SDP Introduction: 'Significance Determination Process (SDP ... · SDP Phases I •-" -Phase 1 -...

Sdp \ Introduction \Intro_LP.ppt

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Human Resources,Training & Development

SignificanceI.

Determination Process

Technical Training Center.Chattanooga, Tennessee e

Learning Objectives

* Given a scenario, use IMC!0612,Appendix B to determine if an ."issue hassufficient signiticance to warrant use of

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the significance determination process.* Given a scenario, use IMC-0609,

Appendix A, and a Phase 2 pre-solvedtable to determine the risk significance.

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Technical Training CenterChattanooga,, Tennessee --

Purpose. - S" DP:

The'Significance "Deter min~ationProcess ( SDP)uses risk inswhere appro te, to .help -- tl•e NRCinspectors and -staff to determinethe safety significance ofinspection fin~dings,

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Technical Training CenterChattanooga, Tennessee

SDP Objectives..," .f . ' .-,'. iL, - .,.

To characterize" te sig...;:nificanc ofan -.inspection fi d hing for th,,.e' N RC.licensee perform-ance assessment:process, -using best available riskinsights as appropriate.

The SDP thus a'ssmigns a colorto thei nspection- fi nd ng.


Exhibit 2: REACTORWOVERSIGHT PROCESS

j t*. I-1..,

Agency Response

Management Conference

Monitor Licensee Actions.. - - - - - ! - - - - - - - - -

.......... : NRC Inspections

Additional Regulatory Actions

Communications

Public Meetings

e Press Releases* NRC Web Site* PDR/ADAMS

Assessment ReportsInspection Plans

Inspection FindingsPerformance Indicators

Assessment Process

(Action Matrix)

Significa

Enforcement t Cornerstones of Safety

I

nce Evaluations I I Significance Evaluations

Significance Determination Process Performance Indicator Thresholds

4 A.

Supplemental Event Response neric Safety Risk InformedInspections (ShAIT/IIT) Inspections Baseline Inspections

Inspections

) k------------------------------ -------------------------

Performance Indicators

Performance Indicators


Performance Results in all 7 Cornerstones of Safety

- . . I,. , ' , .

SDP

Green -ACDF ,<

col:ors

very low sfety significance~ME-6 K

White low to moderate safety significance.1E-6 <ACDF< -IE-5

Yellow - substantial safety significance.1E-5 <ACDF < 1E-4 .

Red-- high safety significance.1E-4 < ACDF


oo,SDP Objeclti ves

(Continued)To provide all stakeholders anobjectiveand common framework-for',.... ,communicating the pote ntial safetysignificance of inspection findings.,

* To provide a basis for assessmentand/or enforcement actions associatedwith an inspection finding.To provide the inspectors with plant-specific risk information for use in risk-informing the inspection program.

Technical Training Center -Chattanooga, Tennessee

Types of SDs

* At least one SDP supports eachcornerstone associated with thestrategic performance areas.'defined in IMC-2515.

" The SDPs and related instructionsare found in IMC 0609.


Exhibit 1: REGULATORY.,FRAMEWORK

' 1:1, .'

PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETYAS A RESULT OF CIVILIAN

NUCLEAR REACTOROPERATION

Cornerstones

SHUMAN ------- SAFETY CONSCIOUS WORK ------ --- PROBLEM -------PERFORMANCE ENVIRONMENT IDENTIFICATION AND

. "RESOLUTION

Cross-Cutting-Areas

Technical Training CenterChattanooga, Tennessee - -

SDP ListingA. Significance Determination of

Reactor Inspection Findings forAt-Power Situations

•I., a : redes. SD .P

B. Emergency Preparedness SDPC. Occupational Radiation Safety.

S DP..Do Public Radiation Safety SDP..E. Physical Protection SDP:,

F. F ire Protection SDP..i .. . . : " :: " . :• . . -.'• : .... .

Technical TrainingtCenterChattanooga, Tennessee

SDP ListingG. Shutdow.n Safey SDP

H. Containment Integ-"rity SDP1. Operator Requal. Human

a~ u,, • ., H4' ..

Performa nce SDPJ. SG Tube Integrity Findings SDPK. Maint. Risk Assess. & Risk

Management SDPM. Significance Determination

Process Using Ual tative CriteriaTechnical Training CenterChattanooga, Tennessee

Determining theSignificance .--of" Reactor

InspectionFin din gs1ft forAtPower Situations,

I :.

