Search and Seizure Digests

8/10/2019 Search and Seizure Digests

1/50

CONSTITUTIONAL LAWCHAPTER IVTHE SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROVISION

THE ANTI-TERRORISM LAW (RA 9372)

NOTE: Applicable provisions of the Human Security Act/Anti-Terrorism Law, Republic Act No. 9372, Approved onMarch 6, 2007 and effective on July 15, 2007 (This Law shall be automatically suspended one (1) month beforeand two (2) months after the holding of any election)

Sec.18. Period of detention without judicial warrant of arrest.- The provisions of Article 125 of theRevised Penal Code, notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement personnel, who, havingbeen duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of a personcharged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to committerrorism shall, WITHOUT INCURRING ANY CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR DELAY IN THEDELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES, DELIVERSAID CHARGED OR SUSPECTED PERSON TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITYWITHIN A PERIOD OF THREE (3) DAYS counted from the moment said charged or suspectedperson has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into custody by the said police,or law enforcement personnel: Provided, That the arrest of those suspected of the crime ofterrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result from the surveillance under Section 7 andexamination of bank deposits under Section 27 of this Act.

The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before detaining the person suspectedof the crime of terrorism, present him or her before any judge at the latters residence or officenearest the place where the arrest took place at any time of the day or night. It shall be the dutyof the judge, among other things, to ascertain the identity of the police or law enforcementpersonnel and the person or persons they have arrested and presented before him or her, toinquire of them the reasons why they have arrested the person and determine by questioning andpersonal observation whether or not the subject has been subjected to any physical, moral orpsychological torture by whom and why. The judge shall then submit a written report of whathe/she had observed when the subject was brought before him to the proper court that hasjurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested.

The judge shall forthwith submit his report within 3 calendar days from the time the suspect wasbrought to his/her residence or office.

Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorismor conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law enforcement personnel shall notify in writingthe judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest; provided, That where thearrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the written notice shallbe served at the residence of the judge nearest the place where the accused was arrested. Thepenalty of 10 years and 1 day to 12 years imprisonment shall be imposed upon the police or lawenforcement personnel who fail to notify any judge as provided in the preceding paragraph.

Sec.19. Period of Detention in the event of an actual or imminent terrorist attack.- In the vent ofan actual or imminent terrorist attack,, suspects may not be detained for more than three dayswithout the written approval of a municipal, city, provincial or regional official of a Human RightsCommission, or judge of the municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the

Court of Appeals nearest the place of arrest. If the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays orholidays, or after office hours, the arresting police of law enforcement personnel shall bring theperson thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is nearest theplace where the accused was arrested. The approval in writing of any of the said officials shall besecured by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned within five days after the date ofthe detention of the persons concerned; Provided, however, That within three days after thedetention the suspects whose connection with the terror attack or threat is not established, shallbe released immediately.

Sec.26. provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or conspiracy to committerrorismeven if they have been granted bail because evidence of guilt is not strongcan be:

1. Detained under house arrest;


2/50

2. Restricted from traveling; and/or3. Prohibited from using any cellular phones, computers, or other means of communications

with people outside their residence.

Sec.39. Seizure and Sequestration.- The deposits and their outstanding balances, placements,trust accounts, assets, and records in any bank or financial institution, moneys, businesses,transportation and communication equipment, supplies and other implements, and property ofwhatever kind and nature belonging:

To any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to committerrorism;to a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons;to a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association or group ofpersons,-shall be seized, sequestered, and frozen in order to prevent their use, transfer or conveyance forpurposes that are inimical to the safety and security of the people or injurious to the interest of theState.

The accused or suspect may withdraw such sums as are reasonably needed by his familyincluding the services of his counsel and his familys medical needs upon approval of the court.He or she may also use any of his property that is under seizure or sequestration or frozenbecause of his/her indictment as a terrorist upon permission of the court for any legitimate

reason.

Sec.40. The seized, sequestered and frozen bank depositsshall be deemed property held intrust by the bank or financial institution and that their use or disposition while the case is pendingshall be subject to the approval of the court before which the case or cases are pending.

Sec.41. If the person suspected as terrorist is acquitted after arraignment or his case dismissedbefore his arraignment by a competent court, the seizureshall be lifted by the investigating bodyor the competent court and restored to him without delay. The filing of an appeal or motion forreconsideration shall not stay the release of said funds from seizure, sequestration and freezing.

If convicted, said seized, sequestered and frozen assets shall automatically forfeited in favor ofthe government.

