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P O R T E R J . GOSS, FLORIDA. CHAIRMANDOUGLAS K. BEREUTER, NEBRASKA, VICE CHAIRMANSHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT. NEW Y O R KJIM GIBBONS, NEVADARAY LAHOOD, ILLINOISRANDY "DUKE" CUNNINGHAM, CALIFORNIAPETER HOEKSTR A, MICHIGANHARD M. BURR. NORTH CAROLINABY EVERETT, ALABAMA

liNGALLEGLY, CALIFORNIAtCOLLINS, GEORGIA

JANE HARMAN. CALIFORNIA, RANKING DEMOCRATALCEE HASTINGS,FLORIDASILVESTRE REYES. TEXASLEONARD L. BOSWELL, IOWACOUNC.PETERSON,MINNESOTAROBERT E. (BUD) CRAMER, JR.,ALABAMAANNA G. ESHOO, CALIFORNIARUSH D. HOLT, NEW J E R S E YC.A. DUTCH B U P P E R E B E R G E R , MARYLANDEX-OFFICIO MEMBERS:J. DENNIS HASTERT. S P E A K E RNANCY PELOSI. DEMOCRATIC LEADER

ROOM H-405, U.S. CAPITOL(202)225-4121PATRICK B. MURRAY, STAFF DIRECTORL. CHRISTINE HEALEY, DEMOCRATICCOUNSEL

U.S. HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVESPERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE

ON INTELLIGENCEWASHINGTON, DC20515-6415

April 1, 2004

The PresidentThe White HouseWashington, DC20500Dear Mr. President:

Nearly a year ago, following the initial failure to find weapons of massdestruction in Iraq, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligenceundertook an inquiry into the pre-war intelligence underlying the judgmentsthat Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction and had ties to terrorists.While aspects of the inquiry are still ongoing, we believe steps can and shouldbe taken now to correct some of the deficiencies already identified.We are mindful of the many intelligencesuccesses of the brave anddedicated cadre ofpeople serving our country as intelligence officers - manyofwhom are overseas at this very hour, risking their lives for our freedom. Tokeep faith with them, we must ensure they have all the tools they need tosucceed.The problems that have plagued our intelligence over the years must be

fixed now in order to protect our troops in Iraq, to win the war on terrorism,and to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. It is in this spirit thatwe issue thisurgent call to action.We urge you to act immediately on the following near-termrecommendations:

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The PresidentApril 1, 2004Page Two

declassification decisions involving 9/11 or the Iraq WMDinquiry and ask theCIA to appoint a professional, non-partisan review panel to makedeclassification recommendations.

Acknowledge the problems in pre-war intelligence. It is difficult forthe Intelligence Community to talk about shortcomings in intelligence if seniorpolicy leaders still insist that there were no serious problems. Acknowledgingthe problems will allow the intelligence communityto move aggressively to fixthem.Direct the intelligence agencies to scrub immediately all WMD

intelligence estimates worldwide and forward updates on all areas ofserious concern. The systemic analytic deficiencies that plagued estimatesofIraq's WMDprograms could also have affected other estimates, includingonthe nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran.Direct the Intelligence Community to: (1 ) improve collection andvetting of hard-target information, to include newways of deployinghuman intelligence collectors; and (2) adopt a more aggressive plan for

diversifying the human intelligence (HUMINT) collector workforce withpeople who understand the cultures and speak the languages of targetedcountries and groups. The Intelligence Community failed to develop reliablehuman intelligence sources that could provide accurate information on the truestate of Iraq's WMDprograms or Iraq's ties to al-Qa'ida.Direct a crash program to develop technical tools for detecting and

accurately characterizing WMDprograms. Current technical collectionprograms, such as satellite imagery, were unable to answer key questionsregarding Iraq's WMDprograms prior to the war.Direct the National Security Council to review, and report backwithin 3Odays, options for taking immediate steps to strengthen and

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The PresidentApril 1, 2004Page Three

information to policymakers. Three of the most important pre-warintelligence judgments - that Iraq had stockpilesofchemical and biologicalweapons, was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, and was developingunmanned aerial vehicles probably intended to deliver biological warfare agentand could threaten the U.S. homeland - were seriously flawed.

