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The views contained in this report are those expressed during the tabletop exercise by participants and do
not reflect the official policy or position of National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or
the U.S. Government.
EXERCISEREPORTANDSUMMARYOFFINDINGSOnOctober45,2011,leadingfiguresfrom
industry,stateandfederalagencies,theArmedForces,andotherrelevantorganizationsmetat
NationalDefenseUniversitysInstituteforNationalStrategicStudiesinWashington,D.C.to
conductandparticipateinacrisissimulationofseveresolarweathereffectsonthenations
power
grid.
Their
purpose
was
to
explore
issues
pertaining
to
how
private
and
governmental
agencieswouldreacttowidespreaddamagetothegrid,howtheymightcooperateduringsuch
acrisis,andtoexplorewhatstepscouldbetakentomitigatetheeffectsofsevereevents.
SECUREGRID11ELECTRICALGRIDCRISISTABLETOPEXERCISE
InstituteforNationalStrategicStudies
NationalDefenseUniversity
October45,2011
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i
SponsoringandHostingOrganizationsDepartmentofHomelandSecurity
UnitedStatesNorthernCommand
NationalDefenseUniversity
ForinformationregardingSecureGrid,pleasecontactthebelowPOC:
Dr.RichardB.Andres
EnergySecurityChair,InstituteforNationalStrategicStudies
ProfessorofNationalSecurityStrategy,NationalWarCollege
NationalDefenseUniversity
(202)6854427,[email protected]
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Whileaseverestormisalowfrequencyoccurrenceevent,it
hasthepotentialforlongdurationcatastrophicimpactstothe
powergridanditsaffectedusers.Theimpactscouldpersistfor
multipleyears
with
potential
for
significant
societal
impacts
and
witheconomiccoststhatcouldbemeasurableintheseveral
TrillionDollarsperyearrange.
AnOverviewoftheNationalAcademyofSciences
ReportonSevereSpaceWeatherandthe
VulnerabilityoftheUSElectricalPowerGrid
MetatechCorporation
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iii
TableofContentsSecureGrid11Overview............................................................................................................................. 1
ParticipatingOrganizations........................................................................................................................... 3
Objectives..................................................................................................................................................... 6
Background................................................................................................................................................... 7
TabletopExercisePart1:Prevent(T0+7hrs).............................................................................................. 9
TabletopExercisePart2:Protect(T0+20hrs)........................................................................................... 13
Tabletop
Exercise
Part
3:
Respond
(T0
+
20
hrs)
........................................................................................
17
Recommendations...................................................................................................................................... 21
AppendixSecureGrid11ScenarioBackground...................................................................................... 24
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SecureGrid11OverviewSecureGrid11isthethirdinanongoingseriesofexercisesthatNationalDefenseUniversitysInstitute
forNational
Strategic
Studies
(INSS)
has
conducted
in
conjunction
with
the
Department
of
Homeland
SecurityandU.S.NorthernCommandonthevulnerabilityoftheNorthAmericanElectricGrid.Previous
exercisesexaminedtheabilityofpublicandprivateinstitutionstoworktogethertopreventand
mitigatecyberandphysicalattacksonthegrid.Thisyearsgameexaminedthethreatposedtothegrid
byextremesolarweather.Thistypeofeventisconsideredalowprobabilityhighimpactevent,thatis,
whiletheprobabilityofaneventislowinanygivenyear,thepotentialharmitcoulddototheUnited
Statesandothercountriesishigh.
Theexercisescenariowasbasedonaspaceweathereventwithimpactssimilarinnaturebutlesssevere
thanthosedescribedbytheNationalAcademiesofScience(NAS)2009ReportExtendedSummary
Severe
Space
Weather
Events
Understanding
Societal
and
Economic
Impacts.
The
NAS
report
describedapossiblegeomagneticdisturbance(GMD)similartoasuperstormwhichoccurredin1921.
ThisGMDproducedamagneticfieldchangerateof4800nanoTeslasperminute(nT/min)at50degrees
geomagneticlatitude.TheNASreportexplainsthatsuchaneventoccurringtodaycouldresultin
widespreadpoweroutageslastingforseveralyears.Bycomparison,thisexercisepostulatedaless
severeeventproducingfewerlongtermpoweroutagesbutstilloccurringatanunprecedentedscale
andduration.Additionalscenariobackgroundisprovidedintheappendixtothisdocument.
SecureGrid11washeldonOctober45,2011atNationalDefenseUniversityinWashingtonD.C.and
attendedbyleadingfiguresfromindustry,stateandfederalagencies,andthescientificcommunity.The
exerciseentailedacrisissimulationwiththegoalofexploringhowprivateandgovernmentagencies
wouldrespondtoasolarstormcausingwidespreaddamagetothegrid,howtheymightcooperate
duringsuchacrisis,andtoexplorewhatstepscouldbetakentomitigatesuchsevereevents.The
scenariosintheexerciseweredesignedbyateamofexpertsfromindustry,theDepartmentof
HomelandSecurity,U.S.NorthernCommand,andtheNationalOceanicandAtmospheric
Administration.
Thetabletopexercisewasconductedinthreemodulesusingaguidedseminarstructuretoexplore
relevantquestionsandissues.AfteropeningcommentsonthemorningofOctober4th,participantswere
assignedtofourseparatebreakoutgroupscontainingadiversemixofrepresentatives.Eachgroupwas
instructedtoaddressaspecificsetofbroadquestionsineachstage,whichconsistedofanearlywarning
stage,an
event
occurrence
stage,
and
apost
event
damage
assessment/consequence
management
and
mitigationstage.Groupsweregiventwohourstoaddresseachstageoverthecourseofthefirstday.
Thesecondday,October5th,consistedofpostexerciseanalysis,whichbroughteachteamintoplenary
sessiontodebrieftheentiregroupontheirfindings,insights,andrecommendations.
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Ontheseconddayoftheevent,allparticipantswereabletohearanddiscussthefindingsofthe
individualgroups.Theafternoonoutbriefsessionprovidedaforumtopresentthegamesresultsto
seniorofficials.
Althoughthedetailsofthelessonslearnedandrecommendationsthatresultedfromeachgroups
participationand
immersion
in
the
experience
are
discussed
in
detail
below,
the
most
important
findingsaresummarizedhere.
Thebroadestconsensusreachedbytheparticipantswasthatinaneventassevereastheonepositedby
theexercise,preventionispreferabletoresponseandrecovery.Improvementsinearlywarning,
especiallythereplacementoftheAdvancedCompositionExplorer(ACE)satellite,hardeningofcritical
equipment,stockpilingofreplacementtransformers,andimprovedresilienceinthegridwereidentified
ascrucialcomponentsofanyefforttominimizetheprobabilityoflongtermgridoutagesresultingfrom
aGMD.
Thebiggestunresolvedquestionconcernsthetypeofdamagesuchaneventmightcausetocriticalgrid
components,especially
large
extremely
high
voltage
(EHV)
transmission
transformers.
