Selected for publication in ORBIS

Commanding Spies

by

Mr. Matthew A. Rose Defense Intelligence Agency

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Under the Direction of: Dr. Genevieve Lester

United States Army War College Class of 2018

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Word Count: 7,312

14. ABSTRACT

Technological advances in war continue, making once cutting-edge capabilities obsolete. The spy remains

an outlier. Historical accounts show the utility of spy networks to military commanders. These accounts

also reveal the innate tensions with commanding military spies. The military’s management of strategic

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) elements is a vexing issue. To understand the issue, exploring the tensions

between the profession of arms and HUMINT is fundamental. From this basic tension of professions, other

sub-tensions derive. Sub-tensions in command, authority, levels, and risk tolerance are observable in

historical and recent instances. Friction within the tensions routinely reduces the effectiveness of military

and intelligence elements. Past great-power conflict accounts highlight the friction points U.S. military

elements experienced. Looking forward there are three areas where friction reduction is required.

Research into the differences between the professional of arms and HUMINT and other tensions is lacking.

Next, strategic HUMINT elements and operations within the Department of Defense is an area lacking in

clear definitions. Not defining this area is fraught with risk if inaction continues. Finally, the processes used

to develop strategic HUMINT elements should be reconsidered.

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Command and Control, Intelligence, US Code Title 10, Title 50, Human Intelligence, Counterintelligence

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Commanding Spies

(7,312 words)

Abstract

Technological advances in war continue, making once cutting-edge capabilities

obsolete. The spy remains an outlier. Historical accounts show the utility of spy

networks to military commanders. These accounts also reveal the innate tensions with

commanding military spies. The military’s management of strategic Human Intelligence

(HUMINT) elements is a vexing issue. To understand the issue, exploring the tensions

between the profession of arms and HUMINT is fundamental. From this basic tension of

professions, other sub-tensions derive. Sub-tensions in command, authority, levels, and

risk tolerance are observable in historical and recent instances. Friction within the

tensions routinely reduces the effectiveness of military and intelligence elements. Past

great-power conflict accounts highlight the friction points U.S. military elements

experienced. Looking forward there are three areas where friction reduction is required.

Research into the differences between the professional of arms and HUMINT and other

tensions is lacking. Next, strategic HUMINT elements and operations within the

Department of Defense is an area lacking in clear definitions. Not defining this area is

fraught with risk if inaction continues. Finally, the processes used to develop strategic

HUMINT elements should be reconsidered.

Commanding Spies

Technological advances have altered the character of war throughout history.1

And while this is true of projectiles and armor, the spy is an outlier. The human element

of intelligence collection, commonly referred to as spies or espionage, is a unique

intelligence discipline. Unlike calibrated instruments that collect images or radio

frequencies, Human Intelligence (HUMINT) allows for the collection of information

inaccessible through other means.2 Although, spies are not without shortcomings. Since

the creation of the world’s second oldest profession, how to command and control

military spies has vexed commanders and historians alike. This is especially true for

those who do not offer immediate value to a theater or tactical commander. Spies who

seek strategic intelligence over operational intelligence are especially difficult to

command, direct, and integrate into military operations.

Commanding spies is paradoxical. A military commander will find themselves

attempting to control a seemingly immutable set of opposing forces. Given this fact, it

begs the question, how should the Department of Defense (DoD) manage the tensions

associated with commanding its strategic HUMINT capabilities? Examining this space

involves studying tensions. Tension, a physics term, describes the act of being

stretched by opposing forces.3 The term can also refer to mental or emotional strain on

an individual.4 Ironically, both explanations are fitting. For military commanders and

intelligence practitioners alike, navigating these tensions and reducing friction is

essential for success. “One spy in the right place is worth 20,000 men in the field,” an

idea attributed to Napoleon, summarizes the utility of a well-placed spy if the tensions

are reconciled.5

2

Historical examples provide insights and impacts of such perennial struggles

between operational commanders and HUMINT capabilities. The foundational tension

between the military and spies lies within the disparities in the professions. From this

foundation, subsequent tensions in command, authority, level, and risk tolerance are

apparent. Friction within these tensions occurs when influencing actors emplace

incompatible or restricting management frameworks between the opposing sides. One

size does not fit all.

This concept of tensions and friction is instinctive for Americans. The U.S.

system of government is built upon the idea of three equal parties that check and

balance one another. Removing the tensions should not be the goal; they are integral to

the design. Rather, understanding and identifying reoccurrences will assist with

managing and resolving current and future problems. Through this the DoD may

implement a system where natural tensions are expressed but managed properly by

governance, thus leading to superior outcomes.

Tension of Profession

The first tension with commanding spies is the most basic. This tension bridges

two distinct professions – HUMINT and arms. Intuitively, the United States accepts

spies are not Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, or Marines. It is true military HUMINT collectors

are cross-trained in arms, but their primary job is not to perform routine military duties.

This relationship among professions is common to the military. Doctors, lawyers, and

engineers are other professions which have a similar relationship with the profession of

arms. However, HUMINT appears different from other vocations based on two

questions. Is HUMINT a profession and is it compatible with the profession of arms? On

3

compatibility consider the Peace Corps, an organization which states applicants

associated with intelligence need not apply.6

Professions are the creations of humans and fit in a specific societal role. The

study of professions is “ecological,” because they develop when society creates the

preconditions for them to exist.7 A profession provides autonomy of practice for its

members and may exclude non-members.8 As one profession grows and determines its

“jurisdiction” of practice, others interact to determine their corresponding places in

society.9 This idea describes a competition or tension among professions for jurisdiction.

John Burk, a prominent American military sociologist, relies on this definition, “a

relatively “high status” occupation whose members apply abstract knowledge to solve

problems in a particular field or endeavor.”10 He further explains the military is a

profession despite the field of sociology historically taking this for granted.11

Nations rely on their military professionals to defend their borders, respond to

disasters, and wage war. To accomplish this charge the profession of arms routinely

employs sanctioned violence. The profession of arms serves a specific purpose in the

international system of nations. Humans recognize this profession’s practice includes

the sanctioned termination of human life. This sets militaries apart from other

professions. On this point, societies hold militaries to a higher standard than other

professions.12

4

Figure 1. Sets of Enclosing the Profession of Arms13

Can the same be said for spies? A spy, colloquially, is “someone who is

employed by one nation to secretly convey classified information of strategic importance

to another nation.”14 The act of “spying” or using spies is referred to as espionage.15

There is little distinction between the collector and the source. Both are considered

“criminals,” if caught. Spying is almost universally a crime in all nations; each has their

own definition on what constitutes a spy.16 Conversely, almost all nations employ them

for their own benefit. Societies clearly have use for spies. While there is not one

standard definition of a spy, international norms were established to combat the idea,

one man’s soldier is another man’s spy. The international community remains firm on

distinguishing between spies and the armed forces.

Spies in the military are an enigma. They offer utility but erode the purity of the

law of war. In the Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions, international law

5

recognizes that spies are different from lawful combatants.17 Therefore, combatants and

spies can be treated differently.18 Within the United States, President Abraham Lincoln

shared this view on the dishonest practice despite the Union Army’s employment of

spies. He issued General Order 100 – also known as the Lieber Code – which stated a

“spy is someone who secretly seeks information for the enemy and should be hung by

the neck regardless of their success in the endeavor.”19 Today, there is a general

international law consensus that spies are not afforded the same privileges afforded to

their military counterparts when captured by the enemy.20

Knowing that spies and soldiers are different – despite sharing similar

jurisdictions – does not de facto recognize military HUMINT as a profession. For this

point, the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) John Cardwell presented a unique case

study for the management of spies. Cardwell contended the Holy Bible could offer

lessons on spy management for “One Nation, under God.”21 In the Old Testament, there

are two examples of the use of military spies by Israelite leaders. Moses chose twelve

prominent tribesmen to spy on Canaan. These amateurs were sent to live among the

Canaanites for forty days with the charge of determining whether Canaan was their

“Promised Land.” When the tribesmen reported back, they disagreed with each other

and lost their faith in God. This intelligence operation concluded poorly for ten of the

twelve - who were subsequently stoned to death. Adding to the intelligence failure, God

severely punished the Israelites for losing their faith.

