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Shedden Papers

The Weaponisation of Space: Next Arms Race?

David Steele

Centre for Defence and Strategic StudiesAustralian Defence College 2007

Abstract

This paper questions whether the Chinese anti-satellite test in 2007 risks creating an arms race in space. It fi nds that while other countries and regional groupings have their own space programmes, these are largely civilian, money-making enterprises. The USA currently has the pre-eminent military presence in the space domain, and has a range of options to continue to develop these programs without them being seen as threatening to other states. Despite being alarmed by the Chinese tests, and having stated an unwavering determination to retain its space assets and its superiority in space, there does not appear to be a danger of an arms race between the US and others in space at the present time. However, much will depend on China’s aspirations. An incoming US President would do well to consider how the US could lead in ensuring the peaceful development of the space domain.1

This document is approximately 5,500 words, excluding its bibliography and abstract. It prints off at 20 pages.

1 Editor’s note. Since this paper was writt en, the US successfully demonstrated an ASAT capability when it shot down a satellite early in 2008.

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The Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS) is the senior educational institution of the Australian Defence College. It delivers a one year Defence and Strategic Studies Course, a postgraduate level educational program which places emphasis on practical, rather than theoretical research, on teamwork and support for the personal and professional goals of all course members. Course members and staff share a commitment to achieving scholarly and professional excellence, with course members graduating with a Master of Arts awarded by Deakin University or a Graduate Diploma awarded by the CDSS. These papers have been submitt ed as coursework, and have been chosen for publication based on their scholarly att ributes and the timeliness of their topic.

For further information about the CDSS please visit: htt p://www.defence.gov.au/jetwc

© Commonwealth of Australia

This work is copyright. It may be downloaded, displayed, printed and reproduced in unaltered form, including the retention of this notice, for personal, non-commercial use or use for professional purposes. Apart from any use as permitt ed under the Copyright Act 1968, all other rights are reserved. To replicate all or part of this document for any purpose other than those stipulated above, contact the CDSS.

Shedden Papers: ISSN 1836-0769

Disclaimer.

This work is the sole opinion of the author, and does not necessarily represent the views of the Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies or the Department of Defence. The Commonwealth of Australia will not be legally responsible in contract, tort or otherwise, for any statement made in this publication.

Editing of this essay to make it suitable for publication was undertaken by CDSS Publications Editor, Stephanie Koorey.

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About the author

Air Commodore David Steele serves with the Royal Australian Air Force. Air Commodore Steele graduated from Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies in 2007, with a Graduate Diploma in Strategic Studies. His previous qualifi cations include a Bachelor of Science (Physics) from the RAAF Academy, a Graduate Diploma in Military Aviation and a Graduate Diploma in Management Studies. He has piloted a variety of aircraft including the Iroquois helicopter and F111 strike aircraft , has been a leader of the Roulett es aerobatic team, and is a qualifi ed fl ying instructor, the latt er two for which he received the Conspicuous Service Cross. Air Commodore Steele has been posted to Air Force Headquarters, to Williamtown, and served as Australia’s Defence Att aché to Iraq.

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Introduction

On 11 January 2007, China conducted an anti-satellite weapon test, successfully destroying an obsolete weather satellite with a kinetic hit from a projectile launched into space via a ballistic missile.2 This missile was launched from a land-based mobile system located at the Xichang space launch facility in southwestern China. Some 1,600 pieces of debris were scatt ered through low earth orbit, constituting a hazard to other satellites. The anti-satellite test (ASAT) was not initially acknowledged by China but confi rmed by United States government sources one week later. On 23 January 2007 the Chinese fi nally acknowledged the test when a Foreign Ministry spokesperson made a brief statement stating that the demonstration was ‘not targeted at any country’3 and that China continues to oppose the weaponisation of space. However, no further information has been forthcoming despite international condemnation of the ASAT test.4

On 24 April 2007 General Michael Moseley, the US Air Force (USAF) Chief of Staff , said that China’s ASAT weapon test was a ‘strategically dislocating’ event, as signifi cant as Russia’s launch of Sputnik in 1957.5 He went on to say that China’s bold activity in outer space, in conjunction with its program to expand the capability and lethality of the People’s Liberation Army, indicates ‘[t]his is a country….very serious about extending range, opportunity and capability with their air and space assets’ adding ‘they are gett ing the ability to go beyond just a Taiwan scenario’.6

Space, in relative terms, is a busy environment with approximately 11,000 objects currently large enough to be tracked.7 Around 3,000 of these objects are satellites, of which only approximately 700 are active.8 The remainder of these objects are debris ranging in size from expended rockets and defunct satellites down to orbiting paint fl akes. The vagueness of these fi gures is due to the fact that most countries do not report the role or status (active or inactive) of individual satellites, particularly those satellites with classifi ed military payloads.9

