SIGINT Applications in U.S. Air Operations Part 1: Collecting the Enemy's Signals

7/29/2019 SIGINT Applications in U.S. Air Operations Part 1: Collecting the Enemy's Signals

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'fOP SECRET ?IOFO:Ri>'t

SOUTHEAST AS,SIGINT APPLICATIONSU. S. AIR OPERATIO

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, C R Y P i O L O G I C SCHOOLTl4lNAtiON,...

DIGTRillUTlOtl NOTE:di t r i bution ofl- \le c"n stil-l- mal


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T8F JEdl I UMBRA

SECURITY NOTICEAlrhough the information contained in


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)

,-ep SiER

ForewordCryprologic operations in support of U.S. Air Force

during the Kortan Wa r provided the es5tntial bast from wrelated SIG IN T systems employed in Southeas< A..ia indeveloped. U.S. Air Force commanden in Korea ltarntd toapplication of SIGINT in their operations. A; they didanalysts for the first time worked in the air operalions ceselves to assiSt in the application of SIGINT

U.S. Air Force and U.S. Naval Air commanders in Sourecalling the KOr


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USAF

....Preface

In preparing this initial volume on SIGINT applicatA s i ~ n air operations, he wriren used a wide variety ofNotewonhy among these were the unit historie5 of AService's Pacific Region, documentary matenals fromGroup; operational message files, including' a major oMr. Delmar Lang of NSA; drafts prepared by Mr. JaB3, before he departed NSA; the technical reports oflibrary; and interviews.

The Writers are inddxed to many persons for ass..inaDi!!:o_ ;n nn P fntm._

(Ofteen


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T8F J

CONTENTSChapterI. THE SETTING

U.S. Forces .U.S. Air Operations Over North VietnamReconnaissance ProgramsSAC ReconnaissanceTarucal R e c o n n a i s s a n c ~

II. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR DEFENSESYSTEM ..The NV N Air Surveillance NetworkSAM's and AMNorth Vietnam's Tactical Air Force

III. GROUND AND SURFACE COLLECTIONAdjustments an che Crypcologic OrganizationAFSS Ground Collection

Thailand OperationsNaval Security Group Surface.C o l ~ . e - c t -. . . .Ground Collection of North V i e t n ~

Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 1

IV. AIRBORNE COLLECTIONAir F o r e ~ Platforms

C-130 ProgramRC -m : e c : ~ " " " U C C pJarfgcrnl

NaJ P l a t l o r m ~ . _IManagement Complexity' LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

INDEX

g p 51


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CHAPTER IThe Setting

T8P 5EIJ

Th e air war over North Vietnam, in one sense, rconvtntional contest of arms benveen American and commwith most U.S. aircraft and crew losses resulting f rom Northusc of AAA. While the air war unfold


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101 SEERIJI UtuiLR:C OPERATIONSSJGINT APPLICATIONS IN U.S AIR2 . A Wing (MAW) at Da Nang and Chuof Tonkin; and the lst Manne ar h U S air mission against NorthLai. South Vittnam, c o : d u c t ~ ~ - . ~ P a ~ i l i c (CINCPAC). gave 7thVietnam. The Comman e r - t ~ - f '. o rations over North Vietnam.Air Force coordination au[honty or aar (Tan Son Nhut for coorand the 7th Flett kept a liaison offictr on duty ~ e t n a m (MACV). notNs.stance Cornman , t . A.dination. Military I Air Force the strikes of 1st Manne trPACOM. conrrolltd through 7th. tdiately north of the DMZ.Wing which centered on the area smmAir Force

. Air Force had six tactical fighter wings, t ~ r e eIn South Vtctnam: 7th ctical reconnaissance wing, and varaousspecial operations wmgs. one fl rimarily the f-\OOD's, andsupport elements. The fighter wmgs ~ a t i o n s wings flew a wideF-4's (modifications C to E); the s ~ ~ - AC-lt9G. A-I. C-123assortment of aircraft. mdudmg the

T6 P DEe11ET ~ h l B l \ : t

rg p SFTHE SETTINGand others which wero adapred for ground supportreconnaissanct wings fltw the R B - ~ 7 E . RF-4C, RF-101Se-venth Air Force wings o ~ r a t e d from a i r f i ~ l d s at Bien HBay, Da Nang, Phan Rang. Phu Cat, Pleiku, Tan Son Nand other locations. Th t Republic of Vietnam Air Force headquarters at Tan Son Nhur, operartd from many of thtwith n u m ~ r e d wings at Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhur, D

1 Trang, and Binh Thuy. The South Vietnamese Air F o rsquadrons of A- I proptller-driven SKY RAIDERS, threeA-37 subsonic attack jets, and one S4:1Uadron o f F - ~fighters. These forces participated from time to time w~ l ~ m ~ n t s in strikes over North Vietnam.

In Thailand, 7th and 13th Air Forcts had number


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!8 P 911!ftliir PtSII'SIGINT APPLICATIONS IN U.S. AIR OPERATIONS

flew E ~ ' s from Taldili aDd EC-47's &om Na Khan Plwwm. Scoeralr.aiaii'ICIIGIIAiSIInce 1qllldroas at Uclorn flew RF-4's.Stnqic Air Command (SAC) also dcploytd uniu for aperatiau inSouchast Asia. Prom Kadena Air Bale, Okinawa, U TaJ*> Air lluc,Thailand, mel J\nclmen Air lluc, Guam, SAC lauacha:I.B-52 milsiaosapinst targetS in South Viemam and aiCJCII the infiltration corridor inLaos. SAC also coaducM


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toE seellET P"BR eSIGINT APPLICATIONS IN U.S. AIR OPERATIONS

CRUSADER. Other aircraft such as the E-2A HAWKEYE with itsspecial radar served as early warning plarforms for the fleer. Still otherssuch as the RF-SG CRUSADER and R A - ~ C VIGILANTE carried outreconnaissance missions employing various sensors.

The first Marine Ai r Wing, under the 3rd Marine AmphibiousForce, had rnajor units ac Da Nang and Chu Lai, with other forcrs atMarble Mountain (ncar Da Nang). Phu Bai, and Dong Ha primarily forgrouod support. The major unirs, Marine Air Group (MAG) ll at DaNang and MAG's 12 aod 13 at Chu Lai, in addition to supportingground units in South Vietnam, also flew missions over Route PackageI in North Vietnam (see illustration. p. 8). Their missions were. for themost pan, responsive to MACV strike objectives and were thus distinctfrom both Navy and Air Force operations over the North.

M A G -l l at Da Nang flew A- 6 INTRUDER"s and F- 4PHANTOM fighter-bomber aircraft. Its Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadr on One (VMCJ-l) flew reconnaissance and electronicwarfare versions of these aircraft, RF-4B's and EA-6A'.s. MAG-12flew A- 4 SKY HAWKs and MAG-13. F-4"s from the air base at ChuLai.

