Infante, Janileah Judette B. LLB-1

Case Digest (Set 7)

Title: LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSReference: G.R. No. 176951

Facts:Issue:Discussion:Ruling:

Title: DEMETRIA vs. ALBA Reference: G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987

Facts:

Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977." Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 IS REPUGNANT TO THE CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF FUNDS ARE TO BE MADE.

Discussion:The conditions on the release of money from the treasury [Sec. 18(1)]; the restrictions on the use of public funds for public purpose [Sec. 18(2)]; the prohibition to transfer an appropriation for an item to another [See. 16(5) and the requirement of specifications [Sec. 16(2)], among others, were all safeguards designed to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 puts all these safeguards to naught. For, as correctly observed by petitioners, in view of the unlimited authority bestowed upon the President, "... Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the enactment of unfunded appropriations, results in uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses accountability for budgetary performance and entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling party may well expand [sic] public money not on the basis of development priorities but on political and personal expediency." The contention of public respondents that paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. 1177 was enacted pursuant to Section 16(5) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution must perforce fall flat on its face.

Ruling:WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is hereby declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

Title: GUINGONA vs. CARAGUEReference: G.R. No. 94571 April 22, 1991

Facts:The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00. The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act Strenghthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.

The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations.

Discussion:An examination of the aforecited presidential decrees show the clear intent that the amounts needed to cover the payment of the principal and interest on all foreign loans, including those guaranteed by the national government, should be made available when they shall become due precisely without the necessity of periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating funds therefor, since both the periods and necessities are incapable of determination in advance.

The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit standing of the country.

Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the decrees.

Ruling:The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to implement the same.

Title: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), petitioner, vs. COCOFED, ET AL. and BALLARES, ET AL.,EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO JR. and the SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) respondents.

Reference: G.R. No. 147062-64 December 14, 2001

Facts:Issue:Discussion:Ruling:

Title: PASCUAL vs.THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL., Reference: G.R. No. L-10405 December 29, 1960

Facts:Petitioner prayed, that the contested item of Republic Act No. 920 be declared null and void; that the alleged deed of donation of the feeder roads in question be "declared unconstitutional and, therefor, illegal"; that a writ of injunction be issued enjoining the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the Director of the Bureau of Public Works and Highways and Jose C. Zulueta from ordering or allowing the continuance of the above-mentioned feeder roads project, and from making and securing any new and further releases on the aforementioned item of Republic Act No. 920, and the disbursing officers of the Department of Public Works and Highways from making any further payments out of said funds provided for in Republic Act No. 920; and that pending final hearing on the merits, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the aforementioned parties respondent from making and securing any new and further releases on the aforesaid item of Republic Act No. 920 and from making any further payments out of said illegally appropriated funds.

Issue: Whether or not Article VI, section 25(2) was violated.

Discussion:The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed, subsequently thereto, unless the latter consists of an amendment of the organic law, removing, with retrospective operation, the constitutional limitation infringed by said statute. Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected feeder roads in question, the legality thereof depended upon whether said roads were public or private property when the bill, which, latter on, became Republic Act 920, was passed by Congress, or, when said bill was approved by the President and the disbursement of said sum became effective, or on June 20, 1953. Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to respondent Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and hence, was null and void. The donation to the Government, over five (5) months after the approval and effectivity of said Act, made, according to the petition, for the purpose of giving a "semblance of legality", or legalizing, the appropriation in question, did not cure its aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropriation.

Ruling:Hence, it is our considered opinion that the circumstances surrounding this case sufficiently justify petitioners action in contesting the appropriation and donation in question; that this action should not have been dismissed by the lower court; and that the writ of preliminary injunction should have been maintained.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the records are remanded to the lower court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this instance against respondent Jose C. Zulueta. It is so ordered.

Title: TIO vs. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARDReference: G.R. No. L-75697 June 18, 1987

Facts:The petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators adversely affected. It assails the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred to as the BOARD).

Petitioner's attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE on the grounds of Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof;

Issue: Whether or not the one title-one subject rule was applied.

Discussion:The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object." The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. It should be given practical rather than technical construction. 

Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the tax provision of the DECREE is a rider is without merit. That section reads, inter alia:

Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall acrrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.

Ruling:The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5, supra. Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. The title of the DECREE, which is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is

unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the DECREE. 

