Jesper. The Euro: Why it Failed. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.

Matthijs, Matthias. "Europe After Brexit: A Less Perfect Union." Foreign Affairs 96, no. 1 (Jan,

2017): 85-95. https://search.proquest.com/docview/1858034494?accountid=351.

Moravcsik, Andrew. "Europe's Ugly Future." Foreign Affairs 95, no. 6 (Nov, 2016): 139-146.

https://search.proquest.com/docview/1832180659?accountid=351.

Mounck, Yascha. "Pitchfork Politics: The Populist Threat to Liberal Democracy." Foreign

Affairs 93, no. 5 (Sep, 2014): 27-I.

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4 (1961): 657-65.

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| Chart | Calendar. Accessed April 25, 2017.

http://www.tradingeconomics.com/netherlands/gdp-growth.

Pepino, Silvia. Sovereign Risk and Financial Crisis: The International Political Economy of the

Eurozone. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

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Piketty, Thomas. Capital in the Twenty-First Century.” Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of

Harvard University Press, 2014.

"Robert Mundell - Facts." Nobelprize.org. Accessed April 25, 2017.

http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1999/mundell-facts.

html.

Sinn, Hans-Werner. The Euro Trap: On Bursting Bubbles, Budgets, and Beliefs. Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2014.

Stiglitz, Joseph. The Euro: How a Common Currency Threatens the Future of Europe. New

York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2016.

Wallace, Paul. The Euro Experiment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.

"Winston Churchill: Calling for a United States of Europe." European Union. Accessed April 25,

2017. https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/winston_churchill_en.pdf.

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Power and Tragedy: Migration, Tolerance, and the Nation-State

Introduction

I went to study in Europe at perhaps one of the most exciting (and for many, saddening)

moments in recent European history. For the first time since after the second World War,

Western European democracies have been seriously questioning the logic and reasonableness of

the European integration project. As discussed in the essay beforehand, the Eurozone has

wreaked havoc on many European states. Additionally, growing intra-state inequality has given

salience to the popularity of racist and xenophobic nationalist parties across the continent. When

I arrived in mid-August, the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union was fresh in

the minds of all Europeans I spoke with. “Is this the beginning of the end of the European

Union? Will EU-solidarity trump euroscepticism? How will this affect the common market?

How much popularity will these far-right parties continue to gain?” These were the questions

asked in Copenhagen classrooms and corner bars alike. Thus, I was thrust into the heat of the

debate.

This essay seeks to explore some of the themes I encountered while in Europe, namely

the role of modern global migration and whether or not Muslims migrating from the (largely)

Arab world are to be tolerated. Ultimately, despite all of its shortcomings, the conception of

tolerance should play a fundamental role due to the political and economic realities of today’s

world. The generalized application of a Rawlsian justice narrative demonstrates that justice

would require tolerance only in equal and fully reciprocal relationships. It takes no astute

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observer to determine the current politico-economic structure of world society is one far from

this reciprocal ideal. If not for common sense, justice as fairness should demonstrate this. Yet it

is dangerous to believe the Rawlsian ideal can, if ever, be fully reached. As Reinhold Niebuhr 70

has said, “When… optimism is not qualified to accord with the real and complex facts of human

nature and history, there is always a danger that sentimentality will give way to despair and that a

too consistent optimism will alternate with a too consistent pessimism.” This is not to implant 71

a pessimism into the idealistic reader, but to understand that in any human society, the realities of

power and political reality must always be set against the greater backdrop of optimism and the

ideal. To this end, Martin Luther King’s steadfast belief, propounded most strongly in his

famous “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” that the consistent “human progress” of social gospel

ethicists such as Walter Rauschenbusch is by no means guaranteed. Thus, while Niebuhr

emphasizes man’s propensity to sin alone, King recognizes this propensity, all the while

believing in movements toward justice nonetheless. 72

As the following discussion will show, such a situation exists in Europe today. The

justice ideal demands complete equal treatment to those fleeing violent conflict and seeking

economic opportunity. But the political realities of inherited and unjust power transmitted

through the sovereign nation-state will not permit such an ideal. The denial of justice then

becomes the focal point of Europe’s intolerance towards Muslims and other migrants. In order

70 However, as Rawls says, “Nevertheless, the idea of a well-ordered society should also provide some guidance in thinking about nonideal theory, and so about difficult cases of how to deal with existing injustices. It should also help to clarify the goal of reform and to identify which wrongs are more grievous and hence more urgent to correct.” See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001, 13. 71 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of its Traditional Defence, In Reinhold Niebuhr: Major Works on Religion and Politics, Edited by Elisabeth Sifton, New York, NY: The Library of America, 2015, 354-5. 72 It was, of course, grace that King believed to be stronger than sin.

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that European society maintain its social cohesion in these troubling times, it will have to strike a

bargain somewhere between outright injustice and total justice. Tolerance will play a role. But

in this role, tolerance must be aware of the unjust power differentials it supports.

