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Separate Opinion(Rep vs Sandigan

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SEPARATE OPINION PUNO, J.: While I concur in the result of the ponencia of Mr. Justice Carpio, the ruling on whether or not private respondent Dimaano could invoke her rights against unreasonable search and seizure and to the exclusion of evidence resulting therefrom compels this humble opinion. The ponencia states that (t)he correct issue is whether the Bill of Rights was operative during the interregnum from February 26, 1986 (the day Corazon C. Aquino took her oath as President) to March 24, 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution). [1] The majority holds that the Bill of Rights was not operative, thus private respondent Dimaano cannot invoke the right against unreasonable search and seizure and the exclusionary right as her house was searched and her properties were seized during the interregnum or on March 3, 1986. My disagreement is not with the ruling that the Bill of Rights was not operative at that time, but with the conclusion that the private respondent has lost and cannot invoke the right against unreasonable search and seizure and the exclusionary right. Using a different lens in viewing the problem at hand, I respectfully submit that the crucial issue for resolution is whether she can invoke these rights in the absence of a constitution under the extraordinary circumstances after the 1986 EDSA Revolution. The question boggles the intellect, and is interesting, to say the least, perhaps even to those not half- interested in the law. But the question of whether the Filipinos were bereft of fundamental rights during the one month interregnum is not as perplexing as the question of whether the world was without a God in the three days that God the Son descended into the dead before He rose to life. Nature abhors a vacuum and so does the law. I. Prologue
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SEPARATE OPINIONPUNO, J.:WhileI concur intheresult of the ponencia of Mr.JusticeCarpio, therulingonwhether or not private respondent Dimaano could invoke her rights againstunreasonable search and seizure and to the eclusion of evidence resulting therefromcompels this humble opinion. !he ponencia states that "t#he correct issue is whether the$illof %ights was operative during the interregnum from &ebruar' (), *+,) "the da'Corazon C. -.uino took her oath as /resident# to March (0, *+,) "immediatel' beforethe adoption of the &reedom Constitution#.1*2 !he ma3orit' holds that the $illof %ightswasnot operative, thusprivaterespondent Dimaanocannot invoketheright againstunreasonable search and seizure and the eclusionar' right as her house was searchedandher properties wereseizedduringtheinterregnumor onMarch4, *+,). M'disagreement is not with the ruling that the $ill of %ights was not operative at that time,but with the conclusion that the private respondent has lost and cannot invoke the rightagainst unreasonable search and seizure and the eclusionar' right. 5sing a differentlensinviewingtheproblemat hand, I respectfull'submit that thecrucial issueforresolution is whether she can invoke these rights in the absence of a constitution underthe etraordinar' circumstances after the *+,) 6D7- %evolution. !he .uestion bogglestheintellect, andisinteresting, tosa'theleast, perhapseventothosenot half8interested in the law. $ut the .uestion of whether the &ilipinos were bereft offundamental rightsduringtheonemonthinterregnumisnot asperpleingasthe.uestion of whether the world was without a 9od in the three da's that 9od the 7ondescended into the dead before :e rose to life. ;ature abhors a vacuum and so doesthe law.I. Prologue!he ponencia suggests that the Constitution, the $illof %ights in particular, is theonl' source of rights, hence in its absence, private respondent Dimaano cannot invokeher rights against unreasonable search and seizure and to the eclusion of evidenceobtained therefrom. /ushing the ponencias line of reasoning to the etreme will result inthe conclusion that during the one month interregnum, the people lost theirconstitutionall'guaranteedrightstolife, libert'andpropert'andtherevolutionar'government was not boundb'thestrictures of dueprocess of law. 6ven beforeappealing to histor' and philosoph', reason shouts otherwise.!he ponencia recognizedthe6D7-%evolutionas asuccessful revolution1(2 thatinstalled the -.uino government. !here is no right to revolt in the *+From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as an inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable. (H. Black, Handbook of American onstitutional !aw "", #th edition, $%&'( "t has been said that the locus of positive law)making power lies with the people of the state and from there is derived the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any e*isting form of government without regard to the e*isting constitution. (+olitical ,ights as +olitical -uestions, .he +arado* of !uther v. Borden, $// Harvard !aw ,eview $$&0, $$11 2$%3'4(214It is m' considered view that under this same natural law, private respondent Dimaanohas a right against unreasonable search and seizure and to eclude evidence obtainedasaconse.uenceof suchillegal act. !oeplainm'thesis, I will first la'downtherelevant law before appl'ing it to the facts of the case at bar. !racking down the elusivelawthat will governthecaseat barwill takeustothelab'rinthsof philosoph'andhistor'. !o be sure, the difficult' of the case at bar lies less in the application of the law,but more in finding the applicable law. I shalltake up the challenge even if the routetakes negotiating, but without trespassing, on political and religious thickets.II. Natural Law and Natural Rights-s earl' as the 9reek civilization, man has alluded to a higher, natural standard orlaw to which a state and its laws must conform. 