U.S. Air Operations Over North Vietn4mBefore the Gulf of Tonkin incidents in 1964, American air operations

consisted only of reconnaissance missions in th t Lamian-NonhVietnamese border area. The diminutive South V i e t n a m ~ Air Force(VNAF). under Air Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky. flew A-IE propellerdriven aircraft from Da Nang with the help and guidance of Americanadvisors, but established rules of engagement at that stage prohibiteddirect action by U.S. advisors unless provoked by the enemy. The Uruted

S t a t ~ launched its first air suikes against North Vittnam on Auguu1964 in retaliation for the Nonh Vietnamese PT boat attacks on theU.S. desuoyers MQddox and C Tumer Joy in the Gulf of Tonkin. In An air urikc is an attack on $pccific targets by fighter, bomber or anack aircraft on anoffensive min1on and may COCI$1$1 of loCvcral air orgamzations under a single command HIrhc au A sonic is "an opcrauonal flight by one aircraft .. This diffrrs from a min1onwhch ~ ~ " t h e dtsparchmg of one or more aircraft m accompl1sh one parucular lask."(jomt Chiefl o( Scaff. Dictia,.ry of Umt1d 511111.1 Milir.ry TnmJ for Joinl UJK'Washmgton, D C.C.S Government Pnnring Office. l January l968l'P8P SEflRE+ ' t ' iili '

THE SETTING 1Oi [this Initial a1r o ~ r a t i o nbased pilors flew so . named PIERCE ARROW, U.S. and suppon bases. rues against :-..;orth VIetnamese PT

Followtng PIERCE ARROWattacks agamn the norch unnl F ~ b c h e L S da not undertaattacks on us. faciht.Jes then c uar\ ( 965 In reactionPresldem duected th akmg p l a . c ~ !n Sourhe exccuuon of )CSt '. aurhortzmg Admtral Shar to ' pl>n railed FLAM--" flAMING DART p c.1rrv uu( r e t . 1 h < ~ t o r v srnoperauons conducted 8 d fL'.S ptlots from the atta k un an II eNorrh VJecnamese A cb earners C ~ a l S e t ~ lnd Hcmcoc.lermy arracks and f lNor(h Vietnamese panhandle. port 3CJ me 5 Jr Don

Before the end of Februar 1965 ..Washington prepart'd a plan s . )CS J.nd (..'lvihanVetnam called ROLLING TH ystem,:mc .ur unkes af . UNDER a ...,0 parr o a1r strikes against preselect d J _ . prograreconnais.sance against both fi ed CS-Jes..gnated targetsh lxe and m o v 1 n ~ targets Tht e program were to make tt as difficult as -. . e'.oncinue support of comm . c . possible tor .'lorrhURIS[ tOrces In South y nmcreasmgly severe p e n a l t i ~ s on the nonh fi Let.n.Jm a forces. or concmumg sup

Th e firsr ROLLING THUNDERstrikeJ similar to FLAMING DART boperauons ~ e r e to bt. ut a 'oup d e1a1 m S a .c o n s e q u ~ m alert Status of the Republic of vcancellation of this 1 ltTnarn Air ForcTHVNDER 5 pan. The_ first actual strtkr was. ft a one-day operatton mvolving I ll L.S. and.arcra , on 2 March 1965, against a North Viernam .a port complex. ROLLING THUNDER 6 esr '"PP' Progr ed . . came on l-1 MJ . l m o s : ~ m l aJr s t r i k ~ s a g a m ~ t North Vietnam then conun

R O L L I N ~ y ~ ~ ~ ~ ; ~ havmg a distinctive number. Ae.g., barracks su miSSion r ~ f e r r e d co a speafit: class'J II pply areas. communtcanom. radar sites. or poorrna v CINCPAC d d Sraff. and 'e,;her th ,. rethcompmen e th(' mmion co rhe Jomr---- e. or e res1dem aurhonzed exerunnn.;cs defines .zrmed r e c o n m ~ i m m c e as. ~ n d auadung largeu of opponunnv a m ~ s i u n with ptlm:w. purposJr,efed targeu.' and not for :he p u r p o ~ c 0f .uuck

TBP Sft1!1


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t9 P &E,Iii I:JIIRA*SIGINT APPLICATIONS IN U.S. AIR OPERATIONS

Aftu me beginning of ROlliNG THUNDER, lh_e U.S. commandscoach.cml air strikes only in areas daipotcd speafically.forPACFLT, PACAF, and MACV assumed respwibillry for ~ ~ n k t s wtchiathe various distr im of North Vietnam. or "''"" packages as they werecalled.

T I U I L . \ ~ D

IOUTf PACUGE AIEAS

.J:QP EEt:Riif HIIBitll

DOD

iDTH PARAlLELE!fECTIYE! APRIL 1,_8

i!TH I " A R A L L E ~EFFEC'!IVElAPI\!1. 1m

...,er SftTHE SETTING

Originally, each service had rhrtt route package areas ftime. rhtn roratcd rtSJIOIIIibility for those areos with the DIn order 10 all"" !he pi1o


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lOP SECK I G!OIBRH10 S!GINT APPLICATIONS IN US AIR OPERATIONS

USMC Aircraft in SEAR e c o m u z i u ~ m c e Programs

Under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and its Joint Reconn a i s . ~ a n c c Center OCS/JRC) in Washington, the Strategic Air Commandhad responsibllity for strategi


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IOf XCR:R WI I l l12 SIGINT APPLICATIONS IN U.S. AIR OPERATIONS

LOCATING EMITTERS THROUGH AIRBORNE OJRECTION FINDINGUsing reaivers for ELINT signals spooning . I

r J r e qu e n c y range, servia. ELINT operators collected radar, mimle"g.;;Ta'nce, navigational (beacon) and odter non-communications signals.

Of primary importance in the air war tere, of course. theelenromognetic rodiatioru of the enemy"s rodar sets which comprisedupwards of90 percent of the sisnals recorded.

Since most rodar signals of inltresc were in the very high frequencyrange and inrercqn depended largely on being within line of sight ol theemitting radars, U.S. EL!NT operators on ai_rborno platforms col_lectedthese signals. While intercepting the signals, ihe airborne operators alsowere able to 10ke succeuive direction finding bearings along a baseline-the porh taken by the a i r c r a f t ~ t o fi1< the relative positions of therodars (see illusttation above). -.) (1 ilO I ll!CI:ET di4Bih USAF

TQP &ETHESEmNG

Operators and analySIS ponicipotiag in ELINT collec~ o r ~ l y p r ~ s r d the signals immtdiately for iaformati011on operations . They planed the signals, reood out rhe aud

SII!nals, exammed the film which photographically recordisplays to meuure pulse ralt frequtncy (PRF) and orher cof the _ s i g n ~ ! for i d ~ n t i f i c a t i o n of rhe emitter by type. Tthe deriVed mformanon woth that p


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Ior SElkE I UMBRA\4 SIGINT APPLICATIONS IN C S. AIR OPERATIONS

SAC e c o r m a i s s t ~ n c e

In Southea5t Asia. SAC flew U-2's, drones. RB-47's, RC-l3Ys. andthe SR-71 on photo reconnaissance and SIGINT missions. As the JCS~ x e c u t i < J c agenc for strategic ELJNT operations, SAC u n d e r t o o ~ majorELINT processing at its Omaha headquaners and also in field locations.The U-2 Progrm J

On 13 February 1964. SAC began a high -altitude ph ororeconnaissance and SfGINT program ucilizlng the U-2 aircraft, the highaltitude-up to 70,000 feet-monoplane with a cruising speed of 460mph and a range up to 3,000 miles. The first U-2 mission staged fromCJark Air Qase in rhe Philippines m a program n i c k n a m e d . ~ ! . , . . . . , , . . . . . , _ . JI } Shortly after the initial February misston, the U-2"s be.

operating out of Bien Hoa AB. RVN, on an almosr daily basis - arecorded 1,100 missions from inception of rhe program to 1 November1%8. Acting on data produced by U- 2 missioos and r ~ u e s t s received from MACV and others, SAC planned the U- 2 missions and,after JCS/JRC approval, forwarded instructions to the field for execution.During 1964 U-2s ranged over La05 and Nurth V1etnam withoutrescriaions, but following L'-2 photographic derewon of a SAM (SA-2)instaJiation to the southeast of Hanoi tn early Apnl 1965. rhe JCSdirected that U-2 missions be restricted from overflying SAM sites.

t h ~ distinctions b e t w ~ e n what is Jlrategtc and.. wharfs rawcal b e c a m ~ . at umts.somewhar b l u r r t > ~ . and 1he- r r - r m ~ ilre U)ed here wuh mme r ~ e r v a t t o n . The bombing ofN V ~ was Strategic. u supported the regton of mam c o n f r o n c a r ~ o n . South VLetnamDespite SAC's mareg1' mimon and nrare,!!'ic 8-52 bomber force. Lt was PACFLTand P...-.CAf whtch camed out rhe s u a t ~ } ! . I C bombmg of S A C ~ B-'i2 torce.on'tht:uther hand, used in South Vietnam. performed a tacttcal supporr mtmon.

