SharekYouthForum Promise or Peril the Status of Youth in Palestine

7/31/2019 SharekYouthForum Promise or Peril the Status of Youth in Palestine

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The Status of Youth

in Palestine


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Acknowledgment

This Report could have not been prepared without the devotion

and resilience of those listed below, In addition to the many

courageous, frank and passionate, young women and men that

participated actively in all focus groups and interviews conducted

during the research period.

Team Leader

Suan Mushasha

Principal Authors

Sara Bailey, and Darragh Murray

Key Advisors and Contributors

Bader Zamareh (Executive Director of Sharek) Moheeb Shaath

(Director of Sharek/Gaza), Yousef Ghosheh, Sahar Othman,

Hanneen Abu Nahleh, Mohmmed Arouki, Sami Abu Sultan,

Khaled Abu Ali,

Translation into Arabic

Malek Quttieneh

Graphic Design

Mohammed Amous.

Opinions expressed in this report represent Sharek Youth Forum

only. The report is self nanced by Sharek no outside funding were

solicited.


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Acknowledgment 2

1. Introduction 5

1.1MethodologicalNote 8

2. Participation 10

2.1FearandDisillusionment:PalestinianPoliticalParties 11

2.2CivicandAssociationalLife 13

2.3BarrierstoParticipation 14

2.4CritiquesoftheApproachofYouthOrganisations 16

2.5Sports,CultureandRecreation 16

2.6Summary 17

3. Education/Knowledge 18

3.1TheImportanceofEducation 18

3.2EducationinPalestine 19

3.3The Importanceof Educat ion withrespect toNat ional I dent ity 21

3.4AccessandCost 22

3.5TheCurriculum 23

3.5.1DifficultiesIdentifiedwiththeNewCurriculum 23

3.6QualityofEducation 25

3.6.1LimitedResourcesIncreasingDemand 25

3.6.2TeacherQuality 25

3.6.3AppropriatenessofSchoolingtoLifeRequirements 27

3.6.4Wasta 28

3.6.5TheGovernmentResponse 28

3.7TheLinkbetweenEducationandEmployment 29

3.7.1EducationalCompetenciesandtheDemandsoftheLabourMarket 30

3.7.2TheRoleofthePublicSector 31

3.7.3PublicandPrivateSectorParticipation 31

3.7.4GovernmentalResponses 32

3.8TechnicalandVocationalEducationTraining(TVET) 33

3.9Summary 34

Contents

4. PovertyandUnemployment 35

4.1Poverty 35

4.2Employment/Unemployment 36

4.2.1RatesofUnemploymentintheWestBankandGazaStrip 37

4.2.2Wasta 38 4.2.3 Unemp loymen tasaDri ve r for Memberships in Armed Groups 40

4.2.4UnemploymentasaDriverofEmigration 40

4.2.5MicrofinanceandSustainability 41

4.2.6GenderandEmployment 42

4.2.7TheImpactof Employment/UnemploymentonYouthTransi tion 44

4.3Summary 45

5. TheHealthofYoungPalestinians 47

5.1TheSocialDeterminantsofHealth 47

5.2TheHeal thand We llbeing of YoungPalest in ians: key ind icators 49

5.2.1ChronicDiseaseRates 50

5.2.2MentalHealthIndicators 52

5.5HealthInterventionsforYoungPalestinians 54

5.5.1HealthPromotion 54

5.5.2AccesstoHealthServices:coverageandquality 55

5.5.3AccesstoMentalHealthServices 56

5.6Summary 58

6. JusticeandSecurity 59

6.1TheRuleofLawandJustice 60

6.1.1TheLackofFaithintheGovernmentsAbilitytoProtect 62

6.1.2Gender 65

6.2InternalDivision 66

6.3TheImpactoftheOccupation 68

6.4TheLimitingEffectsofInsecurity 70

6.5Summary 71

7. TheFutureKnockingattheDoor? 72


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1. Introduction

...they are destined to guide the

ortunes o mankind.

1 UN General Assembly Resolution 2037 (XX), 1965.


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...they are destined to guide thefortunes of mankind.1

Youths vital role in the developmentof society was formally recognised

by the United Nations in GeneralAssembly Resolution 2037, whichstated that youth play an importantpart in every eld of human

development ... they are destinedto guide the fortunes of mankind.2This

Youths vital role in the developmentof society was formally recognised

by the United Nations in General

Assembly Resolution 2037, whichstated that youth play an importantpart in every eld of human

development ... they are destinedto guide the fortunes of mankind.2This recognition, and the criticalimportance of youth to society,is perhaps best expressed byparaphrasing UNICEF: unless theinvestment in youth is made, all ofhumanitys fundamental long-termproblems will remain fundamental

2 UN General Assembly Resolution 2037 (XX), 1965.

1. Introduction

long-term problems.3

Today, Palestinian youth compriseapproximately 27 percent ofthe total population, and recentdemographic trends indicate that,

in the future, youth will constitutean ever increasing proportion ofPalestinian society.4 As a result ofthe current reality in Palestine primarily aributed to Israels brutal

and longstanding occupation, butalso related to internal division andsocietal norms the reality of lifefor youth is beset by oppression,violence, and deprivation. However,this report does not intend to castyouth as victims; despite thesehardships youth exhibit a resilience,commitment and drive that is

perhaps more inspiring given thecircumstances from which it hasemerged. As will be discussed

below, youth have consistentlybeen the drivers of radical changein Palestinian society, from theirconsolidation into political groupsand activists following the Nakba,5to their fundamental role in bringingIsrael to the negotiating table in the

3 Paraphrased from, Unless the investment in children is made, all ofhumanitys most fundamental long-term problems will remain fundamental

long-term problems. UNICEF, The State of the Worlds Children, (1995).4Youth defined by PCBS here as 15-29 year olds. Palestinian Central Bureau

of Statistics,Palestine Youth: Figures and Statistics, 2006

5 The uprooting of the Palestinian people from their

land in 1948 upon the creation of the State of Israel.

aermath of the rst intifada.

In recognition of the specic

nature of youth issues, and theinterconnection between these issuesand the overall political, economic

and social challenges faced byPalestinian society, the PalestinianNational Authority (PNA) and othernational, regional and internationalorganisations have noted that youthissues must be placed centrally ontheir agendas.6

Yet, while youth play a fundamentalrole in the development of societyunder normal conditions, it isperhaps in situations of occupation,injustice and oppression that thepotential and power of youth takes

on a fundamental and criticalimportance. Throughout history andacross the globe, youth have been atthe forefront of revolutions, ghting

for justice, freedom and equality. Thisyear marks the 20th anniversary ofTiananmen Square when one millionChinese youth took to the streetsand shook a seemingly invincibleState to its core. The brutality of theChinese governments response isan embodiment of their fear in theface of youth empowerment. The

6 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics,Palestine Youth:

Figures and Statistics, 2006, p. 4.

power and potential of youth hasalso been evident in the anti-Vietnamwar movement and the million manmarch in the United States, in thecivil rights movement in NorthernIreland, and in the dening role of

youth resistance to the apartheidregime in South Africa, as epitomised

by the actions of high-school studentsin Soweto in 1976.

This power and potential has alsobeen witnessed in Palestine. In1987, Palestinian children and youth

became among those etched in theannals of history when they roseup, armed only with stones, self-

belief and community solidarity, andforced a major military power to thenegotiating table. The involvement

of Palestines young in the resistancemovement was unusually intense,prominent and sustained.7 Theinstitutions of Palestinian society,over the course of four decades ofoccupation, expulsion and exile, hadempowered their youngest members.The symbolic power of Palestinianuniversities as national institutionsextended their role beyond providersof education to bearers of national

7 Barber, B.K. Political violence, family relations, andPalestinian youth functioning, Journal of Adolescent

Research, 14, 1999.


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consciousness. 8 Neighbourhood andpopular commiees, constituting true

forms of participatory democracy,allowed for the fullest realizationof human creative potential.9 A newpragmatic unity took hold, enabling

Palestinians of diverse ideologicalpersuasions, class backgroundsand geographic locations to worktogether.10 Adopting their societysagenda of freedom and self-determination was the drivingforce behind youth involvement inthe uprising. These young peoplemade fundamental ideologicalcommitments regarding social andpolitical needs and placed their liveson the line to aain them.11

However, the resultant Oslo process

and the return of the Palestinianleadership from exile in Tunis begana process of disempowerment anddisenfranchisement. The power ofyouth was curbed, both by the Israelioccupation, as actions were takento crush the potential and spirit of

8 Christa Bruhn, Higher Education as Empowerment:The Case of Palestinian Universities, 49 AmericanBehavioral Scientist, 1125 (2006).