7ophocles unmistakabl' articulates thisin his poignant literar' piece, Antigone. In this mid8fifth centur' -thenian traged', a civilwar divided two brothers, one died defending !hebes, and the other, /ol'neices, diedattacking it.!he king forbade /ol'neices burial, commanding instead that his bod' beleft tobedevouredb'beasts. $ut accordingto9reekreligiousideas, onl'aburial8even a token one with a handful of earth8 could give repose to his soul. Moved b' piet',/ol'neices sister, -ntigone, disobe'ed the command of the king and buried thebod'. 7hewasarrested. $rought beforethekingwhoasksher if sheknewof hiscommand and wh' she disobe'ed, -ntigone replies>. . ..hese laws were not ordained of 5eus,And she who sits enthroned with gods below,6ustice, enacted not these human laws.7or did " deem that thou, a mortal man,ouldst by a breath annul and override.he immutable unwritten laws of heaven..hey were not born today nor yesterday8.hey die not8 and none knoweth whence they sprang.2#4-ntigone was condemned to be buried alive for violating the order of the king.1=2-ristotlealsowrote in his Nicomachean Ethics> ?f political 3usticepart isnatural,part legal natural, that whichever'wherehasthesameforceanddoesnot eist b'peoples thinking this or that@ legal, that which is originall' indifferent, but when it hasbeen laid down is not indifferent, e.g. that a prisoners ransom shall be mina, or that agoat and not two sheep shall be sacrificed, and again all the laws that are passed forparticular cases, . . .1)2 -ristotle states that "p#articular law is that which each communit'la's down and applies to its own members> this is partl' written and partl'unwritten. 5niversal law is the law of ;ature. &or there reall' is, as ever' one to someetent divines, a natural 3ustice and in3ustice that is binding on all men, even on thosewho have no association or covenant with each other. It is this that 7ophocles -ntigoneclearl' means when she sa's that the burial of /ol'neices was a 3ust act in spite of theprohibition> she means that it was 3ust b' nature.1 in one wa', it can be in him that rules and measures@andinanotherwa',inthat whichisruledandmeasuredsinceathingisruledandmeasured in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure. !hus, since all things governedb' Divine /rovidence are regulated and measured b' the eternallaw, then allthingspartake of or participate to a certain etent in the eternal law@ the' receive from it certaininclinations towards their proper actions and ends. $eing rational, however, theparticipation of a human being in the Divine /rovidence, is most ecellent because heparticipatesinprovidenceitself, providingfor himself andothers. :eparticipatesineternal reason itself and through this, he possesses a natural inclination to right actionandright end. !hisparticipationof therational creatureintheeternal lawiscallednatural law. :ence, the psalmist sa's> !he light of !h' countenance, ? Aord, is signedupon us, thus impl'ing that the light of natural reason, b' which we discern what is goodand what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprinton us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else thanthe rational creatures participation in the eternal law.1((2 In a few words, the natural law isa rule of reason, promulgated b' 9od in mans nature, whereb' man can discern how heshould act.1(42!hroughnatural reason, weareabletodistinguishbetweenright andwrong@through free will, we are able to choose what is right. When we do so, we participatemore full' in the eternal law rather than being merel' led blindl' to our proper end.Weare able to choose that end and make our compliance with eternal law an act of self8direction. In this manner, the law becomes in us a rule and measure and no longer arule and measure imposed from an eternal source.1(02 !he .uestion that comes to thefore then is what is this end to which natural law directs rational creaturesC!he first self8evident principle of natural law is that good is to be pursued and done,and evil is to be avoided. -ll other precepts of the natural law are based upon this, sothat whatever the practical reason naturall' apprehends as mans good "or evil# belongsto the precept of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.1(=2 $ecause good isto be sought and evil avoided, and good is that which is in accord with the nature of agiven creature orthe performance of acreatures properfunction, thenthe important.uestion to answer is what is human nature or the proper function of man.!hose towhich man has a natural inclination are naturall' apprehended b' reason as good andmust thus be pursued, while their opposites are evil which must be avoided.1()2 -.uinasidentifies the basic inclinations of man as follows>$. .o seek the good, including his highest good, which is eternal happiness with :od.2&'4&. .o preserve himself in e*istence.1. .o preserve the species ) that is, to unite se*ually.