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Hannah Arendt: Democracy and The PoliticalAuthor(s): SHELDON S. WOLINSource: Salmagundi, No. 60, On Hannah Arendt (Spring-Summer 1983), pp. 3-19Published by: Skidmore CollegeStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40547750.
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2/18
Hannah
Arendt:
Democracy
and
The Political
BY
SHELDON
S.
WOLIN
The
question
of
democracy
s not one
that has received much
attention
rom hose
who have written
bout Hannah
Arendt.This
omission
seems understandable
because Arendt herself
never
systematically
ddressed he
topic
n
any
of her
writings.
et it s not
difficulto show
that
many
f the
major categories
hat
ompose
and
distinguish
er
political
utlook were
ither ritical f
or
incompatible
with emocratic
deas. This believe o be thecase
with hedistinction
on which
her
political
deals were
grounded,
he distinction etween
thepolitical nd the social. Her critical ttitude oward emocracy
rested n a correct
ntuition hatthe
mpulse
of
democracy
has been
to override
hatdistinction. or
historically, emocracy
as
been
the
means
by
which
he
many
have
sought
ccess to
politicalpower
n
the
hope
that tcould be used
to redress heir conomic nd social lot. The
natural stateof
society
ontains
mportant
istinctions f
wealth,
birth,
nd education
hatare
typically
xtended nto
political
power.
Thus
social
power
s translatednto
politicalpower
which s thenused
to increase ocial
power.
Democracy
s the
attempt
f the
many
to
reverse
he
natural
ycle
of
power,
to translate ocial weakness
nto
politicalpower n orderto alleviatetheconsequencesof what s not
so much
their ondition s their
ot-tery.
Democracy
would
lso obliterateheseArendtian
istinctionsecause
itwants o extend
hebroad
egalitarianism
f
ordinary
ives
nto
public
life. t s at odds
with
he
emphasis
n
authority,
mbition,
lory,
nd
superiority
hat
figured
o
importantly
n
Hannah Arendt's
onception
of authentic
olitical
ction. It was not accidental hat she
excluded
the
entimentsf
fellow-feeling compassion,
ity,
nd love
-
from
the
political
realm,
or,
more
important,
hat she was silent
about
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3/18
4 SHELDON S. WOLIN
friendship so
central o herancient
Greeks)
nd
fellowship
so
basic to Hebraic and Christian
onceptions
f
community).
hese
democratic entimentsnd virtues o not accord withthe
agonistic
conception
of
action she extolled.
Democratic
action
is,
perforce,
collective;
ts
mode s
cooperation;
nd its
presupposition
s not small
audience of heroes but
shared
experience.
In
what
follows
propose
o
explore
he
origins
f the ntidemocratic
strain
n
Arendt's
hought, racing
t from ts
beginnings
n
herclassic
studyof totalitarianismo its apogee in her nextmajor work,The
Human Condition,
Then
I
want to show that
n
her ater
writings
change
s
evident.
t
appeared
first
n
the ast
chapter
f On
Revolution
(1963)
and more
strikingly
n
the collection f
essays,
Crises
of
the
Republic
1969).
While
on the
way
to whatcan
fairly
e described s
a leftward
osition,
she
modified ome of her most characteristic
categories.
Within
imits,
nd
in
herown
way,
she
was,
in
the course
of
reflecting pon
the
political
vents
f
the
1960s,
radicalized.
Hannah Arendt'sfirst
major
work,
The
Origins f
Totalitarianism
(1951),
was
completely
ilent
bout
democracy.
Although
rima
acie
there eems o be nonecessaryeasonwhy nanalysis f totalitarianism
should discuss
democracy,
he historical nd
political
context
f the
subject-matter
nd thebook
suggest
therwise. he book was written
in
the mmediate ftermath
f World War
II.
During
hewar
years
n
the United
Kingdom,
he
British
ommonwealth,
he United
States,
and
in
a
significant
art
of
Nazi-occupiedEurope,
the
single,
most
universal
heme hat et
the
nterpretation
f the
war
n
the minds f
ordinary
eople
everywhere
as of a
struggle
etween
democracy
and
dictatorship.
The
books,
newspapers,magazines,
radio
and
moviesof the timeconveyed pretty nanimousviewpoint hat the
nature f totalitarianism
as
to be
grasped
almost
entirely
n
terms
of the
political
antitheses
etween
democracy
nd totalitarianism:
between
emocratic reedom
f
speech
nd education nd
totalitarian
thought-control
nd mass
manipulation;
etween
emocracy's ystem
of free
olitical arties
nd
government
y
consent
nd the otalitarian
one-party
tate with ts
use of terror
nd intimidation.
While it would be an
exaggeration
o
argue
that the
Origins of
Totalitarianism
eversedhe
ccepted erspective,
t s no overstatement
to
say
that he
work
dopted
viewpoint
hat
nterpreted
otalitarianism
bymeans fcategorieshatweredrawn rom ntellectualraditionshat
were
deeply
anti-democratic.
One tradition
was associated
with
Nietzsche,
he
otherwith
ocqueville.
A fundamental
ategory
f both
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HannahArendt:Democracyand ThePolitical 5
traditions as the mass. For
Nietzsche
emocracy
was
primarily
he
political
xpression
f the
atomistic,
nheroic,
ecurity-loving
ulture
which
ad
emerged
fter hedefeat f the
gonistic,
ristocratic
olitical
culture of
antiquity
by
the slave
morality
of
Christianity.