CASES

UY VS BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 344 SCRA 36Search and SeizureRequisites of a Valid Search WarrantIn Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of UPC reported to the BIR that Uy Chin Ho aka Frank Uy,manager of UPC, was selling thousands of cartons of canned cartons without issuing a report. This is a violation ofSec 253 & 263 of the Internal Revenue Code. In Oct 1993, the BIR requested before RTC Cebu to issue a searchwarrant. Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a warrant on the same day. A second warrant was issued which contains thesame substance but has only one page, the same was dated Oct 1st 2003. These warrants were issued for thealleged violation by Uy of Sec 253. A third warrant was issued on the same day for the alleged violation of Uy ofSec 238 in relation to sec 263. On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of

the PNP, on 2 Oct 1993, searched the premises of the UPC. They seized, among other things, the records anddocuments of UPC. A return of said search was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. UPC filed a motion toquash the warrants which was denied by the RTC. They appealed before the CA via certiorari. The CA dismissedthe appeal for a certiorari is not the proper remedy.ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.HELD: The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a way for it ordered the return of the seized items but sustained thevalidity of the warrant. The SC ruled that the search warrant issued has not met some basic requisites of validity. Asearch warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions.These requirements, in outline form, are:

(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person;


3/50

(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainantand such witnesses as the latter may produce; and

(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.The SC noted that there has been inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched as indicated in thesaid warrants. Also the thing to be seized was not clearly defined by the judge. He used generic itineraries. Thewarrants were also inconsistent as to who should be searched. One warrant was directed only against Uy and theother was against Uy and UPC. The SC however noted that the inconsistencies wered cured by the issuance of thelatter warrant as it has revoked the two others.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against unreasonable searches andseizures:The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searchesand seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrestshall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath oraffirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to besearched and the persons or things to be seized.

NOTES:Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable causein connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination underoath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing theplace to be searched and the things to be seized.

SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personallyexamine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant andany witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their swornstatements together with any affidavits submitted.

PEOPLE VS COURT OF APPEALS, 291 SCRA 400The general rule is that search warrants must be served during the daytime (protect the public from theabrasiveness of official intrusions). Exception: a search at any reasonable hour of day or night may be made whenthe application asserts that the property in on the person or place ordered to be searched. Absence of abuse ofdiscretion, a search conducted at night where so allowed is not improperAbigails Variety Store VOID warrantthe claim that the place actually searched although not the one specifiedin the warrant is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant is unacceptable. What is

material in determining the validity of the warrant is the place stated in the warrant, not the one they had in theirthoughts; particularization of description may properly be done only by the judge and only in the warrant itself.

A petition for certiorari has been filed to invalidate the order of Judge Casanova which quashed search warrantissued by Judge Bacalla and declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant.An application for a search warrant was made by S/Insp Brillantes against Mr. Azfar Hussain who had allegedly inhis possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt 1207 Area F. Bagon Buhay Avenue, SarangPalay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. The following day Search Warrant No. 1068 was issued but was served notat Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent to Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of 4Pakistani nationals and the seizure of a number of different explosives and firearms.ISSUE: WON a search warrant was validly issued as regard the apartment in which private respondents were thenactually residing, or more explicitly, WON that particular apartment had been specifically described in the warrant.HELD: The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to

be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was tosubstitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers hadin their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a placedifferent from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although not that specifiedin the warrant is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in theirsupporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself,not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuingthe warrant.The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers' own personalknowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such achange is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe theplace to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of


4/50

choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door toabuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitutionhas precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properlybe done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officersconducting the search.

PEOPLE VS ARUTA, 288 SCRA 626

Search and SeizureInformers TipAs a general rule: Validity of warrantless searches and seizures as a result of an informers tipOn December 13, 1988, Olongapo Police received a tip regarding 8.5 kilos of marijuanaIn the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an informant named Benjiethat a certain Aling Rosa would be leaving for Baguio City on 14 Dec 1988 and would be back in the afternoon ofthe same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; At 6:30 in the evening of 14 Dec 1988, Aruta alightedfrom a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcementofficers; NARCOM officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; When asked by Lt.Abello about the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to him; When they opened the same, theyfound dried marijuana leaves; Aruta was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.ISSUE: Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is constitutional.HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some drug traffickers are being freed due to technicalities.Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just committed acrime. Aruta was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable

ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when theinformant pointed to Aruta and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled outas the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended Aruta were it not for the furtive finger of theinformant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them tosuspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. The SCcould neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonablesearch and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probablecause and warrantless arrests. Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect awarrantless search of Arutas bag, there being no probable cause and the accused -appellant not having beenlawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent searchwas similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonablesearch and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not beused as evidence against accused-appellant for these are fruits of a poisoned tree and, therefore, must be

rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.

NOTES:When is a warrantless search allowed?

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rulesof Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence;

2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present

in the pursuit of their official duties;b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, andd) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility

reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highlyreasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;4. Consented warrantless search;5. Customs search;6. Stop and Frisk; and7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

PEOPLE VS MONTILLA, 284 SCRA 703Political LawSearch and SeizureInformers Tip Warrantless ArrestDasmarinas, Cavite Police received a tip on June 19, 1994. The marijuana courier will alight at the waiting shed ofBarangay Salitran, Dasmarinas, Cavite, 28 kilos of marijuana.


