Sec Reply Summary Judgment Helen Bagley Show_temp[2]

8/7/2019 Sec Reply Summary Judgment Helen Bagley Show_temp[2]

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JOHN M. McCOY III, Cal. Bar No. 166244E-mail: [email protected] MATTESON, Cal. Bar No. 102103E-mail: [email protected] M. WHITE, Cal. Bar No. 171448E-mail: [email protected]

Attorneys for PlaintiffSecurities and Exchange CommissionRosalind R. Tyson, Regional Director5670 Wilshire Boulevard, 11th FloorLos Angeles, California 90036-3648Telephone: (323) 965-3998Facsimile: (323) 965-3908

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEVADA

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGECOMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CMKM DIAMONDS, INC., URBANCASAVANT, JOHN EDWARDS,GINGER GUTIERREZ, JAMESKINNEY, ANTHONY TOMASSO,KATHLEEN TOMASSO, 1STGLOBAL STOCK TRANSFER LLC,HELEN BAGLEY, NEVWESTSECURITIES CORPORATION,DARYL ANDERSON, SERGEYRUMYANTSEV, ANTHONYSANTOS, and BRIAN DVORAK,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:08-cv-00437-LRH-RJJ

REPLY IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF MOTION BY PLAINTIFFSECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS 1ST

GLOBAL STOCK TRANSFERLLC AND HELEN BAGLEY

Case 2:08-cv-00437-LRH -RJJ Document 175 Filed 01/28/11 Page 1 of 19


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I. INTRODUCTIONDefendants 1

st

Global Stock Transfer LLC (1

st

Global) and its principal,Helen Bagley (Bagley) oppose the motion by Plaintiff Securities and Exchange

Commission (Commission) for summary judgment on several grounds, none of

which is sufficient to defeat the motion. First, they argue that the Commission

must show that the Defendants conduct is unreasonable, notwithstanding that

they are securities professionals, and Section 5 is a strict liability provision.

Second, they essentially argue that blind reliance on an attorneys opinion letters is

reasonable without establishing the elements for a reliance on professionals

defense, or addressing the undisputed facts presented by the Commission and

admitted to by Bagley. Specifically, notwithstanding the strict liability nature of a

Section 5 violation, Bagleys admissions establish the unreasonableness of her

conduct in simply taking the restrictive legends off the certificates based on

opinion letters by Defendant attorney Brian Dvorak (Dvorak). Bagley admits

that nothing this company [Defendant CMKM] did made sense to me, including

CMKMs assertion that it had failed to issue 279 billion of its purportedly

outstanding shares, that she may have wondered whether CMKMs assertion was

actually true, and that she did not feel comfortable with Dvorak but nevertheless

relied on his opinions, even though she thought it strange that CMKM had so many

shares. (See Statement of Facts filed by the Commission in support of its summary

judgment motion (Facts) (Docket No. 161-2) 46-47 & 49-50.)

Additionally, like Rumyantsev, Bagley attempts to persuade the Court that

there are genuine issues of fact by introducing facts purporting to show that there

are several bad acts she did notperform in connection with the offering. Like

Rumyantsev, however, she fails to cite to any authority which requires that the

Commission prove a particular set of facts in order to establish that she and her



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firm were necessary participants and substantial factors in the enormous

offering of unregistered CMKM stock, or that the undisputed facts are, as a matterof law, insufficient to establish her liability.

II. ARGUMENTAs the Commission previously explained in its moving papers, it does not

have a very heavy burden to make itsprima facie case that Bagley and 1st

Global

violated Section 5. It need merely show that (1) no registration statement was in

effect as to the securities; (2) the defendants, directly or indirectly, sold or offered

to sell the securities; and (3) the sale or offer was made through interstate

commerce or the mails. SEC v. Phan, 500 F.3d 895, 902 (9th

Cir. 2007). As

further explained, the second element may be satisfied by establishing that the

Defendants were necessary participants or substantial factors in the

unregistered distribution of CMKM stock. Id. at 906; SEC v. Murphy 626 F.2d

633, 648 & 652 (9th

cir. 1980).

Not surprisingly, Bagley and 1st Global seek to impose a greater burden on

the Commission than the Ninth Circuit in fact requires. They also seek to argue

that their status as a transfer agent and its principal essentially frees them from any

liability for violating Section 5, a proposition for which there is no support.

