THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISION SEC. 2, ART. 3 of the 1987 Constitution

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against

unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no

search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally

by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may

produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

RA 9372, The Human Security Act or the Anti-Terrorism Law

SEC. 18. Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest. The provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement personnel, who, having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall, without incurring any criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities, deliver said charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authority within a period of three (3) days counted from the moment the said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into custody by the said police, or law enforcement personnel: Provided, That the arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result from the surveillance under Section 7 and examination of bank deposits under Section 27 of this Act.

The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before detaining the person suspected of the crime of terrorism, present him or her before any judge at the latters residence or office nearest the place where the arrest took place at any time of the day or night. It shall be the duty of the judge, among other things, to ascertain the identity of the police or law enforcement personnel and the person or persons they have arrested and presented before him or her, to inquire of them the reasons why they have arrested the person and determine by questioning and personal observation whether or not the suspect has been subjected to any physical, moral or psychological torture by whom and why. The judge shall then submit a written report of what he/she had observed when the subject was brought before him to the proper court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested. the judge shall forthwith submit his/her report within three (3) calendar days from the time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office.

Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law enforcement personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest: Provided, That where the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the written notice shall be served at the residence of the judge nearest the place where the accused was arrested.

The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the police or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify any judge as provided in the preceding paragraph.

SEC. 19. Period of Detention in the Event of an Actual or Imminent Terrorist Attack. In the event of an actual or imminent terrorist attack, suspects may not be detained for more than three (3) days without the written approval of a municipal, city, provincial or regional official of a Human Rights Commission or judge of the municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of Appeals nearest the place of the arrest. If the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the arresting police or law enforcement personnel shall bring the person thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is nearest the place where the accused was arrested. The approval in writing of any of the said officials shall be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned within five (5) days after the date of the detention of the persons concerned: Provided, however, That within three (3) days after the detention the suspects, whose connection with the terror attack or threat is not established, shall be released immediately.

SEC. 26. Restriction on Travel. In cases where evidence of guilt is not strong, and the person charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is entitled to bail and is granted the same, the court, upon application by the prosecutor, shall limit the right of travel of the accused to within the municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national security and public safety, consistent with Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution. Travel outside of said municipality or city, without the authorization of the court, shall be deemed a violation of the terms and conditions of his bail, which shall then be forfeited as provided under the Rules of Court.

He or she may also be placed under house arrest by order of the court at his or her usual place of residence.

While under house arrest, he or she may not use telephones, cellphones, e-mails, computers, the internet or other means of communications with people outside the residence until otherwise ordered by the court.

The restrictions abovementioned shall be terminated upon the acquittal of the accused or of the dismissal of the case filed against him or earlier upon the discretion of the court on motion of the prosecutor or of the accused.

VALID SEARCH WARRANTS

(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;

(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person;

(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and

(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.

Sec 2 Art 3 of the Constitution has its exception to Search Warrant:

(1) customs searches;

(2) searches of moving vehicles,

(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;

(4) consented searches;

(5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;

(6) stop and frisk measures have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.

Rule 113 Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:

Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the

commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

Requisites of a Valid Search Warrant

Frank Uy & Unifish Packing Corp. vs Bureau of Internal Revenue et al

FACTS:

In Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of UPC reported to the BIR that Frank Uy,

manager of UPC, was selling thousands of canned cartons without issuing a report. This is a violation of

Sec 253 & 263 of the Internal Revenue Code. In Oct 1993, the BIR requested before RTC Cebu to issue a

search warrant. Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a warrant on the same day. A second warrant was issued

which contains the same substance but has only one page, the same was dated Oct 1st 2003. These

warrants were issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Sec 253. A third warrant was issued on the same

day for the alleged violation of Uy of Sec 238 in relation to sec 263. On the strength of these warrants,

agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the PNP, on 2 Oct 1993, searched the premises of the

UPC. They seized, among other things, the records and documents of UPC. A return of said search was

duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. UPC filed a motion to quash the warrants which was denied

by the RTC. They appealed before the CA via certiorari. The CA dismissed the appeal for a certiorari is

not the proper remedy.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a way for it ordered the return of the seized items but

sustained the validity of the warrant. The SC ruled that the search warrant issued has not met some basic

requisites of validity. A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing

constitutional and statutory provisions.

These requirements, in outline form, are:

(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;

(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other

person;

(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the

complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and

(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be

seized.

The SC noted that there has been inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched as

indicated in the said warrants. Also the thing to be seized was not clearly defined by the judge. He used

generic itineraries. The warrants were also inconsistent as to who should be searched. One warrant was

directed only against Uy and the other was against Uy and UPC. The SC however noted that the

inconsistencies wered cured by the issuance of the latter warrant as it has revoked the two others.

NOTES:

Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under

oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the

place to be searched and the things to be seized.

SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and

any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn

statements together with any affidavits submitted.

The Place to be Searched in the Warrant is Controlling

a. People v. CA

S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search warrant before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.

The following day, Search Warrant No. 1068 (95) against Mr. Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1(the residence of the accused), immediately adjacent (to) Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their personal belongings, papers and effects such as wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts, money, explosives There was no showing that lawful occupants were made to witness the search. The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as required by the warrant itself

The place actually searched was different and distinct from the place described in the search warrant. The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers' own faulty depiction of the premises to be searched. The place they wrote down in the description of the place to be searched, which is exactly what the Judge reproduced in the search warran ist: "premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207. Area-F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan." And the scope of the search was made more particular and more restrictive by the Judge's admonition in the warrant that the search be "limited only to the premises herein described."

Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at least five (5) distinct places in the area involved: the store known as "Abigail's Variety Store," and four (4) separate and independent residential apartment units. Each of the five (5) places is independent of the others, and

may be entered only through its individual front door. Admittedly, the police officers did not intend a search of all five (5) places, but of only one of the residential units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store: that immediately next to the store (Number 1).

Thereafter, private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged; **" and on the same date, submitted their "Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant and to Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible),"

ISSUE: WON the evidence seized admissible

HELD: NO.

The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.

WHAT IS MATERIAL IN DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF A SEARCH IS THE PLACE STATED IN THE

WARRANT ITSELF, NOT WHAT THE APPLICANTS HAD IN THEIR THOUGHTS, OR HAD REPRESENTED IN

THE PROOFS THEY SUBMITTED TO THE COURT ISSUING THE WARRANT.

b. Validity of a warrantless search and seizure as a result of an informers tip

People of the Philippines vs Rosa Aruta

FACTS:

In the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an informant named Benjie that a certain Aling Rosa would be leaving for Baguio City on 14 Dec 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; At 6:30 in the evening of 14 Dec 1988, Aruta alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; NARCOM officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to him; When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; Aruta was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is constitutional.

HELD:

The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some drug traffickers are being freed due to technicalities. Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Aruta was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to Aruta and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended Aruta were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. The SC could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests. Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of Arutas bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are fruits of a poisoned tree and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.

NOTES:

When is a warrantless search allowed?

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence;

2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

2. People of the Philippines vs Ruben Montilla y Gatdula

FACTS:

On 19 June 1994 at about 2pm, police officers Talingting and Clarin were informed by an asset that a drug courier would be arriving from Baguio to Dasmarias carrying an undetermined amount of marijuana. The next day, the informant pointed at Montilla as the courier who was waiting in a waiting shed Brgy Salitran, Dasmarias. Montilla was then apprehended and he was caught in possession of a bag and a carton worth 28 kilos of marijuana. Montilla denied the allegation and he said he came to Cavite from Baguio for work and he does not have any effects with him at that time except for some pocket money. He was sentenced to death thereafter. He averred that the search and seizure conducted was illegal for there was no warrant and that he should have been given the opportunity to cross examine the informant. He said that if the informant has given the cops the information about his arrival as early as the day before his apprehension, the cops should have ample time to secure a search warrant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted is legal.

HELD: The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest is legal. Sec 2 Art 3 of the Constitution has its exception, they are:

(1) customs searches;

(2) searches of moving vehicles,

(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;

(4) consented searches;

(5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;

(6) stop and frisk measures have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.

In the case at bar, it should be noted that the information relayed by informant to the cops was that there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio in the early morning of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time, this would be beside the point for, under these circumstances, the information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by name.

On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant, assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time they could make preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented by the defense. In determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in rural areas.

A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender

(1) dangerous weapons, and

(2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.

People vs. Racho

626 SCRA 633, August 3, 2010

Facts:

On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. The team members posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Appellant was charged in two separate informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs. During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges. On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The appellant brought the case to SC assailing for the first time he legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search.

Issue: Whether or not the appellant has a ground to assail the validity of his arrest.

Held: NOT VALID

The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.

Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had

committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.

Neither was the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the "tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only the appellants physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that he would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.

4. People v. Claudio

FACTS:

Anita Claudio transported 1.1 kilos of Marijuana dried leaves, which are prohibited drugs for the purpose of selling the same from Baguio City to Olongapo City. She rode Victory Liner for transporting the same.

One of the passengers was Daniel Obia, a member of INP, since 1970 up to the present. He was assigned in June, 1972 at the Investigation Division as operative. While he was thus seated, suspect Anita Claudio boarded the same bus and took the seat in front of him after putting a bag which she was carrying at the back of the seat of Obia. The bag placed by suspect behind his seat was a wooven buri bag made of plastic containing some vegetables. He inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at the bottom of the woven bag and smelt marijuana. The plastic woven bag appearing to contain camote tops on the top has a big bundle of plastic of marijuana at the bottom. He could recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at that time at the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. They reached Olongapo City and the accused went down from the bus in front of the Caltex Gasoline Station in Sta. Rita. Right after the accused alighted from the bus, policeman Obina intercepted her and showed her his Id Identifying himself as a policeman and told her he will search her bag because of the suspicion that she was carrying marijuana inside said bag. In reply, accused told him, "Please go with me, let us settle this at home." However, the witness did not heed her plea and instead handcuffed her right hand and with her, boarded a tricycle right away and brought the suspect to the police headquarters with her bag appearing to contain vegetables.

At the police headquarters Investigation Section, the bag was searched in the presence of Investigator Cpl. Tiongco; Pat. Obia, the accused and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang. Inside the plastic bag was found a big bundle of plastic containing marijuana weighing about one kilo.

She violated Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended). In the lower court, she was sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P 20,000.00, and to pay the costs.

HOWEVER, The accused contends that there was a warrantless search, seizure and apprehension.

ISSUE: WON there is a valid warrant of arrest

HELD: YES.

The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Rule 113 Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:

Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant

Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obia did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.