Title: TOBIAS vs. ABALOSReference: G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994

Facts:Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."

Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with.

Issue: Whether or not the one title-one subject rule has not been complied.

Discussion:A liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."

The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation"

Ruling:Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Title: TOLENTINO vs.THE SECRETARY OF FINANCEReference:G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995

Facts:The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

Petitioners claimed that R.A. No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, §24 of the Constitution. Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of Representatives where it passed three readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate where after first reading it was referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee, they complain that the Senate did not pass it on second and third readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630) which it approved on May 24, 1994. Petitioner Tolentino adds that what the Senate committee should have done was to amend H. No. 11197 by striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with the text of S. No. 1630. That way, it is said, "the bill remains a House bill and the Senate version just becomes the text of the House bill."

Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violated Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution

Discussion:To except from this procedure the amendment of bills which are required to originate in the House by prescribing that the number of the House bill and its other parts up to the enacting clause must be preserved although the text of the Senate amendment may be incorporated in place of the original body of the bill is to insist on a mere technicality. At any rate there is no rule prescribing this form. S. No. 1630, as a substitute measure, is therefore as much an amendment of H. No. 11197 as any which the Senate could have made.

S. No. 1630 a mere amendment of H. No. 11197. Petitioners' basic error is that they assume that S. No. 1630 is an independent and distinct bill. Hence their repeated references to its certification that it was passed by the Senate "in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197," implying that there is something substantially different between the reference to S. No. 1129 and the reference to H. No. 11197. From this premise, they conclude that R.A. No. 7716 originated both in the House and in the Senate and that it is the product of two "half-baked bills because neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 was passed by both houses of Congress."

Ruling:In point of fact, in several instances the provisions of S. No. 1630, clearly appear to be mere amendments of the corresponding provisions of H. No. 11197. The very tabular comparison of the provisions of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 to the basic petition of petitioner Tolentino, while showing differences between the two bills, at the same time indicates that the provisions of the Senate bill were precisely intended to be amendments to the House bill.

Without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have enacted S. No. 1630. Because the Senate bill was a mere amendment of the House bill, H. No. 11197 in its original form did not have to pass the Senate on second and three readings. It was enough that after it was passed on first reading it was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means.

Neither was it required that S. No. 1630 be passed by the House of Representatives before the two bills could be referred to the Conference Committee.

Title: BOLINAO ELECTRONICS CORPORATION vs. VALENCIAReference: G.R. No. L-20740     June 30, 1964

Facts:Bolinao Electronics is co-owner an co-petitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting Network Montserrat Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own television (channel 9) and radio stations in the Philippines. They were summoned by Valencia, then Sec of Communications, for operating even after their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBN’s continued operation sans license and their continuing operation had caused damage to his department.

Issue: Whether or not Valencia is entitled to claim for damages.Whether or not the President may legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill.

Discussion:Under the Constitution, the President has the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill. However, when a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or more items of the same, the President cannot veto the provision without at the same time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates. (Art. VI, Sec. 20.)It may be observed from the wordings of the Appropriations Act that the amount appropriated for the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service was made subject to the condition that the same shall not be used or expended for operation of television stations in Luzon, where there are already existing commercial television stations. This gives rise to the question of whether the President may legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill. But this is not a novel question. A little effort to research on the subject would have yielded enough authority to guide action on the matter For, in the leading case of State v. Holder, it was already declared that such action by the Chief Executive was illegal.

Ruling:The SC ruled in the negative. Valencia failed to show that any right of his has been violated by the refusal of CBN to cease operation. Further, the SC noted that as the records show, the appropriation to operate the Philippine Broadcasting Service as approved by Congress and incorporated in the 1962-1963 Budget of the Republic of the Philippines does not allow appropriations for TV stations particularly in Luzon. Hence, since there was no appropriation allotted then there can be no damage; and if there are expenditures made by Valencia’s department they are in fact in violation of the law and they cannot claim damages therefrom. And even if it is shown that the then president vetoed this provision of the Budget Act, such veto is illegal because he may not legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill. This ruling, that the executive's veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever; and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains.

Title: GONZALES vs. MACARAIGReference: G.R. No. 87636 November 19, 1990

Facts:On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill No. 19186, or the GeneralAppropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it eliminated or decreased certainitems included in the proposed budget submitted by the President. Pursuant to the constitutional provision on the passage of bills, Congress presented the said Bill to the President for consideration and approval.

