Section 14 - Presumption of Innocence

7/21/2019 Section 14 - Presumption of Innocence

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SECTION 14 PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

G.R. No. L-21325 October 29, 1971

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLEO DRAMAYO, PATERNO

ECUBIN, PRIOLO BILLONA, FRANCISCO BILLONA,MODESTO RONQUILLA, CRESCENCIO SAVANDALand SEVERO SAVANDAL, defendants; PABLEODRAMAYO and PATERNO ECUBIN, defendants-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar,Assistant Solicitor General Arturo G. Ibarra andSolicitor Conrado T. Limcaoco for plaintiff-appellee.

Arturo E. Balbastro for defendants-appellants.

FERNANDO, J.:

There is an element of ingenuity as well as of novel inthe plea made by counsel de oficioin this appeal of the

accused Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, whowere sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder ofEstelito Nogaliza. The claim is vigorously pressed thatbecause the information alleged conspiracy on the partof seven defendants, with only the two appellantsbeing convicted, two having been utilized as statewitnesses and the other three having been acquittedon the ground of insufficiency of evidence as to theirculpability, the judgment of conviction against theappellants cannot stand, there being a reasonable

doubt as to their guilt. To bolster such a contention,certain alleged deficiencies in the proof offered by theprosecution were noted. A careful study of theevidence of record would leave no other rationalconclusion but that the deceased met his death at thehands of the appellants in the manner as found by the

lower court. Hence the appeal cannot prosper. Weaffirm.

The gory incident which was attended by a fatalitystarted on the morning of January 9, 1964. The twoaccused, now appellants, Pableo Dramayo andPaterno Ecubin, in the company of the deceasedEstelito Nogaliza, all of Barrio Magsaysay, of theMunicipality of Sapao, Surigao del Norte, saw its chiefof police. Their purpose was to shed light on a robberycommitted in the house of the deceased five daysbefore by being available as witnesses. The responsewas decidedly in the negative as they themselves wereprime suspects, having been implicated by at least twoindividuals who had confessed. At about 7:00 o'clockof the same day, while they were in the house of theirco-accused Priolo Billona, the accused Dramayo

invited all those present including the other accusedFrancisco Billons, Modesto Ronquilla. Crescencio andSevero Savandal, for a drinking session at a place atthe back of the school house. It was on that occasionthat Dramayo brought up the idea of killing EstelitoNogaliza so that he could not testify in the robberycase. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin toambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. Theothers were to station themselves nearby.1


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Soon the unfortunate victim was sighted. He wasaccosted by Dramayo with a request for a cigarette. Itwas then that Ecubin hit him with a piece of wood onthe side of the head near the right ear. Dramayo'sparticipation consisted of repeated stabs with a shortpointed bolo as he lay prostrate from the blow of

Ecubin. It was the former also, who warned the rest ofthe group to keep their mouths sealed as to what hadjust happened. His equanimity appeared undisturbedfor early the next morning, he went to the house of thedeceased and informed the, latter's widow Corazonthat he had just seen the cadaver of Estelito. Thebarrio lieutenant and the chief of police were dulynotified. The latter, upon noticing blood stains on thetrousers of Dramayo, asked him to explain. Theanswer was that a skin ailment of his daughter was thecause thereof. 2 The death was due to the woundsinflicted, two in the epigastric region, one in the rightlumbar region, and another in the left breast.

It was on the basis of the above testimony offered bythe prosecution that the lower court reached itsdecision. Its dispositive portion found the accused, now

appellant Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, guiltybeyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of [murder],defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the RevisedPenal Code, qualified by the circumstance of evidentpremeditation aggravated by night time, and imposesupon each of the said accused, Pableo Dramayo andPaterno Ecubin, the penalty of [reclusion perpetual]."3Reference was likewise made in such decision as towhy the other co-accused were not convicted, two of

them, Crescencio Savandal and Severo Savandal

being utilized as state witnesses, and the others three,Priolo Billona, Francisco Billona and Modesto Roquillaacquitted.

Why they should not be found guilty was explained inthe appealed decision thus: "From the beginning the

accused Modesto Ronquilla maintained that he wasnot with the group but that he was fishing in the seaduring the night in question. These facts that is, thatnone of the prosecution witnesses has testified thatany of these three accused actually helped in thekilling of the deceased, Estelito Nogaliza; that thesethree accused were included in the case only muchlater after the filing of this case against PableoDramayo and Paterno Ecubin; the consistentcontention of the accused Modesto Ronquilla that hewas out in the sea fishing during the night in question;and the testimonies of the accused Priolo Billona [and]Francisco [and their witnesses,] Juan Billona,Esperanza Oposa Billona, Guillerma Ponce, andAnselmo Lisondra, given in a straight-forward manner,without hesitation, revealing a clear conscience, andthe fact that the testimonies of these witnesses have

not been refuted by the PC soldiers (whom theyaccused of maltreatment] when they were available tothe prosecution, cause the Court to entertain a veryserious doubt as to the guilt of the said accused." 4

The lower court was hardly impressed with the defenseof alibi interposed by now appellants Dramayo andEcubin, and it must have been their lack of persuasivecharacter that must have led to the able brief of

counsel de oficio, Atty. Arturo E. Balbastro, stressing


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the absence of evidence sufficient to convict, there stillbeing a reasonable doubt to be implied from the factthat while conspiracy was alleged, only two of theseven accused were held culpable. To repeat, ameticulous appraisal of the evidence justifies a findingof the guilt of the appellants for the offense charged,

thus calling for the affirmance of the decision.

1. It is to be admitted that the starting point is thePresumption of innocence. So it must be, according tothe Constitution. 5 That is a right safeguarded bothappellants. Accusation is not, according to thefundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It isincumbent on the prosecution demonstrate thatculpability lies. Appellants were not even called uponthen to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom isforfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessaryfor conviction be in existence. Their guilt be shownbeyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard thisCourt has always been committed. There is need,therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimonyof the state, both oral and documentary, independentlywhatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if

judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at aconclusion that the crime had been committedprecisely by the person on trial under such an exactingtest should sentence be one of conviction. It is thusrequired that circumstance favoring his innocence beduly taken into count. The proof against him mustsurvive the reason; the strongest suspicion must notbe permitted to sway away judgment. The consciencemust be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid

the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only

did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to acrime. What is required then is moral certainty.

So it has been held from the 1903 decision of UnitedStates v. Reyes.6United States v. Lasada,7decided in1910, yields this excerpt: "By reasonable doubt is

meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is doubtengendered by an investigation of the whole proof andan inability, after such investigation, to let the mind resteasy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certain ofguilt is not demanded by the law to convict of anycarnal charge but moral certainty is required, and thiscertainty is required as to every proposition of proofregular to constitute the offense."8To the same effectis an excerpt from the opinion of the late JusticeTuason in People v. Esquivel. 9 Thus: "In thisconnection it may not be out of place to bring to theattention of prosecuting attorneys the absolutenecessity of laying before the court the pertinent factsas their disposal with methodical and meticulousattention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gapsand loopholes in their evidence, to the end that thecourt's mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the

innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escapeunpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution'sprime duty to the court, to the accused, and to thestate." 10

It is understandable why the stress should be on theabsence of sufficient evidence to establish the guilt ofappellants beyond reasonable doubt, the defense ofalibi interposed hardly meriting any further discussion.