Satellites fall into six main groups depending on their role. Jane’s lists these as; ‘weather, communications, navigation, surveillance, military early warning and scientifi c research.’10 The delineation of function between groups is not always clear, even between those with military or civilian use, as some satellites have dual or

2 Reference to ‘kinetic’ implies that the projectile carried no explosive warhead and that the destruction that occurred would have been through the kinetic energy of the collision between the projectile and the target.3 Wade Boese, ‘Chinese Satellite Destruction Stirs Debate.’ Arms Control Today, Vol. 37, No. 2, March 2007, online.4 Wade Boese, Chinese Satellite Destruction Stirs Debate, online.5 Caitlin Harrington, ‘Chinese ASAT test prompts US Strategic Rethink.’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 44, Issue 18, 2 May 2007, p. 8.6 Caitlin Harrington, ‘Chinese ASAT test prompts US Strategic Rethink.’ p. 8.7 Duncan Lennox, ‘Space Warfare: Part One; Launching Out.’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, 28 March 2007, p. 25.8 Duncan Lennox, ‘Space Warfare: Part One,’ p. 25.9 Duncan Lennox, ‘Space Warfare: Part One,’ p. 25.10 Duncan Lennox, ‘Space Warfare: Part One,’ p. 25. Surveillance in this context includes Intelligence, Surveillance and Recon-naissance, more commonly referred to as ‘ISR’.

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triple (as in military, commercial and scientifi c) roles. Therefore as Verinkos says, ‘[a]lthough space is militarized, it has not yet been weaponized.’11 That is, no country has deployed a destructive capability into space designed to destroy targets that are either space-based or ground-based. Also, disregarding the recent Chinese ASAT demonstration, no country possesses a ground-based capability that is designed to destroy other countries’ space-based assets.12

The United States (US) is the leader in the space domain, both military and civilian. From a military perspective, the US warfi ghter is heavily reliant on unrestricted access to US military space assets at all levels of war; the strategic, operational and tactical levels (explained below). The indication that China may be developing an ASAT weapon capability has reverberated through the US.13

The questions this raises are fi rst, could this prompt a space arms race between the US and China, and second, could the US consider weaponising space to maintain its dominance in this domain? This paper will discuss ASAT testing in an historical context, highlight the importance of space to the US warfi ghter, and outline the international legal framework and US policy that relates to space. The paper will discuss trends in future space weapons and the space programs of Russia, India, Europe, China and explore the possibility of a future Taiwan Straits confl ict scenario between China and the US. Finally, this paper will discuss the strategies available to the US, and their implications, if the US is to maintain its dominance in the space domain.14

Before proceeding, it is useful to clarify what is meant by two terms used throughout this paper. First, the term ‘space’ generally means the relatively empty regions of the universe outside of the atmospheres of celestial bodies, however there is no clear boundary between the earth’s atmosphere and space as the density of the atmosphere gradually decreases as altitude increases. For this paper, the term ‘space’ refers to the region beyond the earth’s atmosphere.15 Second, although there is no agreed defi nition for ‘space weapons’, the Canadian government, regarding the use of weapons in space, defi ned weapon as ‘any device or component of a system designed to infl ict harm through deposition of mass and/or energy on any other object.’16 For the purpose of this paper, the Canadian defi nition will be accepted. It should be noted that the defi nition does not extend to weapons that are based on earth and transit through space but do not achieve orbit; for example, inter-continental ballistic missiles

11 Joan Vernikos, ‘Strategic Views on Space.’ Defense and Foreign Aff airs Strategic Policy, Vol. 35, No. 4–5, 2007, p. 13.12 Michael O’Hanlon, Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary: Constraining the Military Uses of Space, The Brookings Institution, Washington: 2004. p. 8.13 Michael O’Hanlon, Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary, pp. 3-5.14 The writer acknowledges the close relationship between ballistic missiles and ballistic missile defence (BMD) and space and future space weapons. However, due to constraints in length, this paper will not discuss BMD. Furthermore, the predominance of the US in the space arena is assumed. As such, US space capabilities will not be described in any detail.15 The Federation Aeronautique Internationale has established the ‘Karman Line’ at an altitude of 100 kilometres (62 statute miles) as a working defi nition for the boundary between the earth’s atmosphere and space.16 ‘Proposal Concerning CD Action on Outer Space.’ Canadian Government, Conference on Disarmament, UN Document CD/1569, 4 February 1999.