Tolerance Talk

Come 2020, tolerance (or intolerance, for that matter), might be hailed as the word of the

decade. With the continued prevalence of the transnational terrorist threat, compounded by the

rise of ISIS, negative political attitudes towards Muslims in Europe have been growing to tragic

levels. Syrian refugees, forced to flee the indiscriminate violence of the now six year Syrian 73

Civil War between Bashar al-Assad and a discordant opposition, headed towards Europe in

droves only to be largely rebuffed by the continent. The tragedy of the Syrian exodus, exploited

by xenophobic nationalist politicians in Europe for political gain, enflamed the general

intolerance toward Muslims further. One need to look no further than newspaper headlines 74

from recent years: “Europe’s Eroding Tolerance,” “Europe’s Test of Tolerance Over Muslim 75

Influx,” “Norway’s Horror: The Murder of Innocents Reinforces the Need for Tolerance in 76

Europe.” “Poor EU Migrants Test Limits of Swedish Tolerance.” This single issue, the 77 78

73 Enes Bayrakli and Farid Hafez, eds. European Islamophobia Report. http://www.islamophobiaeurope.com/reports/2015/en/EIR_2015.pdf. 74 This is all despite the fact that Syria is a religiously plural society. While majority Muslim, 10% of Syrians, for example, identify as Christian. One might readily suspect the real marker of intolerance for white Europeans is the brownness of a Syrian’s skin. 75 Europe's eroding tolerance. (2016, Jan 03). The Washington Post Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/1753064510?accountid=351. 76 Europe's test of tolerance over muslim influx. (2015, Oct 08). The Christian Science Monitor Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/1720282599?accountid=351. 77 "Norway's Horror: The Murder of Innocents Reinforces the Need for Tolerance in Europe." New York Times, Jul 26, 2011, Late Edition (East Coast). https://search.proquest.com/docview/878904686?accountid=351. 78 Stephen Castle, "Poor E.U. Migrants Test Limits of Swedish Tolerance," The New York Times, August 08, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/world/poor-eu-migrants-test-limits-of-swedish-tolerance.html.

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movement of Syrians (and others) fleeing conflict toward Europe, exposes the tense nature of our

modern international system. In the age of globalization, where global capitalism, war, and

modern technology bound multiple cultural and religious backgrounds up with one another, can

Europe forge ahead towards a more inclusive and prosperous society? Or, as a recent article in

The Economist suggests, will Europe revert to pulling its “drawbridges up?” 79

However, in order to understand the issue more deeply, we must turn briefly to

understanding just why people migrate today, realizing that resistance to migration in Europe

existed before the plight of today’s Syria. It is within this context that we will be able to more

adequately comprehend the content of political calls from European leaders for either “more

tolerance” or a reversion to a jingoistic, “drawbridges up” version of European identity.

Why do People Migrate?

Despite the Syrian Refugee Crisis being the most recent and vivid cause of migration, it

is not the first case of human migration. As Segal, Mayadas, and Elliott have written, “The

phenomenon of immigration is neither novel nor recent, having been part of the human

experience since time immemorial, with economics, politics, and religion, as well as a yen for

exploration and adventure, fueling such movements.” This brief quote encapsulates much of 80

the reality of migration. Firstly, it has always been occurring. School-day lessons of nomadic

humans crossing from modern-day Russia to modern-day Alaska via the now aquatically

submerged landmass of Beringia remind us of some of the oldest human migrants; or, in our own

79 "Drawbridges up." The Economist. July 30, 2016. Accessed April 30, 2017. http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21702748-new-divide-rich-countries-not-between-left-and-right-between-open-and. 80 U. A. Segal, N. S. Mayadas, and D. Elliott, "The Immigration Process," In Immigration Worldwide: Policies, Practices, and Trends, Oxford University Press, 2010, 3.

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country, the now semi-mythical tale of religiously motivated Calvinist pilgrims crossing the

tortuous Atlantic Ocean in the Mayflower. Both of these instances demonstrate the timelessness

of human migration. Secondly, as both cases mentioned attest to, the motivations behind

migration are multifarious, nuanced, and complex. One can say with little doubt the nomads

crossing today’s Bering Strait were seeking some type of economic gain, what we can

understand in their particular instance as a command over resources that support life. But could 81

it also be possible they exhibited that innate human tendency for “exploration and adventure” as

well? Had they been exiled from previous society? In the case of the Pilgrims (pilgrimage itself

a journey of highest religious aspiration), we know their religiosity was front and center of their

migration and colonization of the New World. Not only did they seek religious freedom; a

Robert Cushman sermon demonstrates that their exploration and habitation of the New World

was most definitively motivated and mandated by the divine. In describing local exploration,

Cushman claims, “but if God give time and means, we shall, ere long, discover the extent of that

river, together with the secrets thereof; and so try what territories, habitations, or commodities,

may be found, either in it, or about it.” It is God’s will and gift unto the Pilgrims that provokes

their journey. Cushman continues, “So it is by God’s providence, that a few of us are there

planted to our content, and have with great charge and difficulty attained quite and competent

dwellings there.” Lastly, there is something to be said that people always migrate, historically 82

81 For a rather fascinating and well-written account of this, see E. James Dixon’s Quest for the Origins of the First Americans, University of New Mexico Press, 1993. Among Dixon’s interesting exploration of the ways in which ancient nomads would have crossed the Bering Land Bridge, he provides an account of how archaeologists studying the region examine closely when specific pre-historical time periods would have supported human life. 82 Robert Cushman. "The Sin and Danger of Self-Love, Described in a Sermon Preached at Plymouth, in New England, 1621." https://static1.squarespace.com/static/50a02efce4b046b42952af27/t/50a870e2e4b0ea694c52fcdc/1353216226396/SinAndDangerOfSelfLove.pdf.