The
democratic
movement,
Nietzsche
wrote,
is
not
only
heform
f the
decay
of
political rganization,
ut a form f
the
decay,
namely,
he
diminution,
f
man,
making
him
mediocre nd
lowering
is value. 1
Tocqueville,
whose
general
nfluence n
Arendt,
articularly
n
her
understandingf thefounding f the Americanrepublic nd of the
nature f the French
Revolution,
has
not been
fully
ppreciated,
not
only
nticipated
ietzsche's
ostalgia
or
politics
n an
heroic
cale,2
but
was thefirst
ineteenth-century
heoristo
revive he ncient otion
that
ertain orms
f
tyranny ight
ave a
popular
basis.3
Tocqueville
envisioned
an
immense
rotective ower,
operating
enignly
ather
than
brutally,
hat
hinders, estrains,
nervates,tifles,
nd
stultifies
by
a network f
pretty omplicated
ules that
covers thewhole of
social
ife. Democratic
equality,
Tocqueville
held,
has
prepared
men for all
this,
encouraging
hem
to
pursue
petty
and banal
pleasures, to exist in and forhimself, solated and politically
passive.4
The echoes of these writers an be
heard
in
the main
themesof
Arendt's
nalysis
f totalitarianism....
totalitarian
movements,
she
wrote,
depended
less on the
structurelessnessf
a mass
society
than on the
specific
onditionsof
an atomized
and
individualized
mass.
. . . 5
Mass man was
characterized
y
isolation and
lack
of normal ocial
relationships
aused
in
part
by
the breakdown
f
the lass
system. 6
otalitarian
movements,
he
continued,
were
built
on sheer numbers f
indifferent
eople.
. .
who
never eforehad
appeared
on the
political
cene. 7Totalitarian
eaders,
uch as
Hitler
and
Stalin,
had the
confidence of the
masses and
enjoyed
indisputable opularity. 8
he
triumph
f totalitarian
movements,
she
concluded,
shattered the
illusion that
the existence
of
1 Cited in
Tracy
B.
Strong,
Friedrich
Nietzsche
nd
the
Politics
of
Transfiguration
(Berkeley
nd
Los
Angeles,
1975),
p.
201.
2
See,
for
xample,
Democracy
n
America,
tr.
George
Lawrence
Garden
City,
New
York. 1969). d.
15.
3 A.
Andrewes,
The Greek
Tyrants London, 1956).
4
Democracy
n
America,
p.
692.
5 The
Origins f
Totalitarianism
New York, 1951), p.
312.
6 Ibid. pp. 310, 308.
7
Ibid., p.
305.
8
The
Origins f
Totalitarianism
New York,
1951),
p.
301.
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5/18
6 SHELDON S. WOLIN
democracy
had
been made
possible
because
the
majority
ad taken
an active
part
and had
positively
upported
emocratic
overnment.
In
reality
he
majority
had
been indifferent.
his
proved
that a
democracy
could
function
ccording
to
rules
which are
actively
recognized
y only
a
minority.
nsofar s
democracy
ested
n the
masses
at
all,
it had
rested on
the silent
pprobation
nd tolerance
of
the ndifferent
nd
inarticulate
ections
f the
people.
The moral
was
that
while emocratic
reedoms
ight
e defined
n
terms f
formal,
legalequality, heywereviable onlywhere he citizens elongto or
are
represented
y
groups
or form
social
and
political
hierarchy,
that
s,
where
here
was
political
nd
social
inequality.9
The
Origins
oncluded
with
warning,
hat
unless human
beings
resolved
o undertake
fresh
olitical
tart
a
planned
beginning
f
history )
hatwould
nclude
he reation
f a new
polity,
he
future
was
bleak.
There are
plenty
f ndications
hat he
mob.
. .
will
ake
over
and
destroy
wherewe were
unable to
produce. 10
She
undertook
hat
project
herself
n The Human
Condition
1958),
and
offered
er
onception
f
a new
beginning
hat
would
furnish
he
ground orwithstandinghemasses.Therewas ittlen theOrigins hat
would
have
prepared
reader
or he
rchaic
vision
f a new
polity
that
was
inspired
y
the version
f
pre-Socratic
ellenism
ssociated
withNietzsche
nd
Heidegger.
The
Human
Condition
id not
present
a
sketch
f
a
political
onstitution
s
Plato had
done,
but
t did
offer,
in
the
Platonic
sense,
an
idea
that embodied
an
ideal.
And like
Plato's,
her
deal
owed
virtually othing
o the
facts f
history
nd
only
slightly
ore
o the
history
f
political
deas.
The
political
was
the
ideal.
The
intention
ehind
t was
to combat
different
ersion
f the
masses han
heone
which
ad
figured
n
her
nalysis
f totalitarianism.
Although
mass
society
emained
he
danger,
he
nalysis
wasfocused
on
the
phenomenon
f
work
and
on the
transformation
f
society
and
politics
ffected
y
the
modern
mphasis
upon
productivity
nd
economic
growth.
hese
and other
notions
were
ssembled
under
he
idea of
the
social ;
and
behind
hat
dea
was her
main
opponent,
arl
Marx,
who
symbolized
he
destruction
f the
Western
radition
f
politics.
Arendt's
onception
f
the
political
had several
spects.
t
signified
not
a state
or a
society
but
a determinate
ublic
space,
a
forum,
n
agora,setaside, ealouslydefended o that hosemenwhowished o
9
Ibid.,
p.
306.
10
bid.,
pp.
438,
439.
