Simon Tawaifi 2016-Independet research project- International Masters programme in Political Science

Department of Political Science

The Perfect Storm How Offensive Opportunity and Ideational Distance led to third-

party interventions in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain.

Simon Tawaifi

Independent Research Project in Political Science, 30 credits

International Master’s Programme in Political Science

Year, Semester: 2016, Fall

Supervisor: Joakim Kreutz

Examiner: Jonas Tallberg

Word count: 19149

The Perfect Storm How Offensive Opportunity and Ideational Distance led to third-

party interventions in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain.

Simon Tawaifi

Abstract

The purpose of this paper has been to examine foreign interventions in domestic conflicts and

does so by answering the question; under what conditions are states more likely to intervene

in domestic disputes to promote regime change? To answer the research question

comparative historical analysis method has been utilized. Four cases have been chosen to

examine; both sided intervention in Yemen and Syria, single sided intervention in Bahrain

and the non-intervention in Egypt. One hypothesis has been formalized utilizing offensive

realist constructivist theory and the empirical material has been presented, tested, and

discussed accordingly to assess its explanatory value. Consequently, there is strong empirical

support for the presented hypothesis which utilized a merger of offensive realism and

constructivism to achieve a complete observation of Iran and Saudi Arabia´s actions after the

beginning of the Arab Spring.

Keywords Foreign Intervention, Offensive Realism Constructivism, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, Yemen,

Bahrain and Egypt

Contents

1. Introduction ........................................................................................ 1

1.1 Aim .......................................................................................................... 2

1.2 Background .............................................................................................. 2

2. Previous research ............................................................................... 3

2.1 Foreign interventions in civil disputes ........................................................... 4

2.2 Saudi-Iranian rivalry. ................................................................................. 7

3. Theory: between Offensive Realism and Constructivism ..................... 9

3.1 Interventions and regime change. ............................................................... 9

3.2 Calculated Aggression and Power maximization. .......................................... 11

3.3 Constructivism ........................................................................................ 12

3.4 Transnational ideational polarization and regime change. ............................. 14

3.5 Why ideation and not solely ideology or identity? ......................................... 15

3.7 Foreign policy and determining intentions ................................................... 16

4. Method: Between Comparative Case Study and Comparative Historical Analysis. ............................................................................................... 17

4.1 Comparative historical analysis ................................................................. 18

4.2 Analytical framework. .............................................................................. 20

4.3 Case selection ......................................................................................... 22

4.4 Data collection. ....................................................................................... 23

4.5 What counts as evidence? ......................................................................... 23

5 Analysis ............................................................................................. 24

5.1Descriptive Analysis .................................................................................. 24

5.1.1 Syria ................................................................................................... 24

5.1.1.1 Civil strife or political instability: .......................................................... 24

5.1.1.2 Coerciveness of political regimes: ........................................................ 26

5.1.1.3 Conflict between groups within the political system: ............................... 26

5.1.1.4 External aggression and hostility .......................................................... 27

5.1.1.5 The application of appropriate means in order to achieve desired objectives. .................................................................................................................. 29

5.1.2 Yemen: ............................................................................................... 32



5.1.2.3 Conflict between groups within the political system ................................ 34



5.1.3 Bahrain ............................................................................................... 36

5.1.3.1 Civil strife or political instability ........................................................... 36

5.1.3.2 Coerciveness of political regimes .......................................................... 37

5.1.3.3 Conflict between groups within the political system: ............................... 38



5.1.4 Egypt .................................................................................................. 40



5.1.4.3 Conflict between groups within the political system ................................ 41



5.2 Explanatory analysis ................................................................................ 43

5.3 Alternative explanations ........................................................................... 48

Discussion ............................................................................................. 49

Conclusion ............................................................................................ 51

References .............................................................................................. 0

Internet based resources ................................................................................. 2

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1. Introduction

The Middle East has since the beginning of the Arab Spring witnessed a series of revolutions

and regime changes. Starting in late 2010 and early 2011 increased instability, civil wars, and

transnational threats have ravaged the region. What started as populist uprisings against

entrenched regimes have now turned in to a quagmire. Regional and global powers compete

against each other by supporting different factions through different means to change the

picture on the battlefield.

I will argue that even though civil disputes may start because of domestic disputes, their

escalation into full-fledged civil wars is a product of foreign intervention. Furthermore, this

paper will argue that foreign interventions are due to an observed opportunity by the

intervener to enforce regime change to decrease ideational distance which results in expanded

power, security, and regional influence. However, this is not limited to direct military and

economic interventions, it also includes foreign military and economic support to domestic

actors to maximize gains (decreased ideational distance) and minimize cost (absence of direct

involvement).

This will be done by studying the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars with a focus on Saudi

Arabia’s and Iran’s interventions in set conflicts. Furthermore, Bahrain, a one sided Saudi

counterrevolutionary intervention and the Egyptian non-case will be examined. Studies of

civil war have had the tendency to try to explain civil conflicts based on domestic processes

and attributes in the states where the conflicts occur. They do so without considering the role

of foreign actors in the domestic conflicts (Gleditsch, 2007). Furthermore, Owen (2010)

focuses on forcible regime change, however, this paper argues that states may intervene

successfully with non-military means. Moreover, this paper will expand the scope of the term

“intervention” from Regan´s (2002) definition to include regime change as a strategy.

The contribution of this paper will be to demonstrate that when foreign states observe an

offensive opportunity, they will lend economic and military support to ideational proximate

domestic actors to achieve regime change at a minimal cost, in other words without being

directly involved with their own military. The motive behind the support is to increase

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ideational proximity between states which in turn increases the interveners sphere of influence

and hence power in their region.

1.1 Aim

The aim of this paper is to examine foreign interventions (external support to actors) in

domestic conflicts, the consequent escalation of violence, with regime change as a strategy to

achieve the desired outcome (increased ideational proximity). This paper will do so by

examining the role of the regional powers Saudi Arabia and Iran in the Syrian and Yemeni

civil wars, Saudi Arabia´s intervention in Bahrain and the non-case of Egypt. The purpose for

choosing Saudi Arabia and Iran is not only their position as regional powers but also for their

role as promoters of their interpretations of the Sunni and Shia branches of Islam. The

sectarian nature of the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars as well as the Bahraini semi-case cannot

be ignored and further motivates the choice of states to examine. Hence the research questions

follow as such;

- Under what conditions are states more likely to intervene in domestic disputes to

promote regime change?

- What made Saudi Arabia intervene in Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen?

- What made Iran intervene in Syria and Yemen?

1.2 Background

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is region which had been stable in regards to

deeply entrenched regime types in power. However, in late 2010 and early 2011 the region

suddenly suffered change, and fast due to demonstrations which where large in scale and

largely peaceful. Deeply entrenched regimes in Tunis, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen where

eventually overthrown (Haas and Lesch, 2013). However, after the foreign suppression of

demonstrations in Bahrain, failed interventions in Syria, the overthrowing of the

democratically elected regime in Egypt, and turmoil in Libya, hopes for a democratic MENA

changed. The escalations of what was to become the Syrian and Yemeni civil wars where

both a consequence of foreign intervention in set states by both Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other

actors on different sides of the conflicts through different means. Thereby pouring fuel on a

fire.

