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EMOTIONS IN ORGANIZATIONS:

A MULTI-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE

Neal M. Ashkanasy

ABSTRACT

Recent years have seen an upsurge of interest in the study of emotions in

organizations. Research, however, has been hampered by the ephemeral

nature of emotions and a lack of an integrated multi-level model. This

article therefore presents a five-level model of emotions in organizations.

At the lowest level is within-person variation, defined in terms of affective

events theory. Levels of the model then proceed through individual, dyadic

relationship, group, and organization-wide perspectives. The article alsooutlines the neurophysiological processes that underlie the experience,

perception, and communication of emotion; it concludes with a discussion

of implications for research and practice.

INTRODUCTION

Although the study of emotions in work settings is not new (see Mastenbroek,

2000; Weiss & Brief, 2001, for historical overviews), empirical research in this

field has been slow to enter the mainstream of organization science. This situation

began to change, however, following publication in 1983 of Hochschilds The

Managed Heart, and accelerated in 1995 following Ashforth and Humphreys

(1995)Reappraisal. Today the level of interest is at a high point, as evidenced in

the raft of books (Ashkanasy, Hartel & Zerbe, 2000; Ashkanasy, Zerbe & Hartel,

Multi-Level Issues in Organizational Behavior and Strategy

Research in Multi-Level Issues, Volume 2, 954

Copyright 2003 by Elsevier Science Ltd.

All rights of reproduction in any form reserved

ISSN: 1475-9144/doi:10.1016/S1475-9144(03)02002-2

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10 NEAL M. ASHKANASY

2002;Fineman, 1993, 2000;Lord, Klimoski & Kanfer, 2002;Payne & Cooper,

2001) and special issues of journals (Fisher & Ashkanasy, 2000; Fox, 2002; Weiss,2001) that have appeared over the last two years. Simultaneously, there has been a

rise in interest in studying emotions in social psychology (see, for example, Forgas,

2001), much of this buoyed by advances in our understanding of neuropsychology

(see, for example, Damasio, 1999; Dolan, 2000; LeDoux, 2000). Although this

research is still in development, it is becoming clear that emotion dimensions

pervade the entire spectrum of human behavior and interaction, including orga-

nizations.Mumby and Putnam (1992)characterized this as a shift in perspective

from bounded rationality (cf. Simon, 1976) to bounded emotionality (see

also Martin, Knopoff & Beckman, 2000). In particular, recent advances in

emotional research have spanned all levels of organizational analysis. This article,

therefore, presents a multi-level theory of emotions in organizations, extending

across five levels, from the within-person level to the idea of emotional climate

and culture in organizations.

One of the reasons that organization science has been so belated in researching

emotions is because of the inherently ephemeral and idiosyncratic nature of

emotion. How is it possible to study systematically a concept that can vary

so widely and unpredictably within each of us? One moment we are sad, the

next elated. One moment we can be fearful, the next triumphant. Not only that,

but emotions appear to be manipulable. As Hochschild (1983) so poignantly

illustrated, people can even be paid to display emotions different from the one

they are actually experiencing (see also Fineman, 2001). In this article, I argue that

this is exactly what makes the study of emotions so vital and interesting. Recent

advances in research methodology, such as the experience sampling method

(ESM; seeCsikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987; Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983),

have allowed us to study systematically these dynamic phenomena. Consequently,

I present in this article a five-level model of emotions in organizations. The

first level in this model, however, is not the ubiquitous individual level, but

within-person, and involves the temporal variations in mood and emotion thatpeople experience every day of their lives. The remaining levels in the model

proceed through the individual level, to interpersonal relationships, to groups,

and then to organizations. The five levels are illustrated in Fig. 1, showing

the topics salient at each level.

Although this article presents a multi-level model that spans micro and macro

dimensions of organizational behavior, emotions are intensely personal. As a con-

sequence, much discussion is devoted to the micro-level nature of emotions how

individuals experience, perceive, communicate, and manage their own and others

emotions. In this respect, after first defining emotion, I proceed to a description ofsome of the recent findings on the biological bases of emotions. This establishes

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Emotions in Organizations 11

Fig. 1. Five Levels of Emotions in Organizations.

a foundation for discussion of emotion at each level of the model, including the

means of researching this topic. I conclude the article with a discussion of the

implications of emotions at multiple levels for research and practice.

DEFINING EMOTIONS

One of the most frustrating issues confronting writers and readers in the emotion

literature is the diversity of definitions and overlapping terms (see Oatley &

Jenkins, 1992). Terms such as emotion, mood, affect, and feelings appear to be

used almost interchangeably by some authors. Indeed, there is ongoing debate in

the literature about the very underpinnings of emotions and related terms (see, forexample, Eisenberg, 2000; Izard, 1993; Lazarus, 1991; Plutchik, 1991; Zajonc,

1980, 1984, 1985). For example, whileLazarus (1991)argued that emotions are

initiated by cognitions, contemporaneouslyZajonc (1985)argued that emotions

are essentially visceral reactions and therefore constitute antecedents, rather than

consequences of cognition. Since the 1980s, however, the consensus has emerged

that emotions involve an interaction of cognitive and non-cognitive neural systems

(seeBloom, Lazerson & Hofstadter, 1985;Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999;Dalton,

2000;Fischer, Shaver & Carnochan, 1990).In this respect, emotion is seen as an

integration of innate, adaptive subsystems, derived from the evolutionary needsof survival (LeDoux, 1995a;Tooby & Cosmides, 1990).

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Table 1. Simplified Emotional Hierarchy (Adapted fromFischer et al., 1990).

Super-ordinate Component Basic Component Subordinate Component

Positive Love Fondness

Infatuation

Joy Bliss

Contentment

Pride

Negative Anger Annoyance

Hostility

Contempt

Jealousy

Sadness Agony

Grief

Guilt

Loneliness

Fear Horror

Worry

The interactive model would therefore seem to provide an appropriate platform

for a definition of emotion. Working from this model,Izard (1993)cited a taxon-

omy developed byFischer, Shaver and Carnochan (1990)as the basis for defining

emotion (seeGray & Watson, 2001for a similar taxonomy). Fischer et al. define

emotion as a discrete, innate, functional, biosocial action and expression system

(p. 84), and posit that emotions are determined by three distinct categorical

components (seeTable 1). The first, called the superordinate category, involves

a functional appraisal of events as either advancing or hindering the organisms

explicit or implicit goals. The second component, referred to by Fischer et al. as

thebasiclevel, categorizes emotion under five broad labels: love and joy are cate-

gorized under the superordinate heading of positive emotion (goal advancement),

while anger, sadness, and fear are under the superordinate heading of negativeemotion (goal hindrance). The third level defines thesubordinatecategory, which

Fischer et al. describe as manifest in prototypical scripts. These scripts comprise

sets of predetermined behavioral responses used to express emotions in particular

circumstances. Fischer et al. note that there are a great number of scripts, and

that these develop over a lifetime of experience and social learning. For example,

open expression of joy may be appropriate in celebratory circumstances, but may

be circumscribed in other situations (e.g. learning of an inheritance following the

death of a family member).

In the organizational context, Basch and Fisher (2000) have demonstratedthat, with only a few exceptions, employees experience nearly the full range of

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suppressed reactivity to pain. The resulting improvements in the effectiveness of

the motor system help to reduce physical damage to the organism.Summatively, and based on the neurophysiological evidence, Ashkanasy,

Hartel and Zerbe (2000)defined emotions in terms of endogenous and exogenous

inputs to particular neural systems, leading to internal and external manifestations

of emotion. The internal manifestations of emotion include the subjective feelings

experienced by the individual subject to the emotion-eliciting stimulus, which the

individual cognitively interprets. The external manifestations of emotion include

respiration rate, facial expression, and posture. Importantly, it is the external

manifestations of emotion that are subject to interpretation both by the individual

affected and by observers in the environment.

As the reader can see, the foregoing attempts to define emotion have led

inevitably into the murky interior of the human brain. Indeed, understanding of

emotions requires an appreciation of the neural processes that drive emotional

reactions.

Neurological and Biological Bases of Emotions

What makes emotions unique is that they are only partially under our control.

Indeed, I suspect that this property is what has made the study of emotions

such an anathema to organizational scholars. Simon (1976) went so far as

to refer to emotions pejoratively as irrational or even arational behavior, and

suggested that attempts to study emotions using the usual approaches are

inherently problematical. At the same time, the new emotions-cognition research

has shown that it is erroneous to try to study any aspect of human thought or

behavior without addressing the emotions. Damasio (1994) referred to this as

Descartes error. He argues that our cognitive and emotional systems in the

brain work more closely together than had been realized previously, and that

reasoning is dependent on what he terms somantic markers in the physicalbody.

