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Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVol. LVIII, No. 1, March 1998

SemanticRealismand Kripke'sWittgenstein

GEORGEM. WILSON

Johns Hopkins University

This article argues, first, that the fundamental structure of the skeptical argument in

Kripke's book on Wittgensteinhas been seriously misunderstoodby recent commenta-

tors. Although it focuses particularly on recent commentary by John McDowell, it

emphasizes that the basic misunderstandingsare widely sharedby other commentators.

In particular, t argues that, properly construed, Kripke offers a fully coherent reading

of PI #201 and related passages. This is commonly denied, and given as a reason for

rejecting Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein's text. Second, it is pretty universally

accepted that Kripke's Wittgenstein is a 'non-factualist'about ascriptions of meaning.

The article argues that, when Kripke's discussion is rightly understoodand the content

of 'non-factualism' is clarified,there is an important ense in which the skeptical solu-

tion is not committed o non-factualism.

In a recent article,John McDowell states, "...many readers [of Saul Kripke's

book on Wittgenstein]would agree that [Kripke's] apparatusof 'skeptical

paradox' and 'skeptical solution' is not a good fit for Wittgenstein'stexts."1

McDowell includeshimself in this agreementand remindsus that,in an ear-

lier paper, "Wittgensteinon Following a Rule",he had argued strongly forthe same failure of fit.2More narrowly,McDowell contendsin the recent es-

say, as he had contended earlier,thatKripke's exegetical frameworkcannot

even make good sense of Wittgenstein's crucial remarksin Philosophical

Investigations#201, when thatpassageis takenas a whole. Afterquotingthe

bulk of #201, McDowell commentsas follows: "Thislooks like a proposal,

not for a 'skepticalsolution' to a 'skepticalparadox', ocked into place by an

irrefutableargument,as in Kripke'sreading,but for a 'straight olution':that

is, one that works by findingfault with the reasoningthatleads to the para-

dox. The paradoxthat Wittgensteinmentions at the beginning of this pas-

"Meaningand Intentionalityn Wittgenstein'sLater Philosophy,"MidwestStudies in Phi-

losophy XVII (The Wittgenstein Legacy) (1992): 40-52. Hereafter, this article will be

cited as M. McDowell is commenting upon Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein:On Rules and

Private Language (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982). Here-

after,this will be cited as K.

2 "Wittgensteinon Following a Rule," Synthese 58 (1984): 325-63. reprinted n Meaning

and Reference, ed. A. W. Moore (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 255-93. Allcitationsare to the latter.

SEMANTICREALISMAND KRIPKE' WITIGENSTEIN 99



sage... (is) something we can expose as based on 'a misunderstanding'."M,

p. 43)Although #201 is fast becoming the most frequently cited passage in

twentieth century philosophy, for the readersconvenience I will quote it, in

full, still anothertime.

This was our paradox: no course of action could be determinedby a rule, because every

course of action can be made out to accordwith the rule. The answer was: if everything can

be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so

there would be neitheraccordnor conflict here.

It can be seen that there is a misunderstandinghere from the mere fact that in the course

of our argumentwe give one interpretationafter another;as if each one contented us at least

for a moment,untilwe thoughtof yet anotherstandingbehind it. What this shows is thatthere is

a way of graspinga rule which is not an interpretation,but which is exhibitedin what we call

"obeyinga rule" and"going againstit" in actual cases.

Hence there is an inclinationto say: every actionaccordingto the rule is an interpretation.

But we ought to restrictthe term "interpretation"o the substitution of one expression of the

rule for another.3

McDowell makes two broad claims about what we do and do not find in

these remarks,claims that form the basis of his criticisms of Kripke's read-

ing. First, he thinks thatKripke's interpretation rovidesus with no account

of the 'misunderstanding'hatWittgensteincharacterizesas the basis of the

apparentparadox hatopens the passage.Thatis, it seems to him thatKripke

offers no accountof why the paradox s supposedto arise only when we failto see that "... thereis a way of graspinga rule thatis not an interpretation."

Second, McDowell tells that"...there is no hint"in #201 that we can escape

the paradox "...by riddingourselves of the inclination to think of graspinga

rule or meaning as afact about the person who grasps it." (M, p. 43) Here

McDowell is supposing that it is a crucial partof the position of Kripke's

Wittgensteinthat there are no facts abouta speakerthatconstitute his or her

graspof a rule. But, this radicalsounding thesis, he urges, is nowhere to be

found in #201 nor in otherassociatedremarks.Hence, we can see from this

alone thatKripkemust be prettybadlyoff the track n his explanationsof the

Wittgensteinian exts. As McDowell notes, manyotherwritershave madethe

same or similarcomplaintsaboutKripke's exposition. ElizabethAnscombe,

Colin McGinn,andCrispinWrightare in this number.4

3 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (third edition), trans. G. E. M.

Anscombe (New York: Macmillan, 1968): 81e.4 Anscombe, "CriticalNotice of Saul A. Kripke, Wittgenstein:On Rules and Private Lan-

guage, Canadian Journal of Philosophy XV (1985): 103-9; McGinn, Wittgenstein on

Meaning (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), see chapter 2; Wright, "Critical Notice of

Colin McGinn, Wittgensteinon Meaning,"Mind98 (1989): 289-305. The same or similar

criticisms of Kripke's book are also made in G. P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker, Scepti-

cism, Rules and Language (Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1984), see chapter 1; ArthurCollins,

"On the Paradox Kripke Finds in Wittgenstein," Midwest Studies in Philosophy XVI

(1992): 74-88; Edward Minar, Philosophical Investigations #185-202: Wittgenstein's

100 GEORGEM. WILSON



I am sympathetic o the authorwho assertedthat 'the rule-following' pas-

sages in Wittgenstein have become a kind of Rorschach test for philoso-

phers,' and I am as little inclined here to unveil the workings of my uncon-

scious (even my philosophical unconscious) as I am in other contexts of my

life. Nevertheless, in the remainderof this paperI will repress these misgiv-

ings and proceedahead.More specifically,I will try to show that McDowell

is simply wrong about the first of these claims and that the second claim, ashe develops it, rests upon a misunderstandingof his own about Kripke's

larger ine of thought.However, whatever nterestmy discussion has depends

less on correctingMcDowell on this point or that and more on setting out

Kripke's expositionalstrategieswithin a frameworkquitedifferent rom those

favoredby many otherreadersof his book. Understoodalong the lines I will

be expounding,both the views andthe argumentation rticulatedn the book

strike me as much more forceful and interestingthanthey might otherwise

appearto be. Further,althoughI will attemptno overall assessment of the

success of Kripke'sdiscussion as exegesis of Wittgenstein,I do believe that

it is far less obvious than others have imagined that his discussion is not

substantially a good fit' to the well-known section of the Investigations.

1. The Structure of Kripke's Exposition

Leaving McDowell for the time being, let me outline whatI take to the gen-

eral architectureof Kripke'sreconstructionof Wittgenstein.6We start withthe Kripkeanskeptic. It is important o observe that this skeptic consistently

works within a skeletal,but not implausible, conceptionof what would have

to be the case if someone were to mean somethingby a term. We get some

sense of what this conceptioncomes to from the following remarks,remarks

that occur as Kripke s setting up the skeptic's puzzle. Kripkesays,

I, like almost all English speakers,use the word 'plus' and the symbol "+" to denote a well-

known mathematicalfunction, addition.... By means of my external symbolic representation

and my internalrepresentation,I 'grasp' the rule for addition. Although I myself have com-

puted only finitelymany sums in the past,the rule determinesmy answer for indefinitely many

new sums that I have never previouslyconsidered.This is the whole point of the notion that in

learningto addI graspa rule:my past intentionsregardingaddition determinea uniqueanswer

for indefinitely many new cases in the future.(pp. 7-8)

Treatmentof Following a Rule, (New York: GarlandPress, 1990), see chapters1 and 4:

Peter Winch, "Facts andSuper-facts (Saul A Kripke, Wittgensteinon Rules and Private

Language)," The Philosophical Quarterly,33 (1984): 398-404. I have the impressionthat

there is a wide consensusthat the objectionsI will be discussing are correct.5 Mark Wilson, "PredicateMeets Property,"The Philosophical Review XCI (1982): 556.

My indebtedness o my brother'swisdom on these topics is not confined to the diagnostic

proposal cited here. I have been greatly aided and encouragedby long discussions with

him over many years.

6 The ensuing section is adapted rom similar expositionin my "Kripkeon Wittgensteinand

Normativity," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XIX (Philosophical Naturalism) (1994):

366-90.