A. Bagley Has Not Presented Any Genuine Issue Of Material FactThat She Violated Section 5

The undisputed facts establishing that Bagley and 1st

Global were necessary

participants and substantial factors in the multi-billion share unregistered offering

of CMKM stock are simple. These Defendants admit that from December 2002

through September 2004, on numerous occasions, they issued billions of shares of

unrestricted CMKM stock in certificate form without a restrictive legend to numerous

individuals and entities. (Facts 39.) By removing the restrictive legends from the



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stock certificates, Bagley and 1st

Global enabled the stock to be freely traded.

Because the previously restricted stock was unregistered, and these Defendantsremoval of the restrictive legends enabled it to be freely traded, these Defendants

were necessary participants and substantial factors in the overall scheme to make

the multibillion share offering of unregistered CMKM stock to the public.

1. It Is Undisputed That Unregistered CMKM Stock WasOffered And Sold

As a threshold matter, these Defendants argue that the Commission has not

established that there were specific offers and sales of stock; they do not, however,

present evidence that no offers or sales occurred. (Opposition at 18-19.) Among

other things, they argue that no effort was made by the Commission to link trading

activity by Defendant Edwards to particular issuances of shares by the transfer

agent Defendants to Edwards. This argument of course ignores the key undisputed

fact that 1st

Global served as CMKMs Transfer Agent at all relevant times,

beginning in 2002 (Facts 6; see also Declaration of Helen Bagley in support of

Opposition to Commissions motion (Bagley Declaration) 3.) There was no

other transfer agent; the restrictive legends were removed by 1st

Global and

Bagley. Bagley and 1st

Global admitted in their Answer that from December 2002

through September 2004, on numerous occasions, they issued billions of CMKM

shares in certificate form without restrictive legend (Facts 39), and that Bagley

caused 1st

Global to issue substantial numbers of stock certificates without

restrictive legends in late 2002 and 2003, purportedly based on attorney opinion

letters. (Facts 45.)

Once a restrictive legend is removed, the stock is freely tradable. This is, of

course, the entire purpose of removing the legend, and of Defendants scheme.

Once the restrictive legend was removed by Bagley, the unregistered stock became



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indistinguishable from other freely trading CMKM stock.

Without citation, Bagley and 1

st

Global argue that the Commission musttrace the billions of shares of unregistered stock they caused to be dumped into the

market from the original certificates restricting the shares issuance, to their

removal of the legends, to Defendant Edwards offering and selling those specific

shares through Defendant broker-dealer NevWest. This is not the law. For

example, in SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633 (1980), the Ninth Circuit granted the

Commissions motion for summary judgment that Defendant was liable for

violating Section 5 notwithstanding that no one knows how many offerees were

contacted on any of the offerings. Id. at 645. InMurphy, the defendant was

arguing that the offering was exempt from registration as a private offering. Id.

Once the Commission had presented evidence that there was no control placed on

the number of offerees, it was incumbent upon Murphy, in opposing summary

judgment, to rebut that evidence. Id. Without introducing evidence on the number

of offerees, Murphy could not satisfy even the small burden imposed on a party

resisting summary judgment. Id.

Bagley admits she issued 279 billion unrestricted CMKM shares that had

previously been labelled restricted. (Facts 43 & 46.) This was over one-third of

the total amount of outstanding CMKM shares. (Id. 43.) It is undisputed that

Defendant broker-dealer NevWest received stock certificates from 1st

Global, that it

contacted Bagley and/or 1st

Global to verify that the certificates were validly issued

and unrestricted, and that Bagley and/or 1st

Global vouched for the subject stock

certificates. (Facts 52-53.) It is undisputed that Defendant Edwards hand-delivered

to NevWest newly issued stock certificates (Facts 57-58), that those newly issued

certificates can only have been issued by 1st

Global because it was the transfer agent,

that Edwards sold CMKM stock through more than 30 different brokerage accounts



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(Facts 62), and that Edwards was liquidating his position in CMKM. (Facts 59.)

Of course, as a broker-dealer, NevWest offered and sold shares to an unrestrictednumber of offerees in interstate commerce; that was their business.

