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Self Portrait : With Whose Eyes?

On Philosophy

What can philosophy learn about the self and the other from self-portraits?

Aesthetics is the branch of philosophy that is expected to deal with works ofart. It hopes to determine the essence of art of and furnish a discourse about

aesthetic properties and the pleasure we derive from aesthetic objects. This

is not the approach this paper wishes to take.

Philosophy is concerned with thinking. It engages with science, art or

politics in so far as thinking happens in these domains. Philosophy ventures

to think about these domains not because scientists, artists and

revolutionaries do not think. Philosophy is not a higher order discourse

about these object domains. These domains no longer wait for philosophy to

furnish their ideals or methods. Philosophy draws out the generic rules forthinking from these domains where thought is already in action. This could,

at best, result in a users manual for thinking. Such a manual may be useful

in any domain of thinking. However, practices in these domains need not

and do not wait for any guidance from the manuals of philosophy. These

practices are capable of addressing the obstructions to thinking they

encounter as challenges and problems and also to invent creative solutions.

Each creative event of thinking in these domain could bring to light new

problems and new solutions. Philosophy too is a creative activity because it

reinvents the manual of thinking in the light of every creative event ofthinking that takes place in other domains.

Philosophy and Art

The tradition of philosophy from Plato cautions us against learning from art.

Art has negligible cognitive value and it can deceive us. Art as imitation is

twice at remove from the Idea. The painter imitates several things and

activities in nature though he has no knowledge about any of them. Homer

described war in great details however none consulted him on matters ofwar.

Philosophers who came after Plato have revised this position and have

brought some respectability to art. However, art wins respect only in so far it

is subjected to the philosophical determination by aesthetics. Art works are

bound to appearance and to the sensible and cannot aspire to that status of

the intelligible. Even Hegel who devoted major works to art thought that art


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belonged to the past of philosophy. The sensible can be retrieved only in

aesthetics where it negatively indicates the non-availability of the

intelligible.

However, there are philosophers who have allowed themselves to learn from

art. In this paper I shall follow some of them who took painting seriously.Cezzane and Klee were important for Merleau-ponty. Foucault did not write

any book on individual philosophers but devoted a book each to Magritte

and Cezanne and began his Order of Things with a detailed reading of

Velazquez. Deleuze, along with his monographs on major thinkers like

Leibniz, Hume and Kant, has one for Francis Bacon. These thinkers did not

use the painters as illustrations of available philosophical positions . Instead,

they, to borrow a phrase from Stephen Mulhall, saw painting as thought in

action. Merleau Ponty did not write Phenomenology of Perceptionin order

to apply phenomenology to perception. Thinking as understood byphenomenology is already at work in perception. Thought does not relate to

the sensible as if from outside as inference. Nor is thinking a mental act of

scanning residual perceptual images. Seeing is always seeing more. This

transcendence is the work of thought. Painting renders visible this element

of thinking which is at the heart of the visible. Here we see an egalitarian

relationship between philosophy and painting. We see painters as addressing

and solving problems of thought in the every element of the sensible.

Philosophy being a conceptual activity proposes concepts that can respond

to the enquiries of the painters. Philosophy, instead of determining art, takesstock of the intra-philosophical effects of works of art.

What is a portrait?

Before we take up self portraits let us see what portraits are. This does not

mean that self portraits are a subset of portraits. We may be tempted to say

that a portrait depicts other people whereas self portrait shows the artist

himself. Self portrait could then be seen as a self made portrait of oneself.

All these definitions and classifications presuppose available notions of

self and also portrait. We shall see soon that self portraits have questioned

such available notions. Should the author of the portrait be the same as theone portrayed? Can one portray oneself without taking up the stand point of

the other? Does the author, signatory and the model always coincide in a

self portrait? We shall soon see works which claim to be self portarits but

created through the active involvement of chance, mechanical apparatus

and others.

There is another reason why we should be careful with definitions. Our talk


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about portraits have to meet the findings of the art historian who argues that

portraits have appeared only at a specific stage of history and its genesis and

effects were entangled with concrete historical process. The essence of a

portrait has to be delineated in and through its historical effectiveness.

Not all depictions are portraits. Schopenhauer argued that animals couldntbe the subject matter of portraiture. Human countenance, the only the object

of aesthetic contemplation, can be portrayed because that is. Not all

depictions of human beings are portraits. Gadamer has proposed an

ontological account of portraits in terms of recognition and occasionality. A

portrait should afford us the recognition of whose portrait it is. Resemblance

is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure recognition. Recognition is not

mere identification either. dentification in!ol!es the application of criteria

based on a!ailable "nowledge. Gadamer #uotes Hegels comment on his

portrait by Schlesinger $%ur &nowledge should become recognition .