SEMANTICREALISMAND KRIPKE'SWITTGENSTEIN 101



Now there is a greatdeal that is instructivein just this one passage, and

what it tells us is, I believe, confirmedat many other places in the book. Let

us firstrestrictourselves, as the quoted passage restrictsitself, to the exem-

plary case of addition.In order or me to have meant additionby '+', accord-

ing to the observationsabove, I must have established some standard of cor-

rectness for my actualandpotentialapplicationsof the term.Meaning some-

thing by "+" essentially consists in my having a suitable intentionorpolicy

aboutwhat is to count as correct and incorrectapplicationof the expression.

Second, the skeptic supposes, the wanted standardof correctnessis, in this

example,thearithmeticoperationof addition tself. As a matterof mathemat-

ical fact, independentlyof my or anyoneelse's linguisticpractices,the addi-

tion functionyields a uniquenumericalvalue for any pairof naturalnumbers.

This generalarithmetic act represents he basis for taking additionas a feasi-

ble standard f correctness.Third,whatI must do to establish the standard or

myself, the skeptic asserts,is to adopta non-defective rule-a non-defective

'metalinguistic'rule, as it were-to the effect thatcorrectanswers to queries

of the form 'j+k=?' are given by the values of the additionoperationfor the

pairs of numbersthat, query by query,are in question. Having adoptedthis

semantical rule for "+", correct applicationsof the term are settled by the

infinite table of values thatadditiongenerates.Alternatively,we can say that,

if I mean additionby "+", there must be facts about me thathave somehow

'singled out' the additionfunction for me and have done so in such a fashionthat I have been able to form the intention, concerning this very function,

that it is to determinecorrectapplicationsof my use of the term.Hence, my

acceptanceof the semanticalrule embodied n my intentionservesto 'justify'

my answers to queriesframed with "+" (when those answers are correct)in

the sense that it suppliesme with the standardof correctnessthatmy ascrip-

tions of "+" are supposedto track.Finally, the skepticassumes in all of this

that a certain order of conceptualandexplanatorypriority s to be observed.

Let it be granted, or themoment,thatI have formedandadhered o the inten-

tion that addition is to be my standard.The skepticholds that it is because I

have that intention that I mean what I do by "+" and not the other way

around.My intendingof addition that it be my standard s the ground-level

circumstance that constitutesmy meaning additionby "+". For the skeptic,

the existence of my conceptually priorintentionexplains constitutivelyhow

the meaningfulnessof "+" arises for me and thatdetermineswhat I mean by

thatterm.7

It should be emphasized that Kripke's discussion allows from the outset that a speaker's

meaning something by a termis a matterof the speaker's having a certain intentioncon-

cerning the termin question.Moreover, nothingin the arguments hat follow requiresthat

these intentions(or intentionsgenerally)are to be token-identifiedwith events in or states

of the speaker that are themselves not intrinsically intensional, e.g., with brain states,

'pure' states of consciousness, etc. In fact, no special assumptions about the nature of

102 GEORGEM. WILSON



It is precisely at this juncture that the skeptic interposes his skeptical

challenge. It is my contention that the skeptic does not ever doubt that his

conception of what would constitutemeaning addition by "+" is right. What

he does doubt is that this schematic conception can be coherently filled in

with an account of how I (or any otherspeaker)achieves the establishmentof

the requiredstandardof correctness.What,he wants to know, does the adop-

tion of such a standard oncretely consist in? In particular,what are the factsaboutme in virtue of which it is addition that is the standardof correctness

for my prospectiveuse of "+" and not some otherinitially similar but diver-

gent arithmetic operation? What facts about me make it the case that I

employ addition,and not, say, Kripke'squaddition,as my standard? n the

discussion above, it was claimed that theremust be facts about me that, in

some manner, 'single out' addition n such a way as to make it possible for

me to form an intention,about thatfunction,thatit is to settle correctappli-

cations of my use of "+". Well then, the skeptic asks, in what specific fash-

ion does additionget 'singled out' for me so thatI form the specified inten-

tion concerning t?8

The ensuing skeptical argumentpurports o demonstrate hat there are no

satisfactoryanswersto these questions.Some of the proposalsthat the skep-

tic considers cite facts about me that do not single out any particularopera-

intentions are employed. What is assumed is that the 'semantical' intentions in question

must be pertinent ntentions concerning certain propertiesor conditions-in-the-world.The

speaker must intend of those conditionsthatthey areto constitutethe standardof correct-

ness for her use of the term. Then, the problemhas to do with how suitable conditions get

singled out for the speaker. In the concluding section of his critical notice of Kripke's

book, Crispin Wright charges that the skeptical argumentin Kripke either ignores the

special epistemic and 'normative' properties of intentions or illicitly presupposes that a

reductive account of intentions must be correct. See his, "Kripke's Account of the

Argument against PrivateLanguage,"Journal of Philosophy,LXXXI (1985), pp. 775-78.

I believe that these chargesare mistaken.

The question of conceptualandexplanatorypriority s important or the following reason.

Notice that, if a term 'T' is meaningful for speakerS, then inter alia the bi-conditional

a) (o) ('T' is true of o iff o is T)

is correspondinglymeaningfulfor S, and, of course,what it says is true. Moreover,in her

ensuing use of 'T', S adoptsa commitment(in some sense) to a). However, here it is the

meaningfulnessof 'T' for S, independently ettled,that gives rise to S's commitment o a)

and not the other way around,as the classical realist requires. Also, for some philoso-

phers,

b) 'T' is a meaningful predicatefor S [give or take some possible qualifications]

is equivalent,more or less by stipulation, o

c) 'T', as S uses it, stands for the propertyof being T.

But, for the classical realist, the truth of an instance of c) is to be explained by the fact

that the property of being T, if such a property exists at all, has been successfully

recruited by S to serve as a standard of correctness for 'T' and that this has been

accomplishedin virtue of S's independentadoptionof a conceptually priorde re seman-

tical rule. It is difficult to capturethe distinctive character of classical realism without

highlighting the explanatorypicture upon which it relies. (I am indebted here and at vari-

ous otherplaces in this essay to extremely helpfulcomments from Scott Soames.)

SEMANTICREALISMAND KRIPKES WWI7GENSTEIN 103



tion whatsoever. Otherproposalscite facts (e.g., facts aboutmy relevantlin-

guistic dispositions) which, if they do connect with a specific function,

wrongly pick out an operationother than addition.All of them fail to explain

how I have acquired a semantic intention that is directed, as it should be,

upon the addition function. The skeletal conceptionwith which we, follow-

ing the skeptic, startedout, cannot be determinatelygrounded n facts about

me that render t intelligiblethat it is additionI have meantby "+".

As Kripkerepeatedlyemphasizes,the skeptic's problem s a general one:

it concerns themeaningfulnessof any speaker'suse of anyterm. To grasp the

wider point of view, it will help to rehearse these last reflections in a more

generalmode. Thus, let 'T' be any term thata speakerS proposesto use as a

general term or predicate.That is, 'T', as S plans to employ it, is to apply

correctly or incorrectly,as the case may be, to the members of some open-

endeddomain of objectsD. In particular, nd withoutsignificant oss of gen-

erality,we can assume that 'T' is to be a 'descriptive'termfor S, a term that

is appliedcorrectlyor incorrectly, n a given instance, depending upon facts

about the specific character of the candidate item. As before, the skeptic

insists that S's meaning something by the term 'T' can only arise from the

fact thatshe hassupplied or herself a standard f correctness or theenvisaged

use. But, fromwhere,in thesecases, is the appropriatetandard o be derived?

Well, let us take for granted at least at this stage of the argument) hat each

member of D, considered at a time when the pertinentitem exists, exem-plifies a range of determinatepropertiesand does not exemplify a host of

others. We can presumethatthe fact that a D-memberhas a certainproperty

or the fact that it does not obtains ndependentlyof ourbeliefs about the mat-

ter andindependentlyof whatever orms of languageuse we may have put in

place. So, it seems, the standardof correctnessfor the descriptive predicates

ought properlyto be constitutedin terms of the propertiesof the D-mem-

bers-in terms of those objective, predicableconditions, realized or not as

they may be-by the various objects in D. The skeptic repeatsthat what S

must do if she is to mean something by 'T' is to graspor have 'singled out'

for her certainproperties,PI - P., and to adoptthe semanticrule that 'T' is

to be appliedto a D-item o just in case o has preciselythese properties.Vary-

ing the formulation, S is to have the meaning constituting intention, con-

cerningP1- P,, that 'T' appliesto o iff o exemplifies those conditions.

