SB-17-CRM-1393 FOR: Violation of Section 3(e) -...

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SANDIGANBAYAN

Quezon CityFOURTH DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff',

-versus- SB-17-CRM-1393

FOR: Violation of Section 3(e)ofR.A. No. 3019

CARLOS RACADIO ASUNCION,

MAMELFA AMONGOL y RABAGO,Accused,

X-



CARLOS RACADIO ASUNCION,ROSITA R. RAGUNJAN,

Accused,

X-

-versus- SB-I7-CRM-1395


CARLOS RACADIO ASUNCION,VIRGINIA RAFANAN y RABINO

Accused,

-X

-versus- SB-17-CRM-1396FOR: Violation of Section 3(e)ofR.A. No. 3019

C:ARL0S RACADIO ASUNCION,

GENOVEVA RAGASA y REQUEZO,Accused,

-X

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FOR: Violation of Section 3(j)ofR.A. No. 3019

CARLOS RACADIO ASUNCION,MAMELFA AMONGOL y RABAGO,

Accused,

X-




ROSITA R. RAGUNJAN,Accused,

X"




VIRGINIA RAFANAN y RABINO,Accused,

X"



C ARLOS RACADIO ASUNCION,

GENOVEVA R. RAGASA,

Accused,

-versus-


MAMELFA AMONGOL y RABAGO,Accused,

SB-17-CRM-1401

FOR: Malversation of Public

Funds

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-versus-


ROSITA R. RAGUNJAN,Accused,

SB-17-CRM-1402


Funds



Funds

CARLOS RACADIO ASUNCION,VIRGINIA RAFANAN y RABINO,

Accused,

X--

-versus- SB-17-CRM-I404


Funds


GENOVEVA RAGASA y REQUEZO,Accused, PRESENT:

Quiroz, J., ChairpersonCruz, J.

Jacinto, J.

Promulgated on:

1

X- -X

RESOLUTION

QUIROZ,/.:

Before this Court are the following incidents: (1) the Motion forReconsideration (of the Decision dated 17 May 2019)' dated 31 May 2018filed by accused (now convicts) Mamelta Amongol, Genoveva R. Ragasa, andRosita Ragunjan on 03 June 2019 through their counsel; (2) the Motion forReconsideration (14 May 2019 Decision)^ dated 01 June 2019 filed by

' Records, Vol. 2, pp. 377-411.- Records, Vol. 2, pp. 434-448.

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accused (now convict) Carlos R. Asuncion, though his counsel, which wasreceived by this Court by mail on 14 June 2019; and (3) the prosecution'sComment/Opposition (re: AccusedAmongol, Ragasa, andRagunjan's Motionfor Reconsideration dated 31 May 2019 and Accused Asuncion's Motion forReconsideration dated 1 June 2019f dated 24 June 2019 and filed on 03 July2019.

To recall, the Court promulgated the assailed Decision"^ on 17 May2019 finding all the herein accused, along with their co-accused VirginiaRafanan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of all the charges against them, i.e.,(1) violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in Criminal Case Nos. SB-IT-CRM-1393-1396; (2) Section 3(j) of R.A. No. 3019 in Criminal Case Nos.SB-17-CRM-1397-1400; and (3) malversation of public flmds under Article217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 10951 in CriminalCase Nos. SB-17-CRM-1401-1404. The dispositive portion of the Decisionreads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is herebyrendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case Nos. SB-17-CRM-1393-1396, accused

CARLOS RACADIO ASUNCION, MAMELFA AMONGOL yRABAGO, ROSITA R. RAGUNJAN, VIRGINIA RAFANAN yRABINO, and GENOVEVA RAGASA y REQUEZO are each foundGUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.3019, and are hereby imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonmentof SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH as minimum to TEN (10)YEARS as maximum for each count. Additionally, said accused aresentenced to suffer perpetual disqualification to hold public office.