On 29 December 1988, the President signed the Bill into law, and declared the same to have become Rep. Act No. 6688. In the process, seven (7) Special Provisions and Section 55, a "General Provision," were vetoed.

On 2 February 1989, the Senate, in the same Resolution No. 381 mentioned at the outset, further expressed:

"WHEREAS, Be it Resolved, as it is hereby Resolved, That the Senate express its sense that the veto by the President of Section 55 of the GENERAL PROVISIONS of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) is unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without any force and effect; hence, the aforesaid Section 55 remains;

Thus it is that, on 11 April 1989, this Petition for Prohibition/ Mandamus was filed, with a prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order, assailing mainly the constitutionality or legality of the Presidential veto of Section 55, and seeking to enjoin respondents from implementing Rep. Act No. 6688. No Restraining Order was issued by the Court.

Issue: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto poweaccorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto "provisions" of an Appropriations Bill?

Discussion:We are of the opinion that Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90) are not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term. Article VI, Section 25 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides:

"Sec. 25 (2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations billunless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision orenactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates."

Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to some" particular appropriation" therein. The challenged "provisions" fall short of this requirement. Firstly, the vetoed "provisions" do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90) although labelled as "provisions," are actually inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the President’s veto power.

Considering that the vetoed provisions are not, in the budgetary sense of the term, conditions or restrictions, the case of Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia (supra), invoked by petitioners, becomes inapplicable. In that case, a public works bill contained an item appropriating a certain sum for assistance to television stations, subject to the condition that the amount would not be available to places where there were commercial television stations. Then President Macapagal approved the appropriation but vetoed the condition. When challenged before this Court, it was held that the veto was ineffectual and that the approval of the item carried with it the approval of the condition attached to it. In contrast with the case at bar, there is no condition, in the budgetary sense of the term, attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill which was struck out. For obviously, Sections 55 (FY ‘89) and 16 (FY ‘90) partake more of a curtailment on the power to augment from savings; in other words, "a general provision of law, which happens to be put in an appropriation bill" (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, supra).

Ruling:The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90) because they nullify the authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of government to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution.

Restrictions or conditions in an Appropriations Bill must exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. Again, the test is appropriateness. "It is not enough that a provision be related to the institution or agency to which funds are appropriated. Conditions and limitations properly included in an appropriation bill must exhibit such a connexity with money items of appropriation that they logically belong in aschedule of expenditures . . . the ultimate test is one of appropriateness" (Henry v.Edwards, supra, at 158). Tested by these criteria, Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90) must also be held to be inappropriate "conditions." While they, particularly, Section 16 (FY ‘90), have been "artfully drafted" to appear as true conditions or limitations, they are actually general law measures more appropriate for substantive and, therefore, separate legislation.

WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of the assailed Presidential veto is UPHELD and this Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Title: PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION vs. ENRIQUEZReference: G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994

Facts:This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president involving the GAA of 1994. This case also involves the power of Congress as far as the “pork barrel’ fund is concerned. PHILCONSA questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be applied for since that is already the function of the executive. In another case, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAA of 1994, neither house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Tañada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this petition, petitioners contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU's, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).

Issue: Whether or not the President’s veto is valid.

Discussion:

Veto on special provisionsThe president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Tañada et al averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered “inappropriate”; in fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation.

Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs.The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC's), the President vetoed special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already funds allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program. Tañada et al claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to the “One Fund Policy” – it avoided double funding and redundancy. Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual obligations. The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended - 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are "appropriate" in the budgetary sense.The veto herein is then not valid.

Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment.

As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, "shall effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP". The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being "inappropriate" provisions.

Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds.According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the president.

Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU's.Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU's including the payment of separation benefits. The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on the CAFGU's shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws.

Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc.In his veto message: "The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that 'no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law.' I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established principle on compensation standardization. Tañada et al claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.

Ruling:WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED, except with respect to (1) G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the special provision on debt service specifying that the fund therein appropriated "shall be used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" prohibiting the use of the said funds "to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators", and (2) G.R. No. 113888 only insofar as it prays for the annulment of the veto of: (a) the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item of appropriation for the Department of Public Works and Highways (GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786); and (b) Special Provision No. 12 on the purchase of medicines by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (GAA of 1994, p. 748), which is GRANTED.