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(ICBMs).17

Previous Anti-Satellite Tests: An Historical Context

The Chinese ASAT test, although unexpected by the international community, was not the fi rst. The fi rst reported testing of an ASAT occurred in 1959 by the US, just two years aft er the USSR launched the fi rst of the earth-orbiting ‘Sputnik’ satellites. The US test involved the air launch of a missile from a modifi ed B-47 bomber aircraft . The US continued developing its ASAT capability through the 1960s and was known to have deployed nuclear-tipped surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) as an operational ASAT system. The program was extended into the 1970s when the US used Thor intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in an ASAT role. The Thor was reported as being able to intercept a satellite at an altitude of 1,200 kilometres.18 By the mid-1980s the US had launched a missile from an F-15 Eagle fi ghter aircraft successfully intercepting a satellite at an altitude of 525 kilometres.19

The Soviets, and more recently the Russians, have also conducted successful ASAT tests. In 1968 a modifi ed Scarp ICBM was used to demonstrate an ASAT capability, and from 1968 to 1982 the USSR was reported to have made 20 ASAT tests with a variety of missile types.20 In 1992 unconfi rmed reporting alleged Russia was developing an air-launched ASAT capability by utilising a modifi ed missile carried by a MIG-31 Foxhound fi ghter aircraft .21 Similarly, the Chinese had also been reported as developing an air launched ASAT system based on a missile carried by an H-6 bomber aircraft .22

ASAT capability is not solely limited to either ground-based or air launched missiles. The US, Russia and China are all reported as developing ASAT technology based on either ground-based or air-based lasers from the mid 1980s. Such systems would be used to cause eff ects from temporary disruption (‘dazzling’) through to destruction. Reports from a body of US scientists indicate that in September 2006 a US satellite was temporarily taken out of action when ‘dazzled’ by a Chinese laser.23

The Importance of Space to the 21st Century US Warfi ghter

Space was fi rst exploited by both the US and Soviet militaries during the cold war in a somewhat benign manner. Satellites were deployed by both protagonists to observe each others’ military forces, their deployments, monitor each others’ nuclear tests and missile launches. It could be said that such space capabilities during the cold war

17 Michael Krepon and Christopher Clary, ‘Space Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space.’ p. 30.18 Duncan Lennox, ‘Space Warfare: Part One,’ p. 26.19 Duncan Lennox, ‘Space Warfare: Part One,’ p. 26.20 Duncan Lennox, ‘Space Warfare: Part One,’ p. 26.21 Duncan Lennox, ‘Space Warfare: Part One,’ p. 26.22 Duncan Lennox, ‘Space Warfare: Part One,’ pp. 26-27.23 Duncan Lennox, ‘Space Warfare: Part One,’ pp. 26-27.

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contributed to peace by maintaining strategic nuclear stability and, towards the end of the cold war, confi rming the progression of a successful arms limitation program. During this period, space was also increasingly used as a medium for communications, mapping, weather forecasting and scientifi c research to support ballistic missiles. In fact, both cold war superpowers agreed that the mutual toleration of each others’ military space programs served their own interests.24

Since the end of the cold war, the US has increasingly relied on space to support military operations. The global positioning satellite (GPS) system is one such example. Precision strike weapons such as the GPS-guided Joint Direct Att ack Munition (JDAM), an air launched weapon, relies on GPS to provide an accurate tracking solution from its launch point to the target. JDAMs are termed a ‘smart’ weapon, in that they achieve an order of accuracy in several metres. When compared to the accuracy of unguided ‘dumb’ bombs which is in the order of tens of metres, JDAM is the weapon of choice for the warfi ghter as they have a high level of assuredness that a target can be successfully engaged fi rst time and the risk of collateral damage can be minimised. GPS is also used for ‘blue force’ tracking, a system that monitors the position of friendly units and vehicles. This system enhances a commander’s situational awareness on the batt lefi eld and reduces the risk of fratricide.25

GPS is but one example of the heavy reliance of space to the modern warfi ghter. US-led operations for the 1991 Gulf War were supported by 16 military satellites and fi ve commercial satellites. These space assets provided a maximum transmission capability in the order of 200 megabits per second. Just over a decade later in 2003, operations in Iraq were supported by some fi ft y satellites with a transmission capability of some 2.4 gigabits per second.26

US Joint warfi ghting concepts (‘Joint Vision 2020’) call for ‘Full Spectrum Dominance’ and state that space superiority, along with land, sea and air superiority are fundamental to achieving Full Spectrum Dominance.27 Such concepts go on to acknowledge that ‘the medium of space is the fourth medium of warfare’ and that ‘so important are space systems to military operations that it is unrealistic to imagine that they will never become targets’.28 Although the doctrine goes on to say: ‘Currently, there are no space force applications operating in space’,29 it would be fair to say that from a US warfi ghting perspective, the weaponisation of space is under active consideration.