'hoe!er "nows me will here recogni(e me.) Recognition is an e!ent of"nowledge. 'ittgenstein calls it the $dawning of an aspect). 'e see what is

on the can!as as a person whom we recogni(e. Recognition is *seeing as. t

is seeing and not inferring.

Historically, portraits were made at the behest of the patrons and were

e+pected to re!eal the latters authority and wealth. ortraits were made only

of those who were worthy of being displayed in a portrait. n - th century

ordinary mortals too became worthy of being the subject of portraiture. A

picture becomes a portrait if it brings out the #ualities of the model not as atype but as a singular indi!idual. n Rembradants portraits we recogni(e the

presence of a an indi!idual. Howe!er this recognition is an e!ent of

understanding. 'e are not gathering factual details about the historical

indi!idual who happen to sit in front of Rembrandt. /he portrait abstracts

from the specific situation. Also in order for a painting to be a portrait we

e+pect that it suppresses the personal prejudices of the painter with regard to

the model. /he image must be !alid for all.

Normally portraits are drawn with a model posing in front of the artist. As

we said earlier, the portrait abstract from this situation. t could be that artist

did not ha!e a sitter in front of him and was drawing from memory.

Howe!er, for Gadamer the content of portrait carries an intentional reference

to a models ha!ing been there. /he portrait does not copy the original but

intends it. Gadamer calls it occassionality. /his means that the meaning of

the wor" is partially determined by the occasion for which it is intended. 'e


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can ha!e portraits of gods and fictional characters. 0!en if we hesitate to call

them portraits we would concede that they are portrait1li"e. n them the

Gods for the first time ac#uire an mage. /hey become and mage so that

they can ha!e an image.

Historians credits Raja Ra!i 2arma for gi!ing a portrait1loo" to Hindu gods

and goddesses. 'e "now that the painters daughter was the model for these

some of these di!ine portraits. /his does not ma"e those wor"s portraits of

Ra!i 2armas daughter. As a model his daughter was e+pected to pose li"e

the mythological characters. How do mythological characters pose3 /hey

present themsel!es as worthy of a portrait4 /he actual model is not worthy of

such an image, only the mythological character is. Howe!er, the portraiture

lifts the attributes and attires in which the model presents character to the

status of an image. Hence these portraits of mythological characters gi!e an

image to the emerging pan ndian woman as an indi!iduated member of thepatriarchal nuclear family.

According to Hegel ancient Hindus concei!ed their gods as monsters with

se!eral heads and hands. /hey oscillated between the image of god as

property1less and empty on the one hand, monstrous and e+cessi!ely

sensible on the other. %nly in the modern 5hristian 'est that the God for the

first time gains the image of man with a soul and indi!iduality. Recent

historical criticism has argued that this is an orientalist prejudice of the 'est.

'e must learn the correct lessons from this !alid criticism. t will beuninteresting to say that ancient Hindus and 0gyptians too had made

portraits. Here we are confirming the recognition model and e+tending it to

the past. 'e might say that in an anti#ue sculpture of a bust from Greece we

recogni(e Socrates. Here we are e+tending a fact about modern 0urope into

the destiny of all art. t is we who recogni(e Socrates in a bust. 6id Socrates

contemporaries recogni(e him in the bust3 %r, was it the image of a typical

philosopher or citi(en3 6id the social practices yielded an indi!idual who

sought to be recogni(ed in an image3 f not, does the portrait has had a

destiny other than that of recognition3 /he coins of many ancient

ci!ili(ations were stamped with the figures of the so!ereign. erhaps, thosefigures sought obedience as so!ereigns and not recognition as indi!iduals.

'ere they portraits3

Self ortrait7 8odel and 8irror.

n the Self portrait, the artist himself is the model. 9sually the artist uses a


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mirror to portray himself. He loo"s at his own image and draws on the

can!as. 0!en if they do not uses a real mirror we may say that he needs to

loo" at some mirror image of himself drawn from his memory. Hence the

mirror is a transcendental presupposition of self1portrait. n the case of

portrait the mirror was proposed as an analogy. As Gadamer says

recognition always sees more than what is there in the model. Self1protarit

presupposes a literal mirror. /he self portrait need not show the artist in the

process of drawing. He could be doing something else. He is shown as he is

made !isible in a mirror. His !isibility is that of someone who presents

himself to himself as we do in front of a mirror. Self1portrait ma"es this

mirror image !isible to all. 'hat he sees in the mirror is seen by all in the

self portrait. :or the eye which stares out from the self portrait the !iewer

replaces the mirror and also the model, the painter. 'hat is the nature of the

!isibility afforded to us by the mirror3

henomenology and the !isible

'e ha!e three modes of the !isible ; the prosaic appearance of objects in the

world, paintings and mirrors.