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Saudi and Iranian relations have since the 1979 Iranian revolution been referred to as a

regional rivalry. What has further characterized their relations is belligerence, with both

nations being suspicious of each other’s actions and intentions in the Persian Gulf and the

larger Middle East. Many authors have argued that the roots of their rivalry stems from the

antagonistic nature of their relationship with identities such as Arab and Persian or Sunni and

Shia Islam. Others have suggested that structural factors such as geopolitical differences have

limited the possibility of security cooperation (Mabon, 2016). This paper will argue that it is a

combination of offensive opportunities and ideational distance between these states which

results in third-party interventions which thrives to achieve regime change to increase

ideational proximity and therefore power and influence.

It is possible to identify two spheres subject to competition between Tehran and Riyadh,

namely geopolitical (balancing) and ideational. These two spheres have been at the center of

the Saudi-Iranian rivalry since the Iranian revolution. Even though these two spheres can be

viewed as separate, there is no denying that they have feed and continue to feed into their

rivalry (Mabon, 2016).

Because of reasons stated above the best framework for understanding the complicated and

violent regional politics is that of a cold war. It can be referred to as a cold war because the

main actors, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, are not confronting each other military. Instead they

compete for influence in the domestic political systems through states and non-state actors in

each other’s spheres of interests. This struggle predates the Arab Spring; however, the

regional upheavals have presented the regimes in Tehran and Riyadh with new opportunities

in which they compete for power and influence at each other’s expense (Gause, 2014).

2. Previous research

The aim of this section is to get an appreciation and overview of the previous research

conducted in regards to foreign interventions in civil disputes and the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in

the region.

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2.1 Foreign interventions in civil disputes

Research regarding the role third parties in domestic disputes are divided into three research

agendas. The first is concerned with causes of third-party interventions in domestic disputes.

The second is concerned with the outcomes of third-party interventions, and the third is

concerned with the effect which third-party interventions have on the duration of civil wars.

This paper is concerned with the causes of third-party interventions in domestic disputes as

well as duration.

Regan (1998) evaluates the conditions under which third parties intervene in ongoing

domestic conflicts. According to Regan (1998), realism as the dominant paradigm in world

politics, suggests that interventions only takes places when national interests are at stake.

While others suggest that ethical issues and domestic politics can compel states to the

decision to intervene. One of the contributions of this paper will be to overcome the either-or

trench war fare like mentality which exists in international relations (IR) theory. Even though

it is domestic conflicts which is the topic of research, it becomes internationalized by the

interventions by third parties.

Interventions as defined by Regan (1998) as “convention-breaking military and/or economic

activities in the international affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of

the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and

opposition forces” (Regan, 1998:756). He intentionally excludes diplomatic efforts, such as

multilateral forms of intervention, because it does not require the same level of political risk

and cost in comparison to economic and military interventions. This paper will go beyond the

assumption that states intervene to only alter the balance of power to assume that the aim

intervention in these cases is regime change to decrease ideational distance therefore making

regime change a strategy. Since states prefer ideational proximity to have fruitful relations,

regime change becomes the strategy in which they may achieve the desired outcome.

The basis of this assumption is Saudi Arabia´s intervention in Syria. In line with Regan´s

(1998) assumption that the aim is to achieve a negotiate settlement, however in the Saudi

case, the negotiation involves the Syrian President stepping down. Thereby making the

regime change a part of the negotiated settlement. Furthermore, the plan B for the Saudis has

been military victory which involves regime change. Either way regime change is the goal;

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“Syria is Iran's entry into the Arab world,” said one Saudi official, speaking on the condition

of anonymity. “Take down Assad and you inflict a strategic blow on Iran.” (Sullivan, 2012).

Gleditsch (2007) examines how transnational interactions and linkages across state boarders

influence the potential of domestic conflicts. He departs from the assumption the medaling of

outside factors contributes to likelihood of conflict. His paper is limited to the study of ethnic,

political, and economic linkages. This paper contributes by expanding the scope beyond

ethnic and into religious. The reason for this is because in MENA support has predominantly

come through transnational religious lines and not ethnic. With Shias supporting Shias and

Sunnis supporting Sunnis it is very similarly to what is described as contributing factors for

external support by Gleditsch. However, it fails to look beyond ethnic ties. Therefore,

Gleditsch study, despite its great contribution fails to be applicable to this case. This paper

also departs from the assumption that domestic factors lead to a conflict which is small in

scale while outside factors contributes to the escalation of the conflict. The question which

follows from this assumption is; under what condition do state choose to intervene in

domestic conflicts, what motivates their intervention?

This assumption is backed up by research which links youth bulges (disproportionate number

of young people in a state) with the creation of a highly combustible social and political

environments. In Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria between 42 and 57 percent of the

population where under the age of 25. Unlike others demographic cohorts, having a large

number of young people results in a larger likelihood that they will act on their grievances, to

try to rectify them by any means available to them. Even if it requires large scale protest and

even violence. The youth in MENA had pressing grievances against their governments,

including massive governmental corruption, extreme levels of unemployment steady increases

in the cost of living, widespread poverty not to mention the systemic denial of basic rights.

The combination of dissatisfaction with the political status quo, youth bulges and the

socioeconomic challenges which faced these states as a result of the 2008 financial crisis, the

Arab Spring protests had multiple domestic issues which sparked mass protests (Haas and

Lesch, 2013).

Furthermore, Gleditschs research suggests that states which are economically integrate in

their region faces a lower risk of conflict. However, this was not the case between Syria and

Turkey which enjoyed a decade of improved relations and deep economic integration. Despite

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this, Turkey observed an opportunity to maximize gains and expand its influence in Syria by

pursuing regime change from Alawi to Sunni (Tawaifi, 2015).

Cooper and Berdal (1993) examine the difficulties which are associated with outside military

intervention in conflicts which originate from ethnic tensions. They, however, expand the

ethnic scope beyond race to include groups which identify themselves with factors such as,

religion and language association with a specific territory. This expansion of scope will be use

full for this paper but will be referred to as ideational factors. This choice of terminology will

be further developed in the theoretical section of the paper. Furthermore, Cooper and Bergdal

(1993) also include collective interventions which are legitimized by the international

community. However, this paper will not consider such interventions for reasons argued for

by Regan (1998). Unlike Cooper and Bergdal, this paper is not concerned with the changed

role of state sovereignty. This paper is concerned with motives behind third-party

interventions as manifested by Saudi Arabia and Iran´s actions in the Syrian and Yemeni civil

wars as well Saudi actions in Bahrain.

Kreutz (2015) approaches the issue of externa support in domestic conflicts by trying to

explain the decline of armed conflicts in Southeast Asia. He argues that decline in internal

conflicts in East Asia has less to do with domestic policy shifts by governments in the region

and more to do with changes in the international system. In other words, external actors play a

large and important role in the initiation and the escalation of conflicts. If great and regional

powers are more willing to support political rivals in nations where they are competing for

influence, then it is with scientific support that we can assume that there will be an increase in

armed conflicts and politically charged violence in East Asia.

