MANOSCA v CA

[G.R. No. 106440. January 29, 1996]

ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, ASUNCION MANOSCA and LEONICA MANOSCA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 168, HON. GRADUACION A. REYES CLARAVAL, Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 71, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

VITUG, J.:

In this appeal, via a petition for review on certiorari, from the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated 15 January 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24969 (entitled “Alejandro Manosca, et al. v. Hon. BenjaminV. Pelayo, et al.”), this Court is asked to resolve whether or not the “public use” requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a 492-square-meter parcel of land so declared by the National Historical Institute (“NHI”) as a national historical landmark.

The facts of the case are not in dispute.

Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492) square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4[2] of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 06 January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports. Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the legality of the measure. In his Opinion No. 133, Series of 1987, the Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative; he explained:

“According to your guidelines, national landmarks are places or objects that are

associated with an event, achievement, characteristic, or modification that makes a

turning point or stage in Philippine history. Thus, the birthsite of the founder of

the Iglesia ni Cristo, the late Felix Y. Manalo, who, admittedly, had made

contributions to Philippine history and culture has been declared as a national

landmark. It has been held that places invested with unusual historical interest is a

public use for which the power of eminent domain may be authorized x x x.

“In view thereof, it is believed that the National Historical Institute as an agency of

the Government charged with the maintenance and care of national shrines,

monuments and landmarks and the development of historical sites that may be

declared as national shrines, monuments and/or landmarks, may initiate the institution

of condemnation proceedings for the purpose of acquiring the lot in question in

accordance with the procedure provided for in Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of

Court. The proceedings should be instituted by the Office of the Solicitor General in

behalf of the Republic.”

Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for expropriation[3] before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI alleging, inter alia, that:

“Pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, the National Historical

Institute issued Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, which was approved on January,

1986 by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports, declaring the above

described parcel of land which is the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, founder of

the ‘Iglesia ni Cristo,’ as a National Historical Landmark. The plaintiff perforce needs

the land as such national historical landmark which is a public purpose.”

At the same time, respondent Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property. The motion was opposed by petitioners. After a hearing, the trial court issued, on 03 August 1989,[4] an order fixing the provisional market (P54,120.00) and assessed (P16,236.00) values of the property and authorizing the Republic to take over the property once the required sum would have been deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.[5] Petitioners sought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in the implementation of the 03rd August 1989 order of the trial court.

On 15 February 1990, following the filing by respondent Republic of its reply to petitioners’ motion seeking the dismissal of the case, the trial court issued its denial of said motion to dismiss.[6] Five (5)days later, or on 20 February 1990,[7] another order was issued by the trial court, declaring moot and academic the motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of the order of 03 August 1989 with the rejection of petitioners’ motion to dismiss. Petitioners’ motion for the reconsideration of the 20th February 1990 order was likewise denied by the trial court in its 16th April 1991 order.[8]

Petitioners then lodged a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. In its now disputed 15th January 1992 decision, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground that the remedy of appeal in the ordinary course of law was an adequate remedy and that the petition itself, in any case, had failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdictional competence on the part of the trial court. A motion for the reconsideration of the decision was denied in the 23rd July 1992 resolution of the appellate court.

We begin, in this present recourse of petitioners, with a few known postulates.

Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so described as “the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government” that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State.[9] It is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty.[10] The only direct constitutional qualification is that “private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.”[11] This proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced.

Petitioners assert that the expropriation has failed to meet the guidelines set by this Court in the case of Guido v. Rural Progress Administration,[12] to wit: (a) the size of the land expropriated; (b) the large number of people benefited; and, (c) the extent of social and economic reform.[13] Petitioners suggest that we confine the concept of expropriation only to the following public uses,[14] i.e., the -

“x x x taking of property for military posts, roads, streets, sidewalks, bridges, ferries,

levees, wharves, piers, public buildings including schoolhouses, parks, playgrounds,

plazas, market places, artesian wells, water supply and sewerage systems, cemeteries,

crematories, and railroads.”

This view of petitioners is much too limitative and restrictive.

The court, in Guido, merely passed upon the issue of the extent of the President’s power under Commonwealth Act No. 539 to, specifically, acquire private lands for subdivision into smaller home lots or farms for resale to bona fide tenants or occupants. It was in this particular context of the statute that the Court had made the pronouncement. The guidelines in Guido were not meant to be preclusive in nature and, most certainly, the power of eminent domain should not now be understood as being confined only to the expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed estates.[15]

The term “public use,” not having been otherwise defined by the constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency.[16] Black summarizes the characterization given by various courts to the term; thus:

“Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking

property by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, „public use‟ is one which

confers same benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to actual use by

public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed facilities for which

condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, whether exercised by

one or many members of public, a „public advantage‟ or „public benefit‟ accrues

sufficient to constitute a public use. Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457 P. 2d

769, 772, 773.

“Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the right to take

private property in virtue of eminent domain, means a use concerning the whole

community as distinguished from particular individuals. But each and every member

of society need not be equally interested in such use, or be personally and directly

affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public want or exigency, that is

sufficient. Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S.700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67

L.Ed. 1186. The term may be said to mean public usefulness, utility, or advantage, or

what is productive of general benefit. It may be limited to the inhabitants of a small or

restricted locality, but must be in common, and not for a particular individual. The use

must be a needful one for the public, which cannot be surrendered without obvious

general loss and inconvenience. A „public use‟ for which land may be taken defies

absolute definition for it changes with varying conditions of society, new appliances

in the sciences, changing conceptions of scope and functions of government, and other

differing circumstances brought about by an increase in population and new modes of

communication and transportation. Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn., 521, 245 A.2d

579,586.”[17]

The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that “public use” is strictly limited to clear cases of “use by the public” has long been discarded. This Court in Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes,[18] quoting from Berman v. Parker (348 U.S.25; 99 L. ed. 27), held:

“We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not

desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. See DayBrite

Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 US 421, 424, 96 L. Ed. 469, 472, 72 S Ct 405. The

values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It

is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be

beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as

carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have

made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to

reappraise them. If those who govern theDistrict of Columbia decide that the Nation‟s

Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth

Amendment that stands in the way.

“Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the

exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the

means to the end. See Luxton v. North River Bridge Co. 153 US 525, 529, 530, 38 L.

ed. 808, 810, 14 S Ct 891; United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co. 160 US 668,

679, 40 L. ed. 576, 580, 16 S Ct 427.”

It has been explained as early as Seña v. Manila Railroad Co.,[19] that:

“x x x A historical research discloses the meaning of the term „public use‟ to be one of

constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the individual increase and

each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted. x

x x for „whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a public use.‟”

Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states:

“The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that

a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is

undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks.

Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the

purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As

just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what

is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for

resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this

power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state

then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare

satisfies the requirement of public use.”[20]

Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration,[21] has viewed the Constitution a dynamic instrument and one that “is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically” so as to enable it “to meet adequately whatever problems the future has in store.” Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted constitutionalist himself, has aptly observed that what, in fact, has ultimatelyemerged is a concept of public use which is just as broad as “public welfare.”[22]

Petitioners ask: But “(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation of (Felix Manalo’s) birthplace become so vital as to be a public use appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent domain” when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristothan by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.[23]

Petitioners contend that they have been denied due process in the fixing of the provisional value of their property. Petitioners need merely to be reminded that what the law prohibits is the lack of opportunity to be heard;[24] contrary to petitioners’ argument, the records of this case are replete with pleadings[25] that could have dealt, directly or indirectly, with the provisional value of the property.