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and today, in search of something, whether that be more economic opportunity or simply

freedom from violent conflict. In this sense, migration always carries with it, in one way or

another, the hope for a better future. This last view of migration in particular promotes a more

sympathetic understanding between differing societies. Migrants are not tartuffes, duplicitously

attempting, behind feigned virtue and good will, to take advantage of the wealth of Europe at the

expense of others. They are simply human beings, complex like all, seeking a better life for

themselves and their families.

Though this timeless account of migration allows us to see the humanity in any migration

process, it is still helpful to place more recent migration trends in their appropriate historical,

economic, and social context. To this end, Douglas Massey develops four distinct periods of

migration in modern history: the mercantile period, the industrial period, the period of limited

migration, and, lastly, the period of postindustrial migration. The mercantile period saw the

outflow of Europeans to other reaches of the world due to colonization and mercantilistic trade.

During this period, the transatlantic slave trade also transported, against their will, African slaves

who would populate the plantations of the Americas. The industrial period of migration,

beginning in the early 19th century, saw the outflow of over 48 million people from the

industrialized countries of Europe. Though not all, the majority of these (60 percent) people left

for the United States. The shocks of two world wars brought large-scale European emigration to

a halt, resulting in the period of limited migration (1915 - 1960). Yet it wasn’t until the

postindustrial period in developed economies (roughly the late 1960’s until the 1990’s) that the

world saw migration expand to a completely global phenomenon. During this postindustrial 83

83 Douglas Massey, “Why Does Immigration Occur? A Theoretical Synthesis,” In The Handbook of International Migration, Russell Sage Foundation, New York City, 1999, 34-5.

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period, emigration shifted primarily from European sending states to the states of the developing

world. Sender states of another period, now “post-industrialized” and economically mature, had

become largely receiving states. This was an extraordinary break from the past, and brought

many of the inhabitants of the formerly colonized world into Europe proper. 84

However, Elliott, Mayadas, and Segal suggest that the world has entered a new, fifth

period of migration. During this period, immigration policies that were loosening during the

period of postindustrial migration have now begun to tighten in receiving countries of the

developed world. Part of this may be explained by Olzak and Nagel’s “structural theory of 85

ethnic competition,” whereby the reduction of inequalities between groups gives rise to ethnic

conflict. Another well-received theory that has been given much attention is that of “split labor 86

market theory.” In split labor market theory, labor is split into two distinct groups, high-priced

labor and cheap labor. Broadly speaking, these groups would correspond with white collar 87

labor and blue collar labor in the United States. The contention of split labor market theory is

that the drive by business to obtain higher profits and growth leads them to hiring cheap labor

from immigrant and ethnic minorities. This process has the potential to breed resentment

between racial and ethnic groups in the working class. Such a theory fits well into the current

popularity in Europe of anti-free trade and xenophobic parties such as Marine Le Pen’s. Indeed,

as Bozorgmehr et al. suggest, tightened immigration legislation in Europe seems to coincide with

economic downturns. And it is fair to say that the most protracted downturn in recent European

memory has been, in many countries, the slow dismantling and privatization of the welfare state

84 Ibid., 35. 85 Segal, Mayadas, Elliott, 18. 86 Mehdi Bozorghmer et al. "Host Hostility and Nativism." In The Routledge International Handbook of Migration Studies. New York City: Routledge, 2014, 193. 87 Ibid., 193.

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justified by neoliberal economic doctrine. This has led to even greater economic rifts across 88

the Western world. Stephen Castles touches on the most predominant of the rifts due to

neoliberal ideology: “The neoliberal dream is dualistic: a cosmopolitan, mobile world for elites;

a world of barriers, exploitation, and security controls for the rest.” Apropos split labor market 89

theory, one can readily envision the ways in which such an economy leads to the resistance of

migration. For a people already being hurt by the prevalence of existing economic insecurity,

why would they admit (whether reasonable or not) potential labor competition to their country?

The rise of neoliberalism has put even more pressure on existing European “compassion

fatigue.” Bozorgmehr et al. describe this fatigue quite succinctly, “For decades, many European

states had open door policies and generous benefits toward refugees and asylees which attracted

persons fleeing war and political crises. As a result, native Europeans became more

anti-immigrant, blaming newcomers for numerous problems.” 90

It is very likely that Europe and European identity are facing a perfect storm of sorts.

Rising inequality within developed European states has triggered working class backlash, the

result of years and years of economic privatization justified by a neoliberal economic agenda.

This leads lower income labor to resist more open immigration policies. On top of this, recent

terrorist attacks across Europe have awakened latent racism and Islamophobia across the

continent. Postcolonial works such as Edward Said’s Orientalism do enough to expose the ways

88 Journalist George Monbiot gives a clarifying and interesting account of the rise of neoliberal economic doctrine, tracing it back to Austrians Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek, and contrasting it with the post-war Keynesian consensus. Of importance is his summarization of the ways in which neoliberal doctrines have led to the gross inequality currently being experienced within Europe, particularly between the working class and upper income deciles of European economies. See George Monbiot, “Was the Rise of Neoliberalism the Root Cause of Extreme Inequality?” http://evonomics.com/rise-of-neoliberalism-inequality/. 89 Stephen Castles, “Migration, Crisis, and the Global Labour Market,” In Migration, Work, and Citizenship in the New Global Order, New York City: Routledge, 2015, 63. 90 Mehdi Bozorghmer et al., 195.

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in which those from “the Orient” have been mystified, appropriated, and treated as otherworldly.