Kreutz (2015) provides three main reasons for the external support for domestic parties in

internal conflicts. The first is the access external support provides local rebels which includes

weapons, recruitment, training, and economic support. Second, conflict resolution becomes

more difficult as the amount of external and domestic actors increase because of increased

interests. Third, because rebels depend on foreign support, they tend to make extreme

demands to maintain external support.

The common red thread throughout the previous research is that it approaches the subject

through an either/or theoretical lens. It is either concerned with cost/benefit calculation or

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ideational causes for states to intervene in domestic conflicts. Furthermore, previous research

hesitates to declare that regime change as the purpose of the intervention and that settled

agreement is the best possible solution when there is no military victory in sight. This papers

theoretical contribution will be to bridge the gap between these two approaches by weighing

in ideational factors into the cost/benefit analysis. Furthermore, this paper will assume that the

aim of interventions in MENA is to increase ideational proximity between states and the

strategy to achieve that goal is regime change.

2.2 Saudi-Iranian rivalry.

Like the previous field of research, this field also predominantly approaches the subject

through an either/or theoretical lens. On the topic of Saudi-Iranian relations, several books

and journals have been published. The aim of this part of the paper is to achieve an

appreciation of what already has been a topic of research and to identify gaps in the research.

The Shia crescent is viewed by Arab Sunni elites as an attempt by Iran to first, engage the

masses in the region. Secondly, to establish an ideological belt of Shite sympathetic

governments and political factions in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf. The third

aim is to expand Iran’s regional influence, role, and power. Barzegar (2008) examines the

issue of the Shia crescent from an Iranian perspective. He does so by, examining the three

concerns which Sunni Arab elites have expressed in regards to Iran’s intentions in the region

in comparison with Iran’s actual aims and goals in the region.

Furthermore, he argues that because of Iran’s political dynamics and the due to existing

cultural-societal and historical distinction between Arab and Persian masses, the actualization

of an ideologically dominated Shia crescent is difficult, if not outright impossible. He further

argues that Iran´s attempt to create a coalition of Shia friendly governments and political

factions is based on strategic rational and is therefore not based on ideological preference.

Gause (2014) examines the new cold war in the Middle East while placing minimal emphasis

on sectarianism as causes for alliances in the region. The paper does not provide any

alternative explanation but does instead list all grievances within the Sunni block.

Furthermore, he recognizes there is ideological graveness when it comes to goals, preferred

rules and arrangements amongst political institutions within political Islam and amongst the

different factions. Despite all this the essential point and the common denominator for

alliances in the region is identity based, in this case sectarian.

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Of course, Saudi Arabia chooses to support moderate rebels, it is logical because more

extreme groups have always criticized the Saudi regime for being in bed with the west. One of

the reasons al-Qaida had a problem with the Saudis was the stationing of western troops on

holy ground. Furthermore, ISIS (Islamic State in Iran and Syria) have also challenged the

Saudi legitimacy as care taker of the Muslim holy sites, Mecca, and Medina. This further

highlights why the Saudi government, not Saudi individuals, have had the tendency to support

moderate rebel groups (Haynes, 2005; Crooke, 2015).

Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and Qatar had a falling out in the GCC (Gulf Cooperation

Council) enlarge part due to Saudi Arabia´s support for the al-Sisi lead coup d´état in Egypt

against the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization supported by Qatar. Riyadh has traditionally

seen the Muslim Brotherhood as a potential political challenger and has therefore been

cautious in its past dealings with the group. Moreover, the Egyptian states power has

diminished in the region however, it still harbors great influence in the region in large part due

to its position as powerhouse in regards to Arabic-popular culture and media. Which could

pose a threat to the Saudi family’s position domestically if the rhetoric again sting is anti-

west, similar to Al-Qaida´s argument back in the 1990´s (Khatib, 2013).

The essential point is that Sunni factions are supporting other Sunni factions, intentional or

otherwise. Furthermore, Shia factions are supporting other Shia factions or Shia affiliates.

Regardless of the preferred role of Islam in the political sphere and other ideological

preferences within the Sunni block, the result has still been the same, the active fighting to

overthrow a regime in another state. There is no observable case where cross sectarian support

has taken place within the region after the Arab spring.

Alikhani and Zakerian (2016) investigate what factors contributed to shaping the relationship

between Iran and Saudi Arabia leading up to the severing of diplomatic ties after the storming

of the Saudi embassy in Tehran. The paper which is largely descriptive in its approaches the

research question through neorealism and constructivist perspectives in order to describe the

nations behavioral patterns in regards to each other. Even though this paper approaches the

subject of Saudi-Iranian regional rivalry through a combination of realism and constructivist

perspective, it does fails to describe why the actors behave the way they do in the domestic

arenas of other states.

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Over all they have not attempted examine explanatory factors which contribute to foreign

interventions in civil conflicts by these actors but approaches the subject of regional rivalry.

3. Theory: between Offensive Realism and Constructivism

This section will present the theoretical framework from which this paper will depart. It is an

attempt to bridge the gap between John Mearsheimer´s offensive realism, specifically,

strategies for maximizing power and Constructivism as presented by Mark Haas and John

Owen. The former identifies ideological and identity perception and proximity as being at the

core of what shapes policymaker’s perceptions of other states in the international system. The

latter, points out that states push for regime change in other states if the conditions are

favorable and is therefore compatible with offensive realism. Thereby, presenting a complete

Offensive Realist Constructivist observation of the cases which would not have been possible

if only one of the two theories would have been utilized.

3.1 Interventions and regime change.

Before this paper moves ahead there is a need to define intervention. This paper departs from

Regan’s (1998) definition of intervention as a “convention-breaking military and/or economic

activities in the international affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of

the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and

opposition forces” (Regan, 1998:756). Furthermore, intervention can be distinguished from

influence because two criteria are met in Regan’s quote. The first criteria is that it is

convention-breaking, the second is that it targets the authority. Therefore, interventions are

undertaken in order to fight or preserve the current political structure and therefore influence

the outcome (Regan, 2002).

The regional instability which transnational ideational polarization creates can be interpreted

as the offensive opportunity a state with offensive intentions will act upon. It will therefore be

treated as such in this paper. However, contrary to Owen´s (2010) position, I argue that states

must not be directly involved with their own militaries to maximize gains. Quite contrary,

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states might prefer nonmilitary intervention due to the cost/benefit analysis and because the

use of force violates international norms and therefore can be interpreted as a cost. Therefore,

regional powers lend external support to domestic armed conflicts with the goal of achieving

a regime change and increasing their sphere of influence. This way, they have the possibility

to maximize their gains while minimizing the costs.

Therefore, the opportunities which civil wars present to foreign states creates a perfect storm

for interested states to become involved. The reason is that the economic and political

domestic costs of being directly involved with one’s own military is absent. Also absent is the

risk of losing and the possible implications losing will have on the domestic political

landscape and possible war reparation costs. Furthermore, the international norms and

institutional costs which a state that is considered a warmonger will suffer, are absent.

Consequently, interventions are undertaken when there is a reasonable expectation that the

goals, which in this case is regime change, are achievable given the strategy and the

conditions under which the interventions take place in these conflicts. It is unreasonable to

expect political leaders to intervene under circumstances where they expect the interventions

to fail (Regan, 2002). Interventions in this sense must not mean direct military involvement

by an external actor.

