SECONDANNUALREPORT

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDEREUROPE

SHAPE PARIS30 MAY 1953

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ANNUAL REPORTlo

THE STANDING GROUPNORTH ATLANTIC

TREATY ORGANIZATION

from

General MATTHEW B. RIDCWAY

Supreme Alliecl Commander, Europe

Printed in Paris

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERSALLIED POWERS EUROPE

Paris, Franco30 May 1953

SUB.IKCT : Hepurt on ALLIKI) O/.H.W4A7J Kl'HWK. .»fr,?/

TO : The Standing (ironit.

PURPOSE

1. This Report concerns ALLIED COMMAND KUUOPKfrom 80 May 1952, when I became Supreme Allied Com-mander Europe, to date,

2. The purpose of this Report, the second emanatingfrom Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, is toprovide an assessment of the current and prospective capa-bility for discharging assigned defense responsibilities. Itincludes a brief summary of the situation one year ago;an examination of the changes which have since occurred;an appraisal of their effects upon the capability of thisCommand for carrying out its assigned defense mission; aresurvey of its military requirements; and an indicationof the areas of existing major deficiencies. The Report ispurposely couched in somewhat general terms for securityreasons. Precise figures on present stocks of anmunition,on fuel for aircraft, tanks and trucks, and on th-s effect-

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iveness oAV radar to give us timely warning of ^enemy air attack, obviously should not be made public. Allmattera of substance in this Report have been included inclassified re-ports previously made to proper authority.They have been covered in adequate detail and su|>portedby appropriate recommendations.

3. Notwithstaading this unquestioned need for with-holding certain information from publication, I wish toemphasize at the outset of this Report the importance, infact I believe the crucial importance, of making known toour NATO peoples the main facts of the military situationin which they are so deeply concerned. In no other waycan they b€ convinced of the need for the heavy burdensthey are asked to carry. If unconvinced, they cannot be ex-pected to si.pport NATO programs, even on the minimumscale essential to collective security. With an unshakeablebelief in our concept of democracy, I concur wholeheartedlywith my predecessor, General Eisenhower, who a year agoquestioned v/hy there should be « confusion in the minds ofmillions of our own peoples as to the basic aims of ourdefense program, the necessity for it, and the urgentdemard for their own individual efforts. Once the truthis understood, he stated, once the critical dangers presentin the world situation are really known, there will be lesscomplacency concerning our present military situation aridthe harmful effects of delay will be clearly seen. »

4. It has been my constant conviction since I assumedcommand that public understanding is indispensable toprogress towards the minimum military security for whichNATO has teen established. To create this understanding,NATO and i;he national authorities must present the factsof our security situation through a coordinated and sus-tained infoiTnation program. I have previously submittedrecommendations concerning such action.

GENERAL

5. The search for solutions to tin- many major problemsencountered in the effort to become secure gives rise loserious political, economic, financial and social difficultiesto which I am acutely alive. Yet early solutions must b?»found if the basic objectives which brough NATO intobeing are to be reasonably attainable within tin* nearfuture,

0. The assessments which follow constitute a militaryestimate. In preparing it. I have drawn heavily upon theadvice and assistance of the officers assigned to this Com-mand, Of all services, and from all the countries repre-sented in this Command, they are men of high-principledintegrity and demonstrated professional competence, inwhom their countries may have real pride and confidence.This Report is based on their honest and objective analysisand reflects the rigid standards of austere economy con-sistent with minimum acceptable efficiency which are ourcommon aim. These men are deeply aware of the wa>U» ofhuman life, of spiritual values, ard of material treasureswhich past wars have entailed; they are dedicated to theeffort to forestall the catastrophic destruction which futurewars could bring.