Although
the
effectsofgroundinducedcurrent(GIC) ontransformershavebeenstudied,significanttechnical
uncertaintysurroundsquestionsregardingwhethertypicalinservicetransformerswould
catastrophicallyfailinGMDconditions.Thisfactorcomplicateseffortstoaccuratelyestimatethe
possibleextentofequipmentdamageandrelatedgridfailurethatmightoccur.EHVtransformersare
verylarge,extremelyheavy,andhighlydifficulttotransporttotheremotesiteswheretheyaretypically
installed.ThenumbersofexistingsparesarenotsufficienttorecoverfromaGMDthatdamagesa
significantfractionofthenationalorinternationalfleet.Globalsupplychainswouldbeunableto
producereplacementEHVtransformersatarateneededtomeetdemandiflargenumberswere
suddenlyrequiredtorecoverfromaGMDaffectingseveralindustrializedcountries.
Extensivestockpilingofreplacementtransformersisahighlyexpensiveproposition,bothintermsof
manufactureandstorage.Further,givenacatastrophicevent,thejustintimeproductionsystems
currentlyinplacewouldbevulnerabletothecascadingeffectsofabroad,longtermpoweroutage,
makingitdifficulttoobtainreplacementspostevent.Thesetwofactorscreateaconundruminwhich
stockpilingpriortoaneventisexpensiveandproblematic,whilereplacementposteventwouldalsobe
highlyproblematicandextremelytimeconsumingwhentimeisoftheessence.Thus,neitheroptionis
palatableforindustrytoaddress,particularlygiventhelowprobabilityofsuchaneventoccurring.
Therefore,itwastheconsensusoftheexerciseparticipantsthatindustryespeciallyrequiresamore
developedunderstandingofexactlyhowlikelysuchaneventis,aswellashowmuchdamageislikelyto
occurfrom
asevere
GMD.
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ParticipatingOrganizationsOnehundredandtwentyeightindividualsparticipatedinSecureGrid11andweredrawnfromawidevarietyofprivateandpublicorganizations.Participantswereselectedtorepresentorganizations
responsiblefor
operating,
regulating,
and
protecting
the
grid.
These
organizations
include:
AmericanPublicPowerAssociation
AnalyticalServicesInc.(ANSER)
Atmospheric&SpaceTechnologyResearchAssociates(ASTRA),LLC
BCSIncorporated
BoozAllenHamilton
DefenseR&D
Canada
Centre
for
Security
Science
DepartmentofDefense
OfficeofAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforHomelandDefenseandAmericaSecurityAffairs
(OASDHD&ASA)
OfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforOperationalEnergyPlansandPrograms(OASD
OEPP)
OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefenseforInstallationsandEnvironment(I&E)
DepartmentofEnergy
InfrastructureSecurityandEnergyRestorationDirectorate
DepartmentofHomelandSecurity
OfficeofInfrastructureProtection
Science&TechnologyDirectorate
EdisonElectricInstitute
ElectricInfrastructureSecurityCouncil
EmbassyofSweden
Emprimus
ExelonGeneration,LLC
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FederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA)
FederalEnergyRegulatoryCommission(FERC)
FriiPwr,Ltd.
GeoStrategicAnalysis
Headquarters,U.S.ArmyCorpsofEngineers(HQUSACE)
HooverInstitution,StanfordUniversity
ICS/SCADAThreatFocusCellTeamLeaders
IdahoNationalLaboratory
InteragencyCoordinationDirectorate
ISONew
England
NARUCStaffSubcommitteeonCriticalInfrastructure
NationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration(NASA)
NationalAssociationofStateEnergyOfficials(NASEO)
NationalCommunicationsSystem
NationalDefenseUniversity
NationalOceanic
and
Atmospheric
Administration
(NOAA)
NationalWeatherService
NavalSeaSystemsCommandDahlgrenMissionAssuranceDivision
NAVFACMobileUtilitiesSupportEquipment
Navy,OPNAVN00X(NavalWarfareIntegrationGroup,andQDR)
NorthAmericanAerospaceDefenseCommand(NORAD)andUnitedStatesNorthernCommand
(USNORTHCOM)
NORADandUSNORTHCOMInteragencyCoordination(IC)
NORADandUSNORTHCOMJ7JointTrainingandExercises
USNORTHCOMJ34(AssessmentsandCIPBranch)
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NorthAmericanElectricReliabilityCorporation(NERC)
GeomagneticDisturbancesTaskForce(GMDTF)
PHIServiceCompany
PJMCorporation
PotomacElectricPowerCompany
ProgressEnergy
PSEGServicesCorp.
ReliabilityFirstCorp.
SecuredSciencesGroup
SpacePlasma
Laboratory
SSG,LLC
StormAnalysisConsultants
TheNationalAssociationofRegulatoryUtilityCommissioners(NARUC)
ThePraemittiasGroup,Inc.
TranstectorSystems,Inc.
UnitedStates
Air
Force/Air
Force
Weather
Agency
(AFWA)
UnitedStatesNuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)
WhiteHouse
NationalSecurityStaff
OfficeofScienceandTechnologyPolicy(OSTP)
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ObjectivesIdentifyandunderstandthepotentialimpactofamajorgeomagneticstormontheNorthAmerican
PowerGrid.
ExploreandsocializewaystominimizetheimpactofamajorgeomagneticstormonUScritical
infrastructure.
Examineandassessprocessesandproceduresforrecoveringfromacatastrophicgeomagneticstorm.
Clarifyand
deconflict
roles
and
responsibilities
between
public
and
private
agencies.
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BackgroundThesunissubjecttoperiodsofincreasinganddecreasingsunspotactivityapproximatelyevery11years
inwhatisknownasthesolarcycle.Sunspotactivityhasbeencorrelatedtotheoccurrenceofsolarflares
andcoronal
mass
ejections
(CMEs),
which
can
cause
geomagnetic
disturbances
(GMD)
on
Earth.
AlthoughCMEsoccurmoreoftenduringthesolarmaximumwhentheincidenceofsunspotsis
greatest,theycanstilloccuratanytimeduringasolarcycle.MostCMEsareharmlesslydirectedinto
interplanetaryspacebutsometraveldirectlytowardsEarth.WhenaCMEmovingthroughspaceat
millionsofmilesperhourinteractswithEarthsmagneticfield,thenormalfieldisquicklydisturbedand
cancontinuetochangeformanyhoursuntiltheeffectsofthestormhavepassedandthefieldreturns
toanundisturbedstate.AstheEarthsmagneticfieldchanges,DCelectriccurrentsareinducedinlong
distancehighvoltagetransmissionlines.ThesetransmissionlinesareconnectedtogroundedEHV
transformersdesignedtooperateonlywith60cycleACpower.GeomagneticallyinducedDCcurrent
causesACpowertransformerstooperateabnormallyandcanresultinrapidoverhearingandfailureif
conditionsare
unfavorable.
Most
geomagnetic
storms
have
relatively
limited
and
temporary
effects,
however,strongerstormscanadverselyaffectcriticalinfrastructure,bothinspaceandonEarth.In
additiontothegeomagneticeffectsalreadydiscussed,solarstormscantemporarilydistorttheEarths
ionosphereadverselyaffectingradiocommunicationsandGlobalPositioningSystem(GPS)service.
Surfacechargescanbuilduponsatellites,causingunhardenedelectronicsystemstomalfunctionor
permanentlyfail.