~ e f("'(c:'T"It n i ( k n a ~ f ' s l II October l%7-, andr:::::JL-..JI Jul, 1%9 L.-----......1.'"JCS 1 2 ~ 4 - 6 ' J . OR2331Z Apr (TS \ O M I ~ T Channels Onlvlrq p fFcpf i !lMRBA

THESETTING T6i Sltf

USAF

Stracegic Air Command U- 2 hi h I . ud ti _ g a tlt e photo recunarcra t staged from Bien Hoa Air B3st. South VietOL-:-20, tOOth Strategic R e c o n n a i . ~ S a n c e Wing. Thi aircearned a few COMINT receivers.


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lOP SECKEl CMBKA16 SIGINT APPLICATI01\S IN lj S AIR OPERATIONS

I IIDrone Operations

. , . be.,.an anoc her pwgrJm cmploymg RvanIn AuguSt I 964 SAC o m BLUE S?Rll' ?ond c ~ s . orbits were ,dependent on the drones. s e - l f - . .p r o ~ r a m m i n g syscern.

~ -..::s

DOD

Recove:-y of Rvan Drone


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tOP 3ECRi lBA'18 SIG!l'T APPLICATIONS IN t: S. AiR OPERATiONS

od I f n.c::::J or high-altitude. long-SAC separatr m c s ol .' d elaciveJy shorr range mis.5iom.. . nd for low a Cltu e. rrange m l ~ l o n s a . . d d with a maximum range of 2200Model 147T, the high almu \ rone. f land up to 22 miles widenautical miles could photograp a s;"P f 6 600 to 72,000 ft. In783 'le long track from an a mu e o . d h .on a mi f 680 nm .. the Model 147 SC provide onzon-contrast, Wld'l a range o f 155 'I track from 1500 ft. altitude.co-horizon p h ~ r o coverage o a_ 3 ::li:o rers magged the para(hutingIn recovenng drones, CH 5 . P ,r 1 .J. .d . the bay adJaCent to Da .,ang L.--.---=-ehicles m mt atr over turn of the drone to Biepll n either event, upon re d'ed hI ~ ~ - ~ the photographiC materials and rea t t coa AB, SAC prOCCSKU

drone for its ntxt mission.0

sy:stems SAC often- . i esponses from enemy wrapo 'To eltctt 5petl tc r fl 'th' the lethal range of the enemyprogrammed the drones to y : ~ e ; n r c c o n n a i 5 s a n c e platforms were acweapon systems. In such cases, . h f ECM R&D or forhand to measure the enemy responses. Cl t er ortargeting the weaponry itself for U.S. stnkes.

. ~ , ~ . c ~ ~ t j. StrareTc Bcrpgoaj:"'":trategic Air Command ' OL-8, 9th . J

Wing 5taged the SR-71 r e c o ' : n a t s s a n ~ ~ ~ r ~ : w approxmart y 1from Kad.ena Air Base, I n a w ~ .missions a month over Southeast Asia.TQP F i E I H ~ T M hLRA

THE SETTll'G .,., szcERB-47H Operorions

During 1965 and t966 there was keen i n t e r e ~ r tn o b r a iknowledge as pos.sibie concerning the NVN SA-2 mspecialins particularly wanted to know about the fu5mgsignals, for intercept of the latter would lead to U.S. couellhu co degrade the mis5ife beacon s1gnal effeaivene

) cracking from the launch sire or to deron.are miuilprematurely. SACs ERB-47H EUNT platforms. rhe besrrime for use in an opcranon to gain imrlligence on the fusingavailable at Yokota AB, Japan. Retaining Yokora as rhoccasionaHy scaginK from Clark AB, Philtppines. or Bien Horhe ERB-47H's undertook ELfNT miss10ns 9.-ith mainSA-2 as$0Ciated s j g n . : ~ J s in the Gulf of Tonkin m a proI SAC's Reconnausancs Cenrcrf - _ . . , Q C I ' I b l ' l r ~ a s ! l : k ! ' , l ' a - . p : ; " r o c ~ e : s s : e d ~ a n d evaluated th.eJcollected_

Lasting from October 1965 to January 1966Jemployed two drones (model l47E) equipped w\EH an EL1Npackage to intercept the desired SA-2 signals an d a celernetrv

: e l ~ m e t e r the signal to an RB-47 in the Gulf of Tollkinilission was on 16 October 1965 and the first successful inte.ie:sired signals came on 20 O c t o b ~ r 1965 during the ch1rd m i


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USAF

te l JEt:Ri!if r on 20 SIGINT APPLICATIOM " 'US AIR OPERATIONS

Jt ... =' - -r::-1'.!,.

THE SETTrNG --n-wT . u : u : ~ R : , n r r f l d t s . r a n ~ e

Among rhe step, appro\ed s, P ~ e $ 1 t : e n c Johnson 10deal with the mcreasin,2. communm threat in Southewhich to tacnc.:ll phuto 1nre!IH!ence an d ELINmissions by rhe L.S. 1\iav\ .1nd .-\1r Force first over laNonh Vietnam. After Pre:n 1e!" Sou\'anna Phouma oU.S. o v e r t l i , . ~ Z h u in : r u d . ~ L g . w wirh a rhrl:'atPathet Lao ~ a p t u r e ot norrh.,esr L J ~ S . l' S. Navy andflying EA-3B, EC-12!. RA-58. R , ~ - 5 ( , RF-4B/C.an d other aircra.fr ~ g a n .llf retonnamance over LaocaJled YA..t""''KEE TEA..\1. l rhe reconnaissance inro them by rhe United States. Rov:li L.wrian pdms flewagainsc the communisr ele:nems

When nor overflvrn.k! rhe cmlc.d nor.:hwest region ofconcemrated on the ~ o r r h VietnJ.rnese infiltration routesleading from North Vietnam rhrouih rh e Lao panhVietnam. After the first snoor-,Jown of a Navy Y ARF-8A in June I96..I. prorecr furrher low-level fauthorized armed escorrs WHh orden to reraJiare

. r h SR-7l reconnaissance Regular interdiCtion or commumsr troops and supplvKC-135 tanker a.rcraft refue. lng t e soon followed. Wi1h appro.,! from Souvanna Phour.1aircraft . . October 1964 began to check 1he rre of Nonh Viemam. n at Beale AFB, California. SAC's 9th Strategic Reconnausane< 1n a program called B A R ~ E L ROLL Th e Roval loulocano Imissions out or Kadena AB. Okwawa. tlyng out of Vtennane. unuertOCt Chapter .T'i'P H:EflET t. :ZICA


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TSP SP.:t!F t t ttoiSRA22 SIGINT APPLICATIONS IN US. AIROPERATIOM

1at SELKE I UMBRA

DODTHE SETIING T.Qp EEB-66 operated.