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HannahArendt:Democracyand The Political 1
test hemselves
y
the
highest
tandards f
excellence
might
ompete,
by
peech
nd
action,
n
the
presence
f their
eers.
t
was to be
a
politics
of
lofty
mbition,
lory,
nd
honor,
unsullied
by
private
nterest r
thematerial oncerns
n
the
arger
ociety
outside : a
politics
f
actors
rather han
citizens,
gonistic
ather han
participatory,
ncouraging
qualities
hatwould enable men to stand out
rather hanto
take
part
of,
share
(participation pars (part)
+
capio (seize)).
It was
a
combination
f Periclean
democracy,
dealized so as to
expunge
he
democratic lements f law courts nd assemblies, nd an Homeric
assembly
romwhich hemerest
uggestion
hat
Thersites
might
rise
to
quarrel
with
kings
(Iliad 2.211-78)
had
been removed.
It is difficulto
exaggerate
ither
he
severity
ithwhich
he drew
boundaries
round
he
political
n
order
o
separate
t from he
banality
and low concerns f
ordinary
ife,
or the historical
istortions
hich
had to be introduced
n order
o claim forher
construct he
authority
of
the Greeks.
Among
the distortions he
ignored
the
acute class
conflicts hatwere familiar eature f the
Greek
city-states
nd
had
generated
ontinuous
ressure
or
the
broadening
f
citizenship
nd
for he nlargementfpolitical ccess so that xcluded ocialelements
might njoy
thebenefits f
political
membership.
s a result he
gave
us a
politics
without he
divisive onflicts hathave
presented
he
main
challenge
o
politicians,
ust
as she had
given
us what was
said to be
a
Greek-inspiredonception
f action but
without
nalyzing
he vital
place
accordedviolence nd war
n
Greek
onceptions
f the
polis
and
of
noble action.
In the ame
bowdlerizing
ein,
he made
no mention f
the
periodic
efforts,
s
early
s the Solonic land
reforms,
o
expand
the
meaning
of
equality
insonomia)
o as
to include
socio-economic
ontent nd
not ustan equality f formal egal rights.11o insistent as she that
political quality
had to be confined
mong
the few
that he tried
o
maintain hat the real
meaning
of
equality
s
understood
y
the
Greeks
had
notto do
with
air reatmentr
evenwith
qual
rights
ut
with
condition
n
which he ndividualwas
free ecausehe was
neither
a ruler
or
superior)
nor a
subject
or
inferior).12
n
support
of
this
interpretation
he
claimedthat the whole
concept
of rule and
being
ruled. . was felt
o be
prepolitical
nd to
belong
o
the
private
ather
11
See G.
Vlastos, bonomia,
Classical
Philology,
ol. XLI
(1946),
65-83;
J.W.
Jones,
The Law and
Legal Theory
f
the Greeks
Oxford,
1956),
pp.
16-23,
84-90;
M.M.
Austin nd P. Vidal-Naquet,Economic and Social History fAncientGreece: An
Introduction
Berkeley,
os
Angeles,
1977),
pp.
24-26.
12
The Human
Condition
Chicago, 1958),
pp.
32-33.
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7/18
8 SHELDON S. WOLIN
thanthe
public sphere. 13
he claim
s, however,
latly
ontradicted
by
Aristotle's amiliar
efinition hat
'citizens,
n
the common ense
of the
term,
re all who share
in
the civic life of
ruling
nd
being
ruled. 14
The
fragility
f her
deal was underlined
y
the condition
which
t
required.
A
politics
devoted o
the
production
f
memorable
ctions
had to be not
only
xclusive ut
ubsidized. he ancientAthenians
ad
compromised
heir
democracyby
excluding
laves,
resident
liens,
workers,nd women, hat s, practicallyheentirework force f the
polis.
Arendt
ccepted
this
notion and dressed t out
by
adopting
Aristotle's
ustification
hat
these
human ctivities
were
functions
which mbodied
he
metaphysical
rinciple
f
necessity,
hat
s,
they
were
necessary
o
sustaining
uman ife
nd,
by
extension,
he
ollective
life of the
polis.
But
because
these formsof
labor
were bound
endlessly
o
produce
nd
reproduce
hemeansof
life,
nd
because the
fate f the
products
nd
serviceswas
to be consumed nd
thus
o
pass
away
without
race,
nd
because the
aborer
depended
on
employers
or
masters,
the
activitieswere
unfree,
without choice or
lasting
significance.arenthetically,nemight ote hat his ontrast etween
freedom and
necessity
was
comparable
o theone
developedby
Marx, but,
unlike
Marx,
Arendt
wantedto
preserve
ecessity
ather
than
develop
a
complex strategy,
s Marx
did,
for
exploiting
t,
overcoming
t,
and
consorting
with t. For
Arendtfreedom
esided
essentially
n
the
political
realm
wheremen
could exercise
hoice.
In
her
yes,
Marx's exaltation f
abor,
his claimthat t
should
constitute
the
principle
round
which
ociety
hould
be
reorganized,
epresented
an inversion
f
the true
hierarchy
f values. It
meant
enshrining
n
activity
hatwas
essentially
indless,
outinizednd
repetitious
n
place
ofpolitical ctionwith tsdrivefor heunpredictablendmemorable
deed. The artof
politics
eachesmenhow to
bring
orthwhat s
great
and radiant.
.
Greatness. . can
only
ie
n
the
performance
tself nd
neither
n
its motivation or
ts achievement. 15
abor,
on the other
hand,
entails form
f
sociability
hat
nvolves the actual
oss of all
awareness f
individuality
nd
identity.
The animal
laborans is
marked
by
an
incapacity
or
distinction nd hence for
action and
speech. 16
13
Ibid.,
p.
32.
14 Politics Ill.xiii. 1283 b 45.
15 The Human
Condition,
p.
206.
16
Ibid.,
pp.
213,
215.