We should notice here that S's meaning something by 'T', thus con-

ceived,ensures that the

meaningof 'T' for

S enjoysa

certain ntuitivebrandof normativity. For an unbounded number of objects in D, S's semantic

intentionfor 'T' determines,when relevantfacts aboutthe D-items have been

fixed, whether or not, on S's present use, it is correct to apply 'T' to the

objects in question.Actually, as the formulationsuggests, this determination

of correctness s a two stage affair.By adoptinghersemanticrule, S thereby

determines what has to be the case if 'T', as she means it, is to apply. It is

104 GEORGEM. WILSON



determined,as we have said, whichproperties a candidate or 'T'-ascription s

to have. But now, whether 'T' does apply to an object o (as it is at a certain

time) depends also upon the facts abouto's characterat that time. It depends,

so to speak, upon whetherthat character accordswith' the stipulatedproper-

ties P1- Pn. With this qualificationunderstood,we can say that, on the pre-

sent conception, meaning determines correctness and so is, in this sense,

'normative' n relation o the speaker's uturepractice.9

Nevertheless, the skeptic thinks that there is nothing but illusion here.

The skeptical argument s meant to show that it is impossible for any set of

properties o be establishedas thestandard f correctness or any speaker'suse

of any term. More, specifically, the skeptic's strategycan be divided into two

parts. First, assume that 'T' is a non-primitive term for S, i.e., S supposes

that she has established a standardof correctness for 'T' because she has

formed and adheredto an intention to accept a linguistic formulationF of a

rule that purports o define 'T' explicitly in more basic terms. But, the skep-

tic argues, the ruleexpressedby F will be defective for thesepurposes f stan-

dardsof correctness have not alreadybeen establishedfor the terms in the

definiens.If those termsdo not themselves have establishedstandardsof cor-

rectness,then the intentionto acceptF will fail to establish a standardof cor-

rectness for 'T'. (See K, pp. 15-17) Second, the skepticturnshis attention o

the terms thatareprimitive for S and argues,on his case by case basis, that

no facts about the speaker can establish standardsof correctness for theseprimitive expressions. In particular, f 'T' is primitivefor S, then, the skep-

tic claims, the propertiesP1- Pnmust be non-linguistically 'singled out' for

S as the de re subjectof hermeaning-constituting ntentions,and the skeptic

tries to show thatwe can make no sense of this. Therefore,he concludes that

no generaltermhas application-guidingtandards f correctnessand,correla-

tively, that no generalterms meananythingat all.

There is one last importantobservationto be made about the conception

of what it is to mean somethingwhich the skeptic presupposes n his unfold-

ing argumentation.Thatis, the skeptic is what Kripkecalls "aclassical real-

ist" about meaning. Here, for example, is a quotationfrom the segment in

which Kripkeintroduces classical realism (named as such) into his discus-

sion. He says,

The simplest,most basic idea of the Tractatus can hardlybe dismissed: a declarative sentence

gets its meaning by virtue of its truthconditions, by virtue of its correspondence o facts that

must obtain if it is true.For example, "the cat is on the mat" is understoodby

thosespeakerswho realize that it is true if and only if a certaincat is on a certainmat; it is false otherwise.

The presence of the cat on the mat is a fact or condition-in-the-worldthat would make the

sentence true (expressa truth) f it obtained.(p. 72)

I discuss the question of how 'normativity' s treated n contextof the skepticalsolution in

"Kripkeon Wittgenstein and Normativity,"especially pp. 380-84. Hence, I bypass that

tricky issue in the presentessay.

SEMANTICREALISMAND KRIPKE'SWWI7GENSTEIN 105



I devoted as much space as I did to the skeptic's workingconceptionof mean-

ing partly in order to bring out the way in which the skeptic himself is a

classical realist, albeit a skeptical one. It is true that in Kripke's explicit

characterization f 'classicalrealism',he focuses on the idea thatthe meaning

of a sentence arises from its supposed conceptually prior correlation with

'realist' truthconditions, i.e., with a possible fact whose realizationwill ren-

derthe sentence true.Thatis, I take it that,for the case of ('descriptive') sen-

tences, the classical realistholds the following: i) A sentence U means what

it does in virtueof its representinga possible fact F; ii) the possible fact F is

the standard of truth for uses of U, i.e., U is trueiff the possible fact F actu-

ally obtains;andiii) the possible fact F is constitutedas the standardof truth

for U by the system of conceptually prior intentions of relevant speakers

which have (purportedly) stablishedstandardsof correctreference, applica-

tion, etc., for the various termsin U.

By contrast,I have focused on general terms and on the thoughtthat their

meaningfulnessdependsupona speaker'shavingestablishedcertainproperties

or objectiveand exemplifiableconditions-in-the-world s the standardof cor-

rectness that is to govern his/her use of the term in question. However, the

difference between the two modes of exposition are negligible, at least for

present purposes. Someone who accepts the skeptic's 'classical realism'

about general terms can be expected to hold comparablyclassical realistic

views about the semantical status of expressions that fall within the otherlogical categories. Treatingsentences compositionally,he can grant that the

semantic values of the sententialcomponents, taken together with the sen-

tence's logical structure,will determinethe possible fact or type of possible

fact thathas to hold if the sentence is to be true.So, to repeat,it is my con-

tentionthat the skeptic's argumentsproceedfrom a basis of classical realism

aboutmeaning.

At thisjuncture,following ourpreviousdiscussionof the 'additionexam-

ple', we can describesuccinctlythe structure f the skeptic's generalnegative

argument. First, as I have been stressing, he assumes a classical realist

account of the meaningof general terms, i.e.,

CR) If S means something by a term 'T', then there is a set of proper-

ties, PI- P., thathave been establishedby S as the meaning-consti-

tutingstandard f correctness orherapplicationof 'T'.

However, as we also observed in our discussion of "+", the skeptic insiststhat,if certainpropertiesare thusto functionas conditions of correctapplica-

bility for S's use of 'T', then there must be some range of concrete facts

about S which make it the case that it just those propertiesthat have been

successfully 'singled out' for her andaboutwhich she has formed a proper

semantic commitment.The existence of such conditions of applicability or a

106 GEORGE M. WILSON



termmustbe intelligiblygroundedin facts aboutthe speaker'spsychological

and/orsocial history.10Therefore,the 'groundingconstraint'that the skeptic

reasonablyenoughimposes says that

G) If thereis a set of properties,Pi - P., that have been establishedby

S as themeaning-constitutingtandard f correctness orher applica-

tion of 'T', then theremust be facts aboutS that fix P, - P. as thestandard has adopted.

Endorsing this grounding constraint, the skeptic is now in a position to

mount his skepticalattack.As we will see as we proceed,the skepticholds or

is committedto a numberof skepticalsoundingconclusions, but what I take

to be the basic skepticalargumentattempts o show thatthis groundingcon-

straintcannot ever be satisfied. In other words, what I will call "the basic

skepticalconclusion"assertsthat

BSC) Thereare no facts aboutS thatfix any set of propertiesas the stan-

dardof correctness or S's use of 'T'.

This is the conclusion for which Kripke's skeptic argues on a case by case

basis. He investigates a range of suggestions, purporting o exhaust the pos-

sibilities, concerning the kinds of facts about S that might be thought to

establisha set of propertiesas conditionsof correctascribability,andhe triesto demonstratethat each of these suggestions is unacceptable.BSC), then,

sums up the purportedupshot of these central, extended investigations. In

this paper,I will make no attemptto assess the cogency of the case by case

argument or BSC).

In the course of Kripke'sbook, there are numerousreferences to some-

thing called "theskepticalconclusion,"but his skeptic patentlydraws or is

10 On the whole, Kripke'sexpositionproceedsin a manner hatsuggests thatthe facts about

a speakerthatmightgroundher semantical ntentions upona suitableset of propertiesare

restrictedto individualistic facts about the speaker. This can seem to leave the skeptic

open to the charge that he has illegitimately excluded a kind of social version of a

'straight'solution to his puzzle. Thus, one might hope to arguethat there are facts about

membersof a linguistic community-in virtueof their complex, cooperativeuse of a term

'T'-that establishes certainpropertiesPi - Pnas the standard hat govern correctappli-

cations of 'T' among them or in their language. Given this, it could be proposedthat an

individualmemberS of the communitywill be committed o Pi - Pnas his or herstandard

of correctness for 'T' only if his or her linguistic dispositions concerning 'T' situates

him/heras a competentuser of 'T' within the community.However, it is clear that Krip-

ke's skeptic andhis Wittgensteinrejectsuch a line of thought.On page 111, Kripkemen-

tions thatthe firststage of this approachwill involve a 'straight'solutionwhich appealsto

the collective linguistic dispositions of the linguistic communityas a whole, and, fromthe

perspectiveof the skeptic, it will be subjectto some of the same objectionsthathe raises

againstan accountthat relies on the linguistic dispositions of the individual.For this rea-

son, it is my intentionthat referencesto 'facts about the speaker'are to be understoodas

subsumingsocial or institutional acts aboutthe speakeras well.




committed to a number of skeptical-sounding conclusions, and it is not

always clear, in a given context, just which conclusion is being referred to.