24 Michael O’Hanlon, Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary, pp. 1-2.25 Michael O’Hanlon, Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary, pp. 3-4.26 Michael O’Hanlon, Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary, p. 4.27 Department of Defense, Joint Vision 2020 Part 1 America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorrow. US Government, p. 6, available at: <www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jvpub2.htm>, accessed 28 May 2007.28 Department of Defense, Joint Vision 2020 Part 1 America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorrow. US Government, p. 6, available at: <www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jvpub2.htm>, accessed 28 May 2007.29 Michael Krepon and Christopher Clary, ’Space Assurance or Space Dominance?’ p. 30.

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The Legal Batt lefi eld

Along with the advances made into space in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, considerable legal eff orts were also made to ensure the peaceful use of space. Today, there are fi ve major United Nations treaties, conventions and agreements that concern the use of space. The most signifi cant of these is the 1976 Agreement Concerning the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, more commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty (OST). Essentially, the OST ‘prohibits placing ‘‘objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” in orbit or on celestial bodies’ and that ‘Activities on the moon and other celestial bodies will be for peaceful purposes only’.30

In addition to these UN arrangements, several other instruments relating to the militarisation of space have been proposed. The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) bans nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere and space.31 The 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II (SALT II) committ ed the former USSR and US ‘not to develop, test or deploy…systems for placing into earth orbit nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, including….orbital missiles’.32 This treaty was never ratifi ed however. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the former USSR proposed treaties to the US over ASAT testing. The outcome would have been limitations on the development of space-based ballistic missile defence systems and a ban on the use of manned spacecraft for military purposes. The US objected to these limitations.33

More recently, in 2002, China in conjunction with Russia, proposed a draft treaty to the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) that was aimed at fi lling the obvious gap in which no treaty banned the testing or deployment of weapons that are not nuclear or WMD. The draft treaty went on to ‘allow for self-defence of space assets and to accept the militarisation of space’ but prohibited ‘the deployment of any weapons in outer space’ and prevented ‘the use of force against outer space objects’.34 The UN CD did not progress this draft treaty due to legal arguments over defi nitions and disagreement between the US, China and Russia.35

Future Space Weapons: DEW and KEW

Future space weapons can be divided into two general types. The fi rst type is Directed Energy Weapons (DEW); they deliver destructive energy to their targets without transporting mass. The second type is Mass-To-Target Weapons or Kinetic Energy Weapons (KEW); they must transport mass to their target in order to achieve the

30 Bob Preston et. al., Space Weapons, Earth Wars, p.18.31 Duncan Lennox, ‘Space Warfare Part Two: In War and Peace.’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, 4 April 2007, p. 28.32 Duncan Lennox, ‘Space Warfare Part Two,’ p. 28. Note that by this stage, treaties have only ever referred to weapons of mass destruction, the nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.33 Duncan Lennox, ‘Space Warfare Part Two,’ p. 28.34 Duncan Lennox, ‘Space Warfare Part Two,’ p. 28.35 Duncan Lennox, ‘Space Warfare Part Two,’ p. 28.

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desired destructive eff ect. KEW can be further subdivided into two groups; those that rely on their own kinetic energy and those that deliver a conventional warhead for the destructive eff ect.36

Directed Energy Weapons are characterised by propagation of destructive energy at very high speeds. However, whilst the speed of propagation may be impressive (the speed of light), the time to achieve the desired eff ect may not be so impressive. If the desired eff ect is destruction, then enough power must be focussed on a critical component of the target for some time to heat it to a point where it no longer functions. However, the desired levels of eff ect of DEW range from short duration interference or jamming, through to destruction. Candidate technologies for DEW range from chemical lasers through to weapons that transmit microwave energy.

Directed Energy Weapons are constrained by physics. The eff ectiveness of the directed energy reduces in proportion to the square of the range to the target. Also, the energy would be distorted if it was to be directed through or into the earth’s atmosphere. This makes target acquisition and tracking problematic from a technical perspective. DEW also require fuel, either as a stored chemical fuel or as electrical energy. Thus, such weapons have a fi nite number of fi rings and even a fi nite time between fi rings where they require refuelling or regeneration of energy.37 Despite these technical challenges, the US continues to progress research into DEW. The airborne laser prototype38 should be demonstrated in 2009 and research continues into the space-based laser concept.39

Kinetic Energy Weapons are characterised by the use of either blast or direct collision to disable an adversaries space assets. Candidate technologies for KEW cover a wide range of options; from simple technologies such as space mines in a micro-satellite through to high technology solutions such as guns that eject Mach 10+ projectiles known as ‘Rods from God’.40 Similar to DEW, challenges faced by scientists include target acquisition and tracking, energy generation for projectile acceleration and the extremes of heating encountered if the projectile was required to enter the earth’s atmosphere. Despite these diffi culties, the US continues to research these technologies under the cover of funding lines such as space control and counter-space technologies. KEW have a critical limitation; if used in space they create debris fi elds which would pose a risk to not only an adversaries’ space assets, but also to one’s own space assets.41

