SCAN
SHORT FORM ORDER
SUPREME COURT STATE OF NEW YORKCOUNTY OF NASSAU
PRESENT:HON. IRA B. WARSHAWSKY,
Justice.TRIAL/IAS PART 8
O. GENE CASAMASSIMA, a Shareholder ofWestbur Transport, Inc. of Georgia, WestburyTerminals, Inc. of Georgia, Westbury TransportInc. , and Westbury Terminals , Inc. , Suing in theRight of Westbury Transport, Inc. Of GeorgiaWestbury Terminals , Inc. of Georgia, WestburTransport, Inc. and Westbury Terminals , Inc.
Plaintiffs
-against -
INDEX NO. : 008626/2004MOTION DATE: 06/16/2010MOTION SEQUENCE: 002 and
003WESTBURY TRANSPORT, INC. OF GEORGIAWESTBURY TERMINALS , INC. OF GEORGIAWESTBURY TRANSPORT, INC. , WESTBURYTERMINALS , INC. , IGC MANAGEMENT, INC.
IGC TRANSPORTATION , INC. , IGC REALTY, INC.
CASE MANAGEMENT , INC. , ROSWELL REALTYBUSINESS TRUST , WESTBURY LOGISTICS , INC.,MATTHEW CASAMASSIMA LIVING TRUSTMATTHEW CASAMASSIMA and DANIEL DOYLE
Defendants.
The following papers were read on this matter:
Notice of Motion, Affidavit, Affrmation & Exhibits Annexed ........................................ 1Defendants ' Memorandum oflaw in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment............ 2Notice of Cross-Motion, Affrmation, Affdavit & Exhibits Annexed .............................. 3Plaintiffs ' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants ' Motion forSummary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiffs ' Motion for Summar ........................... 4Defendants ' reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Motion forSummary Judgment and in Opposition to Cross-Motion for Summar Judgment andfor Leave to File Amended Complaint ............................................................................... 5
PlaintiffO. Gene Casamassima s Affidavit in Reply to Defendant'Opposition to Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summar Judgment ..................................... 6
Plaintiffs ' Memorandum of Law in Reply to Defendants ' Opposition to
Plaintiffs ' Cross- Motion for Summar Judgment .............................................................. 7
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 9 3212. Plaintiffs cross-
move for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 9 3212 , and for leave to serve an amended
complaint.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Gene and defendant Matthew Casamassima are brothers who inherited a
substantial trucking and trailer repair business from their father. They have been engaged in a
long-standing dispute, which culminated in this action which alleges mismanagement and
misappropriation of corporate funds by defendant Matthew. There are a number of corporations
involved in the operation of the respective businesses. Westbury Transport, Inc. and Westbur
Terminals , Inc. are commonly referred to as the "New York Corporations . They are operated
from two locations , Port Washington and Brentwood. Two companies , initially created to
service a prospective client are entitled Westbury Transport, Inc. of Georgia and Westbur
Terminals , Inc. of Georgia, known as the "Georgia Corporation . Additional defendants include
IGC Management, Inc., IGC Transportation, Inc. , IGC Realty, Inc. , Case Management, Inc.
Roswell Realty Business Trust, and Matthew Casamassima Revocable Living Trust, s./h./a.
Matthew Casamassima Living Trust.
Defendant reiterates the history of this matter, commencing with a 2002 action Westbury
Tramsport, Inc. of Georgia, et al. v. Casamassima, et aI Index No. 02-004888 , which was
dismissed without prejudice on May 11 , 2004 , only to be followed by this action, commenced in
2004. An interim action to remove Matthew as Trustee of a Family Trust was dismissed, with
affirmance by the Appellate Division.
The action has been the subject of prior motion practice. The portions of the complaint
which remain open are as follows:
the Third and Fourth Causes of Action for diversion of corporate assets and
breach of fiduciar duty, have been dismissed, with respect to conduct occuring
prior to June 25, 2001 and June 25 , 1998 respectively;
the Sixth Cause of Action for breach of fiduciar duty on claimed diversion of
funds from the Georgia Corporations by payment of family members for "
show" jobs and paying personal expenses with corporate funds, was dismissed
except as to actions occurring after June 25 , 1998;
the Ninth and Eleventh Causes of Action alleged misappropriation of fuds from
the Georgia Companies for the benefit of companies in which Matthew held a
majority interest, is limited to such conduct after June 25 , 1998;
the Twelfth and Thirteenth Causes of Action allege that defendant Doyle assisted
in Matthew s wrongdoing.