Petitioners, finally, would fault respondent appellate court in sustaining the trial court’s order which considered inapplicable the case of Noble v. City of Manila.[26] Both courts held correctly. The Republic was not a party to the alleged contract of exchange between the Iglesia ni Cristo and petitioners

which (the contracting parties) alone, not the Republic, could properly be bound.

All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in accord with law and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

GARCES v ESTENZO

G.R. No. L-53487 May 25, 1981

ANDRES GARCES, Reverend Father SERGIO MARILAO OSMEÑA, NICETAS DAGAR and JESUS EDULLANTES, petitioners, vs. Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Ormoc City Branch V, BARANGAY COUNCIL of Valencia, Ormoc City, Barangay Captain MANUEL C. VELOSO, Councilmen GAUDENCIO LAVEZARES, TOMAS CABATINGAN and MAXIMINO NAVARRO, Barangay Secretary CONCHITA MARAYA and Barangay Treasurer LUCENA BALTAZAR, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:1äwph ï1.ñët

This case is about the constitutionality of four resolutions of the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City, regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day. That issue was spawned by the controversy as to whether the parish priest or a layman should have the custody of the image.

On March 23, 1976, the said barangay council adopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia".

That resolution designated the members of nine committees who would take charge of the 1976 festivity. lt provided for (1) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and (2)

the construction of a waiting shed as the barangay's projects. Funds for the two projects would be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations " (Exh A or 6).

On March 26, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 6 which specified that, in accordance with the practice in Eastern Leyte, Councilman Tomas Cabatingan, the Chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta, would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor as chairman of the next feast day.

It was further provided in the resolution that the image would be made available to the Catholic parish church during the celebration of the saint's feast day (Exh. B or 7).

Resolutions Nos. 5 and 6 were submitted to a plebiscite and were duly ratified by the barangay general assembly on March 26, 1976. Two hundred seventy-two voters ratified the two resolutions (Exh. 2 and 5).

Funds were raised by means of solicitations0 and cash donations of the barangay residents and those of the neighboring places of Valencia. With those funds, the waiting shed was constructed and the wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired in Cebu City by the barangay council for four hundred pesos (Exh. F-l, 3 and 4).

On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic church of Barangay Valencia so that the devotees could worship the saint during the mass for the fiesta.

A controversy arose after the mass when the parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return that image to the barangay council on the pretext that it was the property of the church because church funds were used for its acquisition.

Several days after the fiesta or on April 11, 1976, on the occasion of his sermon during a mass, Father Osmeña allegedly uttered defamatory remarks against the barangay captain, Manuel C. Veloso, apparently in connection with the disputed image. That incident provoked Veloso to file against Father Osmeña in the city court of Ormoc City a charge for grave oral defamation.

Father Osmeña retaliated by filing administrative complaints against Veloso with the city mayor's office and the Department of Local Government and Community Development on the grounds of immorality, grave abuse of authority, acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance of the law.

Meanwhile, the image of San Vicente Ferrer remained in the Catholic church of Valencia. Because Father Osmeña did not accede to the request of Cabatingan to have custody of the image and "maliciously ignored" the council's Resolution No. 6, the council enacted on May 12, 1976 Resolution No. 10, authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a replevin case against Father Osmeña for the recovery of the image (Exh. C or 8). On June 14, 1976, the barangay council passed Resolution No. 12, appointing Veloso as its representative in the replevin case (Exh. D or 9).

The replevin case was filed in the city court of Ormoc City against Father Osmeña and Bishop Cipriano Urgel (Exh. F). After the barangay council had posted a cash bond of eight hundred pesos, Father Osmeña turned over the image to the council (p. 10, Rollo). ln his answer to the complaint for replevin, he assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions (Exh. F-1).

Later, he and three other persons, Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, and two Catholic laymen, Jesus Edullantes and Nicetas Dagar, filed against the barangay council and its members (excluding two members) a complaint in the Court of First Instance at Ormoc City, praying for the annulment of the said resolutions (Civil Case No. 1680-0).

The lower court dismissed the complaint. lt upheld the validity of the resolutions. The petitioners appealed under Republic Act No. 5440. The petitioners contend that the barangay council was not duly constituted because lsidoro M. Mañago, Jr., the chairman of the kabataang barangay, was not allowed to participate in its sessions.

Barangays used to be known as citizens assemblies (Presidential Decrees Nos. 86 and 86-A). Presidential Decree No. 557, which took effect on September 21, 1974, 70 O.G. 8450-L, directed that all barrios should be known as barangays and adopted the Revised Barrio Charter as the Barangay Charter.

Barrios are units of municipalities or municipal districts in which they are situated. They are quasi-municipal corporations endowed with such powers" as are provided by law "for the performance of particular government functions, to be exercised by and through their respective barrio governments in conformity with law" (Sec. 2, Revised Barrio Charter, R.A. No. 3590).

The barrio assembly consists of all persons who are residents of the barrio for at least six months, eighteen years of age or over and Filipino citizens duly registered in the list kept by the barrio secretary (Sec. 4, Ibid).

The barrio council, now barangay council, is composed of the barangay captain and six councilmen (Sec. 7, Ibid). Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 684, which took effect on April 15, 1975, provides that "the barangay youth chairman shall be an ex-officio member of the barangay council", having the same powers and functions as a barangay councilman.

In this case, Mañago, the barangay youth chairman, was notified of the sessions of the barangay council to be held on March 23 and 26, 1976 but he was not able to attend those sessions because he was working with a construction company based at Ipil, Ormoc City (Par. 2[d] Exh. 1).

Mañago's absence from the sessions of the barangay council did not render the said resolutions void. There was a quorum when the said resolutions were passed.

The other contention of the petitioners is that the resolutions contravene the constitutional provisions that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion" and that "no public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian

institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such. except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium (Sec. 8, Article IV and sec. 18[2], Article VIII, Constitution).

That contention is glaringly devoid of merit. The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money. The construction of a waiting shed is entirely a secular matter.

Manifestly puerile and flimsy is Petitioners argument that the barangay council favored the Catholic religion by using the funds raised by solicitations and donations for the purchase of the patron saint's wooden image and making the image available to the Catholic church.

The preposterousness of that argument is rendered more evident by the fact that counsel advanced that argument in behalf of the petitioner, Father Osmeña the parish priest.

The wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated.

If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal.

As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.

The barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church. A more practical reason for that arrangement would be that the image, if placed in a layman's custody, could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novenas.

The contradictory positions of the petitioners are shown in their affidavits. Petitioner Garces swore that the said resolutions favored the Catholic church. On the other hand, petitioners Dagar and Edullantes swore that the resolutions prejudiced the Catholics because they could see the image in the church only once a year or during the fiesta (Exh. H and J).

We find that the momentous issues of separation of church and state, freedom of religion annd the use of public money to favor any sect or church are not involved at all in this case even remotely or indirectly. lt is not a microcosmic test case on those issues.

This case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saint's image. lt would never have arisen if the parties had been more diplomatic and tactful and if Father Osmeña had taken the trouble of causing contributions to be solicited from his own parishioners for the purchase of another image of San Vicente Ferrer to be installed in his church.

There can be no question that the image in question belongs to the barangay council. Father Osmeña claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image, has the right to determine who should have custody thereof.

If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the Catholic church. that action would not violate the Constitution because the image was acquired with private funds and is its private property.

The council has the right to take measures to recover possession of the image by enacting Resolutions Nos. 10 and 12.

Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.

In Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201, what was involved was Act No. 4052 which appropriated sixty thousand pesos for the cost of plates and the printing of postage stamps with new designs. Under the law, the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Department Head and the President of the Philippines, issued in 1936 postage stamps to commemorate the celebration in Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress sponsored by the Catholic Church.

The purpose of the stamps was to raise revenue and advertise the Philippines. The design of the stamps showed a map of the Philippines and nothing about the Catholic Church. No religious purpose was intended.

Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay, the founder and head of the Philippine Independent Church, sought to enjoin the sale of those commemorative postage stamps.

It was held that the issuance of the stamps, while linked inseparably with an event of a religious character, was not designed as a propaganda for the Catholic Church. Aglipay's prohibition suit was dismissed.

The instant case is easily distinguishable from Verzosa vs. Fernandez, 49 Phil., 627 and 55 Phil. 307, where a religious brotherhood, La Archicofradia del Santisimo Sacramento, organized for the purpose of raising funds to meet the expenses for the annual fiesta in honor of the Most Holy Sacrament and the Virgin Lady of Guadalupe, was held accountable for the funds which it held as trustee. 0

Finding that the petitioners have no cause of action for the annulment of the barangay resolutions, the lower court's judgment dismissing their amended petition is affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët

Teehankee, J., concur in the result.

Fernandez, J., Concepcion Jr. J., are on leave.

AUSTRIA v NLRC

[G.R. No. 124382. August 16, 1999]

PASTOR DIONISIO V. AUSTRIA, petitioner, vs. HON. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION (Fourth Division), CEBU CITY,

CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION CORPORATION OF

THE SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTIST, ELDER HECTOR V.

GAYARES, PASTORS REUBEN MORALDE, OSCAR L. ALOLOR,

WILLIAM U. DONATO, JOEL WALES, ELY SACAY, GIDEON

BUHAT, ISACHAR GARSULA, ELISEO DOBLE, PROFIRIO

BALACY, DAVID RODRIGO, LORETO MAYPA, MR. RUFO

GASAPO, MR. EUFRONIO IBESATE, MRS. TESSIE BALACY, MR.

ZOSIMO KARA-AN, and MR. ELEUTERIO LOBITANA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

KAPUNAN, J.:

Subject to the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the

Resolution[1] of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (the “NLRC”),

rendered on 23 January 1996, in NLRC Case No. V-0120-93, entitled “Pastor Dionisio V.

Austria vs. Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of Seventh Day Adventists, et. al.,”

which dismissed the case for illegal dismissal filed by the petitioner against private respondents

for lack of jurisdiction.

Private Respondent Central Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh-Day

Adventists (hereinafter referred to as the “SDA”) is a religious corporation duly organized and

existing under Philippine law and is represented in this case by the other private respondents,

officers of the SDA. Petitioner, on the other hand, was a Pastor of the SDA until 31

October 1991, when his services were terminated.

The records show that petitioner Pastor Dionisio V. Austria worked with the SDA for twenty

eight (28) years from 1963 to 1991.[2] He began his work with the SDA on 15 July 1963 as a

literature evangelist, selling literature of the SDA over the island of Negros. From then on,

petitioner worked his way up the ladder and got promoted several times. In January, 1968,

petitioner became the Assistant Publishing Director in the West Visayan Mission of the SDA. In

July, 1972, he was elevated to the position of Pastor in the West Visayan Mission covering the

island of Panay, and the provinces of Romblon and Guimaras. Petitioner held the same position

up to 1988. Finally, in 1989, petitioner was promoted as District Pastor of the Negros Mission of

the SDA and was assigned at Sagay, Balintawak and Toboso, Negros Occidental, with twelve

(12) churches under his jurisdiction. In January, 1991, petitioner was transferred to Bacolod

City. He held the position of district pastor until his services were terminated on 31 October

1991.

On various occasions from August up to October, 1991, petitioner received several

communications[3] from Mr. Eufronio Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission asking him to

admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife,

Mrs. Thelma Austria, in his district which amounted to P15,078.10, and to remit the same to the

Negros Mission.

In his written explanation dated 11 October 1991,[4] petitioner reasoned out that he should

not be made accountable for the unremitted collections since it was private respondents Pastor

Gideon Buhat and Mr. Eufronio Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and

offerings since he was very sick to do the collecting at that time.

Thereafter, on 16 October 1991, at around 7:30 a.m., petitioner went to the office of Pastor

Buhat, the president of the Negros Mission. During said call, petitioner tried to persuade Pastor

Buhat to convene the Executive Committee for the purpose of settling the dispute between him

and the private respondent, Pastor David Rodrigo. The dispute between Pastor Rodrigo and

petitioner arose from an incident in which petitioner assisted his friend, Danny Diamada, to

collect from Pastor Rodrigo the unpaid balance for the repair of the latter‟s motor vehicle which

he failed to pay to Diamada.[5] Due to the assistance of petitioner in collecting Pastor Rodrigo‟s

debt, the latter harbored ill-feelings against petitioner. When news reached petitioner that Pastor

Rodrigo was about to file a complaint against him with the Negros Mission, he immediately

proceeded to the office of Pastor Buhat on the date abovementioned and asked the latter to

convene the Executive Committee. Pastor Buhat denied the request of petitioner since some

committee members were out of town and there was no quorum. Thereafter, the two exchanged

heated arguments. Petitioner then left the office of Pastor Buhat. While on his way out,

petitioner overheard Pastor Buhat saying, “Pastor daw inisog na ina iya (Pastor you are talking

tough).”[6] Irked by such remark, petitioner returned to the office of Pastor Buhat, and tried to

overturn the latter‟s table, though unsuccessfully, since it was heavy. Thereafter, petitioner

banged the attache case of Pastor Buhat on the table, scattered the books in his office, and threw

the phone.[7]Fortunately, private respondents Pastors Yonilo Leopoldo and Claudio Montaño

were around and they pacified both Pastor Buhat and petitioner.

On 17 October 1991, petitioner received a letter[8] inviting him and his wife to attend the

Executive Committee meeting at the Negros Mission Conference Room on 21 October 1991, at

nine in the morning. To be discussed in the meeting were the non-remittance of church

collection and the events that transpired on 16 October 1991. A fact-finding committee was

created to investigate petitioner. For two (2) days, from October 21 and 22, the fact-finding

committee conducted an investigation of petitioner. Sensing that the result of the investigation

might be one-sided, petitioner immediately wrote Pastor Rueben Moralde, president of the SDA

and chairman of the fact-finding committee, requesting that certain members of the fact-finding

committee be excluded in the investigation and resolution of the case.[9] Out of the six (6)

members requested to inhibit themselves from the investigation and decision-making, only two

(2) were actually excluded, namely: Pastor Buhat and Pastor Rodrigo. Subsequently, on 29

October 1991, petitioner received a letter of dismissal[10] citing misappropriation of

denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of

duties, and commission of an offense against the person of employer‟s duly authorized

representative, as grounds for the termination of his services.

Reacting against the adverse decision of the SDA, petitioner filed a complaint[11] on 14

November 1991, before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal against the SDA and its officers

and prayed for reinstatement with backwages and benefits, moral and exemplary damages and

other labor law benefits.

On 15 February 1993, Labor Arbiter Cesar D. Sideño rendered a decision in favor of

petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads thus:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, respondents CENTRAL PHILIPPINE

UNION MISSION CORPORATION OF THE SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS

(CPUMCSDA) and its officers, respondents herein, are hereby ordered to immediately

reinstate complainant Pastor Dionisio Austria to his former position as Pastor of Brgy.