The critical connection point of the physiological and neurological systems re-

sides in the limbic system in the brain. Damasio (1998) points out that this is what

drives our emotional responses. The principal components of the limbic system

comprise the (anterior) cingulate cortex, the amigdaloid nuclei (which comprise

two amygdalae), and the hypothalamus. Damasio (1998; see also Dalton, 2000)

has shown that, rather than the limbic system acting in an integrated fashion as

was once thought (seeMacLean, 1952),the different limbic components actually

act independently in respect to each emotion. Moreover, recent research hassuggested that the limbic system is not the only mechanism of emotion, although it

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does account for many of the basic emotional pathways in the brain (see Damasio,

1998). In this account, the emotion systems of the brain comprise a complexsystem of neural pathways connected to nuclei distributed throughout the human

brain. There is little wonder, then, that the nature and sources of emotions are

still mostly undiscovered.

Largely through the work of Joseph LeDoux (Armony & LeDoux, 2000;

LeDoux, 1995a, b, 1996, 1998, 2000), we now have a good deal of understanding

about one emotion, however: fear. LeDoux (1995a)argues that fear is the most

fundamental of emotions from an evolutionary perspective, because fear is the

basic mechanism of self-preservation for every species. Further, because fear is

so crucial for survival,LeDoux (1995a)argues that it provides the most incisive

insights into the emotional brain. Fear is also an emotion that can operate both

internally or externally to our sensory systems. Thus, fear can result from a

perception of something in the environment that represents danger. Alternatively,

our own memories and experiences can teach us to be fearful of or anxious about an

as-yet-unseen danger. LeDoux showed that the amygdalae are the central proces-

sors of the fear system.LeDoux (1995a)describes how the emotional significance

of external and internal stimuli is processed in the brain between the neocortex,

the amygdala, and the limbic system. Figure 2 illustrates the four basic neural

pathways. Pathways 2, 3, and 4 involve cortical processing and memory prior to

activation of the amygdala. Pathway 1, however, provides direct links between

the thalamus and the amygdala and between the amygdala and the perceptive

cortices. It is this link that represents LeDouxs major discovery that some neural

pathways actually bypass neocortical processing. In addition, LeDoux found that

connections between the amygdala and the cortex are reciprocal, although the two

amygdalae send out many more connections to the cortex than they receive back.

This explains why it is so difficult for fear to be unlearned through cortical input,

and why it is so much more difficult for us to control our fear reactions than it is

for fear to take control of our cognitive functions (see Armony & LeDoux, 2000;

LeDoux, 1995a, b).The centrality of the amygdalae has been further underlined by McEwan

(1995), who points out that they also connect to the part of the brain controlling

autonomic, respiratory, cardiovascular, facial, and neuro-endocrinal responses.

For example, the amygdalae influence hypothalamal-pituitary-adrenal activity

through projections to the paraventricular nucleus and the bed nucleus of the stria

terminalis, itself implicated in anxiety (Davis & Lee, 1998).Thus, the amygdalae

are implicated in the adrenal steroid stress response and hypothalamic control

of the autonomic system generally. Another function, the freezing response, a

tendency to freeze with fear, is controlled through amygdalic projections to thecentral gray (LeDoux, 1995a, 2000; McEwan, 1995).

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Fig. 2

Fear Circuits in the Brain. Note:Neural circuits involved in fear. Four pathways are iden-

tified. Abbreviations: LEM (lemniscual nuclei), EX (extralemniscal areas), LH (lateral

hypothalamus), RVL (rostral ventral lateral medulla), BNST (bed nucleus of the stria

terminalis), PVN (paraventricular hypothalmus). Source: LeDoux (1995a).With permis-

sion, from the Annual Review of Psychology, Volume 46 1995 by Annual Reviews

www.annualreviews.org

Evidence for the neural basis of emotions other than fear and anger is not as

forthcoming, however. Damasio (1998) points out, for example, that the amygdalae

are definitely not involved in all emotions. Positive emotions and the negative

emotion of disgust are processed in pathways that do not link to the amygdalae at

all. The bed nucleus of the stria terminalis is associated with anxiety and has similar

output paths to the amygdala (Davis & Lee, 1998). Recently, Tomarken and Keener

(1998)andGotlib, Ranganath and Rosenfeld (1998)have provided evidence that

left frontal hypoactivity, as measured by EEG, is linked to depression, a mooddisorder, and to emotion and the amygdalic function (Drevets & Raichle, 1995).

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The foregoing discussion of the role of the amygdala and its association with

the primitive emotion of fear illustrates another important point: Our emotions arenot always under control. As noted earlier, the neural circuits that are influenced

by the amygdala control our cardiovascular, respiratory, autonomic, facial, and

endocrine responses. The important point here is that these responses are initiated

preconsciously and have internally knowable and externally visible visceral

outcomes. Further, since fear, as a primary emotion, is also involved in secondary

emotions such as apprehension, it is also likely that some of our secondary

emotional responses occur publicly and prior to conscious control.

Finally, I reiterate that the primacy of the fear emotion is not misplaced. Indeed,

in organizational settings, fear appears to be an important motivator. LeDoux

(1996, 1998) notes, for example, that there is strong biological evidence of a

specific mono-polar reaction to fear. Further, writers such asFlam (1993),Funlop

and Rivkin (1997),andMirvis and Sales (1990)have noted the central role that

fear plays in organizational settings. In particular, fear can be conceptualized as

a positive force in the context of Lewins field theory (see alsoCartwright, 1976;

Funlop & Rivkin, 1997);it shocks actors to shift cognitive gears from automatic

(or culturally ingrained) to conscious (or malleable) processes via what Schein

(1979) calls the process of disconfirmation. In this instance, LeDouxs focus on

fear clearly has implications in the wider organizational setting, an idea I shall

develop later in this article.

Although not as advanced as our knowledge of negative emotions such as fear

and anger, there is nevertheless evidence that positive emotions are similarly

based on deeply seated neuropsychological mechanisms. Alice Isen has long

championed the idea that mild positive affect is associated with creative decision

making (Isen, 1993, 1999), including that in organizational settings (Isen &

Baron, 1991). More recently, Isen and her colleagues (seeAshby, Isen & Turken,

1999) have argued that this process is mediated by the neurotransmitter dopamine.

In their theory, dopamine levels in the brain are increased as a result of positive

emotions, and the presence of this neurotransmitter in the anterior cingulatecortex is responsible for more creative and flexible cognitions. Although yet to

be specifically tested, the dopamine theory presented by Ashby and colleagues is

convincingly argued and suggests that, like negative emotions, positive emotions

are mediated by deeply seated neuropsychological processes, largely beyond

our conscious control.

I have provided a brief overview of the biological basis of emotions. In particular,

recent and ongoing research by neurobiologists such as Damasio and LeDoux, and

especially the latest imaging research (e.g. see Dolan, 2000), is doing much to clear

away the mystery surrounding human emotional responses. Although there is stilla long way to go before we have full understanding of these processes, we know

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enough now to tell us that the emotion-generating parts of the brain can no longer

be ignored by researchers of human behavior in organizational settings or, forthat matter, any other setting. The neural pathways associated with emotion are

complex and have a profound effect on a wide range of human behavior. It is

these emotional responses that provide the foundation for the next part of this

article: discussion of emotions as a within-person phenomenon, the first level of

the multi-level model.

EMOTIONS AT LEVEL 1: WITHIN-PERSON

As argued earlier, what makes emotion a unique and challenging variable in

organizational behavior is its dynamic nature. Unlike many of the variables that

have traditionally been studied in organizational behavior, such as personality,

attitudes, and beliefs, emotions and affective states change rapidly from day

to day, and even from moment to moment. This has introduced a heretofore

under-represented level in organizational behavior the within-person, or

temporal, level. Analysis at this level presents all the usual challenges of multi-

level analysis, especially in how to combine data at different levels of analysis

(seeFisher, 2000a).

I deal with two aspects of within-person emotion in organizational settings.