Bagleys argument is opaque. It is not clear whether she is arguing that the

previously restricted shares she caused to be disseminated as freely trading shares

were somehow exempt from registration. If she is, she has the burden of proof to

establish she is entitled to an exemption; furthermore, such exemptions are

construed narrowly. SEC v. Platforms Wireless Intl Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1086

(9th

Cir. 2010), citing SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d at 641. For example, if she were

to assert the private offering exemption, as Murphy did, she would be required to

establish that the exemption was met not only with respect to each purchaser, but

with respect to each offeree. SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d at 645. Contrary to

Bagleys suggestion, however, the reverse is not true; the Commission is not

required to prove every offer and/or sale. Rather, once the Commission introduced

evidence that there was no control placed on the number of offerees, a factor in

determining whether the private offering exemption exists, the burden shifted to

the defendant to rebut that evidence. Id.

Here, Bagley has not even suggested what exemption would apply. Newly

issued unrestricted CMKM shares were delivered to NevWest, a broker-dealer, and

sold by Defendant Edwards, who was liquidating his CMKM holdings.

Defendants Bagley and First Global were necessary participants and substantial

factors in that distribution.1

1To the extent Bagley and 1

stGlobal argue that they may have a defense

based upon opinion letters of counsel (Opposition at 18-19), they are confused asto who has the burden of proof. Contrary to their suggestion, it is not theCommission who has the burden to prove which issuances were based on theopinion letters of Dvorak, but the Defendants who have the burden of showingeach of the elements of a reliance on counsel defense. See SEC v. Goldfield Deep

Mines Co. of Nevada, 758 F.2d 459, 467 (9th

cir. 1985). Moreover, even if the



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2. The Additional Facts Asserted By 1st Global And Bagley DoNot Controvert That They were Necessary Participants AndSubstantial Factors In The Unregistered Offering

Like Rumyantsev, 1st

Global and Bagley seek to argue that there are genuine

issues of fact precluding a finding of liability by presenting a laundry list of bad

acts that they did notengage in, and that the Commission never claimed they

engaged in. These include the facts set forth in paragraphs 5-8 &11-12 of the

Defendants Separate Statement Of Undisputed Facts (Defendants Facts). That

they ever personally owned CMKM stock, for example, is not something the

Commission ever alleged; nor is it a required element for Section 5 liability.

Much of the remainder of the Defendants Facts purports to address

Bagleys level of knowledge. (Defendants Facts 8-9, 13-15.) Some of the

Facts are argument, or set forth Bagleys own legal opinions, and are therefore

inadmissible. (Id. 14-15 & 24.) Others clearly support the Commissions

Statement of Facts, including that the Defendants simply relied on opinion letters.

(Id. 16-23, 26-27, 29-31 & 33-34.) The Defendants reliance on opinion letters,

notwithstanding Bagleys view that nothing CMKM did made sense to her and

her distrust of Dvorak, is addressed below.

Bagley also cites to thirty-two pages of Dvoraks testimony in purported

support of the assertion that Dvorak fully investigated the factual claims

underlying his opinions. (Defendants Facts 32.) In fact, Dvorak testifies,

among other things, that he did not receive cancelled checks he requested (Ex. 1,

121:18-122:1), and that he did not recall or know certain facts (id. 123-124). It is

difficult to ascertain why the Defendants believe that their overbroad factual

Commission were to prove the date of offer or sale, this would not establish whenthe restrictive legend was removed.



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assertion is supported by these thirty pages, some of which are specifically cited by

the Commission because they support its claims that Dvorak acted recklessly.Bagley also sets forth a fact which is not helpful to her, and which helps

establish her liability. She explains that:

From a stock transfer agents perspective, the most common type oftransaction that might raise the issue of securities law compliance isthe request from a shareholder to remove a restrictive legend from acertificate and reissue a certificate without restrictive legend.

(Id. 14.) The remainder of the paragraph is objectionable, however, as it appears

to constitute her own expert opinion as to whether she acted as other stock transfer

agents do, and whether her own conduct was legally sufficient to constitute a

defense to her liability.

