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Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle
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Page 1: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid

James Bryce Clark, OASISRobert Griffin, RSA

Hal Lockhart, Oracle

Page 2: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

Agenda

• Security and privacy for the Smart Grid• Key management standards for the Smart Grid• Authentication and authorization standards for

the Smart Grid

Page 3: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

Agenda

• Security and privacy for the Smart Grid• Key management standards for the Smart Grid• Authentication and authorization standards for

the Smart Grid

Page 4: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

Interoperable Key Management and the Smart Grid

• Smart Grid represents a complex, multi-vendor environments.

• Smart Grid will require a range of cryptographic technologies

• Deploying multiple key management systems results in:– Cumbersome, often manual efforts to manage keys– Increased costs and risks for the utility and consumer– Challenges meeting audit and compliance

requirements

- 4 -

Page 5: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

Enterprise Cryptographic Environments

Key Management

System

DiskArrays

BackupDisk

BackupTape

BackupSystem

Collaboration &Content Mgmt

Systems

File ServerPortals

ProductionDatabase

Replica

Staging

EnterpriseApplications

Email

eCommerceApplications

Business Analytics

Dev/Test Obfuscation

WANLAN

VPN

Key Management

System

Key Management

System

Key Management

System

Key Management

System

Key Management

System

Key Management

System

Key Management

System

CRM

Often, Each Cryptographic Environment Has Its Own Key Management System

- 5 -

Page 6: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

Often, Each Cryptographic Environment Has Its Own Protocol

Enterprise Cryptographic Environments

Key Management

System

DiskArrays

BackupDisk

BackupTape

BackupSystem

Collaboration &Content Mgmt

Systems

File ServerPortals

ProductionDatabase

Replica

Staging

EnterpriseApplications

Email

eCommerceApplications

Business Analytics

Dev/Test Obfuscation

WANLAN

VPN

Key Management

System

Key Management

System

Key Management

System

Key Management

System

Key Management

System

Key Management

System

Key Management

System

CRM

Disparate, Often Proprietary Protocols

- 6 -

Page 7: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

Enterprise Cryptographic Environments

Enterprise Key Management

DiskArrays

BackupDisk

BackupTape

BackupSystem

Collaboration &Content Mgmt

Systems

File ServerPortals

ProductionDatabase

Replica

Staging

Key Management Interoperability Protocol

EnterpriseApplications

Email

eCommerceApplications

Business Analytics

Dev/Test Obfuscation

WANLANVPN

CRM

KMIP: Single Protocol Supporting Enterprise Cryptographic Environments

- 7 -

Page 8: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

KMIP to Commercial Meter

Utility

Digital Certificate Use Case

KMIP to low-end Residential Meter

KMIP to Industrial Meter

- 8 -

Page 9: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

Storage Array

TapeLibrary

SANApplication

Server

Application

Application

Application

Enterprise Key Manager

Symmetric Encryption Use Case

Key Management Interoperability Protocol

- 9 -

Page 10: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

Asymmetric Encryption Use Case

Public Key

Public Key

Public Key

Public Key

Public Key

KMIP

- 10 -

Page 11: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

Enterprise Key Manager

Request Header

Get Unique Identifier

Symmetric Key

Response Header

Unique Identifier

Key Value

KMIP Request / Response Model

Encrypted data

Unencrypted data

- 11 -

Commercial Meter

Utility

Name: XYZSSN: 1234567890Acct No: 45YT-658Status: Gold

@!$%!%!%!%%^&*&^%$#&%$#$%*!^@*%$*^^^^%$@*)%#*@(*$%%%%#@

Page 12: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

Transport-Level EncodingKey Client Key Server

API

Internal representation

Transport

Internal representation

Transport

KMIP Encode

KMIP Encode

KMIP Decode

KMIP Decode

API

KMIP

- 12 -

Page 13: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

KMIP defines a set of standardized Operations that apply to Managed Objects that consist of Attributes and possibly cryptographic material

CreateCreate Key PairRegisterRe-keyDerive KeyCertifyRe-certifyLocateCheckGetGet AttributesGet Attribute ListAdd AttributeModify AttributeDelete AttributeObtain LeaseGet Usage AllocationActivateRevokeDestroyArchiveRecoverValidateQueryCancelPollNotifyPut

Unique IdentifierNameObject TypeCryptographic AlgorithmCryptographic LengthCryptographic ParametersCryptographic Domain ParametersCertificate TypeCertificate IdentifierCertificate IssuerCertificate SubjectDigestOperation Policy NameCryptographic Usage MaskLease TimeUsage LimitsStateInitial DateActivation DateProcess Start DateProtect Stop DateDeactivation DateDestroy DateCompromise Occurrence DateCompromise DateRevocation ReasonArchive DateObject GroupLinkApplication Specific InformationContact InformationLast Change DateCustom Attribute

CertificateSymmetric KeyPublic KeyPrivate KeySplit KeyTemplateSecret DataOpaque Object

Managed ObjectsProtocol Operations Object Attributes

orValue (for certificates)

- 13 -

Page 14: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

Base Objects• Base Objects are:

– Components of Managed Objects:• Attribute, identified by its Attribute Name• Key Block, containing the Key Value, either

– in the clear, either in raw format, or as a transparent structure – or “wrapped” using Encrypt, MAC/Sign, or combinations thereof– possibly together with some attribute values

– Elements of protocol messages:• Credential, used in protocol messages

– Parameters of operations:• Template attribute, containing template names and/or

attribute values, used in operations

- 14 -

Page 15: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

Managed Objects• Managed Cryptographic Objects

– Certificate, with type and value– Symmetric Key, with Key Block– Public Key, with Key Block– Private Key, with Key Block– Split Key, with parts and Key Block– Secret Data, with type and Key Block

• Managed Objects– Template

• Template has a subset of Attributes that indicate what an object created from such a template is

– Opaque Object, without Key Block

CertificateSymmetric KeyPublic KeyPrivate KeySplit KeyTemplateSecret DataOpaque Object

Managed Objects

Key Block (for keys)Or value (fo

mcertificates)

- 15 -

Page 16: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

Attributes• Attributes contain the “metadata” of a Managed Object

– Its Unique Identifier, State, etc– Attributes can be searched with the Locate operation, as opposed to the

content of the Managed Object• Setting/modifying/deleting Attributes

– Only some of the Attributes are set with specific values at object creation, depending on the object type

• For instance, the Certificate Type Attribute only exists for Certificate objects– Some Attributes are implicitly set by certain operations

• Certificate Type is implicitly set by Register, Certify, and Re-certify– Client can set explicitly some of the Attributes

• Certificate Type cannot be set by the client– Not all Attributes can be added, or subsequently modified or deleted once

set• Certificate Type cannot added, modified or deleted

– Some Attributes can have multiple values (or instances) organized with indices

• For instance, a Symmetric Key object may belong to multiple groups, hence its Object Group Attribute will have multiple values16

- 16 -

Page 17: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

Attributes - 2

• 33 Attributes defined Unique IdentifierNameObject TypeCryptographic AlgorithmCryptographic LengthCryptographic ParametersCryptographic Domain ParametersCertificate TypeCertificate IdentifierCertificate IssuerCertificate SubjectDigestOperation Policy NameCryptographic Usage MaskLease TimeUsage LimitsStateInitial DateActivation DateProcess Start DateProtect Stop DateDeactivation DateDestroy DateCompromise Occurrence DateCompromise DateRevocation ReasonArchive DateObject GroupLinkApplication Specific InformationContact InformationLast Change DateCustom Attribute

Describes what “is” the object

Describes how to “use” the object

Describes other features of the object

- 17 -

Page 18: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

Client-to-server Operations• Operation consists of a request from client followed by

server response• Multiple operations can be batched in a single request-

response pair– ID Placeholder can be used to propagate the value of the

object’s Unique Identifier among operations in the same batch– Can be used to implement atomicity

• Requests may contain Template-Attribute structures with the desired values of certain attributes

• Responses contain the attribute values that have been set differently than as requested by the client

- 18 -

Page 19: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

Client-to-server Operations - 2

• 26 client-to-server operations definedCreateCreate Key PairRegisterRe-keyDerive KeyCertifyRe-certifyLocateCheckGetGet AttributesGet Attribute ListAdd AttributeModify AttributeDelete AttributeObtain LeaseGet Usage AllocationActivateRevokeDestroyArchiveRecoverValidate (optional)QueryCancel (optional)Poll (optional)Notify (optional)Put (optional)

Generate objects

Set/get attributes

Use the objects

Support for asynchronous responses

Support of optional operations

Search and obtain objects

Server-to-clientoperations

- 19 -

Page 20: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

Server-to-client Operations

• Unsolicited messages from the server to the client with the following operations:– Notify operation, used by server to inform

client about attribute-value changes– Push operation, used by server to provide an

object and attributes to client, indicating whether the new object is replacing an existing object or not

– Batching can be used

- 20 -

Page 21: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

LEN …Tag Len Value Tag Len Value

LEN… TagLenValueTagLenValue

KMIP Messages in TTLV Format

Type Type

TypeType

- 21 -

Page 22: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

Authentication• Authentication is external to the protocol• All servers should support at least

– TLS 1.2

• Authentication message field contains the Credential Base Object– Allows inclusion of additional credential information

Host

@!$%!%!%!%%^&*&^%$#&%$#$%*!^@*%$*^^^^%$@*)%#*@(*$%%%%#@

@!$%!%!%!%%^&*&^%$#&%$#$%*!^@*%$*^^^^%$@*)%#*@(*$%%%%#@

Enterprise Key Manager

Identity certificate

Identity certificate

TLS

- 22 -

Page 23: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

Agenda

• Security and privacy for the Smart Grid• Key management standards for the Smart Grid• Authentication and authorization standards for

the Smart Grid

Page 24: Security and Privacy for the Smart Grid James Bryce Clark, OASIS Robert Griffin, RSA Hal Lockhart, Oracle.

Questions?

[email protected]@rsa.com

Hal [email protected]


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