Taculing, Progreso and Banago, Bacolod City, without loss of seniority and other

rights and backwages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTEEN THOUSAND

EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (P115,830.00) without deductions and

qualificatioons.

Respondent CPUMCSDA is further ordered to pay complainant the following:

A. 13th month pay - P21,060.00

B. Allowance - P 4,770.83

C. Service Incentive

Leave Pay - P 3,461.85

D. Moral Damages - P50,000.00

E. Exemplary

Damages - P25,000.00

F. Attorney‟s Fee - P22,012.27

SO ORDERED.[12]

The SDA, through its officers, appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the National

Labor Relations Commission, Fourth Division, Cebu City. In a decision, dated 26 August 1994,

the NLRC vacated the findings of the Labor Arbiter. The decretal portion of the NLRC decision

states:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby VACATED and a new one

ENTERED dismissing this case for want of merit.

SO ORDERED.[13]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above-named decision. On 18 July 1995,

the NLRC issued a Resolution reversing its original decision. The dispositive portion of the

resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Our decision dated August 26, 1994 is

VACATED and the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated February 15, 1993 is

REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.[14]

In view of the reversal of the original decision of the NLRC, the SDA filed a motion for

reconsideration of the above resolution. Notable in the motion for reconsideration filed by

private respondents is their invocation, for the first time on appeal, that the Labor Arbiter has no

jurisdiction over the complaint filed by petitioner due to the constitutional provision on the

separation of church and state since the case allegedly involved and ecclesiastical affair to which

the State cannot interfere.

The NLRC, without ruling on the merits of the case, reversed itself once again, sustained the

argument posed by private respondents and, accordingly, dismissed the complaint of

petitioner. The dispositive portion of the NLRC resolution dated 23 January 1996, subject of the

present petition, is as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration is

hereby granted. Accordingly, this case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.[15]

Hence, the recourse to this Court by petitioner.

After the filing of the petition, the Court ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (the

“OSG”) to file its comment on behalf of public respondent NLRC. Interestingly, the OSG filed a

manifestation and motion in lieu of comment[16] setting forth its stand that it cannot sustain the

resolution of the NLRC. In its manifestation, the OSG submits that the termination of petitioner

of his employment may be questioned before the NLRC as the same is secular in nature, not

ecclesiastical. After the submission of memoranda of all the parties, the case was submitted for

decision.

The issues to be resolved in this petition are:

1) Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the complaint

filed by petitioner against the SDA;

2) Whether or not the termination of the services of petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as

such, involves the separation of church and state; and

3) Whether or not such termination is valid.

The first two issues shall be resolved jointly, since they are related.

Private respondents contend that by virtue of the doctrine of separation of church and state,

the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by

petitioner. Since the matter at bar allegedly involves the discipline of a religious minister, it is to

be considered a purely ecclesiastical affair to which the State has no right to interfere.

The contention of private respondents deserves scant consideration. The principle of

separation of church and state finds no application in this case.

The rationale of the principle of the separation of church and state is summed up in the

familiar saying, “Strong fences make good neighbors.”[17] The idea advocated by this principle is

to delineate the boundaries between the two institutions and thus avoid encroachments by one

against the other because of a misunderstanding of the limits of their respective exclusive

jurisdictions.[18] The demarcation line calls on the entities to “render therefore unto Ceasar the

things that are Ceasar‟s and unto God the things that are God‟s.”[19] While the State is prohibited

from interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs, the Church is likewise barred from meddling in

purely secular matters.[20]

The case at bar does not concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar the State

from taking cognizance of the same. An ecclesiastical affair is “one that concerns doctrine,

creed, or form or worship of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious

association of needful laws and regulations for the government of the membership, and the

power of excluding from such associations those deemed unworthy of membership.[21] Based on

this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its

members and relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the

congregation. To be concrete, examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State

cannot meddle are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers,

administration of sacraments and other activities with which attached religious significance. The

case at bar does not even remotely concern any of the abovecited examples. While the matter at

hand relates to the church and its religious minister it does not ipso facto give the case a religious

significance. Simply stated, what is involved here is the relationship of the church as an

employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever

with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church. In this case, petitioner was not

excommunicated or expelled from the membership of the SDA but was terminated from

employment. Indeed, the matter of terminating an employee, which is purely secular in nature, is

different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the religious congregation.

As pointed out by the OSG in its memorandum, the grounds invoked for petitioner‟s

dismissal, namely: misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious

misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties and commission of an offense against the person

of his employer‟s duly authorize representative, are all based on Article 282 of the Labor Code

which enumerates the just causes for termination of employment.[22] By this alone, it is palpable

that the reason for petitioner‟s dismissal from the service is not religious in nature. Coupled with

this is the act of the SDA in furnishing NLRC with a copy of petitioner‟s letter of

termination. As aptly stated by the OSG, this again is an eloquent admission by private

respondents that NLRC has jurisdiction over the case. Aside from these, SDA admitted in a

certification[23] issued by its officer, Mr. Ibesate, that petitioner has been its employee for twenty-

eight (28) years. SDA even registered petitioner with the Social Security System (SSS) as its

employee. As a matter of fact, the worker‟s records of petitioner have been submitted by private

respondents as part of their exhibits. From all of these it is clear that when the SDA terminated

the services of petitioner, it was merely exercising its management prerogative to fire an

employee which it believes to be unfit for the job. As such, the State, through the Labor Arbiter

and the NLRC, has the right to take cognizance of the case and to determine whether the SDA, as

employer, rightfully exercised its management prerogative to dismiss an employee. This is in

consonance with the mandate of the Constitution to afford full protection to labor.

Under the Labor Code, the provision which governs the dismissal of employees, is

comprehensive enough to include religious corporations, such as the SDA, in its

coverage. Article 278 of the Labor Code on post-employment states that “the provisions of this

Title shall apply to all establishments or undertakings, whether for profit or not.” Obviously, the

cited article does not make any exception in favor of a religious corporation. This is made more

evident by the fact that the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, particularly, Section 1, Rule 1,

Book VI on the Termination of Employment and Retirement, categorically includes religious

institutions in the coverage of the law, to wit:

Section 1. Coverage. – This Rule shall apply to all establishments and undertakings,

whether operated for profit or not, including educational, medical, charitable

and religious institutions and organizations, in cases of regular employment with the

exception of the Government and its political subdivisions including government-

owned or controlled corporations.[24]

With this clear mandate, the SDA cannot hide behind the mantle of protection of the

doctrine of separation of church and state to avoid its responsibilities as an employer under the

Labor Code.

Finally, as correctly pointed out by petitioner, private respondents are estopped from raising

the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal. It is already too late in the day for

private respondents to question the jurisdiction of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter since the

SDA had fully participated in the trials and hearings of the case from start to finish. The Court

has already ruled that the active participation of a party against whom the action was brought,

coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the

action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by

the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body‟s

jurisdiction.[25] Thus, the active participation of private respondents in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter

and the NLRC mooted the question on jurisdiction.

The jurisdictional question now settled, we shall now proceed to determine whether the

dismissal of petitioner was valid.

At the outset, we note that as a general rule, findings of fact of administrative bodies like the

NLRC are binding upon this Court. A review of such findings is justified, however, in instances

when the findings of the NLRC differ from those of the labor arbiter, as in this case.[26] When the

findings of NLRC do not agree with those of the Labor Arbiter, this Court must of necessity

review the records to determine which findings should be preferred as more comformable to the

evidentiary facts.[27]

We turn now to the crux of the matter. In termination cases, the settled rule is that the

burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause rests on the

employer.[28] Thus, private respondents must not merely rely on the weaknesses of petitioner‟s

evidence but must stand on the merits of their own defense.