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Hannah Arendt:Democracyand The Political 9
The distinctive
ature f
the
political
r
public
realmwas
developed
by
the ontrasts
hich
Arendt rewbetween
t and the
oncept
f the
social.
The latter
ignified
ll of
the ctivities
nd
relationships
hich,
by
nature,
were
private.
They
ncluded
work
nd
labor,
ove, sex,
family,
nd household.
These,
she
contended,
werematters hat ould
not withstand
he
glare
of
publicity
hat attends ll
political
ctions
without
eing
distorted
r
perverted.
rivate
things,
uch
as
labor,
material
oncerns,
and
bodily
unctions,
should emain
hidden.
1
The crisis fmodernitys that hepoliticalrealmhas been nvaded
by
the ocial
realm,
specially
y
private
conomic
nterestsnd
private
values of
consumption
nd
pleasure.
The most
dangerous
nvader s
the mass
whose
power
has increased
with he
growth
f
conformity.
The
value of
equality
as been
realized
n
the
fact f sameness. olitics
has
given
way
o administration
s bureaucracies
egulate
aily
ife nd
render
t
more
uniform.
he
triumph
f
necessity,
nd of
the
abor-
principle
hat mbodies
t,
s realized
n
theform f a
society
edicated
to
the
gnoble
deal of mere
ife.She described
hat
ociety
n
a
passage
that
s
pure
Nietzsche:
Society
s
the form
n
which
he factof
mutual
dependence
or
the
ake of life nd
nothing
lse assumes
public
ignificance
nd
where he activities
onnected
with heer urvival
re
permitted
to
appear
in
public.18
In
retrospect
he
Human Condition seems
a work that
s
highly
suggestive
t the
margins
f its chosen
problems
nd
irrelevant,
ven
misleading,
t its center.
There are
marvelously erceptive
omments
about
the nature
f action
and of
work,
but the
main
construct,
the
political, couldnotcarry heburden ssigned o it. Thiswas because
two of
the
most fundamental
olitical
problems
were
either
gnored
or treated
uperficially:
ower
nd
ustice.
Power,
he
declared,
exists
only
n its actualization.
t
springs
up
between
men
when
they
ct
together
nd
vanishes
he moment
heydisperse
. . Power
is to an
astonishing egree
ndependent
f
material
factors
. .
This formulation
as
fully
onsistent
withher
discussion
f
work,
labor,
technology,
nd
private
property
which
never succeeded
in
grasping
he
basic lesson
taught
not
onlyby
Marx but
by
the classical
17 TheHuman Condition,p. 77.
18
Ibid.,
p.
46.
19
The
Human
Condition,
p.
200.
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9/18
10 SHELDON S. WOLIN
economists s
well,
that an
economy
s not
merely
work,
property,
productivity,
nd
consumption:
t
s a structuref
power, system
f
ongoing
elationships
n
which
ower
nd
dependence
end o become
cumulative,
nd
inequalities
re
reproduced
n
forms
hat
are
ever
grosser
nd
ever
more
ophisticated.
t
s
a
system
f
power
whose
ogic
contains
no inherent
rinciple
f
ustice,
nd it s
doubtful
hat,
n
the
absence
f
thedevoted
abors
f
philosophers
ver he
past
wo
decades,
itwould
have
ever
cquired
ne.
But
ustice
was not
discussed
y
Arendt
atall; itsimply id notfigure orher s it had forPlato andAristotle,
as the
main
objective
of
political
ction.
Arendt's ilence
bout
ustice
was related o another
xtraordinary
omission:the state. That one could claim
to have a
politics
without
discussing
he state
s
perhaps
he result f her Greek
starting-point.
As is
well-known,
he
oncept
f the
tate
oes notmake n
appearance
until he
early
16th
entury.
ts
absence,
both
n
theory
nd
practice,
allowed her attention o be focusedon
the
political
ctor and action
itself o be treated
n
dramaturgical
erms,
ith
otmuch ttention
iven
to nstitutional
onstraints,
o thedifficulties
f
action-at-a-distance,
and to thedependencef actors pontheir wn nstrumentalities.hen
the modern tate
appears
and
acquires
its
centralized
pparatus
of
power,
he actor
anticipates
he fateof the
contemporary
uthor
n
a
structuralist
ritique:
he extno
longer
needshim.The
presence
f
the
state
has even more
mportant onsequences
for
ordinary
itizens. t
represents
ot
only
the
greatest
oncentration f coercive
power
n
history,
nd it not
only
demands
bedience,
ut tasks for
oyalty,
ven
affection,
rom ts
subjects.
The conditions
which
the modern tate
requires
enormous
evenues,
managed
conomy
nd labor
force,
a
huge
military
stablishment,
ver-moreethal nstrumentsf
violence,
a vast
bureaucracy,
nd a
compliant
citizenry
hat will
produce
legitimation
pon
demand
-
make it
increasingly lain
that the
democratic
tate has become a contradiction
n
terms.
* * *
On
Revolution
1963)
saw Arendt
xchanging
he
paradigm
f Athens
forthe
early
American
republic,
he
agonal
actor of Homer for the
revolutionary
f
1776,
and Pericles for John Adams.
Many
of the
categories developed in The Human Condition were retained,
particularly
he
dichotomy
etween
he
political
and the
social
with ts anti-democraticnd
even
anti-political mplications.
Now,
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10/18
HannahArendt:Democracyand The Political 11
however,
he
opposition
between the
political
and the social was
developed
by
meansof
a
contrast
etween he two
great
18th
entury
revolutions,
he
American,
whichwas
guided
by
an
authentic
olitical
impulse,
nd the
French,
which
catalyzed
the
many
who,
since
antiquity,
had remained outside
history,
hat
is,
the
history
of
memorable ctions.