Title: BELGICA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Reference: G.R. No. 208566   November 19, 2013

Facts:In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of American-English origin) has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature (“Congressional Pork Barrel”). However, it has also come to refer to certain funds to the Executive. The “Congressional Pork Barrel” can be traced from Act 3044 (Public Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local Development Projects during the Marcos period, the Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas Development Fund and later the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority Development Assistance Fund under the Joseph Estrada administration, as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino III administrations.The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.Over the years, “pork” funds have increased tremendously. In 1996, an anonymous source later identified as former Marikina City Romeo Candazo revealed that huge sums of government money went into the pockets of legislators as kickbacks. In 2004, several citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the 2004 General Appropriations Act for being unconstitutional, but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition. In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into allegations that “the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects.” The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation – “JLN” standing for Janet Lim Napoles – had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects” using no fewer than 20 dummy non-government organizations for an entire decade. In August 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit investigation covering the use of legislators’ PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration.As for the “Presidential Pork Barrel”, whistle-blowers alleged that “[a]t least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy [NGO].”

Issue: Whether or not 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are unconstitutional considering it denied the President the power to veto items.

Discussion:For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands,210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as follows:

An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise his power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which provide for parameters of appropriation.Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item." This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line- item" appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose funds, it must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein." And hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes.

Ruling:In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on." Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power of the President mandates that appropriations bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless."

The Court agrees with petitioners.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the above-described system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24.79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.

Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation above-characterized. In particular, the lump-

sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.

Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires. Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is that unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable ends.

Title: TAÑADA vs. TUVERAReference: G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

Facts:Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution,  as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Issue: Whether or not the unpublished presidential issuance have binding force and effect.

Discussion:From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

Ruling:WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

Title: PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-N.U.B.E. vs. VEGAReference: G.R. No. 105364   June 28, 2001

Facts:Republic Act No. 7169 entitled "An Act To Rehabilitate The Philippine Veterans Bank Created Under Republic Act No. 3518, Providing The Mechanisms Therefor, And For Other Purposes", which was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992 and which was published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992, provides in part for the reopening of the Philippine Veterans Bank together with all its branches within the period of three (3) years from the date of the reopening of the head office.7 The law likewise provides for the creation of a rehabilitation committee in order to facilitate the implementation of the provisions of the same.8Pursuant to said R.A. No. 7169, the Rehabilitation Committee submitted the proposed Rehabilitation Plan of the PVB to the Monetary Board for its approval. Meanwhile, PVB filed a Motion to Terminate Liquidation of Philippine Veterans Bank dated March 13, 1992 with the respondent judge praying that the liquidation proceedings be immediately terminated in view of the passage of R.A. No. 7169.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 7169 became effective immediately upon its approval.

Discussion:Anent the claim of respondents Central Bank and Liquidator of PVB that R.A. No. 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette; and, the contention of intervenors VOP Security, et. al. that the effectivity of said law is conditioned on the approval of a rehabilitation plan by the Monetary Board, among others, the Court is of the view that both contentions are bereft of merit.

While as a rule, laws take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions, as indicated in the clause "unless otherwise provided."

In the case at bar, Section 10 of R.A. No. 7169 provides:

Sec. 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law effective immediately upon its approval. It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992. Therefore, said law became effective on said date.

Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169, then it became legally effective on February 24, 1992, the date when the same was published in the Official Gazette, and not on March 10, 1992, as erroneously claimed by respondents Central Bank and Liquidator.

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. Respondent Judge is hereby PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from further proceeding with Civil Case No. SP- 32311.SO ORDERED.

Title: GARCIA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSReference: G.R. No. 111230 September 30, 1994

Facts:In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, 1 the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic ActNo. 7227.

On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition 2 with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993.

The municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within thirty (30) days after its submission. Petitioners then resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. 3 They started to solicit the required number of signatures 4 to cause the repeal of said resolution. Unknown to the petitioners, however, the Honorable Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 to the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of " . . . the petition for a local initiative and/or referendum because the exercise will just promote divisiveness, counter productive and futility.

In its session of July 6, 1993, the COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject is "merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance." 6 On July 13, 1993, the COMELEC en banc further resolved to direct Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Benjamin N. Casiano, to hold action on the authentication of signatures being gathered by petitioners. 