2. In Criminal Case Nos. SB-17-CRM-1397-1400, accusedCARLOS RACADIO ASUNCION, MAMELFA AMONGOL yRABAGO, ROSITA R. RAGUNJAN, VIRGINIA RAFANAN yRABINO, and GENOVEVA RAGASA y REQUEZO are each foundGUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3(j) of R.A. No.3019, and are hereby imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonmentof SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (I) MONTH as minimum to TEN (10)YEARS as maximum for each count, and perpetual disqualification to holdpublic office.

3. In Criminal Case Nos. SB-17-CRM-1401-1404, accusedCARLOS RACADIO ASUNCION, MAMELFA AMONGOL yRABAGO, ROSITA R. RAGUNJAN, VIRGINIA RAFANAN yRABINO, and GENOVEVA RAGASA y REQUEZO are each foundGUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of malversation of public funds underArticle 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 10951, and

^ Records, Vol. 2, pp. 461-468.Records, Vol. 2, pp. 328-360. H

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are hereby imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of TWO (2)YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY afprision correccionalas minimum to SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as maximum foreach count, appreciating the total restitution of public funds as a mitigatingcircumstance. The penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public officeis likewise imposed upon said accused.

Further, the following accused are ordered to pay a fine equivalentto the amount malversed in each case: (1) accused CARLOS RACADIOASUNCION and MAMELFA AMONGOL y RABAGO, the amount ofPhp 100,000.00 in SB-17-CRM-1401; (2) accused CARLOS RACADIOASUNCION and ROSITA R. RAGUNJAN, Php 100,000.00 in SB-17-CRM-1402; (3) accused CARLOS RACADIO ASUNCION andVIRGINIA RAFANAN y RABINO, Php 100,000.00 in SB-17-CRM-1403', and (4) accused CARLOS RACADIO ASUNCION andGENOVEVA RAGASA y REQUEZO, Php 100,000.00 in SB-17-CRM-1404. No civil liability is adjudged, in view of the full restitution of theamounts involved.

SO ORDERED."

At this juncture, it bears noting that accused Virginia Rafanan("Rafanan") did not seek the reconsideration of the foregoing Decision.Instead, she was ordered by this Court to post an additional bond double theamount of each count of conviction,^ in view of her absence during thepromulgation of judgment on 17 May 2019, despite notice thereof. To thisdate, said accused has not posted the said additional bond.

The separate motions for reconsideration of the rest of the accused andthe prosecution's comment thereon may be summarized in this wise:

The motion for reconsideration of accusedAsuncion.

Asuncion maintains that the assailed Decision is not in accord with the

facts of the cases and the law and jurisprudence applicable thereto and that itakes conclusions not supported by evidence.

He insists that this Court erred in ruling that he acted in evident badfaith when he approved the "financial assistance" in favor of the concernedchapters of the Bayanihan ng Kababaihan. On the contrary, according to him,he acted in good faith because the said organization, including the chaptersconcerned, were accredited by the Sangguniang Bayan itself. Moreover, thesubject appropriations ordinance, which was originally enacted in 2010, wasdeemed reenacted in 2012, considering that there was no new appropriations

See Order dated 10 June 2019, Records, Vol. 2, p. 433.

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ordinance enacted after 2010. Since that there was a valid appropriationsordinance in 2012, Asuncion posits that he had the authority to enter approveand release the subject "financial assistance" to the Bayanihan ngKababaihanchapters.

Asuncion further argues that the interpretation made by this Court ofthe provisions of R.A. No. 7171 as to the qualified beneficiaries of the sharesof tobacco excise taxes was "overly restrictive and unjustified." He points outthat the Declaration of Policy of the said law extends the beneficiaries thereofto "farmers of Virginia tobacco-producing provinces," and not only toVirginia tobacco farmers. This is bolstered by the provisions of MemorandumCircular No. 61-A, amending Memorandum Circular No. 61, which speak offanners, and not only Virginia tobacco farmers. The said circular likewisecontemplates "infrastructure projects such as farm-to-market roads" and"barangay economic development projects," which do not solely inure to thebenefit of tobacco farmers. In this regard, the "financial assistance" which wasgranted in favor of the Bayanihan ng Kababaihan chapters intended toprovide a revolving capital for them to re-loan to their individual members tostart their own livelihood project that will eventually help them augment theirfamily income.