For example, it is obvious on brief inspection that CR), G), and BSC), taken

jointly as premises,togetherentailthe radicalskepticalconclusion that

RSC) No one ever meansanythingby anyterm.

Moreover, this 'skeptical conclusion' figuresimportantly n the dialectic set

up between Kripke's skeptic and Kripke's Wittgenstein.In fact, it is RSC)

that Kripkerefers to as "the skepticalparadox;"BSC) may strikeone as sur-

prising andwrongheaded,butthisconclusionof the skepticdoes not represent

his paradox.Now, on the one hand, Kripke's skeptic is plainly committed to

RSC), but Kripke'sWittgenstein s not a skepticof this stripe.For example,

on pp. 70 and71, Kripkemakesthe following remark:

NeverthelessI choose to be so bold as to say: Wittgensteinholds, with the sceptic, thatthere is

no fact as to whetherI meanplus or quus. But if this is to be conceded to the skeptic, is this not

the end of the matter?What can be said on behalf of our ordinaryattributionsof meaningful

languageto ourselves andto others? Has not the incredibleandself-defeating conclusion, that

all languageis meaningless, alreadybeen drawn?

The question that closes this passage refers, quite overtly, to RSC), and the

discussion that ensues affirms unequivocally that Wittgenstein does not

embrace t. In this quotation,RSC) is describedas 'incredibleand self-defeat-

ing,' and it is obvious, in the larger context, that this characterization s

meantto reflectWittgenstein'sattitude.In fact, it is natural o readKripkeas

saying that it is a chief objective of the skeptical solution to explain how

BSC) can be acceptedby Wittgensteinwhile RSC), the skeptical paradox, s

not.

The short explanationof this is: Kripke's Wittgensteinrejects CR). Or,

somewhatmore expansively, Kripke's Wittgensteinrepudiatesthe classical

realist conception of meaning-the conception, elaboratedabove, of whichCR) is meant to be the succinct summary.The point is very important.On

p. 85, Kripkewrites,

In this way the relationshipbetweenthe first andsecond portionsof the Investigationsis recip-

rocal. In order for Wittgenstein's skeptical solution of his paradox to be intelligible, the

'realistic' or 'representational'pictureof languagemust be underminedby anotherpicture (in

the firstpart).On the otherhand,the paradox developed in the second part, antecedentlyto its

solution, drives an important inal nail (perhaps he crucialone) into the coffin of the represen-

tationalpicture.

Now, what does Kripkemean when he tells us that the skeptical paradox

'drives a final nail into the coffin of the classically realist representational

picture?'It is my assumptionthat he means thatWittgensteinrejects classi-

cal realismbecause, perhapsalongwith otherreasons,Wittgensteinsupposes

that the skeptical argumentoffers him grounds for a definitive argument

108 GEORGEM.WILSON



againstthe classical realist viewpoint.But, how is this argument upposed to

run? Well, the skeptic accepts or is committedto the argument rom CR), G)

and BSC) to the conclusion RSC). But, Kripke's Wittgenstein, naturally

enough, sees RSC) as "incredible and self-defeating" and takes the

'contrapositive' argumentas a reductionf classical realism about meaning,

i.e., he endorses the soundness of the inference from -RSC), G), and BSC) to

the conclusion -CR). When Kripke says, as he does several times, that

Wittgensteinaccepts 'theskepticalargument'and endorses'theskepticalcon-

clusion', he means, on the readingI am suggesting,that his Wittgensteinfol-

lows along with his skeptic in his reasoning to BSC), and, for many, this

may well seem to be alreadya sufficiently 'radical'position. But, beyond this

point, the two figures divergein absolutely oppositedirections.

In fact, Kripke is pretty explicit that this is how his exegetical strategy

proceeds.For example, on p. 77, he notes, "Now if we supposethatfacts, or

truth conditions, are of the essence of meaningful assertion, it will follow

from the sceptical conclusion thatassertions hatanyone ever means anything

aremeaningless."And, he continues on pp. 78 and79,

The sceptical paradox s the fundamentalproblem of Philosophical Investigations. If Wittgen-

stein is right,we cannotbegin to solve it if we remainin the grip of the naturalpresupposition

that meaningfuldeclarativesentences must purport o correspond o facts [i.e., to have classi-

cally realist truthconditions]; if this is our framework,we can only conclude that sentences

attributing meaning and intentionare

themselves meaningless....The

pictureof

correspon-dence-to-factsmust be clearedaway before we begin with the sceptical problem.

Thus, the skeptic holds that 'all language has been shown to be meaning-

less;' Kripke's Wittgenstein hinks that the folly of classical realismhas been

revealed. This is why Kripke says, as a prolegomenon to the skeptical solu-

tion, thatWittgensteindenies, in a quiteglobal fashion,thatany sentence has

classically realist truthconditions. As I explained before, this sort of global

'anti-realism' is already implicatedin the acceptanceof BSC). At the same

time, it is classical realism (CR)) that ties sententialmeaningfulnessto the

having of realist truthconditions (as the classical realist conceives of these),

and it is thejob of the skepticalsolution to explain how the meaningfulness

of sentences (and, for that matter,terms) can be preservedafter the tie has

rightlybeensevered.

But, where, accordingto Kripke'sWittgenstein,is the tie to be broken?

AlthoughI do not have the space to explorethis fully, I will observe the fol-

lowing. It seems to me that Kripke'sWittgenstein agrees with the classicalrealist to this extent: if a set of mind and language independent properties

were to be establishedas the standard f correctness or a term'T', thenusers

of 'T' wouldhave to have some kindof pre-linguistic grasp'of properties-in-

the-world that allowed them to form the semantical intentionsthatpurport-

edly establish certainof the propertiesas the standard n question. He also

SEMANTICEALISM NDKRIPKE'SWITTGENSTEIN 09



agrees with the skepticthat we can make no sense of the idea that properties

can be pre-linguistically singledout' in this way nor of the standard-fixing e

re intentionsthat classical realisminvokes. The mistake of the classical real-

ist (and, therefore,of the radicalskeptic),according o Kripke'sWittgenstein,

occurs at the very outset. The meaningfulnessof a term and the fact about

what it means are not engenderedby the constitutively priorrecruitmentof

independentlyexisting propertiesto serve as standardsof correctnessfor a

term.

2. The First Objection

These considerationsare enough to allow us to return to McDowell's key

criticisms of Kripke'sreadingof Wittgenstein.As I noted at the beginning,

the first of these objections asserts that Kripkemakes nothing of the clear

indications in #201 thatWittgensteinmaintains hat the 'paradox'mentioned

in the first sentenceof the passagerestsupona 'misunderstanding' bout the

role of 'interpretation' n our following of (linguistic) rules. In his earlier

essay, "Wittgenstein on Following a Rule," McDowell claims, "But

Wittgenstein'spoint is thatthis [skeptical]dilemma seems compulsoryonly

on the assumption hatunderstandings always interpretation; is aim is.. .to

persuadeus to reject the dilemma by discardingthe assumptionon which it

depends.""Or, again,in his more recentpaper,McDowell assertsthat

We get a more radical divergence from Kripke, however, if we suppose that the thrust of

Wittgenstein'sreflectionsis to cast doubton the masterthesis: the thesis thatwhatever a person

has in her mind, it is only by virtue of being interpreted in one of possible ways that it can

impose a sorting of extra-mental tems into those that accord with it and those that do not. (M,

p. 45)

Thus, it is alleged thatKripkedoes not see that it is this 'master thesis' that

Wittgensteinprimarilyattacks.