9 Penny Johnson and Eileen Kutta, Where Have All theWomen (and Men) Gone? Reflections on Gender and theSecond Palestinian Intifada, Feminist Review, No. 69,2001

10 Jonathan Kuttab, The Childrens Revolt, Journal ofPalestine Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1988.

11Barber, B.K. Political violence, family relations, and

Palestinian youth functioning, Journal of AdolescentResearch, 14, 1999.

youth, and by the nascent PNA whichsought to co-opt youth into existinghierarchical systems.12Thus, while thesecond intifada, begun in September2000, had the same essential causeas the rst namely an end to Israeli

occupation and colonialism therole of youth was fundamentallydierent. The popular resistance

of the rst intifada was replaced byarmed force, and confrontations tookplace not in the community, but atIsraeli checkpoints on the borders ofPalestinian land. Tayseer Mohsein,Gaza-based youth researcher hascharacterised this revolution as anexplosion without direction,13 savefor massive candlelight marchesand funeral processions within the

cities, the population at large14

wasle with virtually no active role inthe uprising.15 Instead of leaders,and activists driven by ideology,empowerment and a belief in nationalliberation, youth in the second intifada

12See, Graham Usher, Facing Defeat: The Intifada TwoYears On, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol 32, No 2,2003; and Penny Johnson and Eileen Kutta, WhereHave All the Women (and Men) Gone? Reflections onGender and the Second Palestinian Intifada, FeministReview, No. 69, 2001.

13Interview with Tayseer Mohsein, 15 June, 2009,Gaza City.

14Remma Hammami and Salim Tamari, The SecondUprising: End or New Beginning?, Journal of PalestineStudies, Vol. 30, No. 2, (2001), p. 17.

15 Remma Hammami and Salim Tamari, The Second

Uprising: End or New Beginning?, Journal of PalestineStudies, Vol. 30, No. 2, (2001), p. 17.

were either predominantly excludedor used by the political factions astools in an armed struggle withinwhich they lacked an authoritativevoice.16

During the period of lawlessnesswhich followed the legislativeelections of 2006, and the internalghting which resulted in the

Hamas takeover of the Gaza Stripin June 2007, youth were again usedin a similar way. From symbols ofnational liberation and resolutedeance in the rst intifada, they had

become the killers and the killed.17

The disempowerment of youthand their radicalisation and co-option into armed movements,

where they lack voice and decisionmaking capacity, can evidentlyhave profoundly negative andviolent results. One need only lookto Sierra Leone, East Timor, or theDemocratic Republic of the Congo,for examples of the destructivepotential of disempowered youthinvolved in armed conict. Indeed,

in this regard disempowerment is

16 Penny Johnson and Eileen Kutta, Where Have All theWomen (and Men) Gone? Reflections on Gender and theSecond Palestinian Intifada, Feminist Review, No. 69,2001, p. 35.

17 Interview with Tayseer Mohsein, 15 June, 2009,Gaza City.

the very antithesis of the productiveand radical possibilities ofempowered youth, as the destructive and not creative potential ofyouth is used by those pursuingpolitical or ideological agendas.

In the current Palestinian context,a reality characterised by internaldivision, violence, unemployment,poverty, and marginalisation,disempowerment has the all too realpotential to spark a fresh outbreak ofconict and destruction.

As noted by the UN GeneralAssembly, youth are both a majorhuman resource for developmentand key agents for social change,economic development andtechnological innovation.18 The

importance of youth is thusevident, as an ill-prepared youthmay impact negatively on societalcohesion, national security andthe developmental process.19 Inthis regard, the involvement ofyoung people in society, and theirengagement not only as beneciaries,

but also as participants and problem

18UN General Assembly, Resolution on World Programmeof Action for Youth to the Year 2000 and Beyond, UN.

Doc. A/50/728, 12.19 See, Jamil Rabah, Mapping of Youth Organizations

Working with youth in the oPt, A Study Conducted on

Behalf of UNDP, (2008), p. 8 and The Status of YouthReport, Young People in South Africa, 2003, p. 42.

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solvers, is a key element in theprocess of youth development.20 Aconcept of youth transition hasthus been realised, which whileregarding youth as a crucialdevelopmental phase in its own

right21 sees youth as a period oftransition from childhood to self-suciency, independence, and full

and active participation in society.22The concept of youth transition is inkeeping with the evolving capacitiesof the child, rst realised in Article

12 of the Convention on the Rightsof the Child, whereby direction andguidance provided to children musttake into account the capacities ofthe child to exercise rights on his orher own behalf;23 i.e. the transition

to autonomy.The importance of youth as adevelopmental phase in its ownright is thus central to this report.Youth is presented as a time oflearning, emerging condence and

participation, and increased self-

20 The Status of Youth Report, Young People in SouthAfrica, 2003, p. 42.

21 The Status of Youth Report, Young People in SouthAfrica, 2003, p. 37.

22 See for example, Djavad Salehi-Isfahani & NavtejDhillon, Stalled Youth Transitions in the Middle East: A

Framework for Policy Reform, The Middle East Youth

Initiative Working Paper No. 8, 2008.23UNICEF, The Evolving Capacities of the Child, 2005,

p. Ix.

suciency and independence. Itis noted that, in Palestine, youthtraditionally ends at marriage,typically the rst time that youngpeople are allowed to establish theirown household.24 Nonetheless, the

concepts inherent in youth transition the preparation for adult life remain pertinently relevant. Forease of analysis, and in keeping withinternational standards, youth aredened as young persons between theages of 15 and 24. Where necessary,this denition may be expanded,either for statistical reasons of in lightof the specic cultural context.

This report addresses Palestinianyouth in the West Bank includingEast Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.This focus is not intended to separate

these youth from the Palestinianpopulation at large, whether it bein what is now known as Israel(Palestinians with Israeli citizenship)or the Diaspora. Rather, it is inkeeping with Shareks mandate, andin light of the particular reality ofyouth living in the West Bank and theGaza Strip. In addition, given Israelsillegal annexation of East Jerusalemand extension of its jurisdiction there,many of the issues addressed in thisreport, such as school education

24 http://www.euromedyouth.net/IMG/pdf_07-EuroMedJeunesse-Etude_PALESTINE-090325.pdf

policies, are of limited immediaterelevance to East Jerusalem youth.

Section 2 notes the importance ofyouth participation and highlightsthe increasing disillusionment ofyouth with their national democraticinstitutions; in particular governmentand political parties. The chaptergoes on to argue that in the currentcontext, opportunities for civicengagement and participation inleisure, recreation and sport must

be urgently scaled up. The role ofyouth organisations in facilitatingcivic engagement is highlighted,along with several concerns about

barriers to youth participation inthese organisations.

Section 3 summarises the currentstatus of education in the West Bankand Gaza Strip, highlighting the roleof education in Palestinian society, itsimportance with respect to nationalidentity, and key concerns relating toaccess and cost, the new Palestiniancurriculum, overall quality ofeducation, and the link betweeneducation and employment.

Section 4 then addresses poverty andunemployment in the West Bankand the Gaza Strip presenting keyindicators, and addressing issues

relating to wasta,25 unemploymentas a driver for membership in armedgroups or emigration, and the impactof gender discrimination on youthsemployment opportunities.

Section 5 highlights the relative lackof information available regardingyouth-specic health issues

before presenting the key socialdeterminants of the health of youthin the oPt. Available youth healthindicators are then presented alongwith several concerns related toyouth health promotion and accessto health services in the oPt.

Section 6 relates to justice andprotection, here youths feelings as determined from focus groupsconducted for this report arepresented. Key issues highlighted

by youth, relate to the rule of lawand justice, the internal division, theIsraeli occupation, and the limitingeects of insecurity.

1.1 Methodological Note

This report is based on an extensivereview of secondary research,including several national opinion25 Roughly translated as mediation, wasta refers to

a system of corruption and cronyism, where eitherbribery of a connection with a person of influence isessential in order to obtain employment

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polls, and ten focus groups conductedwith 15 25-year-olds throughoutthe oPt; six in the West Bank and fourin the Gaza Strip. Sharek sought toensure the participation of youth fromdiverse political and socio-economic

backgrounds, as well as an equalgender balance, in these sessions.While eorts were made to involveyoung people as respondents, timeand resource constraints limited theextent of youth involvement. Thisreport does, however, depend heavilyon youth survey data in order toensure the views of youth themselvesare presented. One of the biggestchallenges in writing this report wasthe dearth of available data for topicssuch as youth health, employmentand poverty. More importantly,there were few evaluations of youth

programs and policies for manyof the issues covered in the reportespecially with regards Governmentin Gaza policies. Thus, a key ndingof this report is the need for furtheryouth research, as well as routinedisaggregation of national statisticsto capture youth data.