Indeed, the period of European expansion and colonial domination across the world was justified

under the banner of a “civilizing” discourse “fraught with inequality and discrimination.” 91

Since this time, racism has permeated European relations with much of the formerly colonized,

developing world. It should be no surprise, then, that when push comes to shove, and many 92

Europeans are frightened by economic insecurity and horrifying terrorist attacks, that they revert

to an archaic belief that, despite the realities of our globalized world, Europe and those practicing

Islam are simply incompatible. This, the current fifth phase in modern historical migration, has

only compounded the plight of millions of Syrians fleeing conflict. It is through the ravages of

war, globalization, and global inequalities that we must view calls for more “tolerance.”

Toleration

While in Europe, a common rallying cry of progressives, both European and American,

was that in regards to the rise of anti-migrant parties such as the Front National in France, the

Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark, Orban’s Fidesz in Hungary, the UK Independence Party, and

Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, more toleration was needed. The Islamophobic

rhetoric emanating from these parties had recently become a prominent aspect of European

political life. A representative I met from the Dansk Folkeparti, for example, claimed that

despite the need for secularism, the historic Christian values of Denmark and Europe were

simply incompatible with Islam. Across from one another in her party’s parliamentary meeting

room (of which an eerie portrait of their party’s founder hung above the fireplace just behind our

91 Montserrat, Guibernau. The Identity of Nations. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011, 107. 92 Ibid., 107.

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host), the PM and I had a few notable exchanges over what she simply termed “the dark forces”

(code for Muslims and Sharia Law). Sitting with this PM in a rather successful Western

democracy, I began to wonder if a “little more toleration” really was the answer or not. I had

previously argued that, in principle, the only real way to achieve justice for migrants and

refugees was simply to open all borders. A borderless world was the way forward-- not only

could I make such arguments on economic grounds, but the ethical and historical underpinnings

were also easily defensible. But in speaking to this lady, observing her adept political

maneuvering and handling of questions, I seriously doubted that parties growing in popularity

such as hers would go away with calls for just “a little more toleration.” As perhaps the most

prominent scholar on toleration, Rainer Forst, has said, “For as long as there has been religion,

the problem of people of different beliefs and the problems of heretics and of nonbelievers have

existed.” Would just “a little more toleration” prove this quote wrong? 93

The problem with toleration I implicitly recognized, but could not express in the moment,

is that toleration does not equate to justice. Thus, toleration can exist while injustice persists,

and when toleration masks fundamental issues of injustice, arranging a modus vivendi of sorts,

the resulting balance is always unstable, being as it is predicated upon balance of power.

That is why there is more to the debate of Muslims and migrants in Europe than tolerance

or intolerance. Those who are to be tolerated are excluded from the dominant community,

identity, and social discourse. They become the Other. It is no surprise, then, that migrants in

Europe are oftentimes pushed to the social margins of society. Many Europeans and others

complain that Islam is simply incompatible with modern European secularism (or, ironically for

93 Rainer Forst, Toleration in Conflict, Cambridge University Press, 2016, 2.

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many, historical Christendom). Huntington’s “clash of civilizations,” though well-enough

developed within itself to pass academic muster, gave life to such notorious and simplistic

notions of today’s globalized world. The same people who are willing to tolerate Islam “to a

certain limit,” who are at fundamental odds with something about Islam, are the same ones

criticizing migrants and refugees for forming ethnic enclaves. Practical reasoning of the 94

importance of ethnic enclaves aside, those “tolerating” Muslims in “their” country do not

explicitly speak in terms of justice, but implicitly. The acceptance of identity within a

nation-state is assumed to be both static and assumed, along with all the unjust power

differentials due to historical, economic, and social circumstance. Whether a matter of cognitive

dissonance or not, the convenient mask of the modern nation-state obscures justice. Rawls’

thought experiment is particularly useful here. No rational actor in the original position,

operating behind a veil of ignorance, could possibly call for a system of such inequity whose

starting point is at the tail-end of hundreds of years of colonialism, exploitation, and continued

(if not political, then economic) subjugation. In this sense, the current arrangements of our

international order are clearly unjust. Yet those fleeing violent conflict, poverty, and systemic

oppression are merely receiving their due and should be pleased with whatever charity a western

state might grant them. Thus, beyond the generosity of what a kind Dane might want to bestow

upon a Muslim migrant, the nation-state owes migrants and potential migrants nothing else

unless forfeited to them. An alien gets what an alien is due, and that does not include the rights 95

94 See David Zucchino, "'I've Become a Racist': Migrant Wave Unleashes Danish Tensions Over Identity," The New York Times, September 05, 2016, Accessed April 30, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/06/world/europe/denmark-migrants-refugees-racism.html. 95 I am cognizant of the requirements of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol for parties to hear asylum claims. With time, however, this distinction between “refugee” and “economic migrant” has become less and less discernible, especially when one considers the threats to life a so-called “economic migrant” might realistically face in their home country.

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of freedom of movement, to seek gainful employment, or even, many times, the basic right as a

political actor-- citizenship. This hypocrisy is not just unjust, but also delusional. Given the 96

realities of today’s globalized world, migration routes, especially from the postcolonial world to

the West, will continue in the face of economic insecurity, war, terrorism, famine, and drought.

The tension here is not only of justice and injustice, but also of the tense nature of

national identity, state sovereignty, and the transnational fluidity of people in the “fifth period”

of migration. In reference to Benedict Anderson’s famous conception of the “imagined

community,” Waldinger and Soehl have said that, “Maintaining that national, imagined 97

community demands that the people be bounded, lest there be not members with interests

reflected in and represented by their state.” As always, identity matters. In this case, identity 98

serves to substantiate a vision of state sovereignty unequipped for the very real movement of

people in the twenty-first century.