Furthermore, Asuncion contends that the fact that the Bayanihan ngKababaihan chapters were accredited by the Sangguniang Bayan and that thesaid chapters returned the amounts received by them upon the issuance of theNotice of Disallowance by the Commission on Audit (CO A), without waitingfor the same to ripen into a case, are counter-indications of evident bad faith.

Asuncion also asserts that the doctrine laid down in Arias V5.

Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 81563, 19 December 1989 applies to him, in that herelied in good faith upon the due diligence of the Sangguniang Bayan, whichaccredited the Bayanihan ng Kababaihan chapters and enacted the subjectordinance appropriating the share of the municipality of Sta. Catalina, IlocosSur in tobacco excise taxes in favor of the said chapters.

As regards the registration of the chapters with the Department of Labor■^nd Employment (DOLE), Asuncion avers that the same merely formalizedthe status of the Bayanihan ng Kababaihan chapters as rural workersassociations. As such, according to him, it was too sweeping for the Court todisregard the defense that the Bayanihan ng Kababaihan chapters were defacto corporations.

Asuncion likewise argues that the element of "undue injury to thegovernment" was not established to a reasonable degree of certainty becausewhat was granted to the Bayanihan ng Kababaihan chapters was not exactly

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a "financial assistance," but a mere loan which the latter were bound to payon a yearly installment basis within a definite term. Moreover, the said loanswere settled within the period given pursuant to the COA's Notices ofDisallowance. The accounts were thus settled immediately upon demand.

As to his conviction for malversation, Asuncion maintains that the cases

relied upon by the Court in its Decision are not on all fours with the ones atbar. He insists that the Court should have applied instead the ruling in Tabuenavs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 103501-03, 17 February 1987, where theSupreme Court held that "good faith in the payment of public funds relievesa public officer from the crime of malversation."

Finally, Asuncion insists that conspiracy was not proven. He points outthat the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution, i.e., the projectproposals, the Memoranda of Agreement, and the disbursement vouchers,were not formally offered for the purpose of establishing conspiracy amongthe accused. The said documents, standing alone, do not constitute proof ofconspiracy among said accused.

The joint motion for reconsideration ofaccused Amongol, Ragasa, and Ragunjan.

For their part, accused Mamelta Amongol ("Amongol"), Genoveva R.Ragasa ("Ragasa"), and Rosita Ragunjan ("Ragunjan") argue that theprosecution was unable to prove their guilt in all the charges against them.

With regard to Criminal Case Nos. SB-17-CRM-1393-1396 forviolation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, Amongol, Ragasa, and Ragunjancontend that the circumstances laid down in the assailed Decision cannot beconsidered as positive and conclusive evidence that would indicateconspiracy, that the Decision banked on circumstances that do not constituteov(jrt acts in furtherance of conspiracy, and that the same was based oncircumstantial evidence that cannot sustain a conviction. Particularly, saidaccused point out that the Court disregarded their defense of good faith.

Accused further aver that mere acquiescence or approval of the act doesnot prove conspiracy. Thus, to them, the circumstances enumerated by theCourt in its Decision are not sufficient to prove their cooperation nor theirapproval to cooperate thereto. In other words, when the prosecution presentedtheir respective applications for "loan assistance," it merely proved that theysubmitted, prepared, consented, and approved the project proposal. In thesame vein, when the four (4) separate MOA between the Bayanihan ngKababaihan chapters and Asuncion were presented, what was only provenwas the fact that the said MOA were entered into by the said parties. Similarly,

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the disbursement vouchers offered by the prosecution only proved thatAsuncion approved the payment of the "financial assistance" and that accusedBayanihan ng Kababaihan chapter presidents received the proceeds of thesame.

As regards Criminal Case Nos. SB-17-CRM-1397-1400 for violationof Section 3G) ofR.A. No. 3019, Amongol, Ragasa, and Ragunjan argue thatthe Court incorrectly placed the burden upon them when it held that theirrespective Bayanihan ng Kababaihan chapters were not entitled to receive thesubject financial assistance. Further, the Court en-ed in failing to apply thedoctrine of presumption of regularity that accused Asuncion should haveenjoyed in the performance of his official duties.