There are advantages and disadvantages of deploying space weapons. Advocates

36 Bob Preston et. al., Space Weapons, Earth Wars, p. 24.37 Bob Preston, et. al., Space Weapons, Earth Wars, p. 24.38 The airborne laser is being developed primarily to protect against ballistic missiles. However, it could be used against space assets.39 Michael Krepon and Christopher Clary; Space Assurance or Space Dominance? pp. 22-23.40 Mach 10 is ten times the speed of sound, or 11,000 kilometres per hour. Rods from God are telegraph pole-length metal cylinders, fi red from space to targets on earth.41 Michael Krepon and Christopher Clary, ‘Space Assurance or Space Dominance?’ pp. 22-23.

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of space weapons cite advantages such as persistent global coverage and an ability to att ack inaccessible terrestrial targets with rapid response times that would see an ICBM engaged either still on the launcher or in its initial launch phase. Also, an argument exists that the employment of space weapons provides the basis for a new deterrence strategy that minimises the risk of a future nuclear confrontation.42 Yet space weapons also have disadvantages beyond the immense technical and fi nancial challenges facing those who would wish to develop them. Satellites are not stealthy. Space-based weapons, similar to satellites, would be relatively predictable in their low earth orbits. Thus, a suitably-equipped adversary would be able to target these weapons. The development of the ground-based command and control infrastructure that supports space weapons will prove to be problematic. Commanders of the future will have to be provided with almost instantaneous situational awareness that must be of such high fi delity that they can be assured that the use of these weapons can be authorised with absolute confi dence.43

Competitors for the Space Domain

There are four competitors to the US in the space domain; China, the European Space Agency, India and Russia.44

The US sees the space domain as central to its interests. The ‘US National Space Policy’ of 31 August 2006, whilst at the unclassifi ed level and very general in nature, makes several statements worthy of consideration. The policy states that US space capabilities are vital to its national interests and that ‘freedom of action in space is as important to the US as air power and sea power’.45 The policy also states that the US will ‘take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests’.46 What can be inferred from this policy is that the US is heavily reliant on space for its national security and that it emphatically wishes to ensure that its access to these assets remains assured.47

Future threats to US military space systems could stem from traditional states or groupings of state actors through to non-state actors. Aft er China’s launch of the ASAT in 2007, it is China that might be considered the USA’s most likely strategic competitor, if not a potential adversary, in the space domain.

Despite the ancient Chinese inventing gun powder and developing a ‘black powder 42 Michael Krepon and Christopher Clary, ‘Space Assurance or Space Dominance?’ p. 51.43 Johnny Stringer, ‘A Frontier Too Far: Credible Justifi cation for the US to Weaponize Space?’ Royal Air Force Air Power, Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring 2007, p.36.44 This section borrows heavily from Johnny Stringer, ‘A Frontier Too Far,’ pp. 40-41.45 US National Space Policy, available at the Federation of American Scientists website at; < htt p://www.fas.org/irp/off docs/nspd/space.html>, accessed 14 April 2008.46 US National Space Policy, available at the Federation of American Scientists website at; < htt p://www.fas.org/irp/off docs/nspd/space.html>, accessed 14 April 2008.47 Duncan Lennox, ‘Space Warfare Part Two,’ p. 28.

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rocket’, Chinese eff orts to develop rocket and space technology only commenced in the mid-1950s. However, by the early 1970s the Chinese had launched their fi rst satellite and developed ICBMs. In the 1980s and 1990s the Chinese space program continued at a modest pace but has more recently increased in tempo. In 2003 the Chinese launched its fi rst piloted space fl ight and in 2005 conducted a second. More recently, the Chinese have indicated that they will launch a probe that will orbit the moon and land a robot on the lunar surface.48 The program continues with plans for the launch in 2008 of a Shenzhou rocket carrying three astronauts and the building of a Chinese space station.49

It should be noted that the Chinese space program is entirely run by the military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Further, there is litt le open source material that refers to China’s military aspirations regarding space. China has embarked on a modernisation plan to improve the PLA and take it from a peasant-based ‘people’s army’ to one that is capable of conducting off -shore operations. China has demonstrated off ensive military space aspirations with the recent ASAT test; therefore it would not be unreasonable to consider that China is discreetly progressing the development of other military space programs and capabilities.