Respondent COMELEC opposed the petition. Through the Solicitor General, it contends that under the Local Government Code of 1991, a resolution cannot be the subject of a local initiative. The same stance is assumed by the respondent Sangguniang Bayan of Morong.

Issue: Whether or not the said resolution cannot be the subject of a local initiative.

Discussion:In due time, Congress respondent to the mandate of the Constitution. It enacted laws to put into operation the constitutionalized concept of initiative and referendum. On August 4, 1989, it approved Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor." Liberally borrowed from American laws, 15 R.A. No. 6735, among others, spelled out the requirements 16 for the exercise of the power of initiative and referendum, the conduct of national initiative and referendum; 17 procedure of local initiative and referendum; 18 and their limitations. 19 Then came Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991. Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Code governed the conduct of local initiative and referendum.

In light of this legal backdrop, the essential issue to be resolved in the case at bench is whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the proper subject of an initiative. Respondents take the negative stance as they contend that under the Local Government Code of 1991 only an ordinance can be the subject of initiative. They rely on section 120, Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides: "Local Initiative Defined. — Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance."

We reject respondents' narrow and literal reading of the above provision for it will collide with the Constitution and will subvert the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 on initiative and referendum.

The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: "The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local legislative body . . ." An act includes a resolution.

Ruling:We note that respondents do not give any reason why resolutions should not be the subject of a local initiative. In truth, the reason lies in the well known distinction between a resolution and an ordinance — i.e., that a resolution is used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which is to have only a temporary effect while an ordinance is intended to permanently direct and control matters applying to persons or things in general. 25 Thus, resolutions are not normally subject to referendum for it may destroy the efficiency necessary to the successful administration of the business affairs of a city. 26

In the case at bench, however, it can not be argued that the subject matter of the resolution of the municipality of Morong merely temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a permanent rule of conduct or government.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and COMELEC Resolution 93-1623 dated July 6, 1993 and Resolution 93-1676 dated July 13, 1993 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

Title: SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ERMITAReference: G.R. No. 169777    April 20, 2006

Facts:The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project).

On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita a letter dated September 27, 2005 "respectfully request[ing] for the postponement of the hearing [regarding the NorthRail project] to which various officials of the Executive Department have been invited" in order to "afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation."

Senate President Drilon, however, wrote Executive Secretary Ermita that the Senators "are unable to accede to [his request]" as it "was sent belatedly" and "[a]ll preparations and arrangements as well as notices to all resource persons were completed [the previous] week."

Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005 a letter from the President of the North Luzon Railways Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the NorthRail project be postponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on the contract agreements relative to the project had been secured.

On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:

SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.

SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. – All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.

Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of E.O. 464, and another letter informing him "that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have not secured the required consent from the President."

Issues: Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;Whether or not Section 1 E.O. 464 is valid in pursuance to Article VI, section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.

Discussion:E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before Congress, deprives Congress of the information in the possession of these officials. To resolve the question of whether such withholding of information violates the Constitution, consideration of the general power of Congress to obtain information, otherwise known as the power of inquiry, is in order.

The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads:

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations.

As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.

However, The required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.

SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.

Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22 of Article VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis-à-vis Section 21 which provides for the power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers. That department heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress’ right to executive information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative.

Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.

Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.

Ruling:Having established the proper interpretation of Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the Court now proceeds to pass on the constitutionality of Section 1 of E.O. 464.

Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it constitutional.

The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID.

Title: BENGZON vs.THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE Reference: G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991

Facts:This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injuective relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations.

On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, et al.", for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.

On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flaship of the First Manila Management of Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."

On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee).Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."

Issue: Whether or not the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, as it is not done in aid of legislation.

Discussion:The 1987 Constition expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 14 Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.

The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also

extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.

Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon commitee was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopaa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.

Ruling:It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the ralatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court holds that, under the facts, including the circumtance that petitioners are presently impleaded as defendants in a case before the Sandiganbayan, which involves issues intimately related to the subject of contemplated inquiry before the respondet Committee, the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is hereby enjoined from compelling the petitioners and intervenor to testify before it and produce evidence at the said inquiry.

