Shinn, Craig - Taking Stock of Institutional Thought

7/22/2019 Shinn, Craig - Taking Stock of Institutional Thought

1/12

Taking Stock of Institutional Thought: Institutions, Institutionalization, and Institutional

EffectsAuthor(s): Craig W. ShinnSource: Administrative Theory & Praxis, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1996), pp. 31-41Published by: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25611175.

Accessed: 14/03/2014 13:14

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

M.E. Sharpe, Inc.is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access toAdministrative Theory

&Praxis.

http://www.jstor.org
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=meshttp://www.jstor.org/stable/25611175?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/25611175?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mes


2/12

TAKINGSTOCK OFINSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT:INSTITUTIONS,INSTITUTIONALIZATION,ANDINSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS

CrmgW, ShinnPortland State University

Administrative Theory and Praxis, 18(2): 31-41, 1996.

One cannot speak orwrite about thecommunity irrigationditches ofNewMexico without using the Spanishterminology of their physical andorganizational structure, if one is todo justice to them ... The termacequia, which can refer to both theactual irrigation channel and theassociation of members organizedaround it,derives from theArabic assaquiya. (Crawford, 1988)

INTRODUCTIONInnorthernNew Mexico, community irrigationditches are hundreds of years old and so are theinstitutionswhich make thempossible. Many irrigationditches are stillmanaged in common as gravity-fedflood irrigationsystems.Water makes lifepossible here.The acequia makes water possible. What follows, inCrawford's Mayor domo, is an account of an acequia,the organization and the ditch.Parciantes are landowners with rights andresponsibilities in common with others of the acequia.To furtherthe common enterprise, each parciante isassessed a contribution ofwork ormoney according to

his or her share. The mayordomo is a parcianteswho isappointed as the day to daymanager of the acequia bya commission of three elected parciantes. While thecommission governs the acequia, the mayordomoadministers. The mayordomo marks the end ofwinterand thebeginning of spring by calling a date to cleanthe ditch. Today, those who respond to the call arelargely locals working for extra money rather thanlandowners fulfilling their assessment. They are locals,people who have grown up with the acequia which stillwaters their lands.The mayordomo initiatesthework of

the crew by scribing a mark in the earth across theditch channel with a cottonwood staffsome five or sixfeet long. This breaks the ditch into a series of tareas,each a plot about five or six feet long and as wide asthe ditch. One shovel, one laborer per tareas stretchesthe crew out over a hundred feet of the ditch. As eachlaborer finishes cleaning out a tareas, themayordomoinspects and, when satisfied, scribes a new tareas. Inthis manner, the crew inchworms its way up theirrigationchannel. The tareas is both the unit ofworkand the unit of accounting. All parciantes depend on thequality of work completed in each tareas and expectfairness in thework among tareas.When Crawford firsttook on the role of the mayordomo, he had beeninvolved as a landowner and then member of thecommission. One day themayordomo had to take hiswife to thedoctor and simply handed the staff, a vara,to Crawford. With the staff, he was in charge ofmanaging the ditch for the duration of thedoctor visit.He gave back the staffand with it the role. Crawfordwas later the appointed mayordomo. For several years,he marked the change of winter to spring by etchingtareas along the ditch and ensured the life of theacequia, the ditch, and the organization.

The book,Mayordomo, is a description of theembeddedness of values in social structure that bothenables and constrains administrative action. Thedescription provides ample evidence of institutions,institutionalization, and institutionaleffects. Evident inthe case ofmanaging irrigationditches innorthernNewMexico are not just roles and standard procedures andnorms but also the underlying basis of agreement onwhich these depend. It becomes clear that on anacequia, administrative action, whether viewed as onemore annual cycle of ditchmaintenance predicated onpatternshundreds of years old or a change forparticularpolicy reasons, depends on the institution. utcomes arein part a result of the state and condition of theinstitution.

31

This content downloaded from 160.39.50.239 on Fri, 14 Mar 2014 13:14:43 PMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/12

One does not need to reach forMayordomo tofind accounts of institutionsor interest in institutionaleffects. The current literatureregarding communities(Bellah, et al, 1985), new democracy movement (Lappe& DuBois, 1994), citizenship (Putnam, 1995), andreinventing government (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992)explore social problems which ask critical questionsabout institutions. The questions raise postmodernquestions about the limits of radical individualism andthe requirement of institutions in social life. In theacequia, solutions to the proximate problem of waterallocation or contributions to the common propertyresource of the irrigationditch itself are embedded inthe ability of the acequia as awhole to function.Whilea public choice analysis may yield insight ontransaction costs, or an analysis of dependency mightyield power differentials, or a cultural analysis mightidentify traditional practice, or an organizationalanalysis might yield a description of roles, only aninstitutionalperspective, like thedescription offeredbyCrawford, makes apparent the embeddedness of theparts in the fabric of thewhole. The enabling andconstraining features of the acequia for administrationof the acequia become apparent from such a view.

In another type of account, inCommunity andthe Politics of Place, Kemmis (1990) exploresinstitutional solutions to thekind of problems raised byBellah, et al, Lappe and DuBois, Putnam, and Osborneand Gaebler. Proximate problems of education, urbanredevelopment, environmental protection, economicdevelopment, etc., are framed as problems of civiccapacity. What can be done to improve our ability tosolve such problems? How can we address theproximate problem in a way that improves our abilityto address futureproblems? Kemmis asks how to revivecitizenship and build an enabling political culture.Heanswers by attending to institutions,thewell of socialagreement on how toproceed. For Kemmis, institutionsare the loom on which the fabric of culture, traditions,and rules arewoven. As in the acequia, in the city ofMissoula institutionsmake a difference. Perhaps that iswhy institutional theory is experiencing a revival inpublic administration.

