School Reconstitution as an Education Reform Strategy

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School Reconstitution as anEducation Reform Strategy:A Synopsis of the Evidence

Jennifer King RiceBetty Malen

National Education AssociationResearch DepartmentRonald D. Henderson, Director


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School Reconstitution as anEducation Reform Strategy:A Synopsis of the Evidence

Jennifer King RiceBetty Malen

National Education AssociationResearch DepartmentRonald D. Henderson, Director


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Te National Education Association is the nations largest professional employee organiza-tion, representing 3.2 million elementary and secondary teachers, higher education facul-ty, education support professionals, school administrators, retired educators, and studentspreparing to become teachers.

Copies of this publication may be purchased from the NEA Professional Library Distribu-tion Center, P.O. Box 404846, Atlanta, GA, 30384-4846. elephone 1-800-229-4200 for priceinformation or go to the NEA Professional Library Web site at http://www.nea.org/books.

Reproduction: No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permis-sion from NEA Research, except by NEA-affiliated associations and NEA members. Anyreproduction of this material must contain the usual credit line and copyright notice. Ad-dress communications to Editor, NEA Research, 1201 16th Street, NW, Washington, DC20036-3290.

Copyright 2010 by the National Education AssociationAll Rights Reserved


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Issues involving school reconstitution as a reform strategy are at the forefront ofAmerican education policy. At the National Education Association, we believe any dis-cussion of school reconstitution rightfully begins by asking:

n What do we know from prior research and practice about school reconstitution,especially as it relates to student achievement and narrowing achievement gaps?

n What might an ideal school reconstitution reform strategy look like?n Are there ways to examine what we have learned about school reconstitution

efforts that will enable us to apply those lessons in a manner that supports studentand teacher learning?

o that end, NEA commissioned a review of the research literature on schoolreconstitution, particularly the way in which such efforts have served to improve studentachievement and narrow achievement gaps. Tis paper provides a basis for discussinghow to design and implement school reconstitution efforts to meet those targets.

We hope this review is useful for revisiting ideas and generating new thoughtsabout school reconstitution. And we hope that our efforts in this regard will help usensure a great public school for every student.

Dennis Van Roekel John WilsonPresident Executive Director


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Contents

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Theoretical Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Empirical Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Evidence on the Treat of Reconstitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Evidence on the Application of Reconstitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Implications for Policy, Practice, and Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Implications for the NEA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21


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Executive Summary

I n an effort to turn around chronically low-performing schools, states and districtsaround the nation have experimented with school reconstitution. Tis reform strat-egy seeks to enhance the stock of human capital in schools by replacing (or threaten-ing to replace) large percentages of a schools administrators, teachers, and support staffwith individuals who are presumably more capable and committed. Tis paper analyzes

the theoretical research on the assumptions that underlie this approach to school reformand the empirical research on the effectiveness of school reconstitution as a strategy forimproving school performance. It draws on a systematic review of these literatures toassess whether this strategy is a viable approach to school reform.

Te theoretical literature demonstrates that reconstitution reforms pivot on sets ofassumptions about how changes in organizational incentives and organizational capacityaffect organizational performance. School reconstitution policies seek to create incentivesfor educators to exert greater effort and, at times, these policiesalso provide resources ( i.e., scal capital, human capital, socialcapital, cultural capital, and relevant information) that mightenhance the capacity of schools. Te underlying assumption is

that the altering of incentives and capacity will result in improvedschool performance.

Te available empirical studies of school reconstitution are limited in scope anduneven in quality. Te evidence to date suggests that school reconstitution is, at best, arisky strategy. Its espoused benets are not well documented in the extant literature, andits actual effects may harm rather than help struggling schools. Both the threat and theapplication of reconstitution may create incentives that intensify effort but undercut effec-tiveness. Further, evidence suggests that reconstitution can undercut commitment to theorganization and weaken capacity for school improvement. Even when implemented on a very small scale and accompanied by supplemental resources, reconstitution may depletethe stock of human capital in schools and undercut productivity by imposing intense

human costs and engendering organizational inefficiencies that make it less rather thanmore likely that the school will improve its performance. Hence, our analysiscalls for restraint in the deployment of this strategy until we have a strongertheoretical and empirical understanding of and justication for this reform.