Title: STANDARD CHARTERED BANK vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKSReference: G.R. No. 167173      December 27, 2007

Facts:On February 1, 2005, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of respondent, delivered a privilege speech entitled "Arrogance of Wealth" before the Senate based on a letter from Atty. Mark R. Bocobo denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regulation Code (R.A. No. 8799) and urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future. Upon motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, the speech was referred to respondent. Prior to the privilege speech, Senator Enrile had introduced P.S. Resolution No. 166.

Petitioners argue that respondent has no jurisdiction to conduct the inquiry because its subject matter is the very same subject matter of their pending cases.

Issue: Whether or not having pending cases of the petitioner may exempt them from appearing in the legislative inquiry.

Discussion:It is true that in Bengzon, the Court declared that the issue to be investigated was one over which jurisdiction had already been acquired by the Sandiganbayan, and to allow the [Senate Blue Ribbon] Committee to investigate the matter would create the possibility of conflicting judgments; and that the inquiry into the same justiciable controversy would be an encroachment on the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had set in much earlier.

To the extent that, in the case at bench, there are a number of cases already pending in various courts and administrative bodies involving the petitioners, relative to the alleged sale of unregistered foreign securities, there is a resemblance between this case and Bengzon. However, the similarity ends there.

Central to the Court’s ruling in Bengzon -- that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was without any constitutional mooring to conduct the legislative investigation -- was the Court’s determination that the intended inquiry was not in aid of legislation.

Unfortunately for the petitioners, this distinguishing factual milieu in Bengzon does not obtain in the instant case. P.S. Resolution No. 166 is explicit on the subject and nature of the inquiry to be (and already being) conducted by the respondent Committee, as found in the last three Whereas clauses thereof, viz.:

WHEREAS, existing laws including the Securities Regulation Code seem to be inadequate in preventing the sale of unregistered securities and in effectively enforcing the registration rules intended to protect the investing public from fraudulent practices;

WHEREAS, the regulatory intervention by the SEC and BSP likewise appears inadequate in preventing the conduct of proscribed activities in a manner that would protect the investing public;

WHEREAS, there is a need for remedial legislation to address the situation, having in mind the imposition of proportionate penalties to offending entities and their directors, officers and representatives among other additional regulatory measures; (emphasis supplied)

The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the said resolution,

exposes the error in petitioners’ allegation that the inquiry, as initiated in a privilege speech by the very same Senator Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities x x x." This fallacy is made more glaring when we consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate "to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future."

Ruling:Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.

The prosecution of offenders by the prosecutorial agencies and the trial before the courts is for the punishment of persons who transgress the law. The intent of legislative inquiries, on the other hand, is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not be enacted into law.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Prohibition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Manifestation and Motion dated June 21, 2006 is, likewise, DENIED for being moot and academic.

Title: NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., vs. SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETEReference: G.R. No. 72492 November 5, 1987

Facts:Assailed is the validity of a subpoena dated October 25, 1985 sent by the respondent Committee to the petitioners Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac, Chairman of the Board of Directors and the General Manager, respectively, of petitioner Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative NORECO II, requiring their attendance and testimony at the Committee's investigation on October 29, 1985. Similarly under fire is the Order issued by the same Committee on the latter date, directing said petitioners to show cause why they should not be punished for legislative contempt due to their failure to appear at said investigation.

The investigation to be conducted by respondent Committee was "in connection with pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities"  in the City of Dumaguete where petitioner NORECO II, an electric cooperative, had its principal place of business. Specifically, the inquiry was to focus on the alleged installation and use by the petitioner NORECO II of inefficient power lines in that city.

The motion to quash was denied in the assailed Order of October 29, 1985 directing the petitioners Torres and Umbac to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt. Hence this Petition for certiorari andProhibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order.

Respondents, claim that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction. It is also the position of the respondents that the contempt power, if not expressly granted, is necessarily implied from the powers granted the Sangguniang Panlungsod. 

Issue: Whether or not respondents may direct herein petitioners to show cause why they should not be punished for legislative contempt for their disobedience of said subpoena.

Discussion:The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that branch of the government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis, and local legislative bodies cannot correctly claim to possess it for the same reasons that the national legislature does. The power attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se but to the character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government. The same thing cannot be said of local legislative bodies which are creations of law.

Thus, the contempt power, as well as the subpoena power, which the framers of the fundamental law did not expressly provide for but which the then Congress has asserted essentially for self-preservation as one of three co-equal branches of the government cannot be deemed implied in the delegation of certain legislative functions to local legislative bodies.