The first is based on affective events theory, or AET (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996),

which holds that emotional states at work are determined by the occurrence

of discrete work events, especially the everyday hassles and uplifts that we

all experience in our working lives. These events generate specific emotional

reactions that are hypothesized to influence behavior and attitudes. The second

area concerns the role of mood in workplace settings. Unlike the direct cause-

and-effect nature of AET, mood is a more diffuse state and is likely to change

more slowly. Nonetheless, as a form of affective state, mood is still ephemeral

and changing.

Affective Events Theory

AET was derived initially from the realization that job satisfaction is not really

an affective state, but rather a set of job-related attitudes (see Fisher, 2000b;

Weiss, 2002). Although Organ and Near (1985) addressed this point over 15

years ago, Fisher and Weiss make the point that most modern characterizations

of job satisfaction continue incorrectly to equate job satisfaction with affect.They argue that job satisfaction and affect, although related, are conceptually and

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operationally distinct constructs, and should be treated as such in organizational

behavior theory (see alsoWright & Staw, 1999).Consistent with the case I have made earlier concerning the biological bases

of emotion, AET is predicated on the proposition that employees behavior and

performance at work are not so much determined by attitudes and personality, but

rather by moment-by-moment variations in the way they feel at work (see Fisher,

2000b;Weiss, Nicholas & Daus, 1999). Weiss and Cropanzano (1996)argue in

particular that events and conditions in the workplace environment constitute

affective events, and that it is these events that ultimately determine moods and

emotions. Such emotions and moods can lead to the formation of more long-term

attitudes, reflected in low job satisfaction and low affective commitment, or even

a propensity to leave the organization. Conversely, accumulation of positive affect

can lead to positive attitudes, including job satisfaction, and productive work (see

Wright, Bonnett & Sweeney, 1993;Wright & Cropanzano, 1998). The seminal

contribution of AET is that, for the first time in the OB literature, an attempt

has been made to tackle the ongoing, temporally varying processes that underlie

behavior in organizations.

AET is still under development, but it is the first true multi-level model of

emotions in organizations. At the between-person level (and as I discuss later),

personal dispositional variables such as trait affectivity (Watson & Tellegen, 1985)

affect the formation of positive and negative emotions. At the organizational level,

the model in its present configuration (viz., Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) takes

into account aspects of the work environment, including job characteristics, role

stressors, and requirements for emotional labor (discussed later in this article).

Research into AET is progressing but has yet to be published extensively in

the peer-reviewed literature, although results that are emerging to date (e.g. see

Fisher, 2000b;OShea, Ashkanasy, Gallois & Hartel, 1999, 2000a, b;Weiss et al.,

1999) are encouraging. Results of these studies have supported the central tenet

of AET: that emotional reactions to events at work mediate subsequent attitudinal

and behavioral responses to the events.One aspect of ongoing controversy, however, concerns the conceptual nature

of emotions in social settings and is salient to AET.Basch and Fisher (2000), for

example, present emotions as discrete states including, for example, joy, pride,

fear, anger, and disgust. Others, such as Russell and Feldman-Barrett (1999),

refer instead to core affect. Based on Watson and Tellegens (1985) affect

circumplex (seeFig. 3),Russell and Feldman-Barrett propose that core affect is

based on dimensions of pleasantness and activation. In the original Watson and

Tellegen model, however, affect is based on dimensions of positive and negative

affect.Russell and Carroll (1999a, b)argue that the basic dimension is the rotatedaxes or dimensions of activation and pleasantness (seeWatson & Tellegen, 1999,

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Fig. 3

The Circumplex Model of Affect. Source:Watson and Tellegen (1999). With permission,

from theAmerican Psychological Association 1999.

for a response to Russell and Carroll). Carver (2001) has subsequently argued

that the two positions can be reconciled using a functionalist perspective, where

each dimensional model is appropriate to different behavioral conditions, based

on an incentive focus or a threat-avoidant focus.

Similar to Carver (2001), I argue that adoption of the appropriate model ofemotion is contingent on the question being addressed. Gray and Watson (2001)

and Finn and Chattopadhyay (2000) conclude likewise that discrete emotions,

affect, and mood are reciprocally interrelated, and that choice of which model is

most appropriate depends on the purpose of the analysis and the functional nature

of outcomes.

Interestingly, AET researchers (see Fisher, 2000b; Weiss et al., 1999) have

provided strong confirmation that job satisfaction and affect are different, albeit

related, constructs. They have used ESM (Larson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983),

where respondents were asked to provide data on their instantaneous feelingsover a set period in their workplace environment.

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A further outcome of AET is the importance ofaccumulation of hassles and

uplifts. Thus, rather than theintensityof major events being the source of attitudesand behavior at work, according to AET, emotions are more determined by the

frequency with which hassles or uplifts occur (seeFisher, 1998, 2000a, b). This

conclusion implies that, in respect of negative emotions, people are more capable of

handling one-off incidents than they are of dealing with ongoing hassles. A further

corollary of this is that the accumulation of negative events can be offset by positive

support from colleagues, friends, and family (seeGrzywacz & Marks, 2000).

This conclusion leads to the idea of affective episodes, where it is not so

much particular events that result in outcomes, but rather the accumulation of

positive or negative events in an episode that determines how we feel (cf.Fisher,

2000b). In addition, Fredrickson (2000) refers to the peaks and ends of

affective experiences, where the outcomes of affective episodes are determined

respectively by two factors: (1) the most intense experience; and (2) the experience

at the end of the episode. Thus, an employee who experiences a series of setbacks

may ultimately end up seeing the episode in a positive light if the episode has

a positive conclusion.

In summary, it is clear that the AET model holds tremendous potential to further

our understanding of why people behave as they do in organizations. AET is the

first model in the organizational literature to include transient emotional states

as its core, and it provides explanations previously inaccessible to researchers

of organizational behavior. Early research findings (e.g. Fisher, 2000b; OShea

et al., 1999, 2000a, b; Weiss et al., 1999) are encouraging, but there remain

several unresolved issues in the way that the model is operationalized, including

the nature of affect and emotion. Still, there is enough already to suggest

that study of within-person variations in emotion will provide further useful

insights in this respect.

Mood

Although not as rapidly varying as emotion, mood nonetheless constitutes a

distinct additional source of within-person variability (seeGray & Watson, 2001;

Oatley & Jenkins, 1992)and an important determinant of decision making and

behavior in social (see Forgas, 1992; Isen, 1999) and organizational (see George &

Brief, 1992, 1996a)settings. As a general rule, however, research into the effects

of mood in workplace settings has treated positive (Isen & Baron, 1991) and

negative (George & Brief, 1996b) mood as distinctly different phenomena. In

this regard,Forgass (1995)affect infusion model (AIM) may provide a means tounderstand mood as a more integrated phenomenon. More recently, Forgas and

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George (2001)teamed up to show how the AIM might be applied in workplace

settings.In the AIM, mood affects cognitive judgments through two basic mechanisms

(Forgas, 1995). In the first of these mechanisms, mood acts directly on decision

making through fast evaluative reactions based on body states (cf. Damasio, 1994).

Put simply, research has shown that judgmental evaluations are usually consistent

with the actors prevailing mood state (e.g. seeBower, 1981; Forgas, 1995;Forgas

& George, 2001;Isen, Shalker, Clark & Karp, 1978;Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman

& Evans, 1992; Mayer & Salovey, 1988). The second mechanism in the AIM

works through the effect of mood on selection of cognitive strategies and the

effect of mood states on memory.

The AIM attempts to provide an integration of positive and negative mood

theory, but the bulk of work on mood in workplace settings has treated positive

and negative mood effects differentially. In the following paragraphs, therefore, I

briefly review first positive, then negative mood effects.

Positive Mood

In respect to positive mood, the work of Isen and her colleagues has been at the

forefront of our understanding (see Isen & Daubman, 1984; Isen, Daubman &

Nowicki, 1987; Isen, Johnson, Mertz & Robinson, 1985). Findings of these studies

have provided evidence that positive affect results in creativity and cognitive

flexibility. Consistent with this, the general conclusion from research (e.g.Isen &

Baron, 1991) is that positive mood is associated with positive outcomes, including

better job satisfaction (Connolly & Viswesvaran, 2000), less turnover (Shaw,

1999), more helping behaviors at work (Williams & Shiaw, 1999), better negotia-

tion outcomes (Carnevale & Isen, 1986), and improved performance (Cropanzano

& Wright, 2001; Wright & Staw, 1999).Kraiger, Billings and Isen (1989)have

also shown that positive affect leads to more positive evaluations of jobs, although

only when the jobs were already seen to be rich and meaningful. The picture that

emerges from these results is that positive mood is universally desired in organi-zations. The reality, unfortunately, is not so rosy.George and Brief (1996a), for

example, note that positive mood, although facilitative on some tasks, especially

those involving creativity (seeEstrada, Isen & Young, 1994), may actually inhibit

performance on other tasks. This is because high performance is so often accom-

panied by striving and effort to meet challenging goals (cf. Locke & Latham,

1990).Positive mood feelings under these conditions are likely to be put on hold.

