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Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

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Comments on “Vintage and Credit Rating: What Matters in the ABX Data During the Credit Crunch”. Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board* *The views expressed herein are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board of Governors, its members, or its staff. Discussion. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Comments on “Vintage and Credit Rating: What Matters in the ABX Data During the Credit Crunch” Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board* *The views expressed herein are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board of Governors, its members, or its staff.
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Page 1: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

Comments on “Vintage and Credit Rating: What Matters in the ABX Data During the Credit Crunch”

Shane SherlundFederal Reserve Board*

*The views expressed herein are mine alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board of Governors, its members, or its staff.

Page 2: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

Discussion

Very nice, careful paper!

Decompose movements in ABX-HE prices

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

06Q1 06Q3 07Q1 07Q3 08Q1 08Q3

AB

X p

rice

Source: Markit.

Page 3: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

Discussion

Common factors

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

-40

-20

0

20

40

06Q1 06Q3 07Q1 07Q3 08Q1 08Q3

2006-1 AAA2007-1 AAA

2006-1 BBB-2007-1 BBB-

HPA

AB

X p

rice

sH

PA

(percent)

Source: Markit, RadarLogic.

Page 4: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

Discussion

Ratings factors

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

06Q1 06Q3 07Q1 07Q3 08Q1 08Q3

AAA AA A BBB BBB-

2006

-1 A

BX

pri

ces

Source: Markit.

Page 5: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

Discussion

Vintage factors

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

110

06Q1 06Q3 07Q1 07Q3 08Q1 08Q3

2006-1 2006-2 2007-1 2007-2

AA

A A

BX

pri

ces

Source: Markit.

Page 6: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

Cumulative Default CurvesSeptember 2008

Source: Calculations from First American LoanPerformance.

Page 7: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

Discussion

Liquidity effects

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

-100

0

100

200

300

400

06Q1 06Q3 07Q1 07Q3 08Q1 08Q3

2006-1 AAA2007-1 AAA

2006-1 BBB-2007-1 BBB-

LIBOR-OIS

AB

X p

rice

s

LIBO

R-O

IS (basis points)

Source: Markit, Federal Reserve.

Page 8: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

Discussion

Common factor Relatively small effect early on; low correlation Onset of financial turmoil, significant and

persistent increase Systematic, non-diversifiable risk High correlation across assets

Asset rating and vintage factors Effects decrease over time Distinguish between vintages and tranches Roles in asset volatility small

Page 9: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

Discussion

Liquidity premium Influence increased at onset of financial turmoil Along with common factor, accounts for downward

pressure on ABX prices Across ratings Across vintages

Page 10: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

Comments

Composition of each vintage Underwriting Geography

Page 11: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

House Price Appreciation2000-2008

Source: FHFA House Price Index.

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

Per

cent

(an

nual

rat

e)

CA, FL, AZ, NV

OH, MI, IN

National

Page 12: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

Percent of Subprime Mortgages with Negative Equity by State2005-2008

Source: Calculations from First American LoanPerformance, FHFA and S&P/Case-Shiller house price data.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

2005 2006 2007 2008

CA, AZ, FL, NV

OH, MI, IN

Rest of U.S.

Per

cent

of

loan

s

Page 13: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

Serious Delinquency Rates by State2005-2008

Source: First American LoanPerformance.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

2005 2006 2007 2008

CA, AZ, FL, NV

OH, MI, INRest of U.S.

Per

cent

of

loan

s

Page 14: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

Comments

Liquidity effect Investors? Borrowers? Both?

Page 15: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

Subprime Mortgage Rate ResetsSeptember 2003

Source: First American LoanPerformance.

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

300000

350000

2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Nu

mb

er

of l

oa

ns

Page 16: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

Subprime Mortgage Rate ResetsSeptember 2004

Source: First American LoanPerformance.

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

300000

350000

2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Nu

mb

er

of l

oa

ns

Page 17: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

Subprime Mortgage Rate ResetsSeptember 2005

Source: First American LoanPerformance.

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

300000

350000

2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Nu

mb

er

of l

oa

ns

Page 18: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

Subprime Mortgage Rate ResetsSeptember 2006

Source: First American LoanPerformance.

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

300000

350000

2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Nu

mb

er

of l

oa

ns

Page 19: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

Subprime Mortgage Rate ResetsSeptember 2007

Source: First American LoanPerformance.

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

300000

350000

2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Nu

mb

er

of l

oa

ns

Page 20: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

Subprime Mortgage Rate ResetsSeptember 2008

Source: First American LoanPerformance.

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

300000

350000

2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

Nu

mb

er

of l

oa

ns

Page 21: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

Cumulative Prepayment CurvesSeptember 2008

Source: Calculations from First American LoanPerformance.

Page 22: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

Comments

Measure of fit? R-squared (pseudo R-squared) “Variance decomposition”

Page 23: Shane Sherlund Federal Reserve Board*

Summary

Ratings and vintage factors Effects decreased over time Role in asset volatility small

Common factor Significant and persistent effect once financial

turmoil started Systematic risk; high asset correlations

Liquidity premium Influence increases over time


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