THE SITUATION IN MAY 1952

7. I turn now to the situation of a year ago, the tinio ;;twhich the first Annual Report of the Supreme Allied Com-mander Europe was issued. The military mission entrust-ed to the European Allied Commend then as now was:

a. In war to defend NATO's European territoriesThis mission was not qualified in either space or time, it

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was not merely to defend certain pails of the NAT(H?uro-pean urea and their peoples. Nor was the responsibilityonly to become effective in some future year whei meansmight be available. The task was to defend all, at anytime, il: war should occur.

b. In pcaft'ti'mr to develop an integrated, effective forceMpahlv of aMQnplMiing the wartime mission if required,But the underlying and fundamental purpose was the pre-scrvat.on of peace through the deterrent effect on potentialaggressors of s:rong, balanced, combat-ready forces, capa-ble of challenging aggression, or at least of rendiring itssucces-i doubtful. Already, the great progress that hadbeen made in the build-up from the exposed and almostdefenseless condition which existed in 1%0 at the time ofthe Communist attack on South Korea had made a majorcontribution toward this end.

8. The next basic consideration, giving concrete dimen-sions to the tasks involved in accomplishing the assignedmission, was th«? Soviet threat — its nature and magnitude.There were two particular points to be stressed in thiscouncil, on. Fiist, our task as military men was to concernourselves with Soviet capabilitks. Military planning andrecomaiondntiois could not be based upon speculative esti-mate* ov a potential aggressor's intentions. If the* missionassigr ed to this Command was to be discharged, our forceshad to be prepared ;o meet an aggressor's forces as theyactually existed and could be brought into battle. We hadto reckon with military realities. We could not rely onattempts to fathom the minds of the men in the Kremlinnor t<* follow their frequent reversals of tactics. Second,it was necessary to r*aet effectively to Soviet actions withinwhale ver period, of waning might be provided. Of all thebask- principles of war, nona could have more devastating

thai; that of SURPRISE. The impor-;; ?.

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rSoviet CAPABILITY and of TIME as o factor*

of fundamental significance could scarcely be exaggerated.9, The Soviat bloc had over 5 1/2 million men under

arms, roughly 4 1/2 million belonging to the Soviet Unionitself. The USSR mounted 175 line divisions. Satellitestrength was growing. The Soviet air force totaled justover 20.000 front-line aircraft, with a large aircraft :v-serve. The Navy had more than 300 submarines, includinga number of the latest type. The Soviet forces were capa-ble of rapid expansion in case of war. Traimxl r<serv;>manpower and reserves of equipment were immediatelyavailable. Some 30 divisions wen? located in occupiedEurope, of which the 22 in East Germany constituted anever present threat to our forces. The combat effective-ness of the ground forces was ratoc; high and their equip-ment good — in some types superior. The combat effi-ciency of the air force, while rated below NATO standaids,wag* improving, particularly with the replacement ofpiston- :ype with modern jet aircraft. The Soviets' well-known disregard for their own casualties further increasedtheir offensive CAPABILITY.

10. The balance-sheet of NATO security in WesternEurope, as I evaluated it in May 19f 2. showed major assetsand major liabilities. Tha milita -y assets, such as themultiple elements of command structure and leadership,plans and directives, organized combat units, and provisionfor their support, had already begun to give the basis forhope of future security.

11. In concrete terms of combat units in being, thedivisions, air squadrons, and combat vessels, the defenseforce which then existed had already become sufficient todeny unopposed conquest to Lhe Soviets, although therecould have been no serious claim of capability to hold apredetermined line if the Soviets had launched a full-scale

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offensive. The Allied Command provided command andcontrol machinery for coordinated employment of suchunits as were available, to the full measure of their limi-ted capability. An initial structure had been brought intobeiiiK and was steadily being strengthened.

12 A start, but only a start, had been made in the pro-vision of supporting elements for the combat unit;;. Theseincluded the logistical organisations, depots and airfields,comT-at suppon units, and all the rest of the complex sup-porting establishment needed to give modern fightingforces a capability for sustained combat.

13. In morale and in the determination to gain themilitary strength needed for security, the alliance hadalready demonstrated its essential soundness. In the all-important element of leadership, rapid progress was beingmade through growing experience in the handling of unitsin the field, through the integration of diverse nationalelements, through the training of additional junior leaders,and through the infusion of common objectives .and doc-trines at ail levels of command.

14. Underlying all the.se factors, there had bc-en trulyremarkable progress in the basic decisions on nationaland international policies, and in plans and programs forthe creation of additional units, for the improvement andexpansion of support elements, and for the more effectivecoordination and employment of existing forces. Therewas a recognition, basic to all these efforts, of the necessityfor a common defense to meet a common peril.

