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Security Architecture Cost/Benefit Model: December 10, 2013 Mark O. Scott Technical Fellow for System Security Architecture and Engineering Layered Assurance Workshop Assessment of Two Embedded System Approaches Approved for Public Release: Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems Case 13-2400, 12/9/13
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Page 1: Security Architecture Cost/Benefit Model · and network security is the ability to build and deploy truly bulletproof systems having verifiable protection. And this remains the most

Security Architecture Cost/Benefit Model:

December 10, 2013

Mark O. Scott Technical Fellow for System Security

Architecture and Engineering

Layered Assurance Workshop

Assessment of Two Embedded System Approaches

Approved for Public Release: Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems Case 13-2400, 12/9/13

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• Why is this a significant topic?

• What is the scope of today’s presentation?

• How are the two approaches similar? How do they differ?

• What assumptions are built into the cost/benefit model?

• How will the costs and benefits be characterized?

• What results emerged from this model?

• How can these results be applied to current endeavors?

• What additional work can profitably be done in this area?

Security Architecture Cost/Benefit

Approved for Public Release: Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems Case 13-2400, 12/9/13

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A Precarious Position …

Dr. Roger R. Schell

From ACSAC 2001: Information Security: Science, Pseudoscience, and Flying Pigs

Approved for Public Release: Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems Case 13-2400, 12/9/13

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A Bold Assertion … Dr. Roger R. Schell

From ACSAC 2001: Information Security: Science, Pseudoscience, and Flying Pigs

“The greatest achievement in the science of computer and network security is the ability to build and deploy truly bulletproof systems having verifiable protection. And this remains the most powerful solution available for many of today’s hard problems.”

Approved for Public Release: Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems Case 13-2400, 12/9/13

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Bob Blakley, In Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS, 2002)

The Measure of Information Security is Dollars

Approved for Public Release: Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems Case 13-2400, 12/9/13

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Bob Blakley, In Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS, 2002)

The traditional approach to information security has failed.

The information security community does not currently have a viable technical alternative to the failed model.

The Measure of Information Security is Dollars

Approved for Public Release: Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems Case 13-2400, 12/9/13

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Bob Blakley, In Workshop on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS, 2002)

The traditional approach to information security has failed.

The information security community does not currently have a viable technical alternative to the failed model.

A. Information about both losses and product effectiveness is the prerequisite for the formation of a viable information security solution market.

B. The value of security solutions is impaired by customers’ inability to distinguish between effective and ineffective offerings.

C. The act of accepting liability for losses could be a powerful economic signal of a vendor’s belief in the effectiveness of its security solutions.

The Measure of Information Security is Dollars

Approved for Public Release: Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems Case 13-2400, 12/9/13

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7th Layered Assurance Workshop

LAW has provided a forum for vital exchange, as well as a maturing source of information, focused on

key issues relating to the effective and efficient modular construction and certification of assured

systems from assured components.

It is widely recognized that such an approach is the most promising way to achieve diverse and flex ible systems that can be certified quick ly

and cost effectively.

LAW is concerned with the theoretical, engineering, and certification challenges to be met before this

goal can be fully realized.

http://www.acsac.org/2013/workshops/law

Approved for Public Release: Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems Case 13-2400, 12/9/13

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The Objective of D-MILS is …

• To provide an environment for the design, analysis, verification, compositional implementation and certification of scalable, interoperable, and affordable trustworthy architectures.

Distributed MILS (D-MILS) Project

http://www.d-mils.org/page/overview

Approved for Public Release: Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems Case 13-2400, 12/9/13

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• Alternatives to “failed” information security solutions do exist – The science of information security is rich with solutions to solve the hard

problems – Ability to build and deploy truly bulletproof systems having verifiable

protection

• The market for these solutions must be built upon effective offerings

• What does the Layered Assurance Workshop bring to the equation?