#. .o live in community with other men.0. .o use his intellect and will ) that is, to know the truth and to make his own decision.2&34-s living creatures, we have an interest in self8preservation@ as animals, inprocreation@ and as rational creatures, in living in societ' and eercising our intellectualandspiritual capacitiesinthepursuit of knowledge.1(+2 9odput theseinclinationsinhuman nature to help man achieve his final end of eternal happiness. With anunderstanding of these inclinations in our human nature, we can determine b' practicalreason what is good for us and what is bad.14B2 In this sense, natural law is an ordinanceof reason.14*2 /roceeding fromthese inclinations, we can appl' the natural lawb'deduction, thus> good should be done@ this action is good@ this action should thereforebedone.14(2 Concretel', it isgoodfor humanstolivepeaceabl'withoneanother insociet', thus this dictates the prohibition of actions such as killing and stealing that harmsociet'.1442&romthepreceptsof natural law,humanreasonneedstoproceedtothemoreparticular determinations or specialized regulations to declare what is re.uired inparticular cases considering societ's specific circumstances. !hese particulardeterminations, arrived at b' human reason, are called human laws "-.uinas positivelaw#. !he' are necessar' to clarif' the demands of natural law. -.uinas identifies twowa's b'whichsomethingma'bederivedfromnatural law> first, likeinscience,demonstrated conclusions aredrawn fromprinciples@ and second, as inthe arts,general forms are particularized as to details like the craftsman determining the generalform of a house to a particular shape.1402 !hus, according to -.uinas, some things arederived from natural law b' wa' of conclusion "such as one must not kill ma' be derivedas a conclusion from the principle that one should do harm to no man# while some arederivedb'wa'of determination"suchasthelawof naturehasit that theevildoershould be punished, but that he be punished in this or that wa' is not directl' b' naturallawbut isaderiveddeterminationof it#.14=2 -.uinassa'sthat boththesemodesofderivation are foundin the human law. $ut those thingsderivedasa conclusion arecontained in human law not as emanating therefrom eclusivel', but having some forcealsofromthenatural law. $ut thosethingswhicharederivedinthesecondmannerhave no other force than that of human law.14)2&inall', there is divine law which is given b' 9od, i.e., the ?ld !estament and the;ew !estament. !his is necessar' to direct human life for four reasons. &irst, throughlaw, man is directed to proper actions towards his proper end. !his end, which is eternalhappinessandsalvation, isnot proportionatetohisnatural humanpower,makingitnecessar' for him to be directed not 3ust b' natural and human law but b' divinel' givenlaw. 7econdl', because of uncertaint' in human 3udgment, different people formdifferent 3udgments on human acts, resulting in different and even contrar' laws. 7o thatman ma' know for certain what he ought to do and avoid, it was necessar' for man tobe directed in his proper acts b' a 9od8given law for it is certain that such law cannoterr. !hirdl', human lawcan onl' 3udge the eternal actions of persons. :owever,perfection of virtue consists in man conducting himself right in both his eternal acts andin his interior motives. !he divine lawthus supervenes to see and 3udge bothdimensions. &ourthl',becausehumanlawcannot punishor forbidall evils, sinceinaiming to do awa' with allevils it would do awa' with man' good things and wouldhinder the advancement of the common good necessar' for human development, divinelawisneeded.14.he only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to ;oin and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in asecure en;oyment of their properties (used in the broad sense, referring to life, liberty and property( and a greater security against any, that are not of it.2004!his collective agreement then culminated in the establishment of a civil government.!hree important conse.uences of Aockes theor' on the origin of civilgovernmentand its significanceto the natural rights ofindividual sub3ects should be noted.&irst,since it was the precariousness of the individuals en3o'ment of his naturaland e.ualright to life, libert', and propert' that 3ustified the establishment of civil government, thenthecentral, overridingpurposeof civil government wastoprotect andpreservetheindividualsnatural rights. &or 3ust astheformationb'individualsof civil or politicalsociet' had arisen from their desire to unite for the mutual /reservation of their Aives,Aiberties and 6states, which I "Aocke# call b' the general name, /ropert',1=)2 so, too, didthe same motive underlie 8 in the second stage of the social contract 8 their collectivedecisiontoinstitutecivil government.1=.hat 04$ut, while Aockes theor' showed the necessit' of civil societ' and government, it wascarefulto assert and protectthe individualsrights against governmentinvasion, thusimpl'ingatheor'of limitedgovernment that bothrestrictedtheroleof thestatetoprotect the individuals fundamental natural rights to life, libert' and propert' andprohibited the state, on moral grounds, from violating those rights.1))2 !he natural rightstheor', which is the characteristic -merican interpretation of natural law, serves as thefoundation of the well8entrenched concept of limited government in the 5nited 7tates. Itprovides the theoretical basis of the formulation of limits on political authorit' vis88vis thesuperior right of the individual which the government should preserve.1).hat the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and sei?ures shall not be violated.