Tis paper, a condensed version of a more extensive chapter pre-pared by the authors on this topic in 2009, concludes with recommendations for theNEA. We recommend that policymakers who wish to proceed with school reconstitutiondo so only if certain conditions are met

Te evidence to date suggeststhat school reconstitution is,at best, a risky strategy.

Reconstitution mayundercut productivity.


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1) An adequate supply of administrators, teachers, and staff who are, by somestandard, more capable and committed and who are waiting in the wings to takepositions in reconstituted schools.

2) Valued resources and meaningful support structures to make reconstitutedschools magnets for high-quality educators.

3) Additional resources that are sufficient to bolster the capacity of these schools toimprove performance and that are exible so site educators can employ them inways that are aligned with their priorities.

4) Sufficient time to ensure that the above conditions can be met.

Finally, if policymakers decide to experiment with reconstitution under theseconditions we urge them to systematically evaluate each and every experience with thisreform so we develop a more complete understanding of the full range of conditionsneeded for reconstitution to work as a viable strategy for school reform.


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Introduction

School reconstitution is one o many corrective action strategies or turningaround low-per orming schools. It seeks to enhance the stock o human capitalin schools by replacing (or threatening to replace) large percentages o a schoolsadministrators, teachers, and support staff with individuals who are presumably morecapable and committed. ypically, employees in reconstituted schools are not terminated;

teachers and support staff members are permitted to reapply or positions at the schoolbeing reconstituted or to trans er to other positions in the system. School administratorsmay be retained or reassigned. Tis en masse shif in staff is one o the sanctions that canbe imposed on schools that ail to meet per ormance standards under the No Child LefBehind legislation. States and districts also may use this strategy as a way to give low-per orming schools a resh start.1

Reconstitution has been tried in a number o locations. 2 For example, early exper-iments occurred in San Francisco as a result o desegregation decrees. More recently,low-per orming schools in Chicago have been placed on probation, a classication thatsignals the school may be reconstituted. Schools in Colorado Springs, CO, Portland, OR,and Washington, DC, have been restaffed. Several schools in exas and three systems in

MarylandBaltimore City, Prince Georges County, and Anne Arundel Countyalsohave experience with reconstitution re orms. 3

Policymakers at all levels o the system include school reconstitution in their arrayo possible corrective actions in part because it resonates with research regarding thecentral role that improved teaching plays in school re orm and with characterizations olow-per orming schools as dys unctional organizations thatcannot be rectied by the more gradual, incremental strategies(e.g., individually tailored growth plans and ongoing pro es-sional development programs or administrators, teachers,and support staff) embodied in personnel evaluation pro-cesses (Ruenzel 1996 and 1997, Brady 2003, Rice 2003, Rice and

Malen 2003, Rojas 1996). As the argument goes, dys unctional organizations have to bedismantled and reinvented by a dramatically different cadre o employees who not onlybolster the stock o human capital in low-per orming schools but also create a culture osuccess in those educational settings.

Tis paper analyzes the theoretical research on the assumptions that underliethis approach to school re orm and the empirical research on the effectiveness o schoolreconstitution as a strategy or improving school per ormance. It draws on a systematicreview o these literatures to assess whether this strategy is a viable approach to school

Studies o school reconstitutionare limited in scope and unevenin quality.


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reform (Malen and Rice 2009). Unfortunately, studies of school reconstitution are limitedin scope and uneven in quality. Various Web sites and press accounts make reference toschool reconstitution experiments. Some praise the experiments and credit them withimproving test scores while others claim the experiments not only failed to engenderimprovement but also made matters worse. Our analysis does not encompass all of theexamples of reconstitution referenced in these anecdotal accounts because, in manycases, we could not locate studies that would enable us to determine whether any of the

purported positive or negative effects occurred because of, in spiteof, or apart from the school reconstitution intervention. Rather, webase our analysis on the limited number of empirical studies thatdocument how school reconstitution functions (or fails to function)as a school improvement strategy. In general, available data suggestthat school reconstitution is a risky strategy. We discuss why that is

the case by looking at the underlying theory (how school reconstitution is supposed toengender school improvement) and the empirical evidence (how school reconstitutionactually plays out).

Available data suggest thatschool reconstitution is a

risky strategy.