15. Against these asst-ts were ranged grave liabilities.In May 1932, security in Western Europe was still heavilyovershadowed by the enormous preponderance of combat-ready Soviet muUry power poised behind the Iron Cur-tain. Furthermore, there were grave deficiencies in Allied

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preparedness to meot a Soviet attack had it come. Thetotal fighting strength of the Allies formed but a smallfraction of the Soviet Forces deployed in forward areas.Land forces and naval strength assigned to Allied Com-mand Europe were entirely insufficient.

It). The inadequacy of the Air Forces was particularlyacute. Many uriits were deployed in exposed areas east ofthe Rhine, with no prepared re-dopJoyment sites. Com-mand, control and warning arrangements were fragmen-tary in the extreme. A large number of our aircraft weivof obsolescent piston-engine type.

17. The principal subordinate commands were still ?.na formative state. The headquarters would not have beenequal to the demands of active operations. Signal commu-nications were seriously inadequate for continued effectivecontrol of the fighting elements.

18. Particularly in the status of supporting elements,the deficiencies would have weighed heavily against ef-fectiveness in combat. Stocks of ammunition were extreir.e-ly low, logistical and maintenance systems inadequate,and re-supply plans and assignments of responsibilitieswere still under discussion and proving extremely difficult.Supply lines ran parallel to the front and were operational-ly unbalanced.

19. Shortages of specialists, career personnel, andexperienced loaders were severe in many units and wouldhave had a substantial adverse effect on combat operations.Many reserve elements lacked the degree of organizationand training reqaired for combat. Finally, althoughexpansion goals and commitmerts for 1952 had beenundertaken at Lisbon, it was increasingly apparent thatthe requisite steps in manning, training, and equippingwere not being taken in full and on time.

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CHANGES, MAY 1952 TO MAY 1953

20. a. Before turning to an examination of the changeswhich have occurred in the past year, I should like to makeclear the main factors which have guided me during myyear of command. The overall objectives I have alreadydiscussed, but they cannot be stated too often. They are,first, to attain sufficient strength to deter potential aggres-sors from breaking the peace, and second, to defend our-selves successfully if the ]>eace is broken. Together withthe threat, these are the true determinants of militaryrequirements.

b. Within the NATO structure it is my duty to assessthese requirements in terms of land, sea, and air forcesand their required support, and to report that assessmentto higher authority with adequate supporting detaQ. It ismy further duty to take all measures within my powertoward meeting the requirements of defense, and to makespecific recommendations to higher authority in such mat-ters us the build-up of forces, command structure, support-ing establishments, airfields and other facilities.

c. It then devolves upon the civil authorities, with theirwider responsibilities and within their ultimate authority,to determine to what extent these requirements and recoir£mendations can and will be met and on what time schedule.

d. With the aid of my subordinate commanders, I thenprepare and submit periodic assessments of the militarycapability for defense based on the military forces andsupporting- establishments the civil governments haveundertaken to provide. These reports also indicate predic-tably iind actual deficiencies. At the same time we aremaking the most of what is actually provided, throughmaintaining a high state of operational readiness andthrough advising as to what composition of armed strength

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and what use of resDurces will give maximum militaryreturn.

21. During the past year much has been done to increaseour defense forces and to maku them more effective.Measured against the Soviet capability, our progress isinsufficient to give us acceptable prospect of success, ifattacked. We are sti-1 far short of the minimum require-ments.. We lack essential supply and support. But a seriesof actions have been taken which have strengthened ourcommand structure, augmented our operational plans anddirectives, and materially increased our land, air, and navalforce**, Examination in more detail of major changesfollows.

DEVELOPMENT OF COMMAND STRUCTURE

22. By August 1952 arrangements for coordinating th;?operations of the forces of Greec* and Turkey with thoseof the remainder of my command had been established.Headquarters Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe,with Lieutenant General Willard G. Wyman, U.S. Army, incommand, were established in Izmir directly subordinate1

to Admiral Carney, Commander-in-Chief, Allied ForcesSouthern Europe. In December 1952 Admiral the EarlMountbatten of Burma, Royal Ns.vy, was appointed Com-mancler-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean, in March1953 he took ovsr his Allied (NATO) Command which inwartime would include units of the British MediterraneanFleet plus naval forces from other NATO nations. TinUnited States Sixth Fleet, with K striking force mission,remains assigned to the Commandur-in-Chicf, Allied Fom?sSouthern Europe. Thus there now exists a commandstructure to control our united forces along a 4000-milefront extending from northern Norway to the Caucasus.