In the public arena, China continues to be ‘in the vanguard of those seeking to ban weapons in space and prohibiting att acks against space-based assets.’50 However, critics have highlighted that the Chinese tactic of ‘att acking whilst negotiating’ could be being used and that the public rhetoric could be very diff erent from Chinese strategic thinking.51 A US Department of Defense report states that ’China’s leaders probably view ASATs, and off ensive counterspace systems….as well as space-based

missile defences as inevitabilities.52

More benignly the European Space Agency is an international organisation comprising 17 member states. Established in the 1970s, its charter is to shape the development of Europe’s space capability by coordinating the fi nancial resources of its members and delivering capabilities far beyond the scope of any single European country.53 The ESA has no military objectives and is a strong proponent of the OST. Further, it has recently issued a resolution which, among other initiatives, reaffi rms the ESA’s support for ‘the use of outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes’.54

India on the other hand is a relatively recent entrant into the space domain. India has developed its own launch facilities and maintains an indigenous imaging and

48 Editors note, a lunar probe was launched in late 2007.49 Joan Vernikos, ‘Strategic Views on Space.’ p. 14.50 Johnny Stringer, ‘A Frontier Too Far,’ p. 41.51 Johnny Stringer, ‘A Frontier Too Far,’ p. 41.52 Michael O’Hanlon, Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary, p. 99.53 See the European Space Agency website available at: < htt p://www.esa.int/esaCP/index.html>, accessed 14 April 2008.54 ‘Resolution on the European Space Policy of 22 May 2007.’ available at: <www.esa.int/SPECIALS/ABOUT_ESA/SEM4UU8RR1F_0.html> accessed 9 July 2007.

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communications satellite capability.55 These satellites are dual use and thus support military operations. However, Stringer asserts that ‘India has no plans to develop off ensive space weapons.’56 India is focussed on developing collaborative international commercial space opportunities as well as a commercial satellite launch facility.57

A more formidable challenge might be seen to come from the former Soviet Union, which was a fi erce competitor with the US in the space domain during the cold war. However, aft er the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, the Russian space program has struggled. In 1992 the Russian space program budget was reduced by around 60% of previous years. Also, access to launch sites was problematic as they were now located outside Russia.58 Russia has now modestly started rebuilding its space program, with a predominantly economic att itude.59 Whilst some US$12 billion has been allocated for 2005-2015 space program budget,60 the program is still seriously under-funded. Russia is looking to opportunities to gain extra funding by providing launch facilities to commercial customers and also through an innovative space tourism program. From the military perspective, Russia has focussed on developing new submarine-launched ballistic missiles that utilise multiple independently targeted nuclear warheads and increasing the capability of its early warning system through the use of satellite technology.61 Russia is said to have no plans to develop space weapons and is actively pursuing international support on the non-militarisation of space.62

In the current international strategic environment, it is also worth briefl y assessing the role of non state actors and their potential to pose threats to state interest in the space domain. Since the commencement of the ‘global war against terrorism’, there has been litt le discussion on the possibility of non-state armed groups acting in the space domain. Whilst it is not feasible to envisage Al Qaeda directly interfering with US space assets, the ground-based parts of the US space system could be vulnerable to computer or conventional att acks.63 However, current thinking proposes that most terrorist organisations prefer att acking terrestrial targets that result in damaging images of casualties and mass panic. Such impact would not be achieved by damaging a satellite constellations support infrastructure through computer att ack. However, this line of reasoning fails to acknowledge the substantial damage that could be rendered to an adversaries’ fi nancial and energy management systems as these systems are heavily reliant on communications through space in modern countries, particularly the US.64

55 Johnny Stringer, ‘A Frontier Too Far,’ p. 40.56 Johnny Stringer, ‘A Frontier Too Far,’ p. 40.57 Johnny Stringer, ‘A Frontier Too Far,’ p. 40.58 Kazakhstan is now paid around US $100 million per year by Russia for access to the Baikonur launch facility. Joan Vernikos, ‘Strategic Views on Space.’ p. 14.59 Joan Vernikos, ‘Strategic Views on Space.’ p. 14.60 Joan Vernikos, ‘Strategic Views on Space.’ p. 14.61 Some eight early warning radars are now located outside Russian territory in states which aspire to join NATO.62 Joan Vernikos, ‘Strategic Views on Space.’ p. 13.63 Johnny Stringer, ‘A Frontier Too Far,’ p. 42.64 Johnny Stringer, ‘A Frontier Too Far,’ p. 42.

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The Future Threat to the US: A ‘Space Pearl Harbour’?65

In July 2000, an article emanating from China was published entitled ‘The US Military’s Soft Ribs and Strategic Weaknesses’ which analysed a future confl ict with the US. The article suggests that developing countries could use information and electronic warfare and create a ‘space Pearl Harbour’ thus toppling a technologically advanced adversary. The article, in part replicated by the Arms Control Association, goes on to say: ‘For countries that could never win a war with the US by using methods of tanks and planes, att acking the US space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice’.66 Similarly, it has been proposed that any threat that the US faces now and into the future, can only be (by default) asymmetric in nature, as the US has become so dominant militarily.