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Theoretical Assumptions

R econstitution reforms pivot on sets of assumptions about how organizationalincentives and organizational capacity affect organizational performance.School reconstitution relies on incentive systems to motivate individualsacross levels of the education system to improve organizational performance. It relies onboth the threat of sanction as well as the application of sanction. Te basic assumption is

that threatening to re-staff schools by placing them on alert status, on probation, oron reconstitution eligible lists will motivate the people who work inthem to exert greater effort. Teoretically, for this threat to be effectivethe target population must believe a) that policymakers will carry outthe sanctions, b) that the sanctions themselves matter, and c) that theperformance standards can be met. 4

Once a school has been reconstituted, it may operate under thesame set of rewards and sanctions as other schools in the district andstate, or it may operate under a unique set of rewards and sanctions thatdistricts or states may create especially for reconstituted schools. Teapplication of rewards and sanctions may make schools eligible for additional resources

including personnel,5

technical assistance, and professional development opportunities.In these instances, policies assume that the incentives are required to ensure that schoolpersonnel will make effective use of these new resources. Where additional resourcesare not provided, policies assume that incentives will motivate personnel to make moreefficient use of extant resources. However the policy is designed, the incentive componentis pivotal.

While many reconstitution policies are driven primarily, if not exclusively, byan emphasis on incentives, they typically include provisions that affect school capacitybecause schools cannot improve unless they have both the will and the capacity to do so.Much of the literature on capacity focuses on the availability of resources ( i.e., scal capi-tal, human capital, social capital, cultural capital, and relevant information) that schools

require to carry out their instructional functions (Corcoran and Goertz 1995, Rice andCroninger 2005, Spil lane and Tompson 1997, Youngs and King 2002). Some researchersargue that the productivity of schoolstheir ability to translate resources into expectedoutcomesis also an important dimension of school capacity (Corcoran and Goertz1995, Malen and Rice 2004).

While many factors can affect an organizations ability to use extant or additionalresources productively, two constructs are particularly helpful. Te rst construct, align-ment , refers to the degree of correspondence between the resources that are provided

School reconstitutionrelies on both the threat of sanction as well as theapplication of sanction.


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2 School Reconstitution as an Education Reform Strategy: A Synopsis of the Evidence

and the resources that are required to accomplish organizational goals. 6 Tis constructreminds us that additional resources, by themselves, do not translate into increasedcapacity, especially if the resources provided are not the resources required to accom-

plish the organizational tasks that are essential to the realization ofcentral policy aims. Te second construct, organizational context,relates to both the degree of fragmentation ( i.e., the number of dis-tinct and disjointed tasks and responsibilities embedded in the workof the organization) and the degree of freneticism ( i.e., the volume,pace, and intensity of the work to be done) (Malen and Rice 2004).Tis construct reminds us that policies may precipitate or exacerbate

organizational dynamics that enhance or undercut productivity (Hatch 2002, F. M. Hess1999, Newman et al. 2000).

In sum, school reconstitution policies seek to create incentives for educators toexert greater effort. At times, these policies also provide resources that might enhancethe capacity of schools. Te underlying assumption is that altering incentives and capac-ity will result in improved school performance.

Additional resources, bythemselves, do not translate

into increased capacity.


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Empirical Evidence

I n this section we examine the empirical evidence on how both the threat and theapplication of reconstitution play out in practice. We summarize what the empiricalevidence says about how reconstitution may affect a schools incentive and capacityto improve its performance.

Evidence on the Threat of ReconstitutionOn the incentive dimension, studies paint a mixed picture. Some indicate that the threatof reconstitution has had little if any motivational impact on site-level personnel largelybecause educators simply did not believe that their schools would, in fact, be reconsti-tuted (Finnigan and ODay 2003, Firestone et al. 1998, Mintrop 2004b). Studies alsoindicate that the threat of reconstitution has prompted site-based personnel to increaseeffort but not necessarily to increase effectiveness.