In1989astronggeomagneticstormcausedablackoutinQuebecjust90secondsaftertheCMEreached
Earth.SinceNASAsACEspacecraftwasnotlauncheduntil1997,therewaslesseffectiveearlywarning
availabletogridoperatorsinthisevent.Ittookninehourstorestorethe18,000MWnetworkafter
repairingor
replacing
destroyed
equipment.
A
geomagnetic
storm
in
2003
took
down
the
Federal
AviationAdministrations(FAA)GPSbasednavigationsystemfor30hoursanddamagedelectrical
systemsfromScandinaviatoSouthAfrica.Theseandotherrecentstormsweresmallcomparedto
knownsuperstormsin1859(Carringtonevent)and1921.The1859superstormfeaturedtwo
consecutiveCMEsfirstobservedbyBritishastronomerRichardCarrington.WhenthefirstCMEslammed
intoEarthabout18hourslater,therewasnopowergridthatcouldbedamagedbutmanytelegraph
systemsfailedorcaughtfireacrossEuropeandNorthAmerica.
Modernstormscancausemuchmoredamageanddisruptionthanearliereventsbecause
infrastructuresaroundtheworldaremoreubiquitous,complex,andinterconnected.IfaCarrington
level
event
where
to
occur
today,
it
could
cause
enormously
more
damage,
potentially
knocking
out
largeportionsoftheworldselectricinfrastructureandcreatingmassiveblackoutsacrosstheglobe.If
suchblackoutswerelonglastingtheycouldaffectphysicalinfrastructureincludingwaterdistribution,
perishablefoodsandmedications,heating/airconditioning,sewagedisposal,telecommunications,and
fuelsupplies.Accordingtothe2009NASreportthedamageinflictedbyamajorCMEcouldcosttheUS
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$12trillioninitsfirstyear.Althoughthe1859stormwasarareevent,stormswitharoundhalfits
intensityoccurmuchmorefrequently.The1921superstormisthemostrecentexample.
ConcernsaboutthesusceptibilityofUSelectricalinfrastructuretoGMDeffectsaresignificantcompared
toothersimilarlyindustrializedcountriesforseveralreasons:
MuchoftheUSislocatedinrelativeproximitytoEarthsmagneticnorthpolewhereGMDeffectsarestronger.
Becauseofgeography,theUShasalargenumberoflongdistanceeastwestorientedhighvoltagetransmissionlineswhichactasgoodantennasforbestcasecouplingwithGMD
producedelectromagneticfields.
TheUShasaddedincreasingamountsofhighervoltagetransmissioninfrastructureineveryyearsincethelastGMDsuperstormin1921.Highvoltagelinestendtobelongerinlengthand
thereforeactasbetterantennasforcouplingGICintothegridandpotentiallydamagingEHV
transformers.
Ifcatastrophic
grid
failure
should
occur
as
aresult
of
asolar
storm,
effective
response
and
efficient
recoverywilldependonthehighlyeffectivecooperationandcoordinationbetweenpublicandprivate
entities.
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TabletopExercisePart1:Prevent(T0+7hrs)0945,October4,2011BrieftoPlayersNOAAs
Space
Weather
Prediction
center
in
Boulder,
CO,
reports
that
an
intense
eruption
on
the
sun
associatedwithalargesunspotclusteronthesunhasbeenobserved.Theyreportthatthisflarehas
alreadyregisteredanR5levelontheNOAASpaceWeatherRadioBlackoutScale,oneofthebiggest
flaresseeninthelastfortyyears.Aradiationstorm,approachingtheS4toS5levelontheNOAASpace
WeatherRadiationScale,isexpectedtoaccompanythiseventinthenextseveralhours.TheCMEis
extremelylargeandbothNOAAandNASAcomputermodelsshowthatitisheadingtowardsEarth.
SomeEarthorbitingsatellitesarealreadybeingaffected.
AverylargegeomagneticstormisexpectedattheG5level,NOAAsspaceweatherequivalentofa
Category5hurricanealthoughabout4eventsofG5strengthoccurinatypical11yearsolarcycle.
Higherlatitudesaretypicallymorevulnerabletothestorm,particularlyinproximitytolargebodiesof
saltwater,whichactsasaconduitforgroundinducedcurrents.Theeffectsofthestrongeststormscan
actuallybegreateratmidlatitudesandleaveextremenorthernorsouthernlatitudeslessimpacted.
ImpactEstimateUpto130MAmericansinitiallyw/oelectricityforseveralhours
Upto2monthstofullyrestorenormalpower
Secondaryimpacts:
Energy
Communications
Water/Sanitation
Banking&Finance
Transportation
EmergencyServices
GovernmentServices
SummaryofTeamDiscussionsTheteamsweregiventwohourstodiscusstheramificationsoftheimpactestimateandtodiscover
whereweaknessesinpreparationcapacitymayreside.Asrepresentativesfromvariousorganizations
spoke,itbecameclearthatissuesofcoordinationwerelessofaconcernthanthoseofphysicalcapacity
torespond.
Given
such
adisaster,
government
agencies
explained
that
only
industry
had
the
appropriateresourcestorespond.
TimeframeofwarningTheprimaryissuesrepeatedacrosseachteamwasthetimelineofwarningsandtheresultantcapacityofindustrytomakemeaningfuldecisionswithinthattimeframe.Fromthetime
theACEsatelliteprovidesfinalinformationabouttheanticipatedseverityofanevent,industrytypically
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hasabout45minutestomakedecisionsonhowtoprotectandpreservethegrid.Thistimeframeis
marginallysufficientforsystemoperatorstoworkthroughmechanismstoidentifyandanalyze
informationabouttheeventasitispasseddown.Importantactionscanbecompletedorinitiatedinthis
timeframebutthereisessentiallynoroomforeventheslightestdelaysormistakes.Actionsofthistype
canincludeunloadingorevensecuringsomelongdistancetransmissionlinesthroughavarietyof
possiblemeasures
in
order
to
reduce
the
GIC
that
will
enter
the
grid,
and
starting
peaking
plants
to
establishasituationwhereregionalloadsandgenerationaremorebalanced.
Advancedwarningcancomeasearlyastwodayspriortoanevent,butthesewarningshavesignificantmarginsoferror,thusmakingthemdifficulttoactupon.
AdvancedwarningsonmeasuredgroundsurgescomemorerapidlyoutofCanadathanfromUSagencies.
Certainoperatingstepscanbetakenwithintwentyhoursofnotificationtoreducevulnerabilityof
the
system
and
the
procedures
for
these
steps
are
already
in
place.
ImmediateStepsGiventhewarningtimeframes,thediscussionturnedtowhatstepscouldactuallybetakentomitigateimpendingdamagetothegrid.Anindustrywideconferencecallwouldoccur,similar
tothecallsconductedbeforehurricanes.AlleightNERCregionswouldbebroughtin,withtheir
respectivecoordinators,tochallengethemtoprepareforwhatevertypeofspaceweathermightbe
approachingandanalyzewhattheimpactcouldbe.