It cannot be denied though that the credible and


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competent evidence of record resulted in moralcertainty being entertained not only by the trial judgebut by us as to the culpability of appellants. The forceof the controlling doctrines, on the other hand, requiredthat the other three accused be acquitted preciselybecause, unlike in the case of appellants, the requisite

quantum of proof to show guilt beyond reasonabledoubt was not present. There is no question as to theother two who testified for the state being likewise nolong subject to any criminal liability. The reference thento opinion of the late Justice Laurel, stressing the needfor adhering to the fundamental postulate that a findingof guilt is allowable only when no reasonable doubtcould be entertained, is unavailing. This is evident fromthe very citation in the brief of appellants of the opinionof Justice Laurel in People v. Manoji. 11 Thus: "Uponthe other hand there are certain facts which if takentogether are sufficient to raise in the mind of the courta grave doubt as to the guilt of the defendant-appellant, 'that doubt engendered by an investigationof the whole proof and an inability after suchinvestigation, to let the mind rest easy upon thecertainty of guilt.' (U.S. v. Lasada [1910], 18 Phil. 90,

96.) The finding of the two gold teeth of the deceasedthe suitcase of Maradani, and the testimony of ErajioEllo that he gave the hat ... to Maradani not onlyengender serious doubt in our minds as to the guilt ofthe appellant but also seems to sustain the theory ofthe defense and strengthen the suspicion of the trialcourt, that Maradani and Salupudin are not foreign to,or entirely ignorant of, the killing of Seijin Ige. In thelight of the facts and circumstances of record, we feel

that it is better to acquit a man upon the ground of

reasonable doubt, even though he may in reality beguilty, than to confine in the penitentiary for the rest ofhis natural life a person who may be innocent. ..." 12The facts of the present case certainly do not fit withinthe above mold. Reliance on the part of appellants onthe above decision is therefore futile.

The judgment of conviction should not haveoccasioned any surprise on the part of the twoappellants, as from the evidence deserving of thefullest credence, their guilt had been more than amplydemonstrated. The presumption of innocence couldnot come to their rescue as it was more thansufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered bythe prosecution. What would have been a blot on thelaw is that if, on the facts as established, noreasonable doubt being entertained, the two appellantswould have been acquitted likewise just because theother five defendants, for the reasons above stated,were not similarly sentenced. The principal contentionraised is thus clearly untenable. It must be statedlikewise that while squarely advanced for the first time,there had been cases where this Court,

notwithstanding a majority of the defendants beingacquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise beingallegedly present, did hold the party or parties,responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged,a moral certainty having arisen as to their capability. 13

2. The brief for appellants did seek to fortify theallegation as to their guilt not having been sufficientlydemonstrated with the contention that the lower court

overlooked or did not properly consider material and


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significant facts of record that ought to havesubstantially affected or altered the judgment. Even themost careful reading of such brief, however, with duerecognition of the vigor in which this particular point ispressed, would not destroy the credibility of the factsas testified to concerning the manner in which the

deceased was killed and the motive that promptedappellants to put an end to his life. That such a versioncould not have been concocted is shown by theundeniable fact that the two appellants were dulyconvicted of robbery, with the deceased as theoffended party. It was understandable then why theywould want to do away with the principal witnessagainst them. There was thus a strong inducement forthe appellants to have committed this crime of murder.With the testimony of record pointing to no otherconclusion except the perpetration of the killing bythem, the effort of their counsel, while to be expectedfrom an advocate zealous in defense of his clients'rights, certainly should not be attended with success. Itsuffices to reiterate the well-settled principle that thisCourt has invariably respected the findings of facts of atrial judge who was in a position to weigh and appraise

the testimony before him except when, as was notshown in this case, circumstances weight or influencewere ignored or disregarded by him. 14

WHEREFORE, the judgment of September 8, 1965affirmed with the modification that the indemnificationto the heirs of Estelito Nogaliza should be in the sumP12,000.00. With costs.

G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980

PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, andALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners,vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Raul M. Gonzales for petitioners

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:

This is a Petition for Prohibition with PreliminaryInjunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners,in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly

situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission onElections (COMELEC) from implementing certainprovisions of Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 forbeing unconstitutional.

The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, isa former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed hiscertificate of candidacy for said position of Governor inthe forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980.

Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualifiedvoter and a member of the Bar who, as such, hastaken his oath to support the Constitution and obey thelaws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., isalso a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident ofSan Miguel, Iloilo.

Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions theconstitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg.

52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal


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protection and due process guarantees of theConstitution. Said Section 4 provides:

Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violationof section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution anddisqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are

hereby declared as disqualification for any of theelective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.

Any retired elective provincial city or municipal officialwho has received payment of the retirement benefits towhich he is entitled under the law, and who shall havebeen 6,5 years of age at the commencement of theterm of office to which he seeks to be elected shall notbe qualified to run for the same elective local office

from which he has retired (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provisionis directed insidiously against him, and that theclassification provided therein is based on "purelyarbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation."

For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr.assail the validity of the following statutory provisions:

Sec 7. Terms of Office Unless sooner removed forcause, all local elective officials hereinabovementioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years,which shall commence on the first Monday of March1980.

.... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4.

Sec. 4. ...

Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty tothe State, including acts amounting to subversion,insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall notbe qualified to be a candidate for any of the officescovered by this Act, or to participate in any partisanpolitical activity therein:

provided that a judgment of conviction for any of theaforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence ofsuch fact and

the filing of charges for the commission of such crimesbefore a civil court or military tribunal after preliminaryinvestigation shall be prima fascie evidence of suchfact.

... (Batas Pambansa Big. 52) (Paragraphing andEmphasis supplied).

Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials ... Theelection shall be held on January 30, 1980. (BatasPambansa, Blg. 52)

Section 6. Election and Campaign Period The

election period shall be fixed by the Commission onElections in accordance with Section 6, Art. XII-C ofthe Constitution. The period of campaign shallcommence on December 29, 1979 and terminate onJanuary 28, 1980. (ibid.)

In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitionersIgot and Salapantan, Jr. also question the accreditationof some political parties by respondent COMELEC, asauthorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground


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that it is contrary to section 9(1)Art. XIIC of theConstitution, which provides that a "bona fidecandidate for any public office shall be it. from anyform of harassment and discrimination. "The questionof accreditation will not be taken up in this case but inthat of Bacalso, et als. vs. COMELEC et als. No. L-

52232) where the issue has been squarely raised,

Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions theyhave challenged be declared null and void for beingviolative of the Constitution.

I . The procedural Aspect

At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition

suffers from basic procedural infirmities, hence,traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution. Forone, there is a misjoinder of parties and actions.Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that ofpetitioners Igot and Salapantan Petitioner Dumlaodoes not join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in theburden of their complaint, nor do the latter join Dumlaoin his. The respectively contest completely differentstatutory provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has joined thissuit in his individual capacity as a candidate. Theaction of petitioners Igot and Salapantan is more in thenature of a taxpayer's suit. Although petitioners pleadnine constraints as the reason of their joint Petition, itwould have required only a modicum more of effort torpetitioner Dumlao, on one hand said petitioners lgotand Salapantan, on the other, to have filed separatesuits, in the interest of orderly procedure.

For another, there are standards that have to be

followed inthe exercise of the function of judicialreview, namely (1) the existence of an appropriatecase:, (2) an interest personal and substantial by theparty raising the constitutional question: (3) the pleathat the function be exercised at the earliestopportunity and (4) the necessity that the constiutional

question be passed upon in order to decide the case(People vs. Vera 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).