For example, several studies report that both elementary and high school prin-cipals responded to the threat of reconstitution by becoming more directive, rigid, andcontrolling in their interactions with teachers even though this new style of play strainedrelationships, pressured teachers to conform to questionable practices, and failed to

translate into stronger instructional programs and more equitable learning opportuni-ties (Anagnostopoulos 2003, Anagnostopoulos and Rutledge 2007, Firestone et al. 1998,Spillane et al. 2002).7 Studies also suggest that teachers were motivated to work harderbut that their intensied effort focused only on short-term, supercial and arguablydetrimental strategies that may hold promise for getting schools off probation but donot engender long-term, substantive changes that may actually help all children improveacademically (Anagnostopoulos 2003, Anagnostopoulos and Rutledge 2007, Diamondand Spillane 2004, Finnigan and ODay 2003, Lipman 2006, Spillane et al. 2002, Wongand Ananostopoulos 1998, Stringeld and Yakimowski-Srebnick 2005, White andRosenbaum 2008).

eachers tended to focus on low-level test-preparation activities in the domainstested at the expense of other dimensions of the curriculum and other elements ofclassroom instruction. Tey also tended to invest their time, energy, and instruc-tional resources on students in benchmark grades who were most likely to pass thetest rather than on students who required extensive assistance to perform well at anygrade level (Anagnostopoulos 2003, Anagnostopoulos and Rutledge 2007, Diamond andSpillane 2004, Finnigan and ODay 2003, Lipman 2006, Spillane et al. 2002, White andRosenbaum 2008, Wong and Ananostopoulos 1998).


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Further, school personnel were inclined to adopt multiple programs that theycould not implement or make supercial adjustments ( e.g., altering classroom posters andwork displays that might impress monitors) that the researchers and, at times, the study

participants viewed as unlikely to improve per ormance (Designsor Change 2005, Diamond and Spillane 2004, Malen and Rice

2004, ODay 2002 and 2008, Sunderman 2001). Whether thesepatterns are typical is an open question. Te threat o reconsti-tution appears to trigger greater effort at least in the short run,but the extra effort may be directed toward practices that runcounter to broadly recognized conceptions o effective pro es-sional practice and equitable educational programs (Finniganand Gross 2007, White and Rosenbaum 2008).

In terms o school capacity, the evidence shows that the threat o reconstitutioncan affect both the inventory o resources and their productive use in unexpected and, attimes, counterproductive ways. Although schools that are subject to reconstitution mayreceive additional human, in ormational, and, at times, scal resources, these supple-

mental resources do not necessarily result in greater capacity.Te human resources provided rarely take the orm o new, ull-time positions atthe school site. ypically, additional personnelofen shared across multiple schoolsprovide pro essional development workshops, intermittent technical assistance, andperiodic oversight (Finnigan and ODay 2003, Mintrop 2004a and 2004b). While moststudies do not address, directly, how the threat o reconstitution might affect the stocko social and cultural capital at the site, they document conditions ( e.g., the intensica-tion o demands, the controlling behavior o principals, the tensions between educa-tors and external actors assigned to the school) that make the development o strongsocial networks and collaborative structures more difficult (Sunderman 2001, Wong andAnagnostopoulos 1998). When additional scal resources accompany the threat o recon-

stitution, the allocations tend to be modest, short-term deposits rather than sizeable,dependable increases in the schools operating budget (Malen and Rice 2004, Mintrop2004a, ODay 2008). For these reasons, researchers generally conclude that supplementalresources that accompany reconstitution policies are not sufficient (Finnigan and ODay2003, Neuman-Sheldon 2006, Stringeld and Yakimowski-Srebnick 2005).

Ironically, the threat o reconstitution may have a negative effect on the stock ohuman capital in low-per orming schools. Te stigma associated with the threat o recon-

stitution and the strain educators in these schools experience maybe a disincentive or highly capable and committed educators towork in low-per orming schools and may prompt teachers andadministrators to exit (Ladd and Zelli 2002, Lipman 2006, Wong

et al. 1999). As a result, the threat o reconstitution may reducethe stock o human capital and unction as an impediment to,rather than a stimulus or, school improvement.

Even i the net effect is to increase the stock o oundational resources available totarget schools, these resources may not translate into increased capacity or at least tworeasons. First, the resources provided may not be aligned with the resources requiredto engender improvement in a particular school. Since schools get stuck or differ-ent reasons, they may require different kinds and combinations o resources to improve

Te threat o reconstitution

can trigger intense short-termeffort, but that effort may not

be directed toward long-term,substantive changes.

Te threat o reconstitutionmay be a disincentive or

committed educators to workin low-per orming schools.