Loadsheddingandthepossibilityofatemporarygridshutdownwerediscussedaslikelycandidatesfor
immediateaction.Loadsheddingincludedsuchconceptsasislandingorestablishingmicrogridswithin
thesystemtoisolatepotentialproblemareasandreducetheneedforlongdistancetransmission.The
mostcontentiousissuewastheideaofsimplyshuttingoffthegridforsomeperiodoftimetoprotectit
fromextensivedamage.Itwasagreedthatthedecisiontotakesuchadrasticmeasureresidedentirely
withtheutilities,butitwasclearthatthepotentialliabilityissuesassociatedwithafalsealarmscenario
weretoogreatforagridshutdowntobeareasonableoption.Complicatingissuesinclude:
Maintainingserviceandkeepingthegridoperatingisalongstandingdeeplyingrainedtoppriorityfromindustryspointofview.
Inplaceproceduresarebasedongettingreadyonceanalertisreceived,buttherestoftheprocedures
are
not
implemented
until
the
grid
is
actually
overloaded,
thus
in
place
procedures
arereactive,notproactive.
Fromtheperspectiveofparticipantsthatwerenotpartofautility,difficultyexistedinunderstandingtheproceduresthatutilitiesalreadyhaveinplacetodealwithcrises.
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Thegridisdynamic;itcanhavehighlystablevoltageatonemomentandpoorvoltagestabilityafewminuteslater,etc.,andasaresult,anymitigationstrategywillchangedailyorfaster.
Thebasicstrategyofcommercialpowercompaniesistomaintainreliableserviceandavoidashutdownatnearlyallcosts.Undernormalconditionsthisapproachensurestheavailabilityof
powerto
utility
customers
but
under
severe
GMD
conditions
this
approach
increases
the
probabilitythatsomeamountofdamagetooperatingequipmentwilloccur.
Muchoftheburdenforrapidlyrespondingtoearlywarningfallsupontheutilitycompanieswhoareboundbyasetofstandardsthatprohibitthemfromdroppingcustomersundermost
conditions.Ifforecastsareincorrectabouttheevent,theutilitywillhavetoanswerto
regulatoryagencies.Thereisnocertaintyaboutwhatdamagewillbecausedandutilities,
operators,engineers,andothersdonotagreeonhowmuchdamagemayoccur.Becausethere
isnolegalprotection,utilitieshavelittleincentivetotakestrongpreventativesteps.
Seasonalityisacriticalfactoraswell.Twotothreemonthswithoutelectricitywouldhavedifferentimpactsinahotsummerascomparedtoaharshwinter.Thisscenarioassumedthat
theweatherwasmild,butshouldasimilaroutageoccurinsubfreezingconditions,the
reactions,procedures,andoutcomeswouldbevastlymorechallenging.
Therewasaconsensusamongexerciseparticipantsthatamoreaccurateassessmentoftheseverityand
timingofGMDconditionsisrequired.Bettermodelingandsimulationcapabilitiescouldhelpinthis
regard.Additionally,abettertechnicalunderstandingoftheeffectsthestormwillhaveonextremely
highvoltage(EHV)transformersthemselvesisimperativesincethisisthemostcriticalfactoraffecting
theduration
of
ablackout
and
recovery.
TransformersTheprimarypieceoftheelectricgridtobeaffectedbyaneventofthemagnitude
positedbytheexercisearetheroughly2000EHVpowertransformersinthebulktransmissiongrid.
Excessivedirectcurrent(DC)flowingthroughalargealternatingcurrent(AC)transformerground
connectionmaycauseoverheatingandfailure.Whilethetruenumberoftransformersthatcouldbe
damagedbyasevereGMDisunknown,losingasignificantportionofthefleetwouldresultin
widespreadlongtermpoweroutages.ThedamagesusceptibilityofanindividualEHVtransformeris
influencedbyitsageandhealth,butalsobythelocalgroundconductanceandgeologyofthe
transformersubstationlocationandconnectedtransmissionlinelengthandorientation.Factorssuchas
thesecan
combine
in
ways
that
can
make
some
older
transformers
less
vulnerable
than
some
newer
ones.
Significantpoints:
MostlargeEHVtransformersaremanufacturedoutsideoftheUnitedStates.IftherewasaneventthatimpactedtheU.S.andothercountries,andifkeypiecesofequipmentweredamaged
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andrequiredreplacement,itwouldtakealongtimetoreplacethem,possiblymonthsoryears,
andtheU.S.mightnotbethefirstpriorityofthemanufacturingcountries.
AnothercomplicatingfactorisreplacementEHVtransformertransportationtotheremotelocationswheretheywouldbeneeded.ManylargeEHVtransformerlocationsarenoteasily
accessibleand
these
very
large
and
heavy
transformers
require
special
transportation
equipmentthathaslimitedavailability.Ifthereisalargemagnitudeevent,littlecapabilityexists
torapidlyreplacetransformers.
ThereistheSTEPprogram(SpareTransformerEquipmentProgram)whichinvolvessharingsparetransformersbetweenutilitiesthatarevoluntarysignatoriestothisagreement.This
programwasdesignedtohandleshortnoticerequirementsforsmallnumbersofreplacement
transformersfollowinganeventsuchasanisolatedterroristattackonafewsubstations.The
questionregardinganadequatenumberofsparesforlargerscaleeventssuchasasevereGMD
ismoredifficulttoanswerandthereiscurrentlynoindustrypositiononthissubject.
Furthermore,theleadtimecanbeaslongsas12yearsforprocuringmajortransformers,many
ofwhichareuniquelydesignedforaspecificgridlocationintermsofvoltageandpowerratings.
Inthe1921levelscenariodescribedbytheNASreport,hundredsoflargetransformersmightneedtobereplacedintheU.S.anditwouldtakeanextremelylongtime,asonlyasmallfraction
ofthevoltageclassesandtypesneededarecurrentlyproduceddomestically.
IfaGMDsuperstormdoesproduceablackout,servicecanberestoredtomanylocationsusinglowervoltagesystemstoeffectivelybypassdamagedpartsofthehighvoltagegrid.Generation
iswellconnectedatlowervoltagelevels.
TheMilitaryAccordingtoUSNORTHCOM,itsbasesattheinstallationlevelarenotnormallyprovidedrealtimeadvancewarningofanimpendingGMD.Certainmissionsdirectlyimpactedbyspaceweather
docurrentlyreceiveforecastsandwarnings.However,noticetoinstallationstoensurereadinessofthe
supportinfrastructuremaybenecessaryaswell.Itisessentialthatbaseshostingcriticalmissionshave
sufficientelectricalpowertosustainindependentcontinuousoperationsevenifthesurrounding
commercialpowergridislost.Thoughmanyinstallationspossessdieselpoweredelectricalgenerators,
theyhavelimiteddieselfuelstorage.Intheeventofawidespreadgridoutage,fuelsuppliescould
dwindlerapidly,therebyimpactingtheabilityofinstallationstoconductprimarymissions.
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TabletopExercisePart2:Protect(T0+20hrs)1300,October4,2011BrieftoPlayersNOAAs
Space
Weather
Prediction
Center
in
Boulder
has
issued
a
G5,
extreme
geomagnetic
storm
warning.ThecoronalmassejectionthatleftthesunlessthantwentyhoursagohasreachedtheACE
(AdvancedCompositionExplorer)spacecraftandisanextremelyintensecoronalmassejectionthathas
theworstcasemagneticpolarityandwillbegintoaffectEarthsmagneticfieldinthenexttwentyto
thirtyminutes.