Negative Mood

AsGeorge and Brief (1996b)note, it appears that findings in respect to negativemood are less straightforward than those for positive mood. Clark and Isen (1982),

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Kaufman and Vosburg (1997), and Rusting and DeHart (2000), for example,

point out that people in a negative mood are often motivated to perform morepositively so that they can change their mood to a positive one. Thus, people in

a negative mood often appear to behave incongruously displaying more helping

behavior and working more productively. Nonetheless, as George and Brief point

out, people in negative moods are still generally less satisfied with their jobs and

are more likely to want to leave their jobs.

Finally, there is evidence that negative mood promotes more cognitively

efficient information processing (see Alloy & Abramson, 1979, 1982; Schwarz

& Bohner, 1996; Sinclair & Mark, 1992). Alloy and Abramson, in particular,

have provided evidence that negative moods are often more accurate and realistic

perceptions, while positive moods can lead to feelings of unrealistic optimism.

As noted earlier, it seems that positive moods are not always such a good thing,

although we would all rather be in a good mood than a bad mood.

To summarize the present discussion of within-person emotion and mood, it is

clear that these are important, but neglected dimensions in organizational behavior

research. Recent research into emotions at work, based on AET and the AIM, hold

the potential for improving our understanding of how and why people behave and

think in organizational settings.

EMOTIONS AT LEVEL 2: BETWEEN-PERSONS

As noted earlier, emotions are dynamic and ephemeral. Even so, there are

aspects of emotions and the effects of emotions that can be described at the

between-person level. Recently, for example, Brockner and Higgins (2001) set

out a regulatory focus theory of emotions, where emotions are determined

by personal focus on promotion (self-promotion) or prevention (self-defense).

These foci, in turn, regulate actors emotional states. Theories such as this,

however, fail to take full account of the temporal variability of emotion as Ihave described above. Nonetheless, there are certain variables, derived from

within-person processes, that do appear as personal outcomes. These include

job satisfaction, turnover, helping behaviors, and performance. Perhaps the most

researched of these variables is affective commitment (Meyer & Allen, 1991),

an emotionally driven liking and attachment to the organization. In addition to

these variables, other aspects of emotions at the individual levels are describable

in terms of traits.

The first of these is well-being, the maintenance of positive emotional health

in workplace settings (see Cooper & Williams, 1994), often from a mentalhealth perspective (e.g.Cotton, 1996).Negatively associated with this is the idea

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of job burnout (see Cordes & Dougherty, 1993; Maslach, Schaufeli & Leiter,

2000), which includes affect as a central component in the form of emotionalexhaustion. The general conclusion of this literature is that the mental well-being

of employees is determined in part through maintenance of positive affect. (I

return to this topic again in discussion of the organizational level.)

The second consideration is trait affect. Similar to state effect discussed

earlier, and based on the affect circumplex as illustrated inFig. 3(seeRussell &

Feldman-Barrett, 1999;Watson & Tellegen, 1985), trait affectivity represents a

personal disposition to be in a long-term positive or negative affective state.Fox

and Spector (2000)andStaw and Barsade (1993)have examined the effect of trait

affect and found that it plays a small role in determining personal outcomes in

organizational settings. Of course, when negative trait affect becomes chronic, the

result is burnout, with more severe consequences for the individual concerned.

More recently,Judge and Larsen (2001)have proposed a theory of job satisfaction

based on trait affect.

The third and final dimension of individual difference that I discuss is the

relatively recently introduced concept of emotional intelligence. This variable

relates to individual capacities to deal with emotion in everyday life, rather

than emotions per se. Nonetheless, this ability is clearly salient in the present

discussion of between-person emotion effects. Fisher and Ashkanasy (2000)

note that much has been expected of the emotional intelligence concept, largely

because of its popularity in the popular press (e.g.Goleman, 1995),and especially

in the management practitioner literature (e.g. see Cooper & Sawaf, 1997;

Goleman, 1998a, b). Practitioners (e.g.Goleman, 1998a) are especially interested

in emotional intelligence as a means to improve selection, training, and emotional

competencies among employees. More recently, scholars have sought to define

emotional intelligence in organizational settings and to determine its relationship

with work attitudes and outcomes (see, for example,Jordan, Ashkanasy & Hartel,

2002). On the other hand, scholars working in the intelligence field (e.g. Davis,

Stankov & Roberts, 1998) have been critical of the construct and some of theexaggerated claims that have been made for it. They point out that there is still a

dearth of empirical evidence in support of the beneficial claims made in respect to

emotional intelligence and ongoing controversy surrounding its definition (see also

Ciarrochi, Chan & Caputi, 2000).

What exactly is emotional intelligence?Goleman (1995)has pointed out that it

is a form of social intelligence (cf.Gardner, 1983; Thorndike, 1966).Most would

agree on this general point, but consensus on the precise nature of the construct

is far from settled.Mayer and Salovey (1993, 1995, 1997),for example, present

emotional intelligence as a set of distinct abilities specifically related to emotion,including perception, identification, understanding, and management of emotion

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(see also Mayer, Caruso & Salovey, 1999; Salovey & Mayer, 1990). Cooper

and Sawaf (1997) and Goleman (1995), on the other hand, present emotionalintelligence as a quasi-personality construct, including social interaction com-

petencies such as empathy, time management, decision making, and teamwork.

Interestingly, Bechara, Tranel and Damasio (2000) have recently presented

neurophysiological evidence, based on individual differences in emotional paths

in the brain (cf.Fig. 2).

Our conclusion is that it is safest to view emotional intelligence in terms of the

Mayer and Salovey (1997)model. In this instance, Ashkanasy, Hartel and Daus

(2002)present a list of some key findings that appear to provide a clearer picture

of emotional intelligence. These are that emotional intelligence:

appears to be distinct from, but positively related to, other intelligences; is an individual difference, where some people are more endowed and others are

less so; develops over a persons life span and can be enhanced through training; involves, at least in part, a persons abilities to identify and to perceive emotion

(in self and others); and includes skills to understand and to manage emotions successfully.

Although individual differences play less of a role in emotions than in the

more traditional areas of study in OB, the dispositional variables discussedhere are nonetheless important. Personal dispositional variables, and especially

personal outcome variables, traditionally lie at the heart of the OB discipline (see

House, Shane & Herold, 1996). It is early days yet in the study of emotions in

organizational settings, but the evidence to date suggests that continued research

in this field is potentially worthwhile. Still, the theme of this article is that it is the

dynamic nature of emotions that makes their study so interesting. In this respect,

it is the next level of analysis interactions that is potentially a more interesting

and rewarding topic.

EMOTIONS AT LEVEL 3:

INTERPERSONAL INTERACTIONS

Level 3 involves perception and communication of emotions in dyads, consistent

with Waldroms (2000) and De Dreu, West, Fischer and MacCurtains (2001)

notion of emotion as principally a relational phenomenon. In this respect, Waldron

points out that the interactional level constitutes the central level of emotions in

organizations. In terms of the present article, therefore, interactions serve as thelinks between Levels 1 and 2 (at the micro level) and Levels 4 and 5 (at the group

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and organizational levels). As such, this level would seem to conform to House,

Rousseau and Thomas-Hunts (1995) concept of a meso-level construct. Theimportance of this level most likely arises because communication of emotions

is so critically important in social animals such as primates. For example, a smile

encourages repetition of the favored behavior, while a frown or snarl discourages

it (Darwin, 1872/1985; Ekman, 1992, 1999). Furthermore, social bonding is

increased whenever groups of animals share emotional responses, as we see in

sports teams and their fans.

The present discussion is divided into two sections. In the first section,

building on the earlier discussion of the neuropsychology of emotion, I cover the

neurological and physiological processes that underlie display, perception, and

communication of emotion. In the second section, I deal more specifically with

the notion of emotional labor (Hochschild, 1983),which has arguably been the

most researched facet of emotions in work settings.