– A forum focused on effective and efficient modular construction and certification of assured systems from assured components

• What about the Distributed MILS Project? – An environment for the implementation of affordable trustworthy architectures

Why is this a significant topic?

Approved for Public Release: Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems Case 13-2400, 12/9/13

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• Embedded System: Composed of Segments with Connections – Embedded Segment

– Operations Segment

– Support Segment

– Command and Control Center

– Mission Entities

– External Entities

• Embedded System: Security Architecture Requirements – Support Multiple Security Processing Domains (aka Security Enclaves)

– Support Cross-Domain interactions and data flows between Security Domains

• Embedded System: Security Architecture Approaches – System High / Multiple Single Levels of Security Processing Domains

– Multi-level Secure (MLS) Operating System throughout system (not the subject of analysis here)

– Multiple Independent Levels of Security (MILS) platform supporting MLS components

• Components of an emerging MILS Ecosystem featured in what follows: – MILS Separation Kernel (MSK)

– MILS Network System (MNS)

– MLS File System (MFS)

– MLS Console System (MCS)

– MILS SK-based Cross-Domain Solution (CDS) – Software- vs. Hardware-based design/implementation

Scope of This Presentation

Approved for Public Release: Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems Case 13-2400, 12/9/13

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Terminology and Diagram Schema

Hardware SoftwareNetwork

TerminologyBLP – Bell and La Padula (Security Model)CDS – Cross-Domain Solution (MLS Component)HMI – Human Machine Interface (Display Console, Keyboard, Mouse)HW – HardwareIDS – Intrusion Detection SystemMCS – MLS Console SystemMFS – MLS File SystemMILS – Multiple Independent Levels of SecurityMLS – Multi-Level Secure (see BLP Security Model)MNS – MILS Network SystemMSK – MILS Separation KernelMSLS – Multiple Single-Level Security (System)OS – Operating SystemPNI – Protected Network Interface (Boundary Security Functions, e.g., Firewall, IDS, Malware Protection)Security Classification – Security Level (Hierarchical) + Optional Compartment (aka Category or Caveat)SH – System High: Aggregate of security classifications of all data potentially in the SystemSK – Separation KernelSL – Single-Level (Processing, Network, Storage)SW – SoftwareSWaP – Size, Weight, and Power

Embedded System Diagram SchemaSecurity ClassificationEncrypted (Data in Transit or at Rest)S1 – Security Level 1 (e.g., Unclassified)S2 – Security Level 2 (e.g., Secret)S3A – Security Level 3, Compartment AS3B – Security Level 3, Compartment BSH Processing, Network, StorageMILS Processing, Network, StorageMLS Processing or Component

Approved for Public Release: Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems Case 13-2400, 12/9/13

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1. SH / MSLS Embedded System

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2. MILS / MLS Embedded System

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• Information security marketplace … – Values product and system assurance – Values product effectiveness, flexibility, and extensibility

• MILS (mostly future) Ecosystem Marketplace – MILS / MLS products are available, mature, and cost-effective – MILS / MLS products are interoperable and certified – Feature-rich MILS development tools are available – Robust MILS / MLS integration frameworks are available

• Cost/Benefit Model Maturity – Costs are relative and lack support of actuals at this time – Benefit Weighting Criteria are relative to approaches under analysis – Benefits – and hence the value of a solution – are difficult to quantify

Cost/Benefit Model Assumptions

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Cost/Benefit Evaluation Criteria

Architecture Feature / Model Criteria SH / MSLS Architecture

MILS / MLS Architecture

Benefit Weighting

Criteria

Core Processing: SH or Single-Level Primary processing at SH Primary SL processing at S3B

Separation

SL SW Instances

Assurance

Certification

SWaP

Performance

Flexibility

Extensibility

Core Processing: Other Security Domains Multiple SL processing enclaves SL SW partitions on MILS SK

CDS: Platform: HW, OS, CDS Engine, Interfaces Two HW CDS platforms; MLS OS Two MILS SK platforms