It is nowclear that analysts did not adequately challenge assumptionsstemming from old information, such as Iraq's use ofWMD in the 1980s andIraq's failure during U.N. inspections to account forWMD-related equipmentand materials. The absence ofproof that stockpiles had been destroyed wastaken as proof that they still existed. The pre-war analysis also stated boldconclusions - such as "Baghdadhas chemicalandbiological weapons..."- thatthe underlying data did not adequately support.

Ensure intelligence analysts are encouraged to provide their bestpossible judgments, without pressure from senior policymakers. In ourreview, we have learned that intelligence analysts examining Iraq's ties to al-Qa'ida were subjected to intense pressure from senior policymakers to findconnections between Iraq and al-Qa'ida. Webelieve that analysts must beencouraged to say when the reporting they are drawing on is not deep enoughor sufficiently reliable to reach definitive judgments.Ensure that intelligence information provided to policymakers isadequately vetted. Offices reporting to the Undersecretaryof Defense for

Policy, particularly the Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office ofSpecial Plans, provided summaries of terrorism intelligence, includinginformation on Iraq's ties to al-Qa'ida, to senior Defense Departmentpolicymakers, the National Security Council staff, and the Office of the VicePresident. These analyses were based in part on unreliableorunvettedinformation. The Director ofCentral Intelligence, who is the President'sultimate arbiter ofintelligence judgments, was apparently not aware that thesematerials were briefed to the Office of the Vice President. Whilepolicymakers

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The PresidentApril 1, 2004Page Four

inappropriately categorical in several key respects, policymaker statementswent even further in creating the impression that the information was evenmore solid than it was.In the case of statements regarding Iraq's ties to al-Qa'ida, policymakersalso often omitted important caveats. For example, they often failed to notethat the reportingon Iraq's ties to al-Qa'ida was fragmentary and conflicting

and from sources of varying reliability. Nor did they make clear that in the fallof 2002 the Intelligence Communityhad said that there was no credibleinformation that Iraq was complicit in or had foreknowledge of any al-Qa'idaattack, including9/11.The DCI said in March 2004, "The steady spread of Usama bin Ladin'santi-US sentiment... ensures that a serious threat will remain for theforeseeable future . . . with or without al-Qa'ida in the picture" and "...that thisenemy remains intent onobtaining, and using, catastrophic weapons." Weneed the very best intelligence now. Time is not on our side.

Sincerely,

ROBERT E. (BUD) CRAMER, JR.

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n f i\\t Uni ted Statesn , i 9 < 20515

CO-SPONSOR H.R. 4104FOR INTELLIGENCE REFORM

April 1, 2004

Dear Colleague:Since June 2003, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligencehas been reviewing pre-war intelligence on Iraq's weapons ofmass destructionand ties to terrorism. Aspects of this inquiryare still ongoing, and our report isstill months away. Nonetheless, extensive document reviews, hearings,interviews, and discussions with the Intelligence CommunitybyCommitteeMembers and staff have revealed serious deficiencies in pre-war intelligence.Our efforts build on work done in prior Congresses: the bipartisan,bicameral House-Senate Joint Congressional Inquiry into 9/11, which producedan 810-page report and 19 specific recommendations for reform, and theChambliss-Harman report on deficiencies in intelligence prior to 9/11, whichalso made bipartisan recommendations.With abundant evidence of the lethal capability of terrorist organizationsworldwide, we need the most accurate and actionable intelligence we canproduce to prevent and disrupt attacks by those who seek to harm us. Wecannot wait to fix identified problems with our nation's intelligence, one of themost important tools in the war on terror. The American people will not forgiveus ifwe delay until after November.

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performance to defeat what George Tenet identifies as the two overriding threatsof the 21st Century: terrorism and the proliferation of weapons ofmassdestruction.

Our legislation addresses: Leadership The Intelligence Community needs stronger leadershipand greater accountability to policymakers. AnyDirector of CentralIntelligence is necessarily too focused on the CIA and lacks theauthority to coordinate the activities of the other IntelligenceCommunity agencies. Moreover, the DCI has only marginal controlover military intelligence resources, even though the majority of theintelligence budget is found in military intelligence programs.