The second example involved one of the surviving tribesmen. Joshua, who

became the Israelites leader. He chose his spies more carefully. In preparation for

entering the “Promised Land,” he selected two professionals to enter Jericho. Joshua

6

requested intelligence on the inhabitant’s attitudes in preparation for an military

operation. The story alludes to these spies using tradecraft to mask their movements

and send secret messages back to Joshua. The two spies discretely recruited assets

under Joshua’s authority. Unlike Moses’ management style, Joshua kept the details and

tasking of his spies hidden from prominent leaders and soldiers.

The historical accounts and veracity of details can be challenged, nevertheless,

the lessons they reveal are important. Cardwell succinctly underscores this when he

writes,

If there is a lesson to be learned, it would appear that a strong case is made for the conduct of spying activities in secret by professionals, unencumbered by other political or military responsibilities, and that these professionals should report in secret to higher authority who would make policy decisions without debate. Spies should definitely not participate in the policy-decision-making process, nor should they take their cases to the public. When that occurs, although stoning is passé, the people are likely to throw figurative rocks at the wrong people for the wrong reasons.22

Cardwell argues spying is an act best undertaken by a community of professionals who

are separate and distinct from general military duties.

Within the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and DoD the term “spy” is generally

not used to describe its workforce. The intelligence discipline that primarily uses

humans to collect information from other humans is HUMINT.23 Other military

intelligence elements or special operating forces can also be regarded as “spies,” under

international definitions or by adversaries. But “HUMINT practitioners” are most

analogous to spies. The DoD’s HUMINT field of practice consists of clandestine, overt,

and interrogation elements.24 The primary task of all within this field is to collect

intelligence. Endeavors that go beyond collecting intelligence are more akin to those

conducted by special operating forces or other elements, and thus not “spying.”

7

But the underlying question remains: is military HUMINT a profession? One could

argue HUMINT is not a “high status” occupation, but would be hard pressed to convince

others that HUMINT practitioners do not apply abstract knowledge to solve problems in

the endeavor of collecting intelligence.25 HUMINT is clearly a profession using most

accepted definitions of the term. Although the compatibility between the military and

HUMINT remains a contention.

The profession of arms and HUMINT are dissimilar despite both being vocations

of war. In the U.S. military, the profession of arms is, “a vocation comprised of experts

certified in the ethical application of land combat.”26 As further described by the 18th

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the profession is built through shared “knowledge,

skills, attributes, and behaviors.”27 The attributes of the profession of arms are starkly

different from those in HUMINT. The ethical behaviors and norms acceptable for

HUMINT collectors are generally unacceptable in military circles.

A clash of ethical norms and behaviors is evident. Consider the common flow of

information between service members. Within military circles, subordinates do not

withhold information from their commanders or staff. Withholding pertinent information

from superiors could be labeled insubordination. On the other the hand, HUMINT

collectors must operate with secrecy and discretion. Withholding source and other

information is normal practice, even between supervisors and their direct subordinates.

Internationally, the military is expected to remain in clear sight for all to see,

hence the uniforms. HUMINT professionals on the other hand do not.28 The interaction

and subsequent friction between members of opposing professions cannot be solely

attributed to differences in process, jurisdiction, or organizational structures. Rather it is

8

the strong undercurrents of distinctly different values and norms which influence those

members.

John P. Langan studied the moral damage associated with the profession of

intelligence collectors noting, “In intelligence agencies there is a general recognition that

the acquisition of intelligence from human sources requires deception and

manipulation.”29 Lieutenant General Vernon Walters, an adept military intelligence

officer with experience in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Defense

Intelligence Agency (DIA), explained, “Americans have always had an ambivalent

attitude towards intelligence. When they feel threatened, they want a lot of it, and when

they don’t, they regard the whole thing as somewhat immoral.”30 Members of

professions customarily place limits on what is acceptable and not. These limits are

routinely based on their corresponding codes of ethics. The Hippocratic Oath taken by

physicians is a manifestation of this idea. In intelligence, and HUMINT in particular, the

limits of practice are this: don’t get caught.31 A former DoD legal advisor, highlighted this

clash, “Intelligence operatives live in a dark and shadowy world, while military forces are

the proverbial knights on white horses. Advocates of military transparency want to

ensure the reputation of America’s men and women in uniform remains untarnished by

association with the shadowy world of espionage.”32 Both professions are controlled by

stringent laws and rules, but society views one as dishonest and the other as honorable.

These examples show military HUMINT members are influenced by a different

set of norms, ethics, and required skills than their general military counterparts. The

anecdotal differences are the friction points within the tension of profession.

Understanding there is a difference is useful when considering other sub-tensions.

9

Acknowledgment of the differences is not the same as concluding the profession of

arms and HUMINT should not be intermingled. The DoD must meld several professions

into its overall organizational structure to achieve success. Intermingling professions

into the military is a valid pursuit. But, the differences between HUMINT and arms are

the bedrock from which misunderstandings, opposition, and other tensions arise.

Sub-Tensions

Like house’s foundation, the tension of professions is the bedrock from which

other sub-tensions branch. On one side a tension is HUMINT and on the other, the

profession of arms. There are sub-tensions of command, authority, level, and risk

tolerance. These sub-tensions are apparent in historical and contemporary examples.

The historical examples show several tensions their frictions at play, but for simplicity

each was examined separately. Commonly, the friction occurring in the tensions are the

events or influencers that attempt to pull actors to an opposing side. There are other

unexplored tensions, but they too also branch from the tension of professions.

10

Figure 2. Tensions with Commanding HUMINT Framework 33

Tension of Command

The first sub-tension resides in military doctrine. The opposing sides in this

tension are command concepts adopted in doctrine, and the HUMINT practitioner’s

preferred modus operandi. Military command is hierarchical so their organizations and

management structures generally follow suit. On the other side, strategic HUMINT

collectors prefer flexibility and the ability to use discretion due to the inherent

uncertainties within their field of practice. To examine this tension one must understand

military command concepts and their purpose, and how these concepts can clash with

HUMINT’s modus operandi.

11

Military command and control (C2) refers to exercising authority and direction of

forces to complete a task.34 C2 is innate for all U.S military members; it permeates

throughout all levels of military culture, doctrine, and policy.35 There are slight definition

differences among the military services, but the idea applies to all. Joint Doctrine

bridges the differences. This doctrine applies to all military services; therefore it

provides the widest applicability for this examination. The Marine Corps and Army

doctrine also provide useful insights into this topic, undoubtedly because the business

of spying and land combat both occur where people live.

The modern view is C2 and unity of command are inseparable. Unity of

command is a concept that traces back to General John J. Pershing during World War I.

General Pershing found it difficult to apply combat power in a multinational command

structure where different commanders were equal.36 Command unity describes how no

military force has two or more commanders who exercise the same type of relationship

over them. To achieve this unity, a force should have only one commander empowered

with the requisite authority. This concept is fundamental and necessary for optimal

combat operations according to military doctrine and experts.37 Unity of command is a

military principal that compliments others such as mass, offense, and maneuver.38

Today, command authority from a higher to a lower commander is delegated

through command and support relationships. The transfer of command authority and

forces is sometimes restricted. For example, United States Code (USC) Title 10,

Section 164, prohibits the delegation or transfer of Combatant Command authority,

except by the President or Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).39 While restrictions remain,

12

the overall framework for command and support relationships ensure unity of command

can be achieved.

When unity of command is not possible – usually because of inadequate

authorities - unity of effort is described as next best. Unity of effort is defined as, “forces

under different commands coordinating and cooperating to achieve a common

objective.”40 Unity of effort describes how commanders at an equal level, or non-military

interagency partners, support one another in the pursuit of an objective, goal, or

mission. Recent doctrine suggests that unity of effort is only guaranteed through unity of

command. The “if this then that” statement is communicated in doctrine, “attaining unity

of effort through unity of command…may not be politically feasible, but it should be a

goal,” and “unity of command is central to unity of effort.” 41 This premise is important for

understanding the difficulty with commanding HUMINT. The premise leads to the

following argument, HUMINT forces can best support a theater commander if they are

under the same chain of command.