Technical Training C-enter,Chattanooga, -TenneSSfe§ý,e

Entry Cnditions,

*This SDP provides,- a ,simplified risk-informed framewrk 'to :esti mate..the increase in core damagefrequency dur-ing -at-powersituations due to-conditions :whichcontribute to unintended risk!increases caused ,by deficientlicens"'ee"performance•

Technical Training CenterChattanooga,, Tennessee I

Deficient Pe rformanceDeficient licensee performance orperformance deficiency is naa issue that isthe result of a licensee not meeting arequirement or standardrwhe rethe

cause was+reasonably within the--licensee's ability to foresee and, correct,and that should have been prevented. Aperformance deficiency can exist! if alicensee fails to, meet a self imposedstandard r a'standard required byregulation. IMC 0612


71. ' ii

Exampleso DeficientPe rformance

•M P ' • • ' "

Safety-related pum dimdscha rgevalve remained- closed followingsurveillance testing. I

" Debris left in safety-related tankfollowing maintenance activities.

• Failing to t corrective

action when testing demonstrateda problem.


Entry Conditio ns. ... (Cd)'Conditions which do no •'•,ppresentdeficient•a .oncs dnoarteolicensee performance are considered part ofthe acceptable plant risk and are notcandidates for SDP evaluation'..

" Each Issue'should be screened by using IMC0612, Appendix B, to determine whetherthe issue is more than a minor issue.

" If issue is not minor, then it is a candidatefor SDP evaluation .,.This SDP is not used '. for event .evaluation.


Use Figure 1 and the questions listed below to determine if a finding has sufficientsignificance to warrant further analysis or documentation.

Figure 1

IMC 0612

Appendix B:

IssueScreening


see exception inSection 05.03

IMC-0612

t

GreaterAppendix B

Ye~sL Figure 1

i,

Traditional-orcement

Yes~i


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Performance Deficiency• .ý t - n ;'-. ..Ques+tion.+ ++ . .

* Did the licensee fail to meet' a re uirementor'standard, where te cause:wasreasonably within thetlicensee's ability toforesee and correct and which shouldhave been prevented?

* A performance deficiency can exist if alicensee fails to meet a self-imposedstandard or a standard required byregulation.

Technical Training Center - I

Chattanooga, Tennessee

.. . ..... ....... ... ... .. .. . . ... .... .... .. .... . . .. . ... i -- • ........ .... .. .. • i • .•......... . ... . . . .

Traditional Enfo, -cetQuestions:,

Does the issue have actual safetyconsequence (overexposure,-excessiveradioactive-release)? I .

* Does the issue have-the potential forimpacting the NRC's ability to performits regulatory function?

* Are there any willful aspects, of" theviolationll

chnical Training Center LiattanoogaA Tennessee

TeCI

Minor QustiJons* Could the issue be reasonably viewed as a

precursor to a significant event?.* If left uncorrected, couldthe':finding become a

more significant safety- :concern?o" Does the finding relate to a performance

indicator that would have caused the P1 toexceed a threshold?'

* Is the finding associated with one of thecornerstone attributes listed at the end of thisattachment and does the finding affect theassociated cornerstone objective? 6

" 9 maintenance risk assessment and riskmanagement questions (not listed here).

Technical Training Center Obje.. p Dm1,-Fi guie

ObjecCaiavegnoogaTennChattanooga, Tennessee . -,--/•,•-•

IniiatngEvents

*Objective -to lim~it.the lielioo of:

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,

those events that uvpset pant stabliityand. challe~nge critical safiety functionsduring shutdown as well as poweroperations.

*Attributes: desi.g-n-c~ontrol, protect~ionagainst external factors, configur : ioncontrol, equipment performance:,procedure quaoity, and humanperformance.,. .....


.Objective to ensu',re. the- '-,avaa ltyreliability, and n.capability of, systemsthat-.respond! to inittiating1 eve nts to:prevent undesira~ble consequences (~.core damage).SAttributes: design -control, prot ctionagainst external I factors, config.• ur . ation

control,.equipment performance,procedlurequality, and human.,.peoredamance. .


Barrier It.egriy IObjective- to provide .. reasonableassurance that physical design barriers=, "; ... s g(fuel cladding, RCSF, andcontainment)protect the public from radionuclidereleases caused by accidents.