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seen of my body. 8y body is summoned by the objects to enter the !isible

region. >ody is the locus of !isibility. /he in!isible is not what is hidden or

beyond the capabilities of my eye. t belongs to the matri+ of the !isible. /he

!isible is a radiation that !isits my body and the objects seen. t is both here

and there. 8erleau1onty thus shifts the locus seeing from the mind to the

body.

b= aintings7

8erleau1ponty distinguishes paintings from other !isible appearances.

ainting, to borrow a phrase from &lee, renders the !isible. aintings

!isibility is a rendering of the !isible along with its in!isible matri+. t

renders the premises of !ision which the prosaic !ision forgets. /he painter

does not copy reality. nstead he loo"s for what reality lac" in order to be a

painting. He does not compensate for this lac" by modifying an internalpicture. nstead he underta"es a gestural articulation with his hand on the

can!as. ainting is e+ecuted not with eyes alone but hands too. /he

*rendering of the !isible happens when the painter brings his body to the

can!as. henomenology restore the wor" of hand to painting, though this

hand wor"s as part of the body in delineating the matri+ of the unseen eye.

:rom *minds eye to the *eyes hand ; such is the transformation 8erleau1

ponty brought out in thin"ing about painting.

ainting offers a blue print for the genesis of !isible things. n e!erydayperception we see objects against a bac"ground. 'e do not see the line the

separates them. 0!erything we see belongs either to the figure or to the

bac"ground. Howe!er. painting presents the line as the generati!e a+is of the

!isible.


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fascinated by the mirror image they create but they do not sustain that

fascination. 0mpirical studies ha!e shown that /he human childs response

to mirror undergoes !arious stages. t begins with curiosity followed by the

e+citement meeting a playmate on the other side of the mirror which

becomes wariness to be followed by the acceptance of the self image. 6oes

the normalcy of self recognition imply the a!ailability of a concept of a self

and hence mastery o!er self3 hilippe Rochat, 6an ?aha!i discuss an

interesting e+periment which throws light on this issue. n front of the mirror

5himpan(ees too, beha!e li"e a human child. n an e+periment a group of

5himpan(ees were e+posed to mirror for @ days to familiari(e them with

the reflecting properties of the mirror. /hen they were sedated and odorless

mar"s were put on top of their eye brows and opposite ear. 'hen awa"e they

were obser!ed for ten minutes for their recognition of the mar"s. /hen they

were e+posed to the mirror. t was obser!ed that with the mirror their

response to the mar" showed a significant increase. /he mirror enabled themto notice themsel!es and perform self1directed actions. 6oes this imply the

a!ailability of the conceptual self awareness and mastery of the self. 6oes it

show the identity between the obser!ed and the obser!er. :rom a

phenomenological perspecti!e 6 . ?aha!i disputes this claim. 5himpan(ees

and human child at some point stop searching for the other side of the mirror

and turn towards their side. nstead of loo"ing through the mirror they learn

to loo" at it. %n this side of the mirror we disco!er a new dimension ; depth.

t is from this depth that the as the seen1seer emerges.

/he mirror brea"s with the "inesthetic image of the self. /he mirror does not

establish an identity between the felt1me and the image. nstead am seeing

myself as seen by others ; in an e+teriority. am an other. /he uncanniness

of the mirror e+perience is due to this intertwining of the identification and

alienation and the self and the other. 8y self image stic"s to me. cannot

ta"e a fresh perspecti!e on it the way can do on other objects in the world.

8erleau1ponty notices the presence of the mirror in 6utch paintings where

the $round eye) of the mirror digests rooms where no one is present.

According to him $more completely than lights, shadows and reflections, themirror image anticipates, within things the labor of !ision.) /he mirror is a

technical object that springs up between the seeing and the !isible body.

>efore reflecting me, the mirror has been at wor" in the refle+i!ity of the

sensible itself. /he mirror translates and reproduces that refle+i!ity. am a

seen1seer. 8irror reproduces this refle+i!ity and completes my e+ternality.

/he mirror is a prosthetic but li"e all prostatic it is implanted in my body. t


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e+tends and reproduces the !ery e+ternality of my body. /he mirror image is

li"e a phantom limb. 8erleau1onty refers to Schilder who said that while

smo"ing a pipe in front of the mirror he felt that the burned surface of the

pipe touched not only where his fingers were but also on image of the finger

in the mirror. /he mirror allows the in!isible of my body to in!ests its

psychic energy in the other !isible bodies. t also allows my body to include

elements from other bodies. $ 8irrors are instruments of uni!ersal magic

that con!erts things into spectacle, spectacle into things, myself into another,

and another into myself.) /he mirror loo"s at us and shows the painters how

things loo"s at us.