A thought experiment can show how this premise creates a tension of command

and subsequent friction. HUMINT practitioners are generally expected to operate as

singletons or in small groups. Militaries are generally most effective when massed into a

unified force.42 Military commanders are normally given areas of responsibility. At the

highest command level below the SECDEF, Geographic Combatant Commanders are

given missions and geographic boundaries to conduct operations.43

13

Figure 3. Areas of Responsibility (AOR) for Geographic Combatant Commanders 44

Strategic HUMINT’s ability to gather intelligence is not limited by the

commander’s priorities or geographic area the collectors may find themselves in.

Collectors are safer and operations are more permissive in areas where adversarial

control is limited. For example, an American collector, operating against the military in

North Korea a risky endeavor. It is often the case, particularly in strategic collection, that

the opportunity to collect against the primary target occurs somewhere in the world. This

is why interrogating suspected terrorists at Guantanamo Bay offers a more permissive

environment. In both cases, the commanders in the permissive environments have

higher theater priorities than North Korea or outside terrorist groups.

14

Using the doctrinal command and support relationships, HUMINT elements

prefer to be in general or direct support to local commanders. This provides the element

increased flexibility necessary to operate. Commanders, although, are advised to seek

unity of command so they pursue command relationships like Operational Control

(OPCON). This relationship restricts the element’s ability to operate within the

commander’s AOR.

The tension of command is a creation of our own design. C2, unity of command,

and associated frameworks serve a purpose for managing military forces. However,

select activities suffer from a broad-brush approach. Strategic HUMINT elements and

their operations suffers when command relationships restrict an element’s flexibility and

movement. Joint Doctrine does not prohibit the SECDEF, defense agencies, or

Geographic Combatant Commanders figuring out how to achieve command across-

AORs. U.S. adversaries do not limit their operations based on U.S. AOR boundaries,

therefore it makes little sense that we should engage in such self-limiting behavior when

pursuing intelligence against these very same adversaries. The idea that strategic

HUMINT is akin to general land forces, who can be neatly organized and positioned

within the sight of a commander is itself the tension.

Tension of Authority

The second sub-tension involves the authorization behind HUMINT and military

operations. Andru Wall succinctly framed this tension when he wrote, “the law permits

while Congress attempts to restrict.”45 The authority to conduct all military operations

stems from executive branch powers and law. The framers of law influence executive

power and the authority to conduct operations by adding restrictions. The merits of each

15

legal restriction are irrelevant. Understanding that legislatures influence how military and

HUMINT operations can be conducted, and by whom, is germane.

Looking back, it appears the first Commander-in-Chief, General George

Washington, understood this tension. He was commissioned as the Commander-in-

Chief of the Continental Army in June 1775.46 For the management of war Congress

provided General Washington with the “full power and authority to act as you shall think

for the good and welfare of the service.”47 He clearly wielded power and authority over

the armed forces, and like many prominent generals before him, he understood the

utility of spies.48

The British military chief of intelligence in the colonies, Major George Beckwith,

noted after the war, “Washington did not really outfight the British, he simply outspied

us.”49 General Washington conceived a human-centric intelligence system and left the

management to skillful officers like Benjamin Tallmadge. 50 Washington not only created

his own network of strategic spies, he understood the risks associated with intelligence

operations supporting the military.51

The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent & need not be further urged--all that remains for me to add, is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in most Enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned and promising a favourable issue. I am Sir Yr Most Obedt servt Go: Washington.52

Washington’s authority to conduct the war did not fully extend into all areas like

strategic diplomacy and espionage. The Second Continental Congress created Secret

Committees, “for the sole purpose of corresponding with our friends in Great Britain,

Ireland, and other parts of the world.”53 The Continental Congress Intelligence

16

Committee corresponded with General Washington to synchronize the military’s efforts

with those areas retained by Congress.54

Quite a lot has changed since 1775, but not Congress’s view on spying and their

control of funding. As noted, the overall authority used by the military nests with the

powers of President of the United States. Authority is the underlying foundation of

command; it provides legitimacy, and characteristically follows a hierarchical structure.55

Thus, a military commander’s authority is not limitless. The executive branch also does

not have limitless authority, due to congressional oversight and dynamic changes in

law. USC Title 10 provides the SECDEF with the “authority, direction, and control over

the Department of Defense.”56 All DoD military and intelligence operations stem from

USC Title 10 or other delegated authorities.57

Unpacking the authority, congressional restrictions on organizational roles,

funding, and oversight become readily apparent. Legal code additions and restrictions

add ambiguity, nevertheless, the three pertinent statutes for Defense HUMINT are; USC

Title 10 Armed Forces, USC Title 50 War and National Defense, and Executive Order

12333, as amended. USC Title 50 and Executive Order 12333 provides the SECDEF

with a redundant authority stream, funding, and oversight outside of Title 10. Under this

supplementary stream, SECDEF and select defense agencies are provided the

authority to conduct intelligence activities within the National Intelligence Program

(NIP).58 The NIP includes IC members, and excludes the activities conducted by military

departments or Combatant Commands for planning and executing tactical military

operations.59 Operations conducted within the NIP fall under the oversight of the House

and Senate Intelligence Committees.60

17

The same statutes also provide guidance to focus the activities of DoD HUMINT

collection elements. EO 12333 states military services shall collect intelligence for

departmental requirements and national requirements as appropriate. EO 12333 also

states the DIA is charged with “collecting information to support national and

departmental missions with the tasking of the Under Secretary of Defense for

Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, and other

components and agencies.”61

These statues created leanings for DoD organizations and their HUMINT

elements. Despite the law stating the SECDEF can use any DoD element to accomplish

his tasks, Geographic Combatant Commands are generally precluded from expending

NIP monies because they are not IC members. IC membership is defined in USC Title

50 and EO 12333.62 On the other hand, the DIA and Special Operations Command

(SOCOM) are not limited by this restriction.

Table 1: Organizational Lean for HUMINT Based on Authorities 63

Organization Title 10 Title 50

Military Services X

Defense Intelligence Agency X

Geographic Combatant Commands X

Joint Task Forces within Combatant

Commands X

U.S. Special Operations Command X X

18

Title 10 and 50 authorities arguments routinely gloss over the fact that the

SECDEF maintains control and direction of all DoD HUMINT. This power can only be

limited by the President.64 The compartmentalization, organizational leanings, and

subsequent funding authorizations with oversight, are congressional limitations on

executive powers. It is not the authorities that produce the tension, but rather the age-

old separation of powers among the legislative and executive branches of government.

Tension of Levels

The third sub-tension occurs between the levels of war and intelligence. To begin

to understand this tension, one should put themselves in the shoes of a World War II

soldier. This soldier, dug in on the forward line of troops, does not necessarily care

about the enemy’s strategic stocks or manufacturing capability. This soldier is worried

about what is over the next hill.65 This illustration describes how intelligence

requirements vary in different levels of war.66 While the levels of war and intelligence are

extensively defined in doctrine, the levels of HUMINT operations and the elements who

conduct them are not. This immaturity and difficulty with defining HUMINT operations

and elements as strategic, operational, or tactical causes friction between collectors and

commanders.

19

Figure 4. Levels of Warfare 67

Sherman Kent, often referred to as the father of intelligence analysis, described

the differences in intelligence levels noting in 1949, “the words “high-level” are there to

exclude what is called “operational” intelligence, tactical intelligence, and the

intelligence of small military formations in battle known as combat intelligence.”68 Kent

postulated there were levels of intelligence in both war and peacetime. Today, military

and intelligence professionals understand this idea when they discuss the three levels

of intelligence; strategic, operational, and tactical. The levels of intelligence share the

same names as the levels of warfare.69

20

Table 2. Levels of Intelligence and Consumers.70

Level of Intelligence Definition Likely Consumers

Tactical Intelligence Intelligence required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations.