However, if my outline of Kripke's exegetical strategy s accurate, hen it

is a mistake to believe that his strategydoes not incorporatean attack on a

thesis off this ilk. Naturally,we can not expect Kripke'sunderstanding f the

'master thesis' to be the same as McDowell's, and we will learn later how

they differ. But Kripke'sWittgensteindoes mount a comparableattack. As I

stressed before, Kripke's skeptic, qua classical realist, maintainsthat, if a

speakermeans something by a term,then she means what she does in virtue

of having a certainkind of intentionconcerningthe standardof correctness

that is to govern its application for her. The content of her intention is asemanticalrule for the use of the term,and sets of properties,consideredas

candidatesfor her intended standard,represent,as we may put it, possible

'interpretations' of the rule she follows. This special concept of an

'interpretation"s importantn the presentcontext. It is this concept, favored

1 McDowell, "Wittgensteinon Following a Rule,"p. 272.

110 GEORGEM. WILSON



by the classical realist, that is, I will urge, considered and repudiated n the

first two paragraphs f #201. I have alreadyargued hat Kripkedistinctly pre-

sents Wittgenstein as denying that meaning something involves

'interpretations' f this sort. Kripke'sWittgensteinagrees with the skeptic on

this point:the classical realistconception of what it is to mean something by

a term, requiringstandardconstituting 'interpretations,' s incoherent.That

conception, summarized n CR), leads to the skeptical paradoxregisteredin

RSC).

To fill this in a bit, let me sketch what I take to be a Kripkeanreading of

#201. I should note at the outset, however, that in what follows I will grant,

apparently n harmonywith Wittgensteinin this and neighboring passages,

thatmeaning something by a term is properlydescribableas an instance of

'following a rule.' He seems to treatthis much as a partof ourordinarycon-

ception of the matterand to allow that such a way of speakingis, in and of

itself, harmless enough. From his perspective,our troublesensue when the

assumption is added that the rule in question is to be construed along the

lines that classical realism suggests. Once that assumptionhas been illicitly

imported, then, as the opening paragraph f #201 explains, we areled to the

following conclusions.Even if all of the facts about a speakerare taken into

account, it is possible to assign an indefinite number of extensionally

incompatible 'interpretations' o her would-be semanticrule. (This is what

BSC) affirms.)Since no one of these varied'interpretations's favoredby thetotalityof relevant facts aboutthe speaker, t looks as if no courseof correct

applicationfor the term has been properlydetermined.12 Indeed, when any

12 Notice that, on this reading, Wittgenstein's argumentat this junctureis not an argument

that invokes a vicious regress of interpretations.He is not arguingthat no 'interpretation'

will assign 'content' to an interpretabletem because any such interpretationwill require,

to give it 'content,' a supplementary nterpretation.Rather, the present readingtakes the

argument to be, as Kripke often stresses, a kind of indeterminacy argument.No facts

about the speaker suffice to determine one classical realist 'interpretation,'out of an

indeterminatenumberof possible alternatives,as the one with which the speaker's puta-

tive intention is concerned. Confusion is easily engendered for the following reason.

When Kripke's skeptic argues that there are no facts that single out any particular

'interpretation,'he investigates, as special cases, some ostensible possibilities that do fail

on the basis of 'regress' considerations.For example, it may be a fact about a speaker

that she can provide, for herself or others,an explicitformulation of the 'interpretation'

she has in mind. However, this will institute a limited regress becausethe skeptic's prob-

lem will arise equally for the various terms used in her formulation.This observationthat

the centralargumentof #201 is not, for Kripke,an argument rom vicious regresswill be

importantwhen we later look at McDowell's specific understanding f Kripke's exegesis

of the passage.

On the other hand, in an unpublished paper, "Skepticism about Meaning: Indetermi-

nancy, Normativity, and the Rule-Following Paradox," Scott Soames argues that the

skeptical argumentequivocateson the notion that the facts about a speaker do or do not

determine a standardof correctness for her uses of terms. If "determine"here means

'yields as an a priori consequence', then the argument s sound, but its conclusion is rela-

SEMANTICREALISMAND KRIPKE'SWITTGENSTEIN 1 1



item whatsoever is taken as a possible subject of an ascription of the term,

there will be 'interpretations'of her rule in virtue of which the item is in

accord with her standard,and there will be alternative, equally feasible

'interpretations'with which the item is in conflict. So, in effect, since no

standardat all will have been established,there will be '...neither accord nor

conflict here."And, we can add, if the possibility of 'accord and conflict' is

never realized, then it seems that the very possibility of meaning evaporates

with it. (This is the claim of RSC)).

In the second paragraph f #201, Wittgensteinoffers his diagnosis of the

confusions that underlie these thoughts. We have been seduced into the

impressionthatthe correctnessor incorrectnessof the speaker's applications

of her term are completely indeterminate,but, this impressionis said to be

generatedby a crucial'misunderstanding.'hatmisunderstandings embodied

in ouracceptance

of theassumption

hat thespeaker's

rule is of such a char-

acter thatit demandsa suitable classical realist 'interpretation'o secure the

very possibility of accord andconflict. To rectify ourconceptionof what it is

to mean something by a term we should drop the hopeless notion that

'graspinga rule (for a term)' involves the assignmentof such an extension-

determining 'interpretation'of the rule in question, and, correlatively, we

should dropthe idea that the rule she follows is one that has the functionof

setting her standardof correctness into place. Thus, meaning something is

not a matter of 'interpretations' hatconstitute the (classical realist) condi-tions of satisfaction for our words and phrases. If we wish to avoid these

entanglements, Wittgensteinrecommends,".... we ought to restrict the term

'interpretation'o the substitutionof one expressionof the rule for another,"

i.e. to cases in which the former is offered as a paraphraseof the latter.

'Interpretations'n this sense do not even createthe illusion of establishing

meanings. They may explicate meanings, but they certainly don't create

them. (See the firstparagraph f #198.)

Finally, Wittgensteinalso says in #201 that we can free ourselves from

the mistakes of the classical realist if and when we learn to understand hat

"...thereis a way of graspinga rule ... which is exhibited in what we call

'obeying the rule' and 'going against it' in actual cases." It is this proposal

that the core of the 'skepticalsolution' is meant to elaborate.I have not and

will not discuss the details of this strandof the purported solution,' but here

is a reminderof theirgist. Very roughly, Kripke'sWittgensteincontends that

our actuallinguistic behaviorexhibits our 'graspof a rule' in this sense: ouruses of the term, and the circumstances in which these uses occur, are

employed by us to serve as the criteria that warrant or fail to warrant)our

everyday ascriptionsof following a rule for a term, .e., of meaningsuch-and-

tively weak. If "determine"means 'yields as a metaphysicallynecessary consequence',thenthe arguments simply unsound.I will nottryto assess this interestingdiagnosis.

112 GEORGEM. WILSON



such by it. Moreover, on this view, these criteria-these 'assertabilitycondi-

tions'-are regardedas fundamental nd primitivewithin the 'languagegame'

of ascriptions of meaning. Indeed, the very meaningfulness of meaning

ascriptions is substantially engendered by our criteria here. All of this is

developed at some lengthin chapter3 of Kripke's book, especially on pp. 86

to 109.

A great deal turns here upon distinguishing firmly between BSC) and

RSC) and keeping track of the places at which they figure in the overall

argument.Both McDowell and Colin McGinn"3eem to me to be seriously

confused on just this point. When Wittgenstein says, "This was our para-

dox," and goes on to state its import, they believe thatKripkeholds that he

is formulating 'the sceptical conclusion,' i.e., the conclusion that Kripke

thinks that both Wittgenstein and the skeptic accept. And then, of course,

Kripke has no plausible way of explaining why Wittgenstein goes on to say

that this conclusion is basedupona fundamentalmisunderstanding.However,

this all turnsupon the conflation indicatedabove. On Kripke's reading,as I

have set it out, the paradoxat the beginningof #201 involves a statementof

RSC), and Kripkenowheresuggests thatWittgenstein accepts that thesis. It

derives from thedeep misunderstanding ponwhich classicalrealism s based.

None of this shows that the reading of #201 that I have just described

renders Wittgenstein's thought accurately.I haven't even argued that it is

superior o the readingthat McDowell himselfprefers.But, I hope thatI havesaid enough to scotch the charge that Kripkedoes not offer any internally

coherent nterpretationf the crucialpassage.

3. The Second Objection

This bringsus to the othercentralthe objectionthatMcDowell raises against

a Kripkeanaccount of #201. Actually, I suspect that the two objections are

interconnected: he assumptions hat McDowell makes in puttingforward he

second criticism blind him to the chain of argumentationn Kripke's bookthatI have been developing.McDowell says,

On Kripke's account, Wittgensteinrescues the idea of understanding of meaning something]

by abandoningthe idea that someone's graspinga meaning is afact about her. According to

Kripke's Wittgenstein,as soon as we look for a fact about a personthat is what hergraspinga

meaning consists in, we are doomed to have any appearance hat what we pick might be the

right sort of fact ... crumblebefore our eyes underthe impactof the regressof interpretations.