Neurological and Physiological Processes as the Basis

of Emotional Communication

As was the case for the neural processes discussed earlier in this article, the

communicative role of emotions can also be considered within an evolutionary

context. If emotional communication is adaptive, then humans will have evolved

a system for both displaying and recognizing emotions, particularly primary

emotions (Pinker, 1997). Evolutionary pressure would favor a recognition system

that is subtle and can detect sham emotion readily. There will also be advantage

to those members of the group who can successfully fake emotion. I argue in

this article that emotional recognition systems exist, but that the detection of

sham emotion by an astute observer is likely to thwart attempts at emotional

deceit. These processes are especially important in the workplace context,

where organizational members are required to interact with one another asa matter of routine.

I noted earlier that the neural circuit for fear includes preconscious pathways

for emotional expression whose effects would be difficult, if not impos-

sible, to control consciously. Many visible expressions of emotion for

example, blushing with embarrassment, watery eyes, panting with fear, and

tensing with anger are automatic, similarly preconscious, and difficult to

control.

I also pointed out earlier in this article that emotional responses are accompa-

nied by complex sub-cortical responses. These have direct sensorimotor effectsas well as effects on hormone levels and emotional behavior beyond the control

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of consciousness. At the same time, people try to maintain a particular emotional

display appropriate for the situation (Hochschild, 1983). The resulting response isthus an interaction of situationally and emotionally determined responses (Hess,

Banse & Kappas, 1995), which may be difficult to untangle. Nevertheless, there

is new evidence that felt emotion is detectable by untrained observers, such as

friends, colleagues, customers, and servers.

As would be expected from the foregoing discussion, there are many indicators

of emotional states (see Ekman, 1984, 1999;Ekman, Friesen & Scherer, 1976;

Izard, 1993; Scherer, 1988). These include vocal intonation (Pittam & Scherer,

1993), body movements and gestures (Ekman & Friesen, 1974;Ekman, Friesen

& Scherer, 1976), combinations of vocal and bodily markers (Ekman, OSullivan,

Friesen & Scherer, 1991), and skin conductivity changes (Ney, 1988). The

weight of empirical evidence concerning facial expression (see Camras, Holland

& Patterson, 1993; Ekman, 1984), however, makes this particular aspect of

emotional expression especially relevant.

The most salient example of this process resides in the role of human smile. Over

the past 30 years, researcher Paul Ekman and his colleagues have identified the

smile as a key element of emotional expression on the human face (Ekman, 1984,

1992, 1999).In particular, research has concentrated on differentiation of felt

and false smiles (Ekman & Friesen, 1982;Ekman, Friesen & OSullivan, 1988;

Frank, Ekman & Friesen, 1993). Further, smiles have been the focus of interest

in the organizational science literature (see Hochschild, 1979, 1983; Rafaeli &

Sutton, 1987, 1989). The role of the smile as a powerful tool of social influence in

the workplace was dramatically illustrated inHochschilds (1983)study of airline

flight attendants. Hochschild, however, also highlighted the negative side of smil-

ing, noting that smiling as a work requirementcan become an onerous task (see

alsoVan Maanen & Kunda, 1989). Hochschild coined the term emotional labor

to describe this situation and gives examples of frustrated reactions to passengers

who expect always to be attended to by smiling staff. (I discuss this topic in

more detail later.)The smiling face is not a unitary phenomenon, however. French anatomist

Duchenne de Boulogne, a contemporary of Darwin, investigated the muscles

involved in smiling over a century ago. Duchenne (1862/1990) found, in a series of

electrophysical experiments, that the smile has two distinct components. Further,

the two components appear to have distinctly different driving mechanisms.

Duchenne concluded that:

. . . frank joy is expressed in the face by the combined contraction of the zygomatic majoris

muscle and theobicularis oculi. The first obeys the will, but the second . . . is only put in play

by the sweet emotions of the soul. . .

(and) fake joy. . .

cannot provoke the contraction of this

muscle (p. 126).

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Fig. 4. The Muscles Involved in Smiling.

The muscle sets that Duchenne referred to are illustrated inFig. 4.Thezygomatic

majoris muscle pulls up the corners of the mouth, while the obicularis oculi

form the creases around the eye that we associate with a smiling face. Duchenne

argues that we can fake the action of the zygomatic majorisbut not theobicularis

oculi; that only in the case of genuine feelings of joy can people smile with their

eyes. Ekman (1990) noted that Duchennes observations appear to have been

lost for a hundred years and that, as a consequence, a great deal of confusion

has been generated in reports of recognizability of facial markers of emotion.

Ekmans early research nonetheless has now been replicated in great detail(Ekman, Davidson & Friesen, 1990; Ekman & Friesen, 1974, 1982; Ekman,

Friesen & Ancoli, 1980; Ekman, Friesen & OSullivan, 1988; Ekman, Hager &

Friesen, 1981). Ekman referred to the smile generated by the obicularis oculi as

the smile of enjoyment and named it the Duchenne-smile (or D-smile) in

honor of its discoverer.

Other research, however, has revealed some departures in detail from

Duchennes original observations. In particular,Ekman, Roper and Hager (1980)

found that the obicularis oculi consist of two distinct groups of muscles. The

inner section, which controls tightening of the eyelids, appears to be controllableto some extent. The outerobicularis oculi, however, which affects the skin around

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the lower eye, appear to be much more difficult to control consciously. In fact, it

is this muscle set that accounts for the sparkle in the eye characteristic of smilesof felt enjoyment (Ekman & Friesen, 1982). Ekman and Friesen have since shown

that felt smiles are, in fact, differentiated from feigned smiles on a number of

other parameters, including synchronization between the action of the two muscle

sets, symmetry of action on both sides of the face, smoothness (or naturalness)

of the muscular contractions, and duration of the muscular contractions. Given

that human perception is highly sensitive to small changes in facial features (see

examples inEkman, 1990), it follows that humans may be reasonably adept at

distinguishing felt from feigned smiles, especially when the actor is not well

trained in presenting feigned emotions.

While Ekman and his colleagues conducted much of their research in laboratory

settings, especially using the proprietary Facial Action Coding System (FACS;

Ekman & Friesen, 1978), more recently the research focus has moved into

field studies involving non-expert judgment. In this respect, Frank, Ekman and

Friesen (1993) showed that nave observers are surprisingly adept at spotting

the difference between felt and false smiles, endorsing Darwins (1872/1985)

observation that so many shades of expression are instantly recognized without

any conscious process of analysis (p. 359). In the Frank et al. study, recognition

accuracy under ideal conditions peaked at 81%. Even under less than ideal

conditions (when the study participants were not instructed to look specifically

to look for real smiles), there was still a clear recognition of enjoyment smiles.

People displaying enjoyment smiles were also seen to be more expressive, natural,

outgoing, sociable, relaxed, and pleasant than those displaying non-enjoyment

(or feigned) smiles.

Ekman (1992) argues further that the complex set of facial expressions, involving

dozens of muscle sets, is a reliable indicator of the whole range of emotions. He also

suggests that, like the Duchenne smile, many facial markers of emotion are driven

by sub-cortical processes and are, therefore, not subject to conscious manipulation.

The question that remains, however, is the accuracy with which onlookersread emotional markers. Early research byKrauss, Apple, Morency, Wenzel and

Winton (1981)showed thatdisplayedemotional states are communicated largely

by verbal, rather than non-verbal, means. The more recent evidence seems to

indicate that non-verbal modes of communication play a more predominant role

in interpretation of feltemotion. In this respect, Ekman (1990) argues that key

non-verbal cues identify felt emotional states, and that these signs (or markers) are

recognizable by observers. TheFrank et al. (1993)studies in relation to smiles of

enjoyment confirm this, as do more recent results obtained byGosselin, Kirouac

and Dore (1995).In the Gosselin et al. research, actors were asked to express feltor feigned emotions of happiness, anger, and sadness. As in the Frank et al. study,

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results showed that observers were more accurately able to recognize emotions

when they were derived from true feelings, rather than a feigned expression.Overall, these studies provide evidence that people can to some extent recognize

emotional states in others, and furthermore that they are able to discern when an

actors emotions are truly felt and when emotions are being feigned, especially

when the actor is not well trained. Combining this finding with the evidence

that emotional reactions are only partially under conscious control, and that they

interact with behavioral and cognitive reactions (Fischer et al., 1990), leads to the

conclusion that emotional states expressed through sub-cortical channels will be

recognizable to some extent, even to untrained observers (seeFrank et al., 1993).

