Side Channel Watermark

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Side-Channel Based Watermarks for Intellectual

Property Cores


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OVERVIEW

INTRODUCTION: IP CORES

WATERMARKING FOR IP PROTECTION

SPREAD SPECTRUM BASED WATERMARK

INPUT MODULATED WATERMARK

PROOF OF OWNERSHIP

ATTACKS

CONCLUSION

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INTRODUCTION : INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY(IP) CORES

Hardware design process is time consuming andexpensive

IP cores: Ready-to-use hardware functional blocks

which can be used in many designsIncreased re-use of previous implementations

Parts of the development bought from another

party 3


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IP CORE BUSINESS MODEL

IP core developers and licensors range in size from

individuals to multi-billion dollar corporations.

By licensing a design multiple times IP core licensor

spread the cost of development among multiple

chip makers.

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CIRCUITDESIGNER

IP COREPROVIDER

END USER


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MOTIVATION: IP CORES + SECURITY?

IP protection a major concern in todays industries

Threats include- cloned products- copyright infringement

Designers implement counter measures into products

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WATERMARKING FOR IP

PROTECTION

Goals of IP watermarking:

1. Detectability: The owner can detect whether or not hisdesign is used in an IC.

2. Proof of ownership: The owner can prove towards athird party that his design was used in an IC.

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A SIDE-CHANNEL BASED WATERMARK

Main idea of a side-channel based watermark:

side-channels can include instantaneous power

consumption, em leakage,etc

An artificial side-channel inserted into the IP core This side-channel leaks out a unique ID

IP owner can check ICs for their unique ID

IP owner can prove copyright violations

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DESIGN APPROACH

Two different design approaches:

1. A spread spectrum basedwatermark

2. An input-modulated watermark

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SPREAD SPECTRUM BASED WATERMARKS

Two Components that are added to the IP core:

1. A PRNG that generates a pseudo-random bit sequence

2. A Leakage Circuit (LC) that is attached to the PRNGand that leaks out the bitstream

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DETECTING A SPREAD SPECTRUM BASED WATERMARK

1) Measure a single long power trace of the targeted device

2) From this power trace derive exactly one power-value for each of

the measured clock cycles. (e.g. by averaging the points of one

clock cycle)

3) Simulate the expected watermarking bit stream B=b1,,bn

4) Generate different Hypotheses Hi by shifting the bit stream

B:H1=b1,,bn

H2=b2,,bn,b1

5) Correlate the Hypotheses Hi with the power-values P=p1,,pn

6) If the bit stream generates a significant correlation peak, the

watermark is embedded in the targeted device.

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ADVANTAGES OF SPREAD SPECTRUM APPROACH

Spread spectrum modulation increases thebandwidth of the transmitted signal.

The watermark remains hidden in the noise floor

of the power side channel.

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DESIGN APPROACH

Two different design approaches:

1. A spread spectrum basedwatermark

2. An input-modulatedwatermark

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131313

Leakage circuit

Combination function

The Watermarking Logic

Known

-inputbits

INPUT-MODULATEDWATERMARK

Result: Side-channel leakage that depends on

the combination function and the known-input bits.


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INPUT-MODULATED WATERMARK

Known-input bits: Some kind of known input to theIP core that has different values for differentmeasurements. The known inputs represent somestate of the IC.

A combination function: A combination functionthat maps the known-input bits and the secret bits

to one output bit.

A leakage circuit: The leakage circuit is attachedto the output of the combination function.

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DETECTING AN INPUT-MODULATED WATERMARK

Perform a differential side-channel analysis

The correct combination function should generatea significant correlation peak

An attacker has no knowledge of thecombinational function used and the varying inputs.

hence robust

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Proof of ownership witha Spread Spectrum based Watermark

LeakageGenerating

Circuit

X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 X11 X12 X13 X14 X15 X16

S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8

Store the signature in a circularshift registerXOR the shift register with theoutput of the PRNG

Leak this sequence out using theLeakage Generating Circuit


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PROOF OF OWNERSHIP

WITH AN INPUT MODULATED WATERMARK

1. Store the signature in internal registers

2. Subsequently feed the Signature asinput to the combination function

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RESISTANCE TO ATTACKS

Remove or destroy the logic that implementsthe watermark

-Reverse-engineering needed

-The watermarking logic can consist of

only a few hundred gates (difficult to locate inlarge ICs)

-Raise the noise of the side-channel

-Only decreases the signal to noise ratio

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CONCLUSION

Two new watermarking schemesfor IP cores

Can be detected at the

hardware level and is very robust

Constructive use of sidechannels

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REFERENCES

[1] Side-channel attack standard evaluation board(sasebo). Further information are available viahttp://www.rcis.aist.go.jp/special/SASEBO/ index-en.html.

[2] A. T. Abdel-Hamid, S. Tahar, and E. M. Aboulhamid. IPWatermarking Techniques: Survey and Comparison. In

System-on-Chip for Real-TimeApplications - IWSOC 2003, page 60. IEEE ComputerSociety, 2003.

[3] I. J. Cox, J. Kilian, F. T. Leighton, and T. Shamoon.Secure Spread

Spectrum Watermarking for Multimedia. IEEE Transactionson Image Processing, 6(12):16731687, 1997.

[4] J. Guajardo, T. Guneysu, S. S. Kumar, and C. Paar.Secure IP-Block Distribution for Hardware Devices. InHardware-Oriented Security and Trust - HOST 2009, pages

8289. IEEE Computer Society, 2009. 21


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[5] A. B. Kahng, D. Kirovski, S. Mantik, M. Potkonjak, and J. L.

Wong.Copy Detection for Intellectual Property Protection of VLSIDesigns.In International Conference on Computer-Aided Design -ICCAD 99,pages 600605. IEEE, 1999.

[6] A. B. Kahng, J. Lach, W. H. Mangione-Smith, S. Mantik, I. L.Markov,M. Potkonjak, P. Tucker, H. Wang, and G. Wolfe.WatermarkingTechniques for Intellectual Property Protection. In DesignAutomationConference - DAC 98, pages 776781. ACM, 1998.

[7] T. Kean, D. McLaren, and C. Marsh. Verifying theauthenticity of chip

designs with the designtag system. In Hardware-OrientedSecurity and 22

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