/he mirror e+tends and completes my e+ternality and restore that to the

depth of my body and field of !ision. :or 8erleau ponty depth is not an

e+tra dimension which can be thought of in terms of length. 6epth has a

primacy o!er length and breath ; the latter two are concei!ed in terms oflength. :or 6escartes depth was the distance of things from my body. n the

5artesian space nothing can hide behind anything or nor encroach upon

anything. /here is no depth but only distances between things. Here each

point is what it is and nothing more or less. /his is a space without depth or

thic"ness. $Spaee is the self e!idence of the $where))

Against this 5artesian clarity 8erleau ponty holds that depth preser!es the

enigma of >eing. t is there where soul and body, seer and seeing, !isible

and in!isible intertwines ; a there which 6escartes either left to the God toscan it from abo!e or treated as a confusion from which thought should

preser!e its distance. do not see space from abo!e or according to its

e+ternal en!elope. see it from within. $After all the world is around me, not

in front of me.) . A bit of can show us forests and storms. /hese

transcendences are not the constructions of my mind. /hey are ; including

depth ; a #uestion posed by the !isible to !ision. n pursuing this #uestion

we plunge into the reasons which allows multiple interpretations and

answers. 'hen the painter depicts depth he is not copying or constructing

but articulating a #uestion. n pictorial depth the $ "now not whence) finds

a support. /his only heightens the enigma. *6epth insists on being sought.6epth is the earl dependence between things which eclipse one another in

their !isibility. /his dependence and contestation between things is not

relationship that can be a matter of measurements. 6epth is $the e+perience

of the re!ersibility of dimensions. 6epth is the $global locality) of there

where e!erything is in the same place at the same time. t is the

!oluminosity which is e+pressed in the $there). t is from this $there) of


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depth that things recei!es it dimensions. /his is the belonging toether of

space and content. /hings are modulations of depth.

5olor responds to this modualtions of depth. 5olor is a dimension, a branch

of >eing. 5olor is not the property of the e+ternal surface. t belongs to theheart of things. t is the depth from which things recei!e their materiality and

!olume. ianting mar"s the birth of the painter from this !ery depth. >irth

too is appearing. At birth the child so far neither seen nor seeing in the

womb emerges into he world where it can see and be seen. 6epth, li"e the

womb harbor the possibilities. 5olor, li"e the cry of a new born is an

e+pression of this emergence.

/he mirror instead of letting the light pass through it and staging an illusion

on the other side, reflects it bac" and creates depth on this side. /he seer1

seeing me emerges from this depth. /he mirror does not display some factabout me. nstead it pluges me in to a depth on this side from which shall

now underta"e action. 'e act in and from this mirror image. /he wariness

which accompanies self recognition and the fear emabarrassement

associated with mirror all could be traced to the enigmatic nature of this

depth to which the mirror frees us. /he painter of a self portrait loo"s into

the mirror not to chec" how he loo"s but to be born again and to render

!isible the depth from which all that is !isible emerges. :or 8erleau onty

seeing is not presence to self. $t is the means gi!en me for being absent

from myself, for being present from within at the fission of >eing only theend of which close up into myself.) Seeing myself in the mirror am being

absent from myself only to return to myself in the depth on this side.

8irror of :initude7 am an other

/his dialectic between identification and distanciation in the mirror shows

that reflection in the mirror is not merely copying but producti!e. Since &ant

philosophy has elaborated this producti!e structure as an ontology of human

finitude. Against 6escartes &ant argued that the * has no immediate access

to itself. /he determination $ thin") relates to the undetermined $ am) onlythrough form of the determinable ; space and time. $ am an other). /he s

lac" of immediate access is the ground of "nowledge and freedom. /he is

not transparent to itself. t needs the e+ternal mirror to attain an image. A

critic of representation li"e Richard Rorty urges us to destroy the mirror.

Howe!er, modern philosophy which is at once a criti#ue and an ontology of

finitude reinstates the mirror as $more than mere reflection).


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As bearers of ontological finitude we are not allowed to "now world apart

from our relation to the world. /he conditions of the possibility of our

e+perience are the same as the conditions of possibility of the object of

e+perience. %ur limits are the openings for our freedom. 'e are such thatour own being is an issue for us. 'e are constantly reborn from the !ery

depth to which we withdraw. /he mirror grants us this enigmatic depth.

:oucault and the surface of mirror.

t is from the mirror that find myself absent from the place where am, as

long as see myself there. ;:oucault

/he mirror is, after all, a utopia, since, since it is a placeless place. n themirror, see myself there where am not, in an unreal, !irtual space that

opens up behind the surface am o!er there where am not, a sort of

shadow that gi!es my own !isibility to myself, that enables me to see myself

there where am absent7 such is the utopia of the mirror B :oucault.

:oucault too was fascinated by painting and also the mirror wor". n

2elas#ue(s


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portray3 /he &ing and #ueen, the models, do not appear in the painting

e+cept for the dim appearance in the mirror "ept in the dar" recess of the

studio. /he focus of the actual painting in front of us seem to be the on

loo"ers ; nfant 8aria, her wards and the !isitor at the door step. 2elas#ue(,

the painter appears but he seems to be caught in he painting as if chance. He

would soon disappear behind the can!as the moment he begins to paint on

the can!as. No one can possibly see the picture that is being drawn on the

easel whose rear side faces us.