There is a paradox, though: we need states to protect fundamental rights, while at the

same time the nature of today’s world makes this more difficult than ever. In the existing

international order, people need the protection of the state. When their home states fail, are

mired in desperation, or, as has been the case recently, simply being obliterated by the masters of

war, to where do they turn? Where is there justice for these people? And if not complete justice,

is there, at least, some respite? Michael Walzer recognizes the practical reality of the

96 This always depends on how a state characterizes citizenship. Countries such as Germany and Denmark follow jus sanguinis, or “right of blood,” whereas the republican model of states such as France and the United States follow jus soli, or “right of the soil.” It is not uncommon to hear migrants in countries such as Denmark express that they have been living in the country nearly their entire life, pay taxes, participate in civil society, but still are not full Danish citizens with all the rights and responsibilities of such inclusion. 97 Benedict R. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Verso, 1991. 98 Roger Waldinger and Thomas Soehl, “Borders, Boundaries, Rights, and Politics,” In The Routledge International Handbook of Migration Studies, New York City: Routledge, 2014, 337.

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nation-state, which is precisely why he balks at grand assimilationist or cosmopolitan schemes.

States serve an important purpose. Grounded in community, they are supposed to protect and

advance fundamental interests of their inhabitants. As a progressive Zionist, therefore, he

realizes the necessity of the State of Israel for a people with a common culture, but rejects the

notion that it be justified by Judaism as a religion, or that it be justified in subsuming all of

historical Palestine for itself. It would be naive, of course, to pretend as though religious and 99

cultural diversity does not play a fundamental and important role in the composition and identity

of a state. France is secular, but who would deny its underlying Catholic nature? Dominant

communities in nation-states should not discriminate along religious lines, but they almost

inevitably will, either implicitly or explicitly, legally or practically, due to their cultural and

social histories. Thus, France can preach liberty, equality, and fraternity, but this is only for the

French. And to pretend that the notion of “Frenchness” does not matter, a look towards Marine

Le Pen’s campaign is sufficient to dispel this idealistic myth.

Which brings us to the dark and tragic side of toleration already alluded to: power and

identity matter.

The Dark Side of Toleration

Lurking beneath the concept of toleration is a conniving and perhaps sinister conception

to some-- that one would have to face living side-by-side with another in which they

fundamentally disagree on issues of cultural, religious, or social importance. Toleration means

one would rather not co-exist with another, but that “the reasons for mutual objection are

99 Michael Walzer, “The State of Righteousness: Liberal Zionists Speak Out,” April 24, 2012, Accessed March 25, 2017, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-walzer/liberal-zionists-speak-out-state-of-righteousness_b_1447261.html.

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counterbalanced by reasons for mutual acceptance which do not annul the former but

nevertheless speak for toleration, or even require it.” Yet, there lies in this statement a perhaps 100

not easily recognizable implicit expression of power, especially when applied to the stratified

social realities of today’s world. “The reasons for mutual objection,” practically speaking,

assumes two, relatively equal people or groups objecting over one another’s beliefs. These

reasons of objection are to be “counterbalanced by reasons for mutual acceptance” which do not

necessarily delegitimate intolerance, but make it appear as though intolerance might not be the

best route. Thus, it might be best expressed as a type of practice in humility among political or

social equals.

Such a definition in practice hinges mightily upon the various weights of those being

“counterbalanced.” The reasons for mutual objection in a society can carry significant weight

when supported most heavily by decisionmakers and those in control of any social or political

institution. Against such objections, the less powerful grouping of those pushing for “reasons for

mutual acceptance” have a weaker voice in such a situation. As Bernard Williams has said, “In a

country where there are many Christians and few Muslims, there may be a question whether the

Christians tolerate the Muslims; the Muslims do not get the choice.” Thus one can quickly 101

imagine how inequality between two contending interests can result in mere force of power of

one group over another. One only needs to think back to John Stuart Mill’s warning of a

“tyranny of the majority” to be reminded of the dangers social conformism can play against

100 Forst, 1. 101 Bernard Williams, “Tolerating the Intolerable,” In The Politics of Toleration in Modern Life, Ed. Susan Mendus, Edinburgh University Press, 2000, 66.

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those with less power. It is therefore necessary to ask what role toleration discourse plays in 102

modern Western societies. Such discourse can easily revert, as it almost certainly does with

many in Europe, to justifying unjust power structures that are products of social, economic, and

historical contingency, despite toleration’s supposed aim at acceptance between two

reciprocating parties for the sake of social cohesion.