The
French
Revolutionmarked hemomentwhen
those who
had been hidden
way
in
the ower
depths
of
society
had
suddenly rupted.
.
. . this
multitude,
ppearing
or
he
first ime
n
broad daylight,was actually the multitude f the poor and the
downtrodden,
hom
very entury
eforehad
hidden
n
darkness nd
shame. 20
t was
as
though,
he
continued,
the
slaves
and resident
aliens
of
ntiquity],
ho formed he
majority
f the
population
without
ever
belonging
o the
people,
had risen nd demanded n
equality
of
rights. 21
hemselves
reoccupied
with heir
needs,
they
enerated
a
type
f
physical
necessity
from
heir wn
misery
nd unleashed
it
upon
public
pace.
Thus
out of
a
primal
ecessity
evolution
merged,
not
s the
nspired
ction
of a
desperate eople
unableto secure edress
for their
grievances,
ut as an
irresistible
rocess,
a
necessity
o
overpowerings to defyhumancontrol, nd hencesignifying as
necessity lways
does
-
the denial of
freedom.22
In
the
American
Revolution,
he
maintained,
the exact
opposite
took
place. 23
The Americans
conducted
a
genuinely political
revolution,
ne that concernednot theorder
f
society
ut the form
of
government.
mong
he
reasonsfor he
difference,
s
Tocqueville
had
argued
efore
er,
was nature's
ounty
ather han olonialvirtue.
Although
herewas
poverty,
there
was little f the
misery
and
want thatwould
ater
goad
the ansculottes o revolt.
At
the same
time
therewas
just
the
right
mount of
deprivation
o
discourage
improper olitical
spirations.
The
majority
f
colonists,
he noted
approvingly, eing
occupied
with continuous
toil,
would
[be]
automatically exclude(d)
. . . from active
participation
in
government. 24
cknowledging
hatwhile
miserymay
not
have
been
the ot of
the white
majority,
t
may
have been the
experience
f the
black
slaves,
she insisted
hat the main
point
was that the social
question
was absent from
revolutionary
merica and
with
t,
the
most
powerful
nd
perhaps
the most
devastating assion motivating
20 On
Revolution,
.
41.
21
Ibid.,
p.
33.
22 Ibid., pp. 33, 41-44.
23
Ibid..
d.
44.
24 On
Revolution,
p.
63.
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11/18
12 SHELDON S. WOLIN
revolutionaries,
he
passion
of
compassion. 25
The
demands
of the
miserable hat the
political
order
remedy
heirdistress ould fall on
sympathetic
ars
in
Europe
because moderns had come to feel
compassion,
not because therewas
any widespread
elief
hat social
and economic
opportunities ught
to be
open
to all. The
game
of
status-seeking,
hewrote
n
a
passage
hat s
simply istorically
ntrue,
. . . was
entirely
bsent from
the
society
of
the
eighteenth
nd
nineteenthenturies.
. , 26 And with
a fine Nietzschean side she
chidedcontemporaryocial scientists orbelieving hat the lower
classes
have,
as it
were,
right
o burst
with
resentment,
reed,
nd
envy.
.
, 27
Although
Arendtwas full f
praise
for heFramers f theAmerican
Constitution
or
having
ucceeded
n
giving
asting
nstitutionalorm
to
revolution,
omething
hichmostmodern evolutionistsave failed
to
do,
her
account of the Constitution
isplayed gain
her
antipathy
towardmaterial
uestions,
n
this
case,
the economicmotives f the
Founding
athers,
ven
hough
many
f thefounders erenothesitant
to
argue
them
openly
n
public space,
as it were.
By
ignoring
hese
matters er ccount f theConstitutioneft ninterpretedhedrive or
centralization,
he determinationo curb
the
power
of the colonial
legislatures,
nd theHamiltonian ision f
a national
conomy
resided
over
by
a
strong
tate.Her failure
o
recognize
hat heFounderswere
more concerned
o halt the democratic ocial movement hat had
captured
omeof the tate
egislatures
nd nitiatedconomic
egislation
favoring
mallfarmers
nd that heir wn
plans
ncluded
capitalist's
version f
the social
question
returns o undercut he
proposals
for
new
conception
f
the
political
or
rather,
new embodiment
advanced towardthe end of
On Revolution.
She criticized
he Framers for
having
introduced
system
of
representative overnment
which meant
that
the
people
are not
admitted
o the
public
ealm. She
charged
heConstitution
ith
aving
caused
the
withering
f the
revolutionarypirit
because
t had failed
to
incorporate
he
ownships
nd the own-hall
meetings,
he
original
springs
f
all
political
ctivity
n
the
country
nto the new
political
order.28 er
charge,
owever,
merely
ccusedtheFramers f
what
hey
openly
vowed.
The
new national
government,
s its
architects
made
clear,
had to break
the
monopoly
which
State and local
institutions
25
Ibid.,
pp.
66,
90.
26
Ibid.,
pp.
66-67.
27
Ibid..
p.
67.
28 On
Revolution,
p.
241-242.
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HannahArendt:Democracyand The Political 13
had on theaffections f the
people.29 ncorporating
ocal institutions
was not
something
he Founders
failedto
do;
it ran
counter
o
their
political
vision.
They
made the
Constitutionnto
a
triumph
f
state-
sponsored
apitalism,
n elite
version f
the social
question
which
included hedefense f
property
ights,
he
ncouragement
f a
national
economy
through urrency
eforms,
ariffs,
axation,
commercial
policies,
state
subsidies,
military
ower
able to
extend
American
commerce,
nd an
enlightenedureaucracy
o
nurturenfant
ndustries.