'e can remo!e the parado+ of this self representation by a= remo!ing the

mirror b= >y stretching the frame towards us and e+posing the models c= by

ma"ing the "ing the painter of this picture. /he presence of the mirror in

itself need not push this picture into a parado+. Such mirrors are common

features in Renaissance 6utch paintings. n


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meticulous and repetiti!e because too broad, the painting may, little by little,

release its illuminations.)

:oucault sees the e+ecution of this new tas" in the mirror wor" of 8anets

paintings. 8anetsA Bar at the Folies-Bergerewe see the bar girl standing

in front of a wall of mirror. /he mirror forms a wall behind her and closes

off the space refusing any depth to the painting. /he composition of the

painting does not allow us to see what is in front of her either. /he mirror

reflects what is in front of the can!as. Howe!er, the figure that stands right

in front of the mirror pre!ents us from seeing that. t is nearly impossible to

locate the mirror reflections of the things which are on the table. %n the right

side we see the reflection of the girl and another man who must be facing

her. :rom the same location in front, the painter could not ha!e seen the

woman and her reflection in the way it is portrayed here. /he painter and

also the !iewer occupy two incompatible places. /his problem could be

sol!ed if the mirror were obli#ue. Howe!er we can see that it is not obli#uefrom the golden frame which runs parallel to the table. f the man were

standing in front of her the woman then his shadow should ha!e been falling

on her. Also the man in the mirror seems to be loo"ing at her from plunging

point of !iew and not from the eye le!el of a face1face encounter.

n 8anet the mirror has mo!ed from the depth of


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not spring from enigmatic depths.

Self portrait and the mirror wor".

'hile painting his Self -Portrait with Palette 5e(annes might ha!e been

standing in front of a strange object ; a mirror with the image of the painter.


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others also see. /his is the world in which am an other. Howe!er,

5e(annes self portrait subtracts the eye from this world of the and the

other. /he self of the portrait, before encountering the $) loo"s with an

impersonal $eye).

see myself in another head7

:rancis >acon was fascinated by the self1portrait of other painters li"e

Rembrandt and 2an Gogh. Here is his remar" on Rembrandts Self ortrait

with >eret, @EF, at 8usee Garnet, Ai+1en1 ro!ence.

if you analy(e it, you will see that there are hardly any soc"ets to the eyes,

that it is almost completely Dan= anti1illustrational wor". thin" that the

mystery of fact is con!eyed by an image being made out of non1rational

mar"s. And you canIt will this non1rationality of a mar". /hat is the reasonthat accident always has to enter into this acti!ity, because the moment you

"now what to do, youIre ma"ing just another form of illustration. >ut what

can happen sometimes, as it happened in this Rembrandt self1portrait, is that

there is a coagulation of non1representational mar"s which ha!e led to

ma"ing up this !ery great image. 'ell, of course, only part of this is

accidental. >ehind all that is RembrandtIs profound sensibility, which was

able to hold onto one irrational mar" rather than onto another)

/his portrait does not present the soulful eyes which we see in other selfportraits of Rembrandt. /he eyes without soc"ets are !anishing into the

lump of flesh 1 a lump of fat in a bowl of soup. /hose eyes are disappearing

from the world and also from the face. Rembrandts hand renders this !isible

on the can!as through non1illustrati!e, non rational and contingent mar"s.

/he hand here is not copying what appears in the minds eye. Nor is it

gesticulating in the wa"e of an eye that always sees more. Here the hand is

responding to the withdrawal of the eye. /he hand doesnt "now what it is

doing. Nor can it will the mar"s it ma"es. /he eye has come to rest on the

surface of the mirror and the hand is committed to the surface of the can!as.

/he hand of the painter wor"s on the can!as just as the child who is in frontof the mirror rubs its body part against the contingent location of

corresponding part of the image. /he self is drawn towards the !isible but

freed from the domination of the eye. /he hand is drawn forward to ma"e

the first gesture and mar". /he mirror allows the launching of this first

contingent mar" that is freed from the self and also the world shared by the

self and the other. /he genius of Rembrandt lies in holding onto one


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irrational mar" rather than onto another. Self1portrait is self1creation without

models.

nstead of models and mirrors, :rancis >acon used photographs to ma"e

portraits and self1portraits. He photographed himself in photo1booths andused those photograph to wor" on his self portraits. 'hy did he prefer

photographs to li!e models. hotograph claims to stay closer to reality than

painting. 0!en a bad photographer has had a closer brush with reality than a

good realist painting. /he reality claim of the photograph is often traced to

its mechanical production. 6espite framing and other intentional

inter!entions the accidental tracing of light on a mechanical de!ice produces

the photograph. A digital photograph retains this claim despite the absence

of such direct contact with reality. /here the reality effect is produced

strictly within technological process.