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School Reconstitution as an Education Reform Strategy: A Synopsis of the Evidence 5

(Finnigan and ODay 2003, Mintrop 2004b, Neuman- Sheldon 2006,Neuman-Sheldon and Jennings 2007, ODay 2008). Te package o sup-ports ofen attached to the threat o reconstitution may not accommo-date these variations. Second, the threat o reconstitution may create orexacerbate organizational dynamics that limit the ability o the schoolto use resources productively. Te pronounced tendency o schools

acing severe sanction to become even more ragmented and reneticworkplaces is well documented in the broader literature on site-levelresponses to high-stakes accountability policies (Hatch 2002, Newman et al. 2000, ODay2002) as well as a prominent pattern in the more limited literature on the threat o recon-stitution as an education re orm strategy (Malen and Rice 2004, Sunderman 2001, Wongand Anagnostopoulos 1998).

Whether the threat o reconstitution operates to improve school per ormance isnot directly or extensively addressed in the research we uncovered. Te big-picture pat-terns, however, are disconcerting. For example, although the threat o reconstitution hasbeen present in Maryland or over a decade, only a ew schools have come off the recon-

stitution eligible list and many more have been added. Whilesuch crude measures may be more misleading than illuminat-ing, they are not encouraging. More site-specic assessments arealso troubling. For example, the threat o reconstitution seemsto engender changes that run counter to partial but prominenttheories o the conditions under which schools might improvetheir per ormance (Newmann et al. 2001). High-quality princi-pals and teachers, coherent instructional programs, and equi-table opportunities or learning are three crucial ingredients oschool improvement that may be affected adversely by the threato reconstitution.

Evidence on the Application of Reconstitution

Evidence regarding the impact o school reconstitution on organizational incentives isindirect but discouraging. Studies have not ocused on how the en masse replacement opersonnel affects the effort o the new staffs or how this action also might motivate edu-cators in other chronically low-per orming schools that may be targeted. So, knowledgeo the direct effects and the spillover effects o reconstitution is limited.

Extant research provides some evidence that new staffs work long hours and exertconsiderable effort, but they do not indicate whether these educators are more motivated,let alone more effective, than either their predecessors or their counterparts (Hansen etal. 1998, Malen et al. 2002). Studies offer some evidence that the promise o a new begin-

ning and a better work environment may be a mild incentive or new recruits to applyor positions in low-per orming schools and or a ew reputedly effective veteran teachers

to stay. But those studies also indicate that the punitive character o the process and theintense stress in the workplace may be a strong incentive or seasoned teachers to avoidseeking employment in reconstituted schools or to trans er out (Hess 2003, Malen et al. 2002, Rice and Malen 2003). Clearly, we need more explicit, extensive, and comparativedata on the impact o en masse restaffing to unpack how the mix o positive and perverse incentives might affect the will component o school improvement and to gauge

Since schools get stuckor different reasons, they

may require differentkinds and combinationso resources to improve.

High-quality principalsand teachers, coherentinstructional programs, andequitable opportunities orlearning may be affectedadversely by the threat oreconstitution.


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whether en masse restaffing policies can be crafed in ways that enhance both the effortand the effectiveness o educators in low-per orming schools.

Evidence pertaining to the impact o reconstitution on organizational capac-ity is incomplete yet disconcerting. Un ortunately, most o the studies we reviewed donot provide detailed accounts o the types o resource investments that may accompanyreconstitution initiatives or the ultimate impact o restaffing initiatives on the levelo oundational resources available to the targeted schools. Te available in ormationindicates that restaffing may alter the stock o human capital in unintended and, at times,counterproductive ways.

For instance, several studies demonstrate that on general indicators ( e.g., educa-tion, experience, turnover) newly hired staffs may be less equipped and less committedthan the educators they replaced (Hess 2003, Rice and Croninger 2005). Although severalstudies suggest school reconstitution may enhance the human and cultural capital avail-able at the school, these results are not reliable or inevitable outcomes, particularly insettings marked by chronic shortages o certied teachers and experienced administra-tors (Rice and Croninger 2005). Most studies do not address the impact o reconstitution

on social capital, but several give credence to the claim that reconstitution may diminishsocial capital by creating highly stress ul and at times chaotic conditions that make itextraordinarily difficult to develop strong social networks, collabora-tive structures, and robust instructional programs (Hansen et al. 1998,Rice and Malen 2003). In short, reconstitution may enhance the stocko human and cultural capital in schools, but the evidence we revieweddoes not establish that reconstitution is a dependable or effective

mechanism or attracting and retaining large pools o highly qualied educators in low-per orming schools or or enhancing social capital in those settings. Indeed, some studiesreveal that reconstitution may deplete those critical resources.