5/50

On 19 June 1994 at about 2pm, police officers Talingting and Clarin were informed by an asset that a drug courierwould be arriving from Baguio to Dasmarias carrying an undetermined amount of marijuana. The next day, theinformant pointed at Montilla as the courier who was waiting in a waiting shed Brgy Salitran, Dasmarias. Montillawas then apprehended and he was caught in possession of a bag and a carton worth 28 kilos of marijuana. Montilladenied the allegation and he said he came to Cavite from Baguio for work and he does not have any effects withhim at that time except for some pocket money. He was sentenced to death thereafter. He averred that the searchand seizure conducted was illegal for there was no warrant and that he should have been given the opportunity tocross examine the informant. He said that if the informant has given the cops the information about his arrival as

early as the day before his apprehension, the cops should have ample time to secure a search warrant.ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted is legal.HELD: The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest is legal and so was the warrantless search. Sec 2 Art 3 of theConstitution has its exception when it comes to warrantless searches, they are:

(1) customs searches;(2) searches of moving vehicles,(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;(4) consented searches;(5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;(6) stop and frisk measures have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.

In the case at bar, it should be noted that the information relayed by informant to the cops was that there would bedelivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio in the early morning of June 20, 1994.Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time, this would be beside the point for, under thesecircumstances; the information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the

corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an indication that the informant knew the courier, the recordsdo not reveal that he knew him by name.On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant, assuming that theycould readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time they could make preparations forapplying therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented by the defense. In determining the opportunity forobtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstancesshould be considered, especially in rural areas.A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authorityto validly search and seize from the offender

(1) dangerous weapons, and(2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.

PEOPLE VS RACHO, GR186529On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for thepurchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team toapprehend the appellant. The team members posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora, andat around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, theconfidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to board atricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu.When he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened,yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. The team then brought appellant to the police station forinvestigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of appellant. The field test and laboratoryexaminations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetaminehydrochloride. Appellant was charged in two separate informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, fortransporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs. During

the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A.9165 but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed theRTC decision. The appellant brought the case to SC assailing for the first time he legality of his arrest and thevalidity of the subsequent warrantless search.ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant has a ground to assail the validity of his arrest.HELD: The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify awarrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate thathe has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. We find no cogent reason to departfrom this well-established doctrine. Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the policeofficers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrestedhad committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted


6/50

from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that wouldengender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intendingto commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant would not have beenapprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have beenconfiscated. Neither was the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with therequisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their officereceived the "tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only theappellants physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the

same day (May 19), there was an assurance that he would be there the following day(May 20). Clearly, the policehad ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.

PEOPLE VS CLAUDIO, 160 SCRA 646There is probable cause in the Warrantless search of a bag (behind him in a bus) by a NARCOM agent when heallegedly smelled marijuana therein. By reason of his training, he could smell marijuana and therefore, he haspersonal knowledge and therefore, probable cause was present making the search legal.

PEOPLE VS AMINNUDIN Y AHNI, JULY 6, 1988M/V Wilcon; marijuananot caught in flagrante delicto; search was unreasonable; evidence inadmissible.Tip received by the Iloilo City Police from informant in Zamboanga city that accused has marijuana in his bag doesnot amount to probable cause because the Iloilo Police have no personal knowledge. Further, there was plenty of

time to secure a search warrant from the court.

PEOPLE VS MALMSTEDT, 198 SCRA 401In an information filed against the accused- appellant Mikael Malmstead was charged before the RTC of LaTrinidad, Benguet, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as theDangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as atourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985. In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left forBaguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in thatplace for two (2) days. Then in the 7 in the morning of May 11, 1989, the accused went to Nangonogan bus stop inSagada. At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, theCommanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to

set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking allvehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted bypersistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs.Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning that a Caucasiancoming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers,in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in themorning and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accusedwho was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist tobe a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply,the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out tobe a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-

looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. Thewrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accusedstopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got thebags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that therewere bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bagsthat accused finally presented his passport.Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for furtherinvestigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also containhashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused andthe same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.


7/50

In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which is aderivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.ACCUSEDS DEFENSE: During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raisedthe issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOMofficers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted tohim by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to takethe same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the nextride and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.

The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt.Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused argues thatthe search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore, theprohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as evidence against him.ISSUE: Whether or Not the contention of the accused is valid, and therefore the RTC ruling be reversed.HELD: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers andeffects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawfularrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peaceofficer or a private person under the following circumstances.

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without awarrant, arrest a person:(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or isattempting to commit an offense;(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts

indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment orplace where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or hasescaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually beingcommitted by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effectsfalls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to alawful arrest. While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search wasmade over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficientprobable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet andprudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with theoffense are in the place sought to be searched. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been

declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanatedfrom a plastic bag owned by the accused, 10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and attempted toflee.The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby affirmed. Costs against the accused-appellant.