/he relationship between the photograph and reality is neither causal nor

intentional. /he photograph, as :oucault prescribed, "eeps the relationship

between language and !ision infinitely open. n the photograph these two

regimes of saying and showing establish an e+ternal and contingent

relationship. >arthes called the trace of this contingent relationship

$punctum. t is an accidental mar" upon which reality of the $ha!ing been

of the sitter haunts the photograph. unctum is not a point in space but a

$pointing out). An J ray is a #uintessential photograph. J ray does not

actually ma"e the interior of the body !isible. nstead it points out a fracture,a rupture or a tumor. t shows the abnormality without showing the body as a

bac"ground. >eneath the figure it shows the armature that sustain it.

ointing does not follow a code. Ha!ing dissol!ed the conte+t it is not a

matter of interpretation either. $/his is not a ipe) painted on the

bac"ground of the figure of a pipe; such is the paradigmatic gesture of

pointing. /he *this is not) of the pointing figure rigidly refers while bursting

through all determinable conte+ts.

magine the duc"1rabbit picture made famous by 'ittgenstein.

henomenology teaches us that we do not see bare lines which we laterinterpret as a duc" or a rabbit. 'e see a duc" or a rabbit. /he rabbit picture

can dawn upon us from the duc" picture. magine someone who sees the

duc" but fails to see the rabbit. 'e can help him to see the rabbit by tracing

our fingers on the picture of the duc". 'hat do our pointing finger point to3

'hen we see the duc" or the rabbit we see those figures against some

bac"ground. Howe!er the tracing finger pic"s out fragments of the figure


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and display them out of conte+t. /his tracing is not an in!itation to the

!iewer to transform his inner picture of a duc" into a rabbit. /he pointing

finger tries to establish real relations between fragments of the duc" and

fragments of rabbit. /hese real relationships are !irtual. /hey are actuali(ed

as good figures in seen in appropriate conte+ts.

henomenology e+pects painting to render !isible principle that generates

figures against bac"ground. >acon abolished or limited the bac"ground and

painted the !irtual relations between fragments of the figure. His self1

portraits distort the figure beyond recognition. 6istortion dissol!es the figure

and the bac"ground and establishes relations of force ; torsion 1 between the

twisted fragments. n his triptych Self1ortrait @K@ the face is mauled by a

transparent cylinder. /he geometric form does not set up a norm for the

figure. nstead it disfigures the face and renders !isible the e+ternal relations

whose contingent configurations compose recogni(able figures of the self.:or 8erleu1onty the mirror draws my e+teriority to its limits. Howe!er, the

mirror returns this e+teriority to the enigmatic depth of a soul. 'ith the help

of photograph >acon culti!ates his self in the !ery e+teriority of accidental

mar"s.

>acon says */his is no longer my head, but feel myself inside a head see

and see myself inside a head). can see myself directly and in an

impersonal manner in a head which is not necessarily my head. am not

bound to my body that pro!ides the in!isible matri+ of the !isible. As'ittgenstein said, feel my pain in others body. 8y relationship to my pain

is not that of ownership. t is also not that e+perience by emotions in a

special way whereas the others emotions are displayed for me. t is not

enough to say that my access to my feelings in!ol!es display of some sort.

Self and the other7 not enough. am an other7 again not enough. 8yself1

other7 perhaps, just enough.

Apart from models, mirrors and photographs >acon also wor"ed with the

self1portrait of another painter ; 2an Goghs Self1portrait on the road to

/arascon @LLL. 6uring @FE1FK >acon painted se!eral !ariations of this selfportrait some of which were titled Study for a ortrait of 2an Gogh. n these

paintings >acon opens up another painters self portrait for further wor". As

we ha!e seen self portrait ma"es !isible the e+teriori(ation which is

constituti!e of the self and ta"en to its limits by the mirror. Howe!er, in the

self portrait this e+teriority was sealed by the conjecture that in a self portrait

the model, the painter and the signatory are the same person. >acon


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#uestions this conjecture. /he self that attains an image in 2an Goghs

painting can be studied and elaborated by another. %ne can see oneself in

anothers self portrait. 2an Goghs Self portrait on the Road to /arascon too

has some uni#ue features. /he painter is catches himself on the road,

wal"ing bac" home after a days wor". He poses and loo"s up. /he

bac"ground seems to be more prominent than the figure. /he figure appears

li"e a cut out. 8ore importantly, a new !isual figure enters the scene of self

portrait ; shadow. 2an Goghs shadow falls across the road e+tending to the

foreground. 2an Gogh #uestions the transcendental presupposition of self

portrait ; 8irror.