.hat no warrant shall issue e*cept upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be sei?ed.2&&&4!he above provisions were reproduced verbatim in the Jones Aaw of *+*).!hen came the *+4= Constitution which provides in -rticle IF, 7ection *"4#, viz>Aection $(1(. .he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and sei?ures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the ;udge after e*amination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be sei?ed.Initiall', theConstitutional Conventionscommitteeonbill of rightsproposedaneact cop' of the &ourth -mendment of the 5nited 7tates Constitution in their draft, viz>.he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei?ures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be sei?ed.2&&14During the debates of the Convention, however, Delegate Ficente &rancisco proposedtoamendtheprovisionb'insertingthephrasetobedeterminedb'the3udgeaftereaminationunder oathor affirmationof thecomplainant andthewitnesshema'produce in lieu of supported b' oath or affirmation. :is proposal was based on 7ection+,of 9eneral ?rder;o. =,ortheCodeof Criminal /roceduretheninforceinthe/hilippines which provided that> "t#he 3udge or 3ustice of the peace must, before issuingthe warrant, eamine on oath or affirmation the complainant and an' witness he ma'produce and take their deposition in writing.1((02 !he amendment was accepted as it wasa remed' against the evils pointed out in the debates, brought about b' the issuance ofwarrants, man'of whichwereinblank, uponmereaffidavitsonfactswhichweregenerall' found afterwards to be false.1((=2When the Convention patterned the *+4= Constitutions guarantee againstunreasonablesearchesandseizuresafter the&ourth-mendment, theConventionmadespecificreferencetothe ,o$d"ase andtracedthehistor'of theguaranteeagainst unreasonable search and seizure back to the issuance of general warrants andwritsof assistancein6nglandandthe -mericancolonies.1(()2 &romthe ,o$d"ase, itma' be derived that our own Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searchesand seizures, which is an almost eact cop' of the &ourth -mendment, seeks to protectrights to securit' of person and propert' as well as privac' in ones home andpossessions.-lmost 0B 'ears after the ratification of the *+4= Constitution, the provision on theright against unreasonable searches and seizures was amended in -rticle IF, 7ection 4of the *+Aec. 1. .he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and sei?ures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue e*cept upon probable cause to be determined by the ;udge, or such other responsible officer as may be authori?ed by law, after e*amination under oath or affirmation of thecomplainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be sei?ed.;oticeabl', therewerethreemodificationsof the*+4=counterpart, namel'> "*# theclause was made applicable to searches and seizures of whatever nature and for an'purpose@ "(# the provision on warrants was epressl' made applicable to both searchwarrant or warrant of arrest@ and "4# probable cause was made determinable not onl' b'a 3udge, but also b' such other officer as ma' be authorized b' law.1((>4( &hat is sought to be regarded is a mans prerogative to choose who is allowed entry in his residence, for him to retreat from the cares and pressures, even at times the oppressiveness of the outside world, where he can truly be himself with his family. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but li!ewise in the objects he wants around him. .here the state, however powerful, does not as such have access e*cept under the circumstances noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. (f. ooleyF 7ear in importance to e*emption from any arbitrary control of the person is that ma*im of the common law which secures to the citi?en immunity in his home against the prying eyes of the government, and protection in person, property, and papers against even the process of the law, e*cept in specified cases. .he ma*im that every mans house is his castle, is made part of our constitutional law in the clauses prohibiting unreasonable searches and sei?ures, and has always been looked upon as of high valueto the citi?en. ($ onstitutional !imitations, pp. >$/)>$$ 2$%&'4( "n the language of 6ustice !aurel, this provision is intended to bulwar! individual security, home, and legitimate possessions (,odrique? v. Eollamiel, >0 +hil. &1/, &1% ($%1'(. !aurel con.