,--d""' - ~ ~ ~ ~ : ~ rPACAF twin 'ot subsonic EB-66 DESTROYER with cr.provided support to ROTHUNDER operations over North 1etnam. The primarof rhis aircraft in Southeasc Asia was Ll___c ]

rg p f[@ft


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-reP C

CHAPTER 11The North Vietnamese Air Defense

r To counter the U.S. and ~ N A F .atr stnkn.') o o p e ~ a t i ~ n wa h Communist Chtna developed .J for:naJ.

orgamzat1on. Nonh Korea and the Soviet L'nton .1lsassistance 1n irs development and operanon. Its .1re:1broad -Halnan Island. much of the Gulf oi Tonk1nVietnam, peripheral regions in Communist ChmJ, J.nd J. p

Three disrincr elemems of the system were an e;uh .surveillance nerwork; an antiaircraft organazation weapons (AW), antiaircraft artillery (AAAJ. 1nd surfJ.units; an d a MIG interceptor force. Of the more thanVietnamese serving the svsre-m, about 90 percent wert' munits. In 1967-68, intdligence sources csumatcd th.uhad over 150 radar sites in its air surveillance networweapons of 37 mm and larger caliber, 30 to 3 5 adJ\sites. 105 MIG-17's, and 22 MIG-21's

Operating d l r e - c t l ~ under the General Staff of che PeViernam (PAVN). the Air Defense Headqu:H!ers J.t HAirfield was the senior authority for !'o;orth Vietn.Jmoperations. In this capacity, it coordinated the o ~ r ~ u o ncomponenrs for maximum effect againn U.S aircraft JAir Defense Headquarters worked closely w1rh the ~ o rAir Force Headquarters also ac Bac Mai. and mam off) of the rwo headquarters were integrated. The A1r ~ rCemer, heart of the system. had two sections: The Au SJnd Atr Weapons Control Staff. Th e Air Siruanon Centprocessed air defense data from the NV N and associatedmunisr air surveillance networks an d issued advJSonC'5 rorhe a1r defense sysrem and the Alf Weapons Control Su~ e n r a t i v e s drawn from the NV N Air Force. SAM .JemployC"d as senior controllers for weapon systems. rheConrrol Staff asse"ised the air situation advisones. ur th

.;poP ~


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1-PJ ,1,iJI' '-Jr1 u.=:'::- 4fJ,1)>1 10 '9 :

T8P 81EK5f Wf litR'26 SIGINT APPLICATIONS IN U.S. AIR OPERATIONSand displayed for than by mcmbon of he Air Situation Cenll!r, and thenassigned wgea 10 subordinate unia ( llusll'ation below).

In conuolling the air defense orKanization, rho Air DefenseHadquarten employed a YViety of communic:alions. It dependedprimarily on radio, bur probably also used landlines when chose werec l= o air defe""' ins!allarions.

S1MPU IIPIWIITATION Of 11\11'1 All DIIIIISI S1STIM Ill OPIIATION

- - - -N-or th Vietnam's air defense uniu primarily used chL---....IJSource IIICd for rM esplaaarioa, u given here, i' DlA'' North v ; ~ , _ A i r ~COM......t Ni C-...1, FTD-SW-06-4-69-INT. January 1969 (TSCW NOFOilNl-TOP Sli'il'lioT YfiBJt a

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE All. DEHNSE SYSTEM I UP

ro p Sfc


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TJS:C 4 " l ~ 3IJ 8

( : ' , - t ' ,_ ,

'P8F ll!t!R!Y thdBJb t28

IUP SELKE I ONIBRH

SIGINT APPLICATIONS IN U.S. AIR OPERATIONS

'

THE NORTH VIETNAMEsE AIR DEfE!IoSE > Y 5 T E ~ I?8F !

n a er e mrr uaion of s ~ s t r m s . :an :\includii!J! !SUi, NSA ~ i a l i s r s CarIQ.JI and othen, helped bv SCA tr


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_c,n TJ:o:,-TJS('

; 'L . ': .:l'e

'N P srcprr "MBB SIGINT APPLICATIONS IN U.S. Alii OPERATIONS

'reP 9EfREif YlUti I

' " ' " - - - . M m - . ~ :I . . - "AIO!x orpruzation, notatly hanclwrinm copies offrom an enemy courier in South Yi01nam, madc o m p l e ~ e advance knowledge ofenemy callsign and fiHanoi's Air Defense Conuol Cenror doprndod onfor information-viral ro in early warning reportingo

VNAF aircraft. These included inrelligonce from agoSourh Yi01nam, reporrs from visual observers, and rfrom rhe Communior Chinese and irs own air defense e

As U.S. aircraft deponed rheir bases in Thailand,the airbasa provided to ~ A i r Defense Hoadquanen ithese raids by means of clandestine communications.took off from CV A's in rhe Gulf of Tonkin the N~ " bad early w a r n i n l l l 1 , . . . , . , = : : : : " r . : : : : " : : ; : ;LJ.nd rom ics own radan nbt EM coasc whic: example, targeully ing at 30,000 ft. a diS!antas lS0-20i Radar of Sovi01 or CHICOM origin was the wsurveillance syaem. The NVN air defense force had apequipmenr sires and about 4o radar reporting sutioappeared in all major geographic divisions of North V

1 especially conconuated in rht Haiphong and Hanoi areSCreened radar-derived information from rho radaconcriburins siccs. each cenrcr processing chc data of livrtponing srarions and passing the screened informalionHeadquanen by poinr-to-poiat and, after February 196

ma 55


23/70

32 SIGINT APPLICATIONS IN U.S. AIR OPERATIONScommunications. Known locations of the filter ccnten were Son La in thenonhwest and Vinh in the southern region. Tentative locations for otherfilllOr cenllOrs were Thai Nguyen, 50 miles north of Hanoi; Haiphong;and Nam Dinh, some 50 miles south of Hanoi.

Primary earl' warning radan employed in the North Vietnamese airsurvcilia""' netWOrk were the Soviet-dosigned FL .T FACE. 10/lfEREST -B, and BAR LOCK or BIG BAR which constituted over half theapproximate 200 ;E. CROSS*Sfto charr. p. lO.OF8P J!CK I UMBRA

,,1'1 - ~ , ( ' 1 J . ~ , ~ ~ ~ ~ l( _,) 10 u:::c I ~ i : JI) ) P. :... 8o:. :o

adars. MOON CONE was .1 lomrr3nl,!e. - ; - - -:lbovt'. p. JO

WP liif!!


24/70

3'-=oJ 4033' -18 us-l ; -F ' . l . .

T8P JEt.RE I b.t lbibtSJGJNT APPUCATJONS lN US AlR OPERIITJONS

radar of ChineS< design which wa effective out to 400 nm. CROSSLEGS was an early warning L-band radar used with height-ftndingradars for g round controlled intercepr ( GCI) of fighter aircraft. It hada ran of 180-230 nm for tar2ets at 45,000 ft

SA,\1 'sand AAANorth Viemam had two major ground organizatl005 for active air

d


25/70

-:. .0 403-18- -rgoR

l'QP itlifHiT ISP 18fb tS!Glt"T APPLJCATJO:>JS !:" t:.S AlR OPERATlOt"S

Sr..J.'v! S i t e ~ :n ~ o r t h V ! ~ n a r n

:nissiit-s from L'.S. :lir artacks. rhe Ncr::h ' l i c m a r t l ~ ~ e Jir de!e:1se f o r e ~ ~iOlated rhe finng units a m o n ~ approxim.:m:!v 300 ?re?ared sites.

