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Science, Technology, and the Cold War: The MilitaryUses of the Jodrell Bank Radio TelescopeGraham SpinardiPublished online: 21 Aug 2006.

To cite this article: Graham Spinardi (2006) Science, Technology, and the Cold War: The Military Uses of the Jodrell BankRadio Telescope, Cold War History, 6:3, 279-300

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14682740600795428

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Science, Technology, and the ColdWar:The Military Uses of the Jodrell BankRadio TelescopeGraham Spinardi

A post-war symbol of Big Science in the UK, and primarily built for scientific purposes, thelarge radio telescope at Jodrell Bank was nevertheless caught up in the politics of the ColdWar. This occurred not because the UK government sought to utilise the telescope’s

potential for space surveillance (for example, to observe satellites or obtain warning ofballistic missiles) but rather as result of Bernard Lovell’s struggle to obtain funding to meet

the escalating construction costs. Drawing upon files in the UK National Archives, thispaper documents the attempts (with limited success) that Lovell made to create military

missions for his telescope, and thus gain support.

Introduction

Constructed during the 1950s, the steerable 250-foot radio telescope at Jodrell Bankwas one of the most significant developments in post-war British science, and certainly

the most visible and expensive. However, government funding was given reluctantly,and only as a consequence of intense lobbying by the advocates of the radio telescope.

Previous accounts have described these activities,1 but what have not been fullydocumented are the military uses to which the radio telescope was put, both for

tracking and eavesdropping on satellites and as an interim ballistic missile earlywarning system (BMEWS).

The military applications of Jodrell Bank shed further light on the issue of science

and technology in the Cold War. Most research in this area has focused on theinvolvement of American universities in military work.2 What literature there is on the

UK tends to concentrate on the role of the defence research establishments rather thanon academia.3 There has been little systematic study of the role of British universities

in the Cold War.4

ISSN 1468-2745 (print)/ISSN 1743-7962 (online)/06/030279-22

q 2006 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/14682740600795428

Correspondence to: Graham Spinardi, Research Centre for Social Sciences, Old Surgeons’ Hall, High School Yards,

Edinburgh, EH1 1LZ. Email: g.spinardi@ed.ac.uk

Cold War History

Vol. 6, No. 3, August 2006, pp. 279–300

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Studies of the Cold War development of American universities such as Stanfordindicate that academic interest in defence work was far from being simply a matter of

being responsive to government requirements.5 Instead, many American academicsand university administrators actively sought to obtain defence support. Both the

prominence and content of certain disciplines were thus shaped by the Cold Warcontext.6 In contrast, the general situation in the UK appears to have been different.

Government defence establishments have typically carried out much research that inthe US might have been done in academia, and UK universities did not traditionally

favour such an entrepreneurial approach to seeking outside support.7

What differed at Jodrell Bank was not just the role of an exceptional entrepreneurialfigure in Sir Bernard Lovell, but also the vision of a technological project of such

expense that normal funding could not accommodate it. Radio astronomy – which, insimple terms, differs from traditional astronomy by collecting and analysing radio

waves rather than light waves – was a new field that had emerged from wartime radarwork.8 This new discipline, especially strong in the UK, was thus in its infancy at the

start of the Cold War, a time not just of intensive military rivalry and mutual distrustbetween East and West, but also of rapidly shifting technological and strategic

conditions.9

In particular, the development in the late 1950s of long range ballistic missiles andthe launch of the first satellites meant that space became a key arena for Cold War

competition. An instrument, such as the Jodrell Bank radio telescope, capable ofpassively listening to radiation from space objects or, with minor adaptation, of

detecting them through radar, thus had considerable military potential. At the sametime, however, the technical and strategic dynamism of this era placed great demands

on the post-war economy, as the UK sought to compete in a wide range of newmilitary technologies. In this context obtaining funding for the large radio telescope

was a major challenge.

Building Jodrell Bank

Work on radio astronomy began at Jodrell Bank at the end of World War II with the

strong support of P. M. S. Blackett, the head of the Department of Physics atManchester University. Along with Lovell, a former lecturer there who had worked onradar during the war, Blackett formed a research group based on radar equipment

acquired from the military and scientists who had worked on the wartime effort.Jodrell Bank’s initial research focus in the late 1940s was radar observation of meteors,

where it quickly established a strong reputation.10

Right from the start Lovell and his supporters were fully aware of the challenge of

gaining sufficient funding for their ambitions. Bernard Lovell in particulardemonstrated the classic attributes of a ‘heterogeneous engineer’, attempting to

manage not just the ‘technical’ aspects of a project, but also the ‘social’.11 One aspect ofthis was a financial astuteness which meant a readiness to accept grants from the

military, with the United States Air Force (USAF) an early contributor at the start of

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the 1950s. The first area of interest to the USAF was Jodrell Bank’s work onionospheric conditions, derived from observations of meteor trails as they drifted in

the winds of the upper atmosphere and from the scintillation of radiation fromdiscrete radio sources. The relevance of this research to the USAF stemmed from the

potential implications for ballistic missile design.12 The USAF also supported work atJodrell Bank on lunar echoes, where its interest lay in the use of a moon relay as part of

a communication system.13

In February 1950 Lovell gained support for the proposed large radio telescope from

the newly formed Committee on Radio Astronomy of the Royal Astronomical Society:

The Council of the Royal Astronomical Society strongly endorses the proposals putforward by the Physical Laboratories of the University of Manchester, for theerection in the United Kingdom of a steerable paraboloid aerial of 250 feet diameter.The Council considers that by the erection of this apparatus the prestige of science inBritain would be considerably enhanced.14

The radio telescope required a huge capital investment (the initial request was for£259,000, but this was quickly out of date due to increases in material costs15) and

most of the efforts of supporters were devoted to securing backing. Much emphasiswas placed on the national prestige associated with such a project, especially as radioastronomy was a field in which the UK had played a pioneering role. However, the

potential of the radio telescope for military use also played a role in gaining support.When a request for funding was made to the Nuffield Foundation in 1951, Lord

Nuffield’s free market beliefs made him disinclined to support such a large stateproject. He was apparently swayed to provide backing by reference to the military

achievements of radar, and the fanciful idea that ‘the radio telescope might one day bedirected if need be on the steppes of Russia’.16 Finally, in March 1952 a grant of

£333,000 was awarded for the construction of the radio telescope with the cost sharedbetween the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) and the NuffieldFoundation.17 However, it became clear over the next year that the budget had been

seriously under-estimated, and this, along with rising costs, meant that only a yearlater the revised estimate was about a third higher at £459,896.18 DSIR agreed to this

increase but ‘gave the warning that it may not be possible for the DSIR to provide thenecessary money for any further such increases in cost should they arise’.19

Lovell also took advantage of one of his contacts from the wartime radar work,Robert Cockburn, formerly of the Telecommunications Research Establishment and

now Controller of Guided Weapons and Electronics at the Ministry of Supply, toarrange a meeting with Sir Harry Garner, Chairman of the Guided Weapons Advisory

Board. According to Lovell, Garner had an ‘interest in having the telescope completedquickly and in a steerable condition’, and this military support helped encourage DSIRto provide further funding for the radio telescope.20