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BUILD-UP OF FORCES23. At Lisbon in February 1952 the nations had set for

themselves, for the first time, firm goals for the build-upof their forces in 1952 and tentative goals for 1953 and1954. As 1952 ended, the goals were in large pnrt metnumerically foi air forces, naval forces, and for activearmy divisions, although there was a substantial shortfallin planned com oat effectiveness. During the last twelvemonths progress in the build-up of forces has been steady,Throughout the command the strength of units has increas-ed, additional major items of equipment have been provi-ded and training advanced. In addition, a substantialnumber of new units have been organized. Nevertheless,for al services there are still major deficiencies in .supportunits, in logistical establishments and in stocks of ammuni-tion ;ind other supplies. 1 would add parenthetically atthis point that our reporting and evaluating system hasbeen considerably strengthened throughout this period. Wecan provide mere definitive information of actual condi-tions than fornr.erly was possible. Thus it is now possibleto evaluate combat-effective units with much greater con-fidence. Wo now have a much more reliable knowledgeof just where we stand.

24. A year a?o the outstanding deficiency was in thetactical air forties. There was a shortage of aircraft, ofcrews, of supply and support. A considerable increase*during the year in the number of combat aircraft, mainlyfrom deliveries under the U.S. Mutual Defense AssistanceProgram, has since bettered our position. Not only havethe numbers of combat aircraft increased, but their com-bat capability has improved. The increase in the numberof pilots and technicians for these aircraft, together withsomp small improvement in aircraft control, warning andreporting systems, have been encouraging. Our network

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of airfields has been enlarged and made more efficient.Our various exercises, which ]>osed difficult problems incoordination and communications, demonstrated the abilityof national forces assigned to SHAPE to work together asa team. In supply, and in the development of the systemfor distributing fuel, we have improved our status overthe past year. Nevertheless, our air power is still todaytha weakest link in our defense. In spite of our progress,our air forces could not adequately carry out their tasks.The increase of air power must receive far greater attei,-tion by the NATO nations.

25. During the past year great »if forts have been madeto improve training of regular forces and at the sametime to achieve better training and mobilization procedu-res for reserve forces, on whom so much of our defensivestrength depends- Lao,k of proper training facilities andareas has hampered this effort, but good leadership cando much to offset the deficiency. Accordingly, SHAPKhas strongly emphasized the ncsec. for leadership at j.Hechelons. Various national forces hi.ve organized additionalschools for junior and non-commissioned officiers, andstudy periods for senior officiers. Mobilization and trainingcxercices have been conducted with encouraging results,Problems in training both active and reserve forces, likemost of our large problems, are now becoming more clearlydefined, and some NATO nations are requesting and usingtraining and advisory missions organized by SHAPK.Such missions are now operating in the Netherlands,Luxembourg and Portugal Another important developmenthas been the recent establishment of atomic indoctrinationcours.es for key NATO commanders and staff officnvs.The courses, which are designed to acquaint officiers withthe use of atomic weapons in tactic il situations, will enableNATO military staffs to consider the implications of

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atomic warfare in the defense of Western Europe, Withall this, there is still an urgent need for all countries tore-examine critically their mobilization systems and toinsure that they are adequate to provide, in the timerequired, forces sufficiently well-trained to perform theirduties.

SUPPORT OF ARMED FORCES

26. The growth of land forces during the past year,while not satisfactory, has been encouraging. Thissituation, however, is not true of the arrangements forthe supply and support of those forces. The initialemphasis which had been given to the creation of front-line troops resulted in a grave shortage of the operationalreserves, of certain critical supplies, and of service troops,without which a modem army cannot maintain itselfeffectively in the field.