Te major exception to this is San Franciscos initial experiment with reconstitu-

tion (Fraga et al. 1998, Rojas 1996). A general description o the initia l reconstitutionexperimentproduced by the superintendent who advocated or and oversaw the initia-tive documents that the reconstitution effort implemented as part o a desegregationdecreewas accompanied by a national teacher recruitment strategy as well as majorinvestments in aculty planning time, pro essional development programs, class sizereductions, acility improvements, technology enhancements, and new instructionalmaterials and services. 8 Tis description suggests that the principals hired to head theschools reconstituted in 1984 were more ethnically diverse than their predecessors andthat the new teachers had stronger academic and linguistic qualications than their pre-decessors (Rojas 1996).

While districts may provide additional scal and in ormational resources, at least

in the short term, such resources may not be sufficient or or aligned with the tasks athand (Finnigan and ODay 2003, Malen and Rice 2004, Stringeld and Yakimowski-Srebnick 2005). Moreover, even where reconstitution is accompanied by gains in someo the oundational resources required or school improvement, the strategy may notenhance the capacity component o school improvement. Te nancial and in orma-tional resources provided at the outset and any increases in cultural capital may be offsetby the drain on the human capital and the social capital resources that are so essential orschool improvement (Rice and Croninger 2005). Moreover, the resource misalignments

Reconstitution maydeplete critical resources.


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and the organizational freneticism and fragmentation that may accompany this strat-egy can undermine the productivity of the remaining resources and further diminishthe schools capacity to improve (Hansen et al. 1998, Malen et al. 2002, Rice and Malen2003). While these deleterious effects are not inevitable, they have been documented evenwhen reconstitution is implemented in a small number of schools and when it is accom-panied by additional, if not altogether sufficient, institutional supports.

Whether reconstitution could enhance school capacity if the sponsoring institu-tions a) incorporated incentives to attract and retain experienced administrators andmaster teachers, b) granted staffs the time, autonomy, and opportunity to envisionalternative organizational designs, or c) dedicated sufficient nancial, informational, andhuman resources to the experiment remains an open, empirical question. Even impres-sive levels of institutional backing may not be able to counter the disruption, stigma, andstrain the reform may engender and to create the resource alignments and organizationalcontexts necessary for resources to be put to productive use (Rice and Malen 2002, Wonget al. 1999).

Evidence on the impact of reconstitution on school performance or, more pre-

cisely, the student achievement proxy is fragile and mixed. Some studies attribute actualor anticipated gains in student achievement to en masse restaffingeven though the controls required to make such attributions arenot part of the design (Archibald and Odden 2000, Odden andArchibald 2000, Rojas 1996). Most studies of reconstitution avoidthis issue or address it indirectly by discussing, as we have donehere, how reconstitution may affect the organizational conditionsthat inuence school performance. Since much of the limited evidence suggests thatreconstitution may have a negative impact on both the incentive and the capacity dimen-sions of school organization, its potential to improve school performance is suspect.

Te impact of reconstitutionon student achievement isfragile and mixed.


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Implications for Policy,Practice, and Research

School reconstitution seeks to improve the stock of human capital and createarrangements that make more productive use of that human capital. We examinedthe theoretical literature to identify the assumptions that underlie this approach to

school improvement, and we examined the empirical research to assess whether schoolreconstitution is a sound strategy. As earlier noted, the evidence to date suggests thatschool reconstitution is a risky strategy. Its espoused benets are not well documentedin the extant literature. Its actual effects may harm rather than help struggling schools.Both the threat and the application of reconstitution may create incentives that intensifyeffort but undercut effectiveness. Tat is, administrators and teachers may work harderbut be prompted to engage in practices that run counter to prominenttheories of school effectiveness and core principles of equitable practice.

Further, evidence suggests that reconstitution can undercut commitmentto the organization and weaken capacity for school improvement. Evenwhen implemented on a very small scale and accompanied by supplementalresources, reconstitution may deplete the stock of human capital in schoolsand undercut productivity by imposing intense human costs and engender-ing organizational inefficiencies that make it less rather than more likelythat the school will improve its performance. Hence, our analysis calls for restraint in thedeployment of this strategy until we have a stronger theoretical and empirical under-standing of and justication for this reform.