Dunn.IS an e:lg:Igeme:H. ~ e . ; i m e : - m .issi.?:nec. : J . r ~ t : ~ 5 :o tne:r re5pe(71Hbanaiions. monitored lir s u r e i i l a n c ~ ~ : o m m u r , ~ r . : m o m J.nci the S(atus c .their subord1nate unm. :we ,zave y e r ' T l t ~ S I O n :o :aunc:1 m i s s i l e ~ or :.t.\AA. Banalion commandes. on ch(" 0ther ~ a r . u : . c ~ u s e me methcc

: : ~ n : ~ : :r:16an,e: J.OC ' ! ' J ! C a n c ~ :1nci !ile TJmi::e:- 11 - n i s s L i e ~ :o :In::!.

!n 'i.tl,lc\ing me '/HF Lt-:F !lnll!t: . : : ~ J ; J . n n e : ~ : : < : C ~ e : - : e s ai ::-,I\ICU . l n " c e i v e : - ~ J

'? .!IE


26/70

't '1, TQP iiEArJiif IH .. . e SIGINT APPLICATIONS IN U.S. AIR OPERATIONS

'' 0 ' ''ACQUISITION RAU.lR

NDR1H V!ETIIAIIESE REGIMENT ~ : N I C A T I O : SSlnlk; thln&cwders: aelnlmstri11tvt, tatllcat data, ~ i ~ ' " " " = = = . , . . , . . . , , . . . , , . . . . JMatuilllorst!aOnrnistrative tralhc only), low VHF Sl;;cllamei{RI 5. JOllO!H ,apeJliCII\IIdataollly),orulantlint.s...ls ward! ioslnlttiono;, inctudi.ne ~ : e n e r a l azimu.,rilll&e data. atfl teQclf'SIS for ltidlii!IMSlftds line fid data. albinistraUw lraftit VIa sa11e 11e.,s 11 reimental htlGllllartrrs. _ ,.mrtlir sortillance network mr "Wamil\1S an Nanllal Moru (HF) commuh:.st1ans.

4 Sends actnmrsitati11e.JJi llllste!laneoos.tralfic mdudi"& srd\ msltuclions.5 Slltds fine prd iilld 01 Ulllt-azillltltll dala vra II'IU illd Qf la'ldtlnt.

lll'fsad 1ne aritiauf'or ril'lte-azillruth ~ a t a wac : : : : : : J Also lliil) broadc:Ht tf lIllS/Of rmte-azrruuth data to othet boiiiIOI\5..MOTE: : : e e : , : , a t ~ : ~ : ~ ~ ! ~ ~ ~ ~ : . = i ' ~ : ~ : : : : i : ~ ~ H ~ ~ f i ~ ~ ~ e n ~ e : ~ ~ ~ ~ : .

batlllian huc.JSI!!S rather.,., pain! to paint

Sfto abow:. p. 28.'P8P ! lettZI UMBRA

THE NO spgp UI!T!i VIETNAAUs AIR DEFENSf. SYSTEM

IUIIMIIIICAhJIIS DIAGIAII 011111 NORTH YEilWIIsl(leottale>,. ..,lo;gns M 236fH SAIIIlGown are thoM used in January

IOE SEUE


27/70

. . .

lOP SECKEl t:JhMRASIGINT APPUCATIONS IN U.S. AIR OPERATIONS THE NORTH VJETN AMESE AIR DEFENSESYSTEM 'T\"JP J

North V e a w t ~ " s AM and SAM uniu employed at least three larpttracking systems in their communi cationl-01 10 for npressing uimuchand I'I4F infwm.otioa; anorher (w exprasing rd.otive direaiDILIJinformation; and a third.


28/70

P.::.. kr-,

SJGI!'T APPLICATIONS 1:-ll' S AIR OPFRATIONS20-30 run or l e s s o , _ ~ o w ; . l i i i i O U J ~ W W I O i q lto its high .PRF nning, theFAN SONG employed bums, onefor a-zimuch and range. che orhrr for elevation and rangr. An L-band1 Jhigh PRF signal transmined through a six-foot dishantenna guded, armed and detonated the SA-2. The FAN SONGcould crack and guidr as manv as three S A ~ 2 missilrs simultaneously lat r a ~ ~ wichin 32 naucical milrs. A bracon cranspondrr { requrnc'fbetween on tht missilt re-sponded ro th r FAt'\1SONG in its tracking and guiding. The FAN SONG tracked, aa:ordingly, both the missile and the incoming aircraft up to 80,000 ft. altitude and provided th t necessary command information for the L-bandcontrol emissions.

After engagement with the rarget. the SAM urut quickly turned off1ts radars to avoid a U.S. stgnal-seeking air-to-ground missile aaackWhile the FAN SONG radars sometimes operated 1n a low PR.F forfiring purposes, SIGINT analysts and Radar Homing and Warning

AAASirerg p SEcRET n IHitn

TIIE ~ O R T H VfET\IA.\fESI: AJR D f f E ~ S E SYSTEM(RHA W) operators regarded "'.eapons, l2.7 mm and ab Th !' > n,. ove. e AJr Defense Hrts units rn all major l \VN .p a m c u l a r l ~ heavv conc:enc . . 1 ~ e o g r a p h t c aH a i p h o n g . c o r r i d o ~ . ranons a on g rhe co

As did ochtr air defense forces AAA . .Atr Defense Headquarters b r o a d ~ ~ n r r s recetvsvsrem. Unrrs empioved radar for asu an c o ~ t ~ t ~ urracking targers t ~ ~ i t h i n 20 dra'J'er .!l.:qumnonnm an lOr fire conrrol

;_pY.-:':~ - " :

AAASite

A.1.'i ?_ -

;tQ


29/70

q::;: ",'i'r1]:.;,31' )-.I :- i-.

~ ~ ....11i l ' i ' j J :,usclj ) l:

i l ' i ' 3)

44 SIGINT APPLICATIONS IN U.S. AIR OPERATIONs THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

~ : = : : : ; : : ~ ~ ; = ~ ; ~ ~ : : : _ : : : ~ : Uos't 1 9 6 ' ~ rhcv ...a ~ . : t ~ : : : :resimen


30/70

46 SIGJNT APPUCATIO!IIS IN U.S. AIR OPERATIONSTACTKAL JIT AIRFIELDS USED BY NORTH VIETNAM'S AIR FORCE

(AS OF JANUARY 1969)

lAOS

Tef Jf!e!ltf!T ef[ IBfh

THE NORTH YIEniAMESE AIR DEFENSE SYST EM

"lorth ViemameJe Bombn A i r - c r t ~ f t . In addition to its' \ o ~ r h Vietnam had a small light bombtr group consi.ning o

: l ~ . : u r IL-28 {BEAGLE) [win rurbojet aircraft dr:!iveTQP 5E


31/70

:1_1_::: 4f) j_):: . . I ' ~ f j

I

t6 f SEEREY t


32/70

"TOP Jtt.R50 SIGlNT APPLICATIONS l:-1 t:.S. AIR OPERATIONS THE :-


33/70

)2 SIGINT APPLICATIONS IN U 5 AIR OPERATIOSS

Between 1965 and 1969 North Vietnam pcrfeaed. therefore, Its airdefense organization to counter U.S. air strike and r e c o n n a i s s a n c ~missions. It d e v e l o ~ d procedures for comroUing and coordinating thr

TQ Q 'T()::)( 0 ) 1:''11 I c: F. L.