5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI

Facts:

The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a tip from one of their informers that the accused

was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening and approached him as he descended from the gangplank

after the informer pointed at him. They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contained three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by the NBI forensic examiner. On

the basis of the finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin. Aminnudin claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and

found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. He was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after

disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for

him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked like marijuana leaves and took him

to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him

and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an

information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him.

Issue:

Whether or not accused constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure is violated

Ruling: In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after

personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. The accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless

arrest allowed.

The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the rules of court not justified unless the accused was caught in flagrante or a crime was about to be committed or had just

been committed. A vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs

law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can

be secured.

In the present case, from the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had

at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who

was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of

his arrival was certain. And from the information they have received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was a probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. The Bill

of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team had

determine on his own authority that a search warrant was not necessary. The evidence of probable cause should be determined by a judge and not law enforcement agents.

ACQUITTED

6.People v. Malmstedt

Facts: Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command (NARCOM) stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an information also was received about a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. During the inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accuseds passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag and when accused opened the same bag the officer noticed four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that the accused finally presented his passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection the stuff toy contained also hashish. Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure Ruling: VALID The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides: Arrest without warrant; when lawful a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporary confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of law, which allows a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the object sought in connection with the offense are in the placed sought to be searched.

When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him a prohibited drug, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.

c. General or Roving Warrants

1. Stonehill v. Diokno

Facts:

Stonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have committed acts in violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. By the strength of this allegation 42 search warrants were issued against their persons and their corporation. The warrant provides authority to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely:(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and (b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for:

(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;

(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;

(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them;

(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and

(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law.

The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against them. In short, the criminal cannot be set free just because the government blunders.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issue is valid.

HELD:

1. Search warrant conducted in the residences of the petitioners were invalid. The constitution protects the peoples right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met.

The warrant was issued from mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code, as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.

There was also a violation to search and seizure clause when they only stated the things to be seized in a general way. THEREFORE, the evidence obtained from the houses are inadmissible.

2. In terms of the search warrant issued to the corporation, Harry Stonehill etc has no cause of action since a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from the personality of its officers or herein petitioner regardless of the amount of shares of stock or interest of each in the said corporation, and whatever office they hold therein. Only the party whose rights has been impaired can validly object the

legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be exercised by a third party. The right to object belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st group of documents, papers, and things seized from the offices and the premises).

2.Bache & Co. Inc. et al vs BIR Commissioner Vivencio Ruiz et al

Search and Seizure Personal Examination of the Judge

FACTS:

Commissioner of Internal Revenue Vera wrote a letter to Judge Ruiz requesting the issuance of a

search warrant against Bache & Co. for the violation of Section 46 (a) of the National Revenue Code in

relation with Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209 and for Judge Ruiz to authorize Examiner De Leon to file

the application for search warrant which was attached to the same letter. Three days after, De Leon and

his witness Logronio went to Judge Ruizs CFI bringing the letter-request, the application for the search

warrant prepared by him [unsigned], Logronios affidavit subscribed defore De Leon, a deposition by

Logronio [printed and signed but not subscribed] and a search warrant accomplished but yet unsigned

by Judge Ruiz.

At the time they [De Leon and Logronio] were at the court, Judge Ruiz was conducting a hearing

and so he [Ruiz] instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio,

after which [hearing done] Judge Ruiz along with Deputy Clerk Gonzales, stenographer Gaspar, De Leon

and Logronio went inside the chamber where Judge Ruiz requested for the Gaspar [stenographer] to

read to him her stenographic notes [deposition]. After that, Judge Ruiz then had De Leon and Logronio

swear an oath and warned them that should statements be false and without legal basis they would be

charged with perjury.

Judge Ruiz then signed De Leons application for Search Warrant and Logronios deposition,

Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued. In the warrant, the things to be searched were indicated:

Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements

books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities;

contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications,

accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals;

and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.

Petitioners filed for MTQ, preliminary and prohibitory Writs of Injunction to be issued, for the

Search Warrant to be declared null and void because the witness was not examined personally by the

Judge. They asked to be paid for damages and attorneys fees. Respondent filed an answer and the

motion was dismissed. While the case was ongoing, BIR made tax assessments based or partly based on

the documents seized during the search.

Issues:

1) W/N Judge Ruiz sufficiently determined if there was probable cause before issuing the Search

Warrant.

2) W/N the Search Warrant was valid for covering more than one offense.

3) W/N the Search Warrant is general in nature.

4) W/N the corporation is entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizures.

HELD: INVALID SEARCH WARRANT

1.INVALID

Judge Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness [Art. III, Sec. 1 of 1987

Constitution and Rule 126, Sec. 3 and 4 of ROC ]

Section 4, Rule 126 of ROC requires that the judge himself personally examine the complainant and his

witness to determine the existence of probable cause. There was no examination done in the present

case, while it is true that the application for SW and Logronios deposition were subscribed before the

judge, there were no questions asked to which could possibly be the basis in determining whether or

not there was probable cause.

2.INVALID

The SW was for at least 4 distinct offenses under the Tax Code:

1st violation Sec. 46 (a), Sec. 72 and 73 provided for the filing of ITR which are interrelated;

2nd violation Sec. 53 for withholding of income taxes at source;

3rd violation Sec. 208 for unlawful pursuit of business or occupation;

4th violation Sec. 209 for failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output

actually removed or to pay tax due.