Based on our review of the theoretical and empirical literature, we urge poli-cymakers to recognize that school reconstitution is a risky strategy and that other

approaches to school improvement may be more prudent. However, should policymak-ers decide to employ this strategy, we advise them to proceed with cautionthat is, toexperiment with school reconstitution only if the following conditions are met.

First, since school reconstitution aims to replace large percentages of a schoolsstaff with educators who are presumably more capable and committed, the use of thisreform strategy should be limited to settings that have an adequate supply of administra-tors, teachers, and staff who are, by some standard, more capable and committed andwho are waiting in the wings to take positions.

Second, since studies have shown that the stigma of reconstitution may be aninherent disincentive for educators to work in low-performing schools, policymakersmust provide valued resources and meaningful support structures to offset the stigma

and boost the attractiveness of working at such sites. Put differently, even settings thathave an adequate supply of replacements ( i.e., meet the rst condition) must be able toattract those personnel to the reconstituted schools despite the stigma. Policymakersneed to do what it takes to make such schools magnets for high-quality educators.

Tird, the resources provided to reconstituted schools must be sufficient to bol-ster their capacity to improve performance, and they must be exible so site educators canemploy them in ways that are aligned with their priorities. Rather than offer resourcesthat are trivial, extraneous, or, worse, intensify the demands and fragmentation in the

Evidence suggests thatreconstitution canundercut commitmentand weaken capacity.


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school, policymakers should work with schools to identi y the resources required a) toattract and retain the personnel needed in the school and b) to support the ongoing worko improving student achievement.

Fourth, any policy aimed at reconstituting schools must be introduced ar enoughin advance to ensure that the above conditions can be met. Without appropriate resourcecommitments and sufficient time to plan and prepare, reconstituted schools may be lefwith the lowest quality teachers, an inadequate resource base, and a climate o reneti-cism that undercuts any potential or the policy to promote school improvement.

At the present time, reconstitution typically is applied in settings where theseconditions are not in place. Tey ofen ace a decit o qualied teachers and administra-tors and they ofen struggle to secure the ull range o oundational resources needed. Asdocumented in the literature, school reconstitution may augment the schools resourcebase but it may also exacerbate the capacity challenges aced by chronically low-per orm-ing schools. So, while school reconstitutions promise o a clean slate or chronicallylow-per orming schools may be attractive in theory, the exist ing literature documents aconcerning picture o such policies in practice.

Our recommendation is to proceed with caution. I policymakers decide toexperiment with reconstitution under these conditions, we urge them to systematicallyevaluate each and every experience with this re orm. Future research should address

outcomes resulting rom both the threat and the application o reconsti-tution. Te current policy context offers a natural laboratory or analyseso how the threat o reconstitution operates to affect incentives, capac-ity, and per ormance. Both longitudinal and comparative studies wouldenable us to document how the threat o reconstitution affects incentivesand capacity in different contexts over time. Care ully crafed studies o

reconstitution experiments, even i done retrospectively, could help policymakers iden-ti y the underlying assumptions and inspect the critical conditions that must hold i this

strategy is to realize its stated aims.

Implications for the NEA

While the NEA does not have a stated position on school reconstitution, the blanketdismissal o teachers and staff is inconsistent with the NEAs long history o promotingand protecting the employment rights o its members. Te stated mission o the NEAis to advocate or education pro essionals and to unite our members and the nation to

ulll the promise o public education to prepare every student to succeed in a diverseand interdependent world. Striking a balance between the dual goalso promoting education re orm and protecting the employment rightso educators is a challenge. School reconstitutiona re orm designed to

give ailing schools a clean slateposes problems or the union because itthreatens due process principles and equitable employment practices. Teblanket indictment o all teachers arguably violates educators right to dueprocess. Te en masse removal and replacement o personnel also runscounter to other salient dimensions o employment such as tenure, senior-

ity rights, teacher evaluation, and teacher trans er and dismissal policies. Regardless othe merits o the unions positions on these issues they have come to represent air laborpractice in education and, hence, must be addressed in reconstitution policies.

Care ully crafed studieso reconstitution could

help policymakers.

School reconstitution

threatens due processprinciples and equitable

employment practices.


