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Standards

Certification

Education & Training

Publishing

Conferences & Exhibits

A Case Study: SAFETY

INSTRUMENTED BURNERMANAGEMENT SYSTEM

(SI-BMS)

Safety SymposiumHouston, TX

May 24, 2006

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2

Mike Scott, PE, CFSE

VP, Process Safety with AE Solutions Registered Professional Engineer in AK, SC,GA & IL Certified Functional Safety Expert (CFSE) Author / presenter of numerous technical papers on

process safety

ISA Instructor SI-BMS Webinar SI-FGS Webinar SI-BMS Class

ISA SP84 Committee Member BMS Subcommittee member FGS Subcommittee co-chair

ISA Safety Division BMS sub-committee chair

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Bud Adler

Director, Business Development with AE Solutions Active in process instrumentation field for over 40 years

Numerous sales, marketing and executive positions withinstrumentation vendors

Life Member of ISA

Member of ISA SP84 Safety Committee

Member of the BMS Subcommittee

Member of the FGS Subcommittee

Author of numerous technical papers related to processsafety

Frequent presenter at technical conferences and userseminars worldwide

Director-elect of ISA Safety Division

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4

Project Overview

Installation of two (2) new redundant Boilers Single Burner Boiler (NFPA 85)

Capable of firing natural gas, oil and / or wastegas

1365 PSIG steam at 310,000 lbs/hr

Client is fully S84 aware and hasimplemented numerous IEC61511 compliant

projectsComplex multiple entity project team

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Project Team Organization Chart

ChemicalManufacturer

Engineering

Firm

Boiler OEM

Burner OEM

SI-BMSConsultant

SIS Aware

SIS Aware

NON-SIS Aware

Semi-SIS Aware

NON-SIS Aware

Multiple sub-contractors

Various degrees of SIS

application knowledgeBoiler OEM had primary

PO for Boiler

Burner OEM and SI-BMScontracts were subs toBoiler OEM

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Construction Industry Institute

Front End Loading effort level directlyaffects the cost and schedule predictabilityof the project.

As the level of FEL tasks increase: The project cost performance from authorization decreases

by as much as 20% The variance between project schedule performance versus

authorization decreases by as much as 39% The plant design capacity attained and facility utilization

improved by as 15% The project scope changes after authorization tend to

decrease The likelihood that a project met or exceeded its financial

goals increased

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SIS FEL Package HAZARD Identification

Conduct HAZOP

Risk Assessment Perform LOPA Develop

SIF List SIS Design Basis Support Report

Safety Requirements Specification Develop

Lifecycle Cost Analysis Interlock List

Sequence of Operations

Conceptual Design Specification Redline P&IDs Develop

System Architecture Diagram

E-stop Philosophy SIS Logic Solver Specification Bill of Materials Approved Inst Vendor List / Procure Plan for SIS SIL Verification Report Control Panel Location Sketch Control Philosophy Specification

Summary Safety Report

Construction Estimate, TIC (+/- 20 %)

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Safety Lifecycle

Apply non-SIS ProtectionLayers to Prevent Identified

Hazards or Reduce Risks

Perform Process HazardsAnalysis & Risk Assessment

Define PHAInput /Output Requirements

Start

SIS Required?

ConceptualProcess Design

PerformSIS Detail Design

Develop Safety RequirementsSpecification

SIS Conceptual Design, &Verify Compliance With SRS

SIS Installation,Commissioning, and Pre-

Startup Acceptance Test

Define TargetSIL

SIS Startup,Operation, Maintenance,

Periodic Functional Testing

Pre-Startup Safety ReviewAssessment

EstablishOperating & Maintenance

Procedures

Modify orDecommission

SIS?

SIS

Decommissioning

YesNo

(Based on ISA-S84)

Project Design Basis /Company Standards

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Initial Design P&ID NG & Bio Gas

Pilot Line

Main Gas Line

Flame

SensorIgniter

HV

103

HV

104

FO

SV

105

Natural Gas

SV

109

SV

108

Combustion

Chamber

FO

SV

110

FC FC

FCFC

BN

102

BS

102A

BS

102B

BS

102C

BS102C

Main

Flame

Main

Flame

Main

Flame

PilotFlame

PT101B PT101CPT101A PT106B PT106CPT106A

Bio Gas Line

HV

103

HV

104

FO

SV

105

FC FC

PT

107B

PT

107C

PT

107A

PT

111B

PT

111C

PT

111A

Bio Gas

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Initial Design P&ID - Oil

Main Oil Line

HV

203

HV

204

No.2 Oil

Combustion

Chamber

FC FC

PT

201B

PT

201C

PT

201A

Atom Steam Line

HV

304

FO

SV

305

FC

PT

301B

PT

301C

PT

301A

Steam

FT

309

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ID Fan

FD FanCombustion Air

PDT

401B

PDT

401C

PDT

401A

Initial Design P&ID - Air

Combustion

Chamber

FGR Air

FT

501B

FT

501C

FT

501A

CleanAir

PT

602A

PT

601B

PT

601C

STACK

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LT

801B

LT

801C

LT

801A

Initial Design P&ID - Steam

Steam Drum

PT

702A

PT

701B

PT

701C

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Economic & Safety Analysis

Calculate Benefit toCost Ratio

Calculate LifecycleCost

Perform SIL Calcs

(PFDavg and MTTFS)

SIS Conceptual DesignArchitecture Options

YesNo

YesNo

B/C > 1.0

LowestLCC?