Bagley also tries to blame the Commission by asserting that At no time did

any representative of the SEC ever raise issues regarding the content of the opinion

letters, or that issuance of shares without a restrictive legend may violate Section

5. (Defendants Facts 25.) Not only is this Fact objectionable because it has

no legal relevance, but it is also obviously untrue, as the Commission filed this

action against Bagley.2

Finally, Bagley seeks to contest the appropriateness of the injunctive relief

sought by the Commission by asserting that she is not presently involved in the

stock transfer business and does not intend to be in the future. (Defendants Facts

3-4.) For the reasons explained in the Commissions Reply regarding its motion

as to Rumyantsev, (Docket No. 164 at 9-12), such assertions are insufficient to

defeat the Commissions request for injunctive relief. Bagley also inserts an

irrelevant paragraph that she paid back a loan from Defendant Edwards, even

2The Commission objects to paragraph 35, that the trading volume

skyrocketed after Edwards & Angell were retained, as irrelevant.



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though the Commission does not seek disgorgement of that loan. (Id. 10.)

3. It Is Undisputed That The Defendants Knew Or Had

Reason To Know That An Illegal Distribution Would Occur

Most of the Opposition is devoted to arguing that (1) transfer agents are

virtually never sued for violating the federal securities laws; and (2) the

Commission was required to prove that Bagley and 1st

Global knew or had reason

to know that an unregistered distribution would occur in connection with the

transactions pending before them. (See Opposition at 5.) The first argument is

completely irrelevant to these Defendants liability although it does highlight the

egregiousness of their illegal conduct in facilitating the distribution of 279 billion

shares of unregistered stock. The second argument simply does not help Bagley or

1st

Global. Although the Commission does not concede that it has a burden to

prove that these Defendants knew or had reason to know the likely consequences

of their acts, even if it does have such a burden, the Commission has satisfied it.

The Defendants rely heavily on the SEC Staff Reply inDefrees, Fisk,

Voland, Alberts & Hoffman, [1971-72 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 78,745

(April 12, 1972).3

This is not a pronouncement by the Commission itself; it is a

staff response to a letter. Additionally, the Defendants choose to emphasize the

language that if the agent knows or has reason to know an illegal distribution

would occur it should take appropriate steps to forestall it. They ignore, however,

the preceding language in that paragraph that:[T]he particular procedures a company and its transfer agent may wishto adopt concerning the removal of restrictive legends in the contextof sales pursuant to rule 144 is within the discretion of those partiesand the responsibility for the effectiveness of those procedures lieswith them.

3For the Courts convenience, a copy ofDefrees is attached as Exhibit 1.



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(See Opposition at 5 [emphasis supplied].) Notably, this language would appear to

impose an affirmative duty on both the issuer, CMKM, and its transfer agent, 1

st

Global, to make sure that their procedures are effective in preventing an illegal

distribution.

The Defendants also ignore the remainder of the Staff Reply, which sets

forth the text of the Letter of Inquiry prompting that Reply, including what the

writers represent is typical procedure for removing restrictive legends from Rule

144 stock. That procedure does not resemble what occurred in this case.

First, the writers explain the conditions under which issuers would be

allowed to remove the restrictive legends:

We interpret the Rule to allow the issuer to remove legends andstop transfer instructions if the issuer has filed its period reports, thetwo year period has elapsed, and the other conditions of Rule 144have been complied with. . . .

Defrees, 78,745 at p. 81,554 [emphasis supplied]. Here, it is undisputed that

CMKM was not filing its required periodic reports. (See Facts 86.) Additionally,

this was not a situation where Bagley verified that the two year restricted period

had elapsed; to the contrary, she admits she may have wondered whether it was

actually true that the 279 billion shares were outstanding and should have been

issued two years earlier. (See Facts 47.)

The writers also explain that the physical removal of the restrictive legends

from the stock certificates may take thirty to sixty days, and in some events had

been known to take six months:

This delay is attributable to the typical routine, which is that thesecurity holders attorney must give an opinion, the opinion must bereviewed and approved by counsel of the issuer, and then the newsecurities must be physically reissued.

Defrees, 78,745 at p. 81,554 [emphasis supplied]. In this case, the opinion letter



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was not issued by the holder of the Rule 144 stock and reviewed by issuers

counsel. Rather, only one attorney was involved, and that was counsel to theissuer, Dvorak. Clearly, the procedure employed by Bagley was not the careful

one employed by the writers to whom the staff was responding inDefrees.

Notwithstanding all of her legal arguments that she and her company should

not be held liable unless the Commission proves that she knew or had reason to

know that an unregistered distribution would occur when she removed the

restrictive legends from the stock certificates, Bagley has not disputed the facts

presented by the Commission which establish that they in fact not only had reason

to know, but acted with scienter. In particular, Bagley:

(1) Issued the shares notwithstanding that nothing this company did

made sense to me, including CMKMs assertion that it had failed to

issue 279 billion of its purportedly outstanding shares. (Facts 46.)