It may be conceded that the third requisite has beencomplied with, which is, that the parties have raisedthe issue of constitutionality early enough in theirpleadings.

This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other

three criteria.

A. Actual case and controversy.

It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited tothe determination of actual cases and controversies.

Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of thefirst paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg.

52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equalprotection clause guaranteed by the Constitution, andseeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC fromimplementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has notbeen adversely affected by the application of thatprovision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualificationhas been filed before the COMELEC. There is noruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which

this Court is being asked to review on Certiorari. His isa question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue,


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and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion fromthis Court to be rendered without the benefit of adetailed factual record Petitioner Dumlao's case isclearly within the primary jurisdiction (see concurringOpinion of now Chief Justice Fernando in Peralta vs.Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of respondent

COMELEC as provided for in section 2, Art. XII-C, forthe Constitution the pertinent portion of which reads:

"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall havethe following power and functions:

1) xxx

2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the

elections, returns and qualificationsof all members ofthe National Assembly and elective provincial and cityofficials. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision must also be related tosection 11 of Art. XII-C, which provides:

Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of theCommission may be brought to the Supreme Court on

certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days fromhis receipt of a copy thereof.

B. Proper party.

The long-standing rule has been that "the person whoimpugns the validity of a statute must have a personaland substantial interest in the case such that he hassustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its

enforcement" (People vs. Vera,supra).

In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it wasonly during the hearing, not in their Petition, that Igot issaid to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, itcannot be denied that neither one has been convictednor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nordisqualified from being candidates for local elective

positions. Neither one of them has been calle ed tohave been adversely affected by the operation of thestatutory provisions they assail as unconstitutionalTheirs is a generated grievance. They have nopersonal nor substantial interest at stake. In theabsence of any litigate interest, they can claim nolocus standiin seeking judicial redress.

It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan haveinstituted this case as a taxpayer's suit, and that therule enunciated in People vs. Vera, above stated, hasbeen relaxed in Pascual vs. The Secretary of PublicWorks (110 Phil. 331 [1960], thus:

... it is well settled that the validity of a statute may becontested only by one who will sustain a direct injury inconsequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many

decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, lawsproviding for the disbursement of public funds, uponthe theory that "the expenditure of public funds, by anofficer of the State for the purpose of administering anunconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication ofsuch funds," which may be enjoined at the request of ataxpayer.

In the same vein, it has been held:

In the determination of the degree of interest essential


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to give the requisite standing to attack theconstitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that notonly persons individually affected, but also taxpayershave sufficient interest in preventing the illegalexpenditure of moneys raised by taxation and theymay, therefore, question the constitutionality of

statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys.(Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., et als., vs.Gimenez, et als., 15 SCRA 479 [1965]).

However, the statutory provisions questioned in thiscase, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and sections 4, 1,and 6 BP Blg. 52, do not directly involve thedisbursement of public funds. While, concededly, theelections to be held involve the expenditure of public

moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitionersallege that their tax money is "being extracted andspent in violation of specific constitutional protectionsagainst abuses of legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen,392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplicationof such funds by respondent COMELEC (see Pascualvs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), orthat public money is being deflected to any improper

purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrainrespondent from wasting public funds through theenforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.(Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18SCRA 300 [1966]), citingPhilippine ConstitutionAssociation vs. Gimenez,15 SCRA 479 [1965]).Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se is noassurance of judicial review. As held by this Court inTan vs. Macapagal(43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking

through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested

with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suitshould be entertained.

C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.

Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a

wellsettled rule that the constitutionality of an act of thelegislature will not be determined by the courts unlessthat question is properly raised and presented inappropriate cases and is necessary to a determinationof the case; i.e., the issue of constitutionality must bethe very lis mota presented."

We have already stated that, by the standards set forthin People vs. Vera,the present is not an "appropriate

case" for either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igotand Salapantan. They are actually without cause ofaction. It follows that the necessity for resolving theissue of constitutionality is absent, and proceduralregularity would require that this suit be dismissed.

II. The substantive viewpoint.

We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two of

the challenged provisions, the Courts not being entirelywithout discretion in the matter. Thus, adherence to thestrict procedural standard was relaxed in Tinio vs. Mina(26 SCRA 512 [1968]); Edu vs. Ericta(35 SCRA 481[1970]); and in Gonzalez vs. Comelec(27 SCRA 835[1969]), the Opinion in the Tinio and Gonzalez caseshaving been penned by our present Chief Justice. Thereasons which have impelled us are the paramountpublic interest involved and the proximity of theelections which will be held only a few days hence.


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Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BPBlg. 52 is discriminatory against him personally isbelied by the fact that several petitions for thedisqualification of other candidates for local positionsbased on the challenged provision have already beenfiled with the COMELEC (as listed in p. 15,

respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrowsDumlao's contention of intentional or purposefuldiscrimination.

The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contraryto the safer guard of equal protection is neither welltaken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protectionof the laws is subject to rational classification. If thegroupings are based on reasonable and real

differentiations, one class can be treated and regulateddifferently from another class. For purposes of publicservice, employees 65 years of age, have been validlyclassified differently from younger employees.Employees attaining that age are subject tocompulsory retirement, while those of younger agesare not so compulsorily retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipalpositions, to require that candidates should not bemore than 65 years of age at the time they assumeoffice, if applicable to everyone, might or might not bea reasonable classification although, as the SolicitorGeneral has intimated, a good policy of the law wouldbe to promote the emergence of younger blood in ourpolitical elective echelons. On the other hand, it mightbe that persons more than 65 years old may also be

good elective local officials.

Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement fromgovernment service may or may not be a reasonabledisqualification for elective local officials. For one thing,there can also be retirees from government service atages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable todisqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old retiree

could be a good local official just like one, aged 65,who is not a retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official,who has retired from a provincial, city or municipaloffice, there is reason to disqualify him from running forthe same office from which he had retired, as providedfor in the challenged provision. The need for new bloodassumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for

government work is present, and what is emphaticallysignificant is that the retired employee has alreadydeclared himself tired and unavailable for the samegovernment work, but, which, by virtue of a change ofmind, he would like to assume again. It is for this veryreason that inequality will neither result from theapplication of the challenged provision. Just as thatprovision does not deny equal protection neither does

it permit of such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil.56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are sinlilarlytreated.

In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protectionclause does not forbid all legal classification. What isproscribes is a classification which is arbitrary andunreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is notviolated by a reasonable classification based upon

substantial distinctions, where the classification is


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germane to the purpose of the law and applies to allChose belonging to the same class (Peralta vs.Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas,18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v. Embroidery andApparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336[1967]; Inchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez 101 Phil.

1155 [1957]). The purpose of the law is to allow theemergence of younger blood in local governments.The classification in question being pursuant to thatpurpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even it attimes, it may be susceptible to the objection that it ismarred by theoretical inconsistencies" (Chief JusticeFernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 1977ed., p. 547).

There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is ashowing of the clear invalidity of the questionedprovision. Well accepted is the rule that to justify thenullification of a law, there must be a clear andunequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtfuland equivocal breach. Courts are practicallyunanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall notbe declared invalid unless the conflict with the

Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt (Peraltavs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 55 [1978], citing Cooper vs.Telfair 4 Dall 14; Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law,3rd ed. 1942, 56). Lastly, it is within the compentenceof the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one whodesires to become a candidate for office provided theyare reasonable, as in this case.

In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are

concerned, the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and whichthey challenge, may be divided in two parts. The firstprovides:

a.judgment of conviction jor any of the aforementionedcrimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact...