In other words, it is difficult to hide our inner feelings and emotional reactions.

If true, this conclusion will challenge some of the more established theories of

organizational behavior based on theories of cognitive and social rationalism (e.g.

Simon, 1976),which are predicated on the notion that emotions can be subsumed

in cognitions and behavior.

In summary, I have argued here that facial expressions, through their sub-

cortical, preconscious mediation, are indicators of true or feigned emotion. From

what we know of the sub-cortical processes of emotion, it is clear that the other

preconscious physical forms of emotional expression will also be indicators of

truly felt versus feigned emotion. Likely perception of these indicators, along with

the cognitive load associated with their attempted control, leads to the conclusion

that a sustained attempt to hide inner feelings and emotional reactions is difficult

at best. This leads us to the issue of emotional labor.

Emotional Labor

In the previous discussion, I introduced the neurological and physiological bases

of the phenomenon thatHochschild (1983)has termed emotional labor the act

of managing emotion in the service of ones job. Like other aspects of emotion inwork settings, emotional labor research is still developing, but there is little doubt

that it has been the most prominent area of study of emotions in work settings in

recent years.

The genesis of emotional labor is that many occupations, especially in service in-

dustries, embody strongly sanctioned norms concerning the appropriate display of

emotion (see, for example, Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987, 1989; Sutton & Rafaeli, 1988).

In many cases, these norms are strongly embedded in the organizational culture,

including the organizations recruitment strategies, job descriptions, and employee

socialization (Fineman, 2001; Ott, 1989; Schein, 1985). Emotional labor alsoaffects policies relating to rewards (Humphrey, 2000)and job valuation (Kruml &

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Geddes, 2000). In essence, job performance in these organizations is dependent

to a large extent on employees skills at emotional expression and managementand, in particular, their ability to successfully project one emotion while simulta-

neously feeling another (Hochschild, 1983). In view of the preceding discussion,

this is not always easily accomplished, so that employees who do possess this

skill are likely to be highly valued and rewarded in their organization. It is not

surprising, therefore, that so much recent research has recently been devoted to

the study of the effects of emotional labor on job performance and customer

service, as well as on employees and organizations well-being and survival (see

Fineman, 2001;Schaubroeck & Jones, 2000;Tews & Glomb, 2000; Wharton &

Erickson, 1993).

A corollary to my earlier discussion of the neurology and physiology of

emotional expression is that emotional labor can have detrimental effects on

well-being. Further, as Hochschild (1983) notes, employees often bottle up

feelings of frustration and resentment, resulting in emotional outbursts. In the case

of an organization that depends on employees displaying emotions, and that fails

to provide a means to express emotions, emotional exhaustion is a likely outcome

(see Grandey, 2000; Hartel, Hsu & Boyle, 2002; Kruml & Geddes, 2000). In

one recent study, for example, emotional labor was found to be a precursor

of emotional exhaustion among debt collectors, military recruiters, and nurses

(Morris & Feldman, 1996).

Parker and Wall (1998) have argued specifically that emotional labor can

have detrimental health effects by weakening the bodys immune system. In this

respect,Grandey (2000)andSchaubroeck and Jones (2000)found that inhibition

of expression of negative emotion might cause a range of physical illnesses,

including serious illnesses such as hypertension and cancer. Pugliesi (1999)

reported in addition that emotional labor was a cause of psychological distress,

and Brill (2000) argues further that emotional dishonesty leads to antisocial

behaviors, including violence.

A further point is that employees who are expected to engage in emotional laborand who consequently experience emotional dissonance may become increasingly

impaired in their ability to express their true emotional feelings (Ekman, Friesen

& OSullivan, 1988;Fineman, 2001; Mann, 1999). The detection by customers of

inauthentic expression may, in turn, lead to even poorer perceptions by the customer

of service quality, resulting in a downward spiral of poor service and increasing

emotional labor (Grove & Fisk, 1990; Mann, 1999; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987).

In summary, emotional expression and communication lie at the important

junction between individual and organizational outcomes, characterized byHouse

et al. (1995)as the meso-level. In effect, incidents of emotional labor constituteaffective events in the AET model. As such, emotional labor leads to emotional

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reactions, and thus to the personal and organizational outcomes I detailed in the

earlier discussion of AET at Level 1 of the model. In this discussion, I also touchedon the individual-level (Level 2: performance outcomes, rewards, well-being) and

organizational-level (Level 5: climate and culture) variables. Later in this article,

I will return to these intersections and suggest an integrated multi-level model

of emotions in organizations. Before moving on to this stage, however, I discuss

emotions at Level 4: group interactions.

EMOTIONS AT LEVEL 4: GROUPS AND TEAMS

Schermerhorn, Hunt and Osborn (2001)define a group as a collection of two

or more people who work with one another regularly to achieve common goals

(p. 174). As such, group members interact on a dyadic and collective basis,

and they naturally encounter all of the perceptions and experiences that I have

outlined earlier in reference to individuals and their interactions. Nonetheless,

groups introduce additional dimensions of cohesiveness, collective values, and

leadership that render an added level of complexity to the discussion of emotions

in workplace settings. In this respect,De Dreu et al. (2001)see group settings as a

sort of emotional incubator, where the emotional states of the group members

combine to produce an overall group-level emotional tenor that, in turn, affects

all group members.Kelly and Barsade (2001)argue more specifically that teams

possess an affective composition or a group mood, which begins initially with

the emotional characteristics of team members, and then develops through a

process of emotional contagion, entrainment, modeling, and manipulation of

affect (see also Barsade, 1997). In this section, therefore, I begin by building

on the previous discussion of personal interactions and emotional display, and

then address two additional dimensions of groups: leadership and the idea of the

emotionally intelligent group.

Emotional Exchange in Groups

In the earlier discussion of emotions in interpersonal relationships, the importance

of emotional displays and perception of emotional markers was emphasized.

Moving to the group level, however, and as Ashforth and Humphrey (1995)

and Kelly and Barsade (2001) argue, factors outside of the narrow confines of

interpersonal relationships come into play. Ashforth and Humphrey give examples

of collective socialization in work groups (Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989),trust ingroup conflict situations (Smith & Berg, 1987),emotional contagion (Hatfield,

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Cacioppo & Rapson, 1992), and attitudes toward play in work (Abramis, 1990).

Zurcher (1982)goes further, arguing that displays of emotion in group situationsconstitute an essential ingredient necessary for establishment of group cohesion.

Lawler (1992) posits that emotion is the essential social process in group

formation and maintenance, because positive emotions strengthen feelings of

control. As such, positive emotion is a necessary precursor of group cohesiveness.

On the other hand, negative emotions weaken group cohesion. In the context

of organizational work groups, George (1990) has shown that affect is a key

ingredient for group effectiveness and satisfaction (see also George & Brief,

1992). Finally, and as I discuss in more detail later, Graen and Uhl-Bien (1995)

have argued that leader-member exchange relationships develop into complex

networks of relationships that define group membership.

The difficulty with these models (in common with much of the literature in

this area) is that there is an assumption that group members can accurately read

emotional cues presented by other group members, and by the group leader in

particular.George and Brief (1992),for example, argue that positive feelings are

an essential prerequisite for group effectiveness, satisfaction, and commitment.

Zurchers (1982)argument implies, however, that emotional climate in groups is

developed through emotional displays. In a similar vein, emotional contagion is

open to manipulation though manufactured displays of emotion (Barsade, 1997).

The question that arises in the context of this article is the extent to which these

phenomena depend on felt, rather than displayed, emotions. In particular, what

would be the effect on the group if emotional displays (especially by the group

leader) are seen to be at odds with perceived felt emotion? A leader who attempts

to engender positive mood in a work group, for example, may not be successful if

group members perceive a conflicting felt emotion such as hostility or contempt.

In particular, attempts to portray a calm, rational, unemotional facade that is

inconsistent with markers of felt emotion are likely to be detectable by group

members, as I argued earlier in this article. Thus, as for the interpersonal case,

perception of insincerity in group interactions is likely to lead to cynicism andpoor group functioning. In this case, displayed emotions in group situations can

have a positive or negative effect, depending on whether the emotional display

is seen to be genuine or contrived. This issue is taken up in more detail in the

following discussion of emotion in leader-member exchange.