With respect to Criminal Case Nos. SB-17-CRM-l401-1404 formalversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, asamended, Amongol, Ragasa, and Ragunjan aver that conspiracy was neverproved, and that the Court failed to appreciate the rule that "good faith in thepayment of public funds relieves a public officer from the crime ofmalversation."

The prosecution's comment on the twomotions for reconsideration.

For its part, the prosecution posits that the Court correctly convicted theaccused of all the charges filed against them.

The prosecution argues that the accused failed to raise new andsubstantial arguments that would warrant the reconsideration of the subjectDecision. As to the finding of conspiracy among the accused, the prosecutioncontends that it can easily be seen that accused acted in conspiracy with oneanother when they entered into the MOA, knowing fully well that theBayanihan ng Kababaihan chapters were not entitled to receive the saidfinancial assistance.

With respect to the conviction for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.)19, the prosecution submits that all elements of the said crime are present

in these cases. According to the prosecution, the Court correctly found thataccused acted in evident bad faith when the release of funds was granted infavor of the Bayanihan ng Kababaihan chapters, in violation of R.A. No 7171.Since the said Bayanihan ng Kababaihan chapters were not registeredassociations of tobacco farmers at the time of the release of the subject publicfunds, they were not entitled to receive the same. As to the existence of a validappropriations ordinance, the prosecution maintains that there is no evidenceon record that shows that the appropriations ordinance in 2010 was reenacted

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in 2011 and 2012, The prosecution points out that accused repeatedly referredto the 2010 appropriations ordinance as the basis to justify the disbursementssubject of these cases. The prosecution further insists that accused Asuncion'sact of entering into the subject MOA was made without authority, consideringthat there was no appropriations ordinance therefor. Also, there should havebeen a separate and specific approval from the Sanggunian, authorizingaccused Asuncion to enter into the MOA and grant the said financialassistance.

As regards the conviction for Section 3(j) of R.A. No. 3019, theprosecution maintains that the Court was correct in ruling that accusedAsuncion approved and granted a privilege or benefit in favor of theBayanihan ng Kababaihan chapters, despite knowing that the latter were notentitled thereto. The prosecution avers that accused Asuncion cannot invokethe presumption of regularity because of the patent disregard of R.A. No. 7171and COA Circular No. 2007-001 dated 25 October 2017.

With regard to the conviction for malversation of public funds underArticle 217 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution agrees with the Courtthat the said crime was consummated the moment accused Asuncion allowedthe release of public funds to the Bayanihan ng Kababaihan chapters, despiteblowing that they were not entitled thereto. Thus, the return of the subjectfunds carmot exonerate the accused. Moreover, the prosecution avers that therestitution was made only on 22 February 2016, when a case had already beenfiled against the accused before the Office of the Ombudsman, despite theNotice of Disallowance being dated 27 May 2013. To the prosecution, thebelated restitution was a mere afterthought on the part of the accused and anattempt to relieve themselves of any liability.

RULING

Both Motions for Reconsideration are devoid of merit.

First, as to who may be beneficiaries of a Virginia tobacco-producingprovince's shares in excise taxes under R.A. No. 7171, the Court maintainsthat the Bayanihan ng Kababaihan chapters, through their respectivepresidents, are not within the contemplation of the law.

Accused insist that the beneficiaries under the said law are not limited

to "Virginia tobacco farmers," but must also include all fanners from Virginiatobacco-producing provinces. To be sure, under Section 1 of R.A. No. 7171on the declaration of policy, the law regards "farmers of the Virginia tobacco-producing provinces" as the "nucleus of the Virginia tobacco industry."Moreover, Section 2 on the law's objective states that "[t]he special support

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to the Virginia tobacco-producing provinces shall be utilized to advance theself-reliance of the tobacco farmers" through the means enumerated therein.Thus, it would be illogical to include all farmers, so long as they are from aVirginia tobacco-producing province, as qualified beneficiaries under the law.Clearly, the beneficiaries should be limited only to Virginia tobacco farmersfrom Virginia tobacco-producing provinces.