Tactical Commanders, Units, & Elements.

Operational Intelligence Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or operational areas.

Joint Task Forces, Combatant Commanders, & Campaign Planners

Strategic Intelligence Intelligence required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels.

President, SECDEF, Congress, Military Service Secretaries, Policy Makers, and Combatant Commanders

By definition, the intelligence levels are differentiated by the finished product and

intended consumer. Strategic intelligence aligns with the strategic level of war. What is

missing is pivotal. The intelligence operations and associated elements are absent in

the definitions. The DoD does not define “strategic intelligence operations,” or “strategic

HUMINT elements.”

A partial reason for this is the non-standardized intelligence collection process.

Strategic intelligence is not solely collected in strategic operations or by strategic

elements. A tactical collector could gather intelligence that fulfills a knowledge gap for a

policy maker, albeit, this example is the exception rather than the rule. It is generally

understood certain elements and operations yield different values of intelligence.

Counterpoints to this idea rely on anecdotes to show the uncertain nature associated

with collection. But collection is not a trivial pursuit; collectors generally understand the

21

type of intelligence that may result from their operations. They also have the discretion

on the type of sources they approach.

Consider military attachés. They are regarded as an overt collection element

among international military circles.71 The type of information these attachés are

expected to collect leans toward the strategic side, but this does not preclude them from

collecting tactical or operational information.72 Attachés must maintain a set of highly

specialized cultural, language, and tradecraft skills to successfully serve in their posts.

They also operate under a unique chain of command. In the U.S. military system,

attachés are not beholden to subordinate commanders, rather to the Chief of Mission.73

Their specialization, unique chain of command, and focus on strategic intelligence infers

they are a “strategic element.” This is not the case for all military HUMINT elements.

While the title of some DoD HUMINT elements denote they are part of a “strategic

element” – strategic debriefer for example- they routinely support operational or tactical

intelligence requirements.74

The separation of strategic assets is not novel. Outside of intelligence, the DoD

determined the nuclear weapons triad remains a strategic military capability. 75 The

triad’s C2, operations, and capabilities are unique compared to other operational and

tactical elements. The triad still serves a critical role in the DoD despite their separation

from regular military elements.

Another military idea useful for understanding this tension is reconnaissance

push and pull. This concept is found in Marine Corps doctrine. Push explains when a

commander knows his foe and requires intelligence to support operations. Pull is used

when knowledge of the enemy or terrain is lacking and a commander has not yet

22

committed to a plan.76 This idea may appear to be useful for tactical or operational

levels of war, but the Romans offer another historical lesson. Julius Caesar cataloged

his use of spies during his time as a supreme military commander. These accounts

survive today in his Bellum Gallicum texts, wherein, Caesar personally questioned

merchants, prisoners of war, and his legates for intelligence purposes. He also

managed his own network of professional spies to supplement overt means. These

professionals were prominent Romans such as, Volsenus, and a cadre of clandestine

operatives called the Speculatores. This array of human sensors provided Caesar with

an understanding of foreign people, terrain, and political-military dynamics for his own

military purposes.77

Analysis of Bellum Gallicum suggests human-derived intelligence was pivotal to

Caesar’s campaigns. The importance of this type of intelligence cannot be overstated.

A.C. Bertrand astutely noted, “Caesar adjusted his military goals to the amount of

intelligence available rather than gathering the intelligence relevant to his military

objectives.” This idea rivals common understanding of the use of intelligence as an

ancillary tool for commanders.78

When Caesar allowed his HUMINT capabilities to operate in a pull mode, he

surrendered partial control and the ability to direct these assets. This mode enabled his

strategic HUMINT forces to operate more freely than others. This freedom was not

required or given to all of his forces. Only those who required this maneuver space to be

successful, and had the requisite skills, were afforded this luxury.

The DoD does not define a strategic equivalent to Caesar’s Volsensus. Instead

all HUMINT elements are considered the same because they are defined as such. The

23

military intelligence and HUMINT communities may differentiate select operations as

more sensitive than others, but this falls short of defining operations and elements as

“strategic.” Definitional gaps leave the analysis and judgement to a case by case basis,

thus causing friction among actors. Because differentiation between strategic and other

HUMINT elements is not explicitly stated, military commanders tend to view all

capabilities as potential available forces. At best, military commanders seek more

capable units to support their operations. At worst, military commanders limit HUMINT

collector’s freedom of movement who are operating in their AORs and possibly against

targets above their respective levels of war.79

Tension of Risk Tolerance

The final sub-tension with commanding spies is risk tolerance. Intelligence

gathering is a risky business. When military intelligence operations are compromised,

the impacts can be calamitous. Risk is seemingly well understood in military circles. A

joint staff officer stated, “risk is the most important dialogue there is [in the DoD]. Either

you can [achieve objectives] or you can’t.”80 But, this risk assessment is incomplete and

does not adequately fit HUMINT. Compromises and attribution are generally not

factored into military risk assessments in the way they are for HUMINT. Despite recent

expansions, joint doctrine’s risk discussions still gather around the probability of not

reaching an objective.81 The risks associated with an operation going awry and

subsequent implications are often misunderstood. Risk tolerance, usually an investment

term, refers to one’s “ability to tolerate something”, or “the limit of enduring a force.”82

Both definitions are useful for this tension. This tension explores how commanders

tolerate risks, except the implications of a compromise shift and exceed their, or even

their higher commander’s, risk limits.

24

For the DoD, risk is visualized as the force between an organization’s strategy

and its objectives. Plainly put, risk is uncertainty. Assigning ownership to risk is a tricky

endeavor. Past DoD risk studies concluded ownership is ambiguous and often

misunderstood. Operational commanders are expected to describe, identify, assess,

and communicate their risk to higher-level commanders. Thusly indicating, risk

ownership flows upward along the chain of command. The overall risk owner for military

operations is the Commander in Chief. The Office of the President may statutorily own

all military risk, but it is the citizens who elect the President, partially by assessing and

inferring the candidate’s risk tolerance. 83

Figure 5. The Lykke Model: Strategy Stool.84

Tolerance and ownership are two altogether different things. One commander’s

personal tolerance varies from the next. A commander’s tolerance is also influenced by

environmental factors. One’s tolerance could be higher when their forces are in war

versus a peacetime environment. Peacetime commanders are presumably less tolerant.

25

Risk tolerance in the HUMINT discipline is no different. However, what is unique to

HUMINT is the shifting ownership and ability to forecast compromising effects.

When a HUMINT operation begins there might be a knowable and manageable

amount of risk. Regardless of the operation type, overt or clandestine, personal and

operational risk changes overtime. HUMINT operations generally take time to develop.

Interrogations or development of clandestine sources can be prolonged. Unique to

HUMINT is when a seemingly tactical operation could fail and thrust parties into a

conflict or cause the failure of a battle.

When military risk exceeds a commander’s tolerance and ownership limits, the

higher commander must approve. In HUMINT, an expected operational failure could be

the compromise of a source and or loss of a collector. The commander may still

approve the HUMINT operation. However, an event that causes national

embarrassment or congressional inquiry would have precluded the operation from

occurring. This describes a tolerance mismatch and tension.

26

Figure 6: Risk Tolerance Framework for HUMINT

A recent illustration of this are the congressional investigations on DoD and CIA

detainment and interrogation abuses.85 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld testified before

both Armed Services Committees regarding the abuse in Abu Ghraib prison.86 Later, the

Senate Intelligence Committee concluded its investigation on CIA’s interrogation

program. Upon full declassification, the allegations, details, and findings were

intolerable for the U.S. population.87 Subsequent restrictions were emplaced on the

DoD. Congress then levied the requirement to videotape DoD “strategic intelligence

interrogations” in the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act.88 The DoD and IC

members were required to conform to the law and changed their policies to respond.89

In this case, when the detainment and interrogations began, the risk tolerance

was within assessed limits. The American public generally had a positive view of

27

coalition operations based on media portrayals and service member accounts. The risk

mismatch was initially realized once the detainment abuses were published throughout

international media outlets. Congress responded. The U.S. population’s tolerance was

further reduced once the details were released in declassified reports. The DoD,

Congress, U.S. population and host nation are just a few groups who had a lower

tolerance post event than they did pre-event. Those savvy within the Washington

Beltway commonly refer to this phenomena as the “Washington Post Test.”90 The test

explains how the tolerance of groups is constricted in compromises. Other examples of

compromises, failures, and embarrassments are littered in the media and outside of

classified channels.