Processing Backplane SL backplane per enclave Single backplane; MNS used

Network System SL network per enclave Single MILS Network System

Disk Storage SL disk per enclave Single MLS File System (MFS)

Disk Encryption SL encryption per enclave Single SH encryption of MFS

HMI / Displays & Controls SH console Single MLS Console System

Data Labeling As necessary for off-board CDS Not required

Complexity

Assurance

Certification

High-level CDS Rule Set SH-S3A and SH-S2 rule sets S3A-S2 and S3B-S2 rule sets

Mid-level CDS Rule Set S2-S1 rule sets S2-S1 rule sets (fewer rules)

CDS Protocol Support Larger rule set may inhibit Smaller rule set may enable

Approved for Public Release: Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems Case 13-2400, 12/9/13

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Cost/Benefit Model Parameters Parameter Parameter Values

Program Phase EMD, Production, Operations

Segment Embedded, Operations, System, Support, etc.

Architecture Feature / Model Criteria

Evaluation criteria used within the Cost/Benefit Model to compare the two architectural approaches. Consists of relevant components that include: Core Processing, CDS Platform, CDS Rule Sets, Development Activity, Network, Storage, Console, Process, etc.

Benefit Weighting Criteria Weighting factor (in Percent) applied to cost to designate a relative benefit. A single value based on multiple criteria: Separation, Single-level SW Instances, Assurance, Certification, SWaP, Performance, Flexibility, Extensibility, etc.

Number of Enclaves Number of Security Domains required in the Embedded Segment: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7

Architectural Approach SH / MSLS or MILS / MLS

Unit Qty Quantity of Component as incorporated into the Architectural Approach

Unit Cost ($M) Cost of component (Quantity 1) in $Millions

Cost ($M) Cost = (Unit Qty) X (Unit Cost) in $Millions

Benefit Weight A weighting factor (in percent) used to capture the relative benefit of a given component cost. See Benefit Weighting Criteria above.

Benefit ($M) Benefit = (Cost) X (Benefit Weight) in $Millions

Value (=B/C) Value = (Sum[Benefits]) / (Sum[Costs]) in percent. For a specified number of enclaves and a given architectural approach, Value is intended to quantity the benefits relative to costs at the overall program, program phase, and segment levels.

Approved for Public Release: Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems Case 13-2400, 12/9/13

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Cost/Benefit Model Structure Program Phase Benefit

Weighting Criteria

SH/MSLS Architecture: 4 Enclaves Configuration MILS/MLS Architecture: 4 Enclaves Configuration Segment Unit

Qty Unit Cost

Cost ($M)

Benefit Weight

Benefit ($M)

Value (=B/C)

Unit Qty

Unit Cost

Cost ($M)

Benefit Weight

Benefit ($M)

Value (=B/C) Architecture Feature / Model Criteria

EMD Phase $126 $90 71% $107 $84 78% Embedded Segment $43 $31 73% $36 $29 80% Core Processing: SH or Primary SL Processing Separation

SL SW Instances Assurance Certification SWaP Performance Flexibility Extensibility

7 $0.4 $3 85% $2 6 $0.4 $2 90% $2 Core Processing: Other Security Domains 3 $0.4 $1 20% $0 4 $0.4 $2 80% $1 CDS: Platform: HW, OS, CDS Engine, Interfaces 2 $3.0 $6 80% $5 2 $3.0 $6 85% $5 Processing Backplane 3 $2.0 $6 60% $4 1 $4.0 $4 100% $4 Network System 4 $1.0 $4 60% $2 1 $4.5 $5 80% $4 Disk Storage 3 $1.2 $4 70% $3 1 $4.5 $5 80% $4 Disk Encryption 3 $1.2 $4 70% $3 1 $2.0 $2 80% $2 HMI / Displays & Controls 1 $3.0 $3 100% $3 1 $6.0 $6 60% $4 Data Labeling

