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Prepared by:Jon Gundersen and the Education and Training Survey Team
UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACEIn partnership with
THE CONSORTIUM FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS
Sharing the SpaceA Study on Education and Training for Complex Operations
About the United States Institute of Peace
The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) is an independent, nonpartisan, national
institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve
violent international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and democratic
transformations, and increase peacebuilding capacity, tools, and intellectual capital
worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and
resources, as well as by its direct involvement in peacebuilding efforts around the globe.
For more information, please visit www.usip.org.
About the Consortium for Complex Operations
The Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO) is a
developing network of civilian and military educators,
trainers, and lessons learned practitioners dedicated to
improving education and training for complex operations.
Principal roles of the CCO are to serve as an information
clearinghouse and to cultivate a civil-military community
of practice for complex operations training and education.
The CCO is a Department of Defense led collaboration
with the Department of State and the United States Agency
for International Development.
About the Team
This study was conducted by the United States Institute of
Peace in partnership with the Consortium for Complex
Operations. The USIP team was lead by Jon Gundersen,
and included the following individuals:
Ingrid Harder, Program Officer
William Story, Senior Consultant
Gregory Maly, Consultant
E. Jill Parlett, Consultant
Brian Rose, Program Assistant
Researchers
Timothy Bertocci
Adriana Brazelton
Elizabeth Detwiler
Kimberly Formo
Charles Wesley Gould
Alexander Johnston
Christopher Jonas
Jon Newstrom
Thomas Oakley
Emily Siegel
Kyana Woolridge
Natalie Zajicova
Acknowledgements
The United States Institute of Peace study
team would like to thank all of the
participants of the workshops and focus
validation groups that USIP hosted in
support of this effort. In addition, we would
like all of the individuals and institutions,
both civilian and military that participated
in our survey. Finally, we wish to thank, in
particular, the leadership and staff of both
the United States Institute of Peace and the
Consortium for Complex Operations
Support Center for their continuous support
and guidance throughout this process.
The views expressed in this report do not
necessarily reflect the views of the United
States Institute of Peace or the Consortium
for Complex Operations, which do not
advocate specific policy positions.
3
Table of Contents
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & INTRODUCTION................................................................ 5
II. METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................................... 11
III. OVERVIEW OF COURSES: INVENTORY RESULTS ..................................................... 13
IV. INTERACTIVE WEB PORTAL..................................................................................... 21
V. KEY ISSUE AREAS..................................................................................................... 23
Whole of Government / Whole of Community ..................................................... 23
Leadership and Management ................................................................................ 25
Situational and Cultural Awareness ...................................................................... 27
Local Capacity Building .......................................................................................... 29
Information and Public Diplomacy ........................................................................ 31
Lessons Learned Processes .................................................................................... 33
Professional Development .................................................................................... 34
VI. NEXT STEPS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................. 37
VII. APPENDICES ............................................................................................................ 41
Appendix A. Institutions and Organizations Surveyed and Consulted .................. 41
Appendix B. Training and Education Survey Questions ........................................ 48
Appendix C. References Consulted........................................................................ 51
Appendix D. Previous Studies and Surveys ........................................................... 53
Appendix E. Portal Fact Sheet ............................................................................... 54
Endnotes ................................................................................................................ 56
4 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
5
Deft diplomacy and directed development must go hand in hand with strong defense
to promote and defend American interests.
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & INTRODUCTION
A nation that makes a great distinction between its
scholars and warriors will have its thinking done by
cowards and its fighting done by fools. –Thucydides
New World For most of the Cold War, the United States was engaged in an existential struggle with
the Soviet Union. The international environment was dangerous, but relatively
straightforward, at least for American policymakers. Our diplomatic and defense policy
was designed for a long Cold War with a competing superpower and for conflict between
sovereign states.
Today we face a new world – a world of fragile and failing states, sectarian and civil
wars, insurgents and terrorists, famines and contagions, human rights violations and
ethnic cleansing and (not always distinguishable) good guys and bad guys. Americans are
currently engaged in complex operations in this chaotic and often ambiguous
environment throughout the world – from Iraq and Afghanistan to Somalia and Haiti.
These operations occur in the gray area between conventional warfare and traditional
peacemaking. They require “soft” non-
kinetic power as well as hard power. In
other words, deft diplomacy and directed
development must go hand in hand with
strong defense to promote and defend
American interests. And the United States
will be involved in this world and in these
operations for the foreseeable future.
Americans will be sharing this complex stage with numerous actors from
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and allies to international civil servants and
private contractors. Therefore, we need a better understanding of other nations and
institutions, their interests and capacities and how they prepare their personnel to operate
in this shared space. Finally, we will continue to be engaged on the ground in some
capacity in sovereign states far beyond our borders. These states have their own history,
culture, and expectations for the future. We need to factor in host country interests and
ownership as we promote and protect American interests overseas in the 21st century.
The CCO and the USIP Study This new world has challenged policy makers not only to rethink the nature of warfare,
but how to prepare for – and how to prevent – armed conflict in the future. With this in
mind, the Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO) was created to foster unity of
effort in how the U.S. Government (USG) educates and trains its personnel for complex
operations.i As a first step, the CCO asked the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) to
survey U.S. educational and training institutions and to develop an inventory of courses
relevant to complex operations. To do this properly, we surveyed not only educators and
trainers, but also experts and practitioners. Consequently, this project is as much an
environmental scan as a course inventory.
6 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Recent policy directives … have recognized the need to elevate the status of stability operations, to enhance civilian capacity, and to better prepare U.S. personnel for complex operations.
The scope of this study did not include rewriting doctrine or addressing resource issues.
Nevertheless, as noted frequently by Secretary Gates, there is a real and recognized need
to increase civilian capacity to conduct complex operations. Clearly, enhancing the
quality and availability of education and training in the civilian sector would improve our
ability to conduct complex operations
more effectively. In fact, recent policy
directives such as National Security
Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44 to
Department of Defense Directive
(DoDD) 3000.05 have recognized the
need to elevate the status of stability
operations, to enhance civilian
capacity, and to better prepare U.S.
personnel for complex operations.
From Workshops to Web Portal Over the course of the past six months, USIP visited key educational and training
facilities, surveyed more than 200 institutions, both military and civilian, representing
over 600 courses, interviewed more than 500 experts, participated in 25 conferences, and
hosted 30 focus and validation groups. The issues and gaps identified by the workshops,
focus groups, and validation groups were then cross-walked with the data collected by
USIP’s team of surveyors. Data from the surveys have been entered into an interactive
web portal that will be available to the CCO community. While the survey and website
cannot claim to be all-inclusive, it is, we believe, the most comprehensive catalogue of
relevant civilian and military courses available to USG stakeholders. We encourage the
community to participate actively in populating the portal and in future CCO activities.
Survey Overview There is a growing cast of actors involved in complex operations sharing the stage with
American personnel throughout the world. Recognizing this, our survey focused on eight
distinct yet overlapping types of institutions:
U.S. Military
U.S. Government Civilian Agencies
U.S. Academic Institutions – public and private
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
Civilian Police
Private contractors
International Organizations
Close allies
Section III includes a series of charts and narratives based on our survey of over 200
institutions from the above sectors. The information and analysis contained in this section
represents a snap shot rather than a finished documentary of the field. In other words,
this report and portal are more of a departure point than a destination.
7
The survey identified a number of key issues. First, the majority of the courses are
available to personnel across the sectors. However, often, these courses only have a small
number of slots available for outside participants, many of which regularly do not get
filled. Second, while there are numerous courses offered, there may not be enough
capacity to accommodate a surge of students, particularly on the civilian side. Finally, the
majority of courses are lecture based, and are taught in a classroom environment, whereas
practitioners have recommended that case studies, field-based and experiential learning
are critical for preparing to work in a complex environment.
Recurring Issues and Recommendations Based on numerous surveys, workshops and focus groups, as well as extensive discussion
with members of the key sectors presently involved with complex operations, the study
team identified a number of key issues and recommendations. Some of these may inform
follow-up CCO activities, such as workshops, conferences, or academic dialogue; while
others might be addressed by policy makers and others in the field. These findings are
presented across the following issue areas:
Whole of Government / Whole of Community
Issue:
Recent policy directives have recognized the need for a “whole of government” approach
to complex operations. Furthermore, participants in the study reinforced the need to go
beyond a “whole of government” to a “whole of community” approach, i.e., including the
spectrum of operators involved on the ground. However, institutional stovepipes,
differences in organizational cultures and even the lack of a common lexicon present
barriers to developing fully integrated training opportunities.
Recommendations:
Support efforts to increase “jointness” between military and civilians and
between civilian agencies involved in complex operations;
Harmonize civilian-military doctrines and also doctrine/guidelines among
civilian agencies;
Conduct training exercises driven by civilian objectives with the U.S. military in
a supporting role, e.g., humanitarian relief, prevention of genocide;
Coordinate U.S. and allied programs to increase civilian capacity for stability
operations, e.g., share best practices;
Sustain and increase portal content with fresh data, new features and continuous
outreach to consortium members;
Utilize survey data to analyze each sectors’ approach to education and training
with a view to harmonizing with other agencies and institutions;
Clarify and coordinate qualification standards and training requirements for
private contractors in complex operations.
8 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Leadership and Management
Issue:
Leadership and management courses are available to both military and civilian personnel.
However, they need to be adapted to take into account the skill sets required to operate
effectively in a complex, ambiguous and often chaotic environment.
Recommendation:
Introduce the latest management techniques into education and training for
complex operations, e.g., flexible and adaptive business models attuned to local
conditions.
Situational and Cultural Awareness
Issue:
While there is no shortage of courses on cultural awareness in general, these courses
frequently boil down to “tourism 101”. Practitioners need guidance on how to interact
within the culture at a professional level, which requires a more nuanced and even
interactive approach.