28

Figure 7. Risk Tolerance Fluctuations Model 91

Few HUMINT operations are compromised. When compromises occur, not all

will have strategic impact. Some do. The select operations that carry high strategic risk

and are conducted and managed by lower echelons are mismatched. Additionally, when

select commanders experience past HUMINT failures, this can create a lower personal

tolerance for accepting HUMINT-related risk. Intelligence, and HUMINT in particular, is

a risky proposition. Collectors pursuing intelligence for national purposes will indubitably

share spaces where tactical and operational level operations occur. Not allowing

HUMINT elements to operate because of risk, indubitably restricts the operations and

blunts the capability’s effectiveness. EO 12333 lays out a framework for the IC –

supported by all federal departments and agencies – to provide intelligence for “the

protection of the United States national interests from foreign security threats.”92.

29

Figure 8. Example of an Alleged Compromise Reported to the United Nations 93

A Look Back

The tensions of profession, command, authority, levels and risk are apparent in

historical examples. A useful example for viewing all the tensions involves the Office of

Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II.

Colonel William Donovan, the presidentially designated “Coordinator of

Information (COI)” who was disinclined to serve as an intelligence officer, addressed a

convincing letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) on the importance of the

Philippines. His letter to the Commander in Chief urged U.S. military action in the

Philippines and requested, “…that I be permitted to serve with this force in any combat

capacity.”94 The Chief of Staff for the War Department, General George C. Marshall,

30

responded, “Your request for service in a combat capacity is typical of you [William

Donovan], I will watch for a suitable assignment in that area, and will call call [sic] on

you as soon as it develops.”95 That was not to be, instead he soon found himself the

director of the nation’s first centralized intelligence agency. FDR, in part based on the

advice of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, found a suitable assignment for

Director Donovan, leading a dedicated agency focused on intelligence and clandestine

and covert operations.96 Formed from hand-me-down units disregarded by the military

services, one of OSS’s inherited missions was espionage.97

The OSS, a nascent intelligence organization, was still technically a military

organization. Despite his formal military rank, Donovan was considered by fellow

officers to be a civilian.98 The tension of control over the organization was widespread.

The COI answered to FDR, but the OSS was administratively placed under the Joint

Staff. Outside of Washington DC, the Secret Intelligence (SI) elements – the espionage

arm of OSS- were controlled by OSS officers with the oversight of the chiefs of

diplomatic missions or the theater military commander. These SI elements were

focused on collecting what would modernly be referred to as national HUMINT, instead

of military HUMINT. A declassified OSS field manual shows this bifurcated command

and control and focus.

It is essential that SI cooperate closely with the armed forces both in Washington and in theaters of operations. In Washington, liaison is maintained between the Military Intelligence Division (MID) and SI on a reciprocal basis in order to insure a free and rapid interchange of appropriate intelligence. Similar arrangements exist with the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and Air Intelligence (A-2). In theaters of operation, the coordination of SI activities with the armed forces is still more complete, since all OSS operations come under the direct control of the theater commander.

31

Although combat intelligence does not normally come within the province of SI, SI organizations in theaters of operations may at times be called upon to assist in the collection of this type of intelligence. However, SI should not engage in the collection of combat intelligence unless specifically requested to do so by the theater commander.99

The tension over who controlled and directed SI collection was fierce. FDR and

senior military commanders understood the necessity of strategic intelligence. On

command relationships, G.C. Marshall and Eisenhower recommended to FDR the

COI/OSS be under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Once there, the Army did not

approve of its officers conducting espionage and covert actions. To assuage this

concern, Eisenhower thought these operations should “be conducted by individuals

occupying a civilian rather than a military status.”100 Once under the JCS and until the

OSS was disestablished, the tension between collecting strategic and military combat

intelligence was evident.

Figure 9. Declassified OSS Planning Process for Military Operations.101

Firsthand accounts from OSS officers who served in Northern Africa, Sicily, Italy,

and Burma describe this tension.102 In Operation TORCH and HUSKY, OSS officers

admitted, “[the OSS agent’s] appalling ignorance of military matters,” and “the traditional

intelligence services such as “G-2, Counterintelligence Corps (CIC), and the office of

32

Naval Intelligence (ONI) often displayed open hostility toward the OSS because they did

not understand its work and its true objectives.”103 The new organization had to prove its

value to the JCS and war effort. Instead of focusing on the strategic intelligence – the

area they were arguably better fit to gather- the OSS focused on collecting military

intelligence to support the amphibious landing in Africa.104 Looking back, the OSS’s

efforts supporting this operation were faulty. The collection and analysis did not

represent the ground truth and the allied landings were contested. The Allied landing

operation was a success, but the intelligence collected and assessments provided by

OSS did not accurately display the armed opposition. Historians note Marshal Pétain

and the French Vichy waged a fierce resistance against Allied landing forces, causing

bloodshed on both sides.105

Despite this initial failure, the OSS was able to provide valuable strategic

intelligence to FDR, British Allies, and General Eisenhower in an environment of

conflicting personality issues.106 While military intelligence was not necessarily their

forte, examples like Detachment 101 in Burma, displayed how intended strategic

intelligence units did provide valuable intelligence to theater and operational

commanders.107

This significant historical example clearly embodies the tensions inherent in

commanding spies. The places, names and dates are different today, but the same

arguments continue in national security circles in both Washington and in theaters

around the world.

Looking Forward

As noted, identifying and understanding the tensions with commanding spies is

the first step to effective management. But just as great powers clashed during WWII,

33

the same may occur in the future.108 To prepare for the future, understanding the

tensions and implementing policies to restrict friction is imperative. Otherwise, the

military is choosing to enter a conflict with one arm tied behind its back.

Further study of the tensions and friction points is required. This examination

briefly surveys select areas where the military and HUMINT are strained. Tensions of

support, communication, benefits for members, and talent management are other

notable areas. Developing a more in-depth understanding on the tensions for similar

fields like counterintelligence and special operations is also a noble pursuit.

Understanding the tensions and friction supports productive interactions with outside

parties like Congress, the IC, and legal circles.

Next, defining strategic HUMINT operations and elements is imperative. National

HUMINT was codified by the Director of National Intelligence in policy. The DoD is an

important member of the “national HUMINT capability,” and already provides highly

capable collectors to de facto national elements.109 An example of this is the High-Value

Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG). According to DoD HIG policy, the group is

responsible for the interrogation of high-value persons in DoD custody, who are

presumably of national interest. 110 The HIG, military attachés, and other DoD HUMINT

elements are examples of “strategic HUMINT elements.” There remains a definition gap

at the DoD-wide level. This definitional gap and the compounding effect of the

disestablishment of the Defense Counterintelligence and HUMINT Intelligence Center

(DCHC) is causing friction between military services, IC members, and combatant

command intelligence staffs.111 A definition could be coordinated across the DoD

HUMINT enterprise and then incorporated into policy. Not taking action opens risk for

34

outside elements like the IC, and Congress, who are already creating definitions in

policies and law. Congress created the term “strategic intelligence interrogation,” in the

National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010. There are definition threshold

gaps in what is strategic and what is not.112 Technological cyber advancements in the

operating environment and risks of inaction predicate a need for this change.