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Our work suggests two potentially important ways the union could respond tothe use of reconstitution as a reform for chronically low-performing schools. First, theNEA should develop a position statement that a) identies the conditions under whichreconstitution may be a reasonable reform alternative and b) reconciles the actual andpotential conicts between school reconstitution, due process rights, and other tradi-tional contractual protections. In the preceding section, we outlined a number of condi-tions that must be met if reconstitution is to have a real chance to realize its stated aims.In addition to these conditions, the NEA should consider if and howreconstitution policies could be structured to recognize and respect theemployment rights of educators. Of greatest concern is the basic rightto due process. Other commonly negotiated provisions for educators(most notably tenure, teacher evaluation, teacher transfer and dismissalpolicies, teacher autonomy, and individual versus collective rewardsand sanctions) also warrant consideration. In some cases ( e.g., tenure),the unions position may have important implications for the design ofreconstitution initiatives. In other cases ( e.g., seniority rights in school

transfer decisions), school reconstitution may give rise to legitimate challenges to tradi-tional union positions. In all cases, a clear and thoughtful position statement that bal-ances the interests of both students and educators could contribute to the development ofmore fair and effective reconstitution policies.

Second, our work suggests the NEA should support ongoing research to developa more complete understanding of the full range of conditions needed for reconstitutionto work as a viable strategy for school reform and as a fair approach to staffing schools.Given its longstanding commitment to both education reform and fair employmentpractices, the NEA has a vested interest in promoting a knowledge base to guide stateand district policy, to inform its own evolving positions on this approach to reform, andto assist their members as they face the prospects of school reconstitution.

How could reconstitutionpolicies be structured torecognize and respect theemployment rightsof educators?


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13

Footnotes

1 For background information on school reconstitution see Goertz and Duffy 2001, Malenet al. 2002, and Mintrop and rujillo 2005.

2 For a description of these experiments see Hendrie 1997 and 1998, Fuhrman 2001, Ladd1996, Mintrop and rujillo 2005, Fraga et al. 1998, Rojas 1996, Khanna et al. 1999,Wong et al. 1999, Spillane et al. 2002, Ressel 1999a and 1999b, and Hansen et al. 1998.

3 Only some of these experiments have been the subject of systematic study, such asFinkelstein et al. 2000, Mintrop 2004b, Sunderman 2001, Spillane et al. 2002, and Laddand Zelli 2002. Some have been the topic of commentaries, such as Hendrie 1998 andRessel 1999a. Some have been described in press accounts, such as Ruenzel 1996 and1997 and Moreno 2003, in dissertations, such as Rojas 1996 and Retana 1997, and inpolicy evaluations and policy papers, such as Hansen et al. 1998, Archibald and Odden2000, Odden and Archibald 2000, and Designs for Change 2005.

4 For an elaboration of this argument see Finnigan and Gross 2007, Finnigan and ODay2003, ODay 2007, Mintrop 2004a and 2004b, Stronge et al. 2006, Mohrman andLawler 1996, and Linn 2003.

5 argeted schools may receive various combinations of coaches, mentors, monitors,instructional staff, and external partners who serve a variety of functions. Tese maybe full-time personnel dedicated to individual schools, they may be part-time alloca-tions, or they may be district or state staff whose time is reallocated to support theimprovement efforts in these schools.

6 For a discussion of the importance of alignment see Rice 2002.7 For an exception to this pattern see Malen and Porton 2003.8 Te initial experiments were carried out during a period of teacher underemployment

in California. In 1984, the district was able to hire back good people who had beenlaid off during the earlier scal crash....precipitated [by] the Prop 13 tax rebellion.Mintrop 2007.


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15

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21

Jennifer King Rice is an associate professor in the Department of Education Policy at theUniversity of MarylandCollege Park. Her research draws on the discipline of economicsto explore education policy questions concerning the efficiency, equity, and adequacy ofAmerican public education. Her current work focuses on teachers as a critical resource inthe education process, and she is working on several projects that use multiple methodsto understand the policies and resources needed to hire and retain qualied teachers indifficult-to-staff schools.

Betty Malen is a professor in the Department of Education Policy Studies at the

University of MarylandCollege Park. Her research examines the political determinantsand the substantive effects of prominent education reforms ( i.e., choice, decentralization,professionalization of teaching, school reconstitution) and analyzes the micropolitics ofschools.


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