G R O C ~ O AND StrRFACE C.OLL.ECTION4 SIGINT APPLICATIONS IN r_ S. AIR O P E R A T I O ~ . Sg Bv mid- J 967 AFSS had completed about 70 percent of0 work at Da Nang u n < i l 1 h ~ spri"!l fI96B when replaced new communicaaons-operatioru b u . I d i n ~ for l : S A ~ 3 2 .the squadron as th


40/70

SIGINT APPUCATI ONS IN U.S. AIR OPERATIO"S GROUND AND SURFACE COLLECTI ON

69Z4TH SECURITY SQCN C


41/70

SIGJ;..oT A.PPUCATIONS IN C S. AIR OPERATIO\SIn mid-1968, with che scaling down of bombing mtSsiom ove the

north, USA-32 had 2'5 manual Morse and six radio telephone recoversin operation at its maiQ. site and on Monkev Mountain. The mission rcohstsred of

Tharland Opef'lllions

1 51 _it. tt . 1 IBR.,

GROU..,D A:-.10 St'RFACE COLLECT!Oi\"designated CSM-627] and later as USM-7. hosted the AF"' Cdorn. The AFSS unit (lJSA-37] at first, and U

~ . ; o v e m b e r 1967) became operarional at Cdorn in Ma.v 196of June the unit was operarin raduxelephone andMorse sir10ns und

Old Faciiit:: Tem Cam? and Ooeraaoru C e n r e ~

lUP )t.CR

tO t SECRET llli!IR'70 SIGII'T APPLICATIOI'S t: S. AIR OPERATI0:'-1 GROUND AND SURFACE UJLLECTIOI\


42/70

Udorn- FY 67: Op


43/70

. h nd developm ent missions frequently fail, of Naval Security Group Surface CollectionC o l l ~ c t l o n searc a ed targtt communications and USA- 29course, to detect the s u s ~ c t v amruuting the NV N Navy and representing a threat co deductions were at : : : . ~ th sulranr reduction in tracrunc

raaical air operations ov y NYN . e re ments ~ l o t s . lc abo followed e MF and HF radar crackinb. he North Yietnamescl fur defense ele passed by NV N ir defense units. In its cap1 1

. 1 (NvN communicauons final authorirr for 1 cnCI ing all a


44/70

lR-P . STANDARD AIRCRAFT CARRIER SUPRAD CONFIGURATION

mirroring the uackins by the enemy's air surveillance ~ k . :SUPRAD communicated with the CV.\'s combat informaaan cenl8'flag war room by secure sound-powered telephone. On the CVA'siCilll1H-11 and E"'""riso. there were special intelligence ~ c u r e : " " " " - :to the flag war rooms which were connected wnh the St.: PRAD

~ . . . , u:lephone and pneumatic tube.NAVSECGllU's imcrcept si1c at Phu Bai, llYN (USN-27J.=SN-842) and USA-32 at Da Nang moaitoml many o dlrT8P I ! . , - lfMBft: L

GROUND AND SURfACE COLLECTIONSUPR.W CONFIGURATIONS

TQp iiERI'

"'r) 1'-TQP EI .ftZT lffcibkA

S I G I ~ T APPLICATIONSIN [; 5. AIR OPERA TLO:\\ GROICND AliD SltRf.KE COLLE Tb f Jl


45/70

' '-1, -l f 1 ) , : ; , ~ 71' 0I'' L. MF /H F communications copied by the SUPRAD crews. Alter he

e s t a b l i s h m ~ n r of dirm COMINT traffic circuits bttwt"en these scatioruand the Navy broadcast facility at San Miguel. Philippines (!!SN-27:.

SUPRAD's received rho CO MINT produced at the shore.based Sit"'v1a San M i g u ~ J .

'For rem made pnor m A u . e . u ~ t 196'-l. set In rne ShtJaow fJ( Wa ... ' 1on J uJ.sonod bam and Js a result of l e c t r o m J ~ n c r i c p h e n t Y ~ t : - ~ J .de pn"ible '.ome ..::oi;eCT.:t:n


46/70

i"l ' l ' ,.ibl ' ' -o,- , r;;c,- .;1-:

, jl 1: u s ~ :d>! I jl -:. L.

I OP SZCitE I tlloJ!'JR::I OF SECK

JOJ Sfdtt I OiOibRA80 SIGI!'iT APPLICAT IONS t: S AIR OP ERATID'.< TOP

JECGROL"ND AND St:RFACE COLLRTION


47/70

II',,rt ; .01 '= : r ; . : ~I ' ~ ' ) l"1)1)'!)-_,L, ':

I

1. .

f@f SLCitt I OJOIBRA

~USN-4l4J at Dong Ha Under Trying Circumsr.anc., (N1966)

I 01 SLL

TOI SECK


48/70

IJS': 403us:-P.L.

CHAPTER IVAirborne Collection

As the North Vietnamese acquired sophisricartd arms fo Gulf of Tonkin incidencs, they began to usc a variety of VHcummunicauons systems which, for thc most pan, could b

U.S. ground or surface collectors only within line-of-si(50 to 70 miles) of the transmitters. Accordingly, to intercepand UHF stgnab thc United Sratcs placcd its main reliancecoJlcction platforms which could intercept them from a distan300 miles. Approximately 90 percent of the Nonh Viedefense VHF and UHF communications intercepted wascollection platforms.Both Navy artd Air Force airborne platforms with SIG Ihad operated in Southeast Asia prior to the 1964 Gulmcidems. Durin the earlier iod interest was

the Air Force C-130 (Q~ ' 1 ' 1 ' 1 r r l i T ' : ' a t ; " ; r l ' : : : r ~ n : : : " e ~ t ; : r r . e c t : : ; : , o ; ; ; n ; - r ; : ; e c : ; ; o ~ n n a i s s a n c e program (ACR

for example. only a 3.2 pc,r:cent inte-rcept effectiveness du l964 missions in Southeast Asia

l..... ,....,. -- "" provided the only reliaT6 T SI!

TQP 6Ei!Riif l!


49/70

u::c 4-0::iI J,

b) I 5. -

p u r p o ~ < S ! . Isu:scamed colleruon of VHF, UHF, and otht:r electromagnenc emu.saons Irga_nic to an enemy's air and air defense structure.

The airbome collection program had its beginning in r - - c ~ e " " c " " . - " " l " ' ~ 3 ~ 0 : - : : " A ' : " C ' l l R ~ P ~ , ~ o p e ~ r a : ' : t ' : ' e d ~ i n ~ S o : : : u : : : t : ; : h : : e a : : : s : : ' r " ' l A r : s ' ! : i a ~ u n :program but connnuously tmproved the capabthty of the platfOrms I cover names, appearing first! QUEEN BEEtnvolved. March 1964. They were permane ntly assigned during Other agencies soon became interested in


50/70

'P8F !EERiiif I ' "PI .TeF X

lOP SECREt UliibkA88 SIGINT APPLICATIONS IN US AIR O P E R A T I O ~ S AIRIOKN E COLLECTION TQP &


51/70

neassary in 1M prosram to lleep !he four C-130's operational inSoutheastMia at anyJiven timr.

Orhiu lllfli s...-..

"" orllliQal PI'OCeiiii'A 0 Nort l l v < l i W n ~ II lwas USA-,2 at Da Sang.J Jrhe llltrOdUCUon 01 tactical hJftler aircraft at i'huc Yen in'"'Bust ,.,.,.. ind the appeara- of sophisticated air defcmo: weapanrv nthe months to follow created an operational requirement for irutialprocaaiag of ACRP and ground site ia.meptat USA-32.NSA and Security Service officials considerod two possible options:mO< the mrirc pr..;.c4 Ito Da Nang to give the platform'sCOMINT crew direct access to the USA-'2 opentions comples forprocnsi"'the mission W.e; or d


52/70

::-- --.. .. .:-.-: --

The foar ACRP airaaft then msef from Da Na"' umil a rocket .uc1.in mid-July 1967 form! their rdocation to Cam Ranh Bay to the oouthofDaNIIIISOthiu ;. IM GtJ{of TOflilm Addi"ll 10 the many arpmen11 orbai"' the ACRP air


53/70

REPRSEftTATIVE U.S.A.F. CIJI ACRP ORBITS- 1!65 1968

the ACRP coulcl operate without escort, one serving u an alternate ., chr. . . . .