The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as thecardinal principle. We are aware of the presumption ofvalidity that attaches to a challenged statute, of thewell-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts shouldbe resolved in favor of constitutionality," and thatCourts will not set aside a statute as constitutionallydefective "except in a clear case." (People vs. Vera,supra). We are constrained to hold that this is one

such clear case.

Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in allcriminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumedinnocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoythe right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV,section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation,according to the fundamental law, is not synonymouswith guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes theconstitutional presumption of innocence, as acandidate is disqualified from running for public officeon the ground alone that charges have been filedagainst him before a civil or military tribunal. Itcondemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect,except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is madebetween a person convicted of acts of dislotalty andone against whom charges have been filed for such

acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for


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public office. A person disqualified to run for publicoffice on the ground that charges have been filedagainst him is virtually placed in the same category asa person already convicted of a crime with the penaltyof arresto, which carries with it the accessory penaltyof suspension of the right to hold office during the term

of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).

And although the filing of charges is considered as butprima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted,yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because ofthe proximity of the elections, time constraints willprevent one charged with acts of disloyalty fromoffering contrary proof to overcome theprima facieevidence against him.

Additionally, it is best that evidenceproand con of actsof disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather thanbefore an administrative body such as the COMELEC.A highly possible conflict of findings between twogovernment bodies, to the extreme detriment of aperson charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore,a legislative/administrative determination of guiltshould not be allowed to be substituted for a judicialdetermination.

Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partialdeclaration of nullity of only that objectionable portionis mandated. It is separable from the first portion of thesecond paragraph of section 4 of Batas PambansaBig. 52 which can stand by itself.

WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 ofBatas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.

Said paragraph reads:

SEC. 4. Special disqualification. In addition toviolation of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of theConstitution and disqualifications mentioned in existinglaws which are hereby declared as disqualification for

any of the elective officials enumerated in Section 1hereof, any retired elective provincial, city or municipalofficial, who has received payment of the retirementbenefits to which he is entitled under the law and whoshall have been 65 years of age at the commencementof the term of office to which he seeks to be elected,shall not be qualified to run for the same elective localoffice from which he has retired.

2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 ofBatas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "... the filingof charges for the commission of such crimes before acivil court or military tribunal after preliminaryinvestigation shall beprima facie evidence of suchfact", is hereby declared null and void, for beingviolative of the constitutional presumption of innocenceguaranteed to an accused.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 112889 April 18, 1995

BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioner,vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDUARDOT. RODRIGUEZ, respondents.


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VITUG, J.:

The Court is called upon, in this petition for certiorari,to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on themeaning of the term "fugitive from justice as thatphrase is so used under the provisions of Section

40(e) of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No.7160). That law states:

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons aredisqualified from running for any elective local position:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political

cases here or abroad(.)

Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for theelective position for the elective position in theProvince of Quezon in the 11th May 1992 electionsfiled this petition for certiorari praying for the reversal ofthe resolution of the Commission on Elections("COMELEC") which dismissed his petition for quowarrantoagainst the winning candidate, herein private

respondent Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly afugitive from justice.

It is averred that at the time private respondent filed hiscertificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against himfor ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft ofpersonal property was still pending before theMunicipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District,County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. Awarrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed,

has yet to be served on private respondent on accountof his alleged "flight" from that country.

Before the 11th May 1992 elections, a petition forcancellation (SPA 92-065) of respondent's certificate ofcandidacy, on the ground of the candidate's

disqualification under Section 40(e) of the LocalGovernment Code, was filed by petitioner with theCOMELEC. On 08 May 1992, the COMELECdismissed the petition.

Petitioner's subsequent recourse to this Court (in G.R.No. 105310) from the 08th May 1992 resolution ofCOMELEC was dismissed without prejudice, however,to the filing in due time of a possible post-election quo

warranto proceeding against private respondent. TheCourt, in its resolution of 02 June 1992, held:

Evidently, the matter elevated to this Court was a pre-proclamation controversy. Since the privaterespondent had already been proclaimed as the dulyelected Governor of the Province of Quezon, thepetition below for disqualification has ceased to be apre-proclamation controversy. In Casimiro vs.Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 84462-63 andAntonio vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos.84678-79, jointly decided on 29 March 1989, 171SCRA 468, this court held that a pre-proclamationcontroversy is no longer viable at this point of time andshould be dismissed. The proper remedy of thepetitioner is to pursue the disqualification suit in aseparate proceeding.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the


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petition, without prejudice to the filing of theappropriate proceedings in the proper forum, if sodesired, within ten (10) days from notice. 1

Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect ofQuezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner

instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28)against private respondent before the COMELEC. Inits 02 February 1993 resolution, the COMELEC(Second Division) dismissed the petition. TheCOMELEC En Banc, on 02 December 1993, denied areconsideration of the resolution.

Hence, this petition for certiorari, the core issue ofwhich, such as to be expected, focuses on whether

private respondent who, at the time of the filing of hiscertificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to befacing a criminal charge before a foreign court andevading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term"fugitive from justice" contemplated by Section 40(e) ofthe Local Government Code and, therefore,disqualified from being a candidate for, and therebyineligible from holding on to, an elective local office.

Petitioner's position is perspicuous and to the point.The law, he asseverates, needs no furtherinterpretation and construction. Section 40(e) ofRepublic Act No. 7160, is rather clear, he submits, andit disqualifies "fugitive from justice" includes not onlythose who flee after conviction to avoid punishment butlikewise those who, after being charged flee to avoidprosecution. This definition truly finds support from

jurisprudence (Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition,

p. 399, by F.B. Moreno; Black's Law Dictionary, SixthEdition, p. 671; King vs. Noe, 244 S.C. 344, 137 S.E.2d 102, 103; Hughes vs. PFlanz, 138 Federal Reporter980; Tobin vs. Casaus, 275 Pacific Reporter, 2d., p.792), and it may be so conceded as expressing thegeneral and ordinary connotation of the term.

In turn, private respondent would have the Courtrespect the conclusions of the Oversight Committeewhich, conformably with Section 533 2 of R.A. 7160,was convened by the President to "formulate and issuethe appropriate rules and regulations necessary for theefficient and effective implementation of any and allprovisions of the Code to ensure compliance with theprinciples of Local Autonomy.

Here are some excerpts from the committee'sdeliberations:

CHAIRMAN MERCADO. Session is resumed.

So, we are in agreement to retain Line 12, Page 36, asis. So next, Page 39.

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kay Benny Marquez.

REP. CUENCO: What does he want?

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kung puwede i-retain langiyan. Bahala na kung kuwestiyunin ang constitutionalitynito before the Supreme Court later on.

REP. CUENCO. Anong nakalagay diyan?


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CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Iyong disqualification to runfor public office.

Any person who is a fugitive from justice in criminal ornonpolitical cases here or abroad.

Mabigat yung abroad. One who is facing criminalcharges with the warrant of arrest pending, unserved. ..

HONORABLE SAGUISAG. I think that is even a goodpoint, ano what is a fugitive? It is not defined. Wehave loose understanding. . .

CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. So isingit na rin sa definition

of terms iyong fugitive.

Si Benny umalis na, with the understanding na okay nasa atin ito.

THE CHAIRMAN. Whether we have this rule or notshe can run. She is not a fugitive from justice. Mrs.Marcos can run at this point and I have held that for along time ago. So can. . .

MS. DOCTOR. Mr. Chairman. . .