27. In an international command, the problem ofproviding the overall logistic support is unusually compli-cated, because each nation is responsible for the supportof its own forces. This arrangement results in a lackof flexibility in the supply system. In an attempt to makethe system less rigid, SHAPE, in October 1952, afterdiscussion with the nations concerned, submitted to theStanding Group specific proposals which, if adopted,should in time remedy the main faults in the organizationof our supply. But merely improving our supply organi-zation do<3s not make good the present lack of operationalreserve stocks. The nations are all agreed that theyshould hold stocks sufficient for several months, i\ periodb&scd on an estimate of the time to begin the replenishmentof stocks in Europe after the outbreak of war, Mainly

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for financial reasons, however, their stocks have not bc-«nbuilt up to the needed level.

28. On the other hand, progress has been good on lh<>third part of the program of infrastructure, that is, offixed military installations including airfields, signal com-munications, and command headquarters. More than halfof the 125 airfields approved have been completed to thepoint where they could be used in an emergency, andconstruction is proceeding well on all but a few of theremainder. Our fixed communications net is beginning totake form.

29. The fourth part of the infrastructure program wasapproved by the Council in December 1952, but only aboutone-half of it was financed at that time. Additional air-fields, headquarters, signals communications, jet-fuelstorage tanks and distribution pipelines to airfields wireamong that portion of the prograir. which was agreed on.The remainder, financed in April D53, included additionalairfields and items such as naval bases, radar installations,radio-navigational aids, arid training installations. InApril 1953, the Council also approved the financing of along-range infrastructure program for 1954, 1955 and 19f.-6,covering the additional NATO military installation*required to be built during this three-year period. Thisfar-sighted departure from previous year-by-year financialapproval represents a long step forward. It will enableus to improve greatly the planning for construction byplacing it on a firm long-range basis.

30. The organization of the civilian bodies of NATOhas l>een progressively strengthened during the past yearas a result of the creation of the position of SecretaryGeneral as a focal point of civilian leadership. Under IxvrdIsmay, the work of building a more cohesive structure

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has gone forward. The North Atlantic Council, since thedecision in early 1952 that it function in permanent; sessionthrough the appointment of Permanent Representatives,has provided increasingly firm top-level direction to NATO,on a continuous basis. Under Lord Ismay, the Interna-tional Staff has been developed to assist and advise in thedischarge of complex civilian responsibilities. The resulthas been to delineate both those and the military responsi-bilities more clearly, to facilitate policy decisions, tostrengthen defense production, and to provide more effec-tive review of performance in meeting accepted goals.The military echelon of NATO now has authoritativecivilian guidance and direction available on a permanentbasis. The political aspects of NATO military exercises,the assessments of the security threat, the administrativeand budgetary supervision of NATO airfield arid otherinfrastructure programs, and the complex tasks o:? pettingannual goals; for the build-up of military forces are n att'jrson which this type of guidance has been received.

THE NATO ANNUAL REVIEW

31. In the NATO Annual Review during 195:2, theCouncil and the International Staff have haci a mostimportant role. Within NATO theirs has been the respon-sibility for determining the level of defense effort foreach country. In their work they have had available astatement of overall requirements in the European areareported by my Command, together with my detailedrecommendations as to the composition of military pro-grams and the balance of air, ground and naval forces.Their *ork was confirmed in the decisions of the Minis-terial Session of the Council in April 1953, whic'i set upfirm force goals for 1953 and provisional goals, for 1954

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for army, air, and navy units, together with appropriaterecommendations on NATO defense production.

THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY

32. During my year of command I have followedclosely the plans for the European Defense Community.The benefits which the early ratification of the Treatywould have brought to our ef forte and to European unityincluded the contribution of West Germany, which 1(.on&idcT indispensable to our defense system. SHAPKh \» maintained constant liaison with the Interiir.Committee of the European Defense Community and hasobserved and assisted in its planning. Its plans an-workable and sufficiently advanced to avoid delay indeveloping a German contribution.

SHIFT OF NATIONAL EMPHASIS

33. Throughout many of the NATO nations the growthof defensive power has reduced the sense of fear andurgency under which they lived in the preceding twelvemonths. Nations are beginning to change their plannedmilitary programs from rapid rearmament to a longer-termpolicy. Although this change may be dictated by tin?economic situation, we must not forget that any realslackening of the defense effort may itself open the wayto aggression.