Given the fact that DSIR and the Nuffield Foundation had made it clear that extrafunding from them was highly unlikely, and that the University of Manchester had no

funds which it could allocate to the capital costs of the telescope, further cost increases

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which became apparent during 1954 were a serious concern. It was at this point thatLovell’s ‘heterogeneous engineering’ went into overdrive as he sought other sources of

funding. In his 1968 book Lovell describes his activities in general terms, unable of courseto reveal details of what would then still have been classified military connections:

I was therefore urgently looking for another source of funds. Like many otherscientists I spent some of my time in the committee structure of external advisors tocertain Ministries. During 1953 and early in 1954 it seemed to me that for variousreasons, radio telescopes were likely to become of great importance in the world ofthe future. I was not lacking friends and ex-colleagues in the appropriate echelons ofthese Ministries and I put up various memoranda for discussion early in 1954.21

One of these attempts to enrol support for the telescope came when Lovell pushed theidea that Jodrell Bank could carry out investigations in the use of radio sources for

navigation. At its twentiethmeeting on 23 February 1954, theAirNavigationCommitteeconsidered a paper by Lovell on the use of the radio emissions from the sun and radio

stars for astronavigation. It was concluded that: ‘The use of solar emissions on S, X andQwave-bands for the navigation of aircraft in overcast conditions should be practicablewith a collector of not more than 3 ft diameter.’ The use of radio stars seemed less

practical as that would have required long integration times. However, ‘the use of radiostar emissions for the navigation of larger and more stable vehicles such as ships under

overcast conditions by day or night would appear to be practicable’. The result was thatthe Committee recommended ‘that consideration be given to the placing of a contract

with an appropriate university for further investigation into the spectrum and theintensity of the radiation from the Sun and radio stars in the centrimetric wave-band’.22

Lovell had continued to press his case after the meeting, impressing Professor A. G.Pugsley of the University of Bristol sufficiently for him to write a letter of support to

the Ministry of Supply:

It appeared from a conversation that I had with Professor Lovell of Manchesterafterwards that his giant radio telescope could do good basic work in this field if onlythe ‘dish’ were made properly curved and not a series of short ‘straights’ or ‘flats’. . . .the capital cost of the change, which can be effected without loss if decided uponquickly, would be about £46,000 as against the main cost of the whole telescope ofabout £430,000 (provided by Nuffield and DSIR).23

However, there was widespread suspicion that Lovell’s suggestion was primarily

motivated by his desire to find extra funding to bolster the precarious financialsituation of the new telescope. For example, it was noted that ‘Blackett’s view is that

Lovell should concentrate on justifying the £430,000 which he has already received’.24

Others, despite this concern, still pressed the case for Lovell to take on the radionavigation work:

. . . yet I feel I must say that having regard to the origin of the proposal and somedoubts as to RRE’s [the Royal Radar Establishment] capacity to proceedexpeditiously, I would favour placing the work with Professor Lovell on the strictunderstanding that he is not to get us involved in his telescope troubles and that a

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realistic and speedy investigation is needed in the first instance. . . . I wish again toemphasise that I am not concerned with the Jodrell Bank venture and entirely agreewith you that we should not get entangled with the finances and difficulties of thatwhite elephant.25

Nevertheless, in May it was decided that after ‘considerable discussions, the

proposal to help Professor Lovell surface his mirror in order to do the survey wasturned down’.26

In the autumn of 1955, with the financial situation of the radio telescope becomingcritical (the overspend was calculated to be over £200,000, of which it was thought theuniversity would need to raise at least half), Lovell’s attempts to gain support from

industry became increasingly desperate.27 Both local firms and major electrical andengineering concerns were approached. Where possible – for example, with Rolls

Royce, GEC, and Ferranti – reference was made to the potential benefits to thesecompanies both in technical knowledge and trained manpower, often in areas of direct

defence relevance. For example, Lovell noted that the radar study of meteors and theionosphere was ‘fundamental to any industry concerned with the future of guided

weapons, missile and rockets’.28 Some money was raised, both from industry and fromprivate donations to the appeal, but it was far from enough to deal with Jodrell Bank’s

growing financial problems.

Satellite Observation

The launch of the first satellite, Sputnik, by the Soviet Union on 4 October 1957provided another opportunity to gain support for the radio telescope, and inparticular to solve the problem of the debt which had accrued. Picking up the

Sputnik’s characteristic radio signal was not the issue – many receivers could achievethat. What Jodrell Bank offered was the potential to use the radio telescope as a radar

system that could track both Sputnik once it stopped emitting its signal, and rocketslike the one that had been used to launch the satellite. Whereas both radio astronomy

and tracking the Sputnik’s signal simply involved passive reception of radio waves,radar used an active approach – sending out signals and then listening for echoes.

Sputnik’s significance, of course, was not simply as a visible demonstration of Soviettechnology. It provided a very public confirmation of what US intelligence alreadysuspected – that the Soviet Union had intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)

capable of reaching the US. Intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) capable ofattacking the UK from Eastern Europe had been in development for some time,

although UK intelligence and air defence planning continued to play down theimmediate threat posed to the UK.29

Surprisingly Lovell was initially reluctant to use the radio telescope to track Sputnik.The Times on 7 October had seven articles on Sputnik, including one entitled

‘Disappointment at Jodrell Bank’ in which Lovell was quoted as saying he was‘scientifically absolutely helpless and frustrated’ because the new radio telescope was

not yet ready.30

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This, however, was not a view shared by the consulting engineers responsible for thedesign and construction of the radio telescope, who offered to make the necessary

adjustments ‘to track the Russian satellite’ on the day after Sputnik’s launch.31 Lovell’sresistance to this offer may have stemmed in part from the on-going dispute between

the engineers, Husband & Co., and Manchester University over the design and cost ofthe radio telescope. Lovell resented any suggestion that the engineers were taking the

lead in this matter, particularly given what he saw as the slow rate of progress so far,noting that Husband had ‘within a little over twenty-four hours, accomplished feats

on which he hitherto refused to give a time-scale to the Site Committee’.32 In addition,Lovell was also perhaps making a point about the lack of earlier support for a satellitetracking function at Jodrell Bank:

I reminded the Ministry of Supply only three days before the launching of theRussian satellite that there is no instrument in this country capable of tracking it byradar, and that they had previously rejected a suggestion that they should providefunds for the modification of one of our smaller telescopes at Jodrell Bank for thispurpose.33

However, Lovell quickly came to appreciate that using the radio telescope to trackSputnik could gain public support (and that the converse was true if Jodrell Bank

did not play a role), and that the work needed to accomplish this meant that ‘itseemed that we should shorten the difficult final stages of the telescope completion

by many months’.34 One persuasive voice pushing Lovell in this direction was thatof Sir Robert Renwick whom Lovell had first met during his wartime work on

radar.35 Lovell had contacted him in connection with Jodrell Bank in October 1955when he sought Renwick’s help in gaining support for the radio telescope from

industry.36

Ten days after the launch of Sputnik a press statement was issued which stated thatthe ‘ability of the Jodrell Bank radio telescope to detect by radar the Russian Rocket has

now been demonstrated’.37 Despite the dispute between the consulting engineers andLovell, the press statement also noted that ‘this display of its power and adaptability

has now been made possible by the cooperation of the engineers who still have somework to carry out on the telescope’.38