STONEHILL VS DIOKNO, JUNE 19, 1967General warrant for violation of CB Laws, TCC, NIRC and RPCSearch and SeizureGeneral WarrantsAbandonment of the Moncado DoctrineStonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have committed acts in violation of Central BankLaws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. By the strength of thisallegation a search warrant was issued against their persons and their corporation. The warrant provides authorityto search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to

seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, creditjournals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions includingdisbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into(2) major groups, namely:

a. those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations andb. those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for:(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;


8/50

(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filedagainst them;

(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to

be disposed of in accordance with law.The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured bypetitioners consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against them. In short,the criminal cannot be set free just because the government blunders.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid.HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail thevalidity of the search warrant issued against their corporation for Stonehill are not the proper party hence has nocause of action. It should be raised by the officers or board members of the corporation. The constitution protectsthe peoples right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but uponprobable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrantshall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant wasissued from mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and CustomsLaws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. In other words, no specific offense had been alleged insaid applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, itwas impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the samepresupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particularacts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, theapplications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal

heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code, as alleged in the aforementioned applications withoutreference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compoundedby the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, creditjournals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursementreceipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions ofStonehill et al, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure ofall records of Stonehill et al and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contraveningthe explicit command of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well astending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. The Moncado doctrine is likewise

abandoned and the right of the accused against a defective search warrant is emphasized.

BACHE VS RUIZ, 37 SCRA 823Search and SeizurePersonal Examination of the JudgeThe clerk of court received the evidence of the applicant for a search warrantOn 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz requesting theissuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all otherpertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner deLeon make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon andhis witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, bymeans of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After thesession had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read

to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned himthat if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz signedde Leons application for search warrant and Logronios deposition. The search was subsequently conducted. ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.

1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him todetermine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause.

2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruledin Stonehill Such is theseriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed searchwarrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a


9/50

search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connec tion with one specific offense. Notsatisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shallissue for more than one specific offense.

3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search WarrantUnregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursementsbooks, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts,promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting

and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records offoreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of theRevised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is asspecific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of lawby which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure or when the things described arelimited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

May a judge deputize his Clerk of Court to take the deposition of the applicant for a Search Warrant subject toclarificatory questions after his hearing in other cases?No. As held in Bache vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, the examination of the complainant ant the witnesses he mayproduce must be done personally by the judge. Otherwise, the warrant shall be void. As such, the SC held inPENDON VS. CA, November 16, 1990 that when the questions asked to the applicant for a search warrant was

pre-typed, the same is not valid since there could have been no searching questions.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS MARCOS, 76 SCRA 301Illegal possession of firearm and violation of CB LawsSearch and SeizureOn March 31, 1971, Amansec went to Baguio and passed by a house at 47 Ledesma Street, Baguio; he wasattracted by the sight of several persons inside the house; he peeped from outside the house and when the curtainwas moved he saw a Buddha that was inside the house; he observed what was going on inside the house and heheard someone say that the golden Buddha was actually for sale and when he observed them closer he overheardthat it was being offered for sale for 100,000 pesos by Rogelio Roxas; he saw the Buddha and firearms and somebullets inside the house. By these facts, Colonel Calano requested for a warrant from J Marcos at about 12midnight on Apr 4, 1971. Due to the urgency he issued the warrant. And eventually the golden Buddha and some

firearms were seized from Roxass house. Santos assailed the warrant averring that the search warrant was notlimited to one offense covering both illegal possession of firearms and violation of Central Bank rules andregulations; that it did not particularly describe the property to be seized; that he did not carefully examine underoath the applicant and his witnesses; that articles not mentioned were taken; and that thereafter the return and theinventory although appearing to have been prepared on said date were not actually submitted to respondent Judgeuntil April 13, 1971 and the objects seized delivered only about a week later on April 19.ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued by Judge Marcos is valid.HELD: The SC ruled in favor Judge Marcos and had basically affirmed the decision of appellate Judge Gatamaitan.Taking into consideration to nature of the articles so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detaileddescription could be given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof,The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law whoexecuted the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to Identify the articles in question, which hedid, so that here, since certainly, no one would be mistaken in Identifying the Buddha, whose image is well

known, and even the firearms and ammunition because these were those without permit to possess, and all locatedat 47 Ledesma St., Baguio City, so far as description was concerned, the search warrant perhaps could not be saidto have suffered fatal defects.

CASTRO VS PABALAN, April 30, l976The search warrant is implemented in an adjoining Barrio of Bangar, La UnionJudge Pabalan ordered the issuance of a search warrant despite failure of the application of Lumang or the warrantitself to specify the offense, to examine the applicant as well as his witnesses on the part of the Judge, and todescribe with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Judge never refuted the assertionswhen required to answer. Application alleged that applicants wee informed and claimed that they verified the reportthat Maria Castro and Co Ling are in possession of narcotics and other contraband in Barrio Padasil, Bangar, La


10/50

Union without specifying the particular place in the Barrio. No complete description of the goods and inquiry wasbrief. Upon actual search, it turned out that it was in Barrio Ma. Cristina and not in Padasil.ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant is validly issued.HELD: Search warrant issued illegal for violation of the 1935 Constitution and the Rules of Court because the twobasic requirements are not complied with: (a) no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, (b) the warrant shallparticularly describe the things to be seized, thus, a general warrant. However, things seized cannot be returnedand shall be destroyed, except the liquors, playing cards, distilled water and five bottles of Streptomycin.