The issue being the legality of petitioner‟s dismissal, the same must be measured against the

requisites for a valid dismissal, namely: (a) the employee must be afforded due process, i.e., he

must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself, and; (b) the dismissal must be

for a valid cause as provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code.[29] Without the concurrence of this

twin requirements, the termination would, in the eyes of the law, be illegal.[30]

Before the services of an employee can be validly terminated, Article 277 (b) of the Labor

Code and Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code further

require the employer to furnish the employee with two (2) written notices, to wit: (a) a written

notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to

said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side; and, (b) a written notice

of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the

circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.

The first notice, which may be considered as the proper charge, serves to apprise the

employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought.[31] The second

notice on the other hand seeks to inform the employee of the employer‟s decision to dismiss

him.[32] This decision, however, must come only after the employee is given a reasonable period

from receipt of the first notice within which to answer the charge and ample opportunity to be

heard and defend himself with the assistance of a representative, if he so desires.[33] This is in

consonance with the express provision of the law on the protection to labor and the broader

dictates of procedural due process.[34] Non-compliance therewith is fatal because these

requirements are conditions sine quo non before dismissal may be validly effected.[35]

Private respondent failed to substantially comply with the above requirements. With regard

to the first notice, the letter,[36] dated 17 October 1991, which notified petitioner and his wife to

attend the meeting on 21 October 1991, cannot be construed as the written charge required by

law. A perusal of the said letter reveals that it never categorically stated the particular acts or

omissions on which petitioner‟s impending termination was grounded. In fact, the letter never

even mentioned that petitioner would be subject to investigation. The letter merely mentioned

that petitioner and his wife were invited to a meeting wherein what would be discussed were the

alleged unremitted church tithes and the events that transpired on 16 October 1991. Thus,

petitioner was surprised to find out that the alleged meeting turned out to be an

investigation. From the tenor of the letter, it cannot be presumed that petitioner was actually on

the verge of dismissal. The alleged grounds for the dismissal of petitioner from the service were

only revealed to him when the actual letter of dismissal was finally issued. For this reason, it

cannot be said that petitioner was given enough opportunity to properly prepare for his

defense. While admittedly, private respondents complied with the second requirement, the

notice of termination, this does not cure the initial defect of lack of the proper written charge

required by law.

In the letter of termination,[37] dated 29 October 1991, private respondents enumerated the

following as grounds for the dismissal of petitioner, namely: misappropriation of

denominational funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of

duties, and commission of an offense against the person of employer‟s duly authorized

representative. Breach of trust and misappropriation of denominational funds refer to the alleged

failure of petitioner to remit to the treasurer of the Negros Mission tithes, collections and

offerings amounting to P15,078.10 which were collected by his wife, Mrs. Thelma Austria, in

the churches under his jurisdiction. On the other hand, serious misconduct and commission of an

offense against the person of the employer‟s duly authorized representative pertain to the 16

October 1991 incident wherein petitioner allegedly committed an act of violence in the office of

Pastor Gideon Buhat. The final ground invoked by private respondents is gross and habitual

neglect of duties allegedly committed by petitioner.

We cannot sustain the validity of dismissal based on the ground of breach of trust. Private

respondents allege that they have lost their confidence in petitioner for his failure, despite

demands, to remit the tithes and offerings amounting to P15,078.10, which were collected in his

district. A careful study of the voluminous records of the case reveals that there is simply no

basis for the alleged loss of confidence and breach of trust. Settled is the rule that under Article

282 (c) of the Labor Code, the breach of trust must be willful. A breach is willful if it is done

intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act

done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently.[38] It must rest on substantial grounds

and not on the employer‟s arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the employee

would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer.[39] It should be genuine and not

simulated.[40] This ground has never been intended to afford an occasion for abuse, because of its

subjective nature. The records show that there were only six (6) instances when petitioner

personally collected and received from the church treasurers the tithes, collections, and donations

for the church.[41] The stenographic notes on the testimony of Naomi Geniebla, the Negros

Mission Church Auditor and a witness for private respondents, show that Pastor Austria was able

to remit all his collections to the treasurer of the Negros Mission.[42]

Though private respondents were able to establish that petitioner collected and received

tithes and donations several times, they were not able to establish that petitioner failed to remit

the same to the Negros Mission, and that he pocketed the amount and used it for his personal

purpose. In fact, as admitted by their own witness, Naomi Geniebla, petitioner remitted the

amounts which he collected to the Negros Mission for which corresponding receipts were issued

to him. Thus, the allegations of private respondents that petitioner breached their trust have no

leg to stand on.

In a vain attempt to support their claim of breach of trust, private respondents try to pin on

petitioner the alleged non-remittance of the tithes collected by his wife. This argument deserves

little consideration. First of all, as proven by convincing and substantial evidence consisting of

the testimonies of the witnesses for private respondents who are church treasurers, it was Mrs.

Thelma Austria who actually collected the tithes and donations from them, and, who failed to

remit the same to the treasurer of the Negros Mission. The testimony of these church treasurers

were corroborated and confirmed by Ms. Geniebla and Mr. Ibesate, officers of the SDA. Hence,

in the absence of conspiracy and collusion, which private respondents failed to demonstrate,

between petitioner and his wife, petitioner cannot be made accountable for the alleged infraction

committed by his wife. After all, they still have separate and distinct personalities. For this

reason, the Labor Arbiter found it difficult to see the basis for the alleged loss of confidence and

breach of trust. The Court does not find any cogent reason, therefore, to digress from the

findings of the Labor Arbiter which is fully supported by the evidence on record.

With respect to the grounds of serious misconduct and commission of an offense against the

person of the employer‟s duly authorized representative, we find the same unmeritorious and, as

such, do not warrant petitioner‟s dismissal from the service.

Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some

established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character,

and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.[43] For misconduct to be considered

serious it must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or

unimportant.[44] Based on this standard, we believe that the act of petitioner in banging the attache

case on the table, throwing the telephone and scattering the books in the office of Pastor Buhat,

although improper, cannot be considered as grave enough to be considered as serious

misconduct. After all, as correctly observed by the Labor Arbiter, though petitioner committed

damage to property, he did not physically assault Pastor Buhat or any other pastor present during

the incident of 16 October 1991. In fact, the alleged offense committed upon the person of the

employer‟s representatives was never really established or proven by private

respondents. Hence, there is no basis for the allegation that petitioner‟s act constituted serious

misconduct or that the same was an offense against the person of the employer‟s duly authorized

representative. As such, the cited actuation of petitioner does not justify the ultimate penalty of

dismissal from employment. While the Constitution does not condone wrongdoing by the

employee, it nevertheless urges a moderation of the sanctions that may be applied to him in light

of the many disadvantages that weigh heavily on him like an albatross on his neck.[45] Where a

penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may have been committed by the worker

ought not be visited with a consequence so severe such as dismissal from employment.[46] For the

foregoing reasons, we believe that the minor infraction committed by petitioner does not merit

the ultimate penalty of dismissal.