Recommendations:
Offer more courses, simulations, and exercises to enhance situational and cultural
awareness;
Develop and offer mediation and negotiation courses for the interagency
community, taking into account local cultural context.
Local Capacity Building
Issue:
Capacity building as a concept has expanded beyond the transfer of technical expertise to
include a broad range of post conflict reconstruction and statebuilding initiatives. It is not
enough to be a subject matter expert or to simply expect to transfer a U.S. based model.
Practitioners need to know how to recognize and respect host-country capacity, how to do
baseline assessments and how to transfer knowledge to local counterparts.
Recommendations:
Train experts to more effectively transfer that knowledge to host country
counterparts, i.e., mentoring skills combined with technical expertise;
Identify and train a cadre of people with the specialized skills needed for capacity
building;
Increase inter-sector understanding and cooperation on issues such as local
security sector reform.
9
Lessons Learned Systems
Issue:
While the U.S. military has a well-developed tactical lessons learned process, the USG as
a whole is not as advanced in capturing and weaving lessons into the educational and
training process. The process is also not as effective on the operational and strategic level
as it is on the tactical level. Furthermore, civilian agencies are too often limited by
resource and time constraints to identify and document effective practices.
Recommendations:
Identify case studies to reinforce emerging doctrine and lessons learned/best
practices into the classroom;
Develop a capability to capture lessons from current operations and integrate
those lessons into course content across the sectors.
Information and Public Diplomacy
Issue:
Coordinated public diplomacy is critical to mission success. Different institutions,
however, often do not coordinate messages, use different means of communication and
too often do not even use the same language or lexicon, e.g., public diplomacy,
information operations. This lack of coordination in developing common communication
and operational language can lead to confusion on the part of the host population and
affect mission legitimacy.
Recommendation:
Integrate shared doctrine into education and training, including developing a
coordinated approach to public diplomacy among the military and civilian
agencies, as well as allies, NGOs, and IOs, taking into account multiple
audiences, including the host nation.
Professional Development
Issue:
Most institutions reward service in a recognized field. Yet, there are few systematic
motivations to pursue expertise in a field such as complex operations. Multi-disciplinary
expertise and “joint” assignments are not encouraged in many institutions. Furthermore,
there are few career incentives to develop an expertise in stability operations.
Recommendation:
Develop career incentives throughout the community for professional level
education and training for, and deployments to, complex operations.
The Way Forward In sum, this report is intended to offer educators and trainers, as well as policy-makers
and practitioners, a supporting foundation to better prepare U.S. personnel for complex
operations. The study reflects the need and urgency to adjust education and training to
10 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
support a whole of government approach to civilian and military complex operations.
There are, however, notable obstacles towards doing so. Challenges include ensuring
knowledge and information is current and accurate; factoring in host country interests and
expectations; achieving unity of effort through coordinated doctrine, education and
training across government; and collaborating on and sharing content and course
materials currently available to limited audiences. Finally, since we seem destined to
share the complex world with multiple players, including allies, NGOs and IOs, we need
to utilize a whole of community approach. This report, along with the supporting
catalogue of courses, highlights opportunities to help the CCO “community of practice”
target common solutions through coordinated efforts. By applying this report’s findings
and recommendations, members of the CCO, and more broadly the U.S. Government,
will be better prepared to navigate the often uncharted seas of complex operations.
11
Our survey tried to capture those courses and
programs that taught practical – not theoretical or historical – information
and skill sets needed to operate in complex, often
ambiguous, environments.
II. METHODOLOGY
Scope In order to conduct a thorough study, we included not just U.S. military and civilian
governmental institutions, but all institutions preparing personnel for deployment to
complex operations. Therefore, the study examined courses delivered by: U.S. military;
USG civilian agencies; the private sector (e.g., contractors, USAID implementing
partners); NGOs; civilian police; academic
institutions; international organizations; and,
foreign training programs. In addition to
course content, we examined the education
and training processes of each sector.
There is a vast universe of courses in both
the public and private sector, which offer
important substance and skills – language
courses, regional studies programs, etc., and
are of general interest to anyone deployed
overseas. However, our survey tried to
capture those courses and programs that
taught practical – not theoretical or historical – information and skill sets needed to
operate in complex, often ambiguous, environments. For example, we included courses
on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, but not historical overviews or theoretical
discussions of insurgencies or terrorism; we included regional study courses in areas with
ongoing complex operations (e.g., the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa), but not other
regional courses (e.g., Europe, Latin America). We also included practical courses related
to specific skill sets that have been identified as relevant to complex operations such as
leadership, mediation, negotiation and conflict analysis. Therefore, this survey is not
intended to provide a definitive compilation of all available courses, but rather a snap
shot of relevant practical courses. As such, we can always widen the lens as conditions
change. The course inventory and associated data will be available to the CCO
community through the Web Portal (see Section IV).
Activities Workshops/Focus Groups. As a first step, USIP conducted three substantive workshops
to identify common requirements and gaps in education and training for preparing
personnel in complex operations. The workshop topics included stability operations,
counterinsurgency and irregular warfare. Over 100 educators and practitioners, from both
U.S. military and civilian government institutions, and select outside experts participated
in the workshops. These groups discussed how we educate and train for complex
operations. Participants agreed that the knowledge and skills needed to conduct complex
operations cut across the above topics. Above all, they affirmed that we must move
beyond separate institutional and parochial interests; in other words, towards “unity of
effort” both within USG and with other institutions both foreign and domestic. The
workshops also identified certain core skill sets needed in a non-permissive environment
such as adaptive leadership, situational flexibility, knowledge of and cooperation with
other operators in the field and capacity building skills.
12 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Survey of Course Offerings. Following the workshops, USIP conducted a survey of
course offerings based on the needs identified during the sessions. The survey was sent to
over 400 education and training institutions. USIP hired an experienced thirteen-member
survey team to follow up and catalog course information which formed the basis for the
study. The survey project was broken down into sectors, as referenced above.
Interviews and Focus Groups. USIP conducted close to 500 phone interviews, attended
and/or participated in 20-25 conferences, made 10 site visits to education and training
facilities, and conducted upwards of 30 focus groups with experts and practitioners. In
addition, USIP hosted a series of sector-specific focus groups to validate the initial
findings of the study. Five of the discussions were held with representatives of
institutions that provide education and training, while one discussion was held with
practitioners on the receiving end of such training.
Portal. In parallel to the survey, USIP developed an interactive portal to store and share
survey results and to serve as a hub of interaction for the CCO and its members.
Specifically, the portal includes a comprehensive database of courses and institutions
related to complex operations, interactive discussion forums, blogging capabilities for
thought leaders, a acronym glossary, subject matter expert directory, directory for
complex operations tools and resources, and a CCO calendar detailing information
regarding complex operations events, including archived files. The course database is
searchable by CCO portal members (see Section IV for more information).
Sector Analysis, Key Issues and Recommendations. Each sector team analyzed how
that sector was engaged in complex operations, the status of education and training, and
major issues and gaps in that sector. We then cross-walked the perceived gaps and needs
with the survey results. Finally, USIP identified crosscutting issues and gaps in education
and training and identified specific recommendations for courses, conferences, and future
activities for the CCO.
13
III. OVERVIEW OF COURSES: INVENTORY RESULTS
This survey is arguably the most
comprehensive collection of courses related
to complex operations available to dateii.
The following overview provides a
breakdown of 616 courses delivered by the
U.S. Military, U.S. Civilian Agencies, U.S.
Academic Institutions, Nongovernmental
organizations and institutes, as well as
foreign and international institutions.
Recognizing that this is not a clearly
defined area of study, courses were selected
based on workshop outcomes and
consultations as outlined in the
methodology section. Over half of the
courses are offered at the graduate or
postgraduate level. Nearly half are
professional or specialized in-house
courses. Only 6 percent of courses surveyed
are offered at the undergraduate level.
Given the interdisciplinary nature of
complex operations, many of the courses
cover a range of topics. Subject categories
were selected based on the main themes
covered in the course. For example, it may appear from the chart that there are no related courses on ethics and codes of conduct offered
by USG civilian agencies. However, ethics may be woven into courses on other subjects such as intercultural awareness or leadership and
management. One of the recurring themes from the study is the lack of a common lexicon or definitions across and even within
organizations. Therefore, there is some crossover in the subject categories. We did not attempt to define areas of study such as
stabilization and reconstruction vs. stability operations. Rather, courses are self-defining as much as possible based on the terminology
used by the course provider.
BREAKDOWN OF COURSES BY SECTOR
25%
14%
38%
2%
21%
U.S. Military = 152
USG Civilian = 86
U.S. Academic = 236
Nongovernmental = 12
International = 130
14 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Breakdown of Course Subjects Offered by Sector
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Irregular warfare
Train-the-trainer courses
Rule of Law
Communication and public diplomacy
Governance
Economic stabilization
Situational awareness
Public security
Interagency planning and coordination
Cultural/intercultural awareness
Counterinsurgency
Ethics and codes of conduct
Civil-military
Humanitarian assistance
Courses on working with other agencies
Regional courses
Reconstruction and Stabilization (general)
International/multilateral organizations
Conflict resolution/mediation/negotiation
Leadership and management
Stability operations/peace operations (general)
U.S. Military USG Civilian U.S. Academic Nongovernmental International
N.B. Courses were selected for their direct relevance to complex operations. For example, the category
“regional courses” only includes courses covering recent or ongoing operational areas.