( .hus is protected his personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the 'tate. There is to be no invasion on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a mans home and the privacies of life. (Boyd v. Cnited Atates, $$> CA >$>, >1/ 2$33>4(2&104 (emphasis supplied(-searl'as*+B0, theCourt hasaffirmedthesanctit'andprivac'of thehomein United States v. Ar"eo,1(4)2 viz>.he inviolability of the home is one of the most fundamental of all the individual rights declared and recogni?ed in the political codes of civili?ed nations. 7o one can enter into the home of another without the consent of its owners or occupants.The privacy of the home ( the place of abode, the place where man with his family may dwell in peace and enjoy the companionship of his wife and children unmolested by anyone, even the !ing, ecept in rare cases ( has always been regarded by civili"ed nations as one of the most sacred personal rights to whom men are entitled. Both the common and the civil law guaranteed to man the right to absolute protection to the privacy of his home. .he king was powerful8 he was clothedwith ma;esty8 his will was the law, but, with few e*ceptions, the humblest citi?en or sub;ect might shut the door of his humble cottage in the face of the monarch and defend his intrusion into that privacy which was regarded as sacred as any of the kingly prerogatives. . .A mans house is his castle, has become a ma*im among the civili?ed peoples of the earth. His protection therein has become a matter of constitutional protection in @ngland, America, and Apain, as well as in other countries.

Ao ;ealously did the people of @ngland regard this right to en;oy, unmolested, the privacy of their houses, that they might even take the life of the unlawful intruder, if itbe nighttime. .his was also the sentiment of the ,omans e*pressed by .ullyF Quid enim sanctius quid omni religione munitius, quam domus uniuscu jusque civium. 2&1'4 (emphasis supplied(!he Court reiterated this in the *+** case of United States v. 'e Los Re$es, et al.,1(4,2 to demonstrate the uncompromising regard placed upon the privac' of the home thatcannot be violated b' unreasonable searches and seizures, viz>"n the case of +hil. >1' 2$%#>4(. The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons and correspondence.(.aada and arreon, +olitical !aw of the +hilippines, Eol. &, $1% 2$%>&4(. The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and sei"ures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a mans soul than the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable can only be for the best causes and reasons.2#4 (emphasis supplied(6ven if it were conceded that privac' and not propert' is the focus of the guaranteeasshownb'thegrowing -merican3urisprudence,this Courthasupheldtherighttoprivac' and its central place in a limited government such as the /hilippines, viz>.he right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identificationwith liberty8 in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. .he language of+rof. @merson is particularly aptF The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citi"en. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions betweenabsolute and limited government. Cltimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. *rotection of this private sector ( protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual( has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of technological age ) industriali?ation,urbani?ation, and organi?ation ) operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion to it. "n modern times, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society.2 (emphasis supplied(!heright toprivac'discussedinJusticeDouglasdissent inthe +a$den"ase isilluminating. We .uote it at length, viz>6udge !earned Hand stated a part of the philosophy of the Fourth Amendment in Cnited Atates v. +oller, #1 F&d %$$, %$#F 2"4t is only fair to observe that the real evil aimed at by the )ourth +mendment is the search itself, that invasion of a mans privacy which consists in rummaging about among his effects to secure evidence against him. "f the search is permitted at all, perhaps it does not make so much difference what is taken away, since the officers will ordinarily not be interested in what does not incriminate, and there can be no sound policy in protecting what does.