Reflection and Shadow

Shadows figures in many of >acans paintings. :or him shadow has much

presence as the body. Shadow is not a reflection. 9nli"e the mirror image itis faceless. /he idea of recognition is meaningless the case of shadow.

Shadow immediately belongs to the object which casts it. /he relationship

between the object and the shadow is causal. Howe!er, what is caused is an

absence.

As a !isible phenomena shadow has an illustrious history. n pre1modern

times gnomon or sun dial used shadow for measurement of both space an

time. Howe!er, as 8ichel Serres has argued the gnomon is not a precursor of

telescope or time1piece. t belonged to a different regime of the !isible. /hetelescope belongs to a mode of "nowing where the "nowing subject projects

the transcendental conditions of perception onto the world. t presupposes

the eye of the !iewing subject at the !iewfinder *contemplating, obser!ing,

calculating, arranging the planets. Howe!er, the gnomon e+ists prior to the

in!ention of the subject. /he role of the "nowing subject is e+hausted in

casting another shadow besides the gnomon. n casting the shadow the

world lends itself to be seen by the world that sees it. Since it a!oids the

"nowing subject, gnomon is an automaton. n this sense the shadow is closer

to the photograph than the painted images that are modelled on mirror

reflection.

Phenomenology teaches us that from my mirror image my body acquires a

depth which is intertwined with that of other. However, my shadow haunts

me in a unsubstitutable but impersonal manner. Phenomenology teaches us

that I am an unsubstitutable perspective on the world. We can see objects


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from new perspectives. However, I am unable to open up new perspectives

on my mirror image. However, we have been told that this is not a

limitation. In other words, this unsubstitutability opens up the depth of the

world where we have room and freedom to take fresh perspectives on the

objects and on ourselves. The shadow does not open up such depth. Insteadshadows maintain a relationship of proportionality with the objects. If we

know the ratio of the height of a known body standing near the pyramid and

the length of its shadow and also the length of shadow of the pyramid then I

can calculate the pyramids height. Shadow is a measure where the world

measures itself. Here measurement is not the activity of a world constituting

subject. Measurement through shadows does not presuppose a meaningful

world. It involves ratios between dark objects and their faceless shadows.

Bacon has treated mirror reflections as shadows caught in the narrow and

dark thickness of mirrors. (Portrait of George Dyer Staring into a MirrorbyFrancis Bacon, 1967)

>acons studies of !an Gogh portrait gi!e importance to the shadow and the

bac"ground. >acon e+plores the figure in its relationship with the road and

the shadow it casts. /he road ta"es an inclination emphasising mo!ement.

0+cept in Study 2, the shadow is carried along by the road that flows with

the dynamism of paints splashed on the can!as in a manner characteristic of

>acon. /he figure seems to be drained away by the shadow. 0!en on the!erge of dissolution the figure retains some mar"s for recognition ; a hat,

wal"ing stic" etc. >acon does not resort to abstraction but stay with the

figure only to #uestion the relationship between it and the bac"ground.

0!erything in the bac"ground could potentially cast a shadow. /he road is a

flu+ of molten shadows. n Study 2 the road ca!es in ta"ing along with it

the figure and the shadow. /he road cuts through the figure. /he road which

carries the shadow along ta"es up a meat1li"e #uality. /he figure of the

painter with its characteristics mar"s seems to be an eddy isolated within this

flow.

8uybridges serial photographs of the human body in motion fascinated

>acon. /hese serial photographs were precursors to cinema. /he uni#ueness

of cinema lies not in creating the illusion of motion but in the seriality of the

frames. /he serial images capture the deformation of the mo!ing body

which is under the propelling causes. A mo!ing body is a body subjected to

forces. >acons fascination for the photograph should be understood in the


19/22

conte+t of its rejection by the phenomenologist. According to the

phenomenologist, the photograph of a galloping horse shows it leaping in

space whereas the painting can show it running. /he photograph "eeps the

instant open and does not let time pass. t free(es mo!ement. $t destroys the

o!erta"ing, the o!er lapping, the metamorphosis of time). :or 8erleau

onty, mo!ing images of cinema are no e+ception. /he photographs

inability to capture mo!ement has nothing to do with whether or not the

image is mo!ing. /he mo!ing image is just as lifeless as the still one.

8erleau1ponty preferred Gericaults painted horses to 8uybridges

photographed ones.

>acon is fascinated by this arrested motion. /he arresting of motion sends

shoc" wa!es through the body. 8otion, primordially is the passage of wa!es

through the body. /hese wa!es also carry the body along. n 8uybridge

serial photographs, the bac"ground changes from one frame to the other./his change can be concealed by using a uniform bac"ground. /his would

emphasi(e the continuity of motion. >acon is interested in the dynamism of

the bac"ground. 'e can compare his approach to that of trac"ing shot in

cinema. /he camera mo!es along with the mo!ing object, "eeping the latter

in focus while blurring the bac"ground. Road mo!ies radicali(e this

e+perience by "eeping the camera inside a mo!ing !ehicle. /he camera

isolates the interior of the !ehicle where the story unfolds. /he road remains

e+ternal to this island of narrati!e continuity. ts relationship with the

narrati!e happenings within the !ehicle is mechanical or casual and hencecontingent.