Also, building a strategic HUMINT force is necessary to operate in both

peacetime and conflict environments. The HUMINT discipline is different than other

non-human capabilities. Yet, HUMINT collectors are sensors and expected to operate

as designed and directed. Strategic and operational HUMINT elements will certainly

require more advanced training and skills than their tactical counterparts. Unfortunately,

the DoD routinely builds its HUMINT forces using a personnel readiness model verses

an acquisition model for things like aircraft carriers or firearms. The acquisition process

for material capabilities is stringent but ensures requirements are paired with deliverable

capabilities. Military attachés, HIG members, and clandestine case officers are just a

few examples where filling two-thirds of the necessary requirements could seriously

hinder operations. The necessary skills in a technologically advancing and more

dangerous operating environment are expected to broaden. Ensuring strategic and

operational HUMINT elements are funded, built, and their talent managed appropriately

is more crucial now than ever.

Endnotes

1 Caleb Carr, comp, The Book of War: Sun-Tzu The Art of War & Karl Von Clausewitz On War (New York: The Modern Library, 2000), 264-265, 445-446.

2 Norman B Imler, “Espionage in an Age of Change: Optimizing Strategic Intelligence Services for the Future,” in Intelligence and the National Security Strategist, Roger Z. George and Robert D. Kline, eds. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 217.

35

3 Merriam-Webster, “Online Dictionary, Tension,” https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/tension?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld (accessed February 16, 2018).

4 Ibid.

5 Robert G. Folsom, The Life and Mysterious Death of Ian Mackintosh: The Inside Story of the Sandbaggers and Television’s Top Spy (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books 2012), https://books.google.com/books?id=TjG1-Uh_J4EC&pg=PT38&lpg=PT38&dq=napoleon+quote+a+spy+in+the+right+place+is+worth+20000+soldiers&source=bl&ots=lzA3KHC4k_&sig=ReRN2fmJ0Uw-vhArDxNxhde52WY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjgjaCYjobZAhWN7VMKHZAYDHAQ6AEIRzAH#v=onepage&q&f=false (accessed February 16, 2018).

6 Peace Corps, “Eligibility,” https://www.peacecorps.gov/about/agency-jobs/eligibility/ (accessed March 23, 2018).

7 Paul DiMaggio, “Review of The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor by Andrew Abbott,” American Journal of Sociology, 95, no. 2 (1989): 534-535, https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/229319 (accessed May 29, 2018).

8 U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2018 Carlisle Scholars Program Strategic Leadership Directive (Carlisle, PA: July 6, 2017), 25.

9 DiMaggio, “Review of the System of Professions,” 534-535.

10 James Burk, “Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession,” in The Future of the Army Profession, 2nd ed., Lloyd J. Matthews, ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 41.

11 Ibid., 44-47.

12 John Mark Mattox, “The Moral Foundations of Army Officership,” in The Future of the Army Profession, 2nd ed., Lloyd J. Matthews, ed (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005), 390-392.

13 Ibid., 390.

14 Merriam-Webster, “Online Dictionary, Spy,” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/spy (accessed February 16, 2018).

15 Merriam-Webster, “Online Dictionary, Espionage,” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/espionage (accessed February 16, 2018).

16 International Committee of the Red Cross, “International Humanitarian Law, Customary Law,” https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule107 (accessed February 16, 2018).

17 Ibid.

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tension?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonldhttps://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tension?utm_campaign=sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonldhttps://books.google.com/books?id=TjG1-Uh_J4EC&pg=PT38&lpg=PT38&dq=napoleon+quote+a+spy+in+the+right+place+is+worth+20000+soldiers&source=bl&ots=lzA3KHC4k_&sig=ReRN2fmJ0Uw-vhArDxNxhde52WY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjgjaCYjobZAhWN7VMKHZAYDHAQ6AEIRzAH#v=onepage&q&f=falsehttps://books.google.com/books?id=TjG1-Uh_J4EC&pg=PT38&lpg=PT38&dq=napoleon+quote+a+spy+in+the+right+place+is+worth+20000+soldiers&source=bl&ots=lzA3KHC4k_&sig=ReRN2fmJ0Uw-vhArDxNxhde52WY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjgjaCYjobZAhWN7VMKHZAYDHAQ6AEIRzAH#v=onepage&q&f=falsehttps://books.google.com/books?id=TjG1-Uh_J4EC&pg=PT38&lpg=PT38&dq=napoleon+quote+a+spy+in+the+right+place+is+worth+20000+soldiers&source=bl&ots=lzA3KHC4k_&sig=ReRN2fmJ0Uw-vhArDxNxhde52WY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjgjaCYjobZAhWN7VMKHZAYDHAQ6AEIRzAH#v=onepage&q&f=falsehttps://books.google.com/books?id=TjG1-Uh_J4EC&pg=PT38&lpg=PT38&dq=napoleon+quote+a+spy+in+the+right+place+is+worth+20000+soldiers&source=bl&ots=lzA3KHC4k_&sig=ReRN2fmJ0Uw-vhArDxNxhde52WY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjgjaCYjobZAhWN7VMKHZAYDHAQ6AEIRzAH#v=onepage&q&f=falsehttps://books.google.com/books?id=TjG1-Uh_J4EC&pg=PT38&lpg=PT38&dq=napoleon+quote+a+spy+in+the+right+place+is+worth+20000+soldiers&source=bl&ots=lzA3KHC4k_&sig=ReRN2fmJ0Uw-vhArDxNxhde52WY&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjgjaCYjobZAhWN7VMKHZAYDHAQ6AEIRzAH#v=onepage&q&f=falsehttps://www.peacecorps.gov/about/agency-jobs/eligibility/https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/229319https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/spyhttps://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/spyhttps://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/espionagehttps://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/espionagehttps://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule107

36

18 A. John Radsan, “The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and International Law,”

Michigan Journal of International Law, 28, Issue 3, 595 (2007): 599-607, https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol28/iss3/5/ (accessed May 29, 2018)

19 Yale Law School, “General Orders No.100: The Lieber Code,” http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp#art88 (accessed February 16, 2018).

20 International Committee of the Red Cross, “International Humanitarian Law, Customary Law,” https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule107 (accessed February 16, 2018).

21 John M. Cardwell, “A Bible Lesson on Spying (Declassified 1978),” Studies in Intelligence, (Fall 1978), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/index-of-declassified-articles/index-of-declassified-articles-by-author.html and http://southerncrossreview.org/44/cia-bible.htm (accessed May 29, 2018).

22 Ibid.

23 Central Intelligence Agency, “News and Information, Intelligence: Human Intelligence,” April 30, 2013,linked from the Central Intelligence Agency Home Page, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/intelligence-human-intelligence.html (accessed February 16, 2018).

24 United States Army Recruiting, “35M Human Intelligence Collector (DLAB required),” August 3, 2012, video file, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_J3zHYURirQ (accessed February 16, 2018); John A. Wahlquist, Interrogation, World War II, Vietnam and Iraq (Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College, 2008), 7, http://ni-u.edu/ni_press/pdf/Interrogation_WWII.pdf (accessed February 18, 2018).

25 Burk, “Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy,” 41.

26 U.S. Department of the Army, The Profession of Arms (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, December 8, 2010), 4, http://data.cape.army.mil/web/repository/white-papers/profession-of-arms-white-paper.pdf (accessed February 16, 2018).

27 U.S. Department of Defense, “General Dempsey’s Letter to the Joint Force,” DoDLive entry posted on October 1, 2011, http://www.dodlive.mil/2011/10/01/general-dempseys-letter-to-the-joint-force/ (accessed February 16, 2018).

28 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Human Intelligence Division and Defense Intelligence Agency, Directorate for Operations, interview by author, February 12, 2018, On location.

29 John P Langan, “Morale Damage and Justification of Intelligence Collection from Human Sources,” in Ethics of Spying. A Reader for the Intelligence Professional (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 2006), 106.