APPRAISAL OF THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES

34. Much then has been added to the defense structure anit existed a year ago. Much that ;s highly encouraging hasbeen accomplished. If we maintain momentum, our

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objectives can be attained within the near future andwithir the economic capabilities of NATO. Yet while thesituation has altered during this past year, the significanceof this change should be sought in the extent to which thepower ratio of Soviet offensive capability to NATO defen-sive strength has changed for or against us.

35. Moreover, we are interested, not in the mere relativealteration in this power ratio, but in the remaining dispar-ity of military potential. This is the only true criterion bywhich to measure our military risk and therefore to gaugethe magnitude and urgency of the further efforts required.Let us examine the Soviet potential,

36. During the past twelve months the USSR has. syste-matically strengthened its armed forces and those of itsEuropean satellites. The highly mechanized group ofSoviet armies stationed in East Germany has been kept ata high level cf training; its equipment has been increasedand its vehicles modernized. Many Russian air squadronshave been ru-cquipped with jet aircraft. A huge programof airfield construction has been nearly completed through-out Eastern Europe. The Soviet naval ship-buildingprogram is continuing steadily and now includes construc-tion of new improved ocean patrol submarines. The mili-tary strength of the satellits countries has been increasedconsiderably. Since January 1952, when these forcesnumbered approximately 1,000,000 men organized into 65divisions, they have increased to more than 1,300,000 menorganized into 70-odd divisions. This total does not countEast Germany, where various units of the police have beenconverted into the nucleus of a German army which nownumbers about 100,000. East Germany is also forming anair force and a naval force. The foregoing summary relatesto the strengthening of Soviet conventional forces. It must

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not be forgotten, however, that Soviet effort in the atomicfield has also continued.

37. These are the facts about trie increasing strength ofthe Soviet bloc. Since Stalin's death there has been muciconjecture about possible changes of policy by the rulers ofthe Soviet Union.'These are matters beyond my purvieu.Moreover, as a soldier I cannot afford to deal with conjec-ture. I feel it my duty to state that I know of no factswhich would lead me to conclude that the military dangerfrom the East has lessened. This view coincides with theofficial communique issued by the North Atlantic Councilat the conclusion of its Ministerial session, 25 April 195M.Although the North Atlantic Council firmJy restated thapolicy of Member Governments to geek every opportunityfor world peace, it reported :

Nevertheless, the. Council found that, there had not yttin fact been any change in the fundamental threat to thesecurity of free peoples. The mo?t striking evidence <>/this continuing threat is the huge and constantly xtr< ny-thentd military m force maintained by those nations whoawpolicies have been responsible foi the pre*t< nt tension, amiwho are still promoting aggressive -<var in several -part* o/the world.

38. An appraisal of the present power ratio goes farbeyond the military field. II embraces every aspect of ourpolitical, economic, financial and sccial systems. All butthe military aspects are beyond both my competence andresponsibility. Yet within the strictly military field, 1 findthe disparity between our available forces and those whichthe Soviet rulers could bring against us so great as towarrant no other conclusion than that a full-scalp Sovietattack within the near future would find Allied CommandEurope critically weak to accomplish its present mission.

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The potential aggressor retains the initiative. lie canexercise Ms offersive capability at will, and choose thetimef plac®, weight, and direction of attack. To allow theNATO nations to maintain their status as free nations, weshould have th4 rreans which can be committed to actionwithin a short timu aiid which can give us the capability ofwithstanding an initial attack and gaining time to gatherour strength. To do otherwise, we would risk needlesslyheavy sacrifice of Jife and great loss of critical equipment.We ne3d not only the physical means out the driving forceof dynamic leadership sustained by a high morale through-out the civilian population as well as among our fightingforces.

RE-SURVEY OF MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

39. Concurrently with the developments cited, the mili-tary requirements a:: Allied Command Europe have been re-surveyod and submitted to the North Atlantic MilitaryCommittee, Through the Council's action on the 1952Annual Review, completed in April 1953, agreed goals forNATO nations for .-future years have been approved.