Even granting arguendo that accused's interpretation of the law iscorrect, it remains true that the records are bereft of any evidence that mayshow that the Baycinihcin ng Kabcibaihavi and its respective chapters arecomprised of farmers. In fact, and as pointed out in the Decision, the accused,through their counsel, admitted in open court that the chapter members "maynot exactly be farmers, " but are "farmers' wives, sisters, or mothers. ^ Thisstatement of their counsel constitutes a judicial admission^ which effectivelybinds the accused. In Sps. Binarao vs. Plus Builders, Inc.,^ the Supreme Courtheld that "[a] party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings, (b)during the trial, either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations,or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding." It should also be emphasizedthat, as a rule, a party is bound by his counsel's conduct in handling a case.Thus, accused cannot belatedly claim now that they are farmers who arequalified to enjoy the benefits under R.A. No. 7171.

Moreover, their claim that they were "farmers' wives, sisters, ormothers" was unsupported by any evidence. Basic is the rule that bareallegations are not evidence and should not be accorded with any weight. Evenassuming that they are indeed "farmers' wives, sisters, or mothers, " nothingin the law allows the benefits under R.A. No. 7171 to be directly extended tosuch persons.

Furthermore, even again assuming that the benefits of the law may beextended to "farmers' wives, sisters, or mothers " and that the Bayanihan ngKababaihan is comprised of such persons, the Bayanihan ng Kababaihanchapters still failed to comply with the requirement under COA Circular No.2007-001 dated 25 October 2017 that they must have legal personality at thetime of their request for financial assistance. The records indubitably showthat, at the time material to these cases, the Bayanihan ng Kababaihanchapters failed to submit the documentary requirements enumerated in COACircular No. 2007-001 for purposes of establishing such legal personality.

^ Decision dated 17 May 2019, p. 18, citing TSN dated 09 May 2018, p. 8.^ Sec. 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of theproceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showingthat it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

8G.R. No. 154430, June 16,2006.^ Mortel V5. Ken, G.R. No. 156296, November 12, 2012

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Considering all the foregoing, accused's argument that they are qualifiedbeneficiaries under R.A. No. 7171 must fail.

Second, as to the existence of a valid appropriations ordinance, theC(3urt finds that no valid appropriations ordinance existed at the time whenthe four (4) MOA were entered into. The Court is not unaware of the LocalGovernment Code provision cited by the accused, i.e., Section 323 thereof,which provides that in cases where the Sanggunian fails to enact an annualappropriations ordinance after ninety (90) days from the beginning of thefiscal year, the ordinance authorizing the appropriations of the preceding yearshall be deemed reenacted.

Indeed, the law provides for the automatic reenactment of anapipropriations ordinance in situations where the Sanggunian concerned failsto enact a new one within ninety (90) days from the beginning of the fiscalyear. What the accused fail to cite, however, is the last sentence of the firstparagraph of Section 323, i.e., "[hjowever, only the annual appropriationsfor salaries and wages of existing positions, statutory and contractualobligations, and essential operating expenses authorized in the annual andsupplemental budsets for the precedins year shall be deemed reenacted anddisbursement of funds shall be in accordance therewith. Thus, assuming thatthe 2010 appropriations ordinance was deemed reenacted in 2011 and,subsequently, in 2012, the law limits such reenactment to the followingmatters: (1) the annual appropriations for salaries and wages of existingpositions; (2) statutory and contractual obligations; and (3) essential operatinge}cpenses which were authorized in the annual and supplemental budgets forthe year of 2010.