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2. Participation

To engage in dialogue and joint decision

making means to be willing to change

the adult ways and experiment with new

solutions...We cannot play with the

voices o youth, accept them as long as

they ft our programmes...and reject them

when they do not. Youth participation is

not a technique; it is a willingness to

engage in intergenerational dialogue.26

26Gil G. Noam, Editor-in-Chief, New Directions for Youth Development JournalQuoted in United Nations Development Programme, Youth in Turkey (HumanDevelopment Report), 2008

1


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The vital role that young peoplecan play in the development ofsociety was formally recognizedat the international level for therst time in a 1965 United Nations

General Assembly Resolution; theDeclaration on the Promotion amongYouth of the Ideals of Peace, MutualRespect and Understanding betweenPeoples.27 This resolution ociallyacknowledged the importance ofyouth engagement in addressingglobal development issues. Severaldecades later, the World Programmeof Action for Youth for the Year

2000 and Beyond, adopted by theGeneral Assembly in a December1995 resolution, identied the fulland eective participation of youth

in the life of society and in decision-making as one of ten priority areasrequiring action by Governments,the international community, civilsociety and the private sector.28

There are countless conceptions ofthe meaning and purpose of youth27United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/

RES/20/2037, 196528United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/

RES/50/81, 1995

participation. The citizenshipconception views participation as themeans by which the young come tolearn about the skills and aitudes that

enable them to function as citizens ina democratic state. The realization

conception refers to the realizationof rights; that is, participation isa right in itself and also a meansthrough which to realize other rights.A more radical formulation theformulation employed in this report- views youth participation as key totransformation and empowerment:participation is the means throughwhich the young are empowered totransform the structures, practicesand aitudes which exclude them

socially, culturally, politically and

economically.

29

As noted in the introduction to thisreport, the participation of Palestinianyouth in the development of theirsociety and the struggle for nationalliberation and self-determinationperhaps reached its peak during therst intifadawhen young Palestinians,armed only with stones, self-beliefand community solidarity broughta world power to the negotiatingtable. While there are signicant

29Definitions based on conceptualisations presentedin Jason Hart, Empowerment or Frustration, Children,

Youth and Environments 17 (3), 2007

2. Participation

exceptions, two decades later, manyyoung Palestinians are increasinglydisillusioned with political life,fearful of factional engagement,unable to secure employment andstruggling even to ll their free time.

Their inability to strive towardsand achieve even the most basic ofgoals has major ramications; not

only on the youth themselves butalso on wider society, with evidentimplications on youths transition toadulthood.

This section suggests that in a contextof continuing factional conict, and

consequent declining trust in partypolitics and governmental structures,opportunities for youth engagementin civic and associational life and

participation in leisure activitiessuch as sports and culture, must

be urgently scaled up. As well asreaping signicant rewards in terms

of the physical and mental wellbeingof young Palestinians, this approachhas the potential to strengthencommunity ties, rebuild shaeredcondence and divert the most

disempowered from behaviourswhich may ruin their futures.

2.1 Fear and Disillusionment:

Palestinian Political Parties

Palestinian youth are perhaps themost politicized young people in theworld; every party or faction has a

youth organization, student councilelections are followed by the politicalclasses as signals of tendencies in thecountry, youth voting rates remainhigh and many young peoplecontinue to demonstrate daily atgreat personal risk against Israelioccupation.

While remaining acutely aware ofthe political forces that aect their

lives, a majority of Palestinian youthare increasingly disillusioned with,and even fearful of engaging with,

Palestinian party politics. In a 2008survey, nearly 70 percent of youngPalestinians dened themselves

as politically inactive or nearlypolitically inactive. Youth in Gazasaw themselves as more politicallyactive than their West Bank peers around 37 percent of Gaza youthstated they were politically activeversus 26 percent of youth in theWest Bank. Young men are alsosignicantly more politically active

than young women 36 percent ofyoung men viewed themselves as


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active or somewhat active in politicsversus just 25 percent of youngwomen. Only 30 percent of youngPalestinians stated they would workfor a candidates campaign in anupcoming election.

Intended voting rates, however,remain relatively high whencompared with other countries. Inthe same survey, 61 percent of youngPalestinians indicated an intention tovote in upcoming national electionsand 15 percent stated they might vote.These gures, in conjunction with the

relative political inactivity of youth,indicate that just three years aer therst national Palestinian multiparty

elections, the engagement of theyoung in the national democratic

process has been to a signicantextent reduced to an intention tovote; a development which hasgrave implications for the future ofPalestinian democracy.

This disengagement fromparty politics relates in part todisillusionment; a disbelief in andmistrust of Palestinian factions. Even

before the Palestinian internal conict

came to a bloody climax in June 2007,only 33 percent of surveyed youthexpressed a high or medium trust

in political parties.30 As one Sharekfocus group participant explained:The youth feel bored about party issues.From time to time we ght, we try to

make a solution, but they, the parties,still dont reach any solution. We want a

real solution for the situation. Because ofthe situation of the parties, we think wemay be disappointed.31

Many other participants in Sharekfocus groups felt unable to eitherchange the nature of Palestinianfactions, or to trust Palestinianfactions to support and realizetheir needs and interests. They alsoexpressed disillusionment withPalestinian government in both theGaza Strip and the West Bank: TheGovernments role in the life of youth is

almost non-existent,32explained oneparticipant and another said: The

government, the decision-makers, dontcare about youth. Most of the areas that

aect youth, the government just doesntcare about them. This is the reality.33

Many young Palestinians are alsodeeply fearful of engaging in party

30 The 2006 survey31Sharek focus group, Gaza City, 15 19 year-olds, 11

July 200932Sharek focus group, 17 21 year-olds, Salfeet, 9

July33Sharek focus group, Gaza City, 15 19 year-olds, 11

July 2009

politics. In a Sharek focus group,one young man who reported

being detained and tortured byGovernment in Gaza security forcesexplained: We cant participate freely;the parties dont accept contradicting

opinions; if you want to express yourselffreely, you may be in danger, you mightget hurt.34Another explained: It isdicult to give your opinion, you maybe heard by other people, and that canbe very dangerous.35 School agedparticipants also reported beingforbidden by their parents fromparticipating in politics:

All parents stop their children beinginvolved in such [political] activities,because they are afraid for them; they

may get hurt. If the parents work

with parties, the youth can workwith the same party, but if parentsdont work with parties, it is hardto do anything. If our parents are

aliated, maybe we will be protectedbecause of that.36

National opinion polls indicate thatthis fear is widespread. In a 2009national survey, only a third of

34Sharek focus group, 20 25 year-olds, North Gaza,11 July 2009


36Sharek focus group, Gaza City, 15 19 year-olds, 11

July 2009

18 24 year olds said they wouldnever be afraid of expressing theirviews on a political subject. Nearly40 percent said they would oen

be afraid and nearly 20 percent saidthey would sometimes be afraid.37

These fears are far from unfounded.Both the Government in Gaza andthe Government in Ramallah arecoming under increasing criticism

by national and international humanrights groups for cracking down onpolitical opposition.38

While disillusionment may be drivingmany young Palestinians away fromfactional politics, disempowerment,poverty and disaection may be

drawing others in. Sara Roy hasargued that young men with no

jobs, no hopes for the future, lileeducation and no history of politicalactivism have joined the armed wingsof Palestinian factions; becoming thegangs of the wanted.39 One Sharekfocus group participant explainedthat: I know young men who have gonethe wrong way just to get 100 dollars so

37UNDPs Palestinian Human Security Survey April2009.

38See: Independent Commission for Human Rights,The Status of Human Rights in Palestinian-ControlledTerritory: Fourteenth Annual Report ExecutiveSummary, 1 January 31 December 2008 http://www.ichr.ps/pdfs/ear14.pdf(accessed 20 August 2009)

39Sara Roy, Failing Peace: Gaza and the Palestinian-Israeli

Conflict, 2007


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they can pay for their jawal [cell phone]cards and cigarees. They become part ofa faction just to get 100 dollars to pay fordrugs, just for a packet of cigarees; the

conditions around us are so restricted;young people just think about how to get

a jawal card and cigarees. No-one canhelp us.40

While resistance, including armedstruggle, is a right under internationallaw, the militarization of youth undera cloud of despair and poverty - andat a time when renewed internalviolent conict remains a real risk

- presents grave dangers to thewhole of Palestinian society. TayseerMohsein argues that when youthare motivated to take up arms inorder to feel empowered, rather

than because they feel empowered,they will be unable to be in controlof their actions and will instead bedirected, as if by remote control, byPalestinian factions.41

Mohseins premise is substantiatedby several studies which notean association between conict,

economic hardship, disillusionment


41Interview with Tayseer Mohsein, 15 June 2009,Gaza City

and a large youth population.42While these factors do not directlyfuel violence, they do increase thelikelihood that unemployed youthwill seek social and economicadvancement by alternative means.