The verified answer includes three counterclaims. The First and Second counterclaims
assert derivative claims on behalf of defendant and Westbury Transport of Georgia, Inc.
WTIG"), against counterclaim defendants O. Gene Casamassima, Bedding Showcase Inc.
BSI") and 1. Hadley Conn ("Conn ) for their misappropriation ofWTIG' s assets, and diversion
of those assets to Bedding Showcase. Counterclaim-plaintiffs seek a constructive trust over
assets wrongfully obtained by counterclaim-defendants.
Plaintiff takes a different view of the history of this intra-family conflict, contending that
the opening volley in the now long-standing dispute, was the firing by Matthew of Gene from
Westbury Transport in 2001 , despite the fact that each was a 50% owner ofthe company, and
negotiations were underway for the distribution of the assets of the conglomerate. This was
followed by an action commenced by Matthew, in which he obtained a temporar restraining
order against Gene s paricipation in any of the Westbur companies , leaving him without
income for himself or the employees he supervised at the Brentwood facility.
As par of their cross-motion, plaintiffs seek to amend the complaint by renaming
Roswell Realty Business Trust as a plaintiff; adding NuWest Logistics and Many Casamassima
as co-defendants; and add a cause of action for dissolution (not listed in the Notice of Cross-
Motion but listed in the Casamassima affidavit).
DISCUSSION
Defendants posit a series of reasons why their motion to dismiss should be granted:
plaintiff is seeking to recover for conduct in which he either paricipated or
acquiesced;
in a similar vein, defendants claim that plaintiff is barred from recovery
under the doctrine of unclean hands;
plaintiff is seeking to recover damages on behalf of entities other than
those on whose behalf he claims to act in this derivative action;
the majority of factual allegations underlying the complaint are
demonstrably false , and plaintiff has conceded his lack of evidence to
support most of the allegations.
When presented with a motion for summary judgment, the function of a cour is "not to
determine credibility or to engage in issue determination, but rather to determine the existence or
non-existence of material issues of fact." (Quinn v. Krumland, 179 A.D.2d 448 , 449 - 450 (1 sl
Dept. 1992)); See also (SJ Capelin Associates, Inc. v. Globe Mfg. Corp. 34 N. 2d 338 343
(1974)).
To grant summary judgment, it must clearly appear that no material and triable issue of
fact is presented. (Stilman v. Twentieth Century-Fox Corp. 3 N.Y.2d 395 404 (1957)). It is a
drastic remedy, the procedural equivalent of atrial , and wil not be granted if there is any doubt
as to the existence of a triable issue. (Moskowitz v. Garlock 23 AD.2d 94 (3d Dept. 1965));
(Crowley s Milk Co. v. Klein 24 A. 2d 920 (3d Dept. 1965)).
The evidence wil be considered in a light most favorable to the opposing par. (Weil
Garfield, 21 AD .2d 156 (3d Dept. 1964)). The proof submitted in opposition wil be accepted as
true and all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the opposing par. (Tortorello v. Carlin, 260
AD.2d 201 206 (PI Dept. 2003)). On a motion to dismiss, the court must" , accept the facts as
alleged in the complaint as true , accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable
inference , and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal
theory
' "
(Braddock v. Braddock 2009 WL 23307 (N. AD. 1 sl Dept. 2009)), (citing Leon
Martinez 84 N.Y.2d 83 , 87 88 (1994)). But this rule wil not be applied where the opposition
is evasive or indirect. The opposing party is obligated to come forward and bare his proof, by
affidavit of an individual with personal knowledge, or with an attorney s affirmation to which
appended material in admissible form, and the failure to do so may lead the Cour to believe that
there is no triable issue of fact. (Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557 , 562 (1980)).
While it may appear to be a difference without distinction, the doctrine of unclean hands
may not be used as a defense to a derivative cause of action, the theory being that the action is
brought on behalf ofthe company, and the unclean hands of the individual shareholder who
brings the action is irrelevant. (Grammas v. Charla, 45 AD.2d 7569 (2d Dept. 1974)). Actual
acquiescence, paricipation in, acquiescence in, or ratification of an act constituting a wrong
against the corporation, however, precludes the shareholder from maintaining an action attacking
such acts on the grounds of equitable estoppel. (Diamond v. Diamond, 307 N.Y. 263 , 266
(1954)); (Pinnacle Consultants, Ltd. v. Leucadia Nat. Corp. 261 AD.2d 164 (PI Dept. 1999)).