15
Course subjects U.S. Military
USG Civilian
U.S. Academic
Non-governmental International Total
Percentage of total
Stability operations/peace operations (general) 30 8 36 0 79 153 25%
Leadership and management 33 28 17 4 13 95 15%
Conflict
resolution/mediation/negotiation 8 8 48 1 13 78 13%
International/multilateral organizations 8 3 18 0 40 69 11%
Reconstruction and stabilization
(general) 25 10 28 0 5 68 11%
Regional courses 44 4 14 0 3 65 11%
Courses on working with other agencies 19 13 12 0 15 59 10%
Humanitarian assistance 1 5 37 1 13 57 9%
Civil-military 19 1 13 0 11 44 7%
Ethics and codes of conduct 10 0 20 0 13 43 7%
Counterinsurgency 22 1 16 0 2 41 7%
Cultural/intercultural awareness 12 4 15 2 4 37 6%
Interagency planning and coordination 15 11 1 0 0 27 4%
Public security 9 2 1 0 14 26 4%
Situational awareness 8 9 6 1 1 25 4%
Economic stabilization 2 9 9 0 2 22 4%
Communication and public diplomacy 6 3 4 0 7 20 3%
Governance 1 5 11 0 3 20 3%
Rule of Law 0 5 8 0 1 14 2%
Train-the-trainer courses 1 1 1 0 4 7 1%
Irregular warfare 5 0 0 0 0 5 1%
16 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Accessibility Given the recent emphasis on interagency planning and coordination, it is not surprising that most of the surveyed courses offered by the
military and the government civilian agencies are open to participants across the sectors. Ninety-five percent of courses delivered by the
military are accessible to participants beyond U.S., military personnel. Of the 86 courses offered by USG civilian agencies, 77 percent are
open to participants from other sectors. More often than not, however, courses have limited quotas set aside for outside participants. These
often go unfilled due to resource issues (either personnel time or direct costs associated with attending a course) as well as the lack of
awareness of available courses across organizations. As a result, courses are less integrated than reflected in the survey results.
(n=152)
(n=86)
ACCESSIBILITY OF COURSES OFFERED BY THE MILITARY
32%
10%
47%
5% 3%
3%
Open to U.S. Military Only
Open to U.S. Military and Civilian
Agencies OnlyOpen to U.S. and Foreign Military Only
Open to U.S. Military, Civilian Agencies,
Foreign Military OnlyOpen to U.S. Military, Civilian Agencies,
Foreign Military and Private SectorOpen to all, including I0s and NGOs
ACCESSIBILITY OF COURSES OFFERED BY USG CIVILIAN AGENCIES
23%
10%
12%26%
29%
Internal to Host Agency Only
Open to Other USG Civilian
Agencies Only
Open to Host Agency andImplementing Partners Only
Open to USG Civilian agencies and
U.S. Military Only
Open to all (including Ios, NGOs,
Private sector)
17
Target Participants The majority of courses offered by the military are available only to mid and senior level officials, whereas only 14 percent are open to
entry-level personnel. This is in contrast with government civilian agencies, where 75 percent of the courses are open to entry-level
officials. For civilian agencies, this survey considers entry level to include GS-05 through GS-09 and up to FO-05. Mid-level is
equivalent to GS-10 through GS-14 and FO-06 through FO-02. Senior level equates to GS-15 or above and FO-01 or above. For the
military courses, entry level is O-1 through O-3, mid-level is O-4 and O-5, and senior level is O-6 and above.
(n=152) (n=86)
TARGET PARTICIPANT LEVEL OF USG CIVILIAN COURSES
6%
30%
7%
8%10%
39%
Entry level only
Entry and Mid-level
Mid-level only
Mid & Senior level
Senior level only
All levels
TARGET PARTICIPANT LEVEL OF U.S. MILITARY COURSES
3% 3%
67%
16%
11%
Entry level only
Entry and Mid-level
Mid-level only
Mid & Senior levels
Senior level only
All levels
18 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
COURSE CAPACITY
1 3 16 5
10
50
100
150
200
250
1 to 10 students 11 to 30 students 31 to 100 students 100+ students
Num
ber
of
cou
rses
U.S. Military
USG Civilian
U.S. Academic Institution
Nongovernmental
International
Capacity The vast majority of courses are offered in classroom settings with capacities of 11-30 students. An additional 35 courses are offered as
distance learning online, on CDROM or by correspondence.
(n=47
0)
19
Frequency Academic and military institutions that operate on a semester schedule tend to offer courses once or twice a year. Conversely, civilian
agencies offer courses on a more regular basis to accommodate for deployment schedules. Courses provided by other sectors are offered
on an ad-hoc or as-required basis. Such courses may be self-paced online, CD-Rom based, short seminars.
(n=526)
COURSE FREQUENCY
4 051 3 03 2
0
50
100
150
200
250
1-2 times/yr 3-5 times/yr 6+ times/yr No set frequency
Nu
mb
er
of
co
urs
es
U.S. Military
USG Civilian
U.S. Academic
Nongovernmental
Internationals
20 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Teaching Methods Courses were surveyed to determine teaching methods and the various tools used to support the learning process. Many courses use
multiple teaching methods; however, over 90 percent of the courses surveyed rely on lectures or seminars as the basic format for the
course. This corresponds to the finding that 87 percent of courses are offered in a classroom setting. Case studies are also common
although many respondents recommended the need for more quality case studies related to complex operations. Military-offered courses
provide the most instances of simulation as a method of teaching.
(n=543) (n = 590)
TEACHING METHODS & TOOLS
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Lectur
e/Se
minar
Case
Stu
dies
Simulat
ion
Gro
up S
tudy
Expe
rient
ial/In
tern
ships
USG Military
USG Civilian
U.S. Academic Institution
Nongovernmental
Internationals
COURSE DELIVERY
87%
3%6%
4%
Classroom based
Field-based
Distance Learning (Online, Correspondence, CD)
Multiple site
21
IV. INTERACTIVE WEB PORTAL
As part of the project, USIP developed an interactive web portal to store and share the
course inventory, and to serve as a virtual hub of interaction for the CCO and its
members. The portal is an essential tool for the CCO to grow and sustain a robust
community of practice. The portal is located at www.ccoportal.org.
Current features and functions include:
Comprehensive database of complex operations courses;
Expansive database of education and training institutions;
Interactive member discussion forums;
Blogging capabilities for thought leaders to debate ideologies and paradigms;
Interactive acronym glossary;
Subject matter expert member directory;
Directory of complex operations tools and resources; and
Complex operations calendar detailing information regarding complex operations
events, including archived files from previous events.
The CCO plans to develop additional portal functionality to support a growing CCO
community to include chat capabilities, conference registration, electronic journal, and a
wiki function. The CCO anticipates that new features and functions will be driven by
member needs to ensure a positive user experience.
When USIP turns the portal over to the CCO it will contain over 600 courses on complex
operations. Courses are easily searchable using a user-friendly interface that allows
members to search by numerous fields including keywords, institution type, accessibility,
and length. Both basic and advanced search functions are available.
The portal provides the infrastructure to expand. The portal and the databases that
underpin it are living tools that the CCO Support Center plans to maintain. To that end,
members are encouraged to submit content through the portal, including courses, events,
documents, queries, and discussion topics.
22 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
23
Overcoming organizational divides is critical for personnel working in the field.
V. KEY ISSUE AREAS
A number of issues regularly arose during interviews and working sessions. These
crosscutting issues are summarized below. They are relevant to each of the eight sectors
studied and form the basis of the recommendations presented in Section VI.
Whole of Government / Whole of Community Recent policy directives – NSPD-44, DODD 3000.05 – have recognized the need for a
“whole of government” approach to complex operations. USG civilian and military
education and training institutions are working to integrate these policy issues into
education and training. Throughout the course of this project, participants have reinforced
the need to (1) institute a whole of government approach; and (2) go beyond whole of
government to a whole of society or whole of community approach. Complex operations
involve multiple actors, underscoring the need for coordination at multiple levels, and for
joint education and joint training exercises. The U.S. government is making important
strides on this front, as are other governments and institutions. However, lack of
resources and cultural differences often hinder progress. And, across the sectors, there is
still more work to be done.
Sharing the Space Overcoming organizational divides is critical for personnel working in the field. Complex
operations involve multiple institutions, often including nongovernmental organizations,
international organizations, militaries and advisors from multiple countries, private
companies, host government organizations, and non-state actors. Each of these groups
has its own organizational culture, language, and interests. Additionally, it is important to
recognize and understand host country interests, cultures, sensitivities and needs. To
work effectively in complex operations,
practitioners must have an
understanding of all of the actors
working on the ground.
Once practitioners understand the range
of operators involved in a complex
environment, training is necessary to be
able to function across cultural boundaries. Our surveys noted that integrated efforts are
difficult in a shared environment, and that more work is needed to enhance inter-
organizational cooperation. Three obstacles stand out:
The need for more open lines of communication, better information sharing
practices, and synchronization of goals and objectives;
The absence of a universally agreed upon language. The lack of a common
lexicon, set of definitions, and terminology for complex operations was noted in
several surveys. Terms such as irregular warfare, stability operations, security,
stability, transition and reconstruction, and counterinsurgency are often used
interchangeably and not altogether accurately across the community.
The need to leverage the capabilities of interagency and international partners
when working in a shared space. This requires not only an understanding of other
24 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
institutions, but an awareness of the capabilities and limitations of their own
institutions, and ability to explain the institution to others.
Shortcomings in this regard cannot necessarily be linked to education and training course
curriculum. Gaps in training and education have more to do with the limited opportunities
for joint training. Enhanced cooperation and “unity of effort” between interagency and
international players, particularly between civilian and military institutions, pose
challenges for training and educating for effective planning, implementation, and analysis
of complex operations. An additional issue is that disciplinary stovepipes separate critical
experts from working together. Some areas of complex operations are outside of current
disciplines and academic structures. These intellectual stovepipes result in a lack of
ownership and no clear responsibilities for tasks that lay between them. Finally, there is a
significant knowledge gap at all levels concerning other organizations in the field, and
how they interact across the military/civilian, governmental/nongovernmental,
public/private, and cross-cultural divides.