Since domestic factors cause conflicts or civil disputes, an opportunity is presented for State

A and State B to influence the outcome in State C. Consequently, the international and/or the

domestic environment becomes more favorable to State A and State B to become involved.

Hence, even if states do not act offensively at any point in time it does not mean that they do

not harbor offensive intentions and prefer a possible regime change in, for example,

neighboring states or states in their regions.

Furthermore, State A and State B try to influence the outcome in State C to increase the

ideational proximity between the influencer and the influenced. The reason, as stated by Haas

(2012) and Owen (2010), is that ideational proximity between states decreases threat

perception between states and increases the possibility that those states will ally.

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Hypothesis: When states observe an offensive opportunity, they lend support to ideational

proximate domestic actors to increase ideational proximity through regime change, therefore

increasing their sphere of influence and power while minimizing costs.

This hypothesis is grounded in John Mearsheimer´s (2001) offensive realism, specifically,

strategies for maximizing power. As well as constructivism as approached by Mark Haas

(2012) and John Owen (2010). Haas identifies ideological and identity perception and

proximity as being at the core of what shapes policymaker’s perceptions of other states in the

international system. While Owen points out that states push for regime change in other states

if the conditions (transnational ideological polarization, and this paper will attempt to expand

to ideational polarization) are favorable and is therefore compatible with offensive realism.

The reason being that states pursue power maximization in order to maximize security (Haas,

2012; Owen, 2002; Owen 2010; Mearsheimer, 2001; Tawaifi, 2015). These theories will be

elaborated upon below.

3.2 Calculated Aggression and Power maximization.

According to Mearsheimer (2001), regional powers, similar to global powers, seek to gain

power at the expense of other states. They do so by competing with other regional rivals for

regional hegemony. Regional powers behave similarly to great powers in their regional

context because the structure of the international system causes states to compete for power.

However, because these states lack the material capabilities to achieve global hegemony they

settle for regional hegemony, if possible to attain.

In addition, regional powers, like great powers, wait for more favorable circumstances to alter

the balance of power when the cost and risk of doing so is too high. By acknowledging this, it

is possible to draw an early conclusion that states want to behave aggressively or offensively

when the cost, risk and reward calculation is in their favor. In other words, states act

Offensive

opportunity

Ideational

distance

Intervention with the intent of

achieving regime change to

decrease ideational distance and

increase power

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aggressively or offensively when there is an observed opportunity to maximize gains and

minimize costs (ibid).

Nevertheless, states cannot always act on their offensive intuition, since their behaviour is

influenced by their capacity to achieve their desired outcome. Based on this observation it is

possible to say that states are not mindless aggressors. They are calculating agents; weighing

the costs, risks, and benefits of offensive actions. The assumption then is that if the benefits

do not outweigh the costs and risk, states will sit by and wait for a better opportunity. This

highlights the assumption that states act offensively when an opportunity presents itself where

the benefits outweigh the costs (ibid). Moreover, states might prefer indirect and/or non-

military intervention because the use of force violates international norms and therefore can

be interpreted as a cost.

Mearsheimer´s (2001) offensive realism identifies war as the most controversial strategy that

states can employ to increase their power. However, states must not directly be involved with

their own militaries to maximize gains. Mearsheimer (2001) does not fully embrace or

articulate proxy wars as such. Moreover, it is not proxy war, because states are not instigating

the conflicts where there are none. Instead they are supporting actors in a domestic dispute.

Therefore, it is a choice to support, not a choice to instigate a conflict by a foreign actor. The

two strategies which most resemble it are ‘Bait and bleed’, and ‘Bloodletting’. The main goal

of these strategies is to keep ones own military and economy intact while the other one’s is

diminished.

Despite this, offensive realism and the family of realist theories fail to explain these conflicts

and the rivalries sectarian nature. The regional alignment of states is along sectarian lines and

is predominantly manifesting itself in the form of the Shia-Sunni rivalry on a state level and

group level.

3.3 Constructivism

Because of reasons stated above, constructivism will be used to complement and fill in gaps

in offensive realism. The reason for this is constructivist theories concern themselves with

ideology and identity as factors which shape foreign policy preferences. Mark Haas (2012)

argues that the domestic dimension of leader’s ideological preferences will likely shape their

approach to international politics in two ways. The first is the definition of ideological

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distance, which essentially entails the extent of the similarities or differences in regards to

ideological beliefs amongst political leaders. Without being specific in regards to the

principles that define the differences or similarities between them. This is observable because,

despite the huge ideological differences separating for example, monarchists from liberals or

liberals from communists. Decision makers will act in similar ways despite very different

ideologies that define their relationship.

This is perhaps best observed during the cold war between the United States and the Soviet

Union. Despite their ideological differences these states behaved similarly in regards to their

foreign policy: supporting states with ideological proximity, creating NATO and the Warsaw

Pact, and instituting puppet regimes in order to maximize security.

As such, the same can be said regarding ideological similarities uniting fascists, monarchists,

or liberals with fellow advocates of the same beliefs in other countries. Therefore,

“Ideological distances impact international relations by shaping policymakers’ understandings

of the likely threats that others pose to their interests” (Haas, 2012:6). In consequence, how

leaders assess other states’ intentions and their understanding of potential threats that other

states could pose to their domestic interests, are affected by either ideological proximity or

distance (Haas, 2012).

The second way in which ideologies shape leaders’ preferences is through the effects of what

Haas refers to as “ideological polarity”, in other words “the number of prominent ideological

groups in any particular system” (Haas, 2012:6). Similarly, relative power considerations

create incentives in a bipolar or multipolar world, the effects which ideologies have on

international relations (IR) in regards to alliance dynamics depend on whether the system is

ideologically bipolar or multipolar. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a region

which could be considered as ideologically multipolar because of the presence of Islamic

fundamentalists, liberals, secular authoritarians, and monarchists (Haas, 2012). However,

even though MENA is ideologically multipolar, identity wise, it resembles a bipolar world

with the Muslim world divided into Sunni and Shia states and groups. Each group tries to gain

influence at each other’s expense where their identity group exists.

Essentially, the constructivist assumption is that relations of amity and enmity in the

international system are shaped by ideational factors. Therefore, in comparison to realism,

constructivism is able to generate a more determinant and greater set of expectations. The

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theory is concerned with the existence of perceptions and therefore assumes that perceptions

that states harbor of others is essential in shaping foreign policy.

“Constructivism, after all, does not treat the state as a unitary, and domestic and systemic

variant of this approach claim that states´ interest, identities, notions of domestic and

international order, as well as perceptions of others could be shaped by societal or

international forces” (Ahmedi, 2013:72). Therefore, “One state´s assessment of the domestic

conditions in other states perceived as hostile will also shape the nature of policy or strategy

towards the target states” (Ahmedi, 2014:73).

3.4 Transnational ideational polarization and regime change.

Based on the assumptions stated above; when is regime change favorable to State A? The

verb change in social sciences has come to imply the coercion of outside powers in domestic

affairs. Fundamentally, regime change is not limited to alteration of a states government or

rulers but it also signifies change of a state’s central political institutions, operational rules

and ideology (goals, preferred rules, and preferred arrangements among political institutions).

