Back up SlidesCulture does not change because we desire to change it. Culture changes when the organization is transformed.Frances Hesselbein, My Life in Leadership, 2011

Answer: The ARNG can mobilize huge numbers of soldiers if given months or years to do so. However, 21st Century military power is not based on the mass mobilization of the manpower and the resources of the entire nation-state.

In addition, ARNG units cannot cultivate and maintain the skills to employ todays complex armor, missile and ISR capabilities. When response times are limited and the U.S. confronts enemy armies, air forces, air defenses and naval forces, shifting the so-called heavy force into the ARNG renders it unusable.

In the 21st Century, the demand is for ready, deployable combat forces-in-being, highly trained forces that can take hits and keep fighting, forces capable of decisive action on land within a joint warfighting framework. Why not rely on the Army National Guard to perform the ground force mission?

Answer: The Marine Corps has very limited maneuver/exploitation capability. It deploys two small tank battalions (33 tanks each) and four LAV (armored trucks) battalions with very limited artillery. In the words of a Naval War College Analyst: The Marines are similar to the Jordanian Army, with one third of the Jordanian Armys armored vehicles. Here is the Marine dilemma: in Najaf, two battalions of the Armys tanks did what a lighter marine battalion could not, inflicting huge casualties on Mr. Sadrs insurgents while taking almost none of their own. The 70-ton tanks and 25-ton Bradleys pushed to the gates of the Imam Ali shrine at the center of the old city. Meanwhile, the marines spent most of the fight raiding buildings far from the old city. Even so, seven marines died, and at least 30 were seriously wounded, according to commanders here, while only two soldiers died and a handful were injured.Alex Berenson, The New York Times, August 29, 2004Why not rely on the Marine Corps to conduct combat operations on land?

The Framework is not just about things. Its about integrating existing and future capabilities within an agile operational framework guided by human understanding.

Its an intellectual construct with technological infrastructure.

The Framework is the next logical step in the evolution of warfare beyond the ad hoc coordination of Federal Agencies or combined arms, air-ground cooperation, air-sea battle, amphibious and special operations. U.S. capabilities must be integrated at the operational level to detect, deter, disrupt, neutralize or destroy opposing forces/threats decisively; Apply the ISR-Strike-Maneuver-Sustainment Framework as a methodology for investment planning and programming as constrained budgets compel force optimization;Develop the framework inside a reduced number of regional unified commands. The ISR-Strike-Maneuver-Sustainment Framework:Burke-Macgregor Group LLC

ISRStrike & MDMNVRSUSTNotional Future Regional Unified CMD Resource Management HeadquartersCombatant Commander(Regional Unified Command)Notional Future Operational Architecture in Regional Unified Command

Integrated Command Structure for a Combat GroupBrigadier GeneralCombat Maneuver Group Commander

Lieutenant ColonelLieutenant ColonelLieutenant ColonelLieutenant ColonelLieutenant ColonelIntelligence functions split, but integrated to support maneuver, strike and IISRManeuver(Operations including PSYOPS)ISRStrikeCOORDSustainment(Personnel/Logistics)Civil Affairs

Forward Presence/Engagement: Myth versus RealityThe large, forward U.S. Naval and Ground presence in the Mediterranean and the Pacific did nothing to prevent these events from occurring:The Muslim Brotherhood succeeded in taking over Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, using mostly nonviolent means to create Shariah Law-compliant constitutions/states. Most of Africa is vulnerable to civil wars, genocide, and anarchy. Since the 1950s, Western countries have poured more than $1 trillion of aid into Africa without changing these fundamentals. Sailing aircraft carriers up and down Irans coast accomplished nothing except to put military personnel and assets at risk. Chinese tensions with Japan regarding Japanese nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands potentially entangles the U.S. in a dispute of no importance to U.S. interests.

Field Army Analysis based on force in Transformation under Fire (Praeger, 2003)Roughly 250,100 troops in the deployable Field Army on rotational readiness.Maneuver Echelon (136,600)Infantry Combat Group (Motorized) (5,000)Combat Maneuver Group (Armored) (5,500)Airborne-Air Assault Group (5,000)Light Reconnaissance Strike Group (5,150)12 X6 X4 X4 XSustainment Echelon (57,500)Engineer Groups (construction)(4,000)Combat Support Groups(6,000)2 X8 XChem-Bio Wafare Group (3,000)1 X420,000 number originates with projections for future Army budgets.

THAADPATRIOTJLENSNASAMBallistic MissilesCruise MissilesAircraftDronesThis Combat Group from the Strike Echelon can be deployed for Homeland Defense or Expeditionary Missions.4000 Troops27 THAADs 48 PATRIOTs72 NASAMsX-BandExample: Theater Missile Defense Group (TMDG)The Joint Force needs this capability.

National Command Authorities should begin fielding TMD Groups from existing assets.