The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled in Stonehill Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

3. INVALID

The description of the things in the Search Warrant does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. Things to be seized shall be particularly described as to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the

description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the description

expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the

search and seizure or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the

offense for which the warrant is being issued.

In Uy Kheytin, et.al. v Villareal, it was established that the purpose and intent of the requiring

that a search warrant describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized is to limit the things

to be seized and only those particularly described in the SW so as unreasonable searches and seizures

may not be made.

Tests for SW:

- A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the

description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio; 57

Phil. 384);

- or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer

may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,)

- or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for

which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court)

3. Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos vs CFI Benguet Judge Pio Marcos

Search and Seizure

FACTS:

On March 31, 1971,Romeo Amansec went to Baguio and passed by a house at 47 Ledesma Street, Baguio he was attracted by several persons inside the house; he peeped from outside the house and when the curtain was moved he saw a Buddha that was inside the house; he observed what was going on inside the house and he heard someone say that the golden Buddha was actually for sale and when he observed them closer he overheard that it was being offered for sale for 100,000 pesos by Rogelio Roxas; he saw the Buddha and firearms and some bullets inside the house.

Romeo reported the incident to Colonel Calano. The latter then requested for a warrant from J Marcos at about 12 midnight on Apr 4, 1971. Due to the urgency he issued the warrant. The search warrant was served two hours after. And eventually the golden Buddha and some firearms were seized from Roxass house.

DOJ Secretary Santos assailed the warrant averring that:

(1) the search warrant was not limited to one offense covering both illegal possession of firearms and violation of Central Bank rules and regulations;

(2)that it did not particularly describe the property to be seized;

(3)that he did not carefully examine under oath the applicant and his witnesses; that articles not mentioned were taken; and

(4) that thereafter the return and the inventory although appearing to have been prepared on said date were not actually submitted to respondent Judge until April 13, 1971 and the objects seized delivered only about a week later on April 19.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued by Judge Marcos is valid.

HELD:

The SC ruled in favor Judge Marcos and had basically affirmed the decision of appellate Judge Gatamaitan. Taking into consideration to nature of the articles so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could be given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof, The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to Identify the articles in question, which he did, so that here, since certainly, no one would be mistaken in Identifying the Buddha, whose image is well known, and even the firearms and ammunition because these were those without permit to possess, and all located at 47 Ledesma St., Baguio City, so far as description was concerned, the search warrant perhaps could not be said to have suffered fatal defects.

4. Castro vs. Pabalan (70 SCRA 477)

Facts:

Ernesto I. Lumang admitted that "he has been informed" and was of the belief that Maria Castro

and Co Ling, being at Barrio Padasil, Bangar, La Union, "have in possession narcotics and other

contraband." There is a claim that he had verified the report and that he had "reasons to believe that a

Search Warrant should be issued to enable the undersigned to take possession" of such narcotics and

other contraband.

Lumang informed Sergeant Francisco. The application for Search Warrant was accompanied by

the joint affidavit of a Sergeant Francisco C. Molina and a Corporal Lorenzo G. Apilado of the Philippine

Constabulary. Again, mention was merely made of their information about narcotics and other

contraband being kept by Castro and Co Ling. They allege that they conducted rigid surveillance, but all

they could come out with is that petitioner Co Ling is an overstaying alien for almost ten years conducting

such traffic and that after verification, he was not registered in the Immigration Office.

Then, on the very same day, the search warrant was issued for illegal traffic of narcotics and

contraband. Again, there was reference to the possession by Castro and Co Ling of such forbidden goods.

As to the complete and detailed description of the properties to be seized, the search warrant merely

mentioned illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband inside the warehouse and premises of petitioners.

According to the Judge, he examined and asked Sgt. Lumang although not in writing and not

recorded. He reasoned that the inquiry was brief because Sgt. had with a long service behind. The barrio

to be searched was handwritten in ink, Maria Cristina cancelling the typewritten name Padasil. But this

correction was not done in the duplicates. Anyhow Padasil and Maria Cristina are adjoining barrios. After

the routine taking of their oath and examination questions and answers, the Presiding Judge of this Branch

signed the application for search warrant, the joint affidavits, and forthwith issued the search warrant."

Issue: W/N a search warrant issued without complying with the requisites of the Constitution and the

Rules of Court should have been nullified

Held:

Respondent Judge conducted the required "examination under oath" be justified merely because respondent Lumang was "a Sergeant of the PC, with a long service behind [him]." He did not even bother to take the depositions of the witnesses in writing, attaching them to the record. There was thus a manifest and palpable violation of the constitutional standard as to the quantum of proof to show the existence of probable cause.

The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular description of "the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." As admitted by the judge in the challenged resolution, there was a mistake concerning the residence of petitioners, which was set forth in the search warrant as being in Barrio Padasil when in fact it is in Barrio Maria Cristina.

Another infirmity was the failure to comply with the basic procedural requisite that a search warrant "shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Reference was made to "an illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband." The latter is a generic term covering all goods exported from or imported into the country contrary to applicable statutes. More than one offense could arise from the activity designated as illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband. As a matter of fact, in the challenged order, reference was made to at least three charges having been filed, the violation of Section 203 of the Internal Revenue Code, its Section 1039 on tax evasion, as well as illegal possession of opium.