THE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

MS. DOCTOR. Let's move to. . .

THE CHAIRMAN. Wait, wait, wait. Can we just agreeon the wording, this is very important. Manny, can you

come up?

MR. REYES. Let's use the word conviction by finaljudgment.

THE CHAIRMAN. Fugitive means somebody who isconvicted by final judgment. Okay,. Fugitive meanssomebody who is convicted by final judgment. Insert

that on Line 43 after the semi-colon. Is that approved?No objection, approved (TSN, Oversight Committee,07 May 1991).

xxx xxx xxx

THE CHAIRMAN. Andy, saan ba naman itongamendment on page 2? Sino ba ang gumawa nito?Okay, on page 2, lines 43 and 44, "fugitive from

justice". What "fugitive"? Sino ba ang gumawa nito,ha?

MR. SANCHEZ. Yes, I think, well, last time, Mr.Chairman, we agree to clarify the word "fugitive".

THE CHAIRMAN. "Fugitive from justice means aperson" ba ito, ha?

MR. SANCHEZ. Means a person...

THE CHAIRMAN. Ha?

HON. REYES. A person who has been convicted.

THE CHAIRMAN; Yes, fugitive from justice, oo.Fugitive from justice shall mean or means one who hasbeen convicted by final judgment. It means one who

has been convicted by final judgment.


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HON. DE PEDRO. Kulang pa rin ang ibig sabihinniyan.

THE CHAIRMAN. Ano? Sige, tingnan natin.

HON. DE PEDRO. Kung nasa loob ng presuhan,

fugitive pa rin siya?

THE CHAIRMAN. O, tama na yan, fugitive from justice.He has been convicted by final judgment, meaning thatif he is simply in jail and because he put up, post bail,but the case is still being reviewed, that is not yetconviction by final judgment. 3

The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious

apprehensions on the possible constitutional infirmityof Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160 if thedisqualification therein meant were to be so taken as toembrace those who merely were facing criminalcharges. A similar concern was expressed by SenatorR. A. V. Saguisag who, during the bicameralconference committee of the Senate and the House ofRepresentatives, made this reservation:

. . . de ipa-refine lang natin 'yung language especially'yung, the scope of fugitive. Medyo bothered ako doon,a. 4

The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing theLocal Government Code of 1991. It provided:

Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons

shall be disqualified from running for any elective local

position:

(a) . . .

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-politicalcases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a

person who has been convicted by final judgment. 5

(Emphasis supplied)

Private respondent reminds us that the constructionplaced upon law by the officials in charge of itsenforcement deserves great and considerable weight(Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs.CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181). The Court certainly agrees;however, when there clearly is no obscurity and

ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be madeto apply as it is so written. An administrative rule orregulation can neither expand nor constrict the law butmust remain congruent to it. The Court believes andthus holds, albeit with some personal reservations ofthe ponente (expressed during the Court's en bancdeliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules andRegulations Implementing the Local Government Codeof 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitivefrom justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive)"who has been convicted by final judgment." is aninordinate and undue circumscription of the law.

Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make anydefinite finding on whether or not, in fact, privaterespondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such termmust be interpreted and applied in the light of the

Court's opinion. The omission is understandable sincethe COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo


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warrantoon the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rulesand Regulations promulgated by the OversightCommittee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts,is thus constrained to remand the case to theCOMELEC for a determination of this unresolvedfactual matter.

WHEREFORE, the questioned resolutions of theCommission on Elections are REVERSED and SETASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED to theCommission which is DIRECTED to proceed andresolve the case with dispatch conformably with theforegoing opinion. No special pronouncement on costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 74259 February 14, 1991

GENEROSO P. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OFTHE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Law Firm of Roberto P. Halili for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:p

The petitioner seeks reversal of the decision of therespondent court dated February 27,1986, thedispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused GenerosoCorpuz y Padre, guilty beyond reasonable doubt as

principal of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds,

and there being no modifying circumstances inattendance, and applying the Indeterminate SentenceLaw, hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonmentranging from Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day ofreclusion temporal, as minimum, to Twenty (20) Yearsof reclusion temporal, as maximum; to restitute to the

provincial government of Nueva Vizcaya the sum ofP50,596.07 which is the amount misappropriated, andto pay the costs of this suit. Further, the accused isordered to suffer the penalty of perpetual specialdisqualification, and to pay a fine equal to the amountembezzled.

SO ORDERED.

As Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of theProvincial Treasurer of Nueva Vizcaya, the petitionerwas designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the saidOffice. In this capacity, he received collections,disbursed funds and made bank deposits andwithdrawals pertaining to government accounts.

On April 13, 1981, his designation as ActingSupervising Cashier was terminated, and on April 22,1981, a Transfer of Accountabilities was effectedbetween the petitioner and his successor. TheCertificate of Turnover revealed a shortage in theamount of P72,823.08.1

A letter of demand dated April 22, 1981, required thepetitioner to produce the missing amount but he wasable to pay only P10,159,50. The balance was

demanded in another letter dated October 12, 1981.This was subsequently reduced by P12,067.51 through


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the payment to the petitioner of temporarily disallowedcash items and deductions from his salary before hisdismissal from the service.2

On September 27, 1982, a final letter of demand forthe total deficiency of P50,596.07 was sent to the

petitioner. The demand not having been met, aninformation for malversation of the said amount wasfiled against him with the respondent court on October11, 1983.

The above facts are not denied by the petitioner. 3Heinsists, however, that he is not guilty of the chargebecause the shortage imputed to him was malversedby other persons.

His claim is that the P50,000.00 constituting the bulk ofthe shortage represented the unliquidated withdrawalmade by Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through one offour separate checks issued and encashed while thepetitioner was on official leave of absence. He avershe was later made to post the amount in his cash bookby Acting Deputy Provincial Treasurer Bernardo C.Aluning and he had no choice but to comply althoughhe had not actually received the said amount.

The four checks drawn from the Philippine NationalBank and the corresponding vouchers dated aredescribed as follows:

1. Provincial Voucher dated December 22, 1980 fromthe General Fund in the amount of P50,000.00 andpaid by PNB Check No. 956637 dated December22,1980.

2. Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 fromthe Infrastructure Fund in the amount of P50,000.00and paid by PNB Check No. NS958525 datedDecember 23,1980.

3. Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from

the General Fund in the amount of P50,000.00 andpaid by PNB Cheek No. 956639J dated December22,1980.

4. Provincial Voucher dated December 29, 1980 fromthe Infrastructure Fund in the amount of P50,000.00and paid by PNB Check No. 958226 dated December29,1980.

Testifying for the prosecution, Pineda insisted he hadliquidated all four checks after the amounts thereofwere disbursed, turning over to the petitioner thecorresponding withdrawal vouchers, paid vouchers,and payrolls, (which were all submitted as exhibits ). 4He added that the petitioner was not really absent onthe dates in question as alleged but was in fact the onewho prepared the said checks in the morning beforeattending to the sick wife in the hospital, returning tothe office in the afternoon. He said that the payrollpayments made on December 22, 23 and 29, 1980,were liquidated on December 29, 1980, after thepetitioner came back from the hospital.5

Acting Provincial Treasurer Perfecto Martinezcorroborated Pineda's testimony that the petitioner wasnot on official leave on the dates in question. He said

that although Check No. 958525 had already beenencashed on December 23 1980, the encashment was


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not immediately recorded in the petitioner's cashbook,"which (was) one way of temporarily hiding the earlydetection of a shortage." It was only in March 1981 thatthe shortage was discovered and, when confrontedwith it, the petitioner had no explanation to offer. 6

Aluning denied he had exerted pressure on thepetitioner to post the shortage in the petitioner's cashbook. He explained that after receiving the bankstatement from the PNB for December 1980, hediscovered that although the amount of P50,000.00appeared to have been already encashed, theencashment was not reflected in the petitioner's cashbook. As his superior, he required the petitioner tomake the proper entry in the cash book because the

amount withdrawn was already part of the latter'saccountability. 7

After considering the evidence of the parties, theSandiganbayan, through Justice Amante Q. Alconcel,made the following findings:

The evidence on record is devoid of any explanationfrom the defense as to the amount of P595.87. Hence,

the accused must be held answerable for themisappropriation of the said amount.