(2) Never asked anyone whether it was actually true that the 279 billion

shares were outstanding and should have been issued two years

earlier, instead relying solely on attorney opinion letters, including by

Dvorak, notwithstanding that she apparently wondered whether the

shares were truly outstanding. (Facts 47.)

(3) Relied on Dvoraks opinion letters notwithstanding that she had

previously learned from a Commission examiner that certain other

opinion letters issued by a different attorney regarding CMKM were

incorrect, causing her to request corrected letters. (Facts 48.)

(4) Relied on Dvoraks opinion letters notwithstanding that she just did

not like him, and did not feel comfortable, to the point where, at

the end of the relevant period, she asked that any opinions from

Dvorak go through another attorney hired by CMKM. (Facts 49.)



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(5) Thought it strange that CMKM had so many shares. (Facts 50.)

Contrary to Bagleys assertions, simply requiring CMKM to submit Dvoraksopinion letters to another attorney after June 2004 did not render her conduct any

more reasonable. (See Bagley Declaration 20.) First, this does not address the

problems raised by her purported reliance on Dvoraks opinion letters prior to June

2004. Second, the representative July 27, 2004, letter from the second law firm,

which Bagley attaches to her Declaration as Exhibit 2, explicitly states that we

have relied upon opinions dated July 20, 2004 of Dvorak & Associates, Ltd., and

makes certain other key assumptions before rendering an opinion that the shares

need bear no restrictive legend.

There is no evidence that Bagley took the simple step of checking the

Commissions public EDGAR system in order to determine whether a registration

statement had been filed for any of the billions of shares from which she was

removing restrictive legends. Nor is there evidence that she was induced to issue

the unrestricted shares by a representation that the shares were registered, or that

she was provided with false registration statements by CMKM or anyone else, as

was the case with regard to the transfer agent in SEC v. Diversified Corporate

Consulting Group, 378 F.3d 1219, 1222 & n.9 (11th

Cir. 2004), which Bagley cites.

Finally, Bagleys suggestion that she was required timely to issue the

certificates without restrictive legend by Commission regulations and Nevada State

law and therefore cannot be held liable for violating Section 5 is tortured and facially

absurd. (See Opposition at 7-10.) Nothing in federal or state law requires a transfer

agent to act in violation of another law Section 5. Indeed, there would be no

purpose to having transfer agents if they are required to simply transfer ownership of

shares without any regard to whether such transfer is legally proper. Additionally,

that others, such as the issuer and attorneys who write opinion letters, also have legal



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responsibilities does not render Section 5 inapplicable to transfer agents.

In short, Bagley has not presented any genuine issue of material fact or crediblelegal argument that would preclude her from being held liable under Section 5.

B. Bagley Has Not Presented Any Genuine Issue Of Material Fact AsTo The Appropriateness Of The Disgorgement Sought

Bagley asserts that genuine issues exist regarding disgorgement.

(Opposition at 21-22.) However, she presents no actual evidence to refute the

reasonableness of the Commissions approximation of her ill-gotten gains,

notwithstanding that the burden has shifted to her to demonstrate that the

disgorgement figure was not a reasonable approximation. SEC v. Platforms

Wireless, 617 F.3d at 1096. If the monies received from other defendants are truly

not related to CMKM, Bagley would presumably easily be able to establish this

fact. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, the burden is placed on the defendants

because they are more likely than the SEC to have access to evidence

demonstrating that the Commissions approximation is not reasonable; for this

reason, the risk of uncertainty should fall on the wrongdoer whose illegal conduct

created that uncertainty. Id. [citation omitted.]

III. CONCLUSIONFor the reasons stated, the Commissions motion for summary judgment

should be granted.

Dated: January 27, 2011 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Karen MattesonKaren MattesonAttorney for PlaintiffSecurities and Exchange Commission



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PROOF OF SERVICE

I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to this action. My business address is:

[X] U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 5670 WilshireBoulevard, 11th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90036-3648Telephone No. (323) 965-3998; Facsimile No. (323) 965-3908.