The final ground alleged by private respondents in terminating petitioner, gross and habitual

neglect of duties, does not requires an exhaustive discussion. Suffice it to say that all private

respondents had were allegations but not proof. Aside from merely citing the said ground,

private respondents failed to prove culpability on the part of petitioner. In fact, the evidence on

record shows otherwise. Petitioner‟s rise from the ranks disclose that he was actually a hard-

worker. Private respondents‟ evidence,[47] which consisted of petitioner‟s Worker‟s Reports, revealed how

petitioner travelled to different churches to attend to the faithful under his care. Indeed, he labored hard for the

SDA, but, in return, he was rewarded with a dismissal from the service for a non-existent cause.

In view of the foregoing, we sustain the finding of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner was

terminated from service without just or lawful cause. Having been illegally dismissed, petitioner

is entitled to reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority right[48] and the payment

of full backwages without any deduction corresponding to the period from his illegal dismissal up to actual

reinstatement.[49]

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The challenged Resolution of

public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, rendered on 23 January 1996, is

NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 15 February 1993, is

reinstated and hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

VICTORIANO V ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS UNION

G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974

BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC., defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION, defendant-appellant.

Salonga, Ordonez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.

Cipriano Cid & Associates for defendant-appellant.

ZALDIVAR, J.:p

Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 58894.

The undisputed facts that spawned the instant case follow:

Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter referred to as Union) which had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows:

Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement.

The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed the following day, March 4, 1964.

Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".

Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and when no action was taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service. This prompted Appellee to file an action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 58894 in the Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing Appellee. 1

In its answer, the Union invoked the "union security clause" of the collective bargaining agreement; assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350; and contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24 and 9 (d) and (e). 2

Upon the facts agreed upon by the parties during the pre-trial conference, the Court a quorendered its decision on August 26, 1965, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from dismissing the plaintiff from his present employment and sentencing the defendant Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to pay the plaintiff P500 for attorney's fees and the costs of this action.

3

From this decision, the Union appealed directly to this Court on purely questions of law, assigning the following errors:

I. That the lower court erred when it did not rule that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional.

II. That the lower court erred when it sentenced appellant herein to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as attorney's fees and the cost thereof.

In support of the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350, the Union contented, firstly, that the Act infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations; that "the very phraseology of said Republic Act 3350, that membership in a labor organization is banned to all those belonging to such religious sect prohibiting affiliation with any labor

organization" 4 , "prohibits all the members of a given religious sect from joining any labor

union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members thereto" 5 ; and, consequently,

deprives said members of their constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the 1935 Constitution. 6

Secondly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of contracts in that, while the Union is obliged to comply with its collective bargaining agreement containing a "closed shop provision," the Act relieves the employer from its reciprocal obligation of cooperating in the maintenance of union membership as a condition of employment; and that said Act, furthermore, impairs the Union's rights as it deprives the union of dues from members who, under the Act, are relieved from the obligation to continue as such members. 7

Thirdly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 discriminatorily favors those religious sects which ban their members from joining labor unions, in violation of Article Ill, Section 1 (7) of the 1935 Constitution; and while said Act unduly protects certain religious sects, it leaves no rights or protection to labor organizations. 8

Fourthly, Republic Act No. 3350, asserted the Union, violates the constitutional provision that "no religious test shall be required for the exercise of a civil right," in that the laborer's exercise of his civil right to join associations for purposes not contrary to law has to be determined under the Act by his affiliation with a religious sect; that conversely, if a worker has to sever his religious connection with a sect that prohibits membership in a labor organization in order to be able to join a labor organization, said Act would violate religious freedom. 9

Fifthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350, violates the "equal protection of laws" clause of the Constitution, it being a discriminately legislation, inasmuch as by exempting from the operation of closed shop agreement the members of the "Iglesia ni Cristo", it has granted said members undue advantages over their fellow workers, for while the Act exempts them from union obligation and liability, it nevertheless entitles them at the same time to the enjoyment of all concessions, benefits and other emoluments that the union might secure from the employer. 10

Sixthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional provision regarding the promotion of social justice. 11

Appellant Union, furthermore, asserted that a "closed shop provision" in a collective bargaining agreement cannot be considered violative of religious freedom, as to call for the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 3350; 12and that unless Republic Act No. 3350 is declared unconstitutional, trade unionism in this country would be wiped out as employers would prefer to hire or employ members of the Iglesia ni Cristo in order to do away with labor organizations. 13

Appellee, assailing appellant's arguments, contended that Republic Act No. 3350 does not violate the right to form lawful associations, for the right to join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor organization, if one's conscience does not allow his

membership therein, and the Act has given substance to such right by prohibiting the compulsion of workers to join labor organizations; 14

that said Act does not impair the obligation of contracts for said law formed part of, and was incorporated into, the terms of the closed shop agreement; 15

that the Act does not violate the establishment of religion clause or separation of Church and State, for Congress, in enacting said law, merely accommodated the religious needs of those workers whose religion prohibits its members from joining labor unions, and balanced the collective rights of organized labor with the constitutional right of an individual to freely exercise his chosen religion; that the constitutional right to the free exercise of one's religion has primacy and preference over union security measures which are merely contractual16

; that said Act does not violate the constitutional provision of equal protection, for the classification of workers under the Act depending on their religious tenets is based on substantial distinction, is germane to the purpose of the law, and applies to all the members of a given class; 17

that said Act, finally, does not violate the social justice policy of the Constitution, for said Act was enacted precisely to equalize employment opportunities for all citizens in the midst of the diversities of their religious beliefs." 18

I. Before We proceed to the discussion of the first assigned error, it is necessary to premise that there are some thoroughly established principles which must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality as obtains in the instant case are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt, that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. 19

1. Appellant Union's contention that Republic Act No. 3350 prohibits and bans the members of such religious sects that forbid affiliation of their members with labor unions from joining labor unions appears nowhere in the wording of Republic Act No. 3350; neither can the same be deduced by necessary implication therefrom. It is not surprising, therefore, that appellant, having thus misread the Act, committed the error of contending that said Act is obnoxious to the constitutional provision on freedom of association.

Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize freedom of association. Section 1 (6) of Article III of the Constitution of 1935, as well as Section 7 of Article IV of the Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 provides that employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join of assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations. Notwithstanding the different theories propounded by the different schools of jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a "right", it can be safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and second, power,

whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from Joining an association. It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with said organization at any time. 20

It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any union. 21

Inasmuch as what both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have recognized, and guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join associations of his choice, it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in the same breath, upon the employee the duty to join associations. The law does not enjoin an employee to sign up with any association.

The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only member of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act, before its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, provides that although it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization" the employer is, however, not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees". By virtue, therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his employment, he must become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.

To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, Republic Act No. 3350 introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization". Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law

prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association.

2. Appellant Union also contends that the Act is unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of its contract, specifically, the "union security clause" embodied in its Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Company, by virtue of which "membership in the union was required as a condition for employment for all permanent employees workers". This agreement was already in existence at the time Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted on June 18, 1961, and it cannot, therefore, be deemed to have been incorporated into the agreement. But by reason of this amendment, Appellee, as well as others similarly situated, could no longer be dismissed from his job even if he should cease to be a member, or disaffiliate from the Union, and the Company could continue employing him notwithstanding his disaffiliation from the Union. The Act, therefore, introduced a change into the express terms of the union security clause; the Company was partly absolved by law from the contractual obligation it had with the Union of employing only Union members in permanent positions, It cannot be denied, therefore, that there was indeed an impairment of said union security clause.