This success in using the radio telescope to track Sputnik was now used in anotherattempt to press for financial support. An appeal was made directly to Prime Minister

Macmillan later in October, with Sir Robert Renwick acting as a conduit for Lovell’sarguments.39 On 22 October, Renwick wrote to Macmillan enclosing a note fromLovell on the military potential of the radio telescope. Lovell’s note pointed out that it

‘has been realised for some time that this instrument would be the most powerfulradar equipment in the Western world and would be particularly well suited to the

location and tracking of satellites by radar’. Furthermore, he noted that the ‘Russianrocket and satellite have therefore provided an unexpectedly early opportunity for

obtaining this basic information which is urgently needed for the design of Britain’sand America’s defence system’.40

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In his letter, Renwick was even more straightforward in pressing the case for theradio telescope:

I personally feel that this country is very lucky to have had ready a radar instrumentwhich is capable of detecting and observing the Russian satellite and rocketindependent of any signals emanating from the device and therefore being able togive us much vital information. The sad part of this otherwise great story is thatManchester University has now used all the funds allocated to them and are short ofsome £250,000 with no money for running expenses or for further development. . . .Provided Manchester University is relieved from its financial embarrassment andsupplied with sufficient funds to operate effectively you have, I suggest, something ofimmense value for defence purposes to offer the Americans.41

With no response from the Prime Minister’s Office, Lovell made the case again to

Renwick in November:

You may remember that when we last met I said the Jodrell Bank telescope appearedto be the only instrument capable of locating the rocket and satellite now that thebatteries have failed. . . .We have, therefore, had to assume the national responsibilityfor keeping track of satellite 1 and its rocket, and nowwe are faced with the same taskon satellite 2, which has just ceased transmission. We are, of course, delighted to be ina position to assist the Ministry of Supply and many other interested bodies at homeand in America in this manner, but our resources are strained more than ever. . . .I am still very distracted by the financial worry over the cost of the telescope. . . . Youwill be interested to learn that the transmitter which we have used on the telescope inthis satellite work is a converted GL Mark 2 and an old C.H.L. unit which I boughtfrom disposal stores for five guineas in 1946! Even so we already have the mostpowerful radar system in the world. . . . The Russians will soon send a rocket to themoon and no doubt all eyes will once more turn to Jodrell Bank.42

Renwick responded to Lovell’s letter by again writing to the Prime Minister’s Office:

‘In these days when the prestige of this country is so vital, I do really feel that a gestureon the part of the Treasury which would make it possible for Jodrell Bank, not only to

keep up with their programme but to lead the world in this particular branch ofscience, would have the unstinted support of the whole country.’43 However, it was not

the Treasury that had provided existing government support for the radio telescope,but rather the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, and Lovell’s lobbyingwas not well received there. At the end of January 1958, H. W. Melville, Secretary of

DSIR wrote an admonishing letter to Professor W. Mansfield Cooper, Vice-Chancellorof Manchester University:

I was very disturbed recently to learn that Professor Lovell had made yet anotherunofficial move to obtain support for his cause in an unorthodox way through apersonal letter to Sir Robert Renwick, and later through an interview with one of thePrime Minister’s Private Secretaries. . . . I do hope you will use your influence todissuade Professor Lovell from further private lobbying of this kind. It can onlymake life even more difficult for all of us.44

Despite the success of Jodrell Bank in tracking the Sputnik satellites, further financial

support was not forthcoming from the UK government. The large debt accrued by the

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University ofManchester in building the telescope was eventually paid off mainly with themoney raised from industry and the public, followed by a final contribution from

Nuffield.45 However, the demonstration that Jodrell Bank could be used to track spaceobjects did lead to one lucrative development. Just before Easter 1958 Lovell was secretly

approached by the United States Air Force with a request to use Jodrell Bank to track theplanned American attempt to launch a rocket to the moon. Lovell agreed, but the first

attempt, launched in August, proved a failure, with the rocket exploding before it clearedthe horizon.46 Subsequent launches also failed in the attempt to hit the moon (something

the Russians, also tracked by Jodrell Bank, succeeded in doing in September 1959), but theprestige of the radio telescope inAmericawas greatly enhanced. Although Jodrell Bankhadreceived no payment for tracking these American rockets, negotiations followed with the

newly formed National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) that led to anagreement for anhourly rate foruse aspartof theUS ‘deep space instrumentation facility’.47

Tracking the Soviet rockets aimed at the moon had been generally done without anyagreed cooperation between Jodrell Bank and the Soviet authorities. However, starting

with Lunik II, which achieved the successful impact on the moon, the Soviets hadprovided Jodrell Bank with the rockets’ coordinates and with the transmitter

frequencies. This, of course, was a matter of self-interest as Jodrell Bank could provideindependent confirmation of the Soviet achievement. At the same time, however,Jodrell Bank’s capabilities were aligned with British military interests:

For three or four years now, Lovell at Jodrell Bank has been of great help to us inconnection with our scientific intelligence work on the Russian space programme. Hisbig telescopehas sometimesbeen theonlymeanswehavehadat ourdisposal for pickingup telemetry fromspace probes and the like.His connectionwithus has beenkept secretbecausewedon’t want anything to get outwhichmightmake theRussians suspicious ofhim. He has very good connections with the Russians and, as you may know, two ofthem have recently been to see him in connection with the VENUS probe.48

This space tracking and intelligence role was also used by Lovell in his attempts to gain

funding for the 125 foot Mark II radio telescope which had been proposed in 1960 as aprototype for a much larger instrument.49 A hold-up in funding approval during 1961

led to the case being made that the new telescope would provide capabilities lacking inthe Mark I:

So far the Russians have used frequencies for which it has been appropriate to useLovell’s big telescope.When the two Russians came over recently they hinted that whenthe next space probe goes up (which will probably be in August, 1962) they may usemuch higher frequencies for transmitting information, and these frequencies may bewithin the banned 3,000–5,000 mc/s [megacycles per second]. For this frequency,Lovell’s mirror would only give a beam width of a few minutes of arc and it would beimpossible to obtain accurate tracking, or even keep the beam on the target.50

However, according to Lovell, these frequencies could be tracked accurately by theproposed Mark II telescope: ‘Lovell informed us that he has been planning to have a

125 ft. aperture radio telescope which would have been ideal for our work.’51 There was

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sufficient interest within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for this matter to be pushedat high levels within the government:

Do you think that Sir Solly Zuckerman, or yourself, could bring pressure to bear toensure that the work goes on? . . . We are very badly placed for getting anyinformation on the Russian space programme. We have tried to push the wholething in JIC circles, but we are meeting with the usual inertia and it will cost a lot ofmoney if anything at all is to be done. Lovell’s new telescope would give us a valuableaid to be going on with.52

In December 1961, the DSIR gave full approval for the Mark II, and construction wascompleted in 1964.