ASIAN SURETY VS HERRERA, 52 SCRA 312Search warrant for estafa, falsification, tax evasion and insurance fraud is a general warrant despite two carloads ofevidence seized

May a Search Warrant be issued for the crimes of Search Warrant for estafa, falsification, tax evasion andinsurance fraud?No, such would be a general warrant and violates the rule that a warrant shall be issued for one (1) specificoffense. (Asian Surety vs. Herrera, 54 SCRA 312)

COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS VS VILLALUZ, June 18, 1976

VIDUYA VS BERDIAGO, 73 SCRA 553Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs lawmay effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.Respondent Berdiago is the owner of a Rolls Royce car, Model 1966, which arrived in the Port of Manila onJanuary 8, 1968. However, the petitioner, Jose Viduya, then Collector of Customs of Manila, obtained reliableintelligence that fraudulent documents were used by Berdiago in securing the release of the car from the Bureau ofCustoms, making it appear therein that the car was a 1961 model instead of a 1966 one, thus enabling respondentto pay a much lower customs duty.There was, accordingly, a formal demand for the payment of the sum to cover the deficiency, respondentmanifesting his willingness to do so but failing to live up to his promise. As the car was kept in a dwelling house atthe Yabut Compound, two officials of the Customs Police Service as duly authorized agents of petitioner, applied torespondent Judge for a warrant to search said dwelling house and to seize the Rolls Royce car found therein.Berdiago filed a motion to quash the search warrant issued by the court based on lack of probable cause to issue

the warrant. Collector Viduya opposed, alleging that Berdiago could not rely on the constitutional right againstunreasonable search and seizure because it was not shown that he owned the dwelling house which wassearched. Nonetheless, respondent Judge in the challenged order quashed such search warrant.ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the warrantHELD: The Court opined that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising policeauthority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement ofcustoms laws. There is justification then for the insistence on the part of private respondent that probable cause beshown. So respondent Judge found in issuing the search warrant.Apparently, he was persuaded to quash it when he noted that the warrant for seizure and detention came later thanits issuance. In thus acting, respondent Judge apparently overlooked that long before the search warrant wasapplied for, to be specific on April 15, 1968, the misdeclaration and underpayment was already noted and thatthereafter on April 24, 1968, private respondent himself agreed to make good the further amount due but not in thesum demanded.

As the car was kept in a dwelling house, petitioner through two of his officers in the Customs Police Service appliedfor and was able to obtain the search warrant. Had there been no such move on the part of petitioner, the dutiesexpressly enjoined on him by law assess and collect all lawful revenues, to prevent and suppress smuggling andother frauds and to enforce tariff and customs law would not have been performed.While therefore, it is to be admitted that his warrant of seizure and detention came later than the search warrant,there were indubitable facts in existence at that time to call for its issuance. Certainly there was probable cause.There was evidently need for the issuance of a search warrant. It ought not to have been thereafter quashed.

DIZON VS CASTRO, April 11, 1985


11/50

PEOPLE VS VELOSO, 48 PHIL 169parliamentary club - JOHN DOE WARRANTSValid IF the best description possible is given in the arrest warrant

it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is to be served by stating his occupation, personal appearance

or peculiarities, place of residence or other circumstances which he may be identified

In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an organization knownas the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the House of Representative of thePhilippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the club.-The police of Manila had reliable information that the

so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend,the chief of the gambling squad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, DetectiveAndres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant from JudgeGarduo of the municipal court. Thus provided, the police attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a little afterthree in the afternoon of the date above- mentioned. They found the doors to the premises closed and barred.Accordingly, one band of police including policeman Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a windowof the house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the outer door.-Once inside the Parliamentary Club,nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them was the defendant Veloso. Veloso askedTownsend what he wanted, and the latter showed him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend thathe was Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and thatthe police had no right to search the house. Townsendanswered that Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it contained gamblingutensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game. About five minutes was consumed inconversation between the policemen and the accused the policemen insisting on searching Veloso, and Veloso

insisting in his refusal to submit to the search.-At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policemanRosacker took hold of Veloso only to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gavehim a blow in another part of the body, which injured the policeman quite severely. Through the combined efforts ofTownsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte,cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.-All of the persons arrested were searched and thenconducted to the patrol wagons. Veloso again refusedto obey and shouted offensive epithets against the policedepartment. It was necessary for the policemen to conduct him downstairs. At the door, Veloso resisted sotenaciously that three policemen were needed to place him in the patrol wagon.ISSUE: WON the search warrant and the arrest of Veloso was valid.RULING: Yes. It is provided, among other things, in the Philipp ine Code on Criminal Procedure that a searchwarrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describingthe place to be searched and the person of thing to be seized. The name and description of the accused should beinserted in the body of the warrant and where the name is unknown there must be such a description of the personaccused as will enable the officer to identify him when found. A warrant for the apprehension of a person whosetrue name is unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in unknown," isvoid, without other and further descriptions of the person to be apprehended, and such warrant will not justify theofficer in acting under it. Such a warrant must, in addition, contain the best descriptio personae possible to beobtained of the person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate clearly theproper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his personal appearance andpeculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he canbe identified. In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described thebuilding to be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands." This, withoutdoubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched. As the search warrant stated that John Doe hadgambling apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila,and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as JoseMa. Veloso without difficulty