30 Imler, Intelligence and the National Security Strategist, 230.

https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol28/iss3/5/http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp#art88https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule107https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/index-of-declassified-articles/index-of-declassified-articles-by-author.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/index-of-declassified-articles/index-of-declassified-articles-by-author.htmlhttp://southerncrossreview.org/44/cia-bible.htmhttps://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/intelligence-human-intelligence.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/intelligence-human-intelligence.htmlhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_J3zHYURirQhttp://ni-u.edu/ni_press/pdf/Interrogation_WWII.pdfhttp://ni-u.edu/ni_press/pdf/Interrogation_WWII.pdfhttp://data.cape.army.mil/web/repository/white-papers/profession-of-arms-white-paper.pdfhttp://data.cape.army.mil/web/repository/white-papers/profession-of-arms-white-paper.pdfhttp://www.dodlive.mil/2011/10/01/general-dempseys-letter-to-the-joint-force/http://www.dodlive.mil/2011/10/01/general-dempseys-letter-to-the-joint-force/

37

31 Tony Pfaff, “Bungee Jumping off the Moral Highground, Ethics of Espionage in the

Modern Age,” in Ethics of Spying. A Reader for the Intelligence Professional (Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press, 2006), 75.

32 Andru E. Wall, “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate, Distinguishing Military Operations, Intelligence Activities and Covert Action,” Harvard Law School, National Security Journal, (December 2011), 87, http://harvardnsj.org/2011/12/demystifying-the-title-10-title-50-debate-distinguishing-military-operations-intelligence-activities-covert-action/ (accessed March 15, 2018).

33 This framework is an original creation of the author. It shows the foundational tension between military and HUMINT professions. Sub-tensions stem from these differences. The identified sub-tensions are described in this study. Other tensions exist, but were not described in this work.

34 U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington, DC: Pentagon, August 2017), 41, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf?ver=2017-12-23-160155-320 (accessed February 16, 2018).

35 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Publication 1, (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, March 25, 2013, Incorporating Change 1, July 12, 2017) V-1.

36 John Perry, Pershing: Commander of the Great War, (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2011), 134, https://books.google.com/books?id=CfjpTz8eQzYC&pg=PA134&lpg=PA134&dq=unity+of+command+principle+pershing&source=bl&ots=z0ACtzVdkn&sig=C1gLaKfHdsR3usYQMHYHnZ7T4N8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi6ufjpt_HYAhXQJt8KHdHyCbEQ6AEIQDAG#v=onepage&q=unity%20of%20command%20principle%20pershing&f=false (accessed February 11, 2018); See here for full text excerpt: Unity of Command. The decisive application of full combat power requires unity of command. Unity of command results in unity of effort by coordinated action of all forces toward a common goal. Coordination may be achieved by direction or by cooperation. It is best achieved by vesting a single commander with requisite authority. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Service Regulations–Operations, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 1954), 25-27.

37 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, V-1, xix; U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Command and Control, MCDP 6 (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, October 1996), 77, http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCDP%206%20Command%20and%20Control.pdf (accessed 15 March 2018); U.S. Army, “Operations,” FM 3-0, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, October 2017), C1, 1-19, 4-24; Colonel Ian Hope, Unity of Command in Afghanistan: A forsaken Principle of War (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, November 2008), https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2008/ssi_hope.pdf (accessed 10 March 2018).

38 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, V-1.

39 Ibid., V-2.

40 Ibid., V-1.

http://harvardnsj.org/2011/12/demystifying-the-title-10-title-50-debate-distinguishing-military-operations-intelligence-activities-covert-action/http://harvardnsj.org/2011/12/demystifying-the-title-10-title-50-debate-distinguishing-military-operations-intelligence-activities-covert-action/http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf?ver=2017-12-23-160155-320http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf?ver=2017-12-23-160155-320https://books.google.com/books?id=CfjpTz8eQzYC&pg=PA134&lpg=PA134&dq=unity+of+command+principle+pershing&source=bl&ots=z0ACtzVdkn&sig=C1gLaKfHdsR3usYQMHYHnZ7T4N8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi6ufjpt_HYAhXQJt8KHdHyCbEQ6AEIQDAG#v=onepage&q=unity%20of%20command%20principle%20pershing&f=falsehttps://books.google.com/books?id=CfjpTz8eQzYC&pg=PA134&lpg=PA134&dq=unity+of+command+principle+pershing&source=bl&ots=z0ACtzVdkn&sig=C1gLaKfHdsR3usYQMHYHnZ7T4N8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi6ufjpt_HYAhXQJt8KHdHyCbEQ6AEIQDAG#v=onepage&q=unity%20of%20command%20principle%20pershing&f=falsehttps://books.google.com/books?id=CfjpTz8eQzYC&pg=PA134&lpg=PA134&dq=unity+of+command+principle+pershing&source=bl&ots=z0ACtzVdkn&sig=C1gLaKfHdsR3usYQMHYHnZ7T4N8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi6ufjpt_HYAhXQJt8KHdHyCbEQ6AEIQDAG#v=onepage&q=unity%20of%20command%20principle%20pershing&f=falsehttps://books.google.com/books?id=CfjpTz8eQzYC&pg=PA134&lpg=PA134&dq=unity+of+command+principle+pershing&source=bl&ots=z0ACtzVdkn&sig=C1gLaKfHdsR3usYQMHYHnZ7T4N8&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi6ufjpt_HYAhXQJt8KHdHyCbEQ6AEIQDAG#v=onepage&q=unity%20of%20command%20principle%20pershing&f=falsehttp://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCDP%206%20Command%20and%20Control.pdfhttp://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCDP%206%20Command%20and%20Control.pdfhttps://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2008/ssi_hope.pdf

38

41 Ibid., xix, V-1.

42 Imler, Intelligence and the National Security Strategist, 230.

43 U.S. Department of Defense, “Unified Command Plan,” https://www.defense.gov/About/Military-Departments/Unified-Combatant-Commands/ (accessed March 15, 2018).

44 Library of Congress, “The World with Commanders’ Areas of Responsibility,” 2005, Created by St. Louis MO, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, https://www.loc.gov/item/2005633566/ (accessed March 19, 2018).

45 Wall, “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate,” 92.

46 Library of Congress, U.S. Continental Congress, Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, Entry Thursday, June 15, 1775, https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(jc00236)) (accessed March 10, 2018).

47 Library of Congress, U.S. Continental Congress, Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, Entry Saturday, June 17, 1775, https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-in/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(jc00238)) (accessed March 10, 2018).

48 Roger Kaplan, “The Hidden War: British Intelligence Operations during the American Revolution,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 47, no. 1 (January 1990): 115-138; Sam Roberts, “War of Secrets; Spy History 101: America’s Intelligence Quotient,” New York Times, September 8, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/08/weekinreview/war-of-secrets-spy-history-101-america-s-intelligence-quotient.html (accessed March 20, 2018); Joseph C. Goulden, “Book Review: ‘George Washington’s Secret Six,’” Washington Times, December 3, 2013, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/3/book-review-george-washingtons-secret-six/ (accessed March 20, 2018).

49 Defense Intelligence Agency, “George Washington: More than a General and a President,” April 20, 2014, http://www.dia.mil/News/Articles/Article-View/Article/566965/george-washington-more-than-a-general-and-a-president/ (accessed March 20, 2018).

50 Kathryn White, “Benjamin Tallmadge,” George Washington’s Mount Vernon, 2018, http://www.mountvernon.org/digital-encyclopedia/article/benjamin-tallmadge/ (accessed March 20, 2018).

51 George Washington, “Historical Letters 1789-1797,” Central Intelligence Agency, July 7, 2008, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/our-first-line-of-defense-presidential-reflections-on-us-intelligence/washington.html (accessed March 20, 2018).

52 George Washington, “From George Washington to Colonel Elias Dayton, 26 July 1777,” National Archives, Founders Online, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-10-02-0415 (accessed March 20, 2018).