According to Black, any statute which introduces a change into the express terms of the contract, or its legal construction, or its validity, or its discharge, or the remedy for its enforcement, impairs the contract. The extent of the change is not material. It is not a question of degree or manner or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its obligation or dispensing with any part of its force. There is an impairment of the contract if either party is absolved by law from its performance. 22

Impairment has also been predicated on laws which, without destroying contracts, derogate from substantial contractual rights. 23

It should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is general, affording a broad outline and requiring construction to fill in the details. The prohibition is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula, for it prohibits unreasonable impairment only. 24

In spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to safeguarding said interests may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect. 25

For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. All contracts made with reference to any matter that is subject to regulation under the police power must be understood as made in reference to the possible exercise of that power. 26

Otherwise, important and valuable reforms may be precluded by the simple device of entering into contracts for the purpose of doing that which otherwise may be prohibited. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. The contract clause of the Constitution must, therefore, be not only in harmony with, but also in subordination to, in appropriate instances, the reserved power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of the people. It follows that not all legislations, which have the effect of impairing a contract, are obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition as to impairment, and a statute passed in the legitimate exercise of police power, although it incidentally destroys existing contract rights, must be upheld by the courts. This has special

application to contracts regulating relations between capital and labor which are not merely contractual, and said labor contracts, for being impressed with public interest, must yield to the common good. 27

In several occasions this Court declared that the prohibition against impairing the obligations of contracts has no application to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the state involving public welfare. 28

Thus, this Court also held that the Blue Sunday Law was not an infringement of the obligation of a contract that required the employer to furnish work on Sundays to his employees, the law having been enacted to secure the well-being and happiness of the laboring class, and being, furthermore, a legitimate exercise of the police power. 29

In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs contract obligations, no unchanging yardstick, applicable at all times and under all circumstances, by which the validity of each statute may be measured or determined, has been fashioned, but every case must be determined upon its own circumstances. Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the general good of the people, and when the means adopted to secure that end are reasonable. Both the end sought and the means adopted must be legitimate, i.e., within the scope of the reserved power of the state construed in harmony with the constitutional limitation of that power. 30

What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350? Its purpose was to insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination against those members of religious sects which prohibit their members from joining labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of their dependents. It cannot be gainsaid that said purpose is legitimate.

The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said religious sects against two aggregates of group strength from which the individual needs protection. The individual employee, at various times in his working life, is confronted by two aggregates of power — collective labor, directed by a union, and collective capital, directed by management. The union, an institution developed to organize labor into a collective force and thus protect the individual employee from the power of collective capital, is, paradoxically, both the champion of employee rights, and a new source of their frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts with management, it produces yet a third aggregate of group strength from which the individual also needs protection — the collective bargaining relationship. 31

The aforementioned purpose of the amendatory law is clearly seen in the Explanatory Note to House Bill No. 5859, which later became Republic Act No. 3350, as follows:

It would be unthinkable indeed to refuse employing a person who, on account of his religious beliefs and convictions, cannot accept membership in a labor organization although he possesses all the qualifications for the job. This is tantamount to punishing such person for believing in a doctrine he has a right under the law to believe in. The law would not allow discrimination to flourish to the detriment of those whose religion discards membership in any labor organization. Likewise, the law would not commend the

deprivation of their right to work and pursue a modest means of livelihood, without in any manner violating their religious faith and/or belief.

32

It cannot be denied, furthermore, that the means adopted by the Act to achieve that purpose — exempting the members of said religious sects from coverage of union security agreements — is reasonable.

It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former. The Supreme Court of the United States has also declared on several occasions that the rights in the First Amendment, which include freedom of religion, enjoy a preferred position in the constitutional system. 33

Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty, 34

and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.

3. In further support of its contention that Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional, appellant Union averred that said Act discriminates in favor of members of said religious sects in violation of Section 1 (7) of Article Ill of the 1935 Constitution, and which is now Section 8 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:

No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination and preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

The constitutional provision into only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship, 35

but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. 36

Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. 37

But if the stage regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. 38

In Aglipay v. Ruiz 39 , this Court had occasion to state that the government should not be

precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character even if the incidental result would be favorable to a religion or sect. It has likewise been held that the statute, in order to withstand the strictures of constitutional prohibition, must have a secular legislative purpose

and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 40 Assessed by these criteria,

Republic Act No. 3350 cannot be said to violate the constitutional inhibition of the "no-establishment" (of religion) clause of the Constitution.

The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements. To help its citizens to find gainful employment whereby they can make a living to support themselves and their families is a valid objective of the state. In fact, the state is enjoined, in the 1935 Constitution, to afford protection to labor, and regulate the relations between labor and capital and industry. 41

More so now in the 1973 Constitution where it is mandated that "the State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relation between workers and employers. 42

The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in favor of members of religious sects that prohibit their members from affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of said employees against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement, and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of the State, the Act also promotes the well-being of society. It is our view that the exemption from the effects of closed shop agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the interests of any particular religion. Although the exemption may benefit those who are members of religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental and indirect. The "establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban regulation on conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions. 43

The free exercise clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to require that religious exercise be preferentially aided. 44

We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted consistently with the spirit of the constitutional provision. It acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion, by certain persons, of a burden that is imposed by union security agreements. It was Congress itself that imposed that burden when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875), and, certainly, Congress, if it so deems advisable, could take away the same burden. It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scrupples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interest" intervenes.45

In the instant case, We see no such compelling state interest to withhold exemption.

Appellant bewails that while Republic Act No. 3350 protects members of certain religious sects, it leaves no right to, and is silent as to the protection of, labor organizations. The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 was not to grant rights to labor unions. The rights of labor unions are amply provided for in Republic Act No. 875 and the new Labor Code. As to the lamented silence of the Act regarding the rights and protection of labor unions, suffice it to

say, first, that the validity of a statute is determined by its provisions, not by its silence 46 ;

and, second, the fact that the law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional. 47

It would not be amiss to state, regarding this matter, that to compel persons to join and remain members of a union to keep their jobs in violation of their religious scrupples, would hurt, rather than help, labor unions, Congress has seen it fit to exempt religious objectors lest their resistance spread to other workers, for religious objections have contagious potentialities more than political and philosophic objections.

Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, and a fortiori to a labor — union assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion — is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. 48

A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.

4. Appellants' fourth contention, that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional prohibition against requiring a religious test for the exercise of a civil right or a political right, is not well taken. The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful association membership in any particular religion or in any religious sect; neither does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act. Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts members with such religious affiliation from the coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector is not required to do a positive act — to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part. A conscientious religious objector need not perform a positive act or exercise the right of resigning from the labor union — he is exempted from the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may have entered into. How then can there be a religious test required for the exercise of a right when no right need be exercised?

We have said that it was within the police power of the State to enact Republic Act No. 3350, and that its purpose was legal and in consonance with the Constitution. It is never an illegal evasion of a constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired result, which is lawful in itself, by discovering or following a legal way to do it. 49

5. Appellant avers as its fifth ground that Republic Act No. 3350 is a discriminatory legislation, inasmuch as it grants to the members of certain religious sects undue advantages over other workers, thus violating Section 1 of Article III of the 1935 Constitution which forbids the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. 50

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are

different. 51 It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is

directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. 52

The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. 53

All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. 54

This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. 55

In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. 56

It is not necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. 57

Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. 58

Hence legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, 59

for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.

We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned requirements. The Act classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and coverage of union shop security agreements, into those who by reason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. Tile classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. There is such real distinction in the beliefs, feelings and sentiments of employees. Employees do not believe in the same religious faith and different religions differ in their dogmas and cannons. Religious beliefs, manifestations and practices, though they are found in all places, and in all times, take so many varied forms as to be almost beyond imagination. There are many views that comprise the broad spectrum of religious beliefs among the people. There are diverse manners in which beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their possessors, may be articulated. Today the country is far more heterogenous in religion than before, differences in religion do exist, and these differences are important and should not be ignored.