Ruling:The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete may, therefore, enact ordinances to regulate the installation and maintenance of electric power lines, e.g. prohibit the use of inefficient power lines, in order to protect the city residents from the hazards these may pose. In aid of this ordinance making power, said body or any of its committees may conduct

investigations similar to, but not the same as, the legislative investigations conducted by the national legislature. As already discussed, the difference lies in the lack of subpoena power and of the power to punish for contempt on the part of the local legislative bodies. They may only invite resource persons who are willing to supply information which may be relevant to the proposed ordinance. The type of investigation which may be conducted by the Sangguniang PanLungsod does not include within its ambit an inquiry into any suspected violation by an electric cooperative of the conditions of its electric franchise.

WHEREFORE, the subpoena dated October 25, 1985 requiring the attendance and testimony of the petitioners at an investigation by the respondent Ad-Hoc Committee, and the Order issued by the latter on October 29, 1985 directing herein petitioners to show cause why they should not be punished for legislative contempt for their disobedience of said subpoena, is declared null and void for being ultra vires. The respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod and the respondent Ad-Hoc Committee are without power to punish non- members for contempt. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on November 7, 1985 enjoining said respondents, their agents and representatives, and the police and other peace officers from enforcing the aforesaid Order of the respondent committee is made permanent. Petition is GRANTED. No costs.

Title: ARNAULT vs. NAZARENOReference: G.R. No. L-3820   July 18, 1950

Facts:In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. Of the first sum, P1,000,000 was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, the Associated Estates, Inc., represented by Jean L. Arnault, for alleged interest of the said Burt in the Buenavista Estate. The second sum of P500,000 was all paid to the same Ernest H. Burt through his other attorney-in-fact, the North Manila Development Co., Inc., also represented by Jean L. Arnault, for the alleged interest of the said Burt in the Tambobong Estate.The special committee called and examined various witnesses, among the most important of whom was the herein petitioner, Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government.Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he draw on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed. It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the present case.

Issue: Whether or not it is within the power of either House of Congress to punish a person not a member for contempt.

Discussion:Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information — which is not infrequently true — recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. (McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S., 135; 71 L. ed., 580; 50 A.L R., 1.) The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly behavior, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any other person. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6, Wheaton, 204; 5 L. ed., 242.) But no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire. (Kilbourn vs.Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377.).

The petitioner has not challenged the validity of Senate Resolution No. 8, and that resolution expressly requires the committee to determine the parties responsible for the

deal. We are bound to presume that the Senate has acted in the due performance of its constitutional function in instituting the inquiry, if the act is capable of being so construed. If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment. (Sullivan vs. Hill, 73 W. Va., 49; 79 S.E., 670; 40 Ann. Cas. [1916 B.], 1115.)

Ruling:We think it could be enforced until the final adjournment of the last session of the Second Congress in 1953. We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.

But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.

We are satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, what is the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000? were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave the P440,000 to a person to him unknown.

"Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable."

Title: GUDANI vs. SENGAReference: G.R. No. 170165     August 15, 2006

Facts:The petitioners are high-ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Both petitioners, Brigadier General Francisco Gudani (Gen. Gudani) and Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Balutan (Col. Balutan), belonged to the Philippine Marines. At the time of the subject incidents, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were assigned to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio City, the former as the PMA Assistant Superintendent, and the latter as the Assistant Commandant of Cadets.

Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan, and AFP Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Generoso Senga (Gen. Senga) were among the several AFP officers who received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to attend the 28 September 2005 hearing. On 23 September 2005, Gen. Senga replied through a letter to Sen. Biazon that he would be unable to attend the hearing due to a previous commitment in Brunei, but he nonetheless "directed other officers from the AFP who were invited to attend the hearing."

On 27 September 2005, Gen. Senga wrote a letter to Sen. Biazon, requesting the postponement of the hearing scheduled for the following day, since the AFP Chief of Staff was himself unable to attend said hearing, and that some of the invited officers also could not attend as they were "attending to other urgent operational matters." By this time, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had already departed Baguio for Manila to attend the hearing.