The Civilian-Military Divide The gap between military personnel and civilians working on the ground in complex
operations is often a major source of friction. Both civilian and military interviewees
noted that civilians generally lack basic knowledge of military command structures.
Similarly, the military lacks knowledge on the role of USG civilian personnel, NGOs and
IOs on the ground in complex operations. More often than not, military and civilian
personnel train separately. However, recent changes in national security directives require
DoS and DoD to integrate stabilization and reconstruction plans with military
contingency plans where appropriate, and coordinate these plans with relevant
government and nongovernmental organizations.
One effort to bridge the divide between the two cultures is the Guidelines for Relations
Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations.
Spearheaded by InterAction, the U.S. military, and the U.S. Institute of Peace, these
guidelines were developed to serve as “rules of the road” for how the two entities should
operate in hostile environments. The United Nations Office for the Coordinator of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has undertaken similar efforts, and has even gone as far as
to offer Civilian-Military Coordination Training. This is offered at three levels to
combined civilian-military classes.
The Civilian-Civilian Divide The divide between military and civilian agencies is not the only gap. There is also a
divide between the various civilian agencies involved in complex operations. For
example, DOS and USAID and at least eight other agencies play a role in stability and
reconstruction operations. Restricted funding and cultural barriers within and among
civilian agencies limit their ability to offer and receive interagency education and training
courses. Furthermore, civilian agencies need to develop shared conceptual frameworks
and shared approaches based on best practices. Education and training should, in part,
cascade from these. USIP, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Institute
(PKSOI), and other agencies are currently engaged in a project to develop just this type
of civilian doctrine. There are also a number of relevant interagency education and
training efforts underway, including: the National Security Education Consortium
(NSEC), the Reconstruction & Stabilization Senior Roundtable, and the National Security
Professional Development Initiative.
25
No amount of training can fully prepare personnel for
every situation. Training programs should instead
inform participants of potential scenarios and instruct them on how to
utilize available resources.
Leadership and Management Good training is only part of what it takes to develop good leaders. The workshops held
at the outset of our study underscored the need to develop adaptive leadership as a core
skill set, particularly for working in a rapidly changing, chaotic environment. Leaders,
especially at the mid-level, must be able to assess the changing operational environment,
analyze their assessments, recalibrate and adjust objectives accordingly.
Leadership and management issues cut across all sectors involved in complex operations.
Our survey findings suggest that training and education programs across sectors are
indeed attempting to address leadership challenges specific to complex situations. The
military is arguably the most systematic of all sectors in training its cadre of leaders for a
wide range of operational challenges. However, civilian training institutions such as the
Foreign Service Institute (FSI) and USIP’s Education and Training Center, as well as a
range of universities and NGOs, offer numerous courses ranging from high-level strategic
planning to team-building and other
personal leadership skills.iii Yet, across the
sectors, we found that while this is a
priority issue, there are still “gaps.”
Teaching the Right Skills No amount of training can fully prepare
personnel for every situation. Training
programs should instead inform participants
of potential scenarios and instruct them on
how to utilize available resources.
Understanding the mechanisms of other
organizations (e.g. financial authorities,
chains of command, and human resource policies) becomes much more critical when
decisions need to be made quickly, or when official authorization is not available.
Additionally, individuals need to understand their role within the broader context in order
to ensure smooth sequencing of activities and coordination with other initiatives. This
includes knowing how to work with local authorities and other organizations working on
the ground. Critical analysis has also been flagged as key competency across all sectors.
Finally, knowledge and technical expertise must be linked up with cultural awareness and
host-country knowledge, interpersonal and communication skills, understanding local and
international legal frameworks, and adherence to standards and codes of conduct.
In addition to these adaptive leadership skills, several organizations stressed a need for
more training in basic managerial skills. One of the shortcomings of training for
management and leadership is the fundamental difficulty of planning, making
assessments and evaluating during a conflict or postconflict situation. This will be
discussed further in the section on capacity building; however, it is also a management
issue.
Teaching to the Right Level Peace and stability operations are often characterized in military terms by the
compression of traditional strategic, operational and tactical levels of decision-making.
The notion of the “strategic corporal” responds to the emerging leadership demands
presented by complex operations, in that the nature of these operations demands a higher
level of leadership from junior officers and non-commissioned officers, as well as the
26 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
ability to carry out a wider range of activities under pressure – from war fighting to civil
administration to humanitarian assistance. It is not uncommon for relatively junior level
personnel to be charged with administering programs in the field with leadership
responsibilities well beyond their rank. Within a military organization, especially at the
tactical level in the field, very young and junior-ranking personnel serve in leadership
positions that entrust them with substantial responsibilities. As such the military provides
leadership training at all levels.
At the same time, some skill sets that would greatly benefit and enhance the effectiveness
of the tactical level leaders – negotiation skills, for example – are primarily taught to
higher-level military leaders at senior officer professional development courses. Junior
military leaders need this training as well.
In contrast to military personnel, lower-ranking civilian officials lack the focused and
deliberate leadership development and experience of the military personnel serving in the
same space. Even if practitioners are not in a formal leadership or management position,
they will likely be navigating fluid or ambiguous “chains of command,” or find
themselves in situations which demand a higher level of flexibility and leadership
capabilities. For example, it is not uncommon for a lawyer to be charged with helping to
develop government legislative structures, oversight mechanisms and committee systems.
A health practitioner may be charged with helping set up a public health care system. Yet
leadership specific courses for civilian personnel are often reserved for senior levels. In
addition, civilian leadership training must be relevant for the audience. For example,
senior-level civilians may be political appointees and may not have had prior related
experience or access and/or incentives to undergo training to prepare for a specific
operation.
A renewed effort to provide the right skills at the right level, and the leadership
development at the right time would greatly enhance the effectiveness of both civilian
and military leaders at the tactical level.
27
The importance of cultural issues in training and
education for those being deployed into the field cut
across all sectors and organizations involved in
complex operations.
Situational and Cultural Awareness There is no shortage of culture or language courses offered by government, military or
academic institutions. It is widely recognized that those working on the ground in
complex operations require situational awareness, which includes an understanding of
local culture, geography, social structure and sensitivities. Cultural awareness provides
personnel with the ability to function across cultural lines in multicultural environments.
Additionally, cross-cultural communication is considered an important skill for all levels
of practitioners working in the field. This includes language training, as well as conflict
resolution and negotiation skills. USG institutions such as the Defense Language Institute
(DLI), FSI, and the National Defense University (NDU) offer negotiation, cultural
awareness and area studies courses, as well as language training to personnel being
deployed into the field. USIP also offers numerous courses and conferences on the above
topics.
The importance of cultural issues in training and education for those being deployed into
the field cut across all sectors and organizations involved in complex operations. Gaps in
education and training for issues related to culture and situational awareness primarily
relate to how nuanced courses are, and how
well personnel are able to transfer skills taught
in training courses into practice.
Cultural Awareness General cultural awareness skills are
important for teaching personnel how to live
and work effectively within a multicultural
environment, and are core skills for
practitioners at every level. This includes
providing individuals with a broadened
awareness of the similarities and differences between one’s own culture and surrounding
cultures. Additionally, cultural awareness provides practitioners with the ability to
identify and analyze the nature of cultural differences as drivers of conflict. While
courses teaching these skills exist within education and training institutions, our survey
found such courses are not as prevalent or nuanced as is necessary to work in a complex
environment.
Situational Awareness Situational awareness, as opposed to cultural awareness, provides individuals with
regional specific knowledge. Practitioners should be well versed in the societies in which
they are operating, in order to effectively engage all parts of those societies. This includes
understanding local political and social structures, as well as environmental, and
geographic knowledge of the region. This information is widely available across the
spectrum of training and education institutions accessible to practitioners. Area studies
programs are regularly offered at both USG training institutions, as well as academic
institutions. However, situational awareness also involves understanding local
sensitivities, understanding the nuances of working in conflict societies, and the impact of
one’s presence and actions on local society. When local sensitivities are ignored, a
foreign presence can have a negative impact on a mission, and what began as a welcomed
presence, can quickly become a negative relationship with a host nation.
28 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
One of the most significant gaps in training and education related to situational awareness
has to do with understanding how to transfer knowledge into action when working on the
ground. Often, training and education occur well in advance of deployment, and far from
the theater of the operation. As such, practitioners do not have the opportunity to
integrate classroom education into everyday practice until on the job. In country training,
for example, allows personnel to interact with a culture as a professional, preparing them
for future work in that environment.
Cross-Cultural Communication In addition to understanding local culture, practitioners need to understand how to
communicate across cultural lines. This includes communicating with citizens on the
ground, local leaders, and others working in the shared space. Cross-cultural
communication, including language skills, as well as mediation and negotiation, is highly
regarded as important for practitioners working in the field.
Multiple languages are often spoken in a shared environment, and can lead to
misunderstanding of intent when working together toward a common goal. Practitioners
working in a complex operation ideally speak the language of the host population;
however, this is seldom the case. To prepare practitioners for working in complex
operations, the government has identified priority languages, and offers short courses and
longer-term proficiency courses at a number of training institutions around the country.
When language proficiency is not an option for all personnel, basic operational language
skills build good will and legitimacy with host populations.
In addition to speaking the local language, it is important for personnel to be taught the
process of selecting and making use of interpreters and translators, particularly in
negotiations. Because of the multinational nature of complex operations, most personnel
cannot communicate effectively with the local population without assistance. Because of
this, the UN, for example, includes the utilization of translators as a key component in
communication and negotiation courses. Selection of interpreters is important because
they may come with their own biases, which may affect a mission’s success.
Additionally, understanding cultural sensitivities is key, so as not to put them in
uncomfortable situations.