40. The results are best stated in the words of theCouncils final communique of 25 April 1953 :

The Council agreed on short and long-teim programs forNATO. They established a firm military program for 1953and a yrovis-onal program for 1954. In addition ti* theforces i >hich Greece and Turkey are vontributing, therewill be v notable increase in the size of the forces assignedto NATO Supreme Commanders and a considerableimprovement in their effectiveness. Training is bringgreatly improved at all levels.

The senes of lar^e scale maneuvers held during the last

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year has appreciably raised the standard of cooperation ofthe forces of the member countries; •//////.%• are briny betterequipped and the organization of support /ow.s- i* dtr<fl»oping. The NATO military authorities consider thai 1fi<attainment of the fore? goals in 1953, and the combineinfluence of these various factory, will add materially to th<defensive strength of NATO during 1953.

Agreement was reached not only on the common ////«•?-cinii of the second part ($187,600,000) of th<- Fourth Slwof tfie Infrastructure Program (the first part to th( amou.itof about $224,000,000 having been settled at a Ministt-rwlMeeting in December), but also on a cost-sharing formulawhith would cover future programs to be submitted by theSupreme Commander for the three-year period In-ginningin 1954, involving expenditure of up to $700,000,000, x ? f f > -jcct to the approval of Parliame tts. Thew program* milinclude a wide range of projects* stuck an airfields, ith>com-muiiicationft, naval batten and port /aciliticti, pipeline* andradar installations. The military authorities of NATO wo-,/.1

have a financial planning fiyur* to which they can workfor over three years. In addition, • />? improved xy#tew <'.vready to be put into operation to ensure closer fintuicw.Ixuptr vision over the expenditure of common infran1ruc1iriefunds.

AREAS OF MAJOR DEFICIENCIES, THE TASKSAHEAD, AND CONCLUSIONS

41. Now, in May 1953, the NATO nations, which werealmost defenseless in 1950, can be justifiably proud in look-ing ;;.t their increased strength. They can be buoyed upby their accomplishments, not weigh*! down by their fears.The result should be an improvement in the morale oftheir peoples. Their seriousness of purpose and thu:rt

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Istrength o will should have been made clear to42. Yet pride in achievement must not blind us to the

magnitude of the tasks ahead, nor hide our true militaryposition today. The achievements during the past yearhave been considerable. They reflect great credit o::i thefourteen NATO nations, but the efforts of the last twoyears could all be wasted were we to relax now. Thereare still many gaps in our defense system which must befilled without delay if our homelands are to have thatreasonable minimum of security which it has been NATO'sprimary purpose to achieve.

43. My predecessor report-ad in May 1952: « There isno real security yet achieved in Europe; there is only abeginning. » Knowledge of the military situation todaygives no grounds for believing that this security lias beenachieved, that the beginning, made a year ago, has nowcome so near to a successful ending that our efforts canbe relaxed. L !i:.:Ji

44. Northern Europe still lacks within its own resourcesthe minimum forces required to give adequate chances ofsuccess, against a major attack. The nations in that areawill have to receive external assistance, and this is contem-plated in our plan;?. The continuing magnitude of Sovietoffensive capabilities in Northern Europe, and the specialrequirements for coordinating the military measures takenby the nations of that area with the contributions of otherNATO partners to defense create a problem of unusualcomplexity and difficulty. The pattern of solution throughcollective action is being gradually clarified. Furtherefforts by all concerned are, however, required.

45. In Central Europe, we have made material progress.It is clear that the basic elements of strength to attain acapability for defense of that area can be found, What isrequired is the continued will and effort to convert this

potentSl into reality. If such effort s forthcoming, andexpecially if an early German contribution is providerl. wecan look forward to the day in the n.nir fu tu re , when ifattacked \ve could conduct a successful defense in that art a.

46. Likewise in Southern Europe, the land forces an1

steadily improving and a successful defense appealsattainable in the foreseeable future. There continues toexist a serious lack of support trooos. This weaknessmust be remedied. Powerful naval forces could make acontribution of the greatest value, but the air forces here,as in other areas, are still dangerously short.

47. There are many measures that apply generallythroughout the whole Western European area. Activeland forces must be further increased. Those already inbeing must be better trained and backed by proper supporttroops, at present lacking. The system of training andmobilising our reserve forces must insure that they areready to ::ace a professional enemy 01 equal terms. Thonaval forces must receive the escort vessels and mine-sweepers which will be vital for defense against a potentialenemy strong in submarines and rr.in^laying capability.