This lies at the heart of the now-published debate between Wendy Brown and Rainer

Forst. Where Forst is keen on according levels of toleration in an ideal democratic society, 103

Brown is worried that toleration discourse cements hegemonic norms. Forst admits that 104

tolerance discourse will always be wedded to power, but that the “criterion of reciprocity” 105

gives “priority to those who argue for equalizing social status rather than to those who argue

against equality and defend social asymmetries with reasons of… a religious kind.” At times, 106

both speak as though they may be conceiving of different aspects of tolerance altogether, but

Forst discourages this approach. In my reading, however, Brown has an indissoluble point of

practical political reality over Forst: “How does tolerance hide and sometimes even legitimate

existing violence in the societies that it governs?” Indeed, why for so many does “Western 107

liberal democracy become identical with tolerance and thereby cleansed of its historical episodes

of slavery, colonialism, imperialism, and fascism?” Brown continues, “Meanwhile, Islam, in

that same discourse, gets relentlessly identified with intolerance.” In a modern twist that only 108

102 See Forst’s light discussion on the topic, 363. As is well known, Mill derived this concept from Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, in which Tocqueville surveyed the young republic; though some have disputed the use of the term by each man. 103 Wendy Brown and Rainer Forst, The Power of Tolerance: A Debate, Edited by Luca Di Blasi and Christoph F. E. Holzhey, New York City: Columbia University Press, 2014. 104 Ibid., 20, 30-1. 105 Ibid., 65. 106 Ibid., 55. 107 Ibid., 20. 108 Ibid., 18-9.

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appears so much as a sardonic power-play, the most dangerous of today’s right-wing populists,

Yascha Mounk says, are those casting themselves as defenders of liberal values: “Insincere

though these Islamophobes’ invocations of liberalism might be, their ability to cloak their

prejudice in the respectable-- even noble-- language of tolerance makes this group the most

dangerous of today’s populist movements,” 109

In regards to tolerance in situations where extreme power differentials exist (such as

Europe), therefore, one can never forget that one individual or group is to be “tolerated,” while

the other individual or group, due to power, becomes the “tolerator,” deciding what should and

should not be tolerated. If the powerful cannot justify their own power, which a quick

application of Rawlsian “fairness as justice” easily shows in the case of Europe, calls for

tolerance immediately become illegitimate.

Yet applying justice in today’s international system is highly problematic. The tragedy of

our world is one in which even illegitimate power will find ways in which to justify itself.

The Tragedy of the Nation-State and Continued Importance of Identity

The classical consensus in international relations has been that the modern state system

emerged from the 1648 Peace of Westphalia which established the concept of self-determination

and state sovereignty. It is from this fundamental realignment of Europe that scholars such as 110

Hedley Bull derive their notion of international society: “A society of states (or international

society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common

values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set

109 Yascha Mounk, “Pitchfork Politics: The Populist Threat to Liberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct, 2014. 110 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, London: Macmillan, 1977, 13.

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of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.” 111

This international society, this order, as Bull terms it, began at Westphalia.

However, other scholars have proposed that Westphalian Sovereignty was not quite the

turning point classical IR scholars have made it out to be. Andreas Osiander in particular

demonstrates the ways in which 19th and 20th century European historiography crafted the

“Myth of Westphalia” around anti-Habsburg propaganda. Despite what Osiander considers 112

irrefutable historical evidence that 1648 was not such a clear break with European Christendom’s

past, he wonders why the myth of westphalia has persisted for so long. His suggested answer is

rather telling:

“Yet on a deeper level, the conventional view may serve an important function. A typical founding myth, it offers a neat account of how the ‘classical’ European system, the prototype of the present international system, came about. Conveniently and comprehensively, it explains the origin of what are considered the main characteristics of that system, such as territoriality, sovereignty, equality, and nonintervention. It fits perfectly with the accepted view of what international relations is about, or at least has ‘traditionally’ been about: relations of a specific kind (with the problem of war occupying a central position) among actors of a specific kind (territorial, sovereign, legally equal).”

113

Thus, the historiography wrote into the past its own conception of the international system,

justifying existing institutions. The development of “the nation” in the 19th century suited such

a modicum of state power well. It brought forth the nation-state, the state being the sovereign

authority which protected and advanced the interests of the nation. In a spectacularly fitting

example of Foucault’s le savoir-pouvoir, Osiander above demonstrates how the control of

knowledge justifies forms of power, reproducing power in new and convenient ways. The

111 Ibid., 13. 112 Andreas Osiander, "Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth," International Organization 55, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 251-87. 113 Ibid., 266.

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historiographers he tells of, the knowledgeable, from the 19th and 20th century control and

dominate the discourse on the history of international relations-- justifying then-present reality

by re-writing the past in a particular manner supportive of the present. Today, though challenged

with the immense burdens of global issues never before encountered for most of history-- global

climate change, transnational terrorism, nuclear weapon proliferation, global finance, the

continuing existence of gargantuan inequality between the economic north and the economic

south, we are left with the nation-state as the primary actor and subject of international society.

As Niebuhr was quick to recognize, despite cosmopolitan attitudes and issues demanding

global cooperation, people continue to care deeply about their nationality. For all its 114

xenophobic rhetoric, Marine Le Pen’s current campaign in France indicates this notion has not

changed. She is publicly regarded as the protector of much-cherished “Frenchness.” My own 115

experience from Denmark is similar. One can hardly walk down a street in Copenhagen without

seeing some manifestation of the Dannebrog, whether on a coffee mug or flitting in the wind

above a corner shop. For many, including those not supportive of the Dansk Folkeparti,

“Danishness” matters. This partially explains why so much of Danish migration policy has

focused on having permanent migrants learn Danish even though almost all Danes speak

English, and many migrants have much more knowledge of English than Danish.

In speaking somewhat tongue-in-cheek on national identities, Montserrat Guibernau has

said:

“The French love cheese and are proud of the Enlightenment and the changes brought about by their Revolution. The English enjoy cricket, tea, and the countryside. They are also pleased about their old democratic legacy. US citizens are proud of the founding

114 See Niebuhr, 2015, especially the chapter entitled “The Morality of Nations.” 115 Mary Dejevsky, "Sarkozy's out – but Marine Le Pen isn't a shoo-in for the French presidency," The Guardian, November 21, 2016, Accessed April 30, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/21/sarkozy-marine-le-pen-france-president-election.