We are proposing the creation of a Director of National Intelligence(DNI) , to lead the Intelligence Community and provide the Presidentwith independent assessments. This will allow the IntelligenceCommunity to operate more effectively as a community and efficientlycoordinate intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination.We are also proposing that the Undersecretary of Defense forIntelligence be dual-hatted as the Deputy Director ofNationalIntelligence. This will foster seamless coordination between theDepartment of Defense and non-military elements of the IntelligenceCommunity.

Jointness Just as Congress passed the 1986 Goldwater-NicholsActto foster "jointness" in the military, Congress should now require theintelligence agencies to work jointly to achieve their missions.We are proposing creation of a Deputy Director of NationalIntelligence for Operations and a Joint Tasking Organization(JTO). These initiatives will facilitate coordinated intelligence collectionand analysis, and help eliminate stovepiping.We are also proposing the creation of a new, modern informationinfrastructure and major changes in information management.

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We are proposing the developmentof modern analytic tools to helpturn information into knowledge.We are also proposing that the D N I create an Alternative Analysis Unitor "Red Team" to challenge analytic assumptions.

The enemies of the United States are not waiting until after the Novemberelections to plot against us. Therefore, we cannot wait to reform and strengthenour intelligence community. Time is not on our side.If you would like to cosponsor this legislation, or for additionalinformation, please contact Suzanne Spaulding at 225-7690 orSuzanne.Spaulding@mail.house.gov.

/TH-A NE H A R M A NDemocrat

ALCEE L. HASTINGSMember of Congress SILVESTRE':Member of Congress

L E O N A R D L. BOSWELLMember of Congress COLLIN C. PETERSONof Congress

ROBERT E. (BUD) C R A M E R , JR.Member of Congress JA G. ESHOOlember of Congress

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Director of National Intelligence (Proposed)

Director of National IntelligenceDNI tCO

Senior Advisor forHomeland Security

Deputy Director of National Intelligence/Undersecretary of Defensefor Intelligence

DDNI/USD(I)

Deputy Director of National IntelligenceFor Operations

DDNI/ODeputy Director of National Intelligence

For ResourcesDDNI/R

Assistant Director ofNational Intelligence,

Defense

1Chairman of the

National IntelligenceCouncil

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Director of Central Intelligence (Existing)

Director of Central IntelligenceDCI

Deputy Directorof Central Intelligence

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Executive Director ofCentral Intelligence Agency

Deputy Directorfor

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Deputy Director ofCentral Intelligence

For Community Management

Assistant Director ofCentral Intelligence for

CollectionAssistant Director ofCentral Intelligence

Analysis andProductionAssistant Director of

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National IntelligenceCouncil

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Responsibilities (Proposed)

Director of National IntelligenceDevelops all-source collection strategy

Daily HUMINT, SIGINT, GEOINT taskingSCI reciprocity across federal governmentGrants accessto intelligence

Classifies intelligenceDevelops integrated intelligencenetworkCommon privacy protection procedures

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National Security AgencyCollects SIGINTas tasked by DNI

Produces SIGINT reportingProvides SIGINT training

National Geospatial-lntelligenceAgency

Produces geospatial intelligenceGeospatial intelligence training

Central Intelligence AgencyCollects HUMINT as tasked by DNI

Produces HUMINT reportingProduces all-source analysisHUMINT trainingAll-source analysis training

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M(3 Responsibilities (Existing)

Director of Central IntelligenceEstablishes SCI clearance directivesDevelopscollection strategy on selected issues

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Director of NSADevelops SIGINT collection strategyTasks SIGINT collection

Collects SIGINTProduces SIGINT reportingInterprets SCI clearance directives

Grants SCI clearancesSIGINT privacy protection procedures

Classifies SIGINTGrants access to SIGINTDevelops a NSAnetwork

SIGINT training

Director ofNational Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

Develops imagery collection strategyTasks imagery collection

Produces geospatial intelligenceClassifies geospatial intelligenceGrants access togeospatial data

Develops a NGAnetworkGeospatial intelligence training

DirectorCentral Intelligence AgencyDevelops HUMINT collection strategyTasks HUMINT collection

Collects HUMINTProduces HUMINT reportingProduces all-source analysis

Grants SCI clearancesHUMINT privacy protection procedures

Classifies HUMINTGrants access to HUMINTDevelops a CIA networkHUMINT training

All-source analysis training

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