Engineer Groups (Construction)Time for Cross-Service Consolidation! Consolidate and Civilianize Major Civil EngineersConsolidate Expeditionary Battlefield Construction Capabilities from all Services Manages contracts for civil works and military bases within CONUS of permanent structures. (i.e. bridges, levees, home ports, dams, reservoirs, land management, buildings, etc.)Expedient construction of sea ports, airfields, logistics hubs, bridges, roads, etc. in an expeditionary combat zone environment.US ArmyUS Air ForceUS Navy

Rapid prototyping applies to the operational force design and the technologies they employ.

When tied to a new force design, rapid prototyping explores/develops new capabilities quickly with smaller inventories of new equipment in soldiers hands before larger investments are made;

Using a proven platform mitigates risk and speeds up delivery. Innovate, dont invent from scratch. (German/IDF approach).The Puma AFVDont bind Army efforts through massive programs intended to stamp out 20,000 ideal designs over two decades of production runs (FCS); Dont build a better carburetor. Go for fuel injection; equip a new force design with new technology; Dont stuff a squad into one platform and court catastrophic losses!How can the Army modernize in a period of fiscal austerity?

Significant increases in fight power in land warfare come through the co-evolution of new concepts of operation, new organizational structures, and new patterns of leadership and training, all of which are designed to exploit new technology and create new capabilities.

New ways to recruit and train are essential to support the required cultural change provide cohesive formations capable of self-organizing.

Decision-making must be pushed to lower levels where tactical leaders in contact with the enemy determine the best method of fulfilling the Joint Force Commanders intent regarding the attainment of operational objectives.

Ground combat forces must be organized, trained and led with these points in mind, or no amount of technology will propel the Army into the 21st Century.Unit Cohesion, Training and Recruiting are inseparable

The primary purpose of an army - to be ready to fight effectively at all times - seemed to have been forgotten. The leadership I found in many instances was sadly lackingGeneral Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, 1956Lessons observed, but not learned.The Problem in 2011 The Solution in 1950 and Today

There is only one tactical principle which is not subject to change. It is to use the means at hand to inflict the maximum amount of wound, death, and destruction on the enemy in the minimum amount of time." General George S. Patton Jr., 1942Build powerful synergies with the technologies and concepts developed by U.S. Aerospace and Maritime Forces;

Prepare for Warfighting Operations that integrate functional capabilities Maneuver, Strike, ISR, Sustainment across service lines inside an integrated Joint C2 operational framework.

Punch above its weight, mobilizing fighting power disproportionate to its size (High lethality, low density);

Organize for joint operations in a non-linear, nodal and dispersed, mobile warfare environment inside a much more lethal battle space than anything seen since WW II;

Ensure the Army has the capability to close with the enemy, take hits, sustain losses, keep fighting and strike back decisively. (Mobile, armored firepower!)The Army will need a new approach in 2013!

AirSea Battle: Option or illusion?On 26 October 2012, Mr. Robert O. Work, Under Secretary of The U.S. Navy, made the following points in a briefing at the Center for Naval Analysis:

Air Sea Battle sees the solution primarily in terms of joint operationsin this case involving naval and aerospace forces.Air Sea Battle focuses on winning a two-sided guided munitions salvo competition in order to facilitate concurrent and follow-on operations (the nature of follow-on operations is not addressed).Air Sea Battle will lead to new Navy-Air Force tactics, techniques, and procedures in the near term, and new platforms, sensors, and weapons in the future.

ASB will require enough munitions to cover an area equivalent to 2/3 the size of the continental US. Assuming it does not escalate to a nuclear exchange what will this operation accomplish?

China as Theater of War: Implications for Army PlannersWe may find ourselves with a full-scale war on our hands. The result [in China]would be the same sort of disaster which overtook Napoleon in Spain -- a slow sinking into the deepest sort of bog.Major General Ishiwara Kanji on Tokyos decision to invade China after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937Japanese Army Minister Sugiyama Hajime predicted the broader war with China would last only two months. Instead Japans war with China dragged on for 8 years until August 1945.

Initial operations to invade northern China, while seizing Shanghai, and several coastal cities took only 250,000 troops. However, by 1945 the Imperial Japanese Army of 5.9 million deployed 4.2 million soldiers to occupy China and Manchuria.

Chinese Nationalist and Communist forces simply withdrew into mountainous central China to rebuild and preserve their forces.

It took three generations (close to 80 years) for the Mongols to conquer China. In the same amount of time the Mongol Armies conquered Persia, Russia, the Middle East, Central Asia and Eastern Europe.

Who is Douglas Macgregor? Colonel (ret) Douglas Macgregor was commissioned in the US. Army in 1976 after 4 years at West Point and 1 year at VMI. In 1991, Macgregor was awarded the bronze star with V device for valor for his personal leadership of the lead cavalry troops that destroyed an Iraqi Republican Guard Brigade in the Battle of the 73 Easting, the U.S. Armys largest tank battle since World War II. His latest book, Warriors Rage. The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting (Naval Institute Press, 2009) describes the action from his tank turret. As the Chief of Strategic Planning and Director of the Joint Operations Center at SHAPE( 1997-2000), Macgregor supervised the conduct and planning of the Kosovo Air Campaign and subsequent occupation of Kosovo.On 16-17 January 2002, the Secretary of Defense directed General Tommy Franks to meet with Macgregor to discuss his concept for the attack to seize Baghdad. Though modified to include less armor and large numbers of Army and marine light infantry, Macgregors offensive concept was largely adopted. Macgregors concepts from his groundbreaking books on military transformation, Breaking the Phalanx (1997) and Transformation under Fire (2003) continue to exert influence inside the worlds militaries. His books are available in Chinese, Korean and Hebrew, as well as English.Macgregor holds a PhD in international relations from the University of Virginia.Burke-Macgregor Group LLC