In this case the meddling of State A into the domestic affairs of State B (Owen, 2010).

As previously discussed, observed opportunities is what makes states act offensively.

Therefore, the opportunities which sharp divisions in regions present to foreign states create a

perfect storm for interested states to become involved. John Owen (2010) refers to this

opportunity as transnational ideological polarizations. Ideological polarization refers to the

temporary strong preference elites in societies have for either ideology A or competing

ideology B. Furthermore, elites in these states have a strong preference for aligning with

states which exemplify and promote these ideologies. Polarization presents governments

either or both of two incentives to use force in order to promote regimes.

However, unlike Owen, this paper will argue that states must not be directly involved with

their own military power to influence the outcome. Quite contrary, states might prefer indirect

military means because direct military involvement yields international norms costs.

The first incentive is internal security, which entails a government’s incentive to maintain and

strengthen its power at home. This happens when internal security is at play because the

transnational ideational polarization reaches the great or regional power at home and threatens

15

the government’s position of power. The second incentive is external security which

essentially entails that governments have a desire to maintain or change the balance of power

in their favor. By promoting the right ideological preference of a great or regional power, they

have the ability to make a target state into an ally or keep it as one. Governments also have a

pre-emptive incentive to promote its preferred ideology where it senses a competitor as a

potential threat to its preferred rules, goals and so on. The latter, external security, will be in

focus for this paper (Owen, 2010).

Polarization and hence forcible regime promotion, is caused by either one of two types of

events. The first is a great power war. Since there is no great power war, this cause will not be

of concern of this paper. The second is regime instability in one or more states in a region.

John Owen (2010) identifies regime instability as a sharp increase of the possibility that one

regime will be changed by another. This change can come in many forms: revolution, coup

d’état, legitimate regime succession, or fresh regime change (which has not yet been

consolidated). What regime instability triggers in the region is transnational ideological

polarization through demonstration effects, or through the plausibility amongst elites that

other nations in the region could suffer the same fate as the nation which triggered the

polarization.

The transnational element of the polarization is crucial, because elites across countries

segregate themselves in blocks as a reaction to one another’s ideological affiliation. They tend

to polarize over two or more ideologies which are present in the international or regional

system (Owen, 2010).

3.5 Why ideation and not solely ideology or identity?

Both Haas (2012) and Owen (2010) have referred to ideology and identity as causal

explanation for why states behave and ally the way they do in the international system. This

paper will utilize the term ideation as an umbrella term to include ideology and identity and

all which it implies. Ideational factors could therefore be religion, identity, ethnicity, cultural

or ideological factors. This further includes a combination of these ideational factors as well.

For example, religious identity which will be at the center of this paper. Actors with strong

preference for religion, or religious interpretation have a stronger incentive to align with an

actor which shares the same preference, state actor or otherwise.

16

Moreover, if this paper would only use political ideology proximity as a point of departure for

alliance formation it would fail to observe the effect which religious identity has on the

alliance systems in the region. This further highlights the importance of using an umbrella

term which is including rather than excluding.

3.7 Foreign policy and determining intentions

Identifying strategy as a part of foreign policy includes three essential elements. The first

element is determining and defining state’s vital goals and desired objectives. In other words:

defining interests. The second element is dependent on the identification of potential or actual

threats to those interests. The third element regards the application of appropriate means of

achieving and protecting the objectives and goals. Consequentially, the policy which emerges

will reflect how policymakers perceive other states in the system (Layne, 1997).

The study of foreign policy strategy can be broken down into two main bodies; non-verbal

and verbal foreign policy. Non-verbal foreign policy examines a state’s line of action in

regards to an object. Therefore, it is placed at an operational level and covers observable

actions. This includes, economic sanctions, use of military capabilities, signing and ratifying

treaties and so forth. Verbal foreign policy, on the other hand, refers to a state’s articulated

course of action in regards to an object. The study of ‘verbal foreign policy’ is then only

achieved by examining statements which identify goals’ interest, and governmental doctrines

(Ahmedi, 2013, Goldmann, 1988).

However, one issue in regards to the study of verbal foreign policy is that it can serve as a

smokescreen to hide intentions. This means that this research will mainly be concerned with

non-verbal foreign policy. This does not mean that statements are entirely ruled out if they

lend themselves to answer or assist in answering the research question.

Moreover, the framework from Feierabend, Feierabend and Nesvold (1973) for data

gathering, will be used as an analytical tool for the descriptive and explanatory analysis. The

reason for choosing the framework mentioned above is its ability to identify the beginning of

political instability, in other words, offensive opportunity. It also enables the identification of

conflict between ideational groups within the political system which creates ideationally

proximate allies and the offensive opportunity which a transnational ideational polarization

presents.

17

Additionally, the observation of verbal and non-verbal foreign policy (by the Tehran and

Riyadh in regards to the cases being studied) enables the identification of interests and

potential threats to those interests. The last, essentially enables the observation and

examination of external support which opposition groups receive from external actors. This

further enables the observation of what Saudi Arabia and Iran deem appropriate in order to

achieve their desired goals. The framework of Feierabend, Feierabend and Nesvold (1973)

overlaps with strategy as a part of foreign policy as identified by Layne (1997) they therefore

increase these tools’s compatibility. This will be further explained in the methodological

section of the paper.

4. Method: Between Comparative

Case Study and Comparative Historical Analysis.

The purpose of this paper is to examine conditions under which third-party interventions

occur by examining why Saudi Arabia and Iran intervened in Syria and Yemen and not Egypt

and Bahrain in the wake of the Arab spring. Therefore, the Arab Spring serves as a point of

departure. Since the unit of analysis are Saudi Arabia and Iran the study becomes

bidirectional.

The previous research on the topic of foreign interventions have predominantly been

quantitative in nature. This paper will conduct a qualitative comparative case study because it

enables the researcher to examine the cases in depth. The use of comparative analysis of a few

cases may prove to be more promising than the shallow statistical analysis of many cases

(Lijphart, 1971). Qualitative research design provides a greater attention to details of the cases

and the observation of decision-making. It is also reasonable to adopt this research design

based on the observation that the research question is concerned with the actor´s actions and

to examine factors which provide the paper with explanatory value rather than just descriptive

(Gerring, 2007).

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The case study method is and should be closely connected with the comparative method. The

great advantage of case studies is that by focusing on a single case it is possible for the

researcher to intensively examine the case in question even though the resources available are

limited. However, a single case study does not constitute a basis for a valid generalization and

it is not capable to disprove an already established generalization (Lijphart, 1971). Therefore,

this paper will use comparative case study because it enables the researcher to generalize

beyond a single case. Thus, making the research inductive.

4.1 Comparative historical analysis

This paper will use comparative historical analysis because even though it is not united by one

theory or method, the work within this tradition is concerned with causal analysis, analysis of

processes over time, and the use of systematic and contextual comparison. Furthermore,

comparative historical analysis is concerned with explanation of/and identification of causal

configurations that produce the outcome of interest, which in this case is intervention. The

causal argument is central to the analysis and therefore, the causal propositions are carefully

chosen and tested against the empirical record rather than presented as ad hoc incidental parts

of an overall narrative. Thus, comparative historical analysis does not include research that

explicitly rejects causal analysis or that refrains from research that is in favor of other goals

(Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003).