So we should conclude thatthere can be no such fact. (M, p. 43)

After these remarks,McDowell observes that neither#201 (nor other pas-

sages in 'the rule-following section') seem to advocate this sort of escape

from 'the skeptical paradox.' So, on this score at least, Kripke must be

wrong. However, readersmay well have noticedthatmy outline of Kripke's

13 See Wittgenstein n Meaning, pp. 67-68.

SEMANTICREALISMAND KRIPKE'S WITTGENSTEIN 113



overall interpretation oes notportrayWittgensteinas responding o the skep-

tical paradox by denying thatmeaning somethingis a fact about the user of

the term. Or, at least, given the initial obscurityof the thesis, it is not obvi-

ous thatthis forms any partof thatresponse.What is going on here?

We shouldbegin by clearing awaytwo possible sources of confusion, two

mistaken grounds for thinking that Kripke's Wittgenstein must hold that

meaning somethingis not a fact. More carefully stated,I want to argue that

nothing in the Kripkeanaccount that I have been sketching presupposesor

implies that

NF) Thereare no facts abouta speaker n virtueof which ascriptionsof

meaning-even among those that are fully warranted by all our

usual criteria-are correct.

Call this thesis "non-factualismaboutmeaning ascriptions." n my opinion,it should not be included as partof the position that Kripke's Wittgenstein

defends.

First, Kripke's Wittgenstein, rejecting classical realism, affirmsthat no

sentences have classical realist truth conditions. That is, he denies, for any

sentence, that there is a possible fact or constellationof possible facts which

is associatedwith the sentencein virtue of the standardsof correctnessestab-

lished for the sub-sentential ermsandwhose realization s therebyrequired f

that sentence is to be true. This entails, of course, thatKripke's Wittgenstein

holds thatascriptions of meaning in particulardo not have classical realist

truth conditions. But it is doubtful that it follows from this, at least for

Kripke's Wittgenstein,thatmeaning ascriptionsare not properly thought of

as, in some sense, describing acts about anguageusers-that fully warranted

ascriptionsof meaningare not true in virtue of such facts. This would follow

if one were to buy into the classical realistconceptionof what it is for a sen-

tence to be fact describing,but there s no reason for Kripke'sWittgenstein odo so. For classical realism,the truthconditions of sentences thathave them

arejust the possible facts those sentences 'represent',as the classical realist

conceives of this. Therefore, having (classical realist) truth conditions and

purportingo describefacts aretakento be one andthe same. But again,there

is no reason for Kripke's Wittgensteinto lapse into the perspective of the

classical realist at thisjuncture,andthere is every reason for him to keep his

vision steady.Notice thatagreementon this point will have the consequence

that no sentences areused to describefacts, given thatKripkehas Wittgen-stein rejectingclassical realisttruthconditionsquite universally.Presumably,

using the resources of the 'skeptical solution', Kripke's Wittgenstein will

want to offer his own account of what uses of language can count as fact

describing. And, I can not see thatanythingin the 'skepticalsolution' fore-

closes thatoption for him.

114 GEORGEM. WILSON



Actually, it seems to be an important motif in Wittgenstein's later

thoughtthatquestionsof classical realism should be kept distinct from ques-

tions about whether sentences of a given class are or are not 'non-factual.'

Consider even the most minimal implications of what he says about a

'family resemblance'termlike "game."I take it that Wittgensteinmaintains

thatthere is no single propertyand no single set of properties hatgovern, by

semantic rule, the correct applicationof this word. Thus, "game"does not

have classical realist truth(or better:satisfaction) conditions. As a piece of

Wittgenstein interpretation, his is not very controversial.Nevertheless, it

does not seem to be a partof the 'familyresemblance'doctrinethat sentences

such as "This activity is a game" or "John s playing a game" etc. do not,

even when they have been 'rightly' employed, serve to (in some sense)

describe facts. On the contrary,the suggestion appearsto be that the two

sortsof questionmentionedabove should be prised apart.On the one hand, if,

in any given case, we correctlyassertthe sentence,"Thisactivityis a game,"

then there will be propertiesof the designatedactivity-there will be facts

aboutthatactivity-in virtue of which our assertion is correct. On the other

hand,neitherthese propertiesnorany others(neither his type of fact nor any

other)have been semanticallyestablishedas a generalstandardof correctness

for applicationsof the term. This allows, as we go from case to case, that the

facts about activities that support our calling them 'games' may vary

significantly.Whatjustifies us, then, in using the same word in each of thedifferentinstances?Nothing more andnothingless thanthe network of fam-

ily resemblancesthat exists among the varied sets of featuresthat form the

bases of our various 'correct'ascriptions.14conclude, therefore, hatthe fact

14 These remarksshould be connected with what Kripke has to say about Wittgenstein's

view that there are fundamentaluses of language in which the way we apply a term has

no independent 'justification' but, is not on that account used zu Unrecht, in the sense

employed in Investigations#289. See K, p. 74, fn. 63, andpp. 87-88. Thus, in actual lin-

guistic practice, we do, as a matter of course, describe or classify certain activities as

'games', and we do so, in each instance,on the basis of certainfacts about the activityin

question.What is more,we are not 'wrong' in so doing-such applicationsare not made

zu Unrecht. After all, despite the absence of independentjustification, there is overall

agreementwithin the linguistic community n describingthese activities as 'games' on the

bases of just those facts about them,andour apprehensionof the facts, as we make these

judgements, has not, by any normal standards,been distorted or otherwise defective.

Moreover, applying "game" n these ways in these cases does not conflict with-indeed,

it helps sustain-the language game 'role' of the word and its 'utility' in the language. So,

we can say that given activities areclassifiedby us as 'games' in virtue of certain salient

facts about them (which may differ from case to case), and the term is applied 'not

wrongly' in these instances. As Kripke explains, such ascriptions are not "...without

properepistemicor linguistic support,"and, as he adds, "... it is essential to the workings

of our language that, in some cases, such a use of language is perfectly proper." (K, p.

74, fn. 63) Kripke's Wittgenstein highlights such observations while denying that the

meaning of the term "game" involves a requirement,established antecedently to actual

applications,that tells us we are rightto call these activities "games"because they have

the propertiesupon which, in fact, our ascriptionsare based. It is a perspective of this

SEMANTICREALISMAND KRIPKE' WITTGENSTEIN 115



thatKripke's Wittgensteinaffirmsthatmeaningascriptionsdo not have clas-

sical realist truth conditions yields no reason to imagine, at least in this

exegetical context, that he is therebycommittedto 'non-factualism'concern-

ing them.

Second, it is true thatKripke's skeptic subscribesto a sort of non-factual-

ism about meaning ascriptions.He contends thateven fully warranted scrip-

tions of meaningdo not andcan not describe facts. But the skepticarrivesat

this result by way of his basic skeptical argumentbecause he has a back-

ground view aboutthe type offact thatwould have to be realizedif meaning

ascriptionswere to be true. Kripke's Wittgenstein, by contrast, agrees with

the skeptic thatthere can be no facts of the type the skeptichas in mind, but

he does not share the assumptionthat facts of that kind are conceptually

requiredfor the truthof meaning ascriptions.So, here once more, he has no

reason to infernon-factualism.

This point is of sufficient mportance hat it deservesexpandedexposition.

When, earlyin this essay, I describedthe conceptualbackground romwhich

the skeptic launches the basic skeptical argument,I mentioned one facet of

his perspective that is not capturedby the formulation n CR). The skeptic

does not simply hold CR); he thinks that it is a trivial conceptual truth.

According to his conception of the contents of statements of the form 'S

means such-and-such y 'T" (andvariants hereof), hey say that

S's use of 'T' standsin the meaning-relation o the properties ndicated

by 'such-and-such,'

where it is presupposed hat this meaning-relation ncorporates he condition

thatthe indicatedpropertiesconstitutethe standardof correctness or S's use

of 'T'. In the light of this 'analysis', the skeptic is preparedto reformulate

BSC) as

There are no facts about S that (constitutively) establish what S means

by 'T',

andthis, in turn,easily paraphrasesnto ourtargetnon-factualism.

However, since Kripke's Wittgenstein dismisses CR) altogether but

acknowledgesthatoureveryday ascriptionsof meaningare in order,he surely

also rejects the skeptic's conception of the content of meaning ascriptions.