It is the established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the illegality of the search warrant does not call for the return of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited by law. The issuance of the search warrant in question the judge did not comply with the requirements of section 98 of General Orders No. 58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return of the opium and its paraphernalia which were found and seized under said warrant, and much less are they entitled to be exonerated because of such omission of the judge.

The SC held that the search warrant in question is tainted by illegality for being violative both of the

Constitution and the Rules of Court. Likewise notwithstanding the illegality of such search warrant, the

challenged order of respondent Judge can be sustained only insofar as it would limit the return of the

articles seized to the liquor, the pack of playing cards, the bottle of distilled water and five bottles of

Streptomycin taken under such search warrant.

5.Asian Surety v. Herrera

Asian Surety vs. Herrera, 54 SCRA 312 (A search warrant for estafa, falsification, tax evasion and

insurance fraud is a general warrant and therefore not valid)

Facts:

Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent Judge Jose Herrera of the City

Court of Manila, and to command respondents to return immediately the documents, papers, receipts

and records alleged to have been illegally seized thereunder by agents of the National Bureau of

Investigation (NBI) led by respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr.

On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso

Zoleta, Jr. supported by the deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in

connection with an undocketed criminal case for estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion,

against the Asian Surety and Insurance Co., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of

the Philippines, with principal office at Room 200 Republic Supermarket Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila.

Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-graft Division of the

NBI entered the premises of the Republic Supermarket Building and served the search warrant upon Atty.

Alidio of the insurance company, in the presence of Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman of the

board of directors of the insurance firm. After the search they seized and carried away two (2) carloads of

documents, papers and receipts.

Issue:

Whether or not the search warrant is void.

Held:

In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses of : (1)

estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud, in contravention of the explicit command

of Section 3, Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no search warrant shall issue for more than one

specific offense."

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the search warrant of October 27, 1965, is

nullified and set aside, and the respondents are hereby ordered to return immediately all documents,

papers and other objects seized or taken thereunder. Without costs.

5. Asian Surety v. Herrera

FACTS: Upon a sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta Jr. supported with the deposition of witness Manuel Cuaresma, the respondent Judge Jose Herrera, issued a search warrant against the petitioner for criminal case of Estafa, falsification, insurance fraud and tax evasion.By virtue of the search warrant, NBI agents seized the place in the office of the petitioner in Republic Market and carried away two car loads of documents, papers and receipt. The petitioners, then filed a suit assailing the validity of the SW, contending that it does not follow the Constitutional and statutory requirements of a valid SW. Issue: What are the violated procedures in the case at bar?

Held:

Single warrant single offense rule. General warrant.

The constitution requires that a SW should be issued upon a probable cause in connection with

one single offense. In the case at bar, the SW was issued for 4separate and distinct offenses. Estafa,

falsification, tax evasion and insurance fraud. Therefore it is invalid for it is a general warrant.

Particular description of the objects to be seized. The constitution mandates that objects to be

seized should be couched not on generic but specific terms.

Section 2 provides that a SW may be issued for the search and seizure of the following

personal properties .a)Property subject to the offense; b)Property stolen or embezzled and

other proceeds or fruits of the offense; c)Property used or intended to be used as the means of

committing the offense

In the case at bar, the respondent judge used all three of the description in relation to the things

to be seized in the petitioner. Thus, they are all couched in 27 generic terms. The respondent judge did

not bother to specify the things to be seized that would be admitted as an evidence to the offense

charged.

Viduya vs. Berdiago

73 SCRA 553 (1976)

Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.

FACTS:

Respondent Berdiago is the owner of a Rolls Royce car, Model 1966, which arrived in the Port of Manila

on January 8, 1968. However, the petitioner, Jose Viduya, then Collector of Customs of Manila, obtained

reliable intelligence that fraudulent documents were used by Berdiago in securing the release of the car

from the Bureau of Customs, making it appear therein that the car was a 1961 model instead of a 1966

one, thus enabling respondent to pay a much lower customs duty.

There was, accordingly, a formal demand for the payment of the sum to cover the deficiency,

respondent manifesting his willingness to do so but failing to live up to his promise. As the car was kept

in a dwelling house at the Yabut Compound, two officials of the Customs Police Service as duly

authorized agents of petitioner, applied to respondent Judge for a warrant to search said dwelling house

and to seize the Rolls Royce car found therein.

Berdiago filed a motion to quash the search warrant issued by the court based on lack of probable cause

to issue the warrant. Collector Viduya opposed, alleging that Berdiago could not rely on the

constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure because it was not shown that he owned

the dwelling house which was searched. Nonetheless, respondent Judge in the challenged order

quashed such search warrant.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the warrant

HELD:

The Court opined that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police

authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the

enforcement of customs laws. There is justification then for the insistence on the part of private

respondent that probable cause be shown. So respondent Judge found in issuing the search warrant.

Apparently, he was persuaded to quash it when he noted that the warrant for seizure and detention

came later than its issuance. In thus acting, respondent Judge apparently overlooked that long before

the search warrant was applied for, to be specific on April 15, 1968, the misdeclaration and

underpayment was already noted and that thereafter on April 24, 1968, private respondent himself

agreed to make good the further amount due but not in the sum demanded.

As the car was kept in a dwelling house, petitioner through two of his officers in the Customs Police

Service applied for and was able to obtain the search warrant. Had there been no such move on the part

of petitioner, the duties expressly enjoined on him by law assess and collect all lawful revenues, to

prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds and to enforce tariff and customs law would not have

been performed.