The aim then, is to explain the causes of substantively important outcomes which in these

cases is interventions. Within this approach there is no need for comparative historical

analysis to embrace any single theory or method in regards to causal analysis. Since it focuses

on a distinctive kind of research which is generally defined by relatively specific

characteristic, which in this case are interventions. This enables the operationalization of tools

which best enables the researcher to address the problems at hand (Mahoney and

Rueschemeyer, 2003).

Furthermore, comparative historical analysis explicitly analyzes historical sequences of events

and seriously examines the unfolding of processes over time. This is not very different from

process tracing in the way the study is conducted. The processes that will be examined are

‘offensive opportunity’ and ‘ideational distance’ which Saudi Arabia and Iran act upon in the

cases. The events which this approach is concerned with, such as revolutions or interventions,

19

are not static occurrences which take place at a single point in time, they are rather observed

as processes that unfold over time and in time (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003).

As a result, the approach incorporates temporal structure considerations of events in its

explanation. They may therefore argue that the influence of an event is very much shaped by

the duration of the event. Consequently, the approach may treat differences in temporal

structure in events as major outcomes need explanation. Furthermore, comparative historical

analysis explicitly considers the effects of timing on the events in relation to each other

because the events themselves located in time. As such, events may precisely intersect with

each other because they are temporal structures. Therefore, the relative timing of this

intersection yields decisive importance (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003). Thus,

transnational ideological polarization is of great importance in order to explain why the states

in question intervened when/where they did. This paper will greatly benefit from this

methodological approach because it can be defined, demonstrated, and explained.

Comparative historical inquiry can be differentiated from other approaches because it is

engaged in systematic and contextual comparison of similar and/or contrasting cases. This

thesis will be concerned with two cases of similar interventions: one semi-case, and one non-

case. Given the analytical interest in regards to causal analysis, systematic comparison

becomes indispensable. This approach usually focuses on a small number of cases, which in

this case are interventions in Syria and Yemen, the semi-case of Bahrain, and the non-case of

Egypt against the Arab Spring and Sunni-Shia regional rivalry as a back drop in this case. The

aim of this approach is to explain important outcomes, which in this case are interventions,

within a historical context, which is the Arab Spring. Although it is not the intention of this

method to achieve universal explanation and applicable knowledge, it manages to land on a

middle ground where significant knowledge is gained (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003).

Most significantly the approach enables the researcher to move back and forth between theory

and history in order to formulate new concepts, discover novel explanations, and refine

preexisting theoretical assumptions in light of detailed case evidence. Seeing that researchers

are usually deeper entrenched in their cases while utilizing comparative historical analysis,

they are more capable to measure variables considering a broader context. Thereby, they have

the capacity to achieve a higher level of conceptual and measurement validity than is usually

possible when a large number of cases are selected (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003).

20

Comparative analysis should avoid the danger which a large number of variables can present.

This could lead to an overwhelming number of variables which limits the possibility of

discovering controlled relationships. Thus, encountering multiple variables should be avoided.

Therefore, this paper will judiciously limit itself to key variables while omitting the once with

only marginal importance (Lijphart, 1971).

4.2 Analytical framework.

The analysis will be guided by a set of categories presented by Feierabend, Feierabend, and

Nesvold (1973) in order to increase comparability between the cases which in turn increases

the paper’s validity. One critical insight brought about by comparative historical analysis is

the need to clearly separate the origins, processes, and outcomes. This is one of the main the

benefits of this framework. Moreover, it enables the researcher to expand upon it and in

weave both Layne´s (1997) essential elements for defining foreign policy strategy, into this

framework. The resulting framework then becomes concerned with causal analysis, analysis

of processes over time, and the use of systematic and contextual comparison which is

therefore compatible with comparative historical analysis.

The first category for data collection and analysis is; civil strife or political instability.

Essentially, this means that the researcher will observe and collect data on political aggression

and violence within nations directed against office holders. This includes violent and non-

violent demonstrations, strikes, riots, sabotage, assassinations, coup d’état, revolts, civil or

guerilla warfare (Feierabend, Feierabend and Nesvold, 1973). The reason for this is that it will

enable the researcher to observe the arrival of the Arab Spring to each state, the subsequent

destabilization of the regime in question, how it leads to the further spread of the transnational

ideational polarization, and the instability it creates in the region which in turns creates the

offensive opportunity states act upon. Offensive opportunity is a key variable to

understanding interventions.

The second category; coerciveness of political regimes. This refers to the observation of

systematic aggression and violence initiated by officeholders. This includes arrests,

imprisonment, executions, martial law, confiscation of property, banning of political parties,

dismissal of officeholders, purges, press censorship, and general curtailment of civil rights

and liberties (ibid). This is useful in order to observe the reaction of regimes to the arrival of

21

the Arab Spring. Furthermore, it enables the researcher to observe the role which those states

play in the creation of the observed opportunity which other states act upon. This further

enables the observation of destabilization of regimes and the spread of the transnational

ideational polarization and thus offensive opportunities.

The third category is; conflict between groups within the political system. This will guide the

researcher to observe forms of aggression with ethnic, religious, and racial (ideational)

motives (ibid). This means both by the regime and by the opposition. This will enable the

observation of actors ideationally distant actors within the states being intervened in. Thus

enabling the observations of actors willing to restive foreign assistance from foreign states.

This will not be limited to violence versus violence, but will also observe ideationally

motivated attacks against non-violent opposition.

The fourth category is; external aggression and hostility. This essentially entails the

observation and data collection on expressed hostility (verbal and non-verbal foreign policy)

by nations towards one another. This includes wars, embargos, recalls of ambassadors,

extreme demands and other international actions (Feierabend, Feierabend and Nesvold, 1973;

Kreutz, 2015). This firstly enables the researcher to observe relations between the intervening

states, and secondly between the states that intervene and the states being intervened in

therefore enabling the observation of threats and ideational distance. Furthermore, the third

and the fourth guiding category are most compatible with two of Layne´s (1997) essential

elements for defining foreign policy strategy as it enables the researcher to both observe the

defined interests and threats to interests.

The fifth category is; the application of appropriate means in order to achieve desired

objectives. Compatible with Layne´s (1997) third essential element, it will enable the

observation and examination of external support which opposition groups receive. The

support which will be observed comes in the form of weapons, recruitment, training, and

economic support to achieve the desired goal of the opposition but most importantly, the

external actors. Furthermore, it will not be limited to only observing support opposition

groups receive. It will also observe how states support regimes which are threatened by

opposition groups and potential regime change. Moreover, this framework supports the

theory goal, which is to define, what we have seen, how we have seen it and how we can see

it in the future.