At itscore, institutional theoryconsiders howand why meanings and forms and procedures come tobe taken for granted (Pfeffer, 1982, p. 239) and theeffects of such taken for grantedness in social life.Institutionalists thrillwith the identification of deepstructures affecting the order of social life - theexplication of D?rkheim's collective unconscious.Having said this, it is not surprising that,while theinfatuation of other social sciences with institutional

explanations ebbs and flows, sociologists can nevermove farfrom institutional theories.But institutionalistshare a common goal of understanding the connectivetissue of social life, how it is maintained, and theconsequences: institutions, institutionalization, andinstitutionaleffects.Some twentyyears ago, several critical papers,

especially Meyer and Rowan (1977), Zucker (1977),and thework of those associated withMeyer and Scott(e.g., Meyer and Scott, 1983), spurred a generation ofinterest,theory, and research. The recent collection ofsummaryworks and synthesis - for example, Marchand Olsen (1989), DiMaggio and Powell (1991), andScott (1995) ? suggests we are at a turning point intheorydevelopment, a stage of theorydevelopment richin ideas and evidence where new questions based onnew formulations rooted in currentunderstanding canand should produce another burst of ideas. This patternisnot new but a repetition, albeit a variation, of earliergenerative and summative periods in social research.

This paper seeks to collect critical ideas frompast research to offer a summary of where institutionaltheory is currently and, by so doing, contribute abackground for the papers which follow. It is a shortpaper, not a book, and thereforewill necessarily referyour attention to recent summaries rather than repeatthegood work they represent.

INSTITUTIONS QUO INSTITUTIONSInstitutions are easier to do and, in fact, easierto teach than define. Social scientists, from politicalscientists to economists to sociologists, are quicker toagree on what institutions are not than what they are.However, social scientists can agree on examples ofinstitutions: family, marriage, city, state, property

rights, voting, election, Robert's Rules, dollar bill,interestrate, college, graduation, contract, corporation,supervisor, urban, family farm,market price, doctor,religion, church, etc.What

are institutions?As othershave suggested (Jepperson, 1991), institutions are thatwhich these examples have in common. The commonelements are that theyhave an objective nature and asubjective nature, theyhave an instrumentalquality anda symbolic quality, they constrain action and enableaction, they reflect structure and process and createstructure nd process. Institutions fixprocesses thatarerather dynamic (Douglas, 1986) or institutionsrepresent a social order or pattern thathas obtained acertainproperty or state (Jepperson, 1991). In contrastto social structure, culture, habit, etc., institutionswed

32



4/12

particular meaning to distinctive elements of socialstructure.

This kind of definition of institution iswidelyfound and captures the historic problem domain ofinstitutionalists. Institutional economists argue withclassical economists over the causal influence of theinstitutions that create the place in which marketexchange occurs. Institutionally oriented politicalscientists focus on theway rules of the game arefixed and political resources are allocated in society byinstitutions.Sociologists are largely institutionalists ndseek to discover and explicate the institutionsguidingbehavior. In each case, institutionsare taken as beingdurable,malleable, socially constructed, and of society.A brief review of the institutional history ofinstitutional theorywill reveal a rich tapestryof ideasand evidence about institutions.

A REVIEW OF INSTITUTIONAL THOUGHTReviews of institutional theories have a

problem of organizing content.Disciplines, chronology,level of analysis, theoretic similarity, and problemorientation all provide appropriateways to divide pastwork. Here, past work is divided by social sciencediscipline: economics, political science, and sociology.The literature is organized by discipline for severalreasons. First, public administration is informed bymany disciplines, but most scholars of publicadministration are rooted in one social sciencediscipline, typically political science, economics, orsociology. A disciplinary orientation for the reviewmayunderscore familiar themes within root disciplines andprovide comparative purchase inotherdisciplines. Also,a disciplinary approach can demonstrate thedevelopment of ideaswithin disciplines. Disciplines areinstitutions that structure theory development(Paluchowski, Shinn,& Stevens, 1989). Also, reviewinginstitutional literature by discipline is the generalapproach taken by Scott (1995) in Institutions andOrganizations, which I referyou to as themost recentbook lengthreview on institutionaltheory.Finally, thisapproach is familiar because itreflectshistoric patternsof thought. However, it is useful to enter a briefreminder that this approach suffersmethodologicallyfromhistoricism.Consequently, comparative differencesare sometimes lost in the face of abundant similarities.