Jodrell Bank and Ballistic Missile Early Warning

In addition to its role in tracking and listening to satellites and space probes, JodrellBank also had a short-lived role in ballistic missile early warning. After roughly two

years’ discussion an agreement between the US and UK governments was signed inFebruary 1960 which gave the go-ahead to the construction of three radars on

Fylingdales moor near the Yorkshire coast. This was to be the third and final link in theUS BMEWS which was designed to provide warning of Soviet nuclear-armed ballisticmissiles if they were launched at the US, with the UK BMEWS also able to provide

warning of shorter-range ballistic missiles fired at the UK.53

Shortly after the announcement of the BMEWS agreement an anonymous article

appeared in the Guardian raising doubts about the cost of BMEWS. The Air Ministryhad little doubt that the article had been written by Professor Lovell, and sought to

rebut his arguments by pointing out that there was ‘no comparison with Jodrell Bankwhich is a telescope, with power requirements which are but a fraction of those of the

BMEWS, the generating plant for which will have an installed capacity of 24megawatts, ie enough for a town of about the size of Guildford’.54

Lovell had also made his doubts clear to the MoD’s Chief Scientific Advisor, Solly

Zuckerman:

You know that I have been warned that those who should know best are somewhatrather less optimistic than they should be, if public statements are to be believed,about the possibilities that lie in the BMEWSystem. I have just seen Professor Lovell,the Head of Jodrell Bank, who has more than confirmed these suspicions. He tellsme the longer he investigates certain problems that have been put to him by theMinistry of Aviation, the less confident does he feel about the capacity of the systemto do what it is supposed to do. More than that, he believes that it would not bedifficult to make such a system unreliable through countermeasures.55

Lovell’s doubts about Fylingdales in 1960 can, however, be put in context by the fact

that he had been discussing such a missile detection role for Jodrell Bank for a numberof years.56 In March 1958:

[Lovell] had a meeting with VCAS [Vice Chief of the Air Staff] in which he suggestedthat the Jodrell Bank radio telescope had capabilities which might be of use in the

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military sphere. . . . As a result of the meeting VCAS undertook to look at theprospects for some emergency arrangements by which the Jodrell Bank radiotelescope could be used for defence purposes against ballistic missiles.57

The initial response was sceptical. One concern was that even if ‘we could get thetelescope to act as a scanning early warning radar taking, say, two or three looks at a

ballistic missile rising through the beam, would the information obtained from thismake any worthwhile identification or prediction possible?’ In addition, it was

considered that:

. . . there is a very important point that the work of installing this high powertransmitter, testing it, and trying out the operational system by means of which thetelescope could be used in an emergency could all represent serious interference withyour astronomical programme and with your research for ballistic missile defencepurposes. My own view is that the interference with your work would not beworthwhile.58

Despite these doubts, Lovell continued to argue for the use of Jodrell Bank as a

BMEWS:

Even with the severe limitations, as set out in your letter, with which I completelyagree, it would seem that at the present time the telescope is the only instrument in astate of reasonable operational readiness which has a chance of giving at least someanswers in the early warning phase. I think, therefore, that you should attempt tosettle whether, if a serious emergency arose before any other systems could bedeployed, it would be worth while to use even the limited facilities offered by thetelescope.59

Although the radio telescope had been designed primarily for passive reception of

radio sources, Sputnik had already demonstrated that it had ‘some capability as anactive radar’ based on the use of a 120 mc/s transmitter giving about 1/2 kw meanpower. This was enhanced in 1958 when the Ministry of Supply ‘placed a small

contract for the investigation of the occurrence of meteors and other sources of signalswhich may interfere with the operation of anti-ICBM radars’. For this purpose they

supplied ‘a 1 kw mean power transmitter operating on 500 mc/s’.60

In addition to a ballistic missile early warning function some consideration was also

given at the same time to two other possible military uses of Jodrell Bank. The first ofthese concerned ‘the possible use of the telescope, again as a radar set, in conditions of

jamming from aircraft targets. The idea here would be to use the telescope as aspotlight radar employing, as it would, a different frequency from the rest of the radar

chain, and offering the possibility of sorting out a jamming situation by counting andpositioning at least a few of the sources of jamming’.61 Secondly, there was someinterest in the intelligence gathering potential of Jodrell Bank and ‘the prospect for

using the telescope as a listening device’.62

However, the ‘primary concern’ was ‘warning of missile launch and the dispatch of

the bomber force’. The likelihood that Jodrell Bank might be prone to false alarms wasnot critical because the bombers could become airborne under positive control and

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be recalled if necessary. Since the Fylingdales BMEWS was not expected to be readyuntil 1963 it was the view of the Vice Chief of the Air Staff that: ‘Until this time there

is a gap in our warning organisation which we must eliminate. I believe Jodrell Bankcan do this.’63 Accordingly the VCAS issued a request for a study of the use of Jodrell

Bank:

Assuming a period of tension or at least enough time to alert and align Jodrell Bank;a known sector of launching sites and the launch simultaneously of say one to threehundred missiles, will you please examine in consultation with Professor Lovell (andthe Air Staff as appropriate):- (a) what warning of missile launch we could expect toobtain from Jodrell Bank. (b) what modifications, if any, are needed to the telescopeto make it more effective for our purpose. (c) how much prewarning wouldnormally be required to place the telescope in a missile detecting condition. (d) whatspecific intelligence information would be of assistance to Professor Lovell if hecould undertake this requirement of early warning. (e) to what extent wouldacceptance of this commitment interfere with normal research.64

There were two particular practical issues to be assessed: discrimination of missilesfrom other objects such as meteors, and the amount of coverage that could be

provided by the Jodrell Bank telescope which had slow mechanical scanning. ProfessorLovell’s measurements indicated that meteors in the direction of interest appeared at

the rate or one or two per hour and so a mass missile attack (300 missiles was asuggested figure) could be discriminated. However, there was some limitation in terms

of the arc of coverage as mechanical scanning could not be achieved quickly enoughwith the current structure, and electronic methods would require so much new work

as to be ready only after Fylingdales was operational.65

By November 1960 the Vice Chief of the Air Staff was convinced of the merits of theproposal:

While Professor Lovell advises that false alarm rates from meteorites and otherspurious signals may not be too serious with this equipment, it is clear thatexperience will be needed for proper interpretation, since the time between firstobservation and possible missile arrival is short (some 7 minutes on the 1,000 milemissile). This would be sufficient however, in times of tension, to allow the BomberForce to be scrambled under positive control. . . . This proposal will in part fill in thegaps in our warning system prior to the installation of BMEWand will also provide amost valuable lead in determining the techniques we will want to adopt when wehave BMEWS. In view of this and the fact that the additional facility can be obtainedquickly using equipment (with minor modifications) surplus to RAF [Royal AirForce] requirements and with a personnel requirement of less than 10, I should begrateful for your formal endorsement of this project.66

The particular concern of the RAF was the detection of IRBMs. Most ICBMs could bedetected by the first two BMEWS sites, but these had no capability against IRBMs that

might be launched at the UK. It was therefore not a major drawback that the JodrellBank dish could not be scanned quickly because if pointed in the optimum direction

the arc covered by the beam would be sufficient to take in many of the IRBM launchsites. Agreement to go ahead with the Jodrell Bank modification was reached within

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the Air Ministry in December 1960, and the proposal was then put to the Secretary ofState for Air in January 1961.