The visionoftheFounderswas nationalrather han ocal, expansive
rather
han
tationary.
onsequently,
orArendt
o
praise
he
Founders
for
having ept
herabble nd
their ocialconcerns
rom
nvading
ublic
space,
and then o tax that
ame
elite
for
being
nsensitiveo
the
value
of local
participatory
nstitutions as
to strain t
a
gnat
and
swallow
the camel.
Arendt's
riticism f the Framers
was an
expression
f
her
unease
at the
spectacle
presented y
modern
representativeovernment
nd
its
ystem
f
political
parties: hey
had made
politics
he
monopoly
f
a
professional
lite nd closed t
off o natural
liteswho
are
inspired,
notbycareers,butby genuine ove of politics.Her solutionwas to
resurrect
n
obscure
proposal
advanced
by
Jeffersonn
a
private
etter
written
nearly
a
quarter century
after the
ratificationof
the
Constitution.Jefferson ad
envisaged
a
system
of
elementary
republics
ocated
n
the
wards,
counties,
nd
states nd
forming
gradation
of
authorities,
ach
with
share of
power,
that
would
serve
o check nd
balance each other.30
lthough
efferson's
roposal
suffered rom some of
the
same
shortcomings
s
ancient
Greek
democracy
n
making
o
provision
or he
political
dmission f
women,
slaves,
nd
aliens,
herewere
enuinely
emocratic
eatureso t.
Every
man in the State was to be an
acting
member f the Common
government,
ransacting
n
person
according
o
his
competence.
Each would
thusfeel
himself o be a
participator
n
the
government
of
affairs,
not
merely
t an
electionone
day
in
the
year,
but
every
day
31
Arendt then
proceeded
to
integrate
Jefferson's
roposal
with
a
tradition f
participation
which extended
back to
the likes
of
the
Committees f
Correspondence
uring
he
American
Revolution
nd
forward
o the
revolutionary
ouncils nd
committeeshathad
sprung
29 See Hamilton'sremarksnFederalist 7 ad finem.
30
On
Revolution, . 258.
31
Cited,
On
Revolution,
p.
257.
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13/18
14 SHELDON S. WOLIN
up spontaneously
ith he outbreak f
revolutions.
he foundthem
in
the
French
Revolution,
he Paris
Communeof
1871,
the
Russian
revolutions f 1905and
1917,
nd
the
Hungarian
Revolution f 1956.
And doubtless he
would
have
included he
Solidarity
movement
n
contemporary
oland.
Most of these
xamples
fulfill
er
xacting
riteria f heroic
politics
and
spontaneous ppearance.
Whether
hey
were
purely
olitical
nd
unmarred
y
ocial and
economic
bjectivesmay
be more
ontestable.
Butgrantingheirmportance,tmaystillbe the case that he factof
their xistenceastsdoubton her
ntire hesis
oncerning
he
orrupting
effects f the ocial
question,
f
material
misery
pon
the
capacity
f
ordinary
itizens o act
n
a
genuinely olitical
way.
f
modern
ocieties
were
mass
societies,
how is
it
possible
for
ordinary
itizens o
escape
the
deadening
effects f routinized abor and
the
corruptions
f
consumer
ociety
nd to
display
n
appetite
for
politics
nd
political
action?How is it
possible,
first,
o
congratulate
heelites
for
keeping
the
masses
t
bay
and, then,
o welcome
hese ommittees
nd
councils
as the
political
lite
f the
people ?
Arendt id
not
ttempt
o
answer
thequestion,but it is not difficulto finda plausibleexplanation,
although
t
involves
getting
ehind the
darkness
which Arendt
repeatedly
ound o be
surrounding
he ives f
aboring eople.
Thanks
to
social
historians nd cultural
nthropologists
e earn hat he
poor
are notwithout
ich
ultures f their wn.
Once
this s
appreciated
heir
capacity
o act ceases to be
inexplicable
nd
the
suspicion
rises that
the
concept
of the
mass
may
be of
limited
tility.
t
may
even be
primarily
n intellectual
onceit,
displacement
f
the
ntellectual's
resentmentt what
apitalist
ulture oes to
the tatus f
ntellectuals:
It
restricts
high
culture o thefew nd then ubsidizes
he ntellectual
to protect he fewfrom heculturalbanality f capitalism.
Arendt's
ndifference,
o
put
t
blandly,
o the culture f
ordinary
and
poor
citizens
produced
a
severely
mpoverished
otion
of the
historical
meaning
f
the
political.
Here
I
have
n
mind
whathas
been
one of themost
mportant, erhaps
he
most
mportant,
ources f
the
popular understanding
f a wide
range
of
political
notions,
uch as
equality,
ustice,
community,
uthority,
nd
power.
The
historical
contributionf
Western
eligions
o
the
political
ducation f
ordinary
and
poor
people
s almost
mpossible
o
exaggerate.
Religion
upplied
a first and
xperience
n
what tmeant o be a member f a
community,
to sacrifice nd share,to be an
object
of
power,
to make not
ust
promises
ut commitmentsf
ong
duration,
o refuse o
conform or
conscience's
ake, and,
not
least,
to found new
communities.
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Hannah Arendt:Democracyand The Political 15
At the end of On Revolution
there
was an element f
pathos
to
Arendt's
project.