Start

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Risk Analysis Results

Item ID No. Description Reqd SIL

1 I-001a High steam drum pressure causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture A2 SIF-002a Low steam drum level causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture 23 SIF-003a Loss of combustion air flow causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture 24 SIF-004a High furnace pressure causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture 25 SIF-005a Low instrument air pressure causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture 1

6SIF-006a Flameout caused by low pressure natural gas causes Fuel Gas Trip. (1oo1) PT, (2oo3) BS Sensor Architecture

1

7 SIF-007a High pressure natural gas causes Fuel Gas Trip. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture 18 I-005a Low pressure biogas causes Biogas Trip. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture A9 I-006a High pressure biogas causes Biogas Trip. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture A10 SIF-010a Flameout caused by low fuel oil pressure causes Fuel Oil Trip. (1oo1) PT, (2oo3) BS Sensor Architecture 111 SIF-011a Low atomizing steam pressure causes Fuel Oil Trip. (1oo2) Sensor Architecture 1

12SIF-012a Safe purge conditions must be satisfied prior to introducing an ignition source into furnace during pilot light-off. (3

groups of 1oo1 Sensors) Overall XooX Architecture 113 SIF-013a Proof of no flame in firebox (by flame scanner) prior to initiating purge sequence. (2oo3) Sensor Architecture 114 I-007a Manual ESD Emergency Boiler Shutdown causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). N/A15 SIF-015a Flameout (all other causes) results in Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture 216 I-008a Low Air to Fuel ratio results in a Master Fuel Trip (MFT) A

7

SIL 1; 4

SIL 2; 4 - SIL A; 1 - MPF

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Yes, a BMS is a SIS if:Risk Analysis determines

additional risk reduction isrequired and a Safety IntegrityLevel of 1 or greater isassigned to a BMS SafetyInstrumented Function

No, a BMS is not a SIS if:

Risk Analysis determines noadditional risk reduction is

required

Is a BMS a SIS?

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SIL Verification Results

SIF Description Func Test Reqd SIL Achvd SIL PFDavg RRF MTTFS (Years)2 Low steam drum level causes Master Fuel Trip

(MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture 24 2 2 5.86E-03 171 20.492a Low steam drum level causes Master Fuel Trip

(MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture 24 2 2 7.10E-03 141 18.78

3 Loss of combustion air flow (or differentialpressure) causes Master Fuel Trip(MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture 24 2 2 5.83E-03 172 20.41

3a Loss of combustion air flow (or differentialpressure) causes Master Fuel Trip(MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture 24 2 2 6.47E-03 155 18.01

4 High furnace pressure causes Master Fuel Trip(MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture 24 2 2 5.84E-03 171 20.52

4a High furnace pressure causes Master Fuel Trip(MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture 24 2 2 6.47E-03 155 20.3

5 Low instrument air pressure causes Master FuelTrip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture 24 1 2 6.42E-03 156 18.09

5a Low instrument air pressure causes Master FuelTrip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture 24 1 2 6.42E-03 156 18.09

6 Flameout caused by low pressure natural gascauses Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3)Sensor Architecture

24 1 2 5.83E-03 172 19.79

6a Flameout caused by low pressure natural gascauses Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1)Sensor Architecture 24 1 2 5.85E-03 171 17.74

7 High pressure natural gas causes Master FuelTrip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture 24 1 2 5.84E-03 171 20.52

7a High pressure natural gas causes Master FuelTrip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture 24 1 2 6.47E-03 155 20.3

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SIL Verification Results

SIF Description Func Test Reqd SILAchvd

SILPFDavg RRF MTTFS (Years)

10Flameout caused by low fuel oil pressure

causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT).(2oo3) Sensor Architecture

24 1 2 5.83E-03 172 19.79

10aFlameout caused by low pressure natural

gas causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT).(1oo1) Sensor Architecture

24 1 2 5.85E-03 171 17.74

11Low atomizing steam supply (low flow)

causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT).(1oo1) Sensor Architecture