LUI VS MATILLANO, May 27, 2004

TWO KINDS OF PROBABLE CAUSE1. The executive determination of probable cause on whether a crime was allegedly committed and file a

criminal case in court; and2. Judicial determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION VS FARAJALLAH, GR 205800


12/50

LEVISTE VS ALAMEDA, GR 182677

BORLONGAN VS LIMSIACO, GR 143591

ROBERTS VS COURTS OF APPEALS, 254 SCRA 307

SKECHERS USA, INC. VS PACIFIC, GR 165412

SUSAN ESQUILLO VS PEOPLE, G.R. No. 182010, August 25, 2010Stop and Friskvalid exception to a Warrantless search and seizureIf the person who claims that he was illegally arrested did not question the validity of her Warrantless arrest beforeher arraignment nor moved to quash the information but raised said issues for the first time on appeal, the same isalready deemed waived.

LEVISTE VS JUDGE ALAMEDA, RTC MAKATI, G,.R. No. 182677, August 3, 2010There is no waiver of the illegality of the arrest if the accused refused to enter a voluntary plea during arraignment

and continued to question the validity of the preliminary investigation which resulted in the filing of the information incourt.

PEOPLE VS SPO3 SANGKI ARA, G.R. No. 185011, DECEMBER 23, 2009Buy-bust operation in front of St. Peters College in Toril, Davao City resulted in 25.6563 grams of shabu

GENERAL OR ROVING WARRANTS

NOTE: In TAMBASEN VS. PEOPLE, July 14, 1995 and People vs. CA, 216 SCRA 101, the Supreme Courtdescribed a search warrant for estafa, robbery, theft and qualified theft was described as SCATTER-SHOTWARRANT

PENDON VS CA, Nov. 16, 1990When the questions asked by the judge to the applicant are pre-typed, the search warrant is not valid since therecould have been no searching questionsBased on the application and joint deposition, a search warrant was issued against Siao and the same complaintwas filed against petitioner for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioner contends that the application for thesearch warrant and the joint deposition of witnesses failed to fulfill the requirements prescribed by the Constitution

on the ground that probable cause was not personally determined.ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the said warrant is valid.HELD: No, Probable cause must be personally determined by the judge after examination under oath of thecomplainant and the witnesses he may produce before the issuance of a search warrant.

PROBABLE CAUSE; WHO DETERMINES PROBABLE CAUSE

VICENTE LIM VS HON. FELIX


13/50

Warrant of arrest issued by the RTC Makati based on the Resolution and the Information filed by the Fiscal is notvalid since the record of the case with the affidavits of witnesses is still in Masbate

AMARGA VS ABBAS, 98 PHIL. 739

QUINTERO VS NBI, 162 SCRA 467 [Searching parties searched different rooms simultaneously thereby resultingin no witnesses in the other rooms searched, the search is not valid]

SOLIVEN & BELTRAN VS MAKASIAR, NOVEMBER 18, 1988 (Note: widely criticized)There is no need for the judge to examine the complainant and the witnesses face to face in order to determineprobable cause. It is enough that he shall personally examine the affidavits of the complainant and the witnessesand if he is convinced that there is probable cause, he can validly issue the warrant of arrestIn these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied dueprocess when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima faciecase was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or notthe constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest withoutpersonally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent eventshave rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners'motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal'sfinding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran wasdenied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through theExecutive Secretary,affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by

theExecutive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have beendenied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.ISSUES: (1) Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed againstthem although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justiceand, subsequently, by the President.(2) Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrantfor his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable causeHELD: With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminaryinvestigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to DeclareProceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process oflaw does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file hiscounter-affidavits before the preliminaryinvestigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given theopportunity to submitcounter-affidavits if he is so minded.

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on theissuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effectsagainst unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall beinviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to bedetermined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainantand the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and thepersons or things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparentlyconvinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainantand his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not anaccurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himselfof the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of awarrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Followingestablished doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documentssubmitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant ofarrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require thesubmission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence ofprobable cause.Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination andinvestigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to theissuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction


14/50

cannot be sustained. The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravelyabused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed forcannot issue.WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of thepublic respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. TheOrder to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiteratedin the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.

PEOPLE VS VILLANUEVA, 110 SCRA 465The judge may validly refuse to issue warrants of arrest if he believes that there is no probable cause to for theirissuance; despite the findings of probable cause by the filing Prosecutor since that was for purposes of filing only.