IUP Xtlti!T t:ff IIR: a T8P !lf

TOP SEcRET !I " PH*94 SIGINT APPLICATIONS IN U.S AIR OPERATIO:>;S FfeFAIRBORNE COLLECTION


54/70

The RC-135 ReconMiJian


55/70

. . . 11111111 ,, u1on, .c&Udllll\lttllllllll tt ll'l'ltr Ult"l F:llt,.,tl ltlrt Jl"lJ U I J , l l l ~11a .. f t l v . M ! I I C ~ t f t 1 l r F I ' ' ' - ;I Jl n March 1967 USAFusigned w name COMBAT APPLE to ihe I 13 ' program plannedfor SEA.

I01 SEClt! I 1111161bt

~ ~ ~ ~ - ~ = - - - - - - : : - - - : - - : - - : - - -Gulf missions. SAC crews aormally c:onsisced of anpiloc, tw o navigators ODd tw o electronic warfare offaircraft commander conaalled the aircraft while airborne missiiMl supervi>or (AMS) CIMltroiled thef rechnicol opencions. The AMS could also bolddesired portion of an orbit in the f'urtberance omechanical lenu or s t e r ~ ~ & ~ thrna ca.....a the m

In basi own the C-130...1!2om in ellllt~ .. ffii!1 ill hi;; ~ e

. . while, _ . ji.::;; C-130the (;ulf, Ieavins the da orbia ro thelThroughOUt 196&, continued to fly dlt'lenhour COM t missioBoy. On l)ecember 196Southeast Asia. responsibility for the SEA A :P !COMBAT APLANCE) the next day.). !continued,maintenance technicians or e C-130's.Although the RC-135's COMINT and comm

A was essentially the same os that carried by the C-Y.1 proved superior to the C-1308 on other sroundJ.

on orbit 12 and a half hours in conttaa m the siz.of the C-1308. Ia 200 mph greater cruillins spesignificant safety factor. The ltC-135's peat( ~ 0 - 4 5 , 0 0 0 ft.) also r ~ n c e d the platform's in!ftCiu VHF UHF range__ IELINT equipment


56/70

--1- . - ~ . -..

liQP &iEiiYPF tiMB&st I:; ) 1 1 )'JGA

and a half houn from lake-off to landiag. Including amillion and paR-mission brief'mgs and debriefinp, ia a-. . f 25 and a halfhours m eath mission.

Resula athiewd durin& 1968 ,_ repreentatiwcolleaiDR. In that period, COMBAT APPLE produadintercqx, more than tw o thirds of which was 110ice an' I - - ~ tJHI' tactial WMMfl _Mons agd : = - ~ V o j c e collection inand low VHP (RIXxtra ~ p r e l i m i n a r y p r o csent tM tnnucripts m_NSA and other Clllllftned PocilicAs in the cu e of !he C - I ~ O ' s , NSAI J t a s k e dwith i n l m : ~ missiON. To mention a ~ assJanuary 1961 _ t=ved tukiq on Rusaianvicinity of Haip&;lig; Any orne U.S. eHaiph0ft1&ta, tho ACRP was to . '-.e Rtop priority. On I 5 }lUIintetcq>t for 30 days commUDJ


57/70

::-,-., ~ l J ; l"_s-:.::; lo)::iP. L. i:J? 3>:

CoUection Position Aboard COMBAT APPLE (AMS PositionLooking Forward)

guidance radar signals. In the mutual exchange, the EW O advised theAMS when he intercepted signals associated with MIG fighter aircraft.The AMS then ~ n ~ u r e d that enemy tactical conuol frtquencies wereunder surveillance for voice transmissions associated with the air activitv.Likewise, when the EW O located an active SAM-associated radar. hetipped off the AMS who attempted t o \ W l i n i l l t J e r ~ c . 5 1 e ~ t - " t l ! S . h . ; w : ! l ! J l ! ! S ! ! . . I l ! l l l l . l ! : l l ~ . ,and cant I v

e pn 19 8 restriction o air o ~ r a l i o n s above the 20th paralleland ordnance delivery above che 19th parallel initially brought SACReconnaissance Center (SACRECONCEN) and 7th Air Forcecomtraints on operauon of the RC-135 which had been flying a.s farnorth as 20 degrees 30 minutes north. SAC first re.suicted the R C - 1 3 ~from areas within 12 nautical miles of lie Bac Long VI (20-0SN Io--43E I and then Stipulated that COMBAT APPLE fly onlv on i" fallbackI 01 SECKEl C !e:SRJt

de_grtes 30 minutes nonh. then relaxed thematted COMBAT APPLE to fly in normal orbitleg adjusted to the 20th parallel.

Th e bombing re-.stricrion.s also brought a major cpriorities of the ACRP. With Ka!ed down U.S. airthe opportunity to move men and supplies more reaDirector Lt. General Marshall S. Caner notitherefore, that rhe ACRP would -emphaslzcommunications of NVN's General Directorate Rthe organization responsible for moving men andinfiltration routes. When President Johnson ordere

N o v e m ~ r 1968 re.suia.ing the U.S. to unarmesearch and re.scue operations, GDRS became the pairborne platforms.I IAmnn-g the . vanous airborne collection pro

Southeast Asia bet\Vef:n 1967 and 1969 were twspecial narure of their mission, stood apan from t

a r r ~ v e in the theater in A u ~ u s t 1967 was the SA qTh u was an EC-121 K specially designed to funextension of the 7th Air Force Tactical Air ConSector (TACC-NS). on Monkey Mountain. Its pexerciK control of and provide a MI G warning sTHUNDER aircraft over enemy territory. lts.lcmiwg s SC'?Cdawt I huipmenc consmed of commrecording. and electronic signal sensor and display L:.S. Navv.developed BRIGAND" (see p. 108intended to ope:rare in a primarily passive role. Theafforded [he tactical controller a passive means ofwatch over the relative positions of strike or reconany enemy aircraft that were also being tracked byinclusion of a tactical acr coordtnaror position s1-uaric Radar lntelligr-nce G t n t r a t ~ o n and Analvsis Develo-

TSP Jft:RET e IBR'102 S!Gll"T APPI.Ir ATIONS IN U 5. AIR O P E R A T I O ~ S

rq p sscAIRBORNE COLLECTION


58/70

(L(!IL

'), l 1 s,-c1-F .l .

"


59/70

Ti P :6 ERiiT UIIBRs

_ : - ~ . -.. -- '" ' .[;:' . < - : - ' ~ ;T h e E C - 1 2 ~ L . . - - - - - - - I ~ a

from

Wion to Jta,1-,..,..,...,.,'='=r-------, isai0111 pdesired orbit area during t r morruog and ahrrDOODTHUNDER millions. Brtwrro rhrse time thr aircraft Nang fer refueling. Qy.,..all misaion timr wu 14 houn.

-rt)p SEC

'f8P JfeRfT t f l!litJI106 SIGINT APPLICATIONS IN l!.S. AIR OPERATIOi'S TS P 9EAIRBORNE COLLECTION


60/70

: ~ F ~ ~ ~ -s,' n,.-~ 1 ~ : - - - . 1 : 1 l ! ~ C

I_.:, :":P:!:,.,, 3b )':..

U S ~ L . - - - . . I ~ C - 1 2 1 M Platformeltcttonic warfare and threat warning support to TF-77 and ocherUnited Sra,;es f o r ~ c s conducring combat operations against NVN.

Announcod by .


61/70

4" ,_ - ~ - .. ' .. : . < . " ' - " ~ " ' ... ~ - ~ - .