Defendants ' first argument is that during the course of discovery, it became apparent that
plaintiff could not identify the amount of funds , if any, diverted from any of the four Westbur
corporations, leaving open the possibility that funds were diverted from another entity. This is
why plaintiff is seeking to amend the complaint to name Roswell Realty Business Trust as a
necessar plaintiff, instead of solely a defendant. The question, at this juncture , is whether
viewing the complaint in its most favorable light, and considering the documentar and
testimonial evidence adduced to date , plaintiff can show that there has been a diversion of fuds
from any of the four corporations on behalf of whom Gene purports to act. If not, the claims
against them must be dismissed.
In support of the request for leave to amend the complaint to include Roswell as a
plaintiff, Gene contends that in 1999-2000 alone , $464 987.26 was diverted from Roswell to IGC
Realty, in which Gene has no interest. Plaintiff further contends that Matthew diverted two major
accounts from the Westbury Georgia companies , initially to IGC Transport, Inc. , and then to
NuWest Logistics , 99% of which is owned by Matthew s son Many, whom plaintiff seeks to
add as a defendant, and the remaining 1 % is owned by Matthew. Defendant opposes the
application to amend the complaint on the grounds that the proposed amended complaint fails to
include derivative claims on behalf of Roswell; that plaintiff had unduly delayed in making
application for leave to amend; and, any such claims on behalf of Roswell are bared by the
statute of limitations.
Provosed Amended Comvlaint
Plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint to include Roswell Realty Business Trust as a
plaintiff so as to seek derivative relief on its behalf is denied. The proposed amended complaint
Exh. "T" to the Cross-motion, neither names Roswell as a plaintiff, nor includes any allegations
that defendant Matthew Casamassima improperly diverted any funds from that entity. Whle
leave to amend, it is often stated, should be freely given, this is not so where the proposed
amended complaint fails to state a cause of action or is plainly lacking in merit. Hynes v. Start
Elevator, Inc., 2 A. 3d 178 , 181 (PI Dept. 2003).
To the extent plaintiff seeks to add Many Casamassima and NuWest as defendants, the
motion is also denied. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Matthew Casamassima improperly
diverted two major clients, Macy s/Associated and Bed, Bath and Beyond, from Westbur to
ICC, and thereafter to NuWest, states a cause of action. These transactions , however, took place
in 1999 and 2000. By bringing this claim for the first time in 2010, it is bared by even the
longest potential statute of limitations , six years.
Roswell , on whose behalf plaintiff ostensibly seeks to act, is a Pennsylvania Trust, the
sole asset of which is a building in Pittsburgh. It is a resident of Pennsylvania. The action
complained of occurred either in Pennsylvania, from where money was allegedly diverted, or
Florida, where it is claimed to have been invested. In either event, CPLR 9202 requires the
application of the statute of limitations of Pennsylvania, where the damage was sustained, or
New York, whichever is shorter.
The substantive law of New York, to the extent that it contains a "relation back" doctrine
is of no benefit to plaintiff. There is no basis upon which to apply New York law to a transaction
which took place outside of New York and had its major impact in Pennsylvania. Even if New
York' s more liberal "relation back" doctrine were applicable , it would not grant relief to plaintiff
in this action since Roswell cannot be said to be "united in interest" with other defendants against
whom the action was timely commenced. (Buran v. Coupal 87 N.Y.2d 173 (1995)).
Third and Fourth Causes of Action
Plaintiff contends that between 1994 and 2001 Matthew diverted $60 000 per month from
the Georgia Corporations to cover operating expenses on a parcel of real estate in Florida, owned
by IGC Realty, Inc. , in which Matthew had a 99% interest, with their father owning the other 1 %.
The remaining claim is from June 25 , 1998 forward.
Ifplaintiffs allegation of$60 000 per month from June 25 through 2001 is fully credited
the total amount is approximately $2. 16 milion. Aside from the fact that he has not, despite
years of discovery, been able to establish what, if any, fuds were diverted from the Georgia
corporations to IGC , or state whether the payments came, in fact, from another entity, Roswell.
It seems clear that he was a full paricipant in the operation of the Georgia companies , and
acquiesced in the transfers, if they occured. More significantly, Matthew has injected far more
money from the sale of the Florida building into the Georgia companies than Gene claims was
misappropriated. Neither he nor the Georgia companies have sustained economic damage as a
consequence of the alleged diversions.
The Fourh Cause of Action is based upon the same unsubstantiated claims of $60 000
per month diversions , and alleges a breach of fiduciar duty. Putting aside the claims of
complicity in the challenged conduct, at the conclusion of discovery, plaintiff canot substatiate
his claims , and has, in fact, benefitted from the contributions from the sale ofIGC's propert as
opposed to suffering a detriment.