24 1 1 3.66E-02 27 14.48

11a

Low atomizing steam supply (low flow)

causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT).(1oo1) Sensor Architecture 24 1 1 3.66E-02 27 14.48

12Proof of gun in position signal is

required prior to startup of fuel oilfiring. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture

24 1 1 3.09E-02 32 48.01

12aProof of gun in position signal is

required prior to startup of fuel oilfiring. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture

24 1 1 3.09E-02 32 48.01

13

Safe purge conditions must be satisfiedprior to introducing an ignitionsource into furnace during pilot

light-off. (2oo3) Sensor Architecture

24 1 1 3.10E-02 32 1501.7

13a

Safe purge conditions must be satisfiedprior to introducing an ignitionsource into furnace during pilotlight-off. (2oo2) Sensor Architecture

24 1 1 3.15E-02 32 146.06

15

Proof of no flame in firebox (by flamescanner) prior to initiating purgesequence. (2oo3) SensorArchitecture

24 1 1 8.58E-06 116508 14.5

15a

Proof of no flame in firebox (by flamescanner) prior to initiating purge

sequence. (1oo1) SensorArchitecture

24 1 1 2.30E-04 4345 28.54

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Economic & Safety Analysis

Calculate Benefit toCost Ratio

Calculate LifecycleCost

Perform SIL Calcs

(PFDavg and MTTFS)

SIS Conceptual DesignArchitecture Options

YesNo

YesNo

B/C > 1.0

LowestLCC?

Start

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Benefit-to-Cost-Ratio

B-C Ratio = FNo-SIS x EVNo-SIS - FSIS x EVSISCostSIS + CostNT

B-C Ratio = Ratio of benefits to cost

FNo-SIS = Frequency of the unwanted event without a SIS

FSIS = Frequency of the unwanted event with a SIS

EVNo-SIS = Total expected value of loss of the event without a SISEVSIS = Total expected value of loss of the event with a SIS

CostSIS = Total lifecycle cost of the SIS (Annualized)

CostNT = Cost incurred due to nuisance trips (Annualized)

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B-C Ratio 2oo3 Architectures

Nuisance Trip

Rate (Yrs) B-C Ratio

SIF-002 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 5.86E-03 0.00032556 20.49 3,660$ 10.59

SIF-003 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.00546448 5.83E-03 0.00003186 20.41 3,675$ 1.04

SIF-004 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 5.84E-03 0.00032444 20.52 3,655$ 10.60

SIF-005 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 6.42E-03 0.00035667 18.09 4,146$ 10.40

SIF-006 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 5.83E-03 0.00032389 19.79 3,790$ 10.54

SIF-007 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 5.84E-03 0.00032444 20.52 3,655$ 10.60

SIF-010 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 5.83E-03 0.00032389 19.79 3,790$ 10.54

SIF-011 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 3.66E-02 0.00203333 14.48 5,180$ 9.71

SIF-012 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.00546448 3.09E-02 0.00016885 48.01 1,562$ 1.10

SIF-013 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 3.10E-02 0.00172222 1,501.70 50$ 11.94

SIF-015 $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 8.58E-06 0.00000048 14.50 5,172$ 10.08

FNo-SIS

(1/Yrs) PFDAvgCostNT

($/Yr)

FSIS

(1/Yrs)EVNo-SIS EVSIS

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B-C Ratio 1oo1 Architectures

Nuisance Trip

Rate (Yrs) B-C Ratio

SIF-002a $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 7.10E-03 0.00039444 18.78 3,994$ 13.28

SIF-003a $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.00546448 6.47E-03 0.00003536 18.01 4,164$ 1.30

SIF-004a $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 6.47E-03 0.00035944 20.30 3,695$ 13.48SIF-005a $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 6.42E-03 0.00035667 18.09 4,146$ 13.19

SIF-006a $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 5.85E-03 0.00032500 17.74 4,228$ 13.15

SIF-007a $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 6.47E-03 0.00035944 20.30 3,695$ 13.48

SIF-010a $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 5.85E-03 0.00032500 17.74 4,228$ 13.15

SIF-011a $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 3.66E-02 0.00203333 14.48 5,180$ 12.21

SIF-012a $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.00546448 3.09E-02 0.00016885 48.01 1,562$ 1.44

SIF-013a $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 3.15E-02 0.00175000 146.06 513$ 15.48

SIF-015a $5,125,000 $5,125,000 0.05555556 2.30E-04 0.00001278 28.54 2,628$ 14.29

FNo-SIS

(1/Yrs) PFDAv gCostNT

($/Yr)

FSIS

(1/Yrs)EVNo-SIS EVSIS

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22

Economic & Safety Analysis

Calculate Benefit toCost Ratio

Calculate LifecycleCost

Perform SIL Calcs

(PFDavg and MTTFS)

SIS Conceptual DesignArchitecture Options

YesNo

YesNo

B/C > 1.0

LowestLCC?