Mediation and negotiation skills are also generally recognized as essential for
practitioners working in the field. While these strategic skills are important in any
environment, they are particularly needed in a chaotic conflict situation. Consensus
building, negotiation, and dispute resolution are essential in shared environments when
multiple parties are involved. These skills are particularly relevant to one’s ability to
recognize and analyze the elements of conflict situations. Cultural issues need to be tied
into these courses as cross-cultural negotiation has its own set of nuances and
sensitivities. Courses on mediation and negotiation are available to personnel through a
variety of institutions, including USG, NGO, and academic institutions. USIP is
integrating its series of critically acclaimed handbooks on cross-cultural negotiation
behavior into its negotiation training (i.e., books on French, Russian, German, North
Korean, Chinese, Japanese, Israeli and Palestinian negotiating styles). In addition, the
Combined Arms Center includes an introduction to negotiation and mediation in conflict
management as a core course for senior officials.
29
Local Capacity Building
Capacity building has become a catch-all label for a host of initiatives designed to
support and develop host-nation organizations, e.g., local civil society organizations,
militaries, police forces, businesses, and governments. The concept is not new:
developing the capacities of poor countries has long been the cornerstone of development
aid. As a reconstruction process, capacity building often refers to the methods used by
interveners to help national institutions and/or to improve their performance. Therefore,
beyond the provision of basic short-term security and humanitarian assistance, most
postconflict stabilization and reconstruction activities in the areas such as security sector
reform, rule of law, governance, or economic sustainability are essentially capacity
building. Furthermore, the development of local capacity – to the degree to which this
can be assessed – underpins the ability of the intervener to define an exit strategy. It
follows that capacity building should be a key element of preparing practitioners across
all sectors for working in complex operations, particularly stabilization and
reconstruction.
In some areas, the U.S. and other donor countries have become proficient at delivering
capacity building programs. The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance
Program (ICITAP) helps countries develop professional civilian-based law enforcement
institutions. The State Department’s African Contingency Operations Training and
Assistance (ACOTA) is designed to enhance the capacity of African partner nations to
participate in multinational peace support operations in Africa. To date, ACOTA has
provided training and non-lethal equipment to over 52,000 peacekeepers from African
partner militaries. In addition, the Treasury Department offers technical assistance and
mentoring in a number of areas, including finance and tax collection, preventing money
laundering, and tracking terrorist financing.
The military also has a long history of working with other countries to enhance their
military skills through individual training courses as well as international programs such
as NATO’s Partnership for Peace. The International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program provides over 2,000 courses at 150 military schools and installations to
military members of friendly and allied countries. The courses enhance and promote
regional stability, defense cooperation, democratic values, the rule of law, and human
rights. The Foreign Internal Defense (FID) program assists nations that need to curb
lawlessness or that need protection from rogue nations.
Participatory Approaches and Partnerships However, capacity building goes beyond a menu of trainings or skill sets to be delivered.
“Capacity building” proposes a set of practices that put the emphasis on participatory
approaches and partnership. In this sense, capacity building requires the ability to
recognize and build on effective local approaches and contextual awareness. This should
be incorporated into planning as well as the way practitioners conduct their work. On the
planning side, assessing and recognizing existing capacity should lay the foundation for
follow on efforts and future evaluation. Interveners should not start from zero when
planning a development strategy but rather focus on building on what already exists – on
strengthening pre-existing capacities. What we found, however, is that baseline
assessments are either not being done, or are not being done well.
30 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Interveners inevitably attempt to transplant their own systems, procedures and values to host nation
institutions. As in medicine, transplantation
of a non-indigenous organ or model may well result
in transplant rejection.
Local Ownership Nurturing local “ownership” is an important element of capacity building and in many
ways is its primary goal. Capacity building programs aim at developing local
competences, in order to prevent or end dependency. In practice, however, interveners
inevitably attempt to transplant their own systems, procedures and values to host nation
institutions. As in medicine, transplantation of a non-indigenous organ or model may well
result in transplant rejection. A more collaborative and customized approach may take
more time, but is far more likely to succeed.
It is not enough for practitioners to be experts in subject matter; they need to recognize
their role in developing local expertise and to support local training, mentoring and
technical transfer of know-how. Unlike the
military, civilian agencies do not consider
teaching or mentoring skills an integral part of
professional development. Military officers
can expect to spend approximately one third
of their professional time either being trained
or training others. Even civilian institutions
with a strong training component do not
always develop teaching, mentoring and
advising skills in a systematic way. As a
result, practitioners selected for their expertise
may have no experience in training or
mentoring others. There is no single formula
for this and it can be a very personal
experience. However, there are effective
practices that require knowing how as well as when to teach, mentor and advise. This
demands an understanding of the local culture and context. Practitioners also need to
understand their role within the broader capacity building effort.
Specialized Knowledge In addition to “soft” skills such as collaborative skills and training and mentoring skills,
advisors and capacity builders need relevant specialized skills to be effective and
credible. An advisor cannot successfully advise a justice minister, for example, without
strong rule of law expertise. However, there is a lack of subject matter expertise in a
number of key capacity building areas and only limited corresponding education and
training programs in areas such as security sector reform. Agencies responsible for
capacity building programs need to identify and develop a cadre of individuals with the
prerequisite skills in this area. In particular, the interagency team needs to recruit a deeper
“bench.” The Civilian Response Corp is a step in the right direction.
31
Public diplomacy and information operations are critical to mission success.
Information and Public Diplomacy Public diplomacy and information operations are critical to mission success. Moreover,
gaining the trust of both the host population, and the population back at home, is
necessary for building mission legitimacy, managing spoilers, and building constituencies
for peace. Maintaining a common message and successful communication with the host
population is often difficult due to the complex nature of the environment. Because the
work of various players is often difficult to coordinate, let alone integrate, they frequently
use different means of speaking with a host population, including using different lexicons
and communication outlets. This lack of coordination in developing common
communication practices and operational language can lead to confusion on the part of
the host population.
Even individual agencies often do not convey the same message, both vertically at all
levels of command within an organization and horizontally to other organizations
working on the ground. Effective public diplomacy involves implementing a consistent
message at all levels of operation – whether it be when interacting with people on the
street or mass communication via television and/or radio – and choosing communication
outlets that are most appropriate for that particular working environment. In other words,
good public diplomacy requires situational awareness. Training should include lessons
learned and best practices on what communication methods and types of messages are
most effective among difference audiences.
Military and civilian personnel often use the terms information operations and public
diplomacy interchangeably. However, they are different terms of art. For the purposed of
this report, we have chosen to use the term “public diplomacy.”
Staying on Message Public diplomacy involves all efforts to communicate a message to the public, from
speaking to individuals on the ground, to utilizing media outlets. These skills are
considered core skills for both civilian and military personnel, and are offered at
government education and training institutions. However, in the field, public diplomacy
messages are too often not coordinated between institutions. For messages to successfully
permeate all aspects of society, consistent messages must be delivered across all chains of
command. To stay “on message,” all levels of command, and all organizations, must
make every attempt to coordinate efforts from the classroom to the field.
Knowing the Environment Complex operations include a number of actors, each with their own methods of
communications and cultural sensitivities.
Those conducting information operations and
public diplomacy must know the multiple
audiences to whom they are conveying
messages. This is necessary to determine what
resonates with what population, including how
they interpret messages, pictures, and other
forms of expression. As such, cultural awareness must be woven into training and
education on media management and public diplomacy.
Finally, different actors have their own forms of media and information sharing practices,
which need to be understood to effectively communicate with a host population.
32 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Additionally, the nature of conflict situations can complicate efforts to communicate with
the public. Because media outlets that are readily available in the U.S. may not be
accessible in a conflict environment, situational awareness is necessary to identify the
capabilities and limitations of mass communication mechanisms within host countries.
33
More often than not, however, lessons that could be shared with others remain lessons noted or worse, lessons lost.
Lessons Learned Processes Practitioners regularly demonstrate the ability to make “ingenious adaptations” in the
field. More often than not, however, lessons that could be shared with others remain
lessons noted or worse, lessons lost.
The military is renowned for its lessons learned capacity at the tactical level. The Center
for Army Lessons Learned, for example, has a sophisticated and timely feedback loop for
troops operating in the field. Joint Forces Command maintains an extensive database of
lessons and resources on past and ongoing joint
operations. Lessons learned are also systematically
identified unit by unit. However, these lessons do
not always percolate vertically or horizontally.
Moreover, the process reportedly falls short at the
operational and strategic levels.
Civilian institutions simply do not have the same
feedback mechanisms to conduct systematic lessons
learned. While agencies recognize the need to
gather lessons from the field, there is a constant
struggle to turn these into valuable information for future deployments. When it comes to
conducting complex operations, civilian agencies are too often limited by time and
resource constraints to focus on identifying and documenting effective practices.
The bottom line is that lessons learned are hard to systematize at the operational and
strategic levels. The further someone is from the impact of their actions, the harder it is
for them to connect a unique experience to generalized lessons for the future. Personnel
need to be trained to recognize an experience as something that could be converted to a
lesson. Equally important, practitioners need to learn how to report lessons back to their
superiors effectively.
Organizations also have to be willing and able to absorb and process lessons learned from
the field and to adapt when lessons point to the need for a course correction. This can
demand substantial resources. For example, even if relevant interviews are conducted,
there may not be funding available for transcription and conversion into lessons learned.
Increasingly, with the help of new web and cell-phone technology, practitioners are
making use of reach-back resources as way to access expertise and lessons learned from
the field. Practitioners point out that it is more useful to know where to find information
when needed than to try and get trained on everything they would need to know ahead of
time.
That said, if training and education programs are to reflect ground truth, effective
programs that incorporate lessons learned into complex operations’ education and
training curricula are vital.
34 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Professional Development The effort to enhance education and training for complex operations at the professional
level becomes a much less meaningful exercise unless it is linked up with career
progression and other incentives. Yet, a common theme across all sectors surveyed in this
study is that there are few systemic motivations to pursue expertise in the field of
complex operations. The disjuncture is in part due to the current status – or lack of status
– of “complex operations” as an area of practice. It also has to do with institutional
approaches to professional-level education and training.