In these cases, the grant of the financial assistance was made only in2012. Hence, if indeed the 2010 appropriations ordinance was reenacted, suchreenactment could not have included a "contractual obligation" which was notexisting in 2010, as it only arose in 2012. Consequently, the grant made in2012 could not have been covered by any valid appropriations ordinanceissued by the Sangguniang Bayan. As fittingly held by the Supreme Court inHon. Quisumbing vs. Hon. Garcia^^:

"xxx Yet, this is obviously not the effect Congress had in mind whenit required, as a condition to the local chief executive's representation of thelocal government unit in business transactions, the prior authorization of thesanggunian concerned. The requirement was deliberately added as ameasure of check and balance, to temper the authority of the local chiefexecutive, and in recognition of the fact that the corporate powers of thelocal government unit are wielded as much by its chief executive as by itscouncil. However, as will be discussed later, the sanggunian authorization

' G.R. No. 175527, December 8,2008.

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may be in the form of an appropriation ordinance passed for the year whichspecifically covers the project, cost or contract to be entered into by the localgovernment unit.

The fact that the Province of Cebu operated under a reenactedbudget in 2004 lent a complexion to this case which the trial court did notapprehend. Sec. 323 of R.A. No. 7160 provides that in case of a reenactedbudget, "only the annual appropriations for salaries and wages of existingpositions, statutory and contractual obligations, and essential operatingexpenses authorized in the annual and supplemental budgets for thepreceding year shall be deemed reenacted and disbursement of funds shallbe in accordance therewith."

It should be observed that, as indicated by the word "only"preceding the above enumeration in Sec. 323, the items for whichdisbursements may he made under a reenacted budget are exclusive.Clearly, contractual obligations which were not included in the previousyear's annual and supplemental budgets cannot be disbursed by thelocal goyernment unit. It follows, too, that new contracts entered intoby the local chief executiye require the prior apnroyal of thesanssunian." (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Third, the Court finds it difficult to subscribe to accused's claim ofgood faith. As earlier mentioned, the grant of the financial assistance wasmade in violation of R.A. No. 7171 and COA Circular No. 2007-001, andwithout a valid appropriations ordinance. The defense of good faith isunavailing precisely because accused Asuncion relied on documents whichshowed palpable defects when he signed them.

Contrary to accused's position, the doctrine laid down in Amado Ariasvs. Sandiganbayan" does not find application in these cases. In the saidlandmark case, the Court acquitted the accused because "[a]ll heads ofofficeshave to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faithof those prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations."However, the Court also held in the same case that for such head of office tobe convicted, "[tjhere has to be some added reason why he should examineeach voucher in such detail. " Along this line, the Supreme Court found theAmado Arias doctrine to be inapplicable in some cases, such as that inRepublic vs. Florendo Arias, viz:

"The Court of Appeals anchored its ruling on the case of Arias v.Sandiganbayan, where the Court acquitted Arias, who was an Auditor ofRizal Engineering District in Pasig and passed upon and approved in auditthe acquisition as well as payment of lands needed for the MangahanFloodway Project. According to the Court, all heads of offices have to relyto a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of thosewho prepare bids, purchase supplies or enter negotiations. However, the

" G.R. No. 81563, December 19, 1989.G.R. No. 188909, September 17,2014.

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' M ̂/yS^

Court went on to state that "there should be other grounds than meresignature or approval appearing on the voucher to sustain a conspiracycharge and conviction" or dismissal in this case.

There exists a ground other than the signatures appearing on

the emergency purchase/repair documents that should have proddedrespondent to conduct a more than cursory examination of thedocuments. The absence of a certification and signature of the end-userwhich would justify the emergency repair and/or purchase is glaring."(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Similarly, in Garcia vs. Office ofthe Ombudsman, et. al.,'^ the SupremeCourt held that "when a matter is irregular on the document's face, somuch so that a detailed examination becomes warranted, the Ariasdoctrine is unavailing." In these cases, the fact alone that no documentaryevidence was submitted by the Bayanihan ng Kababaihan chapters togetherwith their applications for financial assistance to establish their juridicalpersonality, in violation of CO A Circular No. 2007-001, should have proddedaccused Asuncion, as the local chief executive, to make a detailedexamination of the applications. This, he failed to do.