The motion to dismiss the Third and Fourh Causes of Action is granted.
The Sixth Cause of Action
In this Cause of Action plaintiff asserts diversion of funds by placing family members on
the payroll for "no-show" jobs, thereby reducing his distribution from these companies. The
details of these claimed misappropriations were set forth in plaintiff s response to Interrogatory
No. 10 , and are set forth verbatim at pp. 40 - 42 of Defendants ' Memorandum of Law.
The ariculated claims in Response to Interrogatory 10 relate to payments for moving
expenses for family members , travel expenses to England for Matthew s son, and for Mattew
and his wife to visit him there , payment of travel expenses for Matthew s son to Bahama, and
payment of wedding expense for Matthew s daughter. During the course of his deposition, it
became obvious that all of these allegations were rooted in speculation on the par of Gene, that
if checks were issued for payment of moving expenses, he was the signator on at least one of
them, that there were substantiated contradictions as to the source of fuds, such as Mattew
son s travel to England on behalf of his employer, Bear Stears, and the use of frequent fler
miles as opposed to corporate checks for travel by Matthew and his wife. It is also of
consequence that Gene fully acknowledged using corporate fuds for his daughter s wedding,
precisely the conduct about which he claims Matthew is guilty.
The claims also allege purchases of private cars for Matthew s son and daughter with
corporate funds. It is quite clear, however, that the Range Rover for Matthew s daughter was
purchased with a personal loan that Matthew, paid back over 60 months. The GMC for his son
was leased, and at least one of the lease payment checks was signed by Gene, making him an
accessory to the misuse of corporate funds, ifthere were some. Not insignificantly, Gene
daughter was also the beneficiary of a vehicle acquired with funds from Westbur Transport, Inc.
of Georgia, as apparently, according to Gene , were many other family members.
Similarly, Gene was unable to substantiate his claim that construction on Matthew
home in Ashroken was paid for with corporate fuds. With respect to the payment of personal
credit card charges for Matthew, Gene acknowledges that he too had personal credit card charges
paid for by the companies , thereby acquiescing in the conduct about which he complains.
He is not entitled to equitable relief because he is equitably estopped from doing so. The
motion to dismiss the Sixth Cause of Action is granted.
Ninth and Eleventh Causes of Action
The Ninth Cause of Action alleges diversion of fuds from the Georgia companes
into IGC Management, IGC Transportation, IGC Realty, Case Management, Roswell Realty,
Westbur Logistics and the Matthew Casamassima Living Trust. The Eleventh similarly alleges
diversion of funds from the Westbury companies into companies of which Matthew was the sole
owner, creating fictitious debts.
The essence of the claimed wrongdoing is the diversion of fuds, and, as defendants point
out, the creation of fictitious debts of the Georgia companies does not follow a rational thought
process. If defendant companies improperly received funds from the Georgia companies, it is
they who are indebted to the Georgia companies, not the other way around, as plaintiff contends.
Aside from equitable estoppel as a general bar to the recovery of equitable relief by
plaintiff, the underlying allegations , as set out in Answer 11 to Interrogatories, are
unsubstantiated. The contents of the interrogatory responses are at pp. 60 61 of defendants
memorandum of law, as follows:
the previously discussed payment of $60 000 per month to IGC;
a $1.9 million loan from the senior Casamassimas to Matthew, which was
deposited in one of Matthew s companies , then "fueled" into Georgia
companies , creating a debt to Matthew s companies;
Matthew withdrew $6 000 per month from the Georgia companies
between 1998 and 2002 , and has not repaid it;
Matthew took for himself $500 000 in escrow with respect to Roswell'
building in Pittsburgh, the source of which fuds were the Georgia
compames;
Matthew improperly took proceeds of an insurance payment on the
Pittsburgh property for himself, when it should have gone to its rightful
owners , the Georgia companes;
Matthew has diverted at least two accounts from Westbur Georgia to
companies owned by him or his son.
Again, putting aside the issue of equitable estoppel, the allegations are all either factually
unsupported, or fail to represent a claim on behalf of the plaintiff corporations. The issue of the
claimed diversion of $60 000 per month to IGC has previously been dealt with and put to rest.
There is no refutation of response that the $6 000 per month payment to Matthew was nothing
more than regular compensation as established by their father, Emmanuel , the founder of the
corporations. Gene was aware of these payments and, in fact, signed some of the checks.