While the literature is organized by disciplineand within discipline the review is largely historical,there are cross cutting themes. Level of analysis istaken as problematic across all disciplines. Level of

analysis becomes particularly problematic ininstitutional theory development in part becausedifferent disciplines focus institutional research ondifferent levels of analysis. This results in noncomparable cases or confounds variables in metaanalysis. Another theme common across disciplines ininstitutional theory development is the need toaccommodate assumptions of rational actors.Institutional theory paradoxically seems to build awayfrom,and toward the a priori assumption of, humans asrational actors. In a similar vein, all disciplines strugglewith locating the individual in institutional theory.While most institutional theories assume individuals arethe cause of institutions and are the vehicle for theeffectsof institutions, the causal mechanism is at issue.Other types of cross cutting themes can be seen in thedevelopment of institutional theories.Early theorydealswith institutionsprimarily as structuresor the structure:banks or courts, for example. While this focuscontinues, institutional theoryhas expanded to includea focus on processes as institutions, for example, howdecisions are made or the rules in political parties.More recently, institutional theoryhas focused on thecreation and maintenance and reproduction ofinstitutions,for example the role of leaders or the effectof federal reporting requirements on organizationstructureof non profit agencies which receive federalgrants. Because institutional theory has developedacross disciplines as well as within disciplines, in areview by discipline it is important to keep inmindcross cutting comparative themes. The yield of thisbrief survey will be in the similarities betweendisciplines as well within disciplines.

INSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT INECONOMICSIn economics, institutionalthoughtbegins withattending to the question of how markets are createdand maintained and the institutional requirements forthe occurrence of free market exchange. Institutionaleconomics usually isframed by thework of Thorstein

Vehlen and John Commons. This is a satisfactorystarting place, but a nod should be given whenanalyzing American institutional economics to itsrootsin the largerdiscipline. Here thinkers likeAdam Smithand political economists like Pareto raised just the kindsof questions that turn of the century institutionaleconomists suggested should be addressed. Further,Scott (1995) reminds us that institutional economistswere influenced by the pragmatists - Dewey, James,etc. ~ aswell. This body of thoughtmust be taken intoaccount as a context for thebrief review that follows.

33



5/12

Vehlen (1903) offers a durable agenda andtheoretic framework for institutional economists byrejecting the economic assumption of atomic selfinterest as the basis of human behavior and insistingthat much behavior is governed by habit andconvention. The bases of such governance areinstitutions, and, accordingly, for Veblen institutionsconstitute a necessary and appropriate focus of attentionfor conomists. Commons (1950/1970; 1924) introduceda focus on transactions or the nature of exchangecritical to understanding economics. This orientationdirects attention to another economic assumption aboutperfect information and free choice. Commons, and thetradition which followed, leads to an understanding oftheways choice is constrained by informationbut alsosuggests that the friction of human interactiongivesrise to rules of conduct for efficiency reasons.

The problems, questions, and answers offeredby Veblen and Commons are reflected in a latergeneration of theorists like Kenneth Galbraith, KenBoulding, Ronald Coase, andOliver Williamson. Coase(1937), Williamson (1975), and others theorize thatindividuals attempt tomaximize returns to self withbehavior reflecting a consistent preference ordering butconstrained. Imperfect economic or rational behavior isexplained by constraints. Rational behavior for thesetheorists is constrained by less thanperfect information,limited ability to handle information that is available,friction in the transaction process, and leakage inenforcing agreements. Such constraints give rise toinstitutions that improve system efficiency by solvingconstraint limitations. For example, laws and courtssolve some contract enforcement problems. Rules forexchange might substitute for market mechanisms.Along this line of reasoning, a classic institutionaleconomic explanation forgovernment ismarket failure,and, therefore,an appropriate role forgovernment is tocreate a more perfectmarket.

Of particular interest to public administratorsis thework of resource economists like Emery Castleand his studentDaniel Bromley who, likeVeblen, seeindividual economic behavior not only constrained butproduced by institutional arrangements. Bromley(1989), looking at the problem of economiccontributions to policy analysis, argues that ... policyanalysis and institutional change must start with theconcept of individual and group choice sets that aredefined (that is, determined) by the structure ofinstitutional arrangements (Bromley, 1989, p. 245). ForBromley, Kenneth Galbraith, and others, institutionalarrangements are both independent and dependentvariables. Government thenbecomes an active agent in

the production of institutional arrangements.Analytically, the question becomes not government ormarkets but, rather, a design of institutions thatappropriately guide behavior. This analytic concern isreflected in the work of both development andenvironmental economists.Currently, institutional economists areconcerned with theefficiency of differentarrangementsin guiding economic behavior. At the level of theorganization, this is reflectedbyWilliamson (1981) andOuchi (1980). Broader questions about policy impactson economic behavior are reflected in thewritings ofeconomists concerned with policy like Rivlin (1995)and in resource economics by Bromley (1989). In

practice or application, the orientation of institutionaleconomists can be seen not only in public policieswhich impact trade,finance, and banking or those thatdirectly regulate behavior, but also inpolicies that seekto impact individual behavior by modifying marketmotivations or tax incentives or disincentives.

INSTITUTIONAL THOUGHTINPOLITICAL SCIENCEInstitutionalists represent core traditions in

political science. Those interested in the construction ofgovernments, those interested inhistorical descriptionofpolitical events, those interested inexplicating formalstructuresof government and of political process are allinstitutionalists.Scott (1995) concentrateshis discussionon early institutionalists inpolitical science at the turnof the centurywhen attention turned from law andpolitical philosophy to administrative and politicalstructure and process. The question for WoodrowWilson, W.W. Willoughby, and others became howgovernmentworks, rather than normative questions. Aresultwas a wave of description and codification ofpractice which has often been termed the letters andpapers period inpublic administration. The process ofdescription and codification of administrative practiceinstitutionalized practice inways that remain visibletoday. Later political scientistswould decry suchworkas atheoretical ? a claim aimed at early institutionaleconomists as well. However, the codification periodprovides the venture point for the next generation ofinstitutionalists.Clarity ofwhat was or what is takenfor granted iswhat gave rise to questions about whatshould be taken forgranted and caused reconsiderationof thenature of administration.