Theconsequencesofthiseventonthepowergridcertainlycouldbesignificant.Themostsignificantly
impactedareaswilllikelybeintheNortheastincludingtheNortheasternCanadianprovinces,through
NewEnglandintotheMidAtlanticStates,thecentralGreatLakesregion,andalsointhePacific
Northwest.
ImpactEstimateWidespreadpoweroutagespossiblylastingforlongerthaninanypreviouslargeblackout.
SummaryofTeamDiscussionsThediscussionsforthesecondmoduleprimarilycenteredupontwomaintopics:communicationsand
authority.Givenasignificantoutageafteraseverespaceweatherevent,issuesdiscussedincludedhow
communicationswouldtakeplace,and,inparticular,howlocalauthoritieswouldcommunicatewiththe
publictopreventpanicandmaintainlevelsoforderandpublicsafety.Theauthorityissuecenteredon
whohadauthoritytoauthorizewidespreadprotectivemeasuresforthegrid,suchasashutdown.
CommunicationsCascadingeffectswereofsomeconcernregardingtheproblemofcommunications
duringamassivepoweroutage.Questionsregardinghowcommunicationinthatsituationwouldoccur
wereaskedamidconcernsoverpublicpanicgivenalongtermoutageofpower.
Landlinesandcellphoneservicewillverylikelybeoverburdenedordown.Itwasquestionedhowcommunicationswouldoccurinthiscase.Someutilitieshavededicatedcommunications
lines,butthemajorityhavemigratedtocommerciallyprovidedservices.Thisisparticularly
importantbetweenprivateandpublicsectors.Thenuclearindustryhasdedicatedlineswiththe
NRC.
Publicbehaviorandreactionscanproducedangeroussituationseveninnormalweatherevents.Itisnotknownhowthepublicwouldreacttowarningsabouthappeningsinouterspace.Itis
unknownwhatrangeofresponsetoexpectfromthepublic(theycouldpanicorcoulddisregard
warnings),andthoseresponseswillvaryfromplacetoplace.
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Giventhenominalthirtyminutetoonehourfinalwarningprovidedtoutilities,thereisaquestionregardingwhetherthereshouldalsobeprovisionsforwarningthepublicbeyondthe
NOAAwebbasednotificationprocess. Itisnotclearwhatthepubliccoulddoinresponsetoa
warningexcepttowaitandseewherepowerislostthentakeappropriateactionwhere
possible.Spaceweatherisnotawellknownthreatamongthepublic.Itishardtogaugehow
seriouslysuch
warnings
would
be
taken,
particularly
since
NOAA
typically
issues
four
to
five
G5
worstcaseGMDalertsinatypical11yearsolarcycle.
Ensuringthatcleanwatersuppliesandsanitationareafirstpriorityneedstobecommunicatedtoallplayers,especiallythepublic.Attentionmustbegiventohealthandsecurityifoutagesare
potentiallylongterm.
Localauthoritiesneedtobegiventimelyinformation,particularlyincaseofalongtermevent,tominimizethepossibilityofcivildisorder.
BeforeandduringHurricaneKatrina,theelectricutilitiesmadepreparations,toincludeconferencecalls,alerts,warnings,actions,procedures.Lossofcommunicationsexpectedto
accompanywidespreadpoweroutageswouldmakerecoverycoordinationverychallenging,and
asignificantproblemgiventhepotentiallyshorttimeframebetweenfinalwarningandthe
possiblelossofpower.
DefenseSupporttoCivilAuthorities(DSCA)maybeespeciallyimportantifalongtermpoweroutageoccurs.AlthoughDODactivitieshaverobustbackupandredundantcommunications
equipment,thatdoesnotnecessarilymeanthelocalauthoritiesdoaswell.Coordinatedeffort
mustbemadetoensurecommunicationchannelsareopenduringanevent.
Industryneedstokeepgovernmentinformedaboutwiththestatusofthegridandanymajordifficultiespertainingtocommunications.However,therewassignificantdisagreementabout
theabilityofcommunicationssystemstoremainfunctionalinapoweroutage.
Betterunderstandingofthetimeframeforapossiblewindowofpanicisneededsothatauthoritiescangetinfrontoftheproblemandprepareaccordingly.
FEMAhasemergencybroadcastresponsibilityandtherearebackupsystemstothataswell.Radios
and
other
basic
equipment
might
be
used
to
provide
information
to
the
public,
as
internetandtelevisionwilleventuallybelostatmostlocationsinanextendedpoweroutage.If
FEMAneedstoprovideradiosthentheywilldothatbutobviouslythiscanonlybedonein
limitednumbers.
Therewasalsosomediscussionaboutthepossibilityofestablishinganationalcoordinationcenter.
Industryparticipantswerecriticalofthatidea,claimingthatthefederalgovernmentalreadyhastoo
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manyoperationcenters.Abetteralternativewouldbeaprocessratherthananopscenter.Thereis
alreadyagooddealofmonitoringgoingon,wejustneedbettercommunications.
AuthorityandRoleofGovernmentOneachofthefourexerciseteamsthequestionwaspointedlyasked,Whatcangovernmentdotohelputilitiesduringthiskindofemergency?Theresponsewasa
unanimousnot
much.
It
was
quickly
established
that
government
has
little
to
no
authority
to
dictate
toindustryhowitistohandlethesesituations.Manyoftheproceduresneeded,suchasprioritizationof
criticalinfrastructure,arealreadyinplace:water,sanitation,andhospitalstopthatlist.Theprincipal
questions,then,werewhetherthereneedstobeagovernmentalauthoritytoorderutilitiestoshut
downorreduceloadingonthegridinordertoprotectit,whetherinsteadwhatisneededisprotection
fromliabilityshouldutilitieschoosetodosothemselves,and,giventhatmostoftheregulatory
responsibilityrestswiththestates,justwhatistheroleofFederalagenciesinthissituation?
WhatareDOEandDHSdoing?Atthisstageoftheemergency,DHSandDOEwillbecloselyengaged,butwillprobablynottakeanydirectactionaffectingprivatelyownedutilities.Atthe
time
NOAA
issues
the
alert,
DHS
and
DOE
will
be
following
the
situation
but
do
not
have
authoritytorequireanyaction.
Whatarethestatesdoing?InmanycasesstateemergencymanagementofficeswillprobablynotevenbeawareofthethreatofaGMDalertbeforeitcouldstarttoaffectthegrid.Those
thatarewillbespinningupEmergencyOperationsCentersinpreparation.
ForFEMAthefirstpriorityistoprotectlivesandproperty.FEMAsNationalResponseCoordinationCenterwouldbeinitiatingresponseplansatthispoint.Communicationbetween
theFederalgovernmentandthestateswouldbeginaswell.FEMAalreadycommunicateswith
theNOAA
Space
Weather
Prediction
Center
in
Boulder.