TOLENTINO VS VILLALUZ, JULY 27,1987

CRUZ VS GATAN, 74 SCRA 226

OLAES VS PEOPLE, 155 SCRA 486

GERONIMO VS RAMOS, 136 SCRA 435Warrants of arrest issued in 70 plus cases against several accused after less than 1 hour from receipt of therecords of the cases are not valid. Judge could not have determined probable cause in so short a time

JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR, ET AL., G.R.NO. 92163, June 5, 1990Warrant of arrest issued against Senator Enrile after1 hour and 20 minutes from receipt of the records of the caseconsisting of several thousands of pages is valid. There is no need to read all the affidavits or evidence therein. It issufficient that he is convinced of the existence of probable cause.

WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES--WHEN VALID OR NOT; WHETHER "OPERATION KAPKAP" ISVALID; WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF ALLEGED OBSCENE MAGAZINES

PEOPLE VS MENGOTE, G.R. No. 87059, June, 1992Arrest without warrant because of a bulging tummy which looks like a gun tucked therein is not valid. There wasneither personal knowledge nor probable cause.The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious lookingpersons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of

plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, oneof whom holding his abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereuponthe two tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were thensearched. One of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while hiscompanion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to the policeheadquarters for investigation. An information was filed before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal possessionof firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported tothe police including the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that hewas licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest. Hewas convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that theweapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of apoisonous tree.Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.

Held: An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any proceeding for anypurpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of Court, provides arrestwithout warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting tocommit an offense, (b) when the offense in fact has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of thefacts indicating the person arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a penalestablishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, orhas escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accusedappellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen, according to the arresting officersthemselves. There was apparently no offense that has just been committed or was being actually committed or atleast being attempt by Mengote in their presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a broaddaylight or on a busy street on unexplained suspicion.


15/50

Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted.

PEOPLE VS GO, 354 SCRA 338Search of a gun which could be seen tucked in the waist of the accused in a nightclub is valid. Likewise, thesachets of shabu seen on the front seat of the car of the accused when he opened the car are admissible under theplain view doctrine.

MANALILI VS PEOPLE, October 9, 1997

The policemen saw several suspicion-looking men at dawn and when they approached said persons, they ran butwere caught. The unlicensed firearm confiscated after the policemen search them is admissible.Narcotics officers were doing surveillance and chanced upon the accused in a cemetery who seemed to be high ondrugs. He tried to resist the police officers and upon inquiry, found that the accused was possessing whatseemed to be crushed marijuana leaves.HELD: A stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen onthe street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapons. It has been held as one of the exceptions to the general ruleagainst searches without warrant.

PEOPLE VS DEL ROSARIO, July 10, 1994The policemen gave P100.00 to the informant to buy marijuana from the accused. After he returned with themarijuana, the policemen went to arrest the accused. The arrest is not valid since the same does not fall underSection 5 Rule 113. They have no personal knowledge.Accused was charged and convicted by the tr ial court of illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession and

sale of drugs, particularly methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance of the search warrant, which authorizedthe search and seizure of an undetermined quantity of methamphetamine and its paraphernalias, an entrapmentwas planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu, its paraphernalias and of a .22caliber pistol with 3 live ammunition.ISSUE: Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper.HELD: No, Section 2, Article III of the constitution specifically provides that a search warrant must particularlydescribe the things to be seized. In herein case, the only objects to be seized that the warrant determined was themethamphetamine and the paraphernalias therein. The seizure of thefirearms was unconstitutional.Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted.

MALACAT VS CA, 283 SCRA 159Mere suspicions by the police are not sufficient to validate a Warrantless search and seizure or Warrantless arrest.On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo

Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3,Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard,Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-lookingmen, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of stop and frisk,where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest and whose o bjectis either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information ; and thatthe seizure of the grenade from Malacat was incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty ofthe crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penaltyof not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than 30 years ofReclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a notice of appeal indicating that he wasappealing to the Supreme Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-GRCR 15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petitionfor review with the Supreme Court. These men were acting suspiciously with their eyes moving very fast. Yu and

his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about 30 minutes. Thepolice officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gavechase, Yu caught up with and apprehended Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized, inasmuch as allegedlythe previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2 others attempt todetonate a grenade). Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside the latters frontwaist line. Yus companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliberrevolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then brought to Police Station 3 where Yu placed an X mark atthe bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade heallegedly recovered from Malacat. On 30 August 1990, Malacat was charged with violating Section 3 of PresidentialDecree 1866. At arraignment on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of notguilty. Malacat denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several otherpolice officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing


16/50

was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented. In its decision dated 10 February 1994but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of Malacat wasakin to aISSUE: Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of stop and frisk.HELD: The general rule regarding arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validlyeffect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to thoseeffected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, theseare found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated

under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one in flagrante delicto, while that under Section 5(b) has beendescribed as a hot pursuit arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following:(1) customs searches;(2) search of moving vehicles;(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;(4) consent searches;(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and(6) a stop and frisk.