As to the amount of P50,000.00, We are not disposedto give credence to his claim that same has not beenliquidated by the paymaster, for the following reasons:

First, Check No. 958525 is only one of four (4) checksissued and encashed for the same purpose, and thatis, to pay salary differentials as well as salaries and

wages of provincial officials and employees of theprovince of Nueva Vizcaya covering the period,January to December, 1980. Issuance andencashment occurred on December 23, 1980, and infact, another check (No. 956639) was also issued andencashed on the same day. The two (2) other checks

(Nos. 956637 and 958526) were issued and encashedon December 22 and 29, 1980, respectively. Except forCheck No. 958525, which was only entered inaccused's Cash Book on March 31, 1981, or three (3)months after its issuance and encashment, all theother three (3) were duly entered. Then Check No.956639 which, as pointed out above, was issued andencashed on the same day as Check No. 958525, wasduly entered in his Cash Book. Non-entry of the lattercheck on time was a subtle way of camouflaging theembezzlement of its money equivalent.

Secondly, there seems to be no logical reason whyChecks Nos. 956639 and 958525, could not have beenliquidated together by Diosdado Pineda who used theproceeds to pay salary differentials of governmentofficials and employees of the province of Nueva

Vizcaya, since these have been issued and encashedon the same day.

Thirdly, Diosdado Pineda, who was presented as aprosecution witness, swore that he duly liquidated theproceeds of the four (4) checks as follows:

ATTY. DEL ROSARIO ON DIRECT EXAMINATION:

Q If the payroll is already accomplished, where do yougive the payroll?


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A I give it back to the cashier with the correspondingvoucher to support the vouchers paid by me ordisbursed by me.

ATTY. ESCAREAL:

Q So that your cash advances will be liquidated?

A Yes, Your honor.

xxx xxx xxx

Q In the absence of the cashier to whom do you givethese documents?

A give them to the cashier only, no other person.

ATTY. DEL ROSARIO

Q In his absence, do you keep these documents?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q For payrolls that you paid for December 22, 23 and29, when did you give these payrolls to the cashier?

A On December 29, sir.

ATTY. ESCAREAL:

Q Duly accomplished?

A Duly accomplished, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. ALCONCEL:

Q Where did you see your cashier on the 29th?

A At the office, Your Honor.

ATTY. DEL ROSARIO:

Q At what time?

A In the afternoon, sir.

ATTY. ALCONCEL:

Q Are you not aware that your cashier was absent onthat date?

A He was present on that day, sir. He would go outbecause the wife was supposedly having a check-upbut in the afternoon, he would return. (t.s.n., March 29,1985, pp. 1618)

The cashier referred to by the witness is the accused,Generoso P. Corpuz.

And fourthly, We are not impressed by accused's claimthat he was absent on December 22, 23 and 29, 1980.His witness, Diosdado Pineda, declared otherwise. HisEmployee's Leave Card (Exhibit J), wherein his earnedleaves are indicated, shows that during the month ofDecember, 1980, he earned 1.25 days vacation leaveand 1.25 days sick leave, which is the same number ofdays vacation and sick leaves that he earned monthly

from July 7, 1976 to October 1981. Moreover, even if it


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were true that he was absent on December 23, 1980,the day when Check No. 958525 was issued andencashed, yet, the other check which was issued andencashed on the same day was duly liquidated.

The above findings are mainly factual and are based

on substantial evidence. There is no reason to disturbthem, absent any of the exceptional circumstances thatwill justify their review and reversal. On the contrary,the Court is convinced that the facts as establishedpoint unmistakably to the petitioner's guilt of theoffense charged.

This conclusion is bolstered by the Solicitor General'sobservation that:

Moreover, petitioner's denial of responsibility for themissing P50,000.00 is negated by the following factors:

First. When he entered the said amount in his cashbook in March, 1981, he did not make any notation thatsaid amount, though entered, was not actuallyreceived.

Second. At the time he signed the certificate of turn-over (Exhibit C), he did not make any certification thatthe amount of P50,000.00 should not be chargedagainst him.

Third. Despite his insistence that Pineda and Martinezmisappropriated the money, he did not file any case,whether civil, criminal or otherwise, against either orboth.

The absence of a post-audit is not, as the petitionercontends, a fatal omission. That is not a preliminaryrequirement to the filing of an information formalversation as long as the prima facie guilt of thesuspect has already been established. The failure of apublic officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds

or property with which he is chargeable, upon demandby any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facieevidence that he has put such missing funds orproperty to personal use. 8 And what determineswhether the crime of malversation has been committedis the presence of the following requirements underArticle 217 of the Revised Penal Code:

(a) That the offender be a public officer.

(b) That he had the custody or control of funds orproperty by reason of the duties of his office.

(c) That those funds or property were public funds orproperty for which he was accountable.

(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated orconsented or, through abandonment or negligence,

permitted another person to take them.

The petitioner's claim that he is the victim of a "sinisterdesign" to hold him responsible for a crime he has notcommitted is less than convincing. His attempt to throwthe blame on others for his failure to account for themissing money only shows it is he who is looking for ascapegoat. The plaintive protest that he is "a small fry"victimized by the "untouchables" during the Marcosregime is a mere emotional appeal that does not


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impress at all. The suggestion that the supposedinjustice on the petitioner would be abetted by thisCourt unless his conviction is reversed must berejected as an warrant presumptuousness.

The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is

applicable only where the evidence of the parties isevenly balanced, in which case the constitutionalpresumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favorof the accused. There is no such equipoise here. Theevidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and hasnot been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulousclaims of persecution and conspiracy. The presumedinnocence of the accused must yield to the positivefinding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the

prejudice of the public whose confidence he hasbreached. His conviction must be affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costsagainst the petitioner. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 94262 May 31, 1991

FEEDER INTERNATIONAL LINE, PTE., LTD., by its

agent, FEEDER INTERNATIONAL (PHILS.) INC.,petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FourteenthDivision, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, andCOMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondents.

Emma Quisumbing-Fernando and YolandaQuisumbing-Javellana & Associates for petitioner.

REGALADO, J.:p

The instant petition seeks the reversal of the decisionof respondent Court of Appeals dated May 8, 1990,affirming the decision rendered by respondent Court ofTax Appeals which found the vessel M/T "ULU WAI"

liable under Section 2530(a) of the Tariff and CustomsCode of the Philippines (Presidential Decree No.1464), as amended, and its cargo of 1,100 metric tonsof gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil liable underSection 2530(a), (f), and (1-1) of the same Code andordering the forfeiture of the said vessel and its cargo. 1

The facts as culled from the decision of the Court ofAppeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 20470 are as follows:

The M/T "ULU WAI" foreign vessel of Honduranregistry, owned and operated by Feeder InternationalShipping Lines of Singapore, left Singapore on May 6,1986 carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000metric tons of fuel oil consigned to Far East SynergyCorporation of Zamboanga, Philippines.