VTC
at
20
hours
with
all
partners,
with
multiplelevelsofactivation.Forexample,Level1brings15disparateorganizationsand
activatesdialoguechannels.Level2bringsESF2andESF12intothedialogue.FEMAwillnotbe
tellingthemwhattodo,butusingthemasthemainpointsofcontactfortherestof
government.ESF3,publicworkssupport,willprovidegeneratorsifneededandwillbegin
preparationstomovethemtowheretheythinkthemostaffectedareaswillbe.FEMAwillnot
bedirectlyinvolvedintellingindustryhowtocorrectproblems,buttheywillreachbacktofind
outwhatproblemsneedtobesolvedfirst.FEMAdoeshaveadeskwhichincludesprivatesector
personneltodeterminewhatservicesindustryandtheprivatesectorareabletoprovide.
Industrysmajorcoordinationroleduringthistypeofcrisisistoevaluatethescaleandextentofaneventandtocommunicatewithgovernmentalagencies.
AStaffordActdeclarationmightbeneeded.
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Secondaryconcernsneedtobeanalyzed.Whatfuelsuppliesdohospitalsandotheressentialserviceshave?Areairportsstilloperational?
Theprimarymajorissuerequiringmitigationispotentialpublicpanic.Publicpanicmayleadtoarunonresources,socialunrest,eruptionofviolence,anddenigratetheabilityoflocal
governmentto
restore
order.
Emergency
services
are
likely
to
be
strained
to
capacity
and
lifesavingservicesdelayed.Localgovernmentofficialswillberesponsibletoeffectively
communicateunfoldingeventstothepublicandtomaintainpublicorder.Itisimperativethese
officialsareprovidedwiththepertinentinformationtofullyunderstandtheeventsand
empoweredtocommunicatethatinformationtothepublic.
Thequestionwasraisedbyoneparticipant,Shouldweshuteverythingdownfor24hoursinordertoprotectthegrid?Furthermore,doesanyonehavetheabilitytomakethatcallin
regulation?Theunanimousanswerwas,no.Thegridinterconnectionauthoritiescouldtell
powerplantstoshutdownbutthereisnoestablishedauthoritytodirectthisaction.The
Presidenthastheabilitytoprotectutilitiesfromliabilitiesbutshouldauthoritybegiventothe
Presidenttobeabletodirecttheshutdownofthepowergrid?Industryrepresentativesstated
thatplantownersarebestequippedtomakethesedecisions.
OtherItems: Anobviousstepthatgovernmentcoulddotohelputilitieswouldbetoprovideareplacement
fortheACEspacecraftthatprovidesthemostimportantearlywarnings.Itisalreadyseveral
yearsbeyonditsdesignlifetime.Areplacementspacecraftisscheduledforlaunchin2014.
Arewepreparedtoactivateemergencycentersbasedonspaceweatheralerts?Areutilitiespreparedtotellthepublicthattheymaylosepowerduetowhatisgoingoninouterspace?
Powerlossmeansdifferentthingsindifferentregions.Betterunderstandingofthisissueisneeded.Ruralcommunitiestendtobebetterpreparedforpowerlossthanurbanareas.
Federalizetheriskratherthanthegrid.Thisapproachallowsregionaloperatorstocontinuetomaketimelydecisionstoprotecttheintegrityofthegridandminimizestheprobabilityof
extendedblackouts.
Someliabilityconcernsmaybemisunderstoodorinflated,ashospitalsandothermissioncriticalindustriestypicallyhavebackupgeneratorsavailableforemergencies.
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TabletopExercisePart3:Respond(T0+20hrs)1500,October4,2011BrieftoPlayersFEMAanditsfederalpartnersarerespondingtotheworstgeomagneticstormindecades.Thisglobal
eventhasproducedwidespreadimpactsthroughouttheUnitedStates,Canada,andseveralother
countriesinAsiaandnorthernEurope.NOAAisreportingthatthestormisessentiallyovernow,buta
varietyofcriticalinfrastructureswereheavilydamagedduringthestormthoughthemostproblematic
impactsareassociatedwiththepowergrid.
TherearelargepoweroutagesintheNortheastandMidAtlanticStates,aswellasacrossthenorthern
borderwheremostoftheCanadianpowergridisinterconnectedtotheU.S.Manycities,towns,military
bases,andindustrialcentersarecurrentlywithoutnormalpowersupplies.Similarelectricaloutages
havebeenreportedinnorthernRussia,Japan,Sweden,Norway,andtheUK.MajordisruptionstoGPS
serviceandsometelecommunicationsoccurred,butthoseeffectsareexpectedtobetemporaryand
theseservicesshouldreturntonormaloverthenextseveralhoursasthefinaleffectsofthestormfade
away.
Theglobalnatureofthiseventalsopresentsproblemssince,insomecases,thecomponentstoreplace
damagedequipmentwillbeneededinmanycountriesatthesametime.Thatcanplaceaseverestrain
ontheworldwidesupplysystem.Thescopeofthisproblemwillrequirefederal,state,andprivate
partnerstoprovideassistanceinmanypartsofthecountry.
DamageEstimate40MAmericansw/oelectricity
About65%expecttoberestoredin8hours About25%notexpectedtoberestoredinlessthan2weeks Final10%notlikelytoberestoredinlessthan2monthsusingnormalsupplies
SummaryofTeamDiscussionsThebulkofthediscussionforthethirdmodulecenteredonbackupgenerationcapabilities,system
restoration,andcoordination.Itwasduringthissessionthatwaysgovernmentcanhelpindustrywere
better
identified
and
expressed.
Given
the
unprecedented
loss
of
dozens
of
US
transformers,
a
gap
discussedduringthefirstmodulewashowtogetreplacementtransformerstolocationswheretheyare
neededgiventhedifficultyintransportingthem.Governmentcanaidconsiderablyinovercomingthis
problem.Further,governmentcanplayasignificantroleinfindinganddeployingtemporarypower
generationoptionsforisolatedcriticalinfrastructure.
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BackupGenerationgivenaneventofthismagnitude,someareasmaybecomeisolatedfromthegrid.Inthoseinstances,localgenerationforsometemporaryperiodisneededtokeepcriticalinfrastructures
runninguntilthegridcanberepairedtoastatewhereitcanprovideconsistentpoweragain.Thereare
anumberofFEMAownedtwomegawattelectricalpowersourceskeptavailableforhurricanesand
otherdisasters.Capacityexiststomovetheseandquiteafewcustomerscouldberestoredwiththose
powersources.
This
is
an
opportunity
for
the
government
to
assist
by
identifying
needs
and
supplying
electricalpowergenerationcapabilitiesinatimelymannertomitigatelossoflifeandpropertydamage.
Discussionfindingswereidentifiedasfollows:
Thereareportablegeneratorsthatcomeincontainers.FEMAownsmanyofthesecontainerizedgenerators.
Inthecommercialmarket,therearerentalgenerators,buttheymovewiththeglobalmarket,sothosemaynotbeavailableunlesstheUSpayssomekindofretainertokeepsomeportioninthe
country.
TherearesomegeneratorsintheUStowhichindustryhasexclusiverights.Apremiumispaidsothatindustryhasfirstrightstothem.80percentofthemobilemarketisalowervoltagethan
thegridusesandwouldtypicallyneedastepuptransformertogettothepropervoltage.
AneffectiveresponsewillalsorequireclosecoordinationatthehighestlevelsofDOD. Itisunknownhowmuchbackupgenerationrefineriesandotherlargecustomershave.Although
manycompanieshavehardenedtheirsystemstovaryinglevelsinrecentyears,thispracticehas
notbeen
widespread.