Most institutions, both within and outside the government, reward service in a recognized
field. Developing expertise as an infantry officer or a professor of Asian studies, for
example, rather than in an interdisciplinary area such as stability operations, is seen to be
more career enhancing. The military has taken steps to address this tendency to specialize
by rewarding “joint” assignments. However, multi-disciplinary expertise and “joint”
assignments are not encouraged in many institutions. Even in the military, heretofore,
there have been few career incentives for personnel to develop an expertise in stability
operations.
Learning Cultures The organizational cultures of military and civilian institutions further influence their
disparate approaches to professional development. Quite simply, civilian government
agencies do not have the entrenched learning culture that exists in the military, where
training is an integral part of professional development. Military personnel spend up to
one third of their time in training and it is seen as mission essential. Conversely, civilian
organizations generally view expertise as something that comes with a new hire or can be
learned on the job. Civilian agencies have begun to take steps to remedy this, e.g., former
Secretary of State Powell’s Diplomatic Readiness Initiative. These steps have only
partially addressed the real need to enhance the ability of civilian agencies to participate
effectively in complex operations. The lack of a “training float” in USG civilian agencies
is still largely a factor of lack of resources. Budget constraints also contribute to and
exacerbate the lack of a training culture on the civilian side.
Furthermore, in the civilian government sector, honing an expertise while employed too
often is either done on one’s own time or at the expense of active job duties. The
increasing use of private contractors underscores this reality. Government agencies claim
that one of the benefits of using the services of outside contractors is that they can tap
into existing expertise, rather than develop it in-house. This then places the onus on the
private sector to screen for and/or develop expertise to fit the bill. Moreover, civilian
agencies often treat education and training as an administrative function. When learning
programs are offered, they are often not considered “mission essential.” This is reflected
in the reliance on “elective” and even ad hoc courses offered through government
agencies.
Career Incentives The lack of career incentives around education and training within civilian agencies also
extends to deployments to complex operations. Recently, the State Department had
difficulties filling all Iraqi assignments. While there are numerous reasons for this, one
stated reason is scepticism that such an assignment would be career enhancing.
Furthermore, previous deployments to zones of conflicts were done without requisite
35
There needs to be an increased emphasis on professional development and incentives for those engaged in complex operations.
training, so as to fill immediate requirements. This is beginning to be rectified by FSI and
other institutions.
Government agencies are by no means alone in not adequately rewarding service in
complex operations. However, these deployments are far from career enhancing within
the police force. There are no provisions within policing organizations to allow officers to
participate in such operations while maintaining active duty status – let alone take time to
train for such missions. As a result,
civilian police deployed abroad are either
retired or have had to quit the force and
treat international policing as a new
career.
In short, there needs to be an increased
emphasis on professional development
and incentives for those engaged in
complex operations. Clearly, an
understanding about the importance of training, i.e., a training culture, would benefit
from increased resources, particularly on the civilian side. In addition, an assignment to
complex operations, should promote, not sideline, career advancement.
36 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
37
VI. NEXT STEPS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This report has identified a series of crosscutting issues and “gaps” common to most of
the sectors we surveyed. Based on the wide array of inputs, we have highlighted a
number of these. We believe they are ripe for follow-up. They speak to the need to
expand our definition of “jointness,” to capture lessons learned in our education and
training process, and to increase civilian and military cooperation. In order to identify
concrete outcome-based projects, the CCO may consider workshops, conferences,
exercises, research, or other activities to address the following issues.
“Whole of Government” to “Whole of Community”
Expanding the Concept of “Jointness” In 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act reworked the
command structure of the U.S. military, increasing the powers of the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, and bringing together the services of the armed forces. This concept of
“jointness” needs to be expanded beyond the military. Complex operations involve
multiple actors sharing the space and not always working toward a common goal.
Interagency coordination has been improved in recent years to increase the U.S. capacity
for working in conflict zones. However, work is needed to create a “whole of
community” approach to working in complex operations. This includes USG, NGOs,
IOs, the private sector, and foreign governments working and training together for work
in complex operations, where appropriate.
Best Practices from Other Governments The U.S. is not alone in its efforts to create a civilian operational capacity for
stabilization and reconstruction efforts. A number of allied governments have their own
programs and are currently in the process of reviewing how to recruit, train and deploy
civilians to conflict zones. The multinational character of stability operations also
demands interoperability between partner countries. The USG has an ongoing dialogue
with allied government interagency entities on a range of issues related to stability
operations. However, more pressing operational demands often subsume inter-
governmental dialogue on training and preparing personnel for deployment in these
operations.
Exercises and Simulations Training exercises are effective for preparing military and civilians for fieldwork. The
military conducts training exercises more regularly than civilian agencies. These
exercises often include interaction with other types of organizations, but the emphasis,
understandably, is normally on military operations and objectives. At the same time,
more exercises and simulations are needed that are driven by non-military objectives (e.g.
humanitarian crises) and include the multitude of actors involved in complex operations.
In these cases, the military will most likely play a supporting role. Civilian players must
be involved in designing and planning, and not only playing in, these exercises.
Civil-Military Doctrine Historically, civilian and military agencies have difficulty coordinating efforts,
communicating effectively on the ground, or even speaking the same language. Steps
have recently been taken to develop common doctrine and guidelines; however, more
38 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
needs to be done. Civilian and military actors must train together, have open lines of
communication, and speak the same language to operate effectively on the ground.
Portal In addition to the features and functions noted in Section IV of this report, the Portal
should consider adding such features as chat capabilities, conference registration,
exercise calendars, electronic journals, and wiki functions.
Sector Papers The USIP survey team has collected an enormous amount of information on each of the
sectors involved in complex operations. This includes information on where personnel
from each sector (e.g. military and civilian personnel, allies, NGOs, international
organizations and the private sector) are deployed as well as their approach to education
and training for complex operations. The study team has drafted a “gaps” analysis for
each sector. This work formed the basis for this report. In addition, it might be useful to
analyze and present this information from a sector-perspective and to explore how a
particular sector could more effectively integrate its education and training with other
sectors.
Contracting Contracting in complex operations has increased in recent years; however, oversight and
coordination with contracting agencies have been minimal and sporadic, often with
unforeseen political results. Private contractors have differing qualification standards and
training requirements. Due to the ever-growing number of contractors working in
complex operations, increased coordination is necessary both at home – in terms of
education and training – and in the field.
Leadership and Management
Applying Business Models to USG Training and Education In today’s fluid foreign policy environment, the hierarchical, highly centralized
organizations, which were prevalent during the Cold War, have difficulty understanding
and responding to complex crises that require multi-faceted, cross-functional approaches.
Globalization, rapid worldwide transfers of information, and technological innovations
have forced highly centralized business enterprises to re-organize in order to be flexible,
adaptive and attuned to local markets throughout the world. Tiger teams, open source
business development models, and other de-centralized approaches to business planning
and operations have helped companies adapt to doing business in rapidly changing,
ambiguous environments. U.S. companies know how to operate effectively in different
cultural environments and mentor partners in other countries to advance corporate
interests and build corporate capacity. These skills may be highly useful to U.S. educators
and trainers, as well as practitioners in complex operations.
Situational and Cultural Awareness
Including Host-Country Interests into Training and Education Host countries have their own sets of interests, values and sensitivities. While U.S.
personnel are rightfully charged with promoting and defending American national
interest, this cannot be done without understanding the interests and culture of the host
country. There are numerous survey, area study, and culture courses available. However,
39
these are often tailored to the generalists and not the practitioners. Course content should
include integration of lessons learned and case studies in order to better understand the
impact of one’s actions on the local society.
Mediation and Negotiation Mediation, negotiation and cultural awareness courses are readily available to
practitioners. However, such courses should take into account cultural context to better
prepare personnel to work in intercultural environments. Simulations and exercises can
also be used to enhance cultural awareness, offering practitioners a more realistic
experience.
Local Capacity Building
Mentoring Field personnel are quickly rotated in and out of positions without working with others
who have held the same position. Similarly, mentoring and capacity building is about
understanding difference between being the expert and helping develop the expertise of
others. There is a real need to train experts to more effectively transfer that knowledge to
host country counterparts and to understand their role in developing host country
capacity. Moreover, there is a need to develop and utilize reach-back resources that can
be accessed from the field.
Civilian Police Civilian police forces working in complex operations come from multiple nations, and
have different training methods and approaches to working on the ground. Furthermore,
UN police are recruited from different pools (e.g. from national police in France and
Italy, to local law enforcement in the U.S.). These are often retired personnel, especially
in the U.S. There is a need for increased training, cooperation, and synchronization
among these groups before working in zones of conflict. Additionally, consideration
needs to be given to the police-military interface in peace and stability operations. This
could include the development of guidelines, doctrine or joint training around issues such
as intelligence gathering and sequencing from the provision of short-term and longer-
term public security.
Civilian Reserve Corps NSPD-44 has identified the need to develop a cadre of individuals in the civilian sector to
be able to deploy quickly to complex operations. This ambitious program is a national
priority. The CCO should work closely to assist the Office of the Coordinator for
Stabilization and Reconstruction (S/CRS) wherever possible, and particularly on the
education and training side.
Cross-Disciplinary Issues (DDR & SSR) Issues, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector
reform (SSR), that are not the primary responsibility of a single agency or organization
often fall through the cracks and are not adequately addressed through training and
educational programs. Overall, there is a need for increased training in DDR and SSR,
and other cross-disciplinary issues, for both security and civilian forces.
40 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Information and Public Diplomacy
Messaging and Audience Coordinated public diplomacy is critical to mission success. Different institutions,
however, often do not coordinate messages, use different means of communication and
too often do not even use the same language or lexicon. Education and training for
complex operations needs to address how to develop a coordinated approach to public
diplomacy among the military and civilian agencies, as well as allies, NGOs, and IOs,
taking into account multiple audiences, including the host nation.
Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned Capacity and Processes The U.S. military has a well-developed tactical lessons learned process unequal to the
civilian sector. However, operational and strategic lessons learned processes are less
developed within both the military and civilian agencies. Furthermore, training and
education programs often do not have systematic feedback loops or evaluation
procedures to draw lessons from the field in a timely manner. Best practices and issues
from the field are therefore slow to work their way into course content. There is a need to
develop a community-wide approach to, and tools for, evaluation and lessons learned
which is linked up with course development.
Case Studies Most educators identify the value of case studies as teaching tools, but claim that there is
a lack of quality case studies in the areas of practice that make up complex operations.
The CCO is well place to help facilitate the development of relevant case studies that
integrate emerging doctrine, concepts and lessons learned/best practices for use in the
classroom.
Professional Development
“Incentivizing” the Field Deployments to complex operations are not systematically linked up with professional
development and career enhancement for personnel working within and outside of
government. It would useful to provide a forum to address these concerns and identify
common sense incentives to attract and retain the best personnel to the field.
41
VII. APPENDICES
Appendix A.
Institutions and Organizations Surveyed and Consultediv
Institution Name School/Department City State/
Country
Africare Washington DC
Air University Air Command and Staff College
Maxwell AFB AL
Air University Air War College Maxwell AFB AL
Air University U.S. Air Force JAG School
Maxwell AFB AL
American Red Cross Washington DC
American University International Peace and Conflict Resolution Program
Washington DC
American University Peacebuilding and Development Institute
Washington DC
American University Washington College of Law
Washington DC
Australian Defence Force Peacekeeping Centre
Williamtown Australia
Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre
Williamtown Australia
Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution
Stadtschlaining Austria
Booz Allen Hamilton McLean VA
Boston University Boston MA
Brandeis University
Alan B. Slifka Program in Intercommunal Coexistence, The
Waltham MA
Brookings Institution Washington DC
Business Executives for National Security
Washington DC
Camber Corporation Washington DC
Canadian Forces Centre of Excellence for Peace Support Operations Training, The
Ontario Canada
CARE Atlanta GA
Catholic Relief Services Baltimore MD
Catholic Relief Services Nairobi Kenya
Center for a New American Security
Washington DC
Center for Global Solutions Washington DC
42 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Center for International Peace Operations (Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze)
Berlin Germany
Center for the Study of the Presidency
Washington DC
Centre for Intercultural Learning
Quebec Canada
Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto Para Operaciones de Paz (CAECOPAZ)
Buenos Aires Argentina
Centro Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz de Chile (CECOPAC)
La Reina Chile
Columbia University Arnold A. Salzman Institute of War & Peace Studies
New York NY
Columbia University Center for International Conflict Resolution
New York NY
Columbia University International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution
New York NY
Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs
New York NY
Congressional Research Service
Washington DC
Development Alternatives, Inc. Washington DC
DynCorp Reston VA
Eastern Mennonite University Conflict Transformation Program
Harrisonburg VA
Eastern Mennonite University Summer Peacebuilding Institute
Harrisonburg VA
European University Center for Peace Studies
Stadtschlaining Austria
Foreign Service Institute Leadership and Management School
Arlington VA
Foreign Service Institute School of Professional and Area Studies
Arlington VA
Fund for Peace Washington DC
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Garmisch-Partenkirchen
Germany
George Mason University Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution
Fairfax VA
43
George Mason University Peace Operations Policy Program (POPP)
Fairfax VA
George Mason University School of Public Policy
Fairfax VA
Georgetown University Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
Washington DC
Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government
Cambridge MA
Harvard University Law School Cambridge MA
Harvard University School of Public Health
Cambridge MA
Henry L. Stimson Center, The Washington DC
Initiative for Inclusive Security Cambridge MA
Institute for Defense Analysis Washington DC
InterAction Washington DC
International Human Rights Network (IHRN)
Oldcastle Ireland
International Medical Corps Washington DC
International Peacekeeping Operations Association
Washington DC
International Republican Institute
Washington DC
International Rescue Committee
New York NY
International Resources Group Washington DC
James Madison University Mine Action Information Center
Harrisonburg VA
Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)
Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Center (JKDDC)
Suffolk VA
Joint Forces Staff College Norfolk VA
Joint Special Operations University
Hurlburt Field FL
Kings College London Department of War Studies
Strand UK
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, The
Accra Ghana
Marine Corps University Marine Corps War College
Quantico VA
Marine Corps University School of Advanced Warfighting
Quantico VA
Marine Corps University Senior Leader Development Program (SLDP)
Quantico VA
Mercy Corps International Washington DC
44 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Monterey Institute of International Studies
International Policy Studies
Monterey CA
MPRI Alexandria VA
National Defense University
Interagency Transformation, Education and Analysis
Washington DC
National Defense University School for National Security Executive Education
Washington DC
National Democratic Institute Washington DC
Naval Postgraduate School Graduate School of Business & Public Policy
Monterey CA
Naval Postgraduate School Graduate School of Operation & Information Sciences
Monterey CA
Naval Postgraduate School School of International Graduate Studies
Monterey CA
New America Foundation Washington DC
Noetic Washington DC
Northern Virginia Mediation Service
Fairfax VA
Oxfam America Boston MA
Oxford Brookes University Centre for Development and Emergency Practice
Oxford UK
Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping
Washington DC
Peace Corps Washington DC
Pearson Peacekeeping Centre Ottawa Canada
RAND Pardee RAND Graduate School
Santa Monica CA
RedR International Edegem Belgium
Refugees International Washington DC
RONCO Consulting Corp. Washington DC
Rutgers University Camden NJ
Save the Children Washington DC
Stanford University
Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law
Stanford CA
Syracuse University Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs
Syracuse NY
The Ohio State University Department of International Studies
Columbus OH
The Ohio State University The Mershon Center for International Security Studies
Columbus OH
45
Tufts University ALLIES Program at Tufts University
Medford MA
Tufts University Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Medford MA
Tufts University Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy, The
Medford MA
Tufts University Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies, The
Medford MA
U.S. Agency for International Development
relevant divisions Washington DC
U.S. Air Force Special Operations School
Hurlburt Field FL
U.S. Air Force Academy Colorado Springs
CO
U.S. Army Headquarters Department of the Army, G-3/5/7
Washington DC
U.S. Army Medical Stability Operations
Washington DC
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
Center for Army Lessons Learned
Ft. Leavenworth KS
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
U.S. Army Command & General Staff College
Ft. Leavenworth KS
U.S. Army War College
U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
Carlisle PA
U.S. Army/USMC Counterinsurgency Center
Ft. Leavenworth KS
U.S. Coast Guard Academy New London CT
U.S. Department of Commerce Washington DC
U.S. Department of Defense Washington DC
U.S. Department of Education Washington DC
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington DC
U.S. Department of State Washington DC
U.S. Institute of Peace Education and Training Center
Washington DC
U.S. Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning
Quantico VA
U.S. Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare
Quantico VA
U.S. Marine War College Quantico VA
U.S. Merchant Marine Academy
Kings Point NY
U.S. Military Academy Social Sciences Department
West Point NY
46 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
U.S. Naval Academy Annapolis MD
U.S. Naval War College Newport RI
U.S. Office of Personnel Management
Washington DC
U.S. Treasury Washington DC
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
New York NY
United Nations Integrated Training Service
New York NY
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
New York NY
United Nations Peacebuilding Support Unit
New York NY
United Nations UNITAR-POCI New York NY
United Nations University and the University of Ulster
International Conflict Research
Londonderry UK
United Service Institute of India Centre for UN Peacekeeping
New Delhi India
University of Calgary
Peacebuilding, Development and Security Program, The
Alberta Canada
University of California, Irvine International Studies Program
Irvine CA
University of California, Irvine International Studies Program
Irvine CA
University of Chicago Department of Sociology
Chicago IL
University of Chicago Human Rights Program
Chicago IL
University of Colorado Conflict Information Center
Boulder CO
University of Colorado Conflict Information Consortium
Boulder CO
University of Connecticut Storrs CT
University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies
Denver CO
University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS)
Denver CO
University of Maryland
Center for International Development and Conflict Management
College Park MD
University of Maryland
Center for International Development and Conflict Management
College Park MD
47
University of Maryland
Center for International Development and Conflict Management
College Park MD
University of Maryland, University College
College Park MD
University of Massachusetts Department of Political Science
Amherst MA
University of Massachusetts Criminal Justice Department
Lowell MA
University of Massachusetts Criminal Justice Department
Lowell MA
University of Miami Miami FL
University of Michigan Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy
Dearborn MI
University of North Carolina Institute for Defense Business
Chapel Hill NC
University of Washington Seattle WA
USAID University Washington DC
48 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Appendix B.