* * * * * * * * *.he constitutional philosophy is, " think, clear. The personal effects and possessions of the individual ,all contraband and the li!e ecepted- are sacrosanct from prying eyes, from the long arm of the law, from any rummaging by police. *rivacy involves the choice of the individual to disclose or to reveal what he believes, what he thin!s, what he possesses. .he article may be nondescript workof art, a manuscript of a book, a personal account book, a diary, invoices, personal clothing, ;ewelry, or whatnot. Those who wrote the .ill of Rights believed that every individual needs both to communicate with others and to !eep his affairs tohimself. That dual aspect of privacy means that the individual should have the freedom to select for himself the time and circumstances when he will share his secrets with others and decide the etent of the sharing ,footnote omitted-. This ishis prerogative not the 'tates. .he Framers, who were as knowledgeable as we, knew what police surveillance meant and how the practice of rummaging through ones personal effects could destroy freedom.* * * * * * * * *I would . . . leave with the individual the choice of opening his private effects ,apart from contraband and the li!e- to the police and !eeping their contents as secret and their integrity inviolate. The eistence of that choice is the very essence of the right of privacy.2>4 (emphasis supplied(!hus, in 2riswold v. !onne"ti"ut,1(0# CA at &$'(* * * * * * * * *.he ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the Atate tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. (f. ! ed &d post, p. $$&'( Having once recogni?ed that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceableagainst the Atates, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right toremain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by its Bue +rocess lause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. /ur decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice.2&0>4 (emphasis supplied(It is said that the eclusionar' rule has three purposes. !he ma3or and most ofteninvoked is the deterrence of unreasonable searches and seizures as stated in El(ins v.United States1(= "t#he rule is calculated to prevent, not repair. Itspurpose is to deter to compelrespect for constitutionalguarant' in the onl' effectiveavailable wa' b' removing the incentive to disregard it.1(=,2 7econd is the imperative of3udicial integrit', i.e., that the courts do not become accomplices in the willfuldisobedience of a Constitution the' are sworn to uphold . . . b' permitting unhinderedgovernmentaluse of the fruits of such invasions. . . - ruling admitting evidence in acriminal trial . . . has the necessar' effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced theevidence, whileanapplicationof theeclusionar'rulewithholdstheconstitutionalimprimatur.1(=+2 !hird is the more recent purpose pronounced b' some members of the5nited 7tates 7upreme Court which is that of assuring the people all potential victims ofunlawful government conduct that thegovernment wouldnot profit fromitslawlessbehavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriousl' undermining popular trust in government.1()B2 !hefocusof concernhereisnot thepolicebut thepublic. !histhirdpurposeisimplicit inthe &a declarationthat nomanistobeconvictedonunconstitutionalevidence.1()*2In/hilippine3urisdiction, theCourt haslikewiseswungfromonepositiontotheother on the eclusionar' rule. In the *+(B case of U$ .he$tin v. 1illareal,1()(2 the Courtciting,o$d, ruled that seizure or compulsor' production of a mans private papers to beused against him was tantamount to self8incrimination and was therefore unreasonablesearchandseizure. !hiswas aproscriptionagainst fishingepeditions. !heCourtrestrainedtheprosecutionfromusingthebooksasevidence. &ive'earslater or in*+(=, we held in Peole v. !arlos1()42 that although the ,o$d and Silverthorne Lum%er!o. andSilverthornev.UnitedStates1()02 "ases areauthoritiesfor thedoctrinethatdocuments obtainedb'illegal searcheswereinadmissibleinevidenceincriminalcases, 4ee(s modifiedthisdoctrineb'addingthat theillegalit'of thesearchandseizure should have initiall' been directl' litigated and established b' a pre8trial motionfor the return of the things seized. -s this condition was not met, the illegalit' of theseizure was not deemed an obstacle to admissibilit'.!he sub3ect evidence wasnevertheless ecluded, however, for being hearsa'. !hereafter, in *+4(, the Court didnot uphold the defense of self8incrimination when fraudulent books, invoices andrecords that had been seized were presented in evidence in Peole v. Ru%io.1()=2 !heCourt gave three reasons> "*# the public has an interest in the proper regulation of thepart's books@ "(# the books belonged to a corporation of which the part' was merel' amanager@ and"4# thewarrants werenot issuedtofishfor evidencebut toseizeinstruments used in the violation of 1internalrevenue2 laws and to further prevent theperpetration of fraud.1())2!he eclusionar' rule applied in U$ .he$tin was reaffirmed seventeen 'earsthenceinthe*+4


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