Whatever alternativeparsinghe might propose,he thinksthatthe skeptic is

operatingwith a misbegotten idea of what we mean in using our ordinary

forms of words to ascribemeanings. Hence, he should not accept the 'non-

factualist'renderingof BSC). Kripke ays considerableemphasison thepoint

sort that leaves it open for the proponentof the skeptical solution to reject classical realist

truth conditions quite universally while affirming that there is a perfectly good sense in

which NF) is to be accepted.

116 GEORGEM. WILSON



that underlies this observation. He stresses that, since the skeptic and the

proponentof the skeptical conclusion disagree,almost from the outset, about

the semantical import of meaning ascriptions, t is difficult to find non-con-

troversial formulations of some key theses (such as BSC)) to which both

characters an unreservedlyadhere. See K, pp. 62-71) I am suggesting,more

narrowlybut in the same vein, that these difficulties encroachupon the dis-

cussion at just this crucialpoint. While the skeptic may adhereto non-factu-

alism aboutmeaning ascriptionsas a variantformulationof BSC), Kripke's

Wittgensteinwill not.'5

Some of the nuances that explain why the conceptual territory s tricky

here are nicely illustratedby anotherexample that Kripke introduces.I am

thinkingof his brief discussionof the early passages in the Investigationsin

which Wittgenstein comments on the notion that numerals 'stand for' or

'name' numbers.(K, pp. 75-77) Kripkeattends to several features of thesepassages, but I want to highlight only certain analogies that are especially

instructive n the presentcontext. To sharpen he intendedmorals,I will offer

my own elaborationof theexample.

So let us imagine a certaindebate between two philosophicalopponents,

Phineas and Dexter. Both of them assent to the form of words

i) The numeralsname(are namesof) the naturalnumbers.

This is something that we often say and think, and Phineas and Dexter are

prepared o acquiesce in this. Wherethey differ is over the content of these

words.Phineas believes thati) tells us that

15 But, doesn't Kripke quite explicitly assert that his Wittgenstein agrees to 'non-factual-

ism?' After all, Kripke states, "NeverthelessI choose to be so bold as to say: Wittgen-

stein holds with the sceptic that there in no fact as to whetherI mean plus or quus." (p.

70) It is important o keep in mind the state of play at this point in Kripke'sdialectic. He

has just been discussing the difficulties that are created by the situation characterized n

the text, i.e., that the skeptic andWittgensteindisagree, fromfirstto last, aboutthe content

of ascriptions of meaning. This ground-leveldisagreementmakes it difficult for them to

concur about the proper interpretationof various key philosophical theses in which

meaning ascriptionsare themselves implicated. In the course of this discussion, Kripke

several times voices his own doubts about 'skeptical' analyses of classes of philosophi-

cally contestedstatements,and he makes it plain that his doubts include the treatmentof

the content of meaning ascriptionsoffered by the skeptical solution. Now, I have been

pointing out thatBSC), when combined with a classical realistperspectiveon the content

of meaning ascriptions,does lead to non-factualism about meaning ascriptions and, the

skeptical solution (Kripke'sWittgenstein)avoids this consequence only because it rejects

this perspective. Thus, when Kripkemakes the statementquoted above, I take it that he is

affirminghis own belief, baseduponhis doubts about the feasibilityof the skepticalsolu-

tion's account of meaning ascriptions, that Wittgenstein's acceptance of BSC) does

commit him to the truthof non-factualism,no matterhow much he (Wittgenstein) might

("perhapscagily") wish to deny it. I take this expositionally unfortunateremark to be a

piece of commentaryby the narratorKripke)aboutwhat, in his opinion, Wittgenstein is

committed to by his argumentsand not an attempt o explicatethe content of the commit-

mentsthat his Wittgensteinwould explicitlyendorse.

SEMANTICREALISMAND KRIPKE'S WITFTGENSTEIN 117



ii) The numeralsfunction as proper names of entities called "natural

numbers,"

and, in assertingthis, he has a conception or a picture of the way in which

expressionsget establishedandused as propernames. Dexterthinks that this

is all a muddle. The form of wordsin i) to which he grantsassent is used, he

asserts,to registercertainfundamentalacts about the surface grammarof thenumeralsand, especially, facts abouttheir distinctive,non-proper-naming se

in language, i.e., theiruse in counting, in arithmeticcalculation, andin sen-

tences thatrecordthe resultsof these countingsand calculations. He charges

that Phineasmisconstruessentences like i) in terms of a primitivemodel of

'naming-in-general'and winds up with bogus metaphysicalproblemson his

plate.

Now, suppose that Dexter comes up with a Benacerraf-typeargument o

back up his position.16Surveying the arithmetic facts and facts about the

numerals'variouslinguistic roles, he arguesat lengththat

iii) There are no facts that (constitutively)establish any object as that

which bears the numeral n' as its name.

When Phineas is presentedwith Dexter's 'skeptical argument',then, given

his readingof i) as ii), he will reformulatehe new 'skepticalconclusion' as

iv) There are no facts that (constitutively)establish what the numeral

'n' names.

Moreover, if he continues to hew to his original semantical conception,

Phineas will probably infer that, althoughthe numeralsfunction as proper

names, they fail to name anythingat all-a new form of radicalskepticism

aboutthe languageof arithmetic.

On the other hand, if Dexter remains faithful to his alternative viewsabout the meaning of 'Numeral 'n' names the numberN,' he will refuse to

make the critical transitionfrom iii) to iv). Having his own impression of

whati) says, he does not equatethe contentsof i) andii). Indeed,it is a strik-

ing featureof the examplethat Dexterjudges thatiii) is true andiv) is simply

false. Dexter does continue to affirm that, e.g., the Roman numeral "III"

names the number3, andhe believes thatthere are facts about the Romans'

use of "III" hat establishthis as the case. After all, he explains, "III" s the

third numeral n the system of numeralsthat Romansused in counting,cal-culating, and so on. He opines that these and related facts make it the case

that"III"names the number3, and we can graspthis truth,he insists, when

16 Paul Benacerraf,"WhatNumbersCould Not Be," Philosophical Review LXXIV (1965):

47-73, reprinted n Philosophy of Mathematics:Selected Readings, ed. Paul Benacerraf

and Hilary Putnam Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1993), 272-94.

118 GEORGEM. WILSON



we have correctly understoodthe concept of 'naming a number.' In other

words,from his standpoint, t is false that

iv') There are no facts in virtue of which statements of the form

'Numeral'n' names the numberN', even when warrantedby all our

usualcriteria,arecorrect.

If Dexter's position is right, thenthe inference from iii) to either iv) or iv')

to 'non-factualism,'as it were, aboutthe numeralsused as names-is invalid.

In the setting of our original complex of problems, the skeptic is the

counterparthereof Phineas,and Kripke's Wittgensteinplays Dexter's role.

Thus, Kripke's Wittgensteinmaintains, n effect, that,if the meaningfulness

of S's term 'T' were to require hatS's use of 'T' standin the meaning-rela-

tion (as the skeptic conceives of this) to a particularset of properties, then

therecould not be any facts that would establishwhich propertiessatisfy therequirement. Nevertheless, he can be sanguine about this result since he

judges thatthe supposedrequirement rises from a confusedconceptionof the

contentof meaning ascriptions.Hence, he is not committed to the claim that

there are no facts in virtueof which it is true(when it is) that S means such-

and-suchby 'T'. Still, there is a pertinentdifference between the upshot of

the two cases. In the 'numeral' case, Dexter provides a positive gloss of

'Numeral'n' namesthe numberN' that makes it clearthat,for him, thereare

facts in virtue of which such statementsare true.However, when we inspect

the account that the skepticalsolutiongives of the content of meaning ascrip-

tions, it seems to me thatits implicationsfor the parallelissue are less clear.

We would probablyhave to go beyond what Kripke says about the specific

characterof the skepticalsolution to resolve the matter.Be this as it may, we

have seen the following: Kripke's Wittgenstein is entitled to remain alto-

gether agnosticaboutthecorrectnessof non-factualismaboutmeaning ascrip-

tions.

I have devoted a great deal of space to this last point because McDowell,

like most other commentators on Kripke's book, depicts the fundamental

strategyof 'the skepticalsolution' in a mannerI believe to be mistaken. He

reads Kripkeas contendingthatWittgenstein accepts some argumentwhose

conclusion is non-factualismaboutmeaning ascriptions.And then, from that

skeptical base, Wittgenstein s supposedto seek to avoid the apparentlydisas-

trous consequences of his conclusion by constructinga theory accordingto

which ascriptionsof meaningdo not even purportto state or describe facts.The positive theory of 'the skeptical solution', thus understood, tries to

explain how meaning ascriptionsare, in fact, meaningful,but the meanings

that the theory grantsthese sentences are, in Austin's terminology, entirely

non-constative.This depictionof Kripke's exegesis is the familiarone, but it

is all awry.