2.2 Civic and Associational Life

[Civic engagement]has re-emerged as aviable means for young people to develop

and exercise leadership while eectingconcrete changes in their communities.In recognizing that young people arecapable of addressing societal problemsand concerns and providing a forum for

them to do so, civic engagement can be adynamic and powerful strategy. Throughcivic engagement, young peoples ideasand energy can contribute meaningfully

as they participate in communitybuilding, work toward social change, andapply their leadership skills, all the while

gaining access to services, supports, andopportunities that facilitate their own

development.43

42See for example: Sherod, Lonnie, Youth Activism:an international encyclopaedia, volume 2, and UnitedNations Development Programme,Youth and ViolentConflict, 2006 http://www.undp.org/cpr/whats_new/UNDP_Youth_PN.pdf(accessed 20 August 2009)

43Mohammad, I and W Wheeler, Broadening the Boundsof Youth Development: Youth as Engaged Citizens,Ford Foundation and The Innovation Centre forYouth and Community Development, 2001 www.theinnovationcenter.org/r_ydev_civeng.asp (accessed20 August 2009)

With few appealing alternativesavailable to young people frompolitical groups or factions, manyPalestinian youth have becomeengaged in civil or communitydevelopment work in the hope of

contributing towards change in theircommunities.44 The importance ofsupporting existing initiatives andextending their reach cannot beoverstated. Providing opportunitiesfor young Palestinians to engagein meaningful activities will reap

benets in terms of their physical

and mental health (see Section 5) andmay also divert the most disaected

from potentially harmful behaviours,while renewing community ties.

In the Palestinian seing, the

promotion of active participation,including in community life, canmostly be found in the non-formalsector.45 The oPt boasts a hugevariety of youth organizations in2006, there were over 500 youthclubs and centres, and around250 other youth organizations ororganizations which oer youth

programmes in the West Bank and

44Hammad, Suzanne and Tareq Bakri, Learningby Doing: The Experience of PopularAchievement in Palestine, Children, Youthand Environments17(3): 24-48 (2007)

45Euromed Youth III Programme, Studies in Youth

Policies in the Mediterranean Partner Countries Palestinian Occupied Territories (undated)

the Gaza Strip.46 A 2008 survey of 500such organizations found that mostfocus on social, womens, culturaland sports issues and activities

but few on health or human rightsand democracy (six percent and

three percent respectively). Whenasked about their main activity,organizations highlighted sports andarts, followed by social services andcapacity building.

The presence and engagement oflarge numbers of non-governmentorganizations with young Palestiniansin a context of extreme isolation, risingpoverty and political turbulence isa signicant achievement in itself.

Young people spoke to Sharekabout their appreciation of these

eorts. One explained: many youthorganisations actually care about usthese days, and another added, theyare listening to us, and trying to adopt

our ideas.47 These eorts must be

supported and expanded. However,recent studies and Sharek focusgroups note several areas of concernin terms of youth civic engagement.As explained below, traditionalvalues restrict young peoples46Rahhal, Youth and Youth Institutions, Structures,

Projects and Clubs, 200647Both quotations from Sharek Focus Group, Halhul,

18 26-year-olds, 20 July 2009


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and especially young womensparticipation in civic life. In the GazaStrip, there appears to be increasinggovernmental interference in youthactivities. In addition, in many youthassociations, it is older males, rather

than young men and women, whoremain in the driving seat.

2.3 Barriers to Participation

Many youth organizations areconcentrated in major populationcentres such as Ramallah and areunable to reach youth living inisolated villages and small towns.48Sharek focus group participantsthroughout the oPt noted this lackof reach: Many youth dont know

how to participate, or are unaware ofwho to talk to in order to participate.Youth organizations should be activein aracting these inactive powers and

guiding them to participate in useful

activities.49 The geographicalconcentration in major populationcentres aects girls and young women

in particular as since the outbreak ofthe second intifada their mobility has

48Euromed Youth III Programme, Studies in YouthPolicies in the Mediterranean Partner Countries Palestinian Occupied Territories (undated)

49Sharek focus group, 17 21 year-olds, Salfeet,9 July

been restricted by relatives fearfulfor their safety.50 Transportationcosts also prohibit the very poorestfrom aending youth centres outside

of their immediate locality. A youthfrom Salfeet explained that: Living

standards dont allow us to travel toother cities and villages. These extraexpenses form a big obstacle in our

way to communicate with youth fromneighbouring villages and cities.51

Cultural norms also continue torestrict young people in general, andgirls and women in particular, fromparticipating in certain activities.Many youth clubs and centres serveonly male youth and even when suchfacilities are mixed, many youngwomen oen nd that the activities

are dominated by the shabaab (maleyouth) or are forbidden to aend by

their families.52 Sharek focus groupparticipants throughout the GazaStrip highlighted this restriction:Parents in general are against co-ed activities. Girls are not allowed

to participate in camps, lectures or

other activities if the parents know50Rita Giacaman, Ghada Naser and Will Boyce,

Normalising the Abnormal: Palestinian youth and thecontradictions of resilience in protracted conflict, Healthand Social Care in the Community (2008) 16 (3),291298

51Sharek focus group, 17 21 year-olds, Salfeet 9 July52Jason Hart, Empowerment or Frustration, Children,

Youth and Environments 17 (3), 2007

there will be guys in the same room

or place.53

Young women in the Gaza Strip weremore explicit in noting the impact of

broader societal pressure on their

parents decisions. One school-agedgirl from Gaza City explained: ourparents will prevent us from makinggroups, as society will object to us.54Another noted: Our treatment by

parents depends on the traditions ofsociety, sometimes, in some issues,

parents are convinced with the issues,but because society refuses, they go along

with that.55

Several young women consultedduring this research did note,however, their belief that the position

of women and girls in society hasadvanced: For us, freedom of speechhas improved a lot. Girls in the pastdid not have that much space to expressthemselves. Families and the surroundingcommunity spoke for the girl, while her

opinion had minimal aention. Thesedays we can speak more freely, Im notsaying 100 percent freedom, but muchbeer compared to in the past.5653Sharek focus group, 17 21 year-olds, Salfeet,

9 July54Sharek focus group, Gaza City, 15 19 year-olds,

11 July 200955Sharek focus group, 15 20 year-olds, Rafah district,

18 July 2009

56Sharek focus group, 15 20 year-olds, Rafah district, 1

Of signicant concern to several

focus group participants in the GazaStrip was escalating governmentalinterference in youth civicparticipation. One young womanfrom North Gaza explained that:

The government is the biggest thingthat is not convinced with mixed groups.They try to nd them. I did a project

with a mixed group, and the governmentcame and intervened. It was in BeitHanoun, we had a project with MercyCorps [an international NGO]. It wasa community service project. We went at

8am; there were about 30 of us, 15 girlsand 15 boys. The government came and

prevented the activity. They took all of ournames. They took the person responsible

for the project, and investigated him.57Another young man from the samearea explained that the interferencecan also be more subtle: They maynot directly prevent the activity by

coming and closing it down, but theyhave indirect ways to do it. For example,

for mixed group activities, they preventthem by not giving us a license.58

A number of studies also indicatethat even within youth organisations,there are limited possibilities for

57 July 2009us group, 20 25 year-olds, North Gaza, 11 July 200958Sharek focus group, 20 25 year-olds, North Gaza,

11 July 2009


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7

young people to participate inthe decision-making process. Oneresearcher has argued that, in spiteof idealistic statements included inthese [the organizations] bylaws,they are oen just words that have

no practical implications.59 Leadingpositions are oen, in contradiction

of the bylaws, not elected butappointed and therefore depriveyoung people of the chance to reachsuch a position.60 Several researchersaribute these limits to dominant

patriarchal values which stipulatethat the young should respect theirseniors and that it is unthinkablethat they should sit chair-to-chairwith them in the decision-makingsphere.61

The arguments of these researchersare supported by survey ndings

which indicate obedience to parentalauthority remains high in the oPt.In a 2008 survey, only 7 percent ofsurveyed youth said they make theirown decisions even if their parentsdisagree and 35 percent said thatparents make decisions on their

59Rahhal, Youth and Youth Institutions, Structures,Projects and Clubs, 2006

60Euromed Youth III Programme, Studies in YouthPolicies in the Mediterranean Partner Countries Palestinian Occupied Territories (undated)

61Empowerment or Frustration, Children, Youth andEnvironments 17 (3), 2007

behalf. The gap between the WestBank and the Gaza Strip is signicant

here: 25 percent of Gaza youth saythey obey their parents on all issuescompared to 15 percent of youth in

the West Bank.

62

In practice therefore, many youthorganizations continue to beexclusively run by much older males.In youth centres in refugee camps,for example, it is common to nd anadministrative commiee composedof men in their ies or sixties with

a few younger men taking a morejunior role.63

2.4 Critiques of the Approach

of Youth Organisations

Several recent studies have challengedthe approach taken by many youthorganisations in empoweringyoung people. In Empowermentor Frustration, Jason Hart arguesthat many youth organisationsconcentrate on building citizenshipvalues rather than engaging seriouslywith the empowerment of young

62Awrad (opinion poll), Palestinian Youth: Politics,Information and Media, June 2008

63Jason Hart, Empowerment or Frustration, Children,Youth and Environments 17 (3), 2007

people towards the transformationof their environment.64 He associatesthis trend with the programmingtendencies of internationaldonor agencies, suggesting thatthey concentrate on building a

Palestinian citizenry respectfulof human rights and democracywithout acknowledging the veryreal constraints that face youngPalestinians. For instance, donoragencies continue to support youthdemocracy awareness programmesin a context where youngPalestinians are fully consciousthat electing the wrong party willprovoke international boyco and

isolation. Consequently, for manyorganisations, young peoplesparticipation remains in a virtual

box, incapable of realizing realchange through engagement in thesystems of wider society and notmerely in youth specic projects.