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4.3 Case selection

The selected cases in this methodological approach correspond with the subject and research

question. It is not simply limited to popular geographic categories or other boundaries, i.e.

state, organization or otherwise. Case selection is an essential part of a good research strategy

in order to carry out the well-defined objectives of the study. Therefore, the primary criteria

for case selection should be of relevance/relevant to the defined research objective of the

study (George and Bennett, 2005). In this case the defined objective is to understand why

Saudi Arabia and Iran intervened in domestic conflicts. The relative cases are those where we

can observe interventions by the states in question. Furthermore, it is important to observe

semi-cases and non-cases in order to test the theoretical framework and for it to achieve

greater explanatory value. Non-cases are cases where there was no intervention at all, and

semi-cases are cases where one state intervened in domestic conflicts.

Case selection has also been guided by regional proximity and context. Comparability is not

necessarily inherent in any given region; however, it is more likely within set areas or regions

than in randomly selected cases (Lijphart, 1971). The Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

was selected as the region because there are states which experienced both sided interventions

within set regions after the Arab Spring. The semi- and non-cases refers to states which only

observed single sided intervention or no intervention at all.

Furthermore, the comparative method should not lapse into what is commonly referred to as

the ‘traditional quotation/illustration methodology’. What is meant by this, is that case

selection should not be motivated solely by hypothesis confirmation, and therefore disregard

or reject deviant cases if found (Lijphart, 1971). Consequently, this paper has included one

semi-case, the intervention of Saudi Arabia in Bahrain, and one non-case, Egypt, as well. The

sample size for non-intervention cases are large in post-Arab Spring MENA; with some sort

of protests observed in approximately 12 states (BBC News, 2013).

Bahrain and Egypt represent two states which experienced protests and where one, Egypt,

resulted in multiple regime changes and the other, Bahrain, in foreign aided suppression of

protests. Similar, Syria and Yemen represent two states which experienced civil war and

resulted in multiple changes, Yemen, and one, Syria, did not experience change in terms of

heads of states and governments. Deviant cases tend to loom largely over a comparative case

23

study of a few cases. However, it is a mistake to reject a hypothesis altogether because it is a

contrary case (Lijphart, 1971).

Therefore, the cases where we can observe interventions by these regional powers are Syria

and Yemen. Riyadh supports the government in Yemen while actively fighting the Houthi

rebels through different military and economic means. Similarly, Tehran supports the

government in Syria while actively fighting the Syrian rebel groups through different military

and economic means. These states are actively engaged in proxy wars with Syria and Yemen

as their battle grounds. However, in both Egypt and Bahrain, states which also endured

turbulent times with mass protests and a couple of revolutions, we cannot observe escalation

of hostilities between governments and rebels to the extent that it can be considered armed

uprisings. Even though Saudi Arabia intervened on behalf of the Bahraini government there

was no significant violent fight back against the oppressors.

4.4 Data collection.

The material used to examine the research question and to gather data, will be guided by one

question; what kind of data would lend itself to understand why Iran and Saudi Arabia

intervened in Syria and Yemen and not Bahrain and Egypt? An inductive principle therefore

guides the data collection. Thus, the data will consist of press releases, statements, news

reports following the events during the Arab Spring, Syrian conflict, Yemeni conflict, and the

situations in Bahrain and Egypt. The Arab Spring needs to be examined because it is the

essential to the transnational ideational polarization argument and consequently provides

states with the opportunity to act offensively in order to achieve regime change. News reports

are useful to providing chronological documentation of the events during the Arab Spring

which is what successful comparative historical analysis should require.

4.5 What counts as evidence?

The main problem which arises is how to provide empirical support for the claim that Iran or

Saudi Arabia harbor offensive intentions. It would be difficult to claim offensive intentions by

only assessing verbal foreign policy such as statements made by Saudi or Iranian officials

alone. The reason is that verbal foreign policy can serve as smokescreens to hide intentions.

Instead, non-verbal foreign policy, in other words actions taken by the Riyadh and Tehran,

will be the focus of this research. Nonetheless, verbal foreign policy will not be ignored as it

could indicate the studied states foreign policy position and/or their potential shifts.

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5 Analysis

5.1Descriptive Analysis

In this chapter the paper will provide a descriptive analysis of each case concerning

interventions by Saudi Arabia and Iran and guided by the framework presented above. This

enables the paper to answer the first research question. In order to answer the second research

question, the next chapter of the paper will provide explanatory analysis to either confirm or

dismiss the hypothesis in order evaluate their explanatory value.

5.1.1 Syria

5.1.1.1 Civil strife or political instability:

It is in Daraa, a city near the Jordanian border that the Syrian uprising effectively began. In

February 2011, ten children aged between nine and fifteen inspired by the Egyptian uprising

wrote “down with the regime” on the wall of their school. Residents in Daraa reportedly

found out that the children had been arrested and tortured in prison. True or not, on 15 March

a few hundred protesters, many of them family members to the children marched in

downtown Darra. They called for the release of the children as well as for reform and the end

of emergency rule which had been in place since 1963, not for regime change. The crowds

continued to grow and spread to both Damascus and Aleppo, however, they were still largest

in Daraa (BBC News, 2011; Sterling, 2012; Lesch, 2013).

Mosques played a central role in the beginning of the revolt. For years’ mosques, had been

natural gathering points and were preachers could preach fiery sermons and for protesters to

launch protests, furthermore the mosques were off limits to security forces (Lesch, 2013).

The 22 April 2011, Syria was rocked by the largest demonstrations held in a number of cities

across the country. Human rights groups claimed that allegedly over a hundred people (Other

sources put the allege death toll to be at 72) were killed by security forces firing at crowds.

Most deaths where in the village of Ezra, near Darra, and in a suburb of Damascus (BBC

News, 2013; Lesch, 2013).

Despite this one prominent Syrian exile opposition group the National Initiative for Change

called for a final peaceful transition. The call for change included demands for bread-based

25

political reform and was fairly moderate considering the escalating cycle of violence on both

sides. Still there was no direct call for Assad to step down, instead they said;

“if the President does not wish to be recorded in history as a

leader of this transition period, there is no alternative left for

Syrians except to move forward along the same path as did the

Tunisians, Egyptians and Libyans before them” (National

Initiative for Change in The Telegraph, 2011).

Despite most demonstrations being peaceful in the beginning more and more government

forces were being killed by elements of the opposition. The summer of 2011 saw the

formation of a semi-organized opposition fighting force called the Free Syrian Army which

was predominantly made up by defectors from the Syrian Arab Army. There had been

speculation that some soldiers where deserting. These stories were amplified by opposition in

order to give the impression that the Syrian military was on the verge of turning against its

masters (Lesch, 2013).

Furthermore, in Jisr al-Shughour between 3-6 June of 2011, the Syrian government

announced that 120 security personnel had been killed in the northwestern town near Idlib.

What this showed was that government was facing an armed opposition rather than mass

peaceful protests (BBC News, 2013).

However, the Syrian opposition, in and outside Syria was for the most part of 2011 and into

2012 uncoordinated and often divided, lacking therefore any generally recognized or effective

leadership. There had been various attempts by the Syrian opposition groups in exile come

together in order to generate a unified and inclusive front. This was important in order to

generate international support but also this was meant to present a real alternative to those

Syrians which supported the regime due to the simple reason that there was no legitimate

alternative (Lesch in Haas and Lesch, 2013).

The situation started deteriorating significantly in mid-2012 and in part mostly due to growing

desertions by Sunni soldiers who started to organize resistance against the regime as well as

tribal groups in eastern Syria joining the war against the Assad (Gupta, 2016).