On May 14, 1986, the vessel anchored at the vicinity of

Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notifying the Iloilocustoms authorities. The presence of the vessel onlycame to the knowledge of the Iloilo authorities byinformation of the civilian informer in the area. Actingon said information, the Acting District Collector ofIloilo dispatched a Customs team on May 19, 1986 toverify the report.

The Customs team found out that the vessel did nothave on board the required ship and shipping


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documents, except for a clearance from the portauthorities of Singapore clearing the vessel for"Zamboanga."

In view thereof, the vessel and its cargo were held anda Warrant of Seizure and Detention over the same was

issued after due investigation. The petitioner then filedits Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Warrants ofSeizure and Detention which the District Collectordenied in his Order dated December 12, 1986.

In the course of the forfeiture proceedings, the parties,through their respective counsel, agreed on astipulation of facts, to wit:

l. That the existence and identity of MT "ULU WAI"subject of Sl-2-86, herein identified as Exh. "A", isadmitted.

2. That the existence and identity of l,100 metric tonsof gas oil, subject of Sl-2-86-A, herein identified asExh. "B", is admitted;

3. That the existence and identity of 1,000 metric tons

of fuel oil, subject of Sl-2-86 herein identified as Exh."B-1", is admitted;

4. That M/T "ULU WAI" left Singapore May 6, 1986 andwas cleared by Singapore customs authorities forZamboanga, Philippines;

5. That subject vessel arrived at Guiuanon Island,Municipality of Nueva Valencia, sub-province of

Guimaras, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, about

1120HRS, May 14,1986;

6. That subject vessel was boarded by Customs andImmigration authorities for the first time in theafternoon of May 19, 1986, at about 1600HRS;

7. That an apprehension report dated May 21, 1986,submitted by the Team leader of the Customs andImmigration Team, Roberto Intrepido, marked andidentified as Exh. "C", is admitted;

8. That at the time of boarding, the Master of subjectvessel could not produce any ship and/or shippingdocuments regarding her cargo except the PortClearance Certificate No. 179999 issued by the Port of

Singapore authority dated May 4, 1986, marked asExh. "D", which is hereby admitted;

9. That on May 26, 1986, the Master of M/T "ULUWAI", Capt. Romeo E. Deposa filed a Marine Protestdated same date, which Marine Protest, marked andidentified as Exh. "E", is hereby admitted;

10. That the sworn statement of said Capt. Romeo E.

Deposa, marked and identified as Exh. "F", given onMay 26, 1986 before Atty. Hernando Hinojales,Customs Legal Officer, is admitted;

11. That the sworn statement of Mr. Antonio Torres,Owner's representative of M/T "ULU WAI" marked andidentified as Exh. "G" given before Atty. HernandoHinojales on May 28,1986, is admitted;

12. That the sworn statement of Wilfredo Lumagpas,


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Master of M/T "CATHEAD" given before Lt. DennisAzarraga on June 4, 1986, marked and identified asExh. "H", is admitted;

13. That the existence of Fixture Note No. FN-M-86-05-41 entered into by and between the National

Stevedoring & Lighterage Corporation and the FarEast Synergy Corporation, marked and identified asExh. "I", is admitted; and;

14. That the Preliminary Report of Survey SoundingReport dated June 17, 1986, signed by J.P. Piad,Surveyor of Interport Surveying Services, Inc. and dulyattested by Ernesto Cutay, Chief Officer of the M/T"ULU WAI" marked and identified as Exh. "J", is also

admitted. 2

On March 17, 1987, the District Collector issued hisdecision, with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the M/T "ULUWAI" hereby found guilty of violating Section 2530 (a)of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (PD1464), as amended, while her cargo of 1,100 M/T Gas

Oil and 1,000 M/T Fuel Oil are hereby found guilty ofviolating Section 2530* (a), (f), and (1-1) under thesame Code and are hereby forfeited in favor of theRepublic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.3

Petitioner appealed to the Commissioner of Customswho rendered a decision dated May 13, 1987, the

decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decisiondated March 19, 1987 of the District Collector ofCustoms of Iloilo, ordering the forfeiture of M/T "ULUWAI" and its cargo of 2,100 metric tons of gas and fueloil is hereby affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.4

On June 25, 1987, petitioner filed a petition for reviewof the decisions of the Collector and the Commissionerof Customs with the Court of Tax Appeals, praying forthe issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or arestraining order to enjoin the Commissioner fromimplementing his decision. On December 14, 1988, theCourt of Tax Appeals issued its decision, with this

dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondentCommissioner of Customs dated May 13, 1987,ordering the forfeiture of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" forviolation of Section 2530(a) of the Tariff and CustomCodes (sic), as amended, and its cargo of 1,100 metrictons of Gas Oil and 1,000 metric tons of Fuel Oil forviolation of Section 2530 * (a) and (f), and (I-1) of the

same Code, is hereby affirmed. With costs.

SO ORDERED. 5

Petitioner, on January 19, 1990, filed a petition forreview of the Court of Tax Appeals' decision with thisCourt. On March 21, 1990, we issued a resolution 6referring the disposition of the case to the Court ofAppeals in view of our decision inDevelopment Bankof the Philippines vs.Court of Appeals,et al. 7holding


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that final judgments or decrees of the Court of TaxAppeals are within the exclusive appellate jurisdictionof the Court of Appeals.

On May 8, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered itsquestioned decision affirming the decision of the Court

of Tax Appeals. Petitioner's motion for reconsiderationhaving been denied on July 4, 1990, it interposed thisinstant petition contending that:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in finding on the basis ofcircumstantial evidence that an illegal importation hadbeen committed;

2. Petitioner was deprived of property without due

process of law in that its right to be presumed innocentwas not recognized and the decision was notsupported by proof beyond reasonable doubt; and

3. The sworn statements of Deposa and Torres weretaken without assistance of counsel in violation of theirconstitutional right thereto.8

We find no merit in the Petition.

1. It must be here emphasized that a forfeitureproceeding under tariff and customs laws is not penalin nature, contrary to the argument advanced by hereinpetitioner. In the case of People vs. Court of firstInstance of Rizal etc., et al., 9 this Court made anexhaustive analysis of the nature of forfeitureproceedings, in relation to criminal proceedings, asfollows:

. . . It is quite clear that seizure and forfeitureproceedings under the tariff and customs laws are notcriminal in nature as they do not result in the convictionof the offender nor in the imposition of the penaltyprovided for in Section 3601 of the Code. As can begleaned from Section 2533 of the code, seizure

proceedings, such as those instituted in this case, arepurely civil and administrative in character, the mainpurpose of which is to enforce the administrative finesor forfeiture incident to unlawful importation of goods ortheir deliberate possession. The penalty in seizurecases is distinct and separate from the criminal liabilitythat might be imposed against the indicted importer orpossessor and both kinds of penalties may beimposed.