While therefore, it is to be admitted that his warrant of seizure and detention came later than the

search warrant, there were indubitable facts in existence at that time to call for its issuance. Certainly

there was probable cause. There was evidently need for the issuance of a search warrant. It ought not to

have been thereafter quashed.

9. PEOPLE v. VELOSO

JOHN DOE WARRANTS Valid IF the best description possible is given in the arrest warrant it

must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is to be served by stating his occupation, personal

appearance or peculiarities, place of residence or other circumstances which he may be identified.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the accused, Jose Ma. Veloso, guilty of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority, in violation of article 252

In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the House of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the club.

The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was a gambling house. J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduo of the municipal court.

Once the police inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house. Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it contained gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game. Veloso resisted to the search.

At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso only to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a blow in another part of the body, which injured the policeman quite severely. Through the combined efforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.

All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons. Veloso again refused to obey and shouted offensive epithets against the police department.

According to Veloso, the search warrant was void because the name stated therein was the pseudonym John Doe and not Veloso. Therefore, according to him, he had the legal right to resist the police power.

In the search warrant, the name, the place where the person can be found was included as well the things associated to Veloso: John Doe has illegally in his possession in the building occupied by him and which is under his control, namely in the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippines Islands, certain devices and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law, to wit: money, cards, chips, reglas, pintas, tables and chairs and other utensils used in connection with the game commonly known as monte and that the said John Doe keeps and conceals said

devices and effects with the illegal and criminal intention of using them in violation of the Gambling Law.

ISSUE: Is the search warrant invalid for using a wrong name;

HELD: NO.

In the lower court, and again in this court, the attorneys for the defense quoted from Wharton's Criminal Procedure. In that text at pages 51, 52, 54, 55, and 56 of volume 1 of the Tenth Edition, is found the following:

Form and Sufficiency of Warrant. Technical accuracy is not required. . . .

Name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of the warrant and where the name is unknown there must be such a description of the person accused as will enable the officer to identify him when found.

Warrant for apprehension of unnamed party, or containing a wrong name for the party to be apprehended is void, except in those cases where it contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused.

The search warrant for John Doe was valid because even if a wrong name was cited, it contains the best descriptio personae possible to be obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he can be identified.

In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the building to be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands." This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched. It is the prevailing rule that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended.

As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.

We agree with the trial judge and with the Attorney-General in their conclusions to the effect that the search warrant was valid, and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority.

ELI LUI, ET AL. VS. MATILLANO, May 27, 2004

Right against unreasonable searches and seizures; Mission Order does not authorize an illegal search.

FACTS:

Lariosa was employed as a laborer at the Davao United Products Enterprise store, with a monthly salary of P800.00. The store was owned by Leong Shiu Ben and King Kiao. Lariosa was tasked to close the store during lunchtime and after store hours in the afternoon.

Lariosa chose to live in the house of Kiao. Lariosa sometimes did the household chores in there. On October 17, 1988, Lariosa was taken ill and was permitted to take the day off. He went to the house of his aunt, Paulina Matillano, and her husband Eulogio Matillano in Bansalan City, where he rested until the next day, October 18, 1988. Lariosa reported for work the day after, or on October 19, 1988, but Kiao told him that his employment was terminated.

On October 27, 1988, Lariosa returned to Davao City and was able to collect his backwages from Ben in the amount of P500.00. Lariosa withdrew his savings from the Mindanao Savings Bank in Bansalan City. He bought a radio cassette for P2,500.00 and a pair of Rayban sunglasses for P900.00.

On November 3, 1988, Lariosa went to the house of his fiancee, Nancy, next day, November 5, 1988.

That day, Ben informed his nephew, Eli Lui, that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash at the store. Ben reported the matter to NBI Senior Agent Ruperto Galvez, and forthwith executed an affidavit wherein he alleged that after Lariosas employment was terminated on October 19, 1988, he discovered that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash. He suspected that Lariosa was the culprit because the latter, as a former employee, had a duplicate key to the side door of the United Products Enterprise Store.

At 9:00 a.m. on November 6, 1988, a Sunday, Lariosa went to the house of Pagsa and Malang to retrieve his things. The two invited Lariosa to go with them to the beach, and Lariosa agreed. After about an hour, Lui arrived on board a vehicle and asked Lariosa to talk privately. Liu was was armed with a 9 mm. caliber gun and poked Lariosa with the weapon. He warned Lariosa not to run, otherwise, he would be killed. The group went to Bens house to get the keys to the store. Ben joined them as they drove towards the store.

Lui mauled Lariosa and tried to force the latter to admit that he had stolen Bens money. Lariosa refused to do so. Lui then brought Lariosa to the comfort room of the store and pushed his face into the toilet bowl, in an attempt to force him into confessing to the crime. Lariosa still refused to admit to anything. Lui then made a telephone call to the Metrodiscom (PNP) based in Davao City.

In the meantime, a police car arrived at the store with two policemen on board. One of them handcuffed Lariosa at gunpoint and ordered him to open the store with the use of the keys.

Lariosa was asked where he stayed during his day off and Lariosa answered that he stayed in her girlfriends house. The policemen brought Lariosa there, where they asked Nancy if Lariosa had left anything while he slept thereat. Nancy replied that Lariosa had left a radio cassette and a pair of sunglasses. The policemen took these and brought Lariosa back to the Metrodiscom headquarters where Lui and his two companions were waiting.