On January 28, 2011, I caused to be served the document entitled REPLY INFURTHER SUPPORT OF MOTION BY PLAINTIFF SECURITIES ANDEXCHANGE COMMISSION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINSTDEFENDANTS 1

STGLOBAL STOCK TRANSFER LLC AND HELEN

BAGLEY on all the parties to this action addressed as stated on the attached servicelist:

[X] OFFICE MAIL: By placing in sealed envelope(s), which I placed for

collection and mailing following ordinary business practices. I am readilyfamiliar with this agencys practice for collection and processing ofcorrespondence for mailing; such correspondence would be deposited withthe U.S. Postal Service on the same day in the ordinary course of business.

[ ] PERSONAL DEPOSIT IN MAIL: By placing in sealedenvelope(s), which I personally deposited with the U.S. Postal Service.Each such envelope was deposited with the U.S. Postal Service at LosAngeles, California, with first class postage thereon fully prepaid.

[ ] EXPRESS U.S. MAIL: Each such envelope was deposited in a facilityregularly maintained at the U.S. Postal Service for receipt of ExpressMail at Los Angeles, California, with Express Mail postage paid.

[ ] HAND DELIVERY: I caused to be hand delivered each such envelope tothe office of the addressee as stated on the attached service list.

[ ] UNITED PARCEL SERVICE: By placing in sealed envelope(s)designated by United Parcel Service (UPS) with delivery fees paid orprovided for, which I deposited in a facility regularly maintained by UPS ordelivered to a UPS courier, at Los Angeles, California.

[X] ELECTRONIC MAIL: By transmitting the document by electronic mailto the electronic mail address as stated on the attached service list.

[X] E-FILING: By causing the document to be electronically filed via theCourts CM/ECF system, which effects electronic service on counsel whoare registered with the CM/ECF system.

[ ] FAX: By transmitting the document by facsimile transmission. Thetransmission was reported as complete and without error.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Date: January 28, 2011 /s/ Karen MattesonKaren Matteson



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SEC v. CMKM DIAMONDS, INC., et al.United States District Court - District of Nevada

Case No. 2:08-CV-00437-LRH-RJJ(LA-3028)

SERVICE LIST

Irving M. Einhorn, Esq. (served via electronic and U.S. mail)Law Offices of Irving M. Einhorn1710 10th StreetManhattan Beach, CA 90266Email: [email protected]

Attorney for Defendant John Edwards

Mark S. Dzarnoski, Esq. (served via CM/ECF only)

Gordon & Silver, Ltd.3960 Howard Hughes Parkway, Ninth FloorLas Vegas, NV 89169Email: [email protected]

Attorney for Helen Bagley and 1st Global Stock Transfer LLC

Urban A. Casavant (served via electronic and U.S. mail)RR 5 Site 16 Box 29Prince Albert, Saskatchewan S6V 5R3CanadaEmail: [email protected]

John Wesley Hall, Jr., Esq. (served via CM/ECF only)

1311 BroadwayLittle Rock, AR 72202-4843Email: [email protected]

Attorney for Brian Dvorak

Kathleen Tomasso (served via U.S. mail only)9580 Lake Serena DriveBoca Raton, FL 33496Email: [email protected]

Anthony Tomasso (served via U.S. mail only)9580 Lake Serena DriveBoca Raton, FL 33496

Email: [email protected]

Sergey Rumyantsev (served via electronic and U.S. mail)1951 North Jones Boulevard, #G-202Las Vegas, NV 89108Email: [email protected]

Anthony Santos (served via electronic and U.S. mail)6965 North Durango Drive, Suite 1115-208Las Vegas, NV 89149Email: [email protected]



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NevWest Securities Corporation (served via U.S. mail only)

c/o Anthony Santos6965 North Durango Drive, Suite 1115-208Las Vegas, NV 89149Email: [email protected]

Douglas E. Griffith, Esq. (served via electronic and U.S. mail)Kesler & RustMcIntyre Building, 2

ndFloor

68 S. Main StreetSalt Lake City, UT 84101Email: [email protected]

Attorney for Daryl Anderson

Eric N. Klein, Esq. (served via electronic and U.S. mail)Eric N. Klein & Associates, P.A.1200 N. Federal Highway, Suite 200Boca Raton, FL 33432Email: [email protected]

Michael R. Bakst (served via electronic and U.S. mail)PMB 702222 Lakeview Avenue, #160West Palm Beach, FL 33401Email: [email protected]


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