In political science, institutionalists of themiddle yearswent beyond attention toformal structures

34



6/12

to examine the way political life is structuredinformally.Laswell's classic query ofWho Gets What,When and How? (1936) directed attention to particularpolitical settingswhere researchers sought to discerndeep patterns. Dahl's account of New Haven (WhoGoverns, 1961) and, in public administration,Kaufman's The Forest Ranger (1957) or Lindblom'sincrementalism (1959) are such institutional accounts.

Recent work inpolitical science has an arrayof institutional theorists. Rational choice theorists(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991) likeBuchanan andTullock(1962) assume a micro model of rational choice ormaximization of individual utility,much like that ofclassic economics, and then explain institutions asintentional outcomes of collective action problems.Larger structures in society, like interest groups,corporations, or governments are then seen as trade-offsrequired tomaximize self interest.For example, theproduction of a public good like a community irrigationditch requires collective action. Government becomes avehicle for the collective action when collective actionis required over time. One outcome is that politicalinstitutions produce stability in politics as theinstitutions and economics do in themarket place.Another stream of public choice theorists, likeYoungand Ostrom, view institutions as fixing regimes ofexpected behavior, which may be produced intentionallyor unintentionally and may be fixed explicitly orimplicitly.An example of thismodel is the institutionof property rights. In development economics, animportant first step is to establish tenure or propertyrights because western market economics requiresindividual tenure over the objects of economicexchange. In this example, the regime of propertyrightsfixes a slate of behaviors which allow markets tofunction according to the expectation of westerneconomists. Rational choice is perched on a set ofunderstandings or agreements represented by theinstitution.

March and Olsen inRediscovering Institutions(1989), integratethepossibilities for institutionaltheoryin politics. By focusing on the mix of researchregarding decision making in politics andadministration, a brief review of rational choicetheorists, and those whose work focuses on proceduraloutcomes (Kingdon, 1984; March & Olsen, 1989),March andOlsen remind us that politics does not seemto be either a pure case of environmentally constrainedrational competition or a pure case of environmentallyconstrained temporal setting (March& Olsen, 1986, p.17).Rather, institutionsneed tobe explicitly introducedto either approach because, to paraphrase, institutions

create and sustain islands of imperfect and temporaryorganization inpotentially inchoatepolitical worlds. Toquote,

political democracy depends not onlyon economic and social conditionsbut also on the design of politicalinstitutions. Bureaucratic agencies,legislative committees, and appellatecourts are arenas for contendingsocial forces, but they are alsocollections of standard operatingprocedures and structures that defineand defend values, norms, interests,identities and beliefs (March &Olsen, 1989, p. 17).

While current institutionalresearch inpoliticalscience includes rational choice, historical, andprocedural models, all give increasing attention toinstitutional arrangements as explanatory as well asoutcome variables. For example, inCommunity and thePolitics of Place, Kemmis describes the impacts ofinstitutional arrangements on issues like a land useplanning variance request. This, like the effect ofinstitutionson the politics of passing a law like the1990 Clean Air Act, remains of interest to politicalscientists.But political scientists are also interested inhow policies like theclean air act impact institutions. Inthis example, theClean Air Act reinforces the role ofstates as the primary vehicle to deliver federalregulatorypolicy but also initiatesnewmarket strategiesto reduce effluent production. The law creates aninstitution,a market place for air pollution. Similarly,Kemmis is interested in the impact of policy process onthe health of institutions in Missoula. Publicadministrators are clearly aware that institutions areboth cause and effect of the policy environment inwhich they act. Some of themost interesting currenttheorizing is by practitioners at the community levelwho conceptualize and act out alternative institutionaldesigns, i.e.,Kemmis, (1990) and Lappe and DuBois,(1994) .Currentwriting reflects a broadening scope ofconcern inwhat counts for a political institution.

INSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT IN SOCIOLOGYAs suggested earlier, sociologists attend toinstitutions.This gives rise to amore complex array ofthoughtabout institutionsamong sociologists (see Scott(1995) and DiMaggio and Powell (1991) for a morecomplete review). Durkhiem (1912/1961; 1893) offersthe idea of social facts ? symbolic systems that are

35



7/12

produced by social interactionof society and, therefore,are also experienced by individuals as object like.Thatis, they are experienced as being external to theindividual and exerting a coercive force over theindividual. These collective representations, whencrystallized (to use D?rkheim's language), are socialinstitutions. It is also appropriate to review Weber(1924) regarding legitimacy,his notion of roles, and theinfluence of large structures in society. Whilelegitimacy and roles through rules arewell reflected ininstitutional thought, Weber's broad comparativesociology which anticipated current questions is notwell reflected. In these comparative studies, he asksabout the large structures in society, theirorigins, andrelative worth. While Weber finally settled on theinevitability of bureaucratic structures in a modernsociety, he did so on the basis of comparative analysis.Today questions regarding the efficacy of institutionalarrangements tend to be addressed by historicalcomparison. As suggested earlier, history haslimitations, especially when the targetof investigationis that which we take for granted in society ~institutions.