2.5 Sports, Culture and

Recreation

There are no places for entertainment;

the borders are closed; these things aect

64Jason Hart, Empowerment or Frustration, Children,Youth and Environments 17 (3), 2007

us in a big way psychologically.65

It is perhaps unsurprising thatPalestinian policy-makers, absorbedin the struggle for nationalreconciliation and self-determination,

have failed to place the provisionof sports, cultural and recreationactivities at the top of their agendas.Yet the unavailability of suchactivities has serious implications.Threats to the well-being of theyoung, such as participation inconict or criminal activity, are

very much linked to the projectsand programmes that may or maynot be available in their daily lives.Recreational activities can contributegreatly to the development of thephysical, intellectual and emotional

well-being of young people. Theycan even counter to some extentthe mental health problems caused

by conict and violence.66 A youthfrom Salfeet explained to Sharek:Playing soccer is entertaining, ithelps me relieve some of my tension.

Otherwise there is no other source

of entertainment. I wish there were


66Rita Giacaman, Ghada Naser and Will Boyce,Normalising the Abnormal: Palestinian youth and thecontradictions of resilience in protracted conflict, Healthand Social Care in the Community (2008) 16 (3),291298


15/59

public parks, movie theatres, and

active clubs to attend.

As well as improving physicaland mental well-being, sportimproves social skills, values such as

teamwork and cuts across religiousbeliefs, economic status and politicalaliation. Cultural activities can

bridge conict and promote tolerance

and going out with a friend to see alm and have a coee can bring relief

from a day spent at checkpoints.67

While some eorts are being made,

such as the organization of annualsummer camps, access to leisureactivities for young Palestinians isstill wholly inadequate. In 2005, 77percent of Palestinian youth reported

spending their leisure time at homeand participants in Sharek focusgroups overwhelmingly stressedthe need just for something to do.68Palestinian authorities and theirinternational donors must recognizethe importance of sports, culturaland recreational activities for thedevelopment of the young and scaleup such programmes. Emphasis

67Excerpts from United Nations, World Youth Report,2005 http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/wpayleisure.htm

68Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Youth,Culture and Free Time: current status and attitudes, July2005, p. 123.

must be placed on out-of-reach areassuch as smaller towns, camps andvillages.

In addition, eorts to restrict young

peoples participation in sports and

recreation must be prevented. Theinternational community must bringpressure to bear on Israel and compelit to cease unlawful military practicescommon throughout the oPt, whichrestrict youth participation inrecreation activities, for example,

by preventing them from travellingabroad. For instance, on 22 July 2009,the Israeli army arrested Palestiniannational soccer team player,Mahmoud Kamel As-Sarsak at Erezcrossing and prevented two of histeammates - Ibrahim Al Amour and

Haytham Al-Shareef - from leavingGaza.69

2.6 Summary

As this section underlines, whilesome major avenues for youthparticipation are heavily restricted,others, in particular opportunitiesfor engagement in sports, recreation69Al Mezan Press Release, IOF Arrest Palestinian

National Team Player and Prevent Two from LeavingGaza, 2009 www.mezan.org/en/details.php?id=8960&ddname=IOF&id_dept=9&p=center

and civic life remain underexploredor neglected. Palestinian policy-makers and their internationaldonors must recognise the dangersarising from escalating youthdisempowerment, its psychological

effects, and destructive potentialon broader Palestinian society.Expanding appropriate avenues foryouth participation is fundamentalto human development and can reapmajor rewards in terms of physicaland psychological health and well-being, bridging internal conict, anddiverting the most vulnerable fromharmful behaviours.


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3. Education/ Knowledge

0


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3.1 The Importance of

Education

Every State should provide its youngpeople with opportunities for obtaining

education, for acquiring skills andfor participating fully in all aspectsof society, with a view to, inter alia,acquiring productive employment andleading self-sucient lives70

Education plays a signicant role

in the lives of youth, and has beenhighlighted at the international levelas a key area of focus and concern.Article 13 of the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social

and Cultural Rights conrms thehuman right to education, whilethe UN General Assemblys WorldProgramme of Action for Youth(quoted above) includes educationas the rst of ten priorities for youth

development. As illustrated by theobligation codied in the General

Assembly Resolution, educationaects all aspects of a youths life,

from employment opportunities, tothe ability to participate in society,70UN General Assembly, Resolution on World

Programme of Action for Youth to the Year 2000

and Beyond,. Doc. A/50/728.

and the capacity to live a self-sucient life. Crucially, the benets

of education and the costs of aninadequate educational system can also be felt throughout society.Indeed, education is considered one

of the most critical tools for eitherthe development or impairment ofhuman capacities. It is the mirrorwhich reects the degree of poverty

and the pace of achieving morehuman development.71 Equally,although education may be one ofthe most ordinary aspects of modernlife,72 it is central to shaping theculture, individual and communaldevelopment, social stratication,

economy, and politics of anysociety.73 Schools and universitiesnot only educate, they function asinstruments of social integration,and have been identied as a key

factor in the development of anational identity;74 a factor which is71Gihan Abu-Zeid, Arab Youth and Globalisation, in

UNDP, Arab Youth: Strategising for the MDGs,p.27.

72Ismael Abu-Saad and Duane Champagne,Introduction: A Historical Context of Palestinian ArabEducation, 49 American Behavioral Sceintist, 1035,1035 (2006).

73Ismael Abu-Saad and Duane Champagne,Introduction: A Historical Context of Palestinian ArabEducation, 49 American Behavioral Sceintist, 1035,1035 (2006).

74Sven Morch, Youth and Education, Young, 49 (2003),p. 65, and Christa Bruhn, Higher Education asEmpowerment: The Case of Palestinian Universities, 49

American Behavioral Scientist, 1125 (2006).

3 Education/

Knowledgecrucially important in the Palestiniancontext given the existence of a long-standing belligerent occupation andthe absence of a sovereign Palestinianstate.

The Ministry of Education andHigher Education (MoEHE) hasrecognized the fundamental, cross-sectional importance of education.The Ministrys rst ve year plan,

covering the years 2000-2005,regarded education as, inter alia, the

basis for citizenship, a tool for socialand economic development, the basisfor values and democracy.75

Education is also widely regardedas a core component of successfulyouth transition. Education is

expected to facilitate the transitionto employment, and consequently toself-suciency and adulthood.

Within Palestinian society, signicant

importance has traditionally beenaached to education. Continuous

occupation, political turmoil, andthe lack of sovereignty over naturalresources have contributed tomake human resources, and thuseducation, the most importantfoundation for social progress,

75Susan Nicolai, Fragmented Foundations: educationand chronic crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,

UNESCO, Save the Children UK, 2007.

economic development, and culturalidentity.76 The status of education inPalestine today is reective of this

importance; approximately 1,097,957Palestinian children and youth areenrolled in primary and secondary-

level education,77 with enrolmentrates aaining virtual gender parity.

At the tertiary level, Palestine has ahigher university enrolment rate (25-30 percent)78 than the average foundamong other Arab and developingStates; rates comparable to countriessuch as Mexico (21 percent), CostaRica (21 percent), and Malaysia (25percent).79 Female participation atthird level is also signicant, and

there are currently more femalesthan males enrolled in university.

There are signs, however, that thetraditional respect for educationis being somewhat eroded. Sharekfocus group participants in both

76Ramzi A. Rihan, The Palestinian EducationalDevelopment Plan. Promise for the Future., Vol 8 no 2of??

77AWRAD, Palestinian Youth: Politics, Informationand Media, Results of an Opinion Poll, 2008.

78Adriana Jaramillo and Hiromichi Katayama,Lessonsfrom West Bank and Gaza: An Innovative Student LoanScheme, World Bank, Fast Brief No 17, January 2009,and MoEHE, Education Development StrategicPlan 2008-2012, Towards Quality Education forDevelopment, July 2008

79Adriana Jaramillo and Hiromichi Katayama,Lessonsfrom West Bank and Gaza: An Innovative Student LoanScheme, World Bank, Fast Brief No 17, January 2009.


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the West Bank and Gaza Strip wereunanimous in their criticisms of theeducation system, particularly withrespect to the quality of teaching,and the capacity/capabilities ofthe education system itself. Such

frustration may be linked to theworsening economic situation andhigh unemployment rates, and mayalso be a consequence of the shi

in focus of education. While priorto the rst intifada universities werefocused on national liberation andPalestinian identity, aer the Oslo

Peace Accords this focus shied

towards preparing for a State-building role.80 The failure of theOslo process means that this focusis no longer immediately relevantto the lives of Palestinian youth,a potential cause of the apparentdisillusionment. Signicantly,

although disillusionment is evident,enrolment rates remain high, andSharek focus group participants stillintended to aend, or were aending,

university, seeing it as a prerequisiteto employment.