Beyond
extolling
he value of these
new
forms f
elitism,
othing
s said
about how
theymight
e maintained ecause
institutionalizing
hem
would
destroy
he
spontaneity
hichwas an
essential lementof
their
political
authenticity.
heir
appearance,
therefore,
s
accepted
s one would
accept
the
nexplicableworkings
of
DivineGrace. These elites
re chosen
by
no
one,
they
onstitute
themselves.
Politically they
re the best and it
is the task of
good
governmentnd thesignof a well-orderedepublic o assure them f
their
ightful
lace
n
the
public
realm. To be
sure,
she
added,
the
recognition
f theseelites
would
spell
the end of
general
uffrage
for
ecognition
ouldmean
hat he litehad
won the
right
o be heard
in the conduct
of the
businessof the
republic,
and that
they
ared
for
more hantheir
rivate
happiness.
As for hose who
would be
excluded,
hey
had not
only
chosen theirfate
by
remaining assive,
but
they
had,
unconsciously,
ffirmed
one of the most
mportant
negative
ibertieswe
have
enjoyed
ince the end of
the ancient
world,
freedom
rom
politics. 32
This last remark llustrates rendt'sprofound quivocality bout
politics,
n
equivocality
hat ed
her o welcome
pontaneous olitical
action
but
to distrust ction
when the
stakes
became
so
large
as to
threaten
o
ncorporate
he oncerns
hat re ocated loser
o
or
within
private
life. She
wanted a
pure
form of
politics,
one that was
consistent
with the claim that
power
is to an
astonishing egree
independent
f material
actors. 33 olitical
nstitutions,
he declared
flatly,
hould
be made
independent
f economic forces.34t was her
vision
f
purepolitics
hat ed
her
during
he ate 1960s o
oppose
the
VietNam
War,
to defend
ivil
disobedience,
o criticizehe nvolvement
of universitiesnthewarbusiness, nd,withinimits,owelcome ome
aspects
f
the tudent
rotest
movements.
n
all of these ommitments
one can
see a common lement:
support
f actions
hatwere
primarily
political,
r at least could
be seen
that
way,
and without conomic
motives
r broad
social aims.
* * *
In
closing
et me offer ome
remarks
ntended s a contributiono
an
alternative,
emocratic
onception
f the
political.
Whatwould uch
32
On
Revolution,
.
284.
See
also
Crises
of
the
Republic,
pp.
231-233.
33 The Human
Condition,p.
200.
34 Crises
of
the
Republic,
pp.
212-213.
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15/18
16 SHELDON S. WOLIN
a
conception
ook like? How
can
it
escape
being merely
nother
arbitrary
onstruction? ne answer s
that,
historically,
he
dea of
the
political
nd
the idea of
democracy
have
shared so
many
common
meanings
s to seem almost
synonymous.
his
cannot be
said of the
relationship
etween he
dea of the
political
nd,
say,
the dea
of a
political
rder hatwould be
controlled
y
or
responsive
rimarily
o
the
wealthy.
Marx
expressed
his
point
n
one of
his
early
writings:
... it is evident hat ll forms f thestatehavedemocracy or
their
ruth,
nd for
thatreason are false
to the
extent hat
they
are not
democracy.35
Marx's
point
an
be renderedike his: t
s the
nature f the
tate
hat,
insofar s it claims
to be
political,
t will
govern
for
the
good
of
the
entire
ommunity
nd not serve
primarily
he
nterests f
a
particular
class
or
group:
this s the
democratic truth.
But
nsofar s
the tate
in
question
akes
particular
orm,
ay,
one
mainly
ontrolled
y
the
wealthy
r
by
corporations,
t will
by
virtue f
its actual
nature
rule
inthe nterestsf a part fthe ociety,hat s,befalse o thedemocratic
principle
f
the
good
of the
whole
community.
t
follows hat
only
a
democratic
tatehas the
possibility
f
acting
s a
genuine
olitical
tate.
It
might
e added that
most
political
heorists,
rom
ntiquity
o
the
present,
have
accepted
the
premise
of
this
point
and resisted
he
conclusion.
They
have
accepted
he
principle
hat he
political
defines
a distinct ind
of association hat
ims at the
good
of
all,
depends
on
the
contributions,
acrifices,
nd
loyalties
f
all,
but
they
have
then
bent their
ngenuity
o
devising
tructureshat
would allow
the
few
(whether ings,
ristocrats,
epresentatives,
r
bureaucratic
fficials)
to use collective
power
for the
good
of all while
exacting
from he
population
t
large
the
various contributions
eeded for
that
task.
These
are,
however,
mainly
ormal
onsiderations,
nd while
they
help
to
identify orrectly
he
principle
hat
the
political
means
the
common
well-being
s the end and
the definition
f what s
authentic
political
ction,
t
does not
specify
what he
political
has to
include o
that he
common
well-being
s
furthered.
or does it
tell us what
the
nature f the common
well-being
s:
is it
something
hat s
made
or created ?
and,
if
so,
out
of what?Or
is it disclosed?
s it a
pure
good,
or
equivocal,
ven ronic?What
re the
onditionshat re
needed
35
Critique f
Hegel's 'Philosophy
f
Right',
tr.
JosephO'Malley
(Cambridge,1970),
p.
31.
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16/18
HannahArendt:Democracyand The Political 17
for the
political
to
come
into
being
so that the common
well-being
becomes
possible
and
how do these conditions ntail
democracy?
We can
begin
not
by gnoring
he tatebut
by
avoiding
he
error f
assuming
hatthe state s identical
r coterminouswith he
political.
The state s a modern
henomenon
nd
its
raison
d'trewas to
develop,
or
better,
o
capitalize
the
power
of
society
the
power
resident
n
the
human
ctivities,
elationships,
nd transactions hat sustain ife
and its
changing
eeds.