Another early tradition important toinstitutional thought is thatof themicro sociologists ?the early Chicago School, Cooley and Park, etc., andalso George Herbert Mead (1934). The emphasis incognitive process, interaction mechanisms, andproduction of knowledge systems is offered earliesthere. Cooley reminds us that institutions, while ofsociety with the object like characteristic ofDurkheimian social fact and the coercive force ofWeberian structures, are produced through interactionamong individuals. The individual is always the causeaswell as effectof the institution Cooley, 1902/1964,p. 314).

These two streams are reflected by Selznick.The question for Selznick and others of the ColumbiaSchool display Robert Merton's interest infunctionalism. Like Lasswell in political science,Merton asked for explanations about what was reallygoing on in organizations based on deep case analysis,e.g., TVA and The Grassroots (Selznick, 1949). Thelandmark book for themiddle years of institutionalsociologists, Leadership inAdministration (Selznick,1957), grows out of this tradition. In this work,Selznick defines institutionalization as infusingwithvalue beyond the technical requirements of the task athand (Selznick, 1957, p. 17). Expressive leadership isarticulated as a process for infusingvalue or producingthe institutional nature of formal social structures.Selznick assigns responsibility to administrators for

selecting values and expressing those values. Selznickalso offers the idea of critical and routine decisionmaking, where critical decisions, among other things,have thepotential to embrace new organization values.For many current institutionalists concerned withadministrative organizations, Leadership inAdministration stands as the venture point for theirwork.

Later, in The Moral Commonwealth (1992),Selznick offers a cautionary note aboutinstitutionalization. The instrumental nature of theinitial formal structure is an important first step forinstitutionalization as is the informal organizationalelements that arise. The cautionary note is thatinstitutionalization fixes the informal elements withparticular value. It invests the informal capital of socialinteractiontoparticular ends. Internally, thismay serveto build a shared culture and externallymay serve tobuild the organization's values into the surroundingenvironment.While this embeddedness may serve theorganization well, Selznick cautions that the test ofinstitutionalization isexpendability. Because institutionsare not expendable, institutionalization constrains aswell as enables. New to this argument in theMoralCommonwealth is a suggestion that the variations ininfusionboth in and over timemay lead to a pluralityof values embedded in the institution.When thishappens Selznick suggests thattheorganization thathasbecome an institution becomes a communityorganization

? institution community (Selznick,1992, p. 238). Institutions necessarily become, toparaphrase, creatures of theirown history.

Berger and Luckmann inherit the work ofMead, Cooley, Schutz, and others in SocialConstruction of Reality (1967). The central notion isthat repeated interactions over time create sharedgestureswhich become symbolic by capturingmeaningand become reified, object like. Here is a process forthe crystallization of meaning, for the production ofsocial facts at the level of individual interaction.Working in the same era, Goffman offers a complexinterpretivemodel inPresentation of Self inEverydayLife (1959). The cognitive requirements of thismodelhave been a point of criticism like the cognitiverequirements of rational choice in economics. However,in rame Analysis (1974), Goffman offersan intriguingrecipe for institutional effects that is not well reflectedin current institutional theories.While a psychologicalaccount, frame analysis structures interpretation byplacement. The social context draws up an interpretiveframe which is then used as the basis for producingscripted behavior.

36



8/12

An alternative institutional model based incognitive theory is the work of Herbert Simon(1945/1957) and theCarnegie school. While focused ondecision processes, Simon introduced importantconcepts like bounded rationality,programmed and nonprogrammed decisions, and satisficing. Simon offers amicro model of intentionally rational behavior that isconstrained by the organization and the actors role,much like institutional economics. The actor isneitherthe passive outcome of a social machine nor anautonomous rational actor. Organizational action isdependent on individual behavior thatmight appearmore or less rational depending on the flows ofinformation, alternatives, decision opportunities, andrules that the actor faced.

Most recently,Meyer andRowan (1977) havedeveloped theories concerning the nature of culturalelements that become fixed in the process ofinstitutionalization.Meyer and Rowan argue thatgoalorientation and reward structures are not necessary toperpetuate action because, once institutionalized, socialprocesses take on a rule like status.Even further, heybecome fact like in character. The processes arefollowed simply because that is how they are done.Zucker (1977) suggests that institutionalized action isdependent on a context and formal organizations aresettingsprone to institutionalization.For bothMeyer &Rowan and Zucker organizations are not only technicaland instrumental but symbolic and interpretive nd arepart of a largerwhole. DiMaggio and Powell (1983)identifythree alternative mechanisms for transmittinginstitutional effects coercive, mimetic, and normative.These institutionalists focus on the effects amongorganizations at the set, field, or population level.Here, institutionsare not alone in theirhistory but areshaped in part by a larger system of institutions.DiMaggio and Powell offer an institutionalexplanationon a large scale of analysis and raise a question aboutthe efficacy of institutionalization.

The rich tapestry of institutional thoughtevidenced above cries out for a synthesis.How do weorganize what we know? What can we agree on assettled?What formulations have themost promise? Forwhat purposes? What directions are evident? Whatdomains deserve attention?

SUMMARIES OF INSTITUTIONAL THOUGHTAs a result of the bloom of recent institutionalresearch and the revival in institutional thought (i.e.,reprinting of Leadership in Administration), several

theorists have taken on a task similar to the onesuggested for thispaper. This section considers severalrecent reviews of institutional thought as a way tosurface those ideas and evidence that seemwell foundedand those areas which are ripe formore attention. In1991,DiMaggio and Powell edited thevolume TheNewInstitutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Theirintroduction is one such summative piece. Also in thatvolume is a paper by Ronald Jeppersonwhich attemptsto refine institutional theory.W. Richard Scott, inInstitutions and Organizations, does a similar reviewand then turnshis hand to a new analytic formulation.While other and earlier summaries exist (Pfeffer, 1982),these summaries draw conclusions which are worthattention in this paper because they raise questionswhich should direct additional theory formulation,research, and practice.

