+ All Categories
Home > Documents > Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Date post: 30-Jan-2016
Category:
View: 224 times
Download: 0 times
Share this document with a friend
Popular Tags:
32
Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey
Transcript
Page 1: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Schopenhauer

Philosophy 151Winter, 2004G. J. Mattey

Page 2: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Modern Philosophy

● Modern philosophy begins with Descartes● Before Descartes, philosophers had ignored

the role of the subjective in their descriptions of the world

● Descartes recognized that the subjective is the starting-point of all philosophy

● Only our own consciousness is present immediately to us

Page 3: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Idealism

● Berkeley recognized that what comes before consciousness is mediated and dependent on it

● He concluded that the objective, material world exists only in our representation

● To attribute to the objective world an independent existence is contradictory

● Any attempt to conceive of independent existence yields an object for consciousness

Page 4: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Realism

● The dependence of the objective world on consciousness is “transcendental”

● The objective world nonetheless has a reality that is “empirical”

● Material objects exist in space and time and are subject to laws that are not subject to individual whim

● So transcendental idealism cannot be refuted by the reality of material things

Page 5: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Modes of Dependence

● The objective world depends on the subject in two distinct ways– Materially, in that there is no object without a

subject: this was the insight of Berkeley– Formally, in that consciousness determines the

way in which objects exist for it: this was the insight of Kant

● Space, time, and causality are the three forms through which the objective world is determined by consciousness

Page 6: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

The Thing in Itself

● Consciousness is responsible for the existence of objective reality only insofar as it is an object for consciousness

● It must exist independently as a non-object, a thing in itself, in order to become an object

● Kant had claimed that things in themselves are unknowable

● Schopenhauer held that there is a single thing in itself, which he called “will”

Page 7: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Fichte

● Fichte dealt with the problem of the thing in itself by abolishing it

● Objective reality is the product purely of the knowing subject

● In this way, Fichte “entirely abolished the real”

● His system was a caricature of Kant’s● It moved philosophy away from a solution to

the problem

Page 8: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

The Human Being

● The nature of the human being in itself is that of an individual will

● Will is by its nature unconscious● So how can the conscious human being be

the objectification of an unconscious will?● The human body (the “organism”) is the

objectification of the will in space● The brain is the source of the intellect, which

in turn is the source of consciousness

Page 9: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Will and Intellect

● The organism is the primary phenomenon of the will

● As a product of the organism, the intellect is a secondary phenomenon– Will is like substance and intellect is like accident– Will is like matter and intellect is like form– Will is like warmth and intellect is like light

● The intellect, like the organism, is physical, while the will is metaphysical

Page 10: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

A Paradox?

● The human body is a material object only for consciousness

● Consciousness is a product of a part of the human body

● Thus, consciousness is a product of something whose own existence (as object) depends on consciousness

● Representation began when the first eye opened, but how could there have been an eye before there was representation?

Page 11: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Self-Consciousness

● The subject of knowledge and its object must be distinct

● So, the object of knowledge cannot be the self insofar as it knows

● So, knowledge of the self must have as its object something other than intellect

● The non-intellectual part of the self is the will● It consists in willing and having ends, as well

as in having emotions based on desire and aversion

Page 12: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

The Essential Element

● We know, nearly a priori, that every animal wills existence, well-being, and propagation

● We attribute to animals all the modes of willing that we attribute to ourselves

● But we attribute intellect to them only with difficulty

● We only allow by default that they have ideas, which are required for them to have the passions we attribute to them

Page 13: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Grades of Intelligence

● Greater intelligence is due to increased complexity in the organism’s needs

● The degree of intelligence in an animal is correlated with the size and complexity of its brain

● In humans alone there is abstract reasoning● This makes the intellect the dominant

element in human consciousness

Page 14: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

The Detached Intellect

● The dominant role of the intellect in humans has led philosophers erroneously to believe that will is the product of intellect

● But this thesis is refuted by the fact that the will is strong in animals with weak intellects

● In exceptional humans, however, the intellect can detach itself from the service of the will

● In such cases, intellect is purely objective

Page 15: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Completeness of Will

● Will is simple and therefore complete in all organisms– An animal either wills to act or does not will it

● It admits of no degrees, though there are degrees of excitement

● The complex deliberations of the intellect only propose options as to what would best satisfy the ends of the will

Page 16: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Interplay

● At times, the will is moved by the thoughts entertained by the intellect– One becomes sad upon thinking of a lost love

● But the will asserts its mastery by blocking ideas toward which the intellect is inclined but which would trigger negative emotions

● The best analogy for the relation is that of a sighted dwarf being carried on the shoulders of a blind giant