The installation at Jodrell Bank was to comprise ‘a pulse transmitter, receiver anddisplay equipment for use with the main telescope aerial on a frequency of about

36 mc/s’. This would enable detection of IRBMs at 1,000 miles range, and at ‘this rangethe system’s beam width of some 88 would cover an arc of about 130 miles’. On

strategic alert ‘the telescope would be pointed at an area of known IRBM launchingsites’, and the ‘changeover to this role from normal scientific use would take not more

than an hour’. Military personnel would arrive to operate the system and ‘would keepwatch on a simple radar display’, communicating by ‘direct voice communication withappropriate Operations Centres’. There was concern that many ‘unwanted targets

would be shown, such as meteors, satellites, dead rocket motors and other spacedebris, as well as spurious signals from natural phenomena’, but it was ‘impractical

within a worthwhile time scale to provide elaborate equipment of the type proposedfor Fylingdales to discriminate automatically between signals’. It was claimed,

nevertheless, that there was ‘a high probability that an experienced operator woulddistinguish and identify correctly signals from any sizable number of missiles launched

simultaneously or in rapid succession’.67

In turn, the Secretary of State for Air thenwrote to theMinister of Defence at the endof January 1961 to recommend the use of Jodrell Bank for ballistic missile early

warning, noting that because ‘of the difficulty of identifying an attack with absolutecertainty, the warning given by the system could not be acted on in isolation’. To gain

experience of operating the equipment, ‘officers would be attached to Jodrell Bank byarrangement with Professor Lovell at times when the telescope was available from its

other tasks’. Moreover, because most of the equipment required was already available,new capital expenditure required to start the scheme was ‘provisionally estimated at

about £6,000’. The Secretary of State concluded by stating that: ‘Unless you or theMinister for Science, to whom I am copying this minute, see any objection I would like

to go ahead with this.’68

There was general agreement that the use of Jodrell Bank for ballistic missile earlywarning seemed to offer some, albeit limited, benefits in terms of national security.

It also had ‘the further advantage that Professor Lovell, who was one of the publiccritics of BMEWS, would be seen to be supporting an arrangement for obtaining

warning. I understand that he has changed his view that missiles could not beidentified, because he has been told that large numbers would be launched

simultaneously or in rapid succession’.69

However, there was to be another problem for Project Verify, though not one

stemming from any technical or operational shortcomings of the proposal. JodrellBank was a university facility with many overseas scientists visiting, including somefrom Soviet bloc countries. There was concern over what to do about the military

personnel that would be required to operate the BMEWS capability, and it wassuggested that a ‘cover story’ should be invented to explain their presence.70 The

Secretary of State for Air’s view was that:

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We do not intend to give any publicity to the fact that our real interest is in obtainingearly warning of a ballistic missile attack. It would, however, be impossible toconceal the general nature of the equipment we propose to put at Jodrell Bank and ifquestions were asked we should take the line that our object was to gain experiencein satellite tracking and the recognition of space phenomena.71

This suggestion was not well received by the Minister of Defence:

I have seen your minute of 21st March to the Minister for Science about Jodrell Bank.I am afraid I am not happy about this proposal. . . . There are, of course, occasionswhen the national interest requires us to put out a misleading cover story to concealsomething we are doing. I am not clear that it would be justified in the presentinstance. . . . I should have thought that there was every likelihood that the true factswould get round. . . . My present opinion, therefore, is that this project should bedropped.72

Furthermore, it seems that not only was the Minister concerned about deceiving themedia, but also there were some doubts about introducing a military role into an

academic organization:

There is nothing more behind the Minister’s minute than personal distaste for asituation which he has been told requires a cover story, of which he thinks the falsitycould be exposed, backed by distaste on the part of Sir Solly Zuckerman forintroducing a military function into a scientific installation. . . . I have learned(strictly not for repetition outside our own circle) that there is a difference ofopinion within Jodrell Bank about the desirability of this project.73

In the event it was quickly realized that the whole issue of a cover story wasunnecessary:

On reflection, it is clear that it was a mistake to suggest the use of any cover story.The Americans are already using Jodrell Bank for satellite tracking purposes, andhave airmen on duty in uniform. I see no reason why we should not evince a similarinterest in space developments, and this quite openly. We are, in fact, intenselyinterested in all satellite developments. Moreover, it is true, as Professor Lovell hasmade clear, that our modest addition to his existing equipment would be ofscientific value to him.74

With ministerial concern about the use of a cover story assuaged there stillremained another obstacle – Treasury approval. This was obtained in September

1961, but by then another problem had arisen. An article by Chapman Pincher hadsuggested that ‘Jodrell Bank is being mobilised with the assistance of RCA as an

operational ballistic missile early warning system, pending the construction ofFylingdales. The story suggests that Jodrell Bank could be virtually as good as

Fylingdales.’75

Despite this dubious claim, it was now clear that Jodrell Bank’s ‘secret’ could no

longer be sustained. On 22 November 1961 it was announced by the MoD that the ‘AirMinistry is installing some equipment which will be of assistance to Professor Lovell in

his work on the observation of satellite behaviour, and which will in addition offersome capacity for the detection of ballistic missiles’.76

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Installation and Operation of Project Verify/Changlin

The installation of equipment at Jodrell Bank was ready by April 1962, with theequipment designed and installed by Signals Command Laboratories, RAF West

Ruislip.77 For security reasons, the project was given a new codeword of ‘Lothario’ foruse from 20 September, but this too was compromised, and cancelled on 29 October

1962, to be replaced by ‘Changlin’.RAF Signals Command reported that:

With this modification we were expecting Jodrell Bank to give the followingwarning ranges against missiles of two square metres echoing area as follows:-(a) Low trajectory 787 miles at a height of 80 miles. (b) Medium trajectory 890miles at a height of 100 miles. (c) High trajectory 932 miles at a height of 110miles. As there is, of course, no possibility of arranging actual tests with missiles wehave had to be content with looking at a Canberra aircraft, the Echo I satellite andthe Moon and I am happy to say that the results of the preliminary tests justify ourassumptions. I am therefore shortly handing over the installation to C-in-C[Commander-in-Chief] Fighter Command.78

The description of these ‘tests’ show that they were not particularly extensive orrigorous:

The aircraft test consisted of four runs on two consecutive days of a SignalsCommand Canberra flying at an altitude of 45,000 feet inbound to Jodrell Bankfrom the general direction of the Hebrides. With the telescope laid at 48 thisaircraft was detected at nearly 300 miles, immediately it entered the beam, and wasfollowed without difficulty throughout its flight into a range of 45 miles. Furtherevidence on performance was obtained by reflections from the moon which, withthe telescope tracking to follow the orbit, we were able to observe for a period ofabout two hours. Finally, although not orbiting favourably for observation fromJodrell Bank, we were able to track the American satellite Echo I for a shortperiod.79

The equipment consisted of ‘a modified Transmitter Type 1365 installed in a roomwhich is an integral part of the radio telescope, and a modified Console Type