The concepts of a stop-and-frisk and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest must not be confused. These twotypes of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effectedand in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validityof the incidental search. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding thesearch in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, onthe part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be

committed. Plainly, the search conducted on Malacat could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. On theother hand, while probable cause is not required to conduct a stop and frisk, it neverthe less holds that meresuspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop and frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officersexperience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealedabout him. Finally, a stop-and-frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime preventionand detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in anappropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even withoutprobable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer totake steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that couldunexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the stop-and-frisk was invalid: First, there is grave doubts as to Yusclaim that Malacat was a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier. This claim isneither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased

that group. Second, there was nothing in Malacats behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited evenmere suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast an observation which leaves us increduloussince Yu and his teammates were nowhere near Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk.Malacat and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble.Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed with a deadly weapon.None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered inside the front waistline ofMalacat, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge, assuming thatMalacat was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatantviolations of Malacats rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.

PITA VS CA, 178 SCRA 362Requisites before the Mayor could confiscate magazines which are allegedly obscene.On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon

D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District,INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstandowners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to beobscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt alongC.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of variousstudent organizations. Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines publishedand co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against MayorBagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking toenjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from preventing the sale orcirculation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per seobscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the


17/50

press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminateseizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition forpreliminary injunction. The Court granted the temporary restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapseof the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.ISSUE: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner.HELD: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from pornographicliterature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers ofobscene publications. However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the pictures here in question were used

not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutionalprotection. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged asobscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands apublication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary andcommon sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend uponthe circumstances of the case and that the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense ofthe community reached by it." The government authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof tojustify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order:(1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by wayof a search warrant. The court provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from ajudge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that;

1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene and pose aclear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action;

2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to be resolved on

a case-to-case basis and on the judges sound discretion;

WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE BY A PRIVATE PERSON

PEOPLE VS MENDOZA, 301 SCRA 66

SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL VS SOLUTA, 482 SCRA 660

PEOPLE VS ANDRE MARTI, G.R. 81561, January 18, 1991Andre Marti and his wife went to Manila Packing and Export Forwarders, carrying with them four gift wrappedpackages to be delivered to his friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes (wife of the proprietor) asked if she couldinspect the packages, however, Marti refused assuring that it only contained books, cigars and gloves as gift to his

friend.Before delivery to Bureau of Customs/Posts, the proprietor Job Reyes, following standard operating procedure,opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened Marti's boxes, a particular odor emitted therefrom and hesoon found out that the boxes contained dried marijuana leaves. He reported the incident to the NBI whoacknowledged custody of the incident. Marti was convicted for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as theDangerous Drugs Act.ISSUE: Marti contends that the evidence had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights againstunreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication.HELD: Evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in aprivate capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. In the absence of governmentalinterference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. Mere presence ofNBI agents does not convert it to warrantless search and siezure. Merely to look at that which is plain sight is notsearch. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed is not search.

VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE:1. SEARCHES MADE INCIDENTAL TO A VALID ARREST

NOLASCO VS PANO, 139 SCRA 541One who was arrested on board a passenger jeepney may not be brought to her residence and then search thesame. That could not be considered as search incidental to a valid arrest.Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group (CSG).Milagros had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6,1984. At noon of the same day, her premises were searched and 428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2boxes were seized.


18/50

Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Pao issued a search warrant to be served at Aguilar-Roques leased residenceallegedly an underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents seized, charges of subversionand rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the fiscals office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegalpossession of subversive materials. Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it wasillegally obtained and that the search warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficientlydescribe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not beenproperly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applican ts witness.ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid?

HELD: No, Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. Italso specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by theJudge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation ofthe complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and thethings to be seized.It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguelydescribed and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes everything conceivable regardingthe Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversivebooks and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversiveor to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team asto what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles theyshould seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular

description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description wereconsidered null and void for being too general.

PEOPLE VS BURGOS, 144 SCRA 1The arrest of an alleged NPA member while plowing his field is not valid since he is not committing a crime.Likewise, the consent for the search for unlicensed firearm given by his wife is not valid.Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities stating that he was forcibly recruited byaccused Ruben Burgos (D) as member of the NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm against his life, if herefused. Pursuant to this information, PC-INP members went to the house of the Burgos (D) and saw him plowinghis field when they arrived. One of the arresting offices called Burgos (D) and asked him about the firearm. At first,Burgos (D) denied having any firearm, but later, Burgos's (D) wife pointed to a place below their house where a gunwas buried in the ground.After recovery of said firearm, Burgos (D) pointed to a stock pile of cogon where the officers recovered alleged

subversive documents. Burgos (D) further admitted that the firearm was issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, teamleader of sparrow unit.ISSUE: Is the warrantless arrest valid? Is the warrantless search valid?HELD: No, Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, oris about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed inhis presence or within his view. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, itcame in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by thewife of Burgos (D).In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believethat the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first.That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime mayhave been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable

ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.In this case,

Date post:	02-Jun-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	thedoodlbot
View:	247 times
Download:	3 times

Search and Seizure Digests

Documents