Many
have
purchased
or
leased
generators
for
use
in
emergencies.
Hospitalshavebackupgenerationbutonlyafewdaysoffuel.Thefuelresupplyproblemwould
applyacrosstheboardforsuchbackupgeneration.
Aprimaryproblemisthatthereisonlyenoughfueltorunbackupsforafewdays.Hereisanotherplacewheregovernmentcanhelpbyprioritizingfuelsupplytogenerationsystemsin
placetemporarily.Forinstance,intheVancouverOlympics,thegovernmentaggregatedkey
playersneedsforfuel(diesel)generationandfoundthatnotonlywastherenotenoughfuelin
thisareaofCanadatorefuelthesupplybutalsonotenoughtransportationcapabilitytogetfuel
inplace.TheUKexperiencedasimilarproblemin2007whenthereweremajorfloodsand
difficultdecisions
had
to
be
made
about
prioritizing
distribution
sites.
Floridahasmandatedthatallgasstationsalongevacuationrouteshavebackupemergencygenerationcapabilities.Thisstepmaybeagoodideatohelpmitigatethefuelproblemposedby
anylongtermpoweroutage.
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SystemRestorationUltimatelythepowersystemhastocomebackonline.Governmentassistancewouldbeneededtohelpfacilitatetherestorationprocessandsomepotentialsolutionsareoutlined
below:
Easingofregulationsduringcatastrophicevents.Onewaythatgovernmentcouldhelpisthrough
the
issuance
of
waivers
to
existing
regulations,
especially
interstate
waivers
of
vital
commodities,suchasfuel.TheFederalgovernmentcouldassistwithallowingacheaperfuelto
beusedtofacilitatefasterrestoration.Permittingcouldalsobeutilizedtoeasetheroutes.Each
statewouldhavetoapprovethesewaiversunlessthefederalgovernmentmandatedit.The
movementoflargeheavytransformerswouldbeveryresourceconstrained;theyneedtomove
incrediblyslowlyandthereareveryfewcapabilitiestofacilitatemovementofequipmentthis
sizeandweight.
Plannedrollingblackouts.Duringpowerrestoration,rollingblackoutsareapotentialmethodtorationpowersothattherearefewerlocationswithnopoweratall.Servicecanbeprovidedto
somecustomers,
but
not
everyone
at
once.
The
goal
would
be
to
provide
the
best
available
servicetonormalcustomersafterthemostcriticalservicesarerestored.
Prioritizingpowerrestoration.Theremaybesevereeconomicdamageinsteelmillsandindustriessuchaselectronicsfabricationfacilitiesthatnormallyrequirecontinuouspowerto
maintainsterilemanufacturingconditions.Duringtherestorationperiodtherewillbepower,
butitwillbelimited.Noteveryonewillhavepowerallofthetime.
CoordinationIssuesofcoordinationwereasignificantpointofdiscussionamongallthegroups,but
theconsensuswastheprimarycoordinatingbodywouldbeFEMA,underDHS.DOEwouldcoordinate
theenergy
industry
recovery,
while
DHS
would
deal
with
the
overall
federal
response.
It
was
made
clear
again,however,thatindustryisnotcontrolledbygovernment,andthatutilitieswerelargelyfreeto
respondastheyseefit.Inanorganizationalsense,respondingtoalongtermpoweroutagewouldbe
theresponsibilityofthestatewiththeFederalgovernmentmakingresourcesavailable.
Intermsofauthority,thegreatestuncertaintiesarepriortotheevent,notpostevent.Onceaneventhasoccurred,communicationprocessesarewellestablished,thoughsignificantdoubt
existsthattheseprocesseswouldfunctionsmoothlyinalargepoweroutage.Statesandutilities
thathavemanagedmanyrealdisasterswillbebetteratdealingwiththemthanstatesthathave
lessrealexperienceeventhoughthesamemechanismsareinplaceforalltypesofdisasters.
Underemergencysituationssomegenerationprioritiesmaybefungible.IfOhioisabletosupplyallofitsnormalpowerrequirementsbutitsneighborstateIndianais75%blackedoutthen
shouldOhiodenypowertosomeofitsownterritoryinordertoassistIndiana?Thereisno
clearlyestablishedprocessformakingthistypeoftradeoffdecisionundercrisisconditions.
Todaythesedecisionprocessesrestwithutilities.Stategovernmentsworkwithutilitiestokeep
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somepublicassetsrunning,suchashospitals,buttheutilitiesowntheirpowergridandcan
makedeterminationsthemselves.Thereareplansfiledwitheachstateregardingprioritiesfor
water,firestations,peopleonlifesupport,etc.Duringemergenciesitismadeknownaccording
tothoseplanswhichsourcesarethemostcritical. In90percentofrestorations,utilitiesmake
thedecisionaboutwhatgoesbackonlinefirst,basedoninstructionsandwhattheycan
physicallydo.
Utilities
frequently
have
interruptible
power
supply
agreements
with
large
customersandtheconditionsoftheseexistingcontractscandeterminetheorderinwhich
powerisrestoredtousers.ThereisnotalistthatisprovidedbytheFederalgovernment.In
general,however,mandatesexistforhospitalsandothercriticalfacilities.
Amajorpotentialgapinvolvesunderstandinghowlongthepowercouldbelost.Manycoordinationissuescanmoveforwardproperlyandconfidentlyifthatinformationisknown
early.
MilitaryThemilitaryhasacriticalfacilitieslistthatwillbeusedasthemilitarymanagesoutages
affectingits
bases.
A
considerable
number
of
critical
assets
on
military
installations
have
generators
or
otherbackuppowersupplies.Manyinstallationscanprovidebackupelectricalpowertosustain
continuousoperationsformissioncriticalfacilitiessuchascommunicationscenters,althoughthelong
termsustainabilityoftheseassetsdependsontheavailabilityoffuelsupplies.
Somebasesmayhavesomeexcesspowerthatcouldfeedbackintothegrid,butonlytemporarily.Inpastdisasters,basecommandershavecoordinatedthesedecisionswithutilities.
Defensecasestudiesarebeingconductedtodiscovertheactualdurationthatbasescansustainthemselves.Thereissomedebateoverhowlongatypicalbasecansustainitself.Somesaya
weekwould
be
avery
optimistic
estimate.
Mission
critical
functions
are
often
covered
but
day
todayassetsarenot.Othersclaimedthatthemilitaryhasafairlyrobustprogramtoprovide
fuelandhasarobustbackupsystemforcriticalfacilities.Someclaimedthatthemilitarybases
couldruntheirgeneratorsforseveralmonthsifneedbe,butothersdoubtedthecapacitytoget
thefuelinplaceneededtodothat.Anobviousexceptiontothislimitationwouldexistatmany
militarybaseswheretherecanbemillionsofgallonsofaviationorshipboardfuelstoredon
base.Generatorsthatcouldrunonthistypeofplentifulfuelinsteadofdieselwouldhavemore
thanenoughsupplytoprovidepowertoabaseformanyweeksormonths.