Initially, PACFLT ultod for airborne colleclion in SEA a a ~~ psriod Njg = , ~ ~ ~ !he ta< r . P A ~ T _conrinuiiiiL_JL operations on an aadefilllfebail.

I he 6924ib sec;;r,ty sqUidron providod oprra


62/70

l'eP !U!e!RET tjJ IBR

MANAGEMENT COMPLEXITY

Duplicative l n t ~ c e p tAirborne collection required cxtemivc cooperation on

numerous agencies. Air Force commands such .15 ADC. PAand TAC provided airframes, fliJ!ht crews, electronic warand ground maimenanct of airframe-auociated


63/70

platforms and detachmentS afloat operated in direct support of 7thand responded to Navy requirementS for tactical intelligenct. Thedistinction was, however, not always hard and faM. Navy platformssupported all U.S. aircraft over North Vietnam just as the Air Forceplatftlt'ms provided direct support to both TF-77 and Air Forcecommands. The split tiSking did r

National conuoJ over the Air Force c o l ~ o n program did noc gounchallenged. In the spring of 1965, Maj. Gen. Josoph H. Moore.Commander. 7th Air Force. asked with.Qut success -for fr:tg o r d e ~authority for the QUEEN BEE DELTA c.cno colleetwn program.Direct support with empha!is on fast delivery of a t l ' I J ~ g information ro

directed against airborne U.S-/Allied aircraft or against insthe RVN or Thailand which accommodare U.S. and/or AllieCombr Air P4trol (CAP)

The JCS and CINCPAC requirement for fighter CAP onmissions constituted a major management problem in tof the ACRP; no t only for the SIGINT o raton but

L..,,..,.--=,.,..__ ,.....,....,.,....,...,....,.. ...- ,J 7th Air Force wfighter CAP in the Gul o Tonkin the C-130 platform7th Air Forces BlG EYE. a low altitude radar surveillancecontrol EC-121 aircraft. Seventh Air Force allocat'fll-""':.lll..five supportin tanker aircraft to CAP on the Gidf:

Air Force and Navy tactical elements was a major c o n c e r n ~ . L - , . - - , . - . . 1 L.,.,..,.,.,....,.l 1g ter escorts were ost urmg operations Of1 ISIGINT was the wellspring of that warning servict-. required the C-130's to return to base ratherPlacing the ACRP in a direct support category. 7th Air Force reasoned, alternate and safer orbiu. Important intercept and operationwould lead more quickly to that objective. Had General Moore's requesf t were at stake. Following a discussion of this subJect betweebeen approved by PACAF and


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1)0::( -,-'h> ( I 11h F.L. oe, ;,c

required more than 30 minut for r


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.. . ,

AAIABACRP

AMSAWBRIGANDCAPCCAFCDAACFNVNCMACNOCRCCRPCTGDIRNSAECMELSEOBEWEWOFICPACFMFPACGOGDRSIFF:cAF

MAGMAWNVN

Airborne Aid to lntercetf"'Air BaseAirborne Communications Reconnaissa

ProgramAirborne Mission SupervisorAutomatic Weapons Bi-static Radar lm:elligence Generation

Analysis D


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IPACOMPACSCTYRGNPAVNPIRAZPPIPPSPRFRLXXRADARRADINTRHAWRVNSACSACRECONCENSAMSARSEASUPRADSWITACC-NSTAREXVMCJ-1VNAF

'b ) n:I b) I 3; - ~ > 0 lj::;1_ 403lb) oJ; -1 8 us,: '193lh ) 1l ; -"::. L.

Pacific CommandPacific Security Rc11ionP!!!plc's=ietnamPoo i l iwe : : n J Radar Advi..., ZonePlanned Posicion InditamrPW... PerSocondPulte Rcpolicion fteqUCD


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(w JIWHi!!..JO AAAWiiainNVN 44 : : S ~ ! ~ : : : ~ : s : , . 67.J 6VMCJ-1 (Marine C Dcrnince Sn:ndmUSM-8011: 59 I l 110Vinl Hill fannuoaooo: 78 DANCER project: 6 ~ - 6 4 . 76. 78,80 Garofalo. Caoorino Mr.o 29,......________ ___._, I: pbe' Mei Gm ,. I )AR LOCK. SH radars.

BARREL ROLL, 21Bieollpa Air lloJe: 14-15,17, 19

I : ; : ~ : . : ~ : : .1J E : R ING : Stt Drone operaion.

BrGA 6: id , toB-tllBUCKET project: 76BUfFALO HUNTER. s,. DrOne

opctltions. ::ode. Sf t CrypiCIIJittml.Bufthlom, 8enJon K. Mr.: I IBUMBLE BUG. S.. Drone opera .....BUMPY ACTION. S.. Drone opera- U>l"':i::..oe: 1 1

ri developmental: ''"70. 72. 16--19n:pansionof in SEA: 53,68-72srOOIId si.. ~ ~ - 7 2 . 76-BI

C-UO ACRP pluf01m (QUEEN BEE m a ~ n " " ; ' l ' .. ey: l l l - l l 5CHARLIE/DELTA. SILVER I : : t_araircraloo 104-IOlDAWN.CO.MMANDO l o m l ; ; ' t a ~ r , _ t r O I ' l ~ A P ) : 113-11'

c o m ~ ' : } pauol problenuo IH- COMBAT APPL(;. Su RC- 135 air-l 14 borne co11etrion p l a t f ~ r m .Commander in l;hief. Pacdic CCINCPAC). S.. Pacifi< Com .. d.onfiguration: 85-87orbin and ""Bi"l: 88-!14plalformconuolo 112-lll

roplocemenl by RC-L35'1o 94.97CalbiJn syms

V-6)o 28-lOSAM/AM:

COMMANDO LANCE. S.tC-130ACRP plaform.Commun.icalion;., U.S.: n, 66. 7 3

CROSS LEGS, S.e radars.CROSS SLOj. s . adars.

~ P . L . f l f , -%

noelaoollipace Apn


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f-.;..

c. . l . o i i i ~ I I W ~ i i & : . J I I S . I I : I . I I . : U : , : W : i : l i . , : ~ : ~ \ 8 1 1 o . : 4 1 1 : 1 . - - , l : ~ ~ o : o1 lrmn 1 M. 16I :!H U-2 P'"''"'"I IManul M o r ~ e COdniiU,..riOftl: 26. 28,

12. 111. 57-59. n. 76, 99Marine o t ~ , U.S. S . fleet Marine fsm !r ic '"" nin1 IMIG .. .nuop. :!H SIGINT warm .. .Military ~ Coramaad, Viftllllrn(MACY'l:2.BMOON C O N E . ~ Rodors.

M - - . . J C ~ M p h H. Maj. Gen.: 1,12Morri-,JohnE.Bris.Gcn.: 89M.aldoon, llo:rnu:dR. Col.: 89National Security AsmcYand aifbome collemon: 84-85, 88.

92-94,96,99. l l l-111IaodEUNT: 11

and uaflic analysi1: 2 9 - - ~.....,...;"' funa;_, 35,14-56National Security Asmc7. Pacific (NSAPI\C): 61,77-79,89, 113

Naval uaia. Su Patifif F I _ ~ unia andNAVSECGRU uats.Naval Securi


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and EC-1211 1101-104 and ac-n' airborne collrionplatform: 94-101 UNITED FRONT: 19S.t Jso ERB-47. d"""' operari...,, USA-29. S11 Air Farco S.C.rity Sonice

Sll-71. and U-2 prvpam. ania (6922d S.C.ri


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SIGINT Applications in U.S. Air Operations Part 1: Collecting the Enemy's Signals

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