JeppersonIn a review similar to this paper, Jepperson(1991) offersthese summary thoughtsabout institutions.Institutionalization is a relative property requiringidentification of a context, a context rich in dimensions.Institutions are necessarily embedded in society andtherefore the unit of analysis is problematic. Thisfeature suggests an institutional identity crisis if thesymbolic meaning fixed in the institution is differentformultiple overlapping contexts.Jepperson .also suggests that institutionalresearch allows identification of three carriers ofinstitutionalization: formal organizations, regimes, andcultures. Regimes refer to a codification of rules in acentral authority system without the apparatus offormal organization. Culture carries rules that arecustomary or conventional in character. Jeppersonsuggests, but does not extend, an analysis of institutionson the basis of one or more of these carriers. Some

institutions,he suggests,might be transmittedbymorethan one carrier.Jepperson explores the nature of institutionaltheoriesby arrayingorganization theories in a two-foldtablewhere one axis is the degree towhich the unit issocially constructed (high or low) and theother axis isthe level of analysis (individual or structural).Institutional theories are characterized by a high degreeof social construction and a structural level of analysis.This apparent contradiction reflects the probleminstitutionalists have in micro translation, that is,moving from the structural level to the individual levelof analysis.

37



9/12

DiMaggio and PowellNew institutional theories have accommodated

the cognitive revolution and researchers have focusedon the processes of legitimation and reproduction.However, DiMaggio and Powell suggest that newinstitutionalismhas yet to take head on questions ofchange, power, and organizational efficiency. Theysuggest that if institutions fix meaning, then classicquestions of change, power, and efficiency in societyshould be informedby institutional theories. Institutionsshould structurepower and create conflict on the basisof generated interests.Similarly,while theemphasis hasbeen on the stabilizing nature of institutions, thequestion remains: How does high institutionalizationrelate to environmental turbulence? Institutionalizationshould provide another dimensions on whichorganizations can be better or worse than those aroundthem. These questions go not only to thenature of bestpractice but to furthering ur understanding about howinstitutions interact.

TABLE IScott's Three Pillars of Institutions: Varying Emphases

Regulative Normative CognitiveBasis of compliance Expedience Social obligation Taken for grantedMechanisms Coercive Normative MimeticLogic Instrumentality Appropriateness OrthodoxyIndicators Rules, laws, sanctions Certification,

accreditationPrevalence, isomorphism

Basis of legitimacy Legally sanctioned Morally governed Culturally supported,conceptually correctSource: Scott, 1995, p. 35.

While the nature of each pillar is ratherevident, the nature of pillars is not. Each pillarrepresents a consolidation of assumptions, orientation,and argumentation which can be found in the largerliterature. Pillars are faces of an institution.According to Scott, ratherthanbeing an organic theoryof institutions, themodel explicates analytic differencesamong theories. This moves the project toward anexplanation of how we think about institutions? aworthy enterprise ? but away from a model of

W. Richard ScottAfter the historic review of institutional

thoughtwhich is referred to throughout thispaper,W.Richard Scott (1995) takes up the problem ofsummarizing the domain. He offers a model ofinstitutionsthathas three dimensions.Institutions consist of cognitive,normative, and regulative structuresand activities that provide stabilityandmeaning tobehavior. Institutionsare transported by various carriers ?cultures, structures and routines ?and theyoperate atmultiple levels ofjurisdiction (Scott, 1995, p. 33).

This synthetic model encompasses the work ofDiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Jepperson (1991).Scott's contribution is to organize institutional thoughtacross three pillars of institutionalemphases. His tableis reproduced below.

institutions.The typology yields important insights asScott claims. First, in institutional thought, a theory ofpractical action remains as much a matter of ontologyas amatter of findings. Second, thebroad categories ofregulative, normative, and cognitive are useful inorganizing current theorizing.

Scott goes on to explore carriers ofinstitutionalization following Jepperson (1991) andusing his threepillars. Cultures, social structures,and

38



10/12

routines can carry institutionalizedmeaning. That is,meanings are embedded invarious carriers. Culture androutine are conventionally drawn, but Scott narrowssocial structure to mean role systems. Scott's andJepperson's use of carriers ismuch like Giddens's(1984) theory of structurationwhich Scott cites. ForGiddens, structuration is thepatterningof interaction insociety. His theory of structuration depends on adualism where structure is both an outcome of socialaction and the platform for the pattern of the nextaction. Carriers imply a similar dualism. Finally, Scottreviews theway institutional thought has attended todifferent levels of analysis. Interestingly, Scott treatslevels of analysis fromworld systems to organizationalsubsets but does not penetrate the micro translationbarrier. While Scott seeks to organize theory at thelarger levels of analysis, he does not make a similarattempt with the individual level as do theories likethose offered by Goffinan (1959) or Berger andLuckmann (1967).