As established in his deposition, the claimed $500 000 in escrow fuds relating to the
Roswell building had nothing to do with the corporations on whose behalf Gene brings the
action. Aside from the fact that he was unsure that Matthew took $500 000 for himself, the
reality is that the escrow amount was $1 000 000 , which both brothers contributed either from
mortgages on their personal homes, or accumulated savings.
The claimed entitlement to insurance proceeds relating to the Roswell propert in
Pittsburgh is belied by documentary evidence from the closing, providing that in return for a
payment of$327 000 , Gene waived his claim to the insurance proceeds.
Defendants claim that the final allegation, the diversion of customers from the Georgia
companies to entities owned solely by Matthew, or Matthew and his son, is bared by the
doctrine of unclean hands. The customers in question are Macy slFederated and Bed, Bath and
Beyond. They are presently serviced by companies in which Gene has no interest, Nu West
Logistics and IGC Transportation.
The Court has concluded that the doctrine of unclean hands does not bar the individual
shareholder from bringing a derivative action on behalf of the corporations. It is uncontradicted
that these moves occurred after the brothers agreed to go their separate ways, operating
separately, and Gene transferred the Georgia companies ' trailer rental and repair customers to
Bedding Showcase , Inc. ("BSI") in which only he had an interest. Having lost the benefit ofthe
income from these customers into the Georgia companies, Matthew responded by moving
business over which he had control. There is no doubt but that the plaintiff companies operated
two distinct businesses , the trucking and storage out of the Port Washington location, and the
trailer rental and repair business in Brentwood. The former was the domain of Mattew, and the
latter that of Gene. It was only rational that they would segregate the income from the two
branches of the business according to their historical relationships. This transfer of customers by
both individuals after the 2002 agreement to go their separate ways, is nothing more than mutual
acquiescence and condonation of the plan to operate separately, each for their own benefit.
The motion to dismiss the Eleventh Cause of Action, seeking equitable relief, is granted.
The claims are bared under the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
Twelfih and Thirteenth Causes of Action
These claims are directed at Daniel Doyle in his individual capacity. Since the
action was commenced Gene has conceded that he never was other than an employee of the
Georgia companies. Allegations that he aided and abetted Matthew in his improper activities
now ring hollow, since the claims against Matthew have all been dismissed. The Thirteenth
Cause of Action alleges a breach of fiduciar duty.
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The Thirteenth Cause of Action is premised on Doyle s obligations as a director and
officer of the Georgia companies, which he concededly never was.
The Twelfth and Thirteenth Causes of Action against Daniel Doyle are dismissed.
Defendants ' Counterclaims
Three in number, they claim that plaintiff diverted the trailer rental and repair business of
Westbury Georgia s customers to Bedding Showcase (BSI), which is solely owned by plaintiff.
The First Counterclaim seeks the imposition of a constructive trust over all funds wrongfully
obtained in this regard.
The Second Counterclaim alleges that Hedley Conn is the Chief Financial Officer ofBSI
and that he paricipated in the wrongful deposit of checks payable to Westbury Georgia into the
account of BSI. This cause of action is for monetar damages , and does not seek equitable relief.
The Third Counterclaim also alleges a claim for equitable relief in the form of a
constructive trust of assets used for payments of salaries to family members for no-show
positions , thereby damaging the Westbury Georgia companies.
The First and Third Counterclaims are dismissed. Matthew and Gene each paricipated in
the reassignment of customers, and made corporate benefits available to family members, and
each are equitably estopped from complaining about this conduct on behalf of the corporation.
The Second Counterclaim, however, is not barred for the same reason. Defendant counter-
claimant alleges that by opening accounts with similar names to Westbury Georgia companies
plaintiffs were able to deposit checks which were payable to and intended for Westbur Georgia
companIes.
After eight years of this family feud, and the time and effort required by the Cour to
referee the disputes , all that remains is a counterclaim that plaintiff improperly obtained and
deposited checks intended for the Georgia companies into accounts to which only he had access.
The Court has not ascertained the amount of this claim from the record.
The application to add a cause of action for dissolution is denied. Where have we been
for eight years? If plaintiff or defendant wishes to move for the dissolution of one or more of
these diverse entities, they are obviously free to do so. If either side should so move, then the
Court would consider consolidating what remains of the instant action with the action for
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dissolution. (See Grammas v. Charla 45 AD.2d 756).
This matter wil appear on the Court' s calendar on October 14 2010 , at 9:30 AM. , for a
Certification Conference and to select a trial date.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.
Dated: September 13 2010
ENTEREDSEP 14 2010
NASSAU COUNTYCOUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE
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