Page 17: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Motives

● The intellect supplies the will with motives, as, for example, the moral worth of an act

● But the will has motives of its own, which are often hidden from the intellect

● The true motive often emerges only as a result of later circumstances

● The ancient Greek injunction, “Know thyself,” is thus quite difficult to carry out

Page 18: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Will and Morality

● We judge the moral value of an act by the intention which it carries out

● Suppose that the motives of the will are only the result of knowledge

● Then the only motives by which an act is judged morally are those which are provided by the intellect

● We would then be unable to condemn those acts which contradict conscious motives

Page 19: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Development

● Willing springs up spontaneously, while the intellect requires effort to operate

● The strongest will is found in infants, while intellect takes a long time to develop, because it is a function of the brain

● When the intellect reaches its highest powers, will becomes reinforced by sexual desire and passion

Page 20: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Precipitation

● The will frequently acts precipitously, before the intellect has completed its deliberations

● The intellect is unable to resist the emotions that arise on the basis of incomplete deliberation

● Those who can keep their heads are rare, and are to be found mostly among a few nationalities

● We would not be annoyed by many things if we were first to understand their causes

Page 21: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Control

● The will is like a horse that the human is trying to control

● Intellect is the bridle and bit● Its means of control are “instruction,

exhortation, culture, etc.”● But will can overcome this control in fits of

anger, in intoxication and despair● In cases of insanity, all control is lost

Page 22: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Old Age

● The will remains as strong in old age as in a child

● Intellect can burn itself out if it is overused during the course of life

● Those who fare best in old age are those who rest the intellect properly

● The intellect rests in sleep, while the will works to restore the body to order

● The ever-beating heart is the will’s symbol

Page 23: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Imperfection

● If, as all the philosophers claim, intellect is primary, how can its weakness and imperfection be accounted for?

● We cannot understand how the original nature of human beings can break down so consistently

● Will, on the other hand, is not weak and imperfect, and in this way it is a better candidate as the true human nature

Page 24: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Immorality

● An objection is that will is imperfect because it is immoral

● But this objection is based on a faulty conception of morality

● The source of morality is above nature and in contradiction to it

● The will is egoistic, wanting nothing but its own satisfaction

● Pursuing morality leads to the abolition of the will

Page 25: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Interference

● The intellect can function properly only when the will does not interfere

● The activity of the will often corrupts the course of thinking

● But the activity of thinking has little effect on the course of the will

● Coolness and presence of mind is needed to overcome fear, anger, joy, desire

Page 26: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Enhancement

● If the mind were a simple nature, intensity of will would increase the power of thinking

● The pleasurable, healthy emotions, on the other hand, enhance the other bodily functions, such as circulation and respiration

● The brain is a parasitic organ, so the effect of will is not necessarily favorable to its function, the intellect

Page 27: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Hope and Despair

● Hope is explained as an attempt by the intellect to soothe the will, thereby violating its own search for truth

● Often the will suppresses the worst outcome, which comes as a surprise when it happens

● On the other hand, melancholy people, in the service of the will, exaggerate the likelihood of the worst outcome

Page 28: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Love and Hate

● Both love and hate subvert our judgment● We tend to exaggerate the virtues and

minimize the vices of those people and things that we love

● Conversely, we tend to exaggerate the vices and minimize the virtues of what we hate

● This accounts for prejudices of “position, profession, nationality, sex, and religion”

● It also accounts for tenacity of belief

Page 29: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Advice

● If an adviser has a vested interest in the matter at hand, we will discount the advice

● This occurs no matter how insightful the advice may be

● We do this because we see in ourselves the influence of our hopes, desires, etc. on our own conduct

Page 30: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Suspension

● A genius is able to arrive at a state of perfect knowledge and objectivity

● In that state, the genius is able to suspend the will altogether

● Moreover, all the individuality of the genius is shed, and he becomes “the pure subject of knowing”

● This pure state is the correlative of the Platonic form

Page 31: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Irresolution

● There are no corresponding direct influences of the intellect on the will

● Irresolution, the inability to make up one’s mind, seems a counter-example

● But the will is not paralyzed by a menu of options with similar probabilities

● Instead, it lacks the courage to act upon that which most probably has the best outcome, because it wants to play it safe

Page 32: Schopenhauer Philosophy 151 Winter, 2004 G. J. Mattey.

Leadership

● There are persons of exceptional genius whose intellects exert a great influence on their wills

● This leads them not to act with great firmness, decisiveness, and persistence

● Those qualities of character are essential to leadership of other human beings

● So geniuses are not major players in the course of human affairs


Recommended