This section will begin by detailingthe status of education in Palestine,noting the pervasive negative80Christa Bruhn, Higher Education as Empowerment:

The Case of Palestinian Universities, 49 American

Behavioral Scientist, (2006).

impact of the Israeli occupation. Keyissues have been identied from

the literature and primary research access to, and cost of education, thesecondary school curriculum, qualityof education, and the link between

education and employment theseissues will be analysed in furtherdetail.

3.2 Education in Palestine

In 1994, the newly created PalestinianMinistries of Education, and HigherEducation took over responsibilityfor education from the Israelioccupation administration. This wasthe rst time in modern history that

control of Palestinian education hadpassed into Palestinian hands, andeducation was the largest singleactivity transferred to the nascentPNA. Prior to this point educationhad been governed by the Oomans,

the British Mandate, the Egyptians(in the Gaza Strip), the Jordanians(in the West Bank), and the Israelioccupation. In addition to governingprimary, secondary and (to someextent) third level education, theMoEHE also provides a supervisoryrole in early childhood education,

and is responsible for developing thetechnical and vocational educationtraining (TVET) system.

At inception, the MoEHE faced anumber of problems, among which

was a lack of resources. For example,it has been reported that the heavydependency on international aidand cooperation to formulate andimplement education reforms,complicated the process of developinga coherent, indigenous educationalpolicy.81 Additionally, there werenumerous problems arising fromthe uncertainty of the Oslo years. Asnoted by Jarbawi, with respect to thedevelopment of a new curriculum:

What Palestine do we teach? Is it the

historic Palestine with its completegeography or the Palestine that is likely toemerge on the basis of possible agreementswith Israel? How do we view Israel? Is itmerely an ordinary neighbour, or is it a

state that has arisen in the ruins of mostof Palestine? This may well be one of themost dicult questions, but the answerto it need not be the most dicult. Thenew Palestinian curriculum should

be creative, pragmatic, and truthful

81Ismael Abu-Saad and Duane Champagne,Introduction: A Historical Context of Palestinian ArabEducation, 49 American Behavioral Sceintist, 1035(2006).

without having to engage in historicalfalsications.82

Despite these obstacles, by 2000the PNA had made signicant

progress. There was a working

education system, extensive schoolconstruction, and a new Palestiniancurriculum. However, extensivehuman rights and humanitarian lawviolations have inevitably aected

access to education and the qualityof education itself. As noted by theUN Special Rapporteur on the Rightto Education in 2005, militaryoccupations are another appreciablecurb on the right to education, themost egregious example being theIsraeli-Palestinian conict.83 Duringthe second intifada, Israeli forces

reverted to the rst intifada policy oftargeting Palestinian education as ameans of collective punishment. Interms of human losses alone, sincethe outbreak of the second intifada,37 teachers and 662 students have

been killed, 197 teachers and 828students detained, and 55 teachersand 3,620 students injured.84 The82Quoted in, F. Moughrabi, The politics of Palestinian

textbooks, Journal of Palestine Studies, XXXI(I), p. 7.83UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education,

Annual Report 2005, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/50,124.

84MoEHE, The Effect of the Israeli Occupation on thePalestinian Education from (28/9/2000 15/4/2009),

2009. Statistics refer only to primary and secondaryschool students.


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Independent Commission of HumanRights reported that, in 2008,approximately 100 schools suered

disruption as a result of measuresenacted by the occupation forces,resulting in the loss of at least 150

school days. Israeli measures werealso reported as having resulted inthe death of more than 40 Palestinianstudents (33 in the Gaza Strip), whilemore than 180 school students, 60university students, and 18 teachersand personnel members werearrested. These gures are expected

to be signicantly worse in 2009,

as a consequence of, inter alia, theIsraeli oensive on the Gaza Strip (27

December 2008 18 January 2009),and the continuing illegal closure.During the oensive, 150 of 384

public schools in the Gaza Strip wereaacked by Israeli forces; 8 schools

were heavily damaged, of which5 were rendered inappropriate foruse. Forty-six private schools andkindergartens were also damaged;7 completely destroyed, and 41signicantly damaged.85 The eects

of the oensive also disrupted school

activities for the remainder of theschool year, as students and teachersaempted to restore some semblance85The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, Targeted

Civilians, 2009.

of normality.

In the West Bank, the MoEHE hasidentied four major consequences

of the construction of the AnnexationWall:

The absence of teachers and theinability to provide substituteteachers cause the students toleave earlier.

The disruptions usually causethe students and teachers notto complete the curriculumassignment for the year, and alarge part of the textbook is neverstudied, especially in the finalsecondary school-grades.

Cancelling of the extra-curricular

informal activities such as after-school sports activities, field trips,and summer camps.

Inability of school employeesfrom the district offices to reachtheir district schools cause sharpdecline in organization andcoordination between the schoolsand the districts.86

86Ministry of Education & Higher Education,Expansion & AnnexationWall and its impact on tehEducational Process, 2004, p. 3.

3.3 The Importance of

Education with respect to

National Identity

The importance of educationwith respect to the formation of

national identity is recognised at thegovernmental level, with a guidingprinciple of the MoEHE being thateducation should contribute tonational identity and the nationalheritage.87 Equally, UNESCO andSave the Children UK found that,with respect to Palestine, a nationalcurriculum is a visible indicator ofidentity and plays an importantrole in building condence in the

education system.88 In this respect itis interesting to note the experiencesof the Palestinian university system.

Christa Bruhn has found that, ThePalestinian context provides a uniquemanifestation of the university inthat Palestinian universities serve asnational institutions in the absenceof a State. 89 In the pre-intifadaera, universities provided a safe-

87 MoEHE, Education Development StrategicPlan 2008-2012, Towards Quality Education forDevelopment, July 2008.

88Susan Nicolai, Fragmented Foundations: educationand chronic crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,UNESCO, Save the Children UK, 2007, p.95.

89Christa Bruhn, Higher Education as Empowerment:The Case of Palestinian Universities, 49 AmericanBehavioral Scientist, 1125 [2006], p. 1126

haven where Palestinians couldhave access to higher learning,while at the same time exploringand developing a Palestinianidentity, focused on the aainment

of an independent Palestinian State.

Palestinian universities were theonly forum wherein Palestiniancommunities were able to holdelections, and a heavily politicisedstudent body focused on issuesof national liberation. In the post-1993 period, the emergence of thePNA has had a detrimental impacton the independence of nationaluniversities. Donor aid has beenchannelled through the PNA,aecting universitys autonomy; the

PNA has been regarded as operatingtowards expanding its own powerand inuence rather than supporting

the independence and public utilityof the universities.90 In addition,the focus of universities shied

from national liberation to state-building, resulting in the sacrice

of an overarching philosophicalframework in the pursuit of anincreasingly elusive goal.

90See further, Christa Bruhn, Higher Education asEmpowerment: The Case of Palestinian Universities, 49American Behavioral Scientist, 1125 (2006).

7


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3.4 Access and Cost

The level of educational aainmentin the oPt is signicantly high;2008 gures indicate that a total of

1,097,957 Palestinian children and

youth were enrolled in primary andsecondary-level education,91 withapproximately 180,000 enrolledin post-secondary level study.92 Interms of youth-specic participation

rates, approximately 75 percent of15 19 year olds, and 20 percentof 20-29 year olds are enrolled infull time education.93 As notedpreviously, third-level participationrates (approximately 25-30 percent)are the highest in the region. Figuresfrom the Palestinian Central Bureauof Statistics (PCBS) also indicate

that the average number of yearsin schooling is 10 for adolescents equivalent to the basic, or mandatory,school cycle and 12 for 20-24 yearolds.94

Gender participation rates are alsoencouraging; of the total numberof Palestinians enrolled in primary91AWRAD, Palestinian Youth: Politics, Information

and Media, Results of an Opinion Poll, 2008.92Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Palestine

Youth: Figures and Statistics, 2006.93Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Palestine

Youth: Figures and Statistics, 2006.94Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Palestine

Youth: Figures and Statistics, 2006.

and secondary level education, 49.9percent are male, and 50.01 percentfemale. These rates are similar to thosefound in government run schools,(49.1 percent male, 50.8 percentfemale). This level of participation

is reected in both the West Bankand the Gaza Strip, where femaleenrolment rates stand at 50.4 percent,and 51.68 percent respectively.Secondary-school statistics are morespecically relevant to youth, and

these rates are broadly in line withthe previous gures; in government-

run secondary schools, 46.4 percentof the students are male, and 53.5percent are female. Again, gender-

based participation levels are broadlyequivalent in the West Bank and theGaza Strip, where 54.5 percent and52.26 percent respectively of thestudents are female.95

While these gures are encouraging,

with respect to overall accessto education, gender-equalparticipation, and overall number ofyears of schooling, dropout rates arequite high. The PCBS estimates thedropout rate which includes boththose who enrolled in education andsubsequently le, and those who

95AWRAD, Palestinian Youth: Politics, Informationand Media, Results of an Opinion Poll, 2008.

did not enrol at all at 32 percentfor 15-29 year olds; 35 percent formales and 29 percent for females.For 15-19 year olds, the dropout ratewas 16 percent, 21 percent for malesand 11 percent for females.96 A 2009

survey by Sharek indicated that, formales, the predominant factor instopping education related to cost;24 percent of male respondentsstopped education as they could notaord it or needed money, while 38

percent dropped out to support theirfamilies. Thus, a total of 62 percentof males cited economic/cost relatedreasons, compared to 18 percent offemales. For women, the single mostsignicant factor was marriage, with

46 percent of female respondentsdropping out to get married,compared to 3 percent of males.Thirteen percent of women droppedout as their parents did not want themto continue education, compared to4 percent of males. Thus, for women,cultural norms, perhaps related topatriarchy, and not cost, seems to bethe most decisive factor with respectto leaving education early.

96Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, PalestineYouth: Figures and Statistics, 2006.

3.5 The Curriculum

A new Palestinian curriculum has beenprogressively introduced in schoolsin the West Bank and Gaza Strip since2000. This curriculum represents the

rst unied Palestinian curriculumand, importantly, the rst time that

control of the Palestinian curriculumhas passed into Palestinian hands;prior to 2000, a Jordanian curriculumhad been used in the West Bank,and an Egyptian curriculum in theGaza Strip. In developing the newcurriculum, the MoEHE intended toensure a uniquely Palestinian identi ty,

basing the core contents on nationalvalues, Islamic religion, nationalheritage, customs and traditions andthe Declaration of Independence.97

The new curriculum introducedimportant developments with respectto the subjects oered, with new

subjects including civic education,technology, home economics, andhealth and the environment. Inaddition, both Arabic and Englishare taught from the rst year of

schooling, and a subsequent electivethird language is encouraged.

97Quoted in, Susan Nicolai, Fragmented Foundations:education and chronic crisis in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory, UNESCO, Save the Children UK, 2007, p.87.


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The development and introduction ofthe new curriculum has been noted asone of the MoEHEs most considerableachievements. An independentreview, commissioned by BelgianTechnical Cooperation in 2005, found

that it has had a clear positive impacton students enthusiasm to learn andon teachers sense of ownership.98 Itrepresents an important step towardsarming a uniquely Palestinian

identity. However, despite the factthat the production of a unied

curriculum remains a considerablesuccess, particularly in light of theuncertainties of the post-1993 era,(see Jarbawi, section 3.2) a number ofdiculties and problems have been

identied.

3.5.1 Difficulties Identified with the

New Curriculum

Criticisms of the new curriculuminclude the fact that it focuses onthe Palestinian community livingwithin the oPt, with no mention ofthe millions in the Diaspora,99 and98R. Avenstrup, P. Swarts, O. Abu-Hommos, Peace

is our dream: an impact study of the Palestiniancurriculum, Belgian Technical Cooperation,2005, p. 42. Available at, www.pdcd.edu.ps/impact%20study%20report.pdf.

99Palestinian teacher, quoted in Susan Nicolai,Fragmented Foundations: education and chronic crisis inthe Occupied Palestinian Territory, UNESCO, Save theChildren UK, 2007, p. 81.

the relative lack of aention paid to

life skills; a particularly pertinentissue given the challenges associatedwith high population growth. Oneteacher interviewed for the purposesof a UNESCO, Save the Children UK

report commented that there is nospace for us to teach children aboutreproductive health;100 see furtherSection 5. Schools extracurricularhealth programmes are intendedto cover these issues but, in realitythese programmes rarely touch onthe subject.101

However, the most signicantproblem identied in the literature,and endorsed by ndings from focus

groups conducted for the purpose ofthis report, relate to the length and

diculty of the curriculum. Criticismshave been voiced by both parents andstudents that the curriculum is over-dicult, and aimed more towards

the more intelligent students.102 Asurvey conducted by the MoEHE,found that there is a strong opinion

100 Palestinian teacher, quoted in Susan Nicolai,Fragmented Foundations: education and chronic crisis inthe Occupied Palestinian Territory, UNESCO, Save theChildren UK, 2007, p. 87.

101 Susan Nicolai, Fragmented Foundations: educationand chronic crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,UNESCO, Save the Children UK, 2007, p. 87.


among students, parents, teachersand principals that many topics aredicult and that the curriculum is

too long.103 Parents, all of whomwere educated under the previouscurriculums, have diculty helping

students with their homework. Oneparent from Gaza, emphasized thispoint: We used to be able to teachthe old curriculum and help ourchildren. Now we struggle to learnalong with them.104 This problemis further illustrated by the fact thatteachers in keeping with the newcurriculums goals aempt to focus

more on activity based training,but are unable to do so as a resultof the demands placed on them

by the curriculum. As one teachernoted, Teachers might be moreactivity-based in the rst part of the

year because of what they learnt intraining, but in the last half of theyear, when they realize they stillhave to nish two thirds of the book,

all that is over.105

103 MoEHE, Education Development StrategicPlan 2008-2012, Towards Quality Education forDevelopment, July 2008, p. 33.


105Quoted in, Susan Nicolai, Fragmented Foundations:education and chronic crisis in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory, UNESCO, Save the Children UK, 2007, p.

89.

Sharek focus group participantsexpressed frustration that non-Tawjihi related subjects, such asphysical education and art, weredropped in order to try to meet thedemands of both the curriculum

and the Tawjihi examination. Thisperception is supported by existingresearch which has found that, sports,playtime and arts subjects are oen

removed in order to compensate forlost days and catch up on curriculumrequirements.106 Such subjects forman essential component of a well-rounded curriculum, and may beparticularly important in the GazaStrip and the West Bank, in light ofthe stress which youth are subjectto as a consequence of the Israelioccupation and internal violence; seefurther Section 5.

The MoEHE in Ramallah has explicitlyacknowledged this problem, andnoted that there is a need to reviewthe curriculum.107 In the EducationDevelopment Strategic Plan 2008-2012, the MoEHE has pledged toreview the entire curriculum for

106 Save the Children, Growing up under curfew:Safeguarding the basic rights of Palestinian children,Save the Children UK and Save the ChildrenSweden, 2006, p. 25.

107 MoEHE, Education DevelopmentStrategic Plan 2008-2012, Towards Quality Educationfor Development, July 2008, p. 33.

0 1


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grades 1-13, and to modify thetextbooks accordingly.

Overall perceptions of the curriculumare mixed, with roughly equallynumbers of Palestinians viewing it

as very good (22 percent of males,25 percent of females) and average(25 percent of males, 25 percentof females). Signicantly a sizable

minority view the curriculum asbad (15 percent of males, 15 percentof females) or very bad (5 percentof males, 4 percent of females). Ofyouth, between the ages of 18 and24, 33 percent view it as very good,31 percent as good, 21 percent asaverage, and 15 percent as either bad(11 percent) or very bad (4 percent).108These gures in particular the

signicant levels of support for eachcategory seem to reect overall

perceptions of the curriculum and itssuitability to certain students at theexpense of others.

108 Sharek, Perception of Education

in Palestine, 2008.

3.6 Quality of Education

3.6.1 Limited Resources

Increasing Demand

One of the key challenges faced by

the education system in the WestBank and the Gaza Strip relates tomeeting the ever-increasing demandgenerated by a growing population,while maintaining and improving thequality and relevance of education.109Universities appear to have bornethe brunt of this surge in demand;

between 1994/1995 and 2002/2003third-level enrolment rates increased

by approximately 232.3 percent,110while the World Bank estimates thatenrolment in third-level institutionsmore than tripled in the decade

between 1995 and 2006.111

As a result of the current nancial

circumstances in the oPt, publicnancing for third-level education is

weak. This means that the third-level

109 Adriana Jaramillo and Hiromichi Katayama,Lessons from West Bank and Gaza: An InnovativeStudent Loan Scheme, World Bank, Fast Brief No 17,

January 2009, p. 1.110 Dr. Mahmoud Al-Jafari & Dareen Lafi, Matching

Higher Education Graduates with Market Needs inthe West Bank and Gaza Strip, Research Summary,2006.