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RecommendationsOnWednesday,October5th,thefourteamsgatheredtodiscusstheexerciseandsummarizetheresults
fromthepreviousdaysefforts.Thefollowingsummarizesthesediscussions.
ReplacementoftheACESatellite:TheACEspacecraftiscurrentlylivingonborrowedtime,havingwellexceededitsdesignservicelife.Areplacementneedstobescheduledasquicklyas
possible.NASAandNOAAareworkingtolaunchtheDeepSpaceClimateObservatory(DSCOVR)
spacecraftonaDODvehiclein2014.DSCOVRwillprovidetheindicationsandwarningsthatACE
hasprovidedinthepast.
Hardeningthegridisthepreferredsolution:Preventionispreferabletoresponseandrecovery.Appropriatemethodstoprovideeffectivehardeningtoprotecttransformersandothercritical
gridinfrastructureinaGMDsuperstormneedtobeexamined,studied,developed,assessed,
tested,and
deployed.
A
national
strategy
is
needed
to
determine
how
the
costs
of
hardening
thegridagainstspaceweathereventsshouldbefunded.Therearepromisingsignsthatmanyof
themostcriticalgridsystemscouldbehardenedforlessthan$1Btotalcost.
Improvementsinforecastingaccuracyandtimelinessarenecessary:AlthoughearlywarningsaretypicallyprovidedbyNOAA24to36hoursbeforeaCMEcanreachEarthandproducea
GMD,thefinalmostimportantinformationisgeneratedbytheACEspacecraftonlyabout45
minutesbeforeGICcanoccurinthegrid.Thistimeframeisshortfortakingeffectiveactionat
morethan3000independentutilitiesandtransmissioncompaniesintheUSalone.Additionally
othercountriesdependonthissameshortwarningtime.
Gridshutdownisseenbyindustryasanunrealisticoption:ThereisnonationalauthoritytodirectagridshutdowntoprotectcriticalinfrastructureagainstGMDimpacts.Ifestimatescited
inthe2008NationalAcademiesofSciencereportareaccurate,thecostsofnotshuttingdown
thegridcouldeasilyexceedthecostofatemporaryshutdown.Iftheauthoritytoimplementa
shutdownislefttoindustry,legalprotectionagainstliabilityclaimswouldalmostcertainlybe
necessary.
Untilthegridishardenedtopreventtransformerfailuresinlargenumbers,thecapacitytoreplacetransformersinlargenumbersovershorttimeframesneedsmajorimprovement:The
United
States
has
limited
capability
to
manufacture
the
numbers
and
types
of
EHV
transformersthatcouldbeneededfollowingaGMDsuperstorm;thereforethereisdependency
uponforeignsuppliersforreplacements.Whetheratransformerisproduceddomesticallyisnot
directlyrelevanttoitsusefulnessbutfollowingaGMDsuperstormforeignmanufacturerswould
likelyberespondingtoordersfrommanyinternationalcustomersandtheUSmightnotbeseen
ashighestpriority.Thislimitationcouldbeaddressedthroughacombinationofexpanded
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domesticmanufacturingcapacityorincreasesinstockpilereplacementspares.Inbothcases
thereisnobusinesscaseforsuchactionfromindustrysperspective.Governmentwouldneed
toidentifyanationalsecurityriskrequiringsuchactionbyindustryandfindareasonablewayto
fundthesemeasures.Thiswouldbesimilartowhathappenedafter9/11whenanothernational
securityriskwasidentified.Althoughtheairlinesandairportswereprivatelyownedthe
governmentrequired
changes
including
major
airport
security
enhancements,
hardened
airline
cockpitdoors,FederalAirMarshalls,changestocriticalairspacerestrictions,etc.
Effortsmustbemadetobettereducatestateandlocalemergencymanagementofficials:Spaceweatherremainsapoorlyunderstoodtopictomostemergencyplannersandmanagers.
Althoughitisconsideredalowprobabilityhighconsequenceevent,therehavebeentwo
superstormsinthepast150yearsbutinbothcasestheworldwasfarlessdependenton
electricitysuppliestoprovideadequatelivingconditionstobillionsofpeople.Thepublicdoes
notneedtounderstandthedetailsofCMEs,GMDs,GICs,andspacecraftwarningsbutitdoes
needtobebetterpreparedforlongtermpoweroutageswhethertheyarecausedbyspace
weather,other
natural
disasters,
deliberate
attacks
or
simple
equipment
failure
associated
with
aginginfrastructureandgrowingdemand.
Amorecomprehensivestudylookingatcascadingeffectsisneeded:Theimpactontheeconomyofawidespreadandlongtermgridshutdownduetoaspaceweathereventishighly
complexandpoorlyunderstood.Thepotentialeffectsonsocietyareevenlesswellknown.A
betterunderstandingofthissubjectisneededatanationalandinternationallevel.
Federal,state,andlocalemergencymanagementofficialsneedaccesstoanaccuratedatabaseofportablegenerationequipment:Shouldasignificanteventoccur,itislikelythatsomesectionsofthegridwouldremainoperationalinanislandedmode.Inordertokeepcrucial
infrastructureintheseregionsonline,especiallywaterandsanitation,itwouldbehelpfulto
knowwhereallportablegenerationassetsare,andtohavesomeonewithauthoritybe
responsibleforprioritizingtheirdeploymentacrossstatelinesandbetweenutilityserviceareas
whennecessary.
Providetimelyinformationtolocalgovernmentsandmunicipalities:Theburdenofmaintainingpublicsafetyandcommunicationwiththepublicwilllargelyfallupontheshoulders
oflocalauthorities.IndustryandFederalagenciesneedtoestablisheffectiveemergencybackup
communication
capabilities
that
can
keep
enough
of
the
public
informed
even
though
normal
powersuppliesmaybeunavailable.
Revisitthetransformersharingplan:Fewoftheparticipantshadconfidencethatthecurrentplanwouldholduptoanemergencyofthismagnitude.Additionalcooperationandagreements
shouldbeputinplace.TheexistingindustrySTEPprogramfortransformersharingisvoluntary
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andwasdevelopedtohandleemergentneedsforsmallnumbersofreplacementssuchasmight
beneededafteranisolatedterroristattackonnomorethanafewsubstations.
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AppendixSecureGrid11ScenarioBackgroundTheSG11scenariowasdesignedtoexamineproblemssimilartothosehighlightedinthe2009National
AcademiesofScienceExtendedSummaryReportSevereSpaceWeatherUnderstandingSocietaland
EconomicImpacts.
This
figure
taken
from
that
report
shows
one
scenario
examined
by
the
NAS
based
onaneventsimilartoanactual1921superstorm.
ForSG11thefollowingassumptionswereselectivelymadeinordertoprovideanextremelychallenging
butmoremanageablescenario:
Theexercisegeomagneticdisturbance(GMD)producesgeomagneticinducedcurrents(GIC)whichquicklycausespowerblackoutswithinthetwooutlinedareasshownabove.
About65%oftheelectricalloadsandgenerationintheseareascanberestoredwithin8hours. About25%oftheelectricalloadsandgenerationintheseareascannotberestoredbynormal
meansinlessthan2weeks.
Thefinal10%ofelectricalloadsandgenerationintheseareascannotberestoredbynormalmeans
in
less
than
2
months.