Start

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Lifecycle Cost Analysis

Lifecycle CostsProcurement Costs DescriptionSystem Design Engineering costs associated with Front End Loading and

Detailed Design

Purchase Cost of Equipment including Factory Acceptance Testingand Shipping

Installation Construction costs associated with SIS

Start-up Commissioning, PSAT and Initial Functional Testing of SIS

Operating Costs DescriptionEngineering Changes Engineering costs associated with maintenance

Consumption Power, spare parts, instrument air, etc.Maintenance Inspection, Functional Testing

Cost of MTTFS DescriptionLost Production Cost of lost production

Asset Loss Cost of lost equipment

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LCC Analysis Results

SIF Description Life Cycle CostEstimate$75K

Delta LifeCycle Cost$75K

Life Cycle

CostEstimate

$6K

Delta LifeCycle Cost$6K

2 Low steam drum level causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT).(2oo3) Sensor Architecture $207,455$17,156

$92,174$27,650

2a Low steam drum level causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT).(1oo1) Sensor Architecture $190,299 $64,524

3 Loss of combustion air flow (or differential pressure)causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) SensorArchitecture $207,946

$11,802$92,213

$27,2223a Loss of combustion air flow (or differential pressure)causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor

Architecture $196,144 $64,991

4 High furnace pressure causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT).(2oo3) Sensor Architecture $207,272

$27,208$92,159

$28,4544a High furnace pressure causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT).(1oo1) Sensor Architecture $180,064 $63,7055 Low instrument air pressure causes Master Fuel Trip(MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture $211,237

$15,724$80,665

$15,7245a Low instrument air pressure causes Master Fuel Trip(MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture $195,513 $64,9416 Flameout caused by low pressure natural gas causesMaster Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture $211,886

$13,573$92,529

$27,3646a Flameout caused by low pressure natural gas causesMaster Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture $198,313 $65,1657 High pressure natural gas causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT).(2oo3) Sensor Architecture $207,272

$27,208$92,159

$28,4547a High pressure natural gas causes Master Fuel Trip (MFT).(1oo1) Sensor Architecture $180,064 $63,705

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LCC Analysis Results

SIF DescriptionLife Cycle Cost

Estimate$75K

Delta Life

Cycle Cost$75K

Life Cycle Cost

Estimate$6K

Delta Life

Cycle Cost$6K

10Flameout caused by low fuel oil pressure causesMaster Fuel Trip (MFT). (2oo3) Sensor Architecture

$211,886

$13,573

$92,529

$27,364

10aFlameout caused by low pressure natural gas causesMaster Fuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture

$198,313 $65,165

11Low atomizing steam supply (low flow) causes MasterFuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture $246,614

$15,724

$83,495

$15,724

11a Low atomizing steam supply (low flow) causes MasterFuel Trip (MFT). (1oo1) Sensor Architecture $230,890 $67,771

12Proof of gun in position signal is required prior to

startup of fuel oil firing. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture$122,793

$15,724

$73,589

$15,724

12aProof of gun in position signal is required prior to

startup of fuel oil firing. (1oo1) Sensor Architecture$107,069 $57,865

13

Safe purge conditions must be satisfied prior tointroducing an ignition source into furnace duringpilot light-off. (2oo3 FT, 2oo3 PDT, 1oo1 ZSC) Sensor

Architecture

$83,860

$12,693

$82,287

$27,294

13a

Safe purge conditions must be satisfied prior tointroducing an ignition source into furnace duringpilot light-off. (1oo1 FT, 1oo1 ZSC) SensorArchitecture

$71,167 $54,993

15Proof of no flame in firebox (by flame scanner) priorto initiating purge sequence. (2oo3) SensorArchitecture

$259,209

$115,658

$96,314

$35,530

15aProof of no flame in firebox (by flame scanner) priorto initiating purge sequence. (1oo1) SensorArchitecture

$143,551 $60,784

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Final Results

SIF Description Life CycleCostEstimate

$75KDeltaLifeCycleCost$75K

Life CycleCost

Estimate$6K

DeltaLifeCycleCost$6K

Option 1 2oo3 Architecture $4,354,860

$572,086

$1,940,226

$553,008

Option 1A 1oo1 Architecture $3,782,774 $1,387,218

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Conclusion

Complex project team with multi-layeredcontractual arrangement

Implementation of a SIS FEL saved projectteam cost and schedule

Implementation of Safety Lifecycle reducedRisk associated with BMS

Implementation of Economic Analysis

coupled with Safety Availability requirementsresulted in over $500K in savings

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Make your money

work for you!

28

Conclus ion

Proper Implementation of theSafety Lifecycle Can ReduceCost of Ownership!

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Applied Engineering Solutions, Inc.

Thank You! Are There Any

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