SEMANTICREALISMAND KRIPKE'SW1TTGENSTEIN 119



McDowell sees Kripke'sWittgensteinas sharingan argument or non-fac-

tualism with Kripke's skeptic, but, to be accurate about this, we should

notice that his is an argumentdifferent rom any thatwe have canvassed.Here

is a summarystatementby McDowell of the argumenthe imputes.

Kripke in effect assumes that the only way someone's understanding[meaning] something

could even seem to be a fact about her would be if one thoughther understanding her mean-

ing something] was a matterof her having something in mind. He finds in Wittgenstein an

argument,based on the presupposition, o show that a person's having something in mind can-

not constituteher understanding meaning]something, on pain of the regressof interpretations.

And he concludes in Wittgenstein's behalf that a person's understanding meaning] something

cannot be a fact abouther. Accordingto Kripke'sWittgenstein,we must stop conceiving attri-

butions of understanding meaning]as candidates or truth n a sense thatbrings into play facts

or states of affairsin which theirtruthwould consist. (M, p. 44)

Patching in some pieces merely mentioned in the quote, the argumentthat

McDowell is sketchingrunsas follows. If we ask what it is for my use of an

expression to have content, then the platitudinous irst answer is thatI have

somehow 'interpreted' he expression so that it has the content in question.

Soundandinscription ypes do not have contentsintrinsically.As McDowell

puts it, they just 'standthere'. And they acquiretheir contents only because

some speakeror speakersassign them an interpretation.Still, this patently

doesn't take us very far. We ask in turn,"What s it for me to 'interpret'an

expressionso thatit has content?"Surely, it is at least a necessaryconditionhere that I must somehow have the relevant content 'in mind.' But, this

apparently rivial conditionmay not be as innocent as it looks. Accordingto

McDowell, Kripke'sWittgensteinpresupposesthat any content graspedby

the mind is like the content of an expression,i.e., there has to be some vehi-

cle thatexpresses it. More fully, if there is to be a fact about me thatI have

some content 'in mind', then this fact must consist in my mind's containing

or having before it some item that expresses that content, an item, what is

more, that does not intrinsically bear any content at all. However, asMcDowell explains, this is where what he calls "theregress of interpreta-

tions" gets it start. If the content-bearing item in my mind does not,

'consideredin itself,' have content, then it too must have come to have its

contentbecauseI have alreadygiven it an interpretation.What now does my

interpreting his 'mental'item consist in? It too will need interpretationrom

me. With all the relevant premises in place, it appears that the chain of

needed 'interpretations'will neverend. Hence, in McDowell's version, Krip-

ke's Wittgensteinconcludes that there can be nofact aboutanyonethatthey

interpretexpressionsandthereby give themcontent, i.e., therecan be nofact

aboutthem thatthey meansomething by a term.

McDowell is right in finding this argumentquite implausible, and he is

rightthat no such argument s presentin the Investigations.But, for reasons

I have alreadyelaboratedat length, this is also not an argument hat Kripke

120 GEORGEM. WILSON



attributes o Wittgenstein. The readerwill rememberthat I earlier quoted a

proposition that McDowell calls "themaster thesis," a thesis he thinks that

Kripke wrongly has Wittgenstein endorsing and deploying in a skeptical

argument.To quoteonce more, that thesis says, .... whatever a person has in

her mind, it is only be virtue of being interpreted in one of possible ways

that it can impose a sorting of extra-mental tems into those that accord with

it and those that do not." As McDowell intends the 'master thesis' to beunderstood, t claims thatany state,event, or object thathas intensional con-

tent has the content that it does only becausea process of 'interpretation' as

assigned that content to it. In my opinion, no such general 'master thesis'

figures in the account that Kripke gives of Wittgenstein, and Kripke's

Wittgensteindoes not arrive at a 'non-factualismaboutmeaning ascriptions'

by this routeeither."7f my reconstructionof Kripke's 'dramaof skepticism'

is on the mark,then McDowell has misunderstoodboth the structureof the

skeptical argumentandthe contentof the skepticalconclusion that it reaches.

Non-factualism is not a componentof the modest semantic skepticism that

Kripkeattributes o Wittgenstein,andit is not a thesis to which the skeptical

solution offers a mitigating reply.

4. Conclusion

Thereare threebroad essons to be learned romthesereflections.

First lesson.If I am

right aboutthe

central topicsI have

broached,then

the question, "Does Kripke's exegesis, considered in detail, capture the

essence of Wittgenstein's houghtabout'rule-following?"'s badlyin need of

serious reassessment.I have focussed only on the possibility of a Kripkean

readingof Investigations#201, and anotheressay of at least the lengthof this

one would have to be writtento adjudicate he broaderquestion competently.

The critics, and they are many, who have judged that Kripke's account of

Wittgensteinis not 'a good fit' with the texts he scrutinizes have themselves

readKripke n a badlydistorted ashion. Severalof the elements of Kripke'sinterpretation hat may seem not to mesh with Wittgenstein's remarksfall

easily into place when the worst distortions have been eliminated. Since

Kripke's interpretation, s I have presented t, is subtle, powerful, and inter-

esting, we do well to take care to see how the variouspieces might fit, both

with one anotherandwithWittgenstein'sown words.

Second lesson. Let us stipulate that a philosopher is a 'realist' about

ascriptionsof meaningif she satisfies two conditions. She must hold that a)

meaning ascriptions,when true,are true in virtue of facts aboutthe speaker

or speakersin question, and b) the basis of her acceptanceof a) is not built

upon a deflationaryor minimalist account of truthor facts or both. The usual

17 In particular, he is wrong in thinking that, on Kripke's reading, the basic argument of

#201 is structuredby an appeal to a regress of interpretations. ee note 11 above.




way of being such a 'realist' is to be an advocateof classical realism about

meaning, but, if Wittgenstein's skeptical argument is sound, then this is

hopeless. What our recent discussion reveals is that there may be a different

form of 'semanticrealism,' a form thatmay turnout to be available to a pro-

ponent of the skepticalsolution.Naturally,a greatdeal of work would have

to be carriedout to decide if this option is genuinely coherent. One would

have to do a lot to clarify and solidify the two conditions adumbrated bove,

and one would have to fill in a host of details about what the skepticalsolu-

tion actually proposes andhow it is supposedto work. Still, even this dimly

glimpsed possibility is intriguing.'8Theremay be a position on the concep-

tualmapwhose environs have notbeen adequatelyexploredbecauseit lies at

some distancefrom the all-too-familiar rails that recentinvestigatorsof these

mattershave slogged andre-sloggedin fruitlessrepetition.

Third lesson. The seas of language run very high along these rugged

shores."9

18 But these issues are delicate. For example, notice that, while Dexter is a 'realist' in this

sense about statementsof the form 'Number'n' names the numberN,' he is not an onto-

logical realist about the numbers; t is essential to his position that he deniesthat there are

entities called "(natural)numbers."Correlatively, he holds that the fact that these state-

ments have the apparent ogical form of simple relationalpropositionsis deeply mislead-

ing. Their 'real' logical grammar s quite different from what it seems to be. I suspect

that this sort of trade-off between 'realisms' of differentstripesis characteristicof many

similar disputes. In particular,even our strong intuitions about the logical form of state-

ments within a given category may be underminedby our desire to preserve 'factualist'

realism about the statements at issue. For a broad survey of the complex issues that can

arise in this connection, see Mark Wilson, "Can We Trust Logical Form?", Journal of

Philosophy XCI (1994): 1-23.19 Versions of this paper were given at the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill),

Duke University,the Universityof Padua,and the SummerInstituteon Cognitive Science

at San Marino. I greatly appreciatethe help I received from all of these audiences. The

paperwas substantially mprovedas a result of discussions with Martin Stone and com-

ments from KentBach and John Heil, In particular,he evolution of the paperwas heav-

ily influenced by numerous conversations with RichardMoran and an extensive, incisive

commentary from Scott Soames. I am grateful for a 1994-95 Fellowship from the

National Humanities Center with financial support provided by the National Endowment

of the Humanities.Aid fromthese institutionsmadethe presentresearchpossible.

122 GEORGEM. WILSON

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Semantic Realism and Kripke's Wittgenstein-George M. Wilson

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