Training and Education Survey Questions
PART I. Institutions/Programs
1. Institution/Program Name
2. Institution Type
a. USG Civilian
b. USG Military
c. International Organization
d. Non-governmental Organization
e. Academic Institution
f. Other
3. Website URL
4. Contact Information
a. Institution Mailing address
i. Address 1
ii. Address 2
iii. City
iv. State/Province
v. Zip Code
vi. Country
b. Institution Phone Number
c. Institution Fax Number
d. Institution Email Address
5. Description
6. Institution/Program Director Information
a. Director Name
b. Director Phone Number
c. Director Email Address
7. Does your institution provide training and education programs?
8. Where are graduates from this institution/program employed?
9. What are your program completion rates?
10. Point of Contact Information
a. POC Name, title
b. POC Phone Number
c. POC Email Address
PART II. Courses
1. Institution/Program
2. Course Title
3. Course Number
4. Course Instructor
5. Instructor Contact Information
6. Course Description
7. Course Goals/Objectives
8. When was this course developed? (Date)
9. Course Level (check all that apply)
a. Undergraduate
b. Graduate
49
c. Post-Graduate
d. Professional/Continuing Education
e. Other (fill in the blank)
10. Course delivery (check all that apply)
a. On-site classroom
b. Off-site classroom
c. Field-based
d. In-country
e. Distance learning (online or correspondence)
f. Multiple site
g. Other (fill in the blank)
11. Teaching Method (check all that apply)
a. Lecture Seminar
b. Group Study
c. Self-taught
d. Simulation
e. Case studies
f. Guest experts/speakers/lecturers
g. Internships/fellowships/experiential learning
h. Other (fill in the blank)
12. Course length (check all that apply)
a. Academic term
i. Full year
ii. Half year
b. Intensive (fill in the blank)
c. Self-paced
d. Total hours of course (required)
13. Course capacity (choose one)
a. 1-10
b. 11-30
c. 31-100
d. 100+
14. How often is the course offered?
a. 1-2 times per year
b. 3-5 times per year
c. 6+ times per year
d. Other (fill in the blank)
15. Cost/fee (choose one)
a. Yes
b. No
c. Amount (fill in the blank)
16. Prerequisites (choose one)
a. Yes
b. No
c. If yes, list prerequisites (fill in the blank)
17. Course accessibility (check all that apply)
a. Internal only
b. USG civilian agencies
c. USG military
i. Available to a specific service branch (fill in the blank)
ii. Available to joint service
50 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
d. Foreign military
e. International organizations
f. Non-governmental organizations
g. Private sector
h. Public (fill in the blank)
i. Registered student body
j. Partner institutions
k. Other (fill in the blank)
18. Target participants/audience (fill in the blank)
19. Target participant level (check all that apply)
a. Senior officials
b. Middle-level officials
c. Entry-level officials
d. All
e. Other (fill in the blank)
20. Course type (check all that apply)
a. Stand alone course
i. Mandatory
ii. Elective
b. Part of a certificate program
i. Mandatory
ii. Elective
c. Part of a degree program
i. Mandatory
ii. Elective
21. What evaluation tools do you use for your course? (Fill in the blank)
22. Course orientation (check all that apply)
a. Interdisciplinary – approaching a subject from various angles and
methods in order to form new methods for understanding the subject
b. Multidisciplinary – crossing disciplinary boundaries to explain one
subject in terms of another
c. Survey or Overview
d. Oriented to specific discipline/program
23. Course update (check all that apply)
a. Incorporation of lessons learned
b. Incorporation of current events
c. Incorporation of latest theories/policies/discoveries in the field
d. Incorporation of real-life cases
24. Course completion rates (fill in the blank)
PART III. Additional Comments
1. If you were talking to the U.S. Government about how to train for complex
operations, what are the key points you would want to address?
For example: What would you recommend be taught?
How would you recommend it be taught? Whom would
you recommend be in that course?
2. In your view, what gaps or areas of weakness, if any, are there in training and
education (in general) for complex operations?
3. Additional comments?
51
Appendix C.
References Consulted Arnas, Neyla, Charles Berry, and Robert B. Oakley. “Harnessing the Interagency for
Complex Operations.” Washington: Center for Technology and National Security Policy,
National Defense University, 2005.
Carreau, Bernard. “Transforming the Interagency System for Complex Operations.” Case
Studies in Defense Transformation. Number 6. Washington: Center for Technology and
National Security Policy, National Defense University, 2007.
Center for International Cooperation. Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008.
Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008.
Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds. Leashing the Dogs of
War: Conflict Management in a Divided World. Washington: United States Institute of
Peace Press, 2007.
Crocker, Chster A., Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds. Grasping at the Nettle.
Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005.
Davidson, Janine. “Toward a Unity of Effort: The Case for the Consortium for Complex
Operations (CCO).” Unpublished manuscript.
Gompert, David C. and John Gordon IV. War by Other Means: Building Complete and
Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency. Arlington: RAND Corporation, 2008.
McCausland, Jeffrey D. Developing Strategic Leaders for the 21st Century. Carlisle, PA:
U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2008.
Office of the President of the United States. Management of Interagency Efforts
Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization. National Security Presidential
Directive/NSPD-44. December 7, 2005.
Perito, Robert M. ed. Guide to Participants in Peace, Stability, and Relief Operations.
Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007.
Perito, Robert M. Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?. Washington: United
States Institute of Peace Press, January 2007.
Scully, Megan. “RAND Study Says U.S. Lacks Resources to Defeat Insurgencies.”
CongressDaily. February 11, 2008.
[http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=39265&dcn=e_tma]
Tierney, Dominic. “America’s Quagmire Mentality.” Survival 49.4 (2007): 47-66.
U.S. Department of Defense. Headquarters Department of the Army. Counterinsurgency.
FM 3-24. 2006.
52 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
U.S. Department of Defense. Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. Directive Number 3000.05. November 28, 2005.
U.S. Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006. February 6,
2006.
U.S. Department of Defense. Report to Congress on the Implementation of DoD
Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction
(SSTR) Operations. April 1, 2007.
U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Counterinsurgency for
U.S. Government Policy Makers: A Work in Progress. Department of State Publication
11456. October 2007.
U.S. Department of State. Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.
Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Essential Tasks. 2005.
U.S. Government Accountability Office. Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve
DoD’s Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning. GAO-07-549.
May 2007.
Yates, Lawrence, A. U.S. Military’s Experience in Stability Operations. Global War on
Terror Occasional Paper 15. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press,
2006, www.cgsc.army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/yates.pdf
53
Appendix D.
Previous Studies and Surveys Several surveys, studies, and initiatives have been undertaken in recent years to examine
training and education tools, practices, and needs related to complex operations. The
following list and accompanying summaries elaborate on some of these efforts, which
have informed this study.
Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, Office of the Secretary of State.
Final Report of the Workforce and Training Working Group, 29 January 2008.
BearingPoint. Management Study for Establishing and Managing a Civilian Reserve
Corps. 2006.
BearingPoint. Plan for Establishing and Delivering Training for a Civilian Reserve
Corps, 2007.
Carstarphen, Nike, Craig Zelizer, Robert Harris, and Senior Partners of the Alliance for
Conflict Transformation. Bridging the Gap: Graduate Education and Professional
Practice in International Conflict Work. Washington: United States Institute of Peace
Press, 2005.
Linder, Rebecca. Wikis, Webs, and Networks: Creating Connections for Conflict-Prone
Settings. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006.
National Defense University. Interagency Training, Education, and After Action Review
(ITEA) program. International Organization Education and Training Practices: Review
and Analysis.
Schoenhaus, Robert M. “Training for Peace and Humanitarian Relief Operations:
Advancing Best Practices.” Peaceworks, 43. United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002.
Stabilisation Unit. Operational Management and Delivery Group. United Kingdom.
Compendium for Training & Development Delivery Resource.
U.S. Congressional Research Service. Report for Congress. Peacekeeping and Conflict
Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities. RL32862,
updated September 2006.
U.S. Government Accountability Office. Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are
Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian
Reserve Corps. GAO-08-39. November 2007.
U.S. Institute of Peace. Peace and Conflict Studies Programs in North America. 2002.
www.ccoportal.org
For additional information or for assistance with complex operations training
and education questions, please contact the CCO Support Center.
Phone: 703.602.3431 Email: [email protected]
*The CCO Portal was created in collaboration with the U.S. Institute of Peace.
Interactive forums allow
members to discuss and
develop thought and theory
With information on more
than 600 courses from over
200 institutions, the CCO
portal is the most
comprehensive listing of
complex operations course
data available on the web
A blogging feature provides
an environment for thought
leaders to debate on
ideologies and paradigms
The CCO calendar contains
detailed information
regarding complex
operations events
CCO Portal Instructions
To become a member of the CCO Members Portal:1. Visit www.ccoportal.org2. Click the “Request New Account” button3. Fill in the Member Profile Form including contact details,
professional experience, and areas of expertise4. Click “Request new account” to submit your request5. The CCO Support Center will review your membership
request6. Once approved, you will receive an email with further
instructions on how to login to the members portal using atemporary password
To manage your account as a member:1. Visit www.ccoportal.org2. Click the “Login” button3. Login using your username (firstname.lastname) and
password4. Click the "My Account" link at the top right corner of the
members homepage5. You may change your password by clicking the “Change
Password” tab above your name6. You may edit your member profile by clicking the “Edit” tab
above your name. In edit mode you may add a professionalpicture or modify your personal information using the“Account Settings, “ Expertise” and “My Details” tabs
If you forget your password:1. Visit www.ccoportal.org2. Click the “Request New Password” button3. Enter your username (firstname.lastname) OR email address4. A temporary password will be sent to your email address
April 21, 08
56 SHARING THE SPACE: A Study on Education and Training in Complex Operations
Endnotes
i While there is no standard definition of complex operations, for the purposes of this
study, the term encompasses stability operations, counterinsurgency, and irregular
operations, as well as humanitarian, postconflict reconstruction and state-building
activities.
ii Previous and ongoing surveys (within the U.S. and internationally) have focused on
particular aspects of complex ops. For example, a Bearingpoint survey recently
catalogued courses related to R&S, the military has surveyed for courses on Stability
Operations, the UN is currently conducting a survey of courses on peace operations, and
other governments are going though similar exercises.
iii We did not survey the numerous business and executive programs available through
academic institutions, but there is clearly scope for incorporating elements of these
programs into leadership development for complex operations.
iv Surveys were sent to over 400 institutions worldwide. This list represents over 100
institutions that our staff has met with or that have courses cataloged on the CCO web
portal. While the authors recognize that there are many additional institutions and courses
that are highly relevant to this study, this sample has provided a solid basis for our
analysis, and the starting point for the development of a comprehensive catalog of
education and training institutions on the CCO web portal.