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fathers of their nation; they love steaks and big cars. Spaniards appreciate good wine and paella and are content about Columbus’s discovery of America under Castilian sponsorship.” 116

For many, these myths and stereotypes, however true or not, form the identity of a nation. As

expressed above, national flags are just one strong symbol of this. They are definitive crests of

allegiance to an idea and an identity. Though scholars debate vigorously the roots of

nationalism, Guibernau provides a sufficient summary of its multifarious composition. 117

Defining national identity as “a collective sentiment based upon the belief of belonging to the

same nation and of sharing most of the attributes that make it distinct from other nations,”

Guibernau contends that “common culture, history, kinship, language, religion, territory,

founding moment and destiny” have all been invoked to delineate a particular national identity.

Interestingly enough, “sharing most of the attributes” that make a nation “distinct from

other nations,” doesn’t appear to other scholars to be quite so difficult. In reflecting on an essay

by Freud, Michael Ignatieff quotes Freud as saying “it is precisely the minor differences in

people who are otherwise alike that form the basis of feelings of strangeness and hostility

between them.” In our current nation-state system, despite all the commonalities across 118

cultures, these minor differences manifest themselves in the nation. What could be the

self-righteousness that leads to such “group pride,” as Niebuhr would call it? Not straying too

far from Freud, Ignatieff suggests it is possible “to think of nationalism as a kind of narcissism.”

“A nationalist,” he states, “takes the neutral facts about a people-- their language, habitat, 119

116 Guibernau, 10. 117 See Robert McKim and Jeff MacMahan. The Morality of Nationalism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997, for a general survey of both contentious and interconnecting viewpoints on this topic. 118 Michael Ignatieff, “Nationalism and Toleration,” In The Politics of Toleration in Modern Life, Ed. Susan Mendus, Edinburgh University Press, 2000, 77. 119 Ibid., 79.

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culture, tradition and history-- and turns these facts into a narrative, whose purpose is to

illuminate the self-consciousness of a group, to enable them to think of themselves as a nation,

with a claim to self-determination.” Thus, this Freudian group narcissism becomes a 120

justification to a claim on power (self-determination); and as any nation demands a state of its

own, the egoistic pride through which nations are concocted-- invented traditions, “a glorious

past… gilded and refurbished for public consumption” -- becomes deified in a nation’s identity. 121

Along similar lines, Niebuhr comments, “In the imagination of the simple patriot, the nation is

not society but Society. Though its values are relative they appear, from his naive perspective, to

be absolute.” Niebuhr may perhaps be overstating his case here. Indeed, it is likely there are 122

many ways beyond national identity in which people identify themselves (race, ethnicity, and

religion being some of the most prominent). However, there remains a certain validity to

Niebuhr’s point. In the international system, we are primarily marked either by citizenship,

national identity, or a combination of both. Despite the kindred liberal spirits identifying

themselves as “citizens of the world,” the reality is more complicated. Though a valuable dream,

no world government yet exists to grant world citizenship-- and if it does, the gross levels of

inequality throughout the world beg the question of how these citizens of the world justify the

inequalities many of them directly benefit from.

Though a sad state of affairs, this is the world we live in-- and the institutions that justify

its existence are powerful. Moreover, as the neomarxists Hardt and Negri have powerfully

argued, Westphalian sovereignty historically defined itself against the colonial world. Thus, 123

120 Ibid., 80. 121 Ibid., 80. 122 Reinhold Niebuhr. Moral Man and Immoral Society, In Reinhold Niebuhr: Major Works on Religion and Politics, Edited by Elisabeth Sifton, New York, NY: The Library of America, 2015, 220. 123 See Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006.

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the power differentials between north and south, the historically Christian Europe and the

historically Muslim Middle East and Northern Africa (as well as all post-colonial societies), are

oftentimes tragically reified in Westphalian sovereignty because Westphalian sovereignty allows

itself to look out to the external world as different, with no claims being made on the sovereign

state outside of what that sovereign states chooses to agree upon by its own interests and

energies. It is in this sovereignty that powerful Western states, embedded with the pillage and

exploitation of the theft of nations, cement their unjust power.

Habermas is correct to recognize in his compelling essay, The Crisis of the European

Union: A Response, that the challenges of the modern era demand more supranational

government than less, but one wonders if in such a collective action problem, European states

will give up their sovereignty. The nationalism pulsating through Europe, no matter its horrific

racist and xenophobic Islamophobia, is indicative of the remaining social and political relevance

of the nation-state. In addition, Dani Rodrik and his “political trilemma of the world economy,”

show that it is likely there will remain in the future a fundamental tension between democratic

politics, the nation-state, and “hyperglobalization.” Rodrik’s contention is that we cannot have 124

all three at once, and that securing the rights of the nation-state, especially in post-financial crisis

Europe, will be a reality we must live with: “We need to accept the reality of a divided world

polity and make some tough choices. We have to be explicit about where one nation’s rights and

responsibilities end and another nation’s begin.” 125

124 Dani Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy, New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012, 201. By “hyperglobalization,” Rodrik means the ways in which national sovereignty have been forfeited to transnational finance and global capitalism. 125 Ibid., 232.