Then on the evening of 27 September 2005, at around 10:10 p.m., a message was transmitted to the PMA Superintendent from the office of Gen. Senga, stating as follows:

PER INSTRUCTION OF HER EXCELLENCY PGMA, NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL. INFORM BGEN FRANCISCO F GUDANI AFP AND LTC ALEXANDER BALUTAN PA (GSC) ACCORDINGLY.7

Gen. Senga sent another letter to Sen. Biazon, this time informing the senator that "no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear" before the hearing scheduled on that day. Nonetheless, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were present as the hearing started, and they both testified as to the conduct of the 2004 elections.

On the very day of the hearing, 28 September 2005, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464). The OSG notes that the E.O. "enjoined officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval." This Court subsequently ruled on the constitutionality of the said executive order in Senate v. Ermita.

Issue: Whether or not respondents' disobedience to the order of the President as they were appearing in obeisance to the authority of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is tenable.

Discussion:Notably, it is not alleged that petitioners were in any way called to task for violating E.O. 464, but instead, they were charged for violating the direct order of Gen. Senga not to appear before the Senate Committee, an order that stands independent of the executive order. 

Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive branch to seek prior presidential approval before appearing before Congress, the notion of executive control also comes into consideration.25 However, the ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing before Congress pertains to a wholly different and independent specie of presidential authority—the commander-in-chief powers of the President. By tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control.During the deliberations in Senate, the Court was very well aware of the pendency of this petition as well as the issues raised herein. The decision in Senate was rendered with the comfort that the nullification of portions of E.O. 464 would bear no impact on the present petition since petitioners herein were not called to task for violating the executive order.

Ruling:Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions,51 yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the President’s ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Title: NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONSReference: G.R. No. 180643   September 4, 2008

Facts:On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,  (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.

On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the President invoking executive privilege. On November 22, 2007, the respondent Committees issued the show-cause letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. On November 29, 2007, in petitioner’s reply to respondent Committees, he manifested that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. He also manifested his willingness to appear and testify should there be new matters to be taken up. He just requested that he be furnished "in advance as to what else" he "needs to clarify."

Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order dated January 30, 2008; In Re: P.S. Res. Nos. 127,129,136 & 144; and privilege speeches of Senator Lacson and Santiago (all on the ZTE-NBN Project), citing petitioner in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

Issues: Whether or not the petitioner can invoke executive privilege.Whether or not respondents acted a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they punished the petitioner for contempt.Whether or not respondents did not violate the requirements under Article VI, section 21 of the Constitution requiring that its rules of procedure be duly published.

Discussion:The Court articulated in these cases that "there are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public," that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters";and that "the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings."

The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the Office of the President. While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential

culpability of high government officials, including the President, in a given government transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to determine anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not bestowed upon the Legislature the latter role. Just as the Judiciary cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature adjudicate or prosecute.

Moreover, it bears stressing that no inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e. legislation. Investigations conducted solely to gather incriminatory evidence and "punish" those investigated are indefensible. There is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.

The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.

If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective.

Ruling:

This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. They could continue the investigation and even call petitioner Neri to testify again. He himself has repeatedly expressed his willingness to do so. Our Decision merely excludes from the scope of respondents’ investigation the three (3) questions that elicit answers covered by executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot be compelled to appear before respondents to answer the said questions. We have discussed the reasons why these answers are covered by executive privilege. That there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of such information is a recognized principle in other democratic States. To put it simply, the right to information is not an absolute right.For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed Decision did not enjoin respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. All that is expected from them is to respect matters that are covered by executive privilege.

We cannot subscribe to the respondent Committees’ self-defeating proposition that without the answers to the three (3) questions objected to as privileged, the distinguished members of the respondent Committees cannot intelligently craft legislation.

In the present case, it is respondent Committees’ contention that their determination on the validity of executive privilege should be binding on the Executive and the Courts. It is their assertion that theirinternal procedures and deliberations cannot be inquired into by this Court supposedly in accordance with the principle of respect between co-equal branches of government. Interestingly, it is a courtesy that they appear to be unwilling to extend to the Executive (on the matter of executive privilege) or this Court (on the matter

of judicial review). It moves this Court to wonder: In respondent Committees’ paradigm of checks and balances, what are the checks to the Legislature’s all-encompassing, awesome power of investigation? It is a power, like any other, that is susceptible to grave abuse.While this Court finds laudable the respondent Committees’ well-intentioned efforts to ferret out corruption, even in the highest echelons of government, such lofty intentions do not validate or accord to Congress powers denied to it by the Constitution and granted instead to the other branches of government.