Mourney is "nown trope of autobiography. /he self lea!es home, tra!els

through new spaces and encounters others. /his journey in the e+ternal

world is also a journey into himself. /he narrati!e wea!es the inner and

outer journeys into each other leading to self disco!ery and self

transformation. /his is an e+tended play of identification and alienation

characteristic of mirror wor". Howe!er road mo!ies Dand mo!ies in general=

propose another approach to motion. 8otion is not displacement of the body

in space. t is the spasm, deformation and rhythm which the bodyundergoes. mages mo!e through mirrors and shadows undergoes elongation

and mergers. D5artoons films by retaining the discontinuity between frames

pursue this aspect of motion.=/his motion is free from the sensory1motor

responses to an a!ailable world.

'hat does this conception of body1mo!ement has to do with the self3 Here


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we can learn from /homas 8et(ingers account of the de!iant self models

and out of body e+periences. n a railway station, sitting inside a stationary

train we e+perience the mo!ement of the train on another platform as the

mo!ement of our own train. 'e undergo the "inesthetic e+periences of

mo!ement without our body undergoing any motion. 'e e+perience

somebody elses motion in our own body. A marathon runner feels that she

was not loo"ing through her own eyes but from a stand point abo!e the road

and seeing herself running down there. n autoscopy people ha!e the

e+perience of seeing their own body as detached from them. 8et(iger

proposes a concept of the self which can ma"e such e+periences intelligible.

:or him there is nothing called a *the self. /here are only models of the self.

%ften we are not conscious of the fact that we are self models running in our

brain. n other words we are transparent. :irst person stand point is a

window. Howe!er, we can wal" out of that perspecti!e and occupy other

self1models. can wal" through this being someone and loo" at myselfthrough another pair of eyes or head. Here we mo!e from oneself as another

to oneself as no one. >acon says, %ne of the nicest things that 5octeau said

was7 I0ach day in the mirror watch death at wor".I /his is what one does

oneself

Self1hotograph

'e ha!e heard Hegels comment on his portrait. n @E, Adorno, a

profound ad!ersary of Hegel and the author of Negati!e 6ialectics wascaught in his self photograph by Stefan 8oses. /his was part of a series of

self portrait called Self in 8irror which 8oses did with philosophers and

scholars. Adorno sat in front of a mirror and clic"ed his photograph using a

cable which was connected to the delayed shutter of a camera "ept behind

him. Stefan also clic"ed a photograph of Adorno in the act of posing and

clic"ing his self portrait. n the first photograph we see Adornoss image in a

huge mirror placed in the center of a room. /his reminds us of >acons

mirror images. /he image has mo!ed into the thic"ness of the mirror and is

placed as an object in the room. ainting recei!es the mirror image by

putting a frame around it. /his photographs remo!es the frame and placesthe image on the same le!el as other objects in the room. /he role of mirror

here is not to open up depth on our side. nstead it becomes a conduit

through which the image can goes o!er to the other side. n the second

photograph we see both the posing Adorno and his image. 'e can also see

the camera which clic"edOclic"ingOwill clic" the first photograph. n the far

right corner of the second one, we can see 8osess hand shooting this image.


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magine Adorno holding the camera in front of him and clic"ing his own self

portrait. 'hat more do 8oses multiple photographs tell us the abo!e self

portrait3 8oses photographs re!eal the mechanical system that produced theimage ; the cameras, the cable and the mirror. Adorno is posing for an image

and also creating the image. /he mirror renders !isible the contingent point

of con!ersion of these acts. /he mirror image, li"e the duc"1rabbit picture is

made up of the real relations that establish this contingent congruence. /his

is


22/22

/he self is freed from the $my own). ortrayal is freed from intentional

framing and ismechani(ed. /hese two ma"e possible that self photograph

can be e+ecuted by others. 'e may get our autobiographies written by

competent authors and allow it to be published under their authorship. nother words, the artist, model and the signatory all need not con!erge in one.

'e shall not miss moral political nature of this practice of anonymity.

&wong oth these mo!e would ha!e ended up in succumbing to the

stereotypes. /hese artists "now that they cannot fight stereotying byin!o"ing a true image or an authentic image. Self photograph image is a

critical engagement with the stereotyped image. As we saw in >acons

figures or 8et(ingers out of body e+periences the self enters the stereotype

and sustain itself as a contingent e!ent. /here begins a politics of rendering

oneself anonymous.

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