61 mounted, together with dual RACAL Receivers, in a vehicle parked adjacent to theTelescope’.80 The location of the console caused some concern because the room

containing it was next to a workshop used by Russian students and shared anon-soundproofed wall through which it was possible to hear conversations.81 The

transmitter aerial could not be permanently put in place, but would have to be put inpositionwhenever the early warning functionwas required, a process that took about an

hour to complete.82

With the equipment now installed, the Air Ministry seemed surprised to find thatLovell’s offer to use the radio telescope for BMEWS was not without self-interest when

they received a request for payments: ‘We have not to date expected to be called uponto pay for the use of the telescope for this purpose, because we understood that our

task could be fitted into the telescope’s normal programme.’83 Although it wasconceded that this might not be possible if extensive training were to be carried out for

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the early warning operators, there was still some unhappiness within the Air Ministryover Lovell’s request:

The fact that the Americans have paid for the use of the telescope is not a trueprecedent. I understand that there has been a substantial contribution from publicfunds in this country to the capital costs of the telescope. The Americans have madeno such contribution. It is at least strongly arguable that even if we are charged weshould not be charged on the same scale as the Americans. . . . I find it difficult toreconcile the claim that we ought to pay because the telescope has been divertedfrom its normal tasks with:- (i) Professor Lovell’s reactions to the P.Q. byMr Laurence Pavitt of 27th July which, on the Professor’s advice, we answered to theeffect that there have been no interruptions to the telescope’s normal programme.. . . (ii) The facts.84

These facts concerned the lack of opportunity that Fighter Command had had to

carry out training at Jodrell Bank even though they had ‘sent their personnel toJodrell Bank on three occasions at Sir Bernard’s request to help him in his own

work’.85 Despite these misgivings, the £50 per hour payment to Jodrell Bank wasagreed. It was not expected that the use of Jodrell Bank would be very extensive andso the expenditure involved was not large. In normal peacetime the missile detection

equipment at Jodrell Bank would only be used for ‘limited periods to obtainexperience and training in observation and assessment’. It was expected that: ‘The

telescope will probably be available for training for a period of 48 hours about every 6weeks.’86

In the case of an emergency situation it was planned that the ‘telescope will bemanned continuously on a 24-hour basis as soon as possible after the declaration of

a state of Military Vigilance or RAF Alert PHASE I’. It was

. . . expected that a period of tension and worsening political relations will providesuch a declaration and it would be possible to give warning of such an event toJodrell Bank. Prior warning of and declaration of Military Vigilance or RAF AlertPHASE I will be passed to the Director Jodrell Bank or his deputy from the AirDefence Operations Centre Fighter Command either by the Commander-in-Chiefhimself or on his direct authority by the Duty Controller.87

Once the alert was given the Air Defence Operations Command (ADOC) Controller

was ‘to pass to Jodrell Bank the bearing required. (This bearing is to be kept in a sealedenvelope in the ADOC Controller’s cabin)’. If not already there, ‘the five pre-selected

controllers are to proceed by quickest possible means to Jodrell Bank and man thetelescope on a 24-hour basis’. Two warning states were possible: ‘Warning 2 – meaning

“Possibility of detection”. Warning 1 – meaning “Positive detection”. Experience withthe equipment is limited but present indications are that only a large number ofmissiles will give such a response that unequivocal detection can be guaranteed.’ It was

therefore clear that the ‘implications of Warning 2 will be conditioned by the generalintelligence and political situations – All reaction to such a warning is the

responsibility of the ADOC’. On the other hand, ‘Warning 1 implies a large scale attackand immediate reaction at all levels of control is essential’.88

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One potential occasion for ‘military vigilance’ came with the CubanMissile Crisis inOctober 1962. In his memoirs Sir Bernard Lovell hints at the involvement of Jodrell

Bank.89 There is, however, no record in the UK national archives of any activities atJodrell Bank associated with this crisis. This may be because this information remains

classified and is contained in files that are still closed.90 However, it seems more likelythat the UK government did not wish to initiate any activity, no matter how small, that

might inflame the situation,91 and that the benefits of early warning from Jodrell Bankwere not considered sufficiently large.

Certainly, there were doubts about the utility of the Jodrell Bank equipment. FighterCommand did not get to carry out as many training sessions as it had planned, butthose that did take place indicated that the system had significant limitations.

In particular, there was the problem that some natural phenomena ‘gave responseswhich could be mistaken for ballistic missiles’, the most worrying of which was the

aurora:

Even on the somewhat infrequent sweeps of the radio telescope to observe aurora fortraining and observation it was found that aurora responses occurred from 08 to3608 and although more frequently between 908 and 2708 were by no meansconfined to this arc. Auroral responses are also subject to changes during the daybeing strongest in the mornings and evenings, and could be affected by the presenceof sun spot activity and nuclear weapon testing in the atmosphere. . . . On most ofthe Changlin observations the intensity of the auroral returns was such that they did,in fact, present characteristic responses which the operators and trainees couldrecognise and distinguish from what could have been ballistic missiles. Nevertheless,on other occasions, the intensity of auroral returns were such that it is inconceivablethat ballistic missiles would have been seen at all in as much as they would have beenmasked out completely by the effects of aurora.92

Another concern was ‘the likelihood that had a satellite travelling in the right direction

passed through the beam it could not have been distinguished in the Changlin systemfrom a ballistic missile’.93

At the end of February 1963 Fighter Command suggested terminating the use ofJodrell Bank for missile detection. The response of the Air Ministry proposed

continuation until September when the Fylingdales BMEWS was due to be fullyoperational:

. . . the difficulties in developing this project to acceptable operational standards arefully recognised. . . You will be aware that the arrangements for this project werenegotiated at the highest levels between Government departments and that to cancelthe project at this stage might well cause embarrassment, particularly if a categoricalstatement that the project is useless cannot be made and defended. . . . it has beendecided that the project shall continue until September.94

The end of Jodrell Bank’s role in missile detection duly came in September 1963. TheVCAS noted:

Fighter Command have for some time been anxious to terminate their use of thisequipment in view of its limited operational value and the administrative and

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technical problems involved. However, since the equipment was credited with a‘genuine, even if limited, ballistic missile warning capability’, it was decided to retainthe facilities until the operational date of BMEWS.

The VCAS concluded ‘that the operational limitations associated with the equipmentoutweigh the possible advantages to be gained by retaining it as a standby to

BMEWS’.95

True to form, Lovell continued to seek every possible advantage from the situation,

urging the Air Ministry to leave the military equipment at Jodrell Bank:

If this equipment is not urgently required elsewhere then I would like to ask you ifyou would be willing for it to stay here on loan for the time being. This possibilityhas been discussed from time to time, and if arrangements could be made to leave ithere it would be of great value to us. There are a number of scientific experimentswhich we had hoped to carry out, but so far we have been unable to schedule thiswork on the telescope. As far as we are concerned the equipment is not taking up anyroom which we need for other purposes at the present time, and I think that the de-classification of the equipment would involved only the removal of a few labels andrange scales.96

Initially, the Air Ministry’s view was that military equipment should be returned toits rightful owners, even if it was somewhat obsolete for military usage. However, thisposition soon mellowed, and it was agreed that much of the equipment could remain

at Jodrell Bank: ‘Some of the items of test equipment are already needed by theServices and we shall have to ask for them back. However, it would suit us well to leave

the rest of the stuff with Jodrell Bank, for you to use and keep in good condition for usuntil such time as we need it.’97