Group Leadership and Emotion

The role of leadership in communicating, expressing, and managing emotions ingroups is axiomatic (seeGraen & Uhl-Bien, 1995).In this respect,Ashforth and

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Humphrey (1995)refer to leadership in terms of the symbolic models proposed by

Daft and Weick (1984) and Smirchich and Stubbart (1985). In this view, leadershipis seen as a process of symbolic management (Pfeffer, 1981) and involves creating

and maintaining shared meanings among followers. Ashforth and Humphrey

argue that this process depends intrinsically on evocation of emotion. Based on

Ortners (1973) model, they note that symbols generate interacting cognitive

and emotional responses and, they conclude, symbolic management involves

orchestrating, summarizing, and elaborating symbols to evoke emotion which

can be generalized to organizational ends (p. 111). These symbols can be

subtle and ineffable, and need not relate directly to cognitive aspects of emotion.

Thus, leaders engage in communication of symbols designed to make followers

feel better about themselves, and to strengthen followers commitment to the

organization (see alsoFineman, 2001; Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989).

It follows, therefore, that leadership entails perception, recognition, and

management of emotional cues by both the leader and the led, which we

described earlier as emotional sensitivity. In this respect, the leader-member

exchange (LMX) model provides a useful frame of reference (see Graen &

Uhl-Bien, 1995,for a review of LMX theory). The basis of LMX is that leaders

and work group members exhibit different-quality relationships, based on social

exchanges with the leader. When exchanges are high quality, members are given

better job assignments, more freedom, and greater opportunities to work with

the leader. When exchanges are of low quality, on the other hand, members are

given fewer opportunities to interact with the leader and perform low-status work

assignments.

I argue that quality in this context is largely an emotional judgment. Factors

that have been shown to contribute to LMX quality include attitude similarity

(Phillips & Bedeian, 1994; Turban, Jones & Rozelle, 1990), satisfaction with

the relationship (McClane, 1991), psychological size and distance (Salzmann &

Grasha, 1991), and the role of mentoring (Scandura & Schreisheim, 1994). More

recently, social discourse (Sias & Jablin, 1995) and perceptual categorization(Foti, 1995) have been shown to be important in determining exchange quality.

Although few studies have focused on the emotional dimensions in leader-member

exchanges per se, the clear implication of the LMX studies is that higher-quality

relationships between leaders and members are associated with positive emotions.

In a recent laboratory study, Newcombe and Ashkanasy (2002)showed just this

effect. Respondents who viewed vignettes of leaders giving performance appraisal

feedback were judged more favorably on an LMX measure when they displayed

positive emotion. These data suggest that a leaders displayed emotion is a critical

determinant of the quality of relationships with group members, and consequentlyof the leaders ability to communicate emotionally evocative symbols.

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The question remains, however, as to how accurately leaders and members can

perceive and interpret the emotional cues in their relationships. For example, aleader who feels negatively toward a subordinate may consciously display positive

emotion as a means of influencing the subordinate through symbolic management.

If, as I noted earlier, the subordinate can detect unconscious markers of the

negative (felt) emotion, then it is likely that the leaders influence attempts will be

ineffective. Given that leadership involves management of emotionally charged

symbolism, followers interpretation of leadership influence attempts as insincere

is likely to lead to a breakdown in the leadership relationship and to cause distrust

and cynicism (Kanter & Mirvis, 1989). This, in turn, is likely to be recognized by

the leader, leading to further low-quality exchanges and continuing deterioration

of the leader-follower relationship. Thus, symbolic leadership may be seen to

be more than the ability to display skin deep emotions in leader-member

relationships. Ashkanasy and Newcombe (2001) also investigated this issue and

found that leaders insincere expressions of emotion led to much lower LMX

ratings of the leaders. This evidence tells us that insincere attempts to manipulate

symbolism lead to a cynical reaction and can be counterproductive.

The foregoing discussion raises the intriguing possibility that the individual

difference of emotional intelligence may play a key role here. In this respect,

the transformational leadership model (see Bass, 1998;Bass & Avolio, 1990)is

at present arguably the dominant paradigm of leadership.Bass and Avolio (1990)

point out in particular that transformational leadership is enacted when a leader can

project a charismatic vision that is believed in by group members, can inspire group

members to perform above normal standards, can provide intellectual stimulation

for group members, and looks after the emotional needs of group members.

Ashkanasy and Tse (2000)argued that these four aspects of transformational

leadership overlap with Mayer and Saloveys (1988) four dimensions of emo-

tional intelligence, described earlier in this article. Bass (1998), for example,

emphasizes the role played by emotional self-awareness, which is close to Mayer

and Saloveys concept of emotional self-understanding. Also, and as I pointedout earlier, leaders are required to understand the emotional states of group

members, to display empathy, and to project an appropriately emotional persona.

Thus, by inspiring and arousing their followers emotionally, transformational

leaders engender commitment to the organization and to the leaders vision (see

Weierter, 1997).George (2000)similarly sees emotional intelligence as a catalyst

for leaders to energize group members, and to enable them to achieve their goals

and objectives in a trusting group atmosphere.

By the same token, there is a potential for charismatic leadership to be seen

as exploitive. This exploitation may be further compounded when emotionalmanipulation is employed to garner follower compliance. Weierter (1997)

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has noted in addition that follower characteristics are important in resisting

such exploitation. To differentiate this phenomenon from true transformationalleadership, which is directed toward positive outcomes, Bass (1998)coined the

term pseudo-transformational leadership. Again, the tie-in with emotional

intelligence suggests that the emotionally intelligent leader, through understand-

ing and regulation of his or her and others emotions is positioned to achieve

positive outcomes. As Ashkanasy and Tse (2000) note, such leaders form

positive, empathetic, and constructive relationships with their followers. These

relationships enable them to communicate their vision and enthusiasm, and to

inspire the group to achieve above the usual expectations.

The Emotionally Intelligent Work Group?

In my final discussion of group-level questions, I take the issue of emotional

intelligence in groups a step further, addressing the issue of whether emotional

intelligence can be generalized to the group itself. In other words, is it possible

for group members who are more emotionally astute to leverage this ability into

higher group performance and effectiveness? That is, is there such a thing as an

emotionally intelligent group? Druskat and Wolff (2001) argue in particular

that emotionally intelligent teams can be created by appropriate training.

Jordan, Ashkanasy, Hartel and Hooper (2002) have, in fact, addressed this

question in a study that involved five- to seven-person semi-autonomous learning

teams in an undergraduate management class. In this study, conducted in the

context of student-centered learning, students were coached over a nine-week

period in interpersonal communication skills, goal setting, and emotional under-

standing (see Engel, 1993). Team members completed measures of emotional

intelligence at the conclusion of the study, and team emotional intelligence

was calculated by aggregating the scores of team members on this measure.

Jordan and his colleagues expected to find that the high-emotional-intelligenceteams would outperform their low-emotional-intelligence counterparts on two

measures: goal focus and team process effectiveness. Results, however, showed

that the low-emotional-intelligence teams under-performed the high-emotional-

intelligence teams only at the beginning of the nine-week period. At the end

of the coaching period, both the high- and the low-emotional-intelligence

teams were performing at the same high level (see Fig. 5). The results of this

study are based on a laboratory study and are therefore preliminary, but they

suggest that teams can operate more effectively if the group members either

possess a trait of emotional intelligence or if they can be taught the skillsof emotional intelligence.

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Fig. 5. Goal Focus and Process Effectiveness of High and Low Emotional Intelligence

Teams (Jordan, Ashanasy, Hartel & Hooper, 2002).

Although the Jordan, Ashkanasy, Hartel and Hooper (2002) study does not

really answer the question of the emotionally intelligent team, it does support

Druskat and Wolffs (2001) point that emotionally intelligent teams can be

more than just a collection of emotionally intelligent individuals. On the otherhand, and as Kelly and Barsade (2001) point out, groups in organizations are

embedded in the wider organizational context, the final level that I address in this

article.

EMOTIONS AT LEVEL 5: ORGANIZATIONS

CULTURE AND CLIMATE

Level 5 of the multi-level model presented in this article is qualitatively differentfrom the other levels. At the lower levels, organizational policies and values

are interpreted in the context of face-to-face interactions, where all the basic

biological and neurophysiological mechanisms I have discussed up to this

point are salient. Thus, at these levels of the model, a manager can recognize

cues of real or felt emotion, and can identify the emotional indicators of

employees who are genuinely motivated toward goal achievement and confident

of achieving their goals. Similarly, in leader-member exchanges or in group

situations, perception and interpretation of emotional feelings are likely to be

instrumental in the development of high-quality leader-member relationships andhigh-performing teams.