January 2009, p. 1.

system relies heavily on studentfees, which provide approximately60 percent of universities runningcosts.112 This has raised concernsthat universities are reducing thequality of education, by encouraging

higher student enrolment, withoutmaking the associated investmentin resources. As expressed by onefocus group participant, universitiesnow are turning commercial. Tuition

fees are going so high, and the qualityof education is not going up at all.This perception is conrmed by the

MoEHE, who found that increasingdemand, coupled with insucientnancial resources, is negativelyaecting the quality of education.113

3.6.2 Teacher Quality

While a lack of resources isundermining the quality of educationin the oPt, the quality of teachinghas also been identied as an area of

key concern. The education systemcurrently employs approximately46,000 teachers; each year, in responseto increasing demand, 1,800 new


January 2009, p. 1.113 MoEHE, Education Development Strategic

Plan 2008-2012, Towards Quality Education forDevelopment, July 2008, p. 16.

teachers are employed.114 It has beennoted that there is an over-supply ofteachers in 2003/2004, 1,800 postswere lled from a pool of 15,000

applicants115 the conclusion hastherefore been reached that it is not

a shortage of teachers that eectseducation quality, but rather thestandard of teachers themselves.116

Jacqueline Sfeir, who worked inteacher training at Bethlehemuniversity, summed up some ofthe occupation-related problemsfacing new teachers, and indeed allstudents:

Those who were in the rst year ofschool during the beginning of the

rst intifada are now, if they have

chosen to become teachers, likely to

be in their fourth year of university.The rst ve years of schooling wereinterrupted by repeated closures,sometimes up to several months or

even years at a time. Then they hada period of relative stability, but

just before their nal Tawjihi exam,


115 UNESCO, Palestinian Ministry of Education andHigher Education,Assessment 15 the effect of theIsraeli occupation on the Palestinian education 28/9/2000

9/7/2006, 2006.116 Susan Nicolai, Fragmented Foundations: education

and chronic crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,UNESCO, Save the Children UK, 2007, p. 95.


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the second intifada began. Examswere delayed, and for the few years

following, there have been regularinterruptions to university life.117

In the oPt, 11 universities and25 community colleges trainapproximately 130,000 students.According to the MoEHE andUNESCO, these institutions prepareteachers in oen quite dierent

ways, necessitating that a specialin-service program is delivered eachyear for newly recruited teachersto ensure that they are minimallyprepared for work in the classroom.118This nding implies that teacher

training is, by and large, inadequateand unsuited to the specic demands

of the Palestinian education system.

In particular, research has found thatthe focus in the majority of teachertraining programmes is on theory,rather than practice. The World Banknoted that, there is inadequateemphasis on the practicum experience[and that] even teaching methods



courses can be unduly academic.119This system results in teachers whoare inadequately prepared for therigours of class room life.

In the absence of an improvedteacher training system and untilsuch improvements can be put inplace, and have eect the currentsituation presents a signicant and

pertinent demand for in-servicetraining. However, it would appearthat this is a somewhat neglected area.This is not entirely surprising giventhat under the Israeli occupation,teacher training was not a commonphenomena and very few discretetraining services were oered.120 In1994, when the PNA took over theeducation system, there were 185

supervisors; by 2002 this numberhad increased to 345. Traditionally,these supervisors served a regulatoryand control function, however, theMoEHE has shied the focus of

these supervisors towards a moresupportive and developmental role.However, according to teachers119World Bank, Project appraisal document on a proposed

trust fund credit in the amount of US$ 7.0 million tothe West Bank and Gaza for an education action project,Human Development Sector, Middle East andNorth Africa Region, 2001, p.82.

120 S. Assaf, Education disruption and recovery inPalestine, in S. Tawil, Educational destruction andreconstruction in disrupted societies, pp. 51-61,1997, p. 53.

interviewed for a UNESCO, Savethe Children UK Report, much ofthe traditional hierarchical and not-participatory approach to teachertraining remains entrenched.121

These ndings were reinforcedby focus group aendees in both

the Gaza Strip and the West Bank;participants expressed frustration atthe quality of teaching, in particularthe prevalence of spoon-feedingand rote-learning, which doesnot critically engage the students.Improved pre, and in-service teachertraining is one remedy to thisproblem.

As a result of the internal politicaldivisions, students in the GazaStrip also face additional, Gaza-specic problems with respect

to teacher quality. Following theHamas takeover in June 2007, PAemployees in a number of sectors,including education, decided to stayat home, while continuing to receivetheir PA salaries. These teachershave necessarily been replaced byinexperienced appointees; Theteachers are not good enough, this is ashame. The current teachers have no


experience.122 Students involved inthe focus groups expressed theirfrustration at this situation, withparticular reference to the impacton their Tawjihi preparation. Theoriginal teachers who have experience

stay in their houses and the new teachersfrom Hamas came and have no experiencewith the curriculum. We dont depend

on the teachers.123 Another studentemphasised this point, An engineercame to teach us physics, but he hasno experience in physics or in the

curriculum.124

3.6.3 Appropriateness of Schoolingto Life Requirements

Research has shown that, upongraduation, many students lack

necessary skills required by theworkforce. Al-Jafari and Laaributed graduates lack of skills to:

traditional teaching methods basedon didactic approaches, programmedlearning, the infrequent use ofcomputers, and to a general failure touse methods of inquiry, exploration

122 Sharek focus group, 15 20 year-olds, Rafahdistrict, 18 July 2009.




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and problem solving.125 This ndingcorrelates to general criticisms of theeducation system, whereby schoolsare still seen as teacher- and book-centred, with students learning byrote and siing exams to test recall.126

However, it has been pointed out thatthis is not necessarily a problem withthe curriculum, but with the teachersthemselves, and their training. LamisAlimi, former head of education forUNRWA explained that, Yes, thecurriculum does oer teachers a new

way to teach, however, there has notbeen the kind of support teachersneed to use the new methodologiesproperly.127

Consultations with the publicand private sector indicated that

employers require computer,analytical, and communication skills,and work discipline.128 These skillscan be eectively taught and nurtured

125 Dr. Mahmoud Al-Jafari & Dareen Lafi, MatchingHigher Education Graduates with Market Needs inthe West Bank and Gaza Strip, Research Summary,2006, p. 15.



128 Dr. Mahmoud Al-Jafari & Dareen Lafi, MatchingHigher Education Graduates with Market Needs inthe West Bank and Gaza Strip, Research Summary,2006.

within the education systems byproviding access to computers, and

by adopting more inclusive teachingand learning methodologies. Indeed,the skills required by employers, andthe identied problems with respect

to teaching methods, correlate tostudents own criticisms as referredto above.129

3.6.4 Wasta

Wasta, which roughly translates asmediation, refers to a system ofcorruption and cronyism, whereeither bribery or a connection witha person of inuence is essential

in order to obtain employment.Although this issue is discussedfurther below,130 it is worth

mentioning here given the impactit has on youths perceptions of thevalue of education. As noted by onefocus group participant in the WestBank, Education is supposed to qualifyus to work, but wasta is a much easier

way to work. I hear people talking aboutthe right person in the right position.Where is that in our community?131Thefrustration at the prevalence of wasta,and the consequent devaluation129 See Section 3.6.2.130 See Section 4.131 Sharek focus group, 17 21 year-

olds, Salfeet, 9 July

of education, was underlined byanother participant from the GazaStrip, Even if you are well qualiedand skilled, you have to be supported by

wasta to get a job opportunity.132

3.6.5 The Government Response

In the Education DevelopmentStrategic Plan 2008-2012, the MoEHEin Ramallah acknowledged theconcerns relating to teacher quality.While the rst ve year plan focused

largely successfully on access,the current programme is primarilyaimed at improving the qualityof teaching and learning.133 TheMinistry has targeted a number ofprogrammes aimed at achievingthis goal, the two principal targets

being improved teacher training(achieved by enhancing theeducational supervision system)and periodic curriculum review anddevelopment.134

In an eort to improve teacher

quality, the MoEHE intends to trainall new teachers for 60 hours per year132Sharek focus group, 2024 year olds, Khan Younis,

18 July 2009133 MoEHE, Education Development Strategic

Plan 2008-2012, Towards Quality Education forDevelopment, July 2008, p. 53.


per trainee, and to train 52 percentof teaching sta in schools for 24.7

hours each per year. In addition,teaching supervisors will receive 20hours of training annually, and it isintended that the teacher/supervisor

ration will be reduced from 59:1 to50:1 by 2012.135

In order to address students lackof practical skills, new modes andapproaches to teaching such as ICT,E-learning, blended-learning, andso on, will be introduced. Theseimprovements are primarily aimedat the post-secondary level.

Specic information regarding the

Government in Gazas plans wasunavailable, and it is unclear as tohow students, and the educationsystem in Gaza, will be aected.

3.7 The Link between

Education and

Employment

The link between education andemployment has been highlightedas a key area of concern. While the


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relationship between skills learnedduring education and those required

by the workforce have already beentouched upon, this section focuseson the appropriateness of coursesoered and studied at third level

with respect to the demands of thelabour market.

Speaking of the Middle East ingeneral, Salehi-Isfahani and Dhillonhave found that the demand forhigher education does not reect,

or result from an increased demandfor graduates in the local economicsectors.136 Res

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