Even from the phychological point of view, the classification is based on real and important differences. Religious beliefs are not mere beliefs, mere ideas existing only in the mind, for they carry with them practical consequences and are the motives of certain rules. of human conduct and the justification of certain acts. 60

Religious sentiment makes a man view things and events in their relation to his God. It gives to human life its distinctive character, its tone, its happiness or unhappiness its enjoyment or irksomeness. Usually, a strong and passionate desire is involved in a religious belief. To certain persons, no single factor of their experience is more important to them than their religion, or their not having any

religion. Because of differences in religious belief and sentiments, a very poor person may consider himself better than the rich, and the man who even lacks the necessities of life may be more cheerful than the one who has all possible luxuries. Due to their religious beliefs people, like the martyrs, became resigned to the inevitable and accepted cheerfully even the most painful and excruciating pains. Because of differences in religious beliefs, the world has witnessed turmoil, civil strife, persecution, hatred, bloodshed and war, generated to a large extent by members of sects who were intolerant of other religious beliefs. The classification, introduced by Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, rests on substantial distinctions.

The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose. The purpose of the law is precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of their religious belief, join labor unions, from being deprived of their right to work and from being dismissed from their work because of union shop security agreements.

Republic Act No. 3350, furthermore, is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. The law does not provide that it is to be effective for a certain period of time only. It is intended to apply for all times as long as the conditions to which the law is applicable exist. As long as there are closed shop agreements between an employer and a labor union, and there are employees who are prohibited by their religion from affiliating with labor unions, their exemption from the coverage of said agreements continues.

Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects; this is evident from its provision. The fact that the law grants a privilege to members of said religious sects cannot by itself render the Act unconstitutional, for as We have adverted to, the Act only restores to them their freedom of association which closed shop agreements have taken away, and puts them in the same plane as the other workers who are not prohibited by their religion from joining labor unions. The circumstance, that the other employees, because they are differently situated, are not granted the same privilege, does not render the law unconstitutional, for every classification allowed by the Constitution by its nature involves inequality.

The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid. A classification otherwise reasonable does not offend the constitution simply because in practice it results in some inequality. 61

Anent this matter, it has been said that whenever it is apparent from the scope of the law that its object is for the benefit of the public and the means by which the benefit is to be obtained are of public character, the law will be upheld even though incidental advantage may occur to individuals beyond those enjoyed by the general public. 62

6. Appellant's further contention that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional provision on social justice is also baseless. Social justice is intended to promote the welfare of all the people. 63

Republic Act No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare of those who, because of their religious belief, cannot join labor unions; the Act prevents their being deprived of work and of the means of livelihood. In determining whether

any particular measure is for public advantage, it is not necessary that the entire state be directly benefited — it is sufficient that a portion of the state be benefited thereby.

Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all component elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the inter-relations of the members of the community. 64

Republic Act No. 3350 insures economic stability to the members of a religious sect, like the Iglesia ni Cristo, who are also component elements of society, for it insures security in their employment, notwithstanding their failure to join a labor union having a closed shop agreement with the employer. The Act also advances the proper economic and social equilibrium between labor unions and employees who cannot join labor unions, for it exempts the latter from the compelling necessity of joining labor unions that have closed shop agreements and equalizes, in so far as opportunity to work is concerned, those whose religion prohibits membership in labor unions with those whose religion does not prohibit said membership. Social justice does not imply social equality, because social inequality will always exist as long as social relations depend on personal or subjective proclivities. Social justice does not require legal equality because legal equality, being a relative term, is necessarily premised on differentiations based on personal or natural conditions. 65

Social justice guarantees equality of opportunity 66 , and this is

precisely what Republic Act No. 3350 proposes to accomplish — it gives laborers, irrespective of their religious scrupples, equal opportunity for work.

7. As its last ground, appellant contends that the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 3350 is not called for — in other words, the Act is not proper, necessary or desirable. Anent this matter, it has been held that a statute which is not necessary is not, for that reason, unconstitutional; that in determining the constitutional validity of legislation, the courts are unconcerned with issues as to the necessity for the enactment of the legislation in question. 67

Courts do inquire into the wisdom of laws. 68 Moreover, legislatures, being

chosen by the people, are presumed to understand and correctly appreciate the needs of the people, and it may change the laws accordingly. 69

The fear is entertained by appellant that unless the Act is declared unconstitutional, employers will prefer employing members of religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor unions, and thus be a fatal blow to unionism. We do not agree. The threat to unionism will depend on the number of employees who are members of the religious sects that control the demands of the labor market. But there is really no occasion now to go further and anticipate problems We cannot judge with the material now before Us. At any rate, the validity of a statute is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficacy to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects on a particular case. 70

The essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion, is the criterion by which the validity of a statute is to be measured. 71

II. We now pass on the second assignment of error, in support of which the Union argued that the decision of the trial court ordering the Union to pay P500 for attorney's fees directly contravenes Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875, for the instant action involves an industrial dispute wherein the Union was a party, and said Union merely acted in the exercise of its rights under the union shop provision of its existing collective bargaining contract with the Company; that said order also contravenes Article 2208 of the Civil Code; that, furthermore,

Appellee was never actually dismissed by the defendant Company and did not therefore suffer any damage at all . 72

In refuting appellant Union's arguments, Appellee claimed that in the instant case there was really no industrial dispute involved in the attempt to compel Appellee to maintain its membership in the union under pain of dismissal, and that the Union, by its act, inflicted intentional harm on Appellee; that since Appellee was compelled to institute an action to protect his right to work, appellant could legally be ordered to pay attorney's fees under Articles 1704 and 2208 of the Civil Code. 73

The second paragraph of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875 which is relied upon by appellant provides that:

No suit, action or other proceedings shall be maintainable in any court against a labor organization or any officer or member thereof for any act done by or on behalf of such organization in furtherance of an industrial dispute to which it is a party, on the ground only that such act induces some other person to break a contract of employment or that it is in restraint of trade or interferes with the trade, business or employment of some other person or with the right of some other person to dispose of his capital or labor. (Emphasis supplied)

That there was a labor dispute in the instant case cannot be disputed for appellant sought the discharge of respondent by virtue of the closed shop agreement and under Section 2 (j) of Republic Act No. 875 a question involving tenure of employment is included in the term "labor dispute". 74

The discharge or the act of seeking it is the labor dispute itself. It being the labor dispute itself, that very same act of the Union in asking the employer to dismiss Appellee cannot be "an act done ... in furtherance of an industrial dispute". The mere fact that appellant is a labor union does not necessarily mean that all its acts are in furtherance of an industrial dispute. 75

Appellant Union, therefore, cannot invoke in its favor Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875. This case is not intertwined with any unfair labor practice case existing at the time when Appellee filed his complaint before the lower court.

Neither does Article 2208 of the Civil Code, invoked by the Union, serve as its shield. The article provides that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be awarded "when the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff ... to incur expenses to protect his interest"; and "in any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered". In the instant case, it cannot be gainsaid that appellant Union's act in demanding Appellee's dismissal caused Appellee to incur expenses to prevent his being dismissed from his job. Costs according to Section 1, Rule 142, of the Rules of Court, shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed, and the decision, dated August 26, 1965, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 58894, appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant Union. It is so ordered.

Makalintal, C.J, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.