Lui asked Lariosa where he stayed when he went to Bansalan, and Lariosa replied that he used to stay in the house of his aunt and uncle, the Spouses Matillano, in Lily Street, Poblacion Bansalan. Rojas and Lui then brought Lariosa, with his hands still handcuffed, to a car. Luis companions, Alan Mendoza and Henry Tan boarded another car and proceeded to the Matillano residence.

They went to the house of the aunt. With handguns drawn, they kicked the door to the kitchen and gained entry into the house. They then proceeded to the sala where they found Lariosas aunt, Paulina Matillano.

Lui poked his gun at Paulina and warned her not to talk anymore because something might happen. He then said, All right, where is your aparador because we are getting something. Paulina told Lui to wait for her husband Eulogio. Lui ignored her protest and told her that they were in a hurry. Paulina was then impelled to bring Lui and his two companions, Mendoza and Tan, to the second floor where her aparador was located. Rojas and the handcuffed Lariosa remained in the sala. Lui and his two companions then took two mats and two pairs of ladies shoes belonging to Paulina and Eulogio, two pairs of pants, leather shoes, two t-shirts and two polo shirts which belonged to the latters children.

They also ordered Paulina to open a chest and when she did, Lui and his companions took her old Bulova wristwatch, necklace, ring and old coins. Lui and his two companions then went down to the ground floor. When Julieta went out of the room, one of Luis companions recognized her as Lariosas sister. Lui and his companions brought her along with them as they left the house.

.

At 4:30 p.m., Paulina reported to the barangay captain that persons identifying themselves as policemen had gained entry into their house and took some of their belongings. two polo shirts; two t-shirts; two pairs of pants; two floor mats; two pairs of ladies shoes; one Bulova wristwatch; one necklace; one ring; and old coins.[3]

On November 8, 1988, Lariosa executed an uncounselled confession where he stated that he stole P40,000.00 on October 15, 1988 from the Davao United Products, and that he used part of the money to buy appliances, a Sony cassette tape-recorder, two pairs of ladies shoes, a Seiko wristwatch, two pairs of maong pants, Rayban sunglasses and floor mats.]

On November 16, 1988, an Information was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, charging Lariosa with robbery with force upon things. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 17,136,88.[7] The trial court rendered judgment on June 14, 1989, acquitting Lariosa of the crime charged on reasonable doubt. The trial court held that Lui procured Lariosas confession through force and intimidation, in connivance with police authorities.[8] The trial court, likewise, found that Lui had an ulterior motive for charging Lariosa of robbery:

Meanwhile, Paulina Matillano filed a criminal complaint for robbery against Lui, Peter Doe, John Doe and Alan Mendoza. HOWEVER, the petitioners contended that respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search and seizure deserves scant consideration because she did not refuse when she opened the cabinet and chest.

ISSUE: Did she waive her right?

HELD: No.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must be clear and

convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right. There must be proof of the following:

(a) that the right exists;

(b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and,

(c) that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

(d)The waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.

The fact that the aggrieved person did not object to the entry into her house by the police officers does not amount to a permission to make a search therein. A peaceful submission to search and seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.

In this case, the petitioners failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search and seizure by consenting thereto, either expressly or impliedly. Admittedly, respondent Paulina Matillano did not object to the opening of her wooden closet and the taking of their personal properties. However, such failure to object or resist did not amount to an implied waiver of her right against unreasonable search and seizure. The petitioners were armed with handguns; petitioner Lui threatened and intimidated her. Respondent Eulogio Matillano, her husband, was out of the house when the petitioner and his cohorts conducted the search and seizure. He could, thus, not have waived his constitutional right.

FACTS: Microsoft Corporation and Adobe Systems Incorporated (petitioners) are corporations organized and existing under the laws of the United States. Microsoft Corporation is the owner of all rights including copyright relating to all versions and editions of Microsoft software3 and the corresponding users manuals, and the registered owner of the Microsoft MS DOS trademarks in the Philippines. Adobe Systems Incorporated is the owner of all rights including copyright relating to all versions and editions of Adobe Software.cralawred Samir Farajallah, Virgilio D.C. Herce, Rachel P. Follosco, Jesusito G. Morallos and Ma. Geraldine S. Garcia (respondents) are the directors and officers of New Fields (Asia Pacific), Inc., a domestic corporation with principal office at Unit 1603, East Tower, Philippine Stock Exchange Center, Exchange Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City. Petitioners claim that in September 2009, they were informed by a tip that New Fields was unlawfully reproducing and using unlicensed versions of their software. Orion Support, Inc. (OSI) was engaged by petitioners to assist in the verification of this information. Two OSI Market Researchers, Norma L. Serrano (Serrano) and Michael A. Moradoz (Moradoz) were assigned to confirm the informant's tip. Serrano and Moradoz were trained to detect unauthorized copies of Adobe and Microsoft software. wred

They discovered that there are at least two (2) computers using common product identification and/or serial numbers of MICROSOFT and ADOBE software. This is one indication that the software being used is unlicensed or was illegally reproduced or copied. Based on the training we attended, all