The statebecame
a
coercive
gency, eclaring
and enforcinglaw, punishing miscreants of all descriptions,
systematizing
axation,
ncouraging
ommerce nd manufacture
n
the
direction
f national
conomies,
onducting iplomacy,waging
war,
and
seeking mpire.
ts
characteristic
orm f action s the decision
which t
*
'makes
with elentless
egularity;
ts
ypical xpression
s
the
announcement
f a
policy,
and itsmode of
governance anges
rom
inducements
o force.
The
appearance
f the tate
ignifies
hat
urplus ower
s
available,
that
ollectiveifehas succeeded
n
producing
more
power
han
he
daily
needs
of themembers
equire.
The existence f
surplus ower
s a
sign
that hepoliticalhas come intobeing nthe common ifethatmakes
the state
possible.
Common
life resides
in
the
cooperation
and
reciprocity
hat
human
beingsdevelop
n
order o
survive,
meet heir
needs,
nd
begin
o
explore
heir
apacities
nd
the remarkableworld
into which
hey
have been cast. The
political
emerges
s the shared
concerns
f human
beings
o take
care of themselves
nd
the
part
of
their
world hat
they
laim
as their
ot. The
political merges,
n
the
literal
ense,
s a
culture,
that
s,
a
cultivating, tending, taking
care
of
beings
nd
things.
The
common
ife
and the
political
ulture
emerge
o the
accompaniment
f
power.
Shared
concerns
do
not
eliminate he need forpower;theydepend upon it. This was partly
glimpsed
n
a remark
y
the
late
Roland Barthes:
One must
naturally
nderstand
olitical
n
its
deeper meaning,
as
describing
he whole of human relations
n
theirreal social
structure,
n
their
power
of
making
he world.36
There
is,
of
course,
an
irony
here
in
that the skills of social
cooperation,
which
human
beings acquire through xperience
nd
apprenticeship,
nd
which enable them
to
settle
their
existence,
eventually
re made to
work
gainst
hem.
Their
kill
produces
more
36
Mythologies,
r. Annette avers
New
York,
1972),
p.
143.
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17/18
18 SHELDON S. WOLIN
power
han
hey
eed.
Surplus
ower
nables
hem o
project:
o control
more of the future nd so to
develop plans
and
expectations,
.e.,
projects.
The
dynamics
f
collectivity
hen ake hold. The search
for
surpluspower
then
gets
nstitutionalized,
hich s
the
organizational
language
or
alking
bout theroutinized anufacturef
surplus
ower.
Surplus
thenbecomes the
province
f
administration;
t
is
managed
and administered
n
the
form f
programs,ncluding rograms
or he
deployment
f
power
converted nto
weapons
and
man-power.
n
all
of this the political,whichhad emergedas shared concernsand
involvements,
as
disappeared.
The loss of the
political
s a clue
to
its nature:
t
is a mode of
experience
ather
han
a
comprehensive
nstitution
uch
as
the
state.
The
thing
bout
experience
s thatwe can lose
it and
the
thing
bout
political xperience
s thatwe are
always
osing
t and
having
o recover
it. The nature f the
political
s that t
requires
enewal. t
is renewed
not
by
unique
deeds whose excellence ets some
beings apart
from
others,
ut
by rediscovering
he
common
being
f human
beings.
The
political
s based on this
possibility
f
commonality:
ur
common
capacity oshare, o sharememories nd a commonfate.Ourcommon
being
s thenatural oundation f
democracy.
As
beings
whosenature
displays
ommon
elements,
we have an
equal
claim to
participate
n
the
cooperative ndertakings
n which hecommon ife
depends.
We
are
not
equal
in
power
or
ability,
nd that s
precisely
why
equality
is
crucial. The
development
f
power upon
whichthe common ife
dependsrequires
ifferent
ualities
nd it
produces
different
eings,
differences
hich re
nterpreted
s
inequalities.
At the ame
time,
nd
stated omewhat
ifferently,
ur human
being
s
not exhausted
y
ts
common
being.
It
is,
as Hannah
Arendt so often
and
eloquentlyreminded
s,
a
being
hat s
capable
of
expressing
hemostremarkable
and
glorious
iversity.
hat
diversity
as
mportantmplications
n how
power
s exercised
emocratically.
Each of us is a contributoro the
generation
f
power
withoutwhich
human
ife annot
ndure.The
problem
f the
political
s
not to clear
a
space
fromwhich
ociety
s to be
kept
out but
t
s rather
o
ground
power
in
commonality
while
reverencing
iversity
not
simply
respecting
ifference.
iversity
annot
be reverenced
y
bureaucratic
modes
of
decision-making.
iversity
s the
nightmare
f
bureaucracy.
The bureaucrat's esponse o it seither o inventnother lassification
or,
in the
corporate
world,
o manufacture
7 varieties.
he mode of
action
that s consonant
with
equality
and
diversity
s deliberation.
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Hannah Arendt:Democracyand ThePolitical 19
Deliberation
means o
think
arefully.
We
must
hink
arefully
ecause
what s
at
stake
s the
exercise f
human
power.
To exercise
power
democratically,
hat
s,
with hefullest
ossibleparticipation
y
equals,
far
from
eing
n
exercise
f
crude
mass
power,
s the most sensitive
way
f
handling ower.
Democratic
eliberation
mplicates
ur common
being
n
decisions
which re
bound,
n
a
complex ociety,
o threaten
harm o our
diverse
eings.
t
requires
ot
thatwe come to terms
with
power
representatives
nd bureaucrats
an do that
orus
-
butthat
we face t.