''Most infantry, logistics, and security battalions require approximately twice the number of .50-caliber machine guns and more M240G and MK19 machine guns than they would normally possess," according to the 40-page report, entitled ''Marine Corps Ground Equipment in Iraq." The inspector general also determined that even with recommended changes, including replacing damaged armaments, the war will continue to take a toll on the Marine Corps' equipment, from having nearly all of its fighting gear ready for combat this year to having less than two-thirds of it in battle shape by the middle of 2008. Bryan Bender, Marine Units Found To Lack Equipment: Corps estimates of needs in Iraq are called faulty Boston Globe, June 21, 2005, page 1.

*Combining strike and maneuver into a single joint operation inside a Joint Force Command shown is the core of operational art. Striking the enemy throughout the entire depth of operational deployment simultaneously and, at the same time, introducing rapid, mobile, mutually supporting air and ground forces through the disrupted force to fight a series of actions for which the enemy is not prepared is the essence of this form of warfare. These conditions are no less applicable to the defeat of loosely organized guerilla forces operating in complex or urban terrain. The mission to implement this operational concept in the information age falls to the lieutenant general or vice admiral in a JFC.

*The point of this exercise is to ensure the Army can provide on short notice a deployable force of at least 40,000 to 50,000 troops for contingencies within 30-45 days depending on the availability of sea and air lift.

Rotational Readiness is the key to achieving this outcome.*Today, the greater Middle East, Africa and Southwest Asia are at the center of U.S. and allied security concerns. Tomorrow, far more serious military challenges to U.S. and Allied security may emanate from Northeast Asia, Central Asia and Latin America. In contrast to the recent past, these crises are likely to involve inter-State conflicts for regional power and influence that overlap with the competition for energy, water, food, mineral resources and the wealth they create. Miriam Elder, President Dmitry Medvedev said that Russia should unilaterally claim part of the Arctic, stepping up the race for the disputed energy-rich region, Reuters, posted 3:20PM BST 17 September 2008.

The Army is responsible for air and missile defense, a task that will involve more and more resources as directed energy weapons emerge and the capability for continental defense becomes attainable. Building these formations for expeditionary and homeland defense creates new vessels for extended development and investment as technology and its associated capabilities evolve.

*

US Army: Corp of Engineers which is the engineer branch. There is also a separate but confusing similar named US Army Corp of Engineers that is mostly civilian to do work on projects mostly within the United States.US Air Force: Two expeditionary organizations REDHORSE and Prime BEEFUS Navy: SEABEES

*"I am concerned that despite pruning many major procurement programs over the past four years, the militarys modernization strategy still depends on systems that are vastly more expensive and technologically risky than what was promised or budgeted for." Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, 3 April 2013

Effort, time, staff size and budget define the power base and upward mobility of senior leaders whose careers are made through lack of failure rather than bold achievement. Bottom line: Government does not know how to buy value, only effort. The success metric in DoD is the repeated obligation of funds versus the rigorous process of accounting for the received value that funds were originally intended to secure. Attempts at efficiency or reform are obstructed by organizations and staffs afraid to get out in front of the Chief, euphemisms for protecting Service equities. The result is defense industry behavior leading to butts in seats/Time and Materials along with Cost Plus multi-year contracts.This is not the time to invent from scratch the failed FCS model now transformed into the GCV model. Its time to innovate with existing technology.

*In 1947, Army senior leadership testified to Congress: No major war for at least a decade. Focused 563,000 troops on paramilitary occupation duty.Army senior leadership stripped out the third battalion from every regiment in divisions to keep command slots at expense of troops and fighting power.Army senior leadership insisted Korea was infantry country with result that in 1950 only the North Korean enemy had tanks.Army senior leadership blamed Armys failures in Korea on Truman Administration, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and Congress.

**In other words, Air Sea Battle is a concept for the joint employment of precision guided missiles and munitions against unidentified future target sets (presumably China) on the assumption that destroying thousands of targets with great precision will compel future opponents to capitulate or negotiate.

There are significant problems with this approach.

Strike forces are likely to run out of precision guided munitions long before they run out of targets to attack. It assumes symmetry in warfare; that the opponent will respond in ways similar to attacking air and naval forces.

Without integrating ground forces to hold regime survivability and internal control at risk, the probability of achieving conflict termination on favorable terms is low.

Without identifying Service mission-focused force packages in advance (or the military equivalent of Legos that can be assembled into larger joint operational forces), US maneuver, strike, ISR and sustainment capabilities cannot be effectively integrated to pose more complex threats to new enemies.

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