The Court also does not find merit in the argument that the mereapproval of accused Asuncion of the financial grants is not sufficient toconvict him. Aptly, in Zoleta vs. Sandiganbayan,^^ the accused vice-governorwas convicted of the crime charged because of the presence of his signatureon the disbursement vouchers, to wit:

"Finally, Vice-Governor Constantino and Camanay appropriated,took, misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or negligence,permitted another person to take the public funds when they signedDisbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-01-822. The term voucher, when

used in connection with disbursement of money, implies some instrumentthat shows on what account or by what authority a particular payment hasbeen made, or that services have been performed which entitle the paify towhom it is issued to payment. Corollarilv. when an authorized personanproves a disbursement voucher, he certifies to the correctness of the

entries therein, among others; that the expenses incurred were

necessary and lawful, the supporting documents are complete, and the

availability of cash therefor. He also attests that the person who

performed the services or delivered the supplies, materials, or

equipment is entitled to payment." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Contrary to his contention, accused Asuncion was expected to know theyf legalities behind the disbursement of public funds. He was, after all, the localJ chief executive who was supposed to exercise general supervision and controlf over all programs, projects, services, and activities of the municipal

" G.R. No. 197567, November 19,2014.'^G.R. No. 185224, July 29,2015.

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government.'^ He was also tasked to ensure that all executive officials andemployees of the municipality faithfully discharge their duties and functionsas provided by law.'^ To the Court, he should have known the requirementsset forth in R.A. No. 7171, COA Circular No. 2007-001, and the LocalGovernment Code. Besides, ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Fourth, accused cannot claim exoneration on account of their"immediate" restitution of the disbursed funds. To the accused, the restitutionshould have been appreciated by the Court in their favor because it was madebefore the matter has "ripened" to an actual case. The Court disagrees.

In the case of People V5. Miranda,'^ which was also cited in theDecision, the Supreme Court categorically ruled that even "assumingxxx thataccusedXXX had indeed fully reimbursed or returned the amounts he supposedto have malversed, still his criminal liability [was] not extinguished therebyand he must still account and [be] prosecuted for any malversation he hascommitted. " In the said case, the Supreme Court disregarded the fact that theaccused restituted the disbursed funds before the filing of an Informationagainst him. In effect, the Supreme Court held that he should still be tried formalversation, regardless of when he returned the funds. To this Court, thewisdom behind the aforesaid ruling lies upon the nature of the crime ofmalversation, i.e., a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code as onecommitted by a public officer, and not merely a crime against property. Assuch, restitution does not extinguish criminal liability in malversation. Simplyput, mere restitution does not take away the fact that accused had betrayed thepublic trust reposed upon his office. Nonetheless, and as ruled by this Courtin the assailed Decision, restitution has an effect on the civil liability and isbeing treated as a mitigating circumstance herein.

Finally, the Court maintains that conspiracy was established with moralcertainty. Moral certainty is that degree of proof which produces convictionin an unprejudiced mind.'^ In this regard, it is settled that conspiracy need notbe proven by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of theaccused.'^ In these cases, conspiracy may be inferred from accused Bayanihanng Kababaihan chapter presidents' separate acts of applying for financialassistance, knowing that their organization did not have the legal personalityto do so, and accused Asuncion's act of approving all four (4) applications,despite the applicants' blatant disregard of R.A. No. 7171 and COA CircularNt^ 2007-001, all of which were evident on the face of their respective projectroposals.

See Section 444 of the Local Government Code.

Ibid.

No. L-16122, May 30, 1961.See Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.Supra at 14.

Resolution

People V. Asuncion, et. al.SB-17-CRM-l393-1404

Pa-ye 15 of 15.X

All told, the Court finds no cogent reason to set aside its earlier findingsin the Decision dated 17 May 2019. The Court maintains that all the elementsof crimes charged were established by the prosecution with moral certainty.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration(of the Decision dated 17 May 2019) dated 31 May 2018 of MameltaAmongol, Genoveva R. Ragasa, and Rosita Ragunjan and the Motion forReconsideration (14 May 2019 Decision) dated 01 June 2019 of Carlos R.Asuncion are both DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines

fQUChairperson/

Associate Justice

We Concur:

REYNiVIiDO P. CRUZy Associate Justice

BAYA

Assoj

. JACINTO

Justice

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