48. Our greatest weakness, howevt-r, is in the air. Forthe next year, at least, higher priority should he jiivonto the ah1 forces. Not only do we lack the numbor ofmoder;i aircraft indispensable for our defensive tasks, butin some countries, the development of an effective airwarning and control system is only just beginning,

49. To establish a workable supply system the nationsshould plan to meet the requirements for their forcesboth from home production and through negotiation withother governments. National stocks, particularly ofammunition, should be increased froii their present lowlevel.

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50. TW deficiencies I have noted are correct low pro-vided that timely action is taken and sustained. If thisis done, this Command could be capable, within the nearfuture, of effectively defending Western Europe againstfulls-cale Soviet aggression. If these deficiencies remainsubstantially uncorracted, these requirements substantiallyunfulfilled, then Allied Command Europe will continue tobe critically weak in its capability of accomplishing itspresent mission; the NATO nations of Europe will remainexpose:, to the peril of decisive military defeat with allits catastrophic consequences to them and to Westerncivilization.

Rl. Our present difficulties would be lessened throughgreater unity of effort. In the economic field, this vouldhelp solve the problems of military supply and equipment.In the political field, it would facilitate our efforts tomobilise all our available military resources.

52. In four years the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-zation has demonstrated that free nations, workingearnestly together, can achieve collective security. Wehave become seriously aware of the heavy sacrificesdemanded to arm nations for defense. Today we are farfrom the pLite;w of security. We have merely gained thefoothills leadings to that plateau. A levelling off now,when we are far b~low minimum force requirements, mayreturn our European peoples to that grim feeling ofmilitary weakness and futility of effort, only recently leftbehind.

53. During the last two years we have overcome thenatural inertia which besets all human endeavors. Wehave imparted to the huge and complicated machinery ofdefense a momentum of incalculable power, the results offaith r.nd growing strength. We must not lose thatmomentum. To do so would be to nullify all our labor and

sacrifufln, to repudiate our principles, and toour peril. Were the momentum once lost, the efforts torestore it would be many times those we have so far made.

54. The most precious assets of ou? nations are theirspiritual values and their youth. The most sacred obliga-tions of governments are to nurture and preserve thosevalues, and to assure that those lives shall not be hazardedthrough failure to recognize the dep~,h of the threatranged against us.

55. In his « First Annual Repon, Supreme AlliedCommander Europe, » General of the Army Dwight D.Eisenhower wrote: « In a world where powerful forcesare working tirelessly to destroy the freedom, individualliberty, and dignity of man, we cannot for one momentdelay our advance toward security. » The powerful forcesto which !ie referred were those controlled and directedby the Kremlin. « The Soviet Army :», he wrote, « castsits shadow over the length and breadth of Europe. »

56. The North Atlantic Council finds that this threatremains without fundamental change. In the light of theseconsiderations, there cannot be, therefore, any valid mili-tary reason to justify a levelling-off of effort until wehave progressed at least well beyond the goals now setfor 1954,

57. With these conclusions, I believe all my Comman-ders-in-Chief and the senior members < f the splendid inter-national staff of Allied Command Europe will be found toconcur. I wish to record that these afficers are men ofintegrity, loyalty, professional competence and devotionto duty unsurpassed by any comparable group it has beenmy good forture to know in my nearly forty years inthe military service of the United States, and those fortyyears have been enriched by the privilege of heavy respon-

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by association with the military Itptrs ofmany nations.

58. Joined in devotion to the cause of peace andsecurity of all we prize, convinced of the aim and theurgency of our individual efforts, we nave now to sustainthe momentum that has brought us thus far *md tomaintdn our faith in the values we strive to defend.

M, B. RIDGWAY,General, United States Army

Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATIONNORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

NATIONAL MINISTERSPERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES

SECRETARY GENERALI N T E R N A T I O N A L STAFF

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COMMIT!El( W A S H I N G T O N )

C H A N N E L C O M M I U E EBEL, PR. NETH, UK

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PRINCIPAL HEADQUARTERS. ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE

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