This is not to discount nation-states. A threat can also be a state player that possesses, or is developing, military capability, and demonstrates intent to use that capability against another. China possesses a capability (albeit a prototype) that could threaten US space dominance, whilst the ambiguous Chinese tactic of ‘att acking whilst negotiating’ could be being used to mask an emerging intent.

The possibility of a future confrontation between the US and China in the Taiwan Straits in the 2015-2030 timeframe is now being debated by informed commentators and is referred to as a ‘space Pearl Harbour’. Despite the predictions of continued growth in the Chinese economy and the modernisation program being undertaken by the PLA, China is still unlikely to have a military that could challenge the US in a traditional ‘force on force’ contest for several decades. However, the diff erential in terms of military power between the two countries will have decreased such that the advantage that the US currently enjoys may well be eroded, and US forces could be vulnerable to some extent. China could use an ASAT weapon to defeat US space assets and deny the US situational awareness (albeit temporarily) in the Taiwan Straits. Signifi cant casualties could be infl icted on the US by sinking an aircraft carrier or by striking US personnel based on Guam.67 China’s leaders could convince themselves that such a successful fi rst strike would deter the US from considering entering into confl ict. Whilst such a proposition is highly unlikely, US national strategic and security planners must take such scenarios, be they extreme, into account as they plan for the future.

65 Michael Krepon, Weapons in the Heavens, available at: <htt p://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Krepon.asp>, accessed 14 May 2008.66 Al Santoli, (ed.) ‘Beij ing Describes How to Defeat US, in High-tech War; Russia-China Military Technology Agreement De-tailed.’ American Foreign Policy Review Council, China Reform Monitor, No. 331, 12 September 2000, available at: <www.afpc.org/crm/crm331.htm>, accessed 15 April 2008.67 Michael O’Hanlon, Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary, pp. 93-96.

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Future US Strategies

While US dominance in the space domain is not currently under threat, this paradigm may well be challenged over the next few decades. Two major strategies could be progressed by the US in order to both preserve its space dominance, and ensure that space is not weaponised.

First, the US could progress a strategy of ‘Space Assurance through Co-operative Measures’, to ensure that space remains a viable and reliable medium for all countries so that they can explore it peacefully and pursue global commercial activities. Such a posture would require the prohibition of all activities that could be considered dangerous. This would include banning both the fl ight testing of ASAT weapons and the operational deployment of all space weapons.68

To advance such a strategy successfully, the US would have to continue to enjoy its relative superiority in terms of conventional and nuclear military capabilities. This is fundamental and essential to ensure that any potential adversary clearly understands that if they damage or destroy US space assets, the fi nal outcome of any such confl ict will be that they will suff er unacceptable consequences. A second key element of a space assurance strategy is the ability of the US to maintain high fi delity space situational awareness to monitor the intent and research of adversaries in any areas that would adversely aff ect the space domain.69

The co-operative measures that support such a strategy are already in place to some extent. As discussed previously, UN treaties exist that prohibit the placing of WMD in space and acknowledge that the exploration of space should be pursued for peaceful purposes only. However, the UN CD needs to expand and strengthen these treaties to ensure space remains free from weapons. Unfortunately, gaining consensus in this 65-member forum may well be problematic. In order to achieve the desired outcomes sooner, the US could progress an international code of conduct, commonly referred to as ‘rules of the road’70 whereby responsible space-faring nations would agree to notify one another of unavoidable dangerous activities in space and assist in debris mitigation and space traffi c de-confl iction. These road rules could be progressed in the form of either bilateral or multilateral agreements and would hopefully lead UN CD debate.71

Second, the US could develop a ‘Hedging against Weaponisation’ strategy. To do so, the US could hedge against an att ack in the space domain by decreasing the vulnerability of future satellites by improving hardening and redundancy characteristics and

68 Michael Krepon, ‘Weapons in the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option.’ online.69 Michael Krepon, ‘Weapons in the Heavens,’ online.70 Michael Krepon, ‘Weapons in the Heavens,’ online71 Michael Krepon and Michael Katz-Hyman, ‘The Responsibilities of Space Faring Nations.’ p. 2.