Conclusion

The use of Jodrell Bank for military applications is a fascinating footnote in the historyof the Cold War. However, the UK government and its military institutions did not

actively seek to influence the development or use of the large radio telescope. Ratherthe Cold War influence came about passively from the way that security issues were

framed, and the opportunities this created for Lovell to seek support. It was thusLovell, not the UK government, who played an active role in seeking Cold Warmissions for Jodrell Bank because he saw the potential for military funding to help him

pay for the radio telescope.What does appear surprising is that the UK government and military institutions

did not pay more attention to the military potential of Jodrell Bank. However, in themid-1950s, when Lovell was seeking support for the telescope, UK defence policy was

being pulled in many directions, with strategic aims, technological challenges,organizational responsibilities, and the UK’s international relationships all in flux.98

A missile threat to the UK was not thought to be imminent,99 and there were manycompeting weapons programmes under development, too many for the available

resources. What work there was on ballistic missile early warning was coupled with

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attempts to develop active defence against ballistic missiles, and this work had itsorigins, both technological and organizational, in programmes to develop surface to

air guided weapons (SAGWs) for anti-aircraft use.100

Emphasis on ballistic missile early warning for its own sake, rather than as part of

active defence, only came to the fore when the USmade its first overtures to theUKwithregard to the siting of what would become the Fylingdales radar system. Initially, there

were doubts within the RAF as to whether the short warning times were worthwhile.101

These doubts only disappeared when the doctrinal link was made between the

Fylingdales BMEWS and the ability of the V-bombers to scramble before beingdestroyed on the ground, and this argument only emergedwhen it became clear that theairborne deterrent was under threat in the late 1950s – from Polaris! The US Polaris

submarine-launched ballistic missile offered an alternative deterrent system thatappeared to be much less vulnerable to a Soviet first strike, and so every effort was now

made within the RAF to bolster arguments favouring the continued use of bombers.102

Thus, when Lovell was first seeking allies in the military, the RAF had not, as an

institution, realized the significance of the missile early warning that could be providedby the radio telescope. The vulnerability argument only became strongly articulated in

the late 1950s through the processes associated with the activities of the BritishNuclear Deterrent Study Group, set up in July 1959. This led to the cancellation of theUK Blue Streak land-based ballistic missile programme, and cast doubts on the

survivability of bombers based at UK airfields.103 Had the US not proposed the sitingof its third BMEWS in the UK, the potential early warning capability of Jodrell Bank

might have had more appeal as a weapon in the bureaucratic battles fought by the RAFin defence of its bombers. As it happened, the superior capability of Fylingdales meant

that Jodrell Bank was only of limited and temporary interest.However, despite his limited success in gaining military support, Lovell’s overall

achievement was impressive, in that the telescope was built, and funding was eventuallyobtained. That this was done without significantly diverting Jodrell Bank’s work

towards the military, or damaging its international standing, can be considered a majorachievement. At the same time, Lovell’s persistent attempts to gain support earned hima reputationwithin theUK defence bureaucracy, as it was later reported that the ‘typical

reactions from the Director in assessing a new project include “how much will we bepaid?” and “what honour will fall on the establishment if success is achieved?”’.104

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Donald MacKenzie and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments ondrafts of this paper. This research was supported by the UK Economic and Social Research Council.

Notes

[1] Lovell, The Story of Jodrell Bank. Other works include Agar, Science and Spectacle and Edge andMulkay, Astronomy Transformed.

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[2] See, for example, Leslie, The Cold War and American Science; Lowen, Creating the Cold War

University; Forman, “Behind Quantum Electronics”; also see the special issues of SocialStudies of Science 31, no. 2 (April 2001) and Radical History Review, no. 63 (Fall 1995).

[3] Bud and Gummett (eds.), Cold War, Hot Science; MacKenzie and Spinardi, “The

Technological Impact of a Defence Research Establishment.”

[4] The difficulty with obtaining UK data is described in Langley, Soldiers in the Laboratory.

[5] See Lowen, Creating the Cold War University.

[6] See, for example, Waring, “Cold Calculus,” and Herman, “The Career of Cold War

Psychology.”

[7] This has changed in recent years. See Langley, Soldiers in the Laboratory.

[8] See Buderi, The Invention that Changed the World, chapter 13.

[9] The best single account covering the late 1950s is Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special

Relationship.

[10] Edge and Mulkay, Astronomy Transformed, 16–19.

[11] See Law, “Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering.”

[12] Agar, Science and Spectacle, 34.

[13] Ibid., 35.

[14] Lovell, The Story of Jodrell Bank, 32–4. See also Edge and Mulkay, Astronomy Transformed,

58–9.

[15] Lovell, The Story of Jodrell Bank, 35.

[16] Nuffield Foundation’s ‘biographer’, quoted in Agar, Science and Spectacle, 57.

[17] Lovell, The Story of Jodrell Bank, 36.

[18] Ibid., 51.

[19] Quoted in ibid., 54.

[20] Agar, Science and Spectacle, 64.

[21] Lovell, The Story of Jodrell Bank, 84.

[22] “Air Navigation Committee – Report and Recommendation,” National Archives, AVIA

54/1944. All files marked AVIA, AIR, CAB and DEFE are available in the UK NationalArchives at Kew.

[23] Letter from A. G. Pugsley, University of Bristol to E. T. Jones, Principal Director of Scientific

Research (Air), Ministry of Supply, 5 March 1954. AVIA 54/1944.

[24] R. Cockburn, PDSR(G) to PDLRD, 22 March 1954. AVIA 54/1944.

[25] Ivor Bowen, PDQRD(A) to PDLRD, 3 May 1954. AVIA 54/1944.

[26] PDLRD to PDQP(A), 8 May 1954. AVIA 54/1944.

[27] Lovell, The Story of Jodrell Bank, 127.

[28] Quoted in Agar, Science and Spectacle, 80.

[29] See Cole, “British Technical Intelligence”; also Stocker, Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence.

[30] The Times, 7 October 1957, quoted in Agar, Science and Spectacle, 119.

[31] Agar, Science and Spectacle, 119.

[32] Quoted in ibid., 121.

[33] Quoted in ibid., 121.

[34] Quoted in ibid., 121.

[35] Ibid., 121–22.

[36] Ibid., 78

[37] Quoted in ibid., 123.

[38] Quoted in ibid., 123.

[39] Ibid., 74–76.

[40] A. C. B. Lovell, “Note on Jodrell Bank Telescope,” 22 October 1957, sent with letter from

Sir Robert Renwick to Harold Macmillan, 22 October 1957. PREM 11/2484.

[41] Letter from Sir Robert Renwick to Harold Macmillan, 22 October 1957. PREM 11/2484.

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[42] Lovell to Renwick, 12 November 1957. PREM 11/2484.

[43] Renwick to P. S. de Zuleueta, 14 November 1957. PREM 11/2484.

[44] H. W. Melville, Secretary of Department of Scientific and Industrial Research to Professor

W. Mansfield Cooper, Vice-Chancellor, Manchester University, 29 January 1958. PREM11/2484.

[45] Lovell, The Story of Jodrell Bank, 217–29 and 244.

[46] Ibid., 209–212.

[47] Ibid., 222.