In the case at bar, the decision of the Collector ofCustoms, as in other seizure proceedings, concernsthe res rather than the persona. The proceeding is aprobe on contraband or illegally imported goods.These merchandise violated the revenue law of thecountry, and as such, have been prevented from beingassimilated in lawful commerce until correspondingduties are paid thereon and the penalties imposed andsatisfied either in the form of fine or of forfeiture infavor of the government who will dispose of them inaccordance with law. The importer or possessor istreated differently. The fact that the administrativepenalty be falls on him is an inconsequential incidenceto criminal liability. By the same token, the probableguilt cannot be negated simply because he was notheld administratively liable. The Collector's final

declaration that the articles are not subject to forfeiture


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does not detract his findings that untaxed goods weretransported in respondents' car and seized from theirpossession by agents of the law. Whether criminalliability lurks on the strength of the provision of theTariff and Customs Code adduced in the informationcan only be determined in a separate criminal action.

Respondents' exoneration in the administrative casescannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute. Butunder our penal laws, criminal responsibility, if any,must be proven not by preponderance of evidence butby proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Considering, therefore, that proceedings for theforfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal innature since they do not result in the conviction of the

wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty,proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in orderto justify the forfeiture of the goods. In this case, thedegree of proof required is merely substantial evidencewhich means such relevant evidence as a reasonablemind might accept as adequate to support aconclusion. 10

In the case at bar, we find and so hold that theGovernment has sufficiently established that an illegalimportation, or at least an attempt thereof, has beencommitted with the use of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI,"thus warranting the forfeiture of said vessel and itscargo pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff andCustoms Code.

Before we proceed to a discussion of the factual

findings of the Court of Appeals, it bears mention that

petitioner, which is a corporate entity, has nopersonality to invoke the right to be presumed innocentwhich right is available only to an individual who is anaccused in a criminal case.

2. The main issue for resolution is whether or not there

was an illegal importation committed, or at least anattempt thereof, which would justify a forfeiture of thesubject vessel and its cargo.

Petitioner avers that respondent court erred in findingthat an illegal importation had been committed on thebasis of circumstantial evidence, erroneously relyingon Section 5 (now Section 4), Rule 133 of the Rules ofCourt. As earlier stated, forfeiture proceedings are not

criminal in nature, hence said provision of Rule 133which involves. such circumstantial evidence as willproduce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt doesnot apply.

Section 1202 of the Tariff and Customs Code providesthat importation begins when the carrying vessel oraircraft enters the jurisdiction of the Philippines withintention to unload therein. It is clear from the provision

of the law that mere intent to unload is sufficient tocommence an importation. And "intent," being a stateof mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof, but mustordinarily be inferred from the facts, 11 and thereforecan only be proved by unguarded, expressions,conduct and circumstances generally. 12

In the case at bar, that petitioner is guilty of illegalimportation, there having been an intent to unload, isamply supported by substantial evidence as clearly


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demonstrated by this comprehensive discussion inrespondent court's decision:

It is undisputed that the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" enteredthe jurisdiction of the Philippines. The issue that callsfor Our resolution is whether or not there was an

intention to unload. The facts and circumstances borneby the evidence convince Us that there was intent tounload. The following circumstances unmistakablypoint to this conclusion.

1. Considering that the vessel came from Singapore,the route to Zamboanga was shorter and Iloilo liesfurther north. It is not logical for the sailing vessel totravel a longer distance to get the necessary repairs.

2. When the vessel M/T "ULU WAI" anchored atGuiuanon Island, Guimaras, Iloilo, it did not notify theIloilo port or Customs authorities of its arrival. Themaster of the vessel did not file a marine protest until12 days after it had anchored, despite the supposedurgency of the repairs needed and notwithstanding theprovision (Sec. 1016) of the Code requiring the masterto file protest within 24 hours.

3. At the time of boarding by the customs personnel,the required ship's and shipping documents were noton board except the clearance from Singaporean portofficials clearing the vessel for Zamboanga. Petitionerclaims that these were turned over to the shippingagent who boarded the vessel on May 15, 1986.However, this claim is belied by the sworn marineprotest (Exhibit "E") of the master of M/T "ULU WAI"Mr. Romeo Deposa.

It was only on or about the 20th of May when Iinstructed one of the crew to: get down of (sic) thevessel and find means and ways to contact thevessel's representative.

Moreover, in such Sworn Statement (Exhibit "G"), ship

agent, Antonio Torres, stated that he did not know thebuyer of the oil, which is impossible if he had the LocalPurchase Order of the alleged buyer, PogunConstruction SDN. Torres also swore that hisknowledge came from the vessel's owner, withoutmentioning the shipping documents which indicatesuch data. He also said that he did not know theconsignee of the oil which would have been patentfrom the documents. Lastly, as also pointed out by the

court a quo, the captain of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI"Romeo Deposa, in his sworn statement to customauthorities on May 26, 1986, enumerated thedocuments he allegedly gave to Mr. Antonio Torres,but did not mention as among them the LocalPurchase Order of Pogun Construction SDN and theBill of Lading.

4. When the vessel was inspected, the tugboat M/T"CATHEAD", and the large M/T "SEMIRANO NO. 819"were alongside it. A fixture note revealed that thebarge and the tugboat were contracted by ConsigneeFar East Synergy to load the cargo of the vessel intothe awaiting barge and to discharge the same toManila (Exhibits "I" and "I-1").

It is of no moment that the fixture note did not

expressly mention the vessel M/T "ULU WAI"


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Government witnesses, Asencio and Lumagpas,testified that it was the vessel's cargo which was to beunloaded and brought to Manila by them. 13

The aforequoted findings of fact of respondent Court ofAppeals are in consonance with the findings of both

the Collector and the Commissioner of Customs, asaffirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals. We, therefore,find no compelling reason to deviate from theelementary principle that findings of fact of the Court ofAppeals, and of the administrative and quasi-judicialbodies for that matter, are entitled to great weight andare conclusive and binding upon this Court absent ashowing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack of jurisdiction.

3. The fact that the testimonies of Deposa and Torreswere given without the assistance of counsel may notbe considered an outright violation of theirconstitutional right to be assisted by counsel. Asexplained in the case of Nera vs.The Auditor General:14

The right to the assistance of counsel is not

indispensable to due process unless required by theConstitution or a law. Exception is made in the charteronly during the custodial investigation of a personsuspected of a crime, who may not waive his right tocounsel except in writing and in the presence ofcounsel, and during the trial of the accused, who hasthe right "to be heard by himself and counsel," eitherretained by him or provided for him by the government

at its expense. These guarantees are embodied in the

Constitution, along with the other rights of the personfacing criminal prosecution, because of the odds hemust contend with to defend his liberty (and beforeeven his life) against the awesome authority of theState.

In other proceedings, however, the need for theassistance of counsel is not as urgent nor is it deemedessential to their validity. There is nothing in theConstitution that says a party in a non-criminalproceeding is entitled to be represented by counseland that without such representation he will not bebound by such proceedings. The assistance oflawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. Thelegal profession was not engrafted in the due process

clause such that without the participation of itsmembers the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated.The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannotvalidly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.

Besides, if ever there was any doubt as to the veracityof the sworn statements of Deposa and Torres, theyshould have been presented during any appropriatestage of the proceedings to refute or deny thestatements they made. This was not done bypetitioner. Hence, the presumption that official dutywas regularly performed stands. In addition, petitionerdoes not deny that Torres is himself a lawyer. Finally,petitioner simply contends that the sworn statementswere taken without the assistance of counsel but,however, failed to allege or prove that the same weretaken under anomalous circumstances which would

render them inadmissible as evidence against


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petitioner. We thus find no compelling reason to doubtthe validity or veracity of the said sworn statements.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lackof merit and the judgment appealed from is herebyAFFIRMEDin toto.

SO ORDERED.

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Section 14 - Presumption of Innocence

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