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providing them with anti-jam and anti-dazzle capabilities. The US has already embarked on a hedging strategy in a terrestrial sense. The US possesses far superior conventional and nuclear military power than any other country and should continue to enjoy this advantage for several decades. If a country chose to att ack a US space asset, this could be considered an act of war and thus be responded to.72

Other elements of a US hedging strategy would include restricting research and development programs into space weapons to the laboratory environment only, and complying with a ban on fl ight testing. This US restraint would be complemented by the US encouraging other countries to adopt a similar policy. However, the US could anticipate that potential adversaries would continue with their own space warfare programs. In anticipation, the US could ensure that it is positioned to advance quickly its own space weapons programs to the fl ight testing and operational deployment phases if an adversary did not demonstrate a similar level of restraint.73

These two potential US strategies are not mutually exclusive and should be considered as complementary to each other if the weaponisation of space and a space arms race are to be avoided. The last global arms race was between two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union during the cold war. However, this race did not extend into the space arena. Although both countries developed ASAT capabilities, development of space weapons was not progressed to the same extent as other weapons, particularly their respective nuclear strike forces. Both countries understood that to destroy the satellites of another country would have been a very dangerous act, one that could result in nuclear retaliation.

Conclusion

Today there is only one superpower. China’s focus is primarily on economic growth. Although China is undertaking an extensive modernisation program of the PLA, China cannot aff ord to bankrupt itself by entering into an arms race with the US, as the Soviet Union did. If China had a hostile intent, its strategy would focus on an asymmetric approach. It has been argued that China has already demonstrated an asymmetric approach to some extent with its recent ASAT test. Further, neither China nor the US need to race to have the capability to dominate, or perhaps more accurately obliterate, space.74 A single nuclear detonation in the low earth orbit would infl ict irreversible damage to an adversary’s space-based systems. Further, such an event impacts on all users of space.75

72 Michael Krepon, et. al., ‘Preserving Freedom of Action in Space: Realizing the Potential and Limits of US Spacepower.’ Stimson Center Report No. 66, The Henry L. Stimson Center, May 2007, p. 7.73 Michael Krepon, ‘Weapons in the Heavens,’ online. 74 The Soviets and the US conducted high altitude nuclear detonations in the early 1960s. One such test by the US was of a nuclear warhead some 400 kilometres over Johnson Island in the Pacifi c Ocean. This detonation produced artifi cial radiation belts that destroyed satellites and caused failures in electrical equipment some 1,300 kilometres away.75 Johnny Stringer, ‘A Frontier Too Far,’ p. 37.

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Whilst an arms race in space is highly unlikely, both countries will continue to progress the development of military space capabilities. Current US strategic thinking as articulated in documents such as ‘US National Space Policy’ and ‘Joint Vision 2020’ do not bode well for the US demonstrating restraint in the space domain and progressing initiatives such as an international code of conduct. If the strategies of co-operation, reassurance and hedging, are not pursued, the US will inevitably weaponise space in an eff ort to maintain its space dominance.

China’s successful demonstration of an ASAT capability in early January 2007 sent shockwaves throughout the international space community, particularly in the US. China belatedly acknowledged that it had conducted the test but ambiguously went on to state that it continued to oppose the weaponisation of space.

The US military has become heavily reliant on space to support its future joint warfi ghting doctrine; ‘Full Spectrum Dominance’. The US military states that space is the fourth medium of warfare and that it is unrealistic to conceive that US space assets will never become targets. To counter this prospect, it is likely that the US will consider developing space weapons, at least to the concept stage. If this is the case, such weapons fall into two broad categories; Directed Energy Weapons and Kinetic Energy Weapons. Whilst technically feasible, space weapons present many challenges ranging from energy generation to target acquisition and tracking. Further, they will be immensely expensive. Countries such as Russia and India have active commercial and military space programs, but China is the only country other than the US that is showing interest in the weaponisation of space. China will continue to grow substantially in economic terms, including its conventional military capability, over the next few decades. Although it is highly unlikely that China would directly challenge the US in the space arena, an astute China could cause signifi cant trouble to the US through an asymmetric campaign, a ‘space Pearl Harbour’.

The US is faced with the dilemma of how to maintain its dominance in space. Complementary strategies of ‘Space Assurance through Co-operative Measures’ and ‘Hedging Against Weaponisation’ have been proposed in this paper that support this stable dominance, and also suggestions to prevent the weaponisation of space through initiatives such as an international code of conduct. However, it seems these strategies are at odds with the current US National Space Policy and joint warfi ghting concepts, and it is unlikely that they will be progressed without a reappraisal of US policy.

Despite the modernisation of the PLA, China will not rival the US directly in a conventional military sense in the foreseeable future. However, it is certain that China will continue to progress the development of military space capabilities; the only uncertainties are the extent and intent of this development. Although an arms race in

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space between China and the US is unlikely, China could signifi cantly alter the balance of power through a nuclear detonation in space or the use of an ASAT weapon. Such an event would be a disastrous outcome for the international community. China’s ongoing aspirations in the space arena may well lead to the US weaponising space in order to maintain its dominance in this domain.

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