53 Defense Intelligence Agency, “Secret Committees,” May 11, 2014, linked from the Defense Intelligence Agency Home Page, http://www.dia.mil/News/Articles/Article-View/Article/566976/secret-committees/ (accessed February 16, 2018); U.S. Department of

https://www.defense.gov/About/Military-Departments/Unified-Combatant-Commands/https://www.loc.gov/item/2005633566/https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(jc00236))https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(jc00236))https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(jc00238))https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(jc00238))http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/08/weekinreview/war-of-secrets-spy-history-101-america-s-intelligence-quotient.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/08/weekinreview/war-of-secrets-spy-history-101-america-s-intelligence-quotient.htmlhttps://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/3/book-review-george-washingtons-secret-six/https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/3/book-review-george-washingtons-secret-six/http://www.dia.mil/News/Articles/Article-View/Article/566965/george-washington-more-than-a-general-and-a-president/http://www.dia.mil/News/Articles/Article-View/Article/566965/george-washington-more-than-a-general-and-a-president/http://www.mountvernon.org/digital-encyclopedia/article/benjamin-tallmadge/https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/our-first-line-of-defense-presidential-reflections-on-us-intelligence/washington.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/our-first-line-of-defense-presidential-reflections-on-us-intelligence/washington.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/our-first-line-of-defense-presidential-reflections-on-us-intelligence/washington.htmlhttps://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-10-02-0415https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-10-02-0415http://www.dia.mil/News/Articles/Article-View/Article/566976/secret-committees/http://www.dia.mil/News/Articles/Article-View/Article/566976/secret-committees/

39

State, Office of the Historian, “Secret Committee of Correspondence, Committee for Foreign Affairs, 1775-1777,” https://history.state.gov/milestones/1776-1783/secret-committee (accessed February 16, 2018).

54 George Washington, “George Washington Papers, Series 4, General Correspondence: Continental Congress Intelligence Committee to George Washington, September 2, 1777,” Manuscript/Mixed Material, retrieved from the Library of Congress, September 2, 1777, https://www.loc.gov/item/mgw448198/ (accessed February 5, 2018); Jimmy Dick, “The Committee of Secret Correspondence,” Journal of the American Revolution, https://allthingsliberty.com/2013/08/the-committee-of-secret-correspondence/ (accessed February 5, 2018).

55 U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Dictionary of Military, 41; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, III-11.

56 Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute, “United States Code, Title 10, Section 113, Secretary of Defense,” https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/113 (accessed February 18, 2018).

57 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Public Law 107-314, 107th Cong., (Dec. 2, 2002), 116 STAT. 2619, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ314/pdf/PLAW-107publ314.pdf (accessed February 5, 2018).

58 Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute, “United States Code, Title 50, Section 3038, Responsibilities of Secretary of Defense Pertaining to National Intelligence Program,” https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/3038 (accessed February 18, 2018).

59 Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute, “United States Code, Title 50, Section 3003, Definitions,” https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/3003 (accessed February 16, 2018).

60 Wall, “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate,” 87-90.

61 Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, as amended by Executive Orders 13284 (2003), 13355 (2004), and 13470 (2008), Public Law 108-458, (July 31, 2008), Sec. 1.7 (b), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-12333-2008.pdf and https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2008-08-04/pdf/WCPD-2008-08-04-Pg1064.pdf (accessed February 16, 2018).

62 Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute, “U.S. Code Title 50, Responsibilities of Secretary of Defense pertaining to National Intelligence Program, 50 USC sec. 3038 (d),” https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/3038 (accessed March 15, 2018).

63 Table created by author using the data provided in Executive Order 12333. Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, as amended by Executive Orders 13284 (2003), 13355 (2004), and 13470 (2008), Public Law 108-458, (July 31, 2008) https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-12333-2008.pdf and https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2008-08-04/pdf/WCPD-2008-08-04-Pg1064.pdf (accessed February 16, 2018).

64 Wall, “Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate,” 99.

https://history.state.gov/milestones/1776-1783/secret-committeehttps://www.loc.gov/item/mgw448198/https://allthingsliberty.com/2013/08/the-committee-of-secret-correspondence/https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/113https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ314/pdf/PLAW-107publ314.pdfhttps://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ314/pdf/PLAW-107publ314.pdfhttps://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/3038https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/3003https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-12333-2008.pdfhttps://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2008-08-04/pdf/WCPD-2008-08-04-Pg1064.pdfhttps://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/3038https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-12333-2008.pdfhttps://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2008-08-04/pdf/WCPD-2008-08-04-Pg1064.pdfhttps://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2008-08-04/pdf/WCPD-2008-08-04-Pg1064.pdf

40

65 Discussions between Troy Sacquety and author were conducted regarding the focus and

utility of special intelligence provided by the OSS in World War II. Troy J. Sacquety, e-mail message to author, February 1, 2018.

66 Robert Bateman, “Understanding Military Strategy and the Four Levels of War,” Esquire Magazine Online, November 25, 2015, https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/news/a39985/four-levels-of-war/ (accessed February 16, 2018); Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, V-1-7.

67 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, V-1.

68 Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 3, https://muse.jhu.edu/book/43068 (accessed May 29, 2018).

69 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for the Armed Forces, V-1.

70 U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Dictionary of Military, 114.

71 Caryle Murphy, “Soldier, Diplomat, Gossip, Spy in Capital,” Washington Post, November 3, 1982, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1982/11/03/soldier-diplomat-gossip-spy-in-capital/f6340339-e2f5-4d96-8b41-ac6742512ac7/?utm_term=.241476fd60c9 (accessed March 15, 2018); Central Intelligence Agency, “(C) Unrecognized Potential in the Military Attaches (Declassified by CIA Historical Review Program, Sept. 18, 1995),” https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol4no2/html/v04i2a01p_0001.htm (accessed February 5, 2018); Georgetown National Security Archive, “A National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, Jeffrey T. Richelson, ed., May 23, 2001, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB46/index2.html (accessed February 5, 2018); Jeffrey T. Richelson, “A Century of Spies,” Washington Post, 1996, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/style/longterm/books/chap1/a_centur.htm (accessed February 5, 2018); Statement by U.S. Ambassador to Russia on the Expulsion of Russian Intelligence Officers, Youtube, video file, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_8a5KaR6hF4 (accessed March 27, 2018).

72 Central Intelligence Agency, “(S) Communications to the Editors (Declassified by CIA Historical Review Program, Sept. 18, 1995),” https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol4no3/html/v04i3a08p_0001.htm (accessed February 5, 2018); Central Intelligence Agency, “The Role of the US Army Military Attaches Between the World Wars,” June 27, 2008, linked from Central Intelligence Agency Home Page, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/95unclass/Koch.html (accessed February 5, 2018).

73 U.S. Marine Corps, “Marine Corps Support to the Defense Attaché Service (DAS),” http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/intelligence/Intel-OPS-PERS/Defense-Attache-Program/ (accessed February 16, 2018); U.S. Marine Corps, “Marine Attaché Frequently Asked Questions,” http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/133/Docs/Web%20Update%20FAQ.pdf (accessed February 16, 2018); Defense Intelligence Agency, “Joint Military Attaché School,” September 2017, linked from Defense Intelligence Agency Home Page, http://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/Training/JMAS/JMAS_Student_Info_SEPT-2017.pdf (accessed February 16, 2018).

https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/news/a39985/four-levels-of-war/https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/news/a39985/four-levels-of-war/https://muse.jhu.edu/book/43068https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1982/11/03/soldier-diplomat-gossip-spy-in-capital/f6340339-e2f5-4d96-8b41-ac6742512ac7/?utm_term=.241476fd60c9https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1982/11/03/soldier-diplomat-gossip-spy-in-capital/f6340339-e2f5-4d96-8b41-ac6742512ac7/?utm_term=.241476fd60c9https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol4no2/html/v04i2a01p_0001.htmhttps://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol4no2/html/v04i2a01p_0001.htmhttps://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB46/index2.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/style/longterm/books/chap1/a_centur.htmhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_8a5KaR6hF4https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol4no3/html/v04i3a08p_0001.htmhttps://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol4no3/html/v04i3a08p_0001.htmhttps://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/95unclass/Koch.htmlhttps://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/95unclass/Koch.htmlhttp://www.hqmc.marines.mil/intelligence/Intel-OPS-PERS/Defense-Attache-Program/http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/133/Docs/Web%20Update%20FAQ.pdfhttp://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/Training/JMAS/JMAS_Student_Info_SEPT-2017.pdf

41

74 The Free Library, “Debriefing Branch: Defense Strategic Debriefing Course,” October 1,

2010, https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Debriefing+branch%3A+defense+strategic+debriefing+