Scott summarizes new directions forinstitutional research with greatest potential forcontributing to our understanding. He suggests a needto develop a better understanding of the life course ofinstitutions, a need to bridge between institutional andorganizational processes, and a need to do comparativestudies. Scott's list of next steps suggest thatmoreattention to larger rather than smaller levels of analysisis appropriate and that organizations are the primarysubject of institutional theory.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONJepperson, DiMaggio and Powell, and Scottserve us well in summarizing the current state ofinstitutional thought, particularly as it relates toorganizations. They suggest thatwe can take as settledthe cognitive nature of institutionsbut, by doing so,raise questions about cognitive processes. They suggestthatthe taken forgranted nature of institutionalized acts

provides an alternative to theproblem of action but, bydoing so, raise the question of a practical theory ofaction. The cross cutting suggestions to attend toinstitutions as a contextual problem, to themeans oftransmission, to the effects of different institutionaltypes, to problems of power, change, and competitionarewell taken as incremental steps in thecurrent line ofresearch. However, these suggestions do not spur thefield to address several essential questions. Oneremaining question is themicro-translation problemdefined here as theorizing about the interrelationshipofindividuals to institutionsboth as they cause and are

shaped by institutionalization. If social construction isthepathway to institutionalization and to institutionaleffects, thenmore robust theorizingmust occur in thisarea. The theorizingmust take into account what weknow of individual behavior and institutions. It isappropriate tounderscore the call tomove institutionaltheorizing beyond organizations. While the summariesoffered above are self defined as looking at theinstitutional process in organizations, the nature ofinstitutionalization suggests that a wider scope ofsociety is the appropriate subject for the study ofinstitutionaleffects.What practical suggestions can beoffered to a citymayor or the administrator of awaterdistrict?Finally, with the flight rom hot theories likeSelznick's toward cooler cognitive theories likeZucker, Meyer andRowen, andDiMaggio and Powell,institutionalist lose sight of a powerful contributioninstitutional theory has made: the proposition thatinstitutionsstructuresocial life. This can be asked as aquestion: Is institutionalizationa necessary structurationprocess in postmodern society? I suggest it is, and,while this paper will not argue the proposition, it isappropriate to ask why the claim should be explored.

The proposition that institutionalization is anecessary structurationprocess in postmodern societyreflectsa practical concern of improving administrativepractice. To returnwhere we began with the acequia orthe governance of Missoula, there is evidence thatpublic service is, at the same time,both constrained andenabled by the condition of institutions.MayordomoandCommunity and the olitics ofPlace are interestingin that both works are authored by practicingadministrators: Crawford asMayordomo of the acequiaandKemmis asMayor ofMissoula. Each writes a bookthat is a result of the author reflecting on theinstitutional nature of his practice. These are, on theone hand, accounts of how to administer and, on theother hand, accounts of institutions thatmake theiradministrationpossible. Each account recalls theclassicinterest in public administration to improveeffectiveness and efficiency indelivering public policyoutcomes. Each account responds to the concordance ofvoices regarding the declining legitimacy ofgovernment. Yet, each account raises a host ofquestions amenable to institutionalanalysis, like socialscale and social capacity. Is the basic problem one ofscale? Is the city the best place for deciding socialpolicy because the effects of such policy decisionscoalesce in the city? Ifwe returnwelfare policy to thestates,will our ability to address problems improve?Will solving such problems increase legitimacy ofgovernment? If so, what is it about education thatsuggests elevation from local districts to states is a good

39



11/12

thing? Perhaps social policy like water policy is aquestion of social capacity. If so, is theboundary of theappropriate governing unit for various types of publicpolicy as clear as the acequia or as problematic asMissoula? How much has todo with the single purposenature of the acequia or themulti-faceted roles of a citylikeMissoula? How much has towith the condition ofthe institutions that tidily locate the problems andsolutions of irrigationwater distribution to the scale ofthe acequia and not-so-tidily locate the problems andsolutions of welfare or education to other social scales?Each account can be read as a case for consideringinstitutions s a variable, independent and dependent, orrecursive in thematrix of administrative action.

Both Crawford and Kemmis make evident thegrowing self awareness of central administrative actorsof their actions as being related to particular

institutions.Both Crawford and Kemmis demonstratetheir awareness of the values embedded in existinginstitutions and the need for their institutions toembrace new values. Each account, by thenature of theaccount, provides evidence of the unique perspectiveadministrators have of the institutions ofwhich theyarea part. Each account focuses attention on the fabric ofculture, tradition,rules of the game, and norms and onthe institutional loom on which the fabric iswoven.Crawford and Kemmis offer evidence that institutionsare importantstructuration rocesses inpostmodern life.If theyare correct, if theproposition has merit, then theconstruction and maintenance of institutions, theirdeconstruction and reconstruction is the most criticalactivity in a postmodern world. And publicadministrators will be among those who must attend toinstitutions, nstitutionalization,and institutional effects.

REFERENCESBellah, Robert N., Madsen, Richard, Sullivan, WilliamM., Swindler, Ann, & Tipton, Steven M.

(1985). Habits of the eart: Individualism andCommitment inAmerican Life. Berkeley, CA:University of California Press.

Berger, Peter L & Luckmann, Thomas. (1967). TheSocial Construction of Reality. New York,NY: Doubleday Anchor.Bromley, Daniel W. (1989). Economic Interests andInstitutions. New York, NY: Basil Blackwell.

Buchanan, James& Tullock, Gordon. (1962). The Calculus ofConsent. Ann Arbor, MI: UniversityofMichigan Press.Coase, Ronald H. (1937). The Nature of The Firm.Economica, 16, pp. 386-405.Commons, JohnR. (1950/1970). The Economics ofCollective Action. Madison, WI: University ofWisconsin Press.