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When dealing with the organization-wide or macro view, on the other hand,

the situation is much less clear. Although some members of a large organizationwill have meetings with senior managers, these meetings are likely to be brief

and infrequent (Mintzberg, 1973) and are likely to be constrained by power

differences (seeGibson & Schroeder, 2002). Instead, it is necessary to deal with

the more nebulous concept of emotional climate, defined by De Rivera (1992)

as an objective group phenomenon that can be palpably sensed as when one

enters a party or a city and feels an attitude of gaiety or depression, openness or

fear (p. 197). In the context of work organizations, organizational climate has

been studied for some time now (see Ashkanasy, Wilderom & Peterson, 2000;

Reichers & Schneider, 1990) and constitutes the collective mood of organizational

members toward their jobs, the organization, and management. The concept is

distinct from organizational culture, in that climate is essentially an emotional

phenomenon, while culture is more stable and is rooted in beliefs, values, and

embedded assumptions (Ashkanasy, Wilderom & Peterson, 2000; Ott, 1989;

Schein, 1985). Nonetheless, Schein makes it clear that assumptions underlying

organizational culture are associated with deeply felt feelings. More recently,

Beyer and Nino (2001)demonstrated how culture and organizational members

emotional views and states are intimately and reciprocally related. As such,

both organizational climate and organizational culture arguably have emotional

underpinnings.

A number of writers in the organizational literature have noted the emotional

basis of organizational culture (e.g. Beyer & Nino, 2001; Fineman, 2001;

Hochschild, 1983; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987, 1989; Van Maanen & Kunda, 1989),

but primarily in the context of displayed emotional states rather than felt emotion.

This begs the question as to how to ascertain real emotional climate (or culture) in

organizations. AlthoughHartel, Gough and Hartel (in press)measured emotional

climate and reported a correlation with job satisfaction, most advocates of an

ethnographic approach (e.g.Schein, 1985; Trice & Bayer, 1993) argue that only

through active, day-to-day involvement in organizations is it possible to sensereal, as opposed to displayed, emotion. De Rivera (1992) notes, however, that

emotional climate is an objective phenomenon and is therefore amenable to

objective perception and interpretation, provided the observer knows what to look

for. In effect, his point is that observers need to be sensitive to markers of felt,

rather than displayed, emotion. In this case, however, the markers are not so much

in the individual expressions of organizational members, but rather in the social

structures and patterns of behavior that are manifest in the organization. De Rivera

argues further that people are sensitive to such cues, and that they shape their

beliefs and behaviors accordingly. It follows that the arguments developed earlierin the present paper in respect to interpersonal relationships and small groups

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may be extendable to the organization as a whole, especially since organizational

policies ultimately come down to the perceptions, understanding, and behavior ofindividuals, interacting dyads, and groups.

The interplay of culture and emotional climate in the workplace was illustrated

in a recent study byAshkanasy and Nicholson (2003). They measured two dimen-

sions of organizational culture in two restaurant chains using the Organizational

Culture Profile (see Ashkanasy, Broadfoot & Falkus, 2000) and a measure of

Climate of Fear developed for their study. Results showed that, while culture

varied between organizations, the climate of fear varied across sites within each

organization. More particularly, Ashkanasy and Nicholson used an ethnographic

follow-up to show that the climate of fear was present in some of the restaurants,

and they concluded that the climate could, indeed, be palpably sensed, as De

Rivera (1992)intimated. Organizational policies in the form of requirements for

emotional labor are similarly manifest on the shop floor and are easily observed.

The organizations studied byHochschild (1983),for instance, provide illustrative

examples (see alsoAshkanasy, Daus & Hartel, 2002).

The final point in respect to the organizational level deals with the idea of

the healthy organization (Cooper & Williams, 1994). According to Cooper

and Williams, the healthy organization is one where priority is given equally to

employee well-being and to maintaining positive organizational outcomes. Such

an organization also minimizes negative emotional events for its employees,

including a restraint on unreasonable demands for emotional labor. Hartel, Hsu

and Boyle (2002)andKelly and Barsade (2001)are among recent authors who

have emphasized the close connections between organizational-level policies and

group and personal emotional outcomes.

AN INTERACTIVE MULTI-LEVEL MODEL

In this article, I have traced emotions in organizations from the most micro levelof emotional experience to the macro view of organizational climate and culture.

A recurring theme throughout the article, however, is the interrelatedness of

emotional variables across all levels of the analysis. Starting with affective events

theory, itself a multi-level model, through the individual, interrelationships, and

group levels of organizations, there are a myriad of interconnections. In Fig. 6,

which has at its core the AET model proposed byWeiss and Cropanzano (1996),

I have tried to capture some of these links.

At the center of Fig. 6 is Level 1. At this level, affective events determine

emotional reactions (state affect) that, in turn, influence immediate behavior,including contextual (helping) behavior and work performance, as well as the

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Fig. 6. A Multi-Level Model of Emotions in Organizations.

attitudes (affective commitment and job satisfaction) that underlie the personal

outcomes at Level 2. Level 1 incorporates all of the within-person neuropsy-

chological processes that were described earlier in this article, including the

physiological manifestations of emotion. Importantly, and also as detailed earlier,

these affective reactions to events are largely beyond conscious control. Further,

and consistent with AET, emotional reactions mediate the effects of everyday

hassles and uplifts on outcomes. In this respect, it should be noted that it is the

accumulation of frequent events, rather than infrequent intense effects, that arelikely to have the most profound effects in terms of attitudes and behaviors.

Represented at Level 2 are individual differences, including trait affect and

emotional intelligence, and attitudes, including affective commitment and job

satisfaction. Individual differences impact on every level of the model, with

the exception of Level 5. In particular, they affect behaviors directly at Level 1

and indirectly through attitudes at Level 2. Individual differences especially

emotional intelligence also affect expression and perception of emotion at Level

2 that, in turn, constitute affective events at Level 1; they likewise play a role at

Level 4, acting through emotional intelligence in leadership and group processes.In addition, individual differences can act as moderators of the antecedents and

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consequences of emotional reactions. In this respect, Jordan, Ashkanasy and

Hartel (2000, 2002) argue that highly emotionally intelligent individuals aremore able than their low emotionally intelligent counterparts to interpret and deal

with affective events, and also to regulate the effects of their emotions.Finn and

Chattopadhyay (2000)argue similarly that trait affectivity influences the severity

and effect of emotional reactions to events.

Perception of emotion in interpersonal exchanges (Level 3) is posited to lie

at the meso-level of the model and connects to all the other levels, including

organizational climate, culture, and policies at Level 5, and leader-member

exchange at Level 4. In the discussion of Level 3, it was stressed that emotional

communication is governed by physiological constraints. Consequently, expres-

sion of emotion that is different from personally felt emotion, as in the instance

of emotional labor, is difficult, especially when sustained. The significance of

this level and the issues raised in the processes that underlie emotional display

explain in part why there has been such intense research interest in phenomena at

Level 2, and also why this level has such important implications for practice.

Level 4 of the model encompasses group interactions, including group affective

composition (Kelly & Barsade, 2001)and leader-member exchange. Ashkanasy

and Tse (2000)have emphasized in particular the highly interconnected role of

leadership in governing and reacting to emotions in groups, concluding that a

leaders emotional acumen may be central to group effectiveness as well as a

determinant of the individual performances of team members.

At the highest level of the model are organizational policies, climate, and

culture. These encompass the emotional atmosphere thatDe Rivera (1992)asserts

can be palpably sensed within organizations. Driven by top management, this

dimension can include positive climate as well as a climate of fear (Ashkanasy

& Nicholson, 2003). Organizational policies and industry practice are also

important determinants of requirements for emotional labor, which I argue can

have far-reaching effects on employees. Like Level 3, Level 5 has connections

to every other level, but this time as an exogenous effect. Thus, organizationalpolicies can impact: (1) directly on employees in the form of affective events

precipitated by managers (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996); (2) the affective climate

of the organization, which in turn may determine the affective composition of

groups; and (3) leader-member exchanges at Level 4 (see Cogliser & Schriesheim,

2000)that, in turn, can directly affect employee behavior. Organizational policies

can also (4) constitute a major input to perception of emotion, most particularly

in the form of requirements for emotional labor (Hochschild, 1983).

I do not claim that every possible path is represented in Fig. 6.Clearly, there

are likely to be other relationships in the model that I have not dealt with in detail.Nonetheless, the model provides an indicative re

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