Complexity Assurance Certification

25 $0.2 $5 80% $4 0 $0.2 $0 100% $0 High-level CDS Rule Set 15 $0.3 $5 80% $4 9 $0.3 $3 80% $2 Mid-level CDS Rule Set 5 $0.3 $2 80% $1 4 $0.3 $1 80% $1 CDS Protocol Support 7 $0.2 $1 70% $1 4 $0.2 $1 80% $1 Operations Segment $48 $32 67% $32 $23 74% Core Processing: SH or Primary SL Processing Separation 2 $1.0 $2 75% $2 2 $1.0 $2 70% $1 . . . . . . 10 $0.2 $2 60% $1 5 $0.2 $1 80% $1 System $35 $26 75% $40 $32 80% Integration Complexity 1 $25.0 $25 75% $19 1 $25.0 $25 80% $20 Certification & Accreditation (C&A) Complexity 1 $10.0 $10 75% $8 1 $15.0 $15 80% $12 Production Phase $191 $134 70% $150 $119 79% Embedded Segment $73 $52 71% $51 $41 82% Operations Segment $57 $37 65% $35 $26 74% System $60 $45 75% $65 $52 80% Operations Phase $126 $90 71% $107 $84 78% Embedded Segment $43 $31 73% $36 $29 80% Operations Segment $48 $32 67% $32 $23 73% System $35 $26 75% $40 $32 80%

Program Totals (All Segments) $442 $314 71% $365 $287 79%

Approved for Public Release: Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems Case 13-2400, 12/9/13

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Cost/Benefit Model Detailed Results Program Phase Segment Solution Description Benefit

Weighting Criteria

SH/MSLS Architecture: 4 Enclaves Configuration MILS/MLS Architecture: 4 Enclaves Configuration

Segment SH / MSLS Architecture

MILS / MLS Architecture

Unit Qty

Unit Cost

Cost ($M)

Benefit Weight

Benefit ($M)

Value (=B/C)

Unit Qty

Unit Cost

Cost ($M)

Benefit Weight

Benefit ($M)

Value (=B/C) Architecture Feature / Model Criteria

EMD Phase $126 $90 71% $107 $84 78% Embedded Segment $43 $31 73% $36 $29 80% Core Processing: SH or S3B Primary processing at SH Primary SL processing at S3B

Separation SL SW Instances Assurance Certification SWaP Performance Flexibility Extensibility

7 $0.4 $3 85% $2 6 $0.4 $2 90% $2

Core Processing: Other Security Domains Multiple SL processing enclaves SL SW partitions on MILS SK 3 $0.4 $1 20% $0 4 $0.4 $2 80% $1

CDS: Platform: HW, OS, CDS Engine, Interfaces Two HW CDS platforms; MLS OS Two MILS SK platforms 2 $3.0 $6 80% $5 2 $3.0 $6 85% $5

Processing Backplane SL backplane per enclave Single MILS Network System 3 $2.0 $6 60% $4 1 $4.0 $4 100% $4

Network Hub SL network per enclave Single MILS Network System 4 $1.0 $4 60% $2 1 $4.5 $5 80% $4

Disk Storage SL disk per enclave Single MLS File System 3 $1.2 $4 70% $3 1 $4.5 $5 80% $4

Disk Encryption SL encryption per enclave Single SH encryption 3 $1.2 $4 70% $3 1 $2.0 $2 80% $2

HMI / Displays & Controls SH console Single MLS Concole System 1 $3.0 $3 100% $3 1 $6.0 $6 60% $4

Data Labeling As necessary for off-board CDS Not required

Complexity Assurance Certification

25 $0.2 $5 80% $4 0 $0.2 $0 100% $0

High-level CDS Rule Set SH-S3A and SH-S2 rule sets S3A-S2 and S3B-S2 rule sets 15 $0.3 $5 80% $4 9 $0.3 $3 80% $2

Mid-level CDS Rule Set S2-S1 rule sets S2-S1 rule sets 5 $0.3 $2 80% $1 4 $0.3 $1 80% $1