(1924). The Legal Foundations of Capitalism.New York, NY: Macmillan.

Cooley, Charles H. (1902/1956). Human Nature and theSocial Order. New York, NY: Scribner's.Crawford, Stanley. (1988). Mayordomo: Chronicle onan Acequia in Northern New Mexico.

Albuquerque, NM: University ofNew MexicoPress.

Dahl, Robert A. (1961). Who Governs? New Haven,CT: Yale University Press.

DiMaggio, Paul J.& Powell, Walter. (1983). The ironcage revisited: Institutional isomorphism andcollective rationality in organization fields.American Sociological Review 48, pp. 147160.Douglas, Mary. (1986). How Institutions Think. NewYork, NY: Syracuse University Press.D?rkheim, Emile. (1912/1961). The Elementary Formsof Religious Life. New York, NY: Collier._. (1893/1949). The Division ofLabor inSociety.Glencoe, IL: Free Press.Giddens, Anthony. (1984). The Constitution ofSociety.Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.Goffman, Erving. (1974). Frame Analysis: An Essay oftheOrganization of Experience. New York,NY: Harper Colophon._. (1959). Presentations of Self inEveryday Life.Garden City, NJ: Anchor.Jepperson,Ronald L. (1991). Institutions, Institutional

Effects, and Institutionalism. InW. Powell andP. DiMaggio (Eds.), TheNew Institutionalismin Organizational Analysis, pp 143-163.Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Kaufman, Herbert. (1957). The Forest Ranger. Baltimore, MD: Resources for theFuture and JohnHopkins Press.Kemmis, Daniel. (1990). Community and the olitics ofPlace. Norman, OK: University ofOklahomaPress.

40



12/12

Kingdon, J.W. (1984). Agendas, Alternative, and PublicPolicies. Boston, MA: Little Brown.Lappe, Frances Moore & DuBois, P.M. (1994). TheQuickening of America: Rebuilding OurNation, Remaking Our Lives. San Francisco,

CA: Jossey-Bass.Lasswell, Harold. (1936). Politics: Who Gets What,When, How? New York, NY: WhittleseyHouse.

Lindblom, Charles E. (1959.) The science ofmuddlingthrough.Public AdministrationReview, 19,7988.

March, JamesG. & Olsen, Johan P. (1989). Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis ofPolitics. New York, NY: Free Press._. (1976). Ambiguity and Choice inOrganizations.

Bergen, Norway: Universitetsforlaget.Mead, George Herbert. (1934). Mind, Self and Society.Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Meyer, JohnW. & Rowan, Brian. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structures andmyth and ceremony. American Journal ofSociology, 83, 340-363.Meyer, JohnW. & Scott,W. Richard (Eds.). (1983).Organizational Environments: Ritual andRationality. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.Osborne, David & Gaebler, Ted. (1992). ReinventingGovernment. Reading, MA: Plume/AddisonWesley.Ouchi, William G. (1980). Markets, bureaucracies andclans. Administrative Science Quarterly, 25,pp. 129-141.Paluchowski, Thaddeus, Shinn, C, & Stevens, C.(1989). The Spiral of Theory Development:Reconciling Theory as Object and Theory asTool. Western Academy of ManagementProceedings.Pfeffer, Jeffrey. (1982). Organizations andOrganization Theory. Boston, MA: Pitman.

Powell, Walter W. & DiMaggio, Paul J. (Eds.). (1991).The New Institutionalism in OrganizationalAnalysis. Chicago, IL: University of ChicagoPress.

Putnam, Robert D. (1995, December). Tuning in,Tuning out: The strange disappearance ofsocial capital in America. Political Scienceand Politics, pp. 664-683.Rivlin, Alice M. (1992). Reviving theAmerican Dream:The Economy, the States, and the FederalGovernment. Washington, DC: BrookingsInstitutions.

Scott,W. Richard. (1995). Institutions and Organizations.Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.Selznick, Philip. (1992). The Moral Commonwealth.Berkeley, CA: University of California Press._. (1957). Leadership inAdministration. NewYork, NY: Harper & Row._. (1949). TVA and theGrass Roots. Berkeley,CA: University of California Press.Simon, Herbert. (1945/1957). Administrative Behavior.New York, NY: Macmillian.Vehlen, Thorstein. B. (1909). The Limitations ofMar

ginal Utility. Journal of Political Economy,17, pp. 235-245.Weber, Max. (1924/1968). Economy and Society (3volumes). Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich(Eds.). Totowa, NJ: Bedminister.Williamson, Oliver E. (1981). The economics of organizations: The transaction cost approach.American Journal of Sociology, 87, pp. 548577.

_. (1975). Markets and Hierarchies. New York,NY: Free Press.Zucker, Lynne G. (1977). The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence. American

Sociological Review, 42, pp. 726-743.

Craig W. Shinn isAssistant Professor of Public Administration at Portland State University where he teachesadministrative theoryand natural resource policy. He is co-author ofRural Resource Management (1994) with SandraMiller andWilliam R. Bentley. His currentresearch focuses on community based natural resourcemanagement usingamodel of civic capacity and on institutionalarrangements formanaging environmental and natural resource policiesacross jurisdictional boundaries.

41

Date post:	09-Feb-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	santiagoacosta1
View:	215 times
Download:	0 times

Shinn, Craig - Taking Stock of Institutional Thought

Documents