[48] Mr Young, Ministry of Defence to Dr. J. C. Kendrew (Chairman of the new Scientific Advisory

Panel on Intelligence), 31 July 1961. DEFE 7/1389.

[49] See Lovell, Out of the Zenith, 69–73.

[50] Mr Young, Ministry of Defence to Dr. J. C. Kendrew (Chairman of the new Scientific Advisory

Panel on Intelligence), 31 July 1961. DEFE 7/1389.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

[53] For a full account of the UK BMEWS development, see Spinardi, “Golfballs on the Moor.”

[54] Peter Hudson, Air Ministry to E. G. Cass, Ministry of Defence, 24 February 1960. DEFE

7/1388.

[55] S. Zuckerman to Chief of the Defence Staff, 29 April 1960. DEFE 7/1389.

[56] Use of Jodrell Bank for research on this topic had been approved, but not carried out, before

the launch of Sputnik. See “The Radar Detection of the Russian Earth Satellites and CarrierRocket and its Bearing on the Missile Detection Problem” by A. C. B. Lovell, AdvisoryCouncil on Scientific Research and Technical Development, Ministry of Supply, 10 March1958. WO 195/14270.

[57] “Possible Use of Jodrell Bank Radio Telescope in Emergency,” D. G. Morris, ACAS(AD), 29

September 1958. AIR 2/13380.

[58] Letter from E. V. Truefitt to Professor A. C. B. Lovell, Jodrell Bank Experimental Station, 20

June 1958. AIR 2/13380.

[59] A. C. B. Lovell to E. Truefitt, Air Ministry, 21 July 1958. AIR 2/13380.

[60] F. A. Cunnold, “Jodrell Bank Radio Telescope – Capability in the Detection of Ballistic

Missiles and Aircraft,” Science 2 Memo No 287, Scientific Advisor to the Air Ministry, 11August 1958. AIR 77/82.

[61] E. V. Truefitt to Professor A. C. B. Lovell, 16 October 1958. AIR 2/13380.

[62] Ibid.

[63] “Jodrell Bank,” E. C. Huddleston, VCAS to SAAM, 10 October 1960. AIR 2/13380.

[64] Ibid.

[65] “Jodrell Bank,” H. I. Roberts, Deputy Scientific Advisor to VCAS, 19 October 1960. AIR

20/11427.

[66] “Jodrell Bank,” letter from VCAS E. C. Hudleston, 7 November 1960. AIR 2/16074.

[67] “Proposal to Use Jodrell Bank in Emergency for Ballistic Missile Early Warning,” note from

E. C. Huddleston, VCAS to the Secretary of State, 16 January 1961. AIR 20/11427.

[68] Letter from Secretary of State for Air to Minister of Defence, 30 January 1961. DEFE 7/1389.

[69] E. G. Cass to Mr Chilver, 3 February 1961. DEFE 7/1389.

[70] Some of this correspondence is in CAB 124/1777.

[71] Secretary of State for Air (JA) to Minister for Science, 21 March 1961. AIR 2/13380.

[72] HW, Minster of Defence to Secretary of State for Air, 8 May 1961. AIR 20/11427.

[73] “Jodrell Bank,” R. C. Kent, AUS(A) to VCAS, 11 May 1961. AIR 20/11427.

[74] “Jodrell Bank,” E. C. Huddleston, VCAS to Secretary of State, 30 May 1961. AIR 20/9982.

[75] R. C. Kent, AUS (A) to PS to S of S, 21 September 1961. AIR 20/11427.

[76] C. B. McGhee, PS to VCAS, 21 September 1961. AIR 20/11427. See also AIR 2/16217.

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[77] “Project ‘Changlin’ – Post Design Services Radio Engineering Instruction No. 7034,” F. W.

Jenkins for Director of Radio, 9 November 1962. AIR 2/16217.

[78] Air Vice-Marshal Sir Walter P. G. Pretty, Signals Command, RAF to Air Marshal Sir Wallace

Kyle, Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, 4 April 1962. AIR 20/11427.

[79] Appendix to letter from G. C. Godfrey, Headquarters Signal Command, RAF to C. M. Stewart,

Director-General of Signals, Air Ministry, 4 April 1962. AIR 2/13381. Echo 1 was 100 ft indiameter.

[80] “Signals Command Servicing Directive No. 53 (Issue No 1) Servicing Policy – RAF Radio

Installation – Jodrell Bank,” 14 November 1962. AIR 2/16217.

[81] C. Dunkerly, “Security – Royal Air Force Jodrell Bank,” Fighter Command to Under-Secretary

of State, Air Military, AI(S)I, 31 August 1962. AIR 2/13381.

[82] “Minutes of a Meeting held at Air Ministry on 4 December 1961 to discuss Project ‘Verify’,”

H. N. Kitchin, 7 December 1961. AIR 2/16070.

[83] J. F. Mayne, PS to PUS to AUS(A), 10 August 1962. AIR 2/13381.

[84] R. C. Kent, AUS(A) to PS to PUS, 16 August 1962. AIR 2/13381.

[85] Ibid.

[86] “Operation ‘Changlin’ – Regulations and Procedures,” Headquarters Fighter Command, 12

October 1962. AIR 2/16217.

[87] Ibid.

[88] Ibid.

[89] Following a description of Project Verify he says: ‘When the Cuban missile crisis of October

1962 was resolved I had perhaps more reason than many to be thankful, but during thosedays particularly any idealism that the telescope had been built solely to study the remoteregions of the universe vanished forever.’ Lovell, Astronomer by Chance, 322.

[90] AIR 20/12162 and DEFE 21/11 are still closed.

[91] “Record of a conversation between the Chief of the Air Staff, First Sea Lord and the Chief of

the Imperial General Staff held in the Ministry of Defence at 1430, Saturday, 27 October1962.” DEFE 13/482. This notes that: ‘The Prime Minister had been adamant that he did notconsider the time was appropriate for any overt preparatory steps to be taken such asmobilisation. Moreover, he did not wish Bomber Command to be alerted, although hewished the force to be ready to take the appropriate steps should this become necessary.’

[92] “Result of Project Changlin Training Sessions,” Research Branch Fighter Command,

Memorandum No 182, December 1963. AIR 2/16217.

[93] Ibid.

[94] “Project Changlin,” letter from F. R. L. Mellersh, Deputy Director of Operations (Air

Defence), Air Ministry to the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Command,27 March 1963. AIR 2/16217.

[95] “Jodrell Bank,” Draft minute from VCAS, September 1963. AIR 2/16217.

[96] Bernard Lovell to Maurice Dean, Air Ministry, 6 September 1963. AIR 2/16217.

[97] M. J. Dean to Sir Bernard Lovell, 29 October 1963. AIR 20/9982.

[98] Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy.

[99] Cole, “British Technical Intelligence.”

[100] See Twigge, “Ground-Based Air Defence and ABM Systems”; Stocker, Britain and Ballistic

Missile Defence, 1942–2002, chapter 4.

[101] See Spinardi, “Golfballs on the Moor.”

[102] These debates are documented in Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy, particularly chapters 7 and 8; also

Wynn, RAF Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Forces.

[103] Ibid.

[104] Memo from Radio Introduction Unit, RAF to Ministry of Defence, DD Ops (GE), 3 July 1967.

AIR 2/16070.

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