CDS Protocol Support Larger rule set may inhibit Smaller rule set may enable 7 $0.2 $1 70% $1 4 $0.2 $1 80% $1

Operations Segment $48 $32 67% $32 $23 74% Server Processing: SH or S3B Primary processing at SH Primary SL processing at S3B

Separation SL SW Instances Assurance Certification Performance Flexibility Extensibility

2 $1.0 $2 75% $2 2 $1.0 $2 70% $1

Server Processing: Other Security Domains Multiple SL processing enclaves SL SW partitions on MILS SK 4 $1.0 $4 40% $2 2 $1.0 $2 90% $2

CDS: Platform: HW, OS, CDS Engine, Interfaces Two HW CDS platforms; MLS OS Two MILS SK platforms 2 $2.0 $4 55% $2 2 $2.0 $4 65% $3

Network Hub SL network per enclave Single MILS Network System 5 $0.6 $3 40% $1 1 $3.0 $3 65% $2

Disk Storage SL disk per enclave Single MLS File System 5 $0.6 $3 60% $2 1 $3.0 $3 65% $2

Disk Encryption SL encryption per enclave Single SH encryption 4 $1.0 $4 70% $3 1 $1.5 $2 65% $1

HMI / Displays & Controls SH and MSLS consoles Single MLS Concole System 5 $1.0 $5 60% $3 1 $4.5 $5 75% $3

High-level CDS Rule Set SH-S3A, SH-S3B, and SH-S2 rule sets S3A-S2 and S3B-S2 rule sets Complexity Assurance Certification

50 $0.3 $15 80% $12 25 $0.3 $8 80% $6

Mid-level CDS Rule Set S2-S1 rule sets S2-S1 rule sets 20 $0.3 $6 80% $5 10 $0.3 $3 80% $2

CDS Protocol Support Larger rule set may inhibit Smaller rule set may enable 10 $0.2 $2 60% $1 5 $0.2 $1 80% $1

System $35 $26 75% $40 $32 80% Integration Interoperability between SL enclaves Integration of MILS Ecosystem products Complexity 1 $25.0 $25 75% $19 1 $25.0 $25 80% $20

Certification & Accreditation (C&A) CDS and SL enclaves CDS, SL enclaves, and MILS products Complexity 1 $10.0 $10 75% $8 1 $15.0 $15 80% $12

Approved for Public Release: Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems Case 13-2400, 12/9/13

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Cost/Benefit Results Summary ($M)

(%)

Value = Benefit / Cost

Number of Enclaves

Number of Enclaves

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

SH / MSLS Cost

MILS / MLS Cost

SH / MSLS Benefit

MILS / MLS Benefit

50

60

70

80

90

100

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

SH / MSLS Value

MILS / MLS Value

Cost Benefit

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• What’s been tried before? – Useful, but not secure – Secure, but not useful – Build it, they will come …

• What works? – A market based on effective offerings – Solutions that solve the hard problems – Assured systems from assured components – Affordable trustworthy architectures

• MILS Ecosystem components with potential – MILS Separation – MILS Network System – MLS File System – MLS Console System – MILS SK-based CDS

Cost/Benefit in the Security Arena …

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• Better incorporate the following qualities into the Cost/Benefit Model – Relevant – Complete – Consistent – Transparent – Accurate – Conservative – Insightful

• Architecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) Modeling

• Cost/Benefit Model Maturity – Include costs based on actuals – Quantify and detail Benefit Weighting Criteria – Automate the model to include “submodel” characterization functions – Automate scenario, analysis, and reporting functions

Further Investigation …

From 2007 Workshop on the Economics of Information Security, A Framework for Classifying and Comparing Models of Cyber Security Investment to Support Policy and Decision-Making, Rachel Rue et al.

See Software Engineering Institute, Architectural Security Modeling with the AADL, Jorgen Hansson et al.

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