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Moreover, Niebuhr expresses pessimism about the ability of nation-states to 1) to act

against their own self-interest (whatever that may be) and 2) to make moral and ethical claims on

one another. Much of this follows from Niebuhr’s general inferences on “group pride” and

human psychology. The nation-state is a source of pride and identity. We have, then, a system

highly unjust, where those who are the victims of historical oppression and domination are told

they must be “tolerated” when they begin to intermingle with the former and current oppressors.

Power is not given up easily, and the tragic nature of today’s world is that states will continue to

act in their own self-interest, not (unless convenient) on behalf of justice. If Europe cared about

justice, they would have done everything possible to settle Syrian refugees. This did not happen.

And if an ethical claim is made on a European state, oftentimes they simply suggest their hands

are politically and legally tied, and that sovereignty, that arbitrary configuration concocted

during the early ages of European colonialism, must remain sacrosanct.

Conclusion

Today, due to war, inequality, and the globalized economy, we have more intermingling

of people of different cultural background than ever before. One group in the West preaches

“more tolerance.” The other preaches “incompatibility of cultures.” To a strong degree, the

“more tolerance” camp threatens to neglect the important realities of European identity, and that

identity still matters to a large group of people even in a globalized world, as well as how far

states will go to seek their own interest and maintain power. Additionally, injustice can persist

while tolerance persists. Tolerance, especially in the case of Muslims and many other migrants

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in Europe, does not equate to justice, as it is always predicated on the power differential of the

tolerator and the tolerated.

Those preaching an “incompatibility of cultures,” naively forget that it is precisely

globalization and historical dominance and oppression that has contributed to the advantageous

acquisition and development of so much wealth and prosperity in the West. True, the benefits of

globalization have not been adequately distributed in Western states, and this, today, is well

enough known. However, I suspect going forward, center-left and moderate parties in European

nation will account for this reality. If given the time, they will adjust as much as possible to 126

incorporate a more just distributional element into their platforms. If not, they will almost

certainly be out of a job. Additionally, the intolerant move nowhere closer to justice. It is clear

their intolerance moves Europe away from a more ideal and just society.

So, what is the way forward? Do we need more tolerance? Do we need cosmopolitanism

and the erasure of borders? Do we need complete and fair justice meted out across the world?

Or must we pull the drawbridges up? Is national identity too strong to withstand the twenty-first

century’s globalist surge? Is democracy simply incompatible with globalization?

Accounting for all factors, neither of these extremes are reasonable. Despite Westphalian

sovereignty’s difficulties in addressing the issues of today’s globalized world, it is unlikely a

democratic people whose identity is tied up in the nation-state will move toward a global

political order. Nationalism and nativist sentiments prove the nation-state still matters, despite

the realities of globalization. Additionally, as Rodrik has noted, a nation-state seems to be more

democratically accountable when compared to the perceived technocratic structure of European

126 I would not go beyond what is today considered “European center-right” in this regard. Most center-right politicians, such as Francois Fillon in France, still brace what is becoming an unacceptable neoliberal economic agenda.

Betley 54

supranationalism. This is the tragedy of our world today: borders are “gone” (except when it 127

comes to people) but the nation-state continues the primary subject and actor or our international

system. Humans, though timelessly migratory, can move easier (sometimes if “permitted,” other

times even if not “permitted”) than ever before due to modern technological innovation and

migratory networks. And yet despite this movement, the “fifth period” of migration is

demonstrating the power the state has to shut itself off from the right to movement, nonetheless.

This fundamental tension will not likely go away anytime soon.

Despite the sinister ways in which tolerance discourse can mask and perpetuate injustice,

it seems to me that a tolerance of genuine good-will can be of benefit. As mentioned above,

tolerance always includes who will do the tolerating. One who is to be tolerated is someone you

would rather not be around, but for the sake of political of social cohesion, is allowed around

nonetheless. One form tolerance might take is that of political equals in, say, a parliamentary

democracy. Parties will tolerate one another due to more important goals, in this case, that

democracies require a multitude of voices and opinions. The case of Muslims in Europe is

different. The power differential, culturally and politically (especially in dealing whether or not

European states will take in Muslim migrants, asylum seeker, and refugees), is pronounced. The

rise in Islamophobia is evident of this reality. The political reality is such that European

nation-states will likely remain resistant to allowing large-scale migration from Muslim-majority

areas of the world, although justice demands differently. A tolerance of good-will, one that says,

“Despite my antipathies toward these people, I understand where justice lies, I know the guiding

light between the ideal and the cynical, and I can strike a bargain,” is the best way forward.

127 Rodrik, 215-6.

Betley 55

Europe’s leaders would do well, then, to promote tolerance all the while acknowledging the

tragic power differentials of today’s world. This is not to be hypocritical on the part of a

political leader, but to be aware of the prophetic voice of justice as a means of guidance, while

negotiating between varying interests and powers of an egoistic and prideful humanity.

Today, the real existential question for all those suffering at the hands of injustice-- those

whose homes are being bombed by warplanes, who cannot eat or drink due to drought, who are

thrown, helplessly, into the flux of a fight over the powers-that-be-- is when, if ever, justice will

be meted out. This question I cannot answer; not because justice is undesirable, but because

unjust power will always find ways to perpetuate itself. Injustice does not correct itself. Power,

whatever its form, must perform that task. Thus, those seeking justice must either persuade

existing power or discover ways in which to take power into their own hands. Power and justice,

therefore, may never be fully reconciled. Their relationship may remain forever tenuous.

Betley 56

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