ADOBE and MICROSOFT software should only be installed in one computer, unless they avail of an Open Licese Agreement from the software developer, which is not the case in NEW FIELDS. Based on our training, if the first three sets of numbers of the Product I.D. Nos. of the MICROSOFT software installed are the same, it signifies that it came from one installer. It does not matter [if] the last 5 digits of the Product I.D. Nos. are different because this is computer-generated and therefore varies with every installation. Apart from the MICROSOFT software, the serial numbers of the ADOBE software installed in the computer units we used were also the same, signifying that NEW FIELDS only used one (1) installer of the ADOBE software program on two (2) computers.8 (Emphasis supplied)

They also observed that New Fields had 90 computers in their office with Microsoft software, none of which had the Certificate of Authenticity issued by Microsoft. After being informed of the results of the investigation, petitioners then issued certifications that they have not authorized New Fields to copy, print, reproduce and/or publish unauthorized copies of Microsoft and Adobe software products.9cralawred An application for search warrants was filed by Padilla on 20 May 2010, before Judge Amor Reyes in her capacity as Executive Judge of the RTC. The warrants were served on respondents on 24 May 2010. New Fields employees witnessed the search conducted by the authorities. Several items were seized, including 17 CD installers and 83 computers containing unauthorized copies of Microsoft and/or Adobe software.

On 29 June 2010, the RTC issued an Order quashing both warrants and directing that all the items seized from the respondents be returned x x x. According to the RTC, petitioners should have identified which specific computer had the pirated software. The RTC added that no criminal charge has been filed yet, despite the fact that the seized items have been in petitioners possession for several weeks since the warrants were issued. Lastly, the RTC dismissed the petitioners contention that the three-day notice rule was not complied with because petitioners were already notified of the motion personally. HELD: THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE We rule that strict compliance with the three-day notice rule may be relaxed in this case. However, we sustain petitioners contention that there was probable cause for issuance of a warrant, and the RTC and CA should have upheld the validity of both warrants. Compliance with the three-day notice rule In Anama v. Court of Appeals,29 we ruled that the three-day notice rule is not absolute. The purpose of the rule is to safeguard the adverse partys right to due process. Thus, if the adverse party was given a reasonable opportunity to study the motion and oppose it, then strict compliance with the three-day notice rule may be dispensed with.

Existence of probable cause Under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitions for review by certiorari shall raise only questions of law. A question of fact exists when there is a doubt as to the truth of certain facts, and it

can only be resolved through a reexamination of the body of evidence.31cralawred In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc.,32 we ruled that the existence of probable cause is a question of fact.33 In the same case, we also stated that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who conducted the examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses. For this reason, the findings of the judge deserve great weight. The reviewing court should overturn such findings only upon proof that the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of reason.34

In this case, we find reason to overturn the rulings of the RTC and CA, since there was grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts. The CA sustained the quashal of the warrant because the witnesses had no personal knowledge of the facts upon which the issuance of the warrants may be justified, and the applicants and the witnesses merely relied on the screen shots acquired from the confidential informant.cralawred

Looking at the records, it is clear that Padilla and his companions were able to personally verify the tip of their informant.

The evidence on record clearly shows that the applicant and witnesses were able to verify the information obtained from their confidential source. The evidence likewise shows that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. Thus, the requirement of personal knowledge of the applicant and witnesses was clearly satisfied in this case.

Leviste v. Alameda

here are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and

judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during

preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public

prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause

exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined

by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-

judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in

court. Whether that function has been correctly discharged by the public

prosecutor, i.e., whether he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of

probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not

be compelled to pass upon.[77]

The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to

ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge

must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for

placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the

judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest

warrant.[78] Paragraph (a), Section 5,[79] Rule 112 of the Rules of Court outlines the

procedure to be followed by the RTC.

To move the court to conduct a judicial determination of probable cause is a

mere superfluity, for with or without such motion, the judge is duty-bound to

personally evaluate the resolution of the public prosecutor and the supporting

evidence. In fact, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with

the court is first andforemost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable

cause for the arrest of the accused.[80]

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal

responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of

probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine

the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and

procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting

documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of

probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal

determination of the existence of probable cause; and (2) if he is not

satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutors report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to

aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable

cause.[81] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The rules do not require cases to be set for hearing to determine probable cause

for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of the accused before any warrant may be

issued.[82] Petitioner thus cannot, as a matter of right, insist on a hearing for judicial

determination of probable cause. Certainly, petitioner cannot determine

beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the [judge's] examination of the records

should be [since t]he extent of the judges examination depends on the exercise of

his sound discretion as the circumstances of the case require.[83] In one case, the

Court emphatically stated:

The periods provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

are mandatory, and as such, the judge must determine the presence or

absence of probable cause within such periods. The Sandiganbayans determination of probable cause is made ex parte and is summary in

nature, not adversarial. The Judge should not be stymied and

distracted from his determination of probable cause by needless

motions for determination of probable cause filed by the accused.[84] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner proceeds to discuss at length evidentiary matters, arguing that no

circumstances exist that would qualify the crime from homicide to murder.

The allegation of lack of substantial or material new evidence deserves no

credence, because new pieces of evidence are not prerequisites for a valid conduct

of reinvestigation. It is not material that no new matter

or evidence was presented during the reinvestigation of the case. It should

be stressed that reinvestigation, as the word itself implies, is merely a repeat

investigation of the case. New matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a

reinvestigation, which is simply a chance for the prose