* Attributes: design control, configurationcontrol, procedure nuality, human,performance, cladding performancecladding ),RCSe eui ment and barrier

performance (RCS, .and SSC and barrierperformance containment).


SDP Qu:est ions.*iIs the event associated with an increase in thelikelihood of an initiatingoevent?Is the finding associated, ,.with .theoperability,availability, reliabilityor fUnctiOnOf a system

or train in a mitigating system?* Is the finding associated with the integrity of

fuel cladding, the reactor coolant system,reactor containment, control room envelope,auxiliary building (PWR), or ... (BWR)?

* Is the finding associated with degradedcondition ,that could, concurrently influence anymitigation equi "mnt and an initiatin event?

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Technical Training CenterChattanooga, Tennessee-,1

SDP Questi (cont'd)* Is the finding associated with or invc

impairment or degradationof a' fireprotection feature?Is the finding associated with the sp,fuel pool cooling! system radiologicalbarrier?

ilve

ant

* Is the finding associated with inadequate10 CFR 5Q.65(a)(4) risk assessment(quantitative only) and/or risk"management?


I

. ............ .....

SDP PhasesI •-" -

Phase 1 - Characterization and.lInitialScreening of Findings

Characterization of the finding and an initial screening oflow-significance 'findings for disposition by the licensee'scorrective action program.

Phase 2- Risk Significance Estimation andJustification Using the- Site Specific Risk-Informed Inspection Notebook and Pre-SolvedTable

Plant-specific estimation of the..,risk significance of aninspection 'finding and :deVelopment of' the basis for thedetermination.

Technical Training CenterChattanooga, Tennessee -

SDP Phases..Continued)

Phase 3 Risk Sin. ifcanceEstimation.: Using-,.. Any:. Risk Basis"••That Departs from the Phase 1or.Phase2.... 2 Process

S...Any departure from the guidance provided forPhase 1 or 2 constitutes a Phase 3 analysis...

........Phase. ...3 analysis methods will utilize appropriateP....RA .techniques and relyI on ,the expertise of NRCrisk analysts..

Technical Training Center:Chattanooga,, Tennessee

Determine Applicable Scenarios from Table 2.

TPCS AFW I EIHP FB HPR STATU S

Initiating EventLikelihood(Table 1)

Mitigation Capability - Table 41

2

3

OK

OK

CD

CD

CD

4

5


Plant name abbrev.: CALL

Table 3.X for each scenario

... .. •. .. . ...... ... .... .

A Lmittl MthIf events A and- -are ndepndent,e

then the Pr(A and; B) is: ,

Pr(A and B)=Pr(A)Pr(B)

Logarithms

log AB= .lo IA log B


SDP Tables..*In IMC -060,9-

-Table 4, RemainingMitigation Capability Credit-Table 5, Counting Rule Worksheet ,

In Site Specific WorkbookTable 1, Categories of Initiating Events

-Table-Table

21Initiators and Dependency '!

3.X, Worksheets for. required.initiatingevent scenarios.


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Example using - --'notebook-1 1 .- .

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TDAFWIssue

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SDP Phase 2 StepsI,(IMC 0609, ApA tt. 1)

eck for. .the mostStep 2.1. 0 1"e '.,_,

current version nof SDPNotebook and Pre-solvedIWorksheet...

Step 2.1.2: Determine the:.,exposure ti'me.

Technical Training CenterChattanooga,.Tennessee

. .. i....-... • . .. q . , • ,. . i

1.1 Exposu;re Tme

If the inception. of the" condition isunknown: I.

-determine last 'successful demonstration offunctionality.Exposure time = (date discoveredinoperable - date of functionalitydemonstration)/2called t/2..


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SDP Phase 2 Steps(IMC 0609, App. - cont'd)Step 2.1.3: Find the appropriate target for

the inspection finding in the pre-solvedtable.

Step 2.1.4: Determine the risk significanceof the inspection-finding and thepotential risk contribution due to LargeEarly Release-Frequency (LERF).,,

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4

. ... ... .. . . . . 7 - • - . . . ... .:° ... ,. .._.... .. " •

SDP Phase 2 Steps(IMC 0609, At- COnt'(Step 2.1.5: Screen for t.he p -otential.riskcontribution due toexterna, eVents if

results from Step 2.1.4 are Geen and isgreater than or equal to 1E-7.

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