26

5.1.1.2 Coerciveness of political regimes:

The regime first responded with crackdown against the protesters in Daraa and later with

promises for reform. Attempting to disperse the crowds, Syrian security forces opened fire

against the killing four. As protests intensified and increased so did the government response

which resulted in more protesters being killed despite most demonstrators being peaceful.

Matters escalated when Syrian forces carried out crackdowns on protesters on the 23rd of

March. On that date, security forces raided the Omari mosque which had become a base from

which protesters where launched as well as a haven for those who feared for their lives.

Additionally, basic needs such as, electricity, water and mobile phone networks where cut off

as well as the banning of funerals because they and the preluding sermons in the mosques had

become focal points of protests.

The regime did however acknowledge that the grievances of the families to be legitimate and

that the it would bring to trail those suspected of killing several protesters in Daraa. The

Syrian government further said it would consider political reforms which included the ending

of the 1963 emergency law. Later per state media, President Assad ordered the release of

everyone arrested during the recent events. Dr. Bouthina Shaaban, political and media adviser

to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad denied that the government had ordered security forces to

open fire on protesters while blaming outside agitators for whipping up trouble. However, she

acknowledged that it "did not mean mistakes had not been made" (BBC News, 2011; BBC

News, 2011).

Into May and June 2011, this same response continued from the government in regards to the

protesters. The government continued to referred to the uprising as a conspiracy by its foreign

enemies tied to Syrian armed gangs, Islamic terrorists, criminal and thugs. It moved almost

entirely towards the narrative of armed gangs supported by enemies form the outside with

their own pernicious anti Syrian agenda. This resulted in continued military and security

forces crackdown on protests in cities across Syria, preluded or followed by some

concessions, and announce reform measures (Lesch, 2013).

5.1.1.3 Conflict between groups within the political system:

The Syrian regime had always portrayed itself as the protector of all the minorities in a

country which is made up by between 65-75 percent Sunni Muslims. There was no difference

27

during the beginning of the revolt, the government echoed the worries which minorities had in

regards to a potential repressive Sunni Muslim rule which was not uncommon in the region

and/or instability during which minorities pay the heavy price, as in Iraq after the U.S. lead

invasion (Lesch, 2013; Gupta, 2016).

The regime was careful in its use of the most loyal divisions in the military, particularly those

mostly made up of Alawites to spearhead the crackdowns in the cities and towns which

generated most unrest. The minority element of the regime, which are Alawites, an offshoot

from Shia Islam (often considered heretical by orthodox or Salafi/Wahhabi Sunnis) as well as

the Christians minorities believed their fate rested with that of the regime and they therefore

vigorously supported the status quo (Abrams, 2011; Lesch in Haas and Lesch, 2013).

Since most of the protesters where predominantly Sunni, the motivation behind this type of

deployment was the regimes fear that most of the conscripts in the Syrian armed forces, which

where Sunni would defect in mass or be unwilling to fire on their religious brethren (Lesch,

2013). These worried where legitimized by the fact that those fighting against the Assad

regime are predominantly Sunni Arabs mainly from the economically weaker sections of

society. The clear majority of the Sunni soldiers who defected belonged to the same weaker

economic sections of society and where often from rural backgrounds. The most effective

fighters of the opposition where however foreign Sunni Islamist fighters (Gupta, 2016). As

the conflict escalated, outside actors like the Lebanese Shia militia Hezbollah started to

intervene on behalf of Iran and the Syrian government, further highlighting the conflicts

sectarian nature (Charbonneau, 2013).

5.1.1.4 External aggression and hostility

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps echoed in the beginning of the conflict the same

statements made by the Syrian government, calling the uprising a foreign conspiracy. During

the early spring of 2011 Ahmad Mousavi, which served as Iran's ambassador in Damascus

until august 2011 stated that the;

“Current events in Syria are designed by the foreign enemies

and mark the second version of the sedition which took place

in 2009 in Iran […] The enemy is targeting the security and

safety of Syria ... [The protestors] are foreign mercenaries,

28

who get their message from the enemy and the Zionists”

(Ahmad Mousavi in Abdo, 2013).

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s initial expressed stance towards the Syrian government

called for stability rather than revolution (Khatib, 2013). However, this changed in early

august 2011 when the former king of Saudi Arabia recalled the country’s ambassador to

Damascus after condemning the crackdown on protesters in Syria and calling on the Syrian

government to implement reforms. The comments by the Saudi monarch came after a similar

statement by the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) and the Arab League. These organizations

had been silent in the beginning of the uprising in Syria (AlJazeera, 2011).

“What is happening in Syria is not acceptable for Saudi

Arabia,[…] Syria should think wisely before it's too late and issue

and enact reforms that are not merely promises but actual reforms,

[…]Either it chooses wisdom on its own or it will be pulled down

into the depths of turmoil and loss.” King Abdullah said in a

written statement (King Abdullah in AlJazeera, 2011).

Contrary to its allies in the west and in the region, Saudi Arabia is late to express the need for

the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad to step down from power. The Saudis new tone was a

result of frustrations with the refusal of Syrian government to engage with Saudi attempts to

mediate between the warring parties, as well as the realization that the Syrian oppositions

achievement could lead regime in Syria which could change the regional balance of power

against Tehran (Berti and Guzansky, 2014).

Al-Arabi prepared a 13-point plan which was reportedly drafted by Qatar which required the

Syrian government to “cease military operations, free all political prisoners, begin dialogue

and announce his intention to form a national unity government and hold pluralistic

presidential elections by 2014” (Black, 2011).

In January of 2012, the Riyadh said it was recalling its observers from the Arab League

initiative to end violence in Syria because Damascus failed to keep its promises and therefore

they withdrew “from the mission because the Syrian government has not respected any of the

clauses" said Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister (AlJazeera, 2012) Soon after these

events unfolded the Arab League called on Bashar al-Assad to step down from power, for

29

elections do be held under a national unity government and stated that they were seeking

Security Council support.

Shortly after, on the 4th of February, 2012, Russia and China vetoed a Security Council draft

resolution which would have demanded that all parties in Syria cease all hostilities. Following

the veto Saudi Arabia criticized Russia for its failure to coordinate with Arab states before the

vote. The Saudi King reportedly warned the Russian president that Saudi Arabia “will never

abandon its religious and moral obligations towards what’s happening” (King Abdullah in

Schanzer, 2012).

In Febuary 2012, the foreign minister of Saudi Arabia stated that humanitarian aid to Syria

was not going to be enough and that arming Syrian rebels was becoming an “excellent idea”

(Saud Al Faisal in Schanzer, 2012). Shortly following, an unnamed Saudi official stated that

Riyadh sought to provide the opposition in Syria with the appropriate “means to achieve

stability and peace and to allow it the right to choose its own representatives” (unnamed Saudi

official in Schanzer, 2012). All this unfolded while Saudi clerics openly called for Jihad in

Syria while ridiculing those who wait for Western intervention (Schanzer, 2012).

"Syria is Iran's entry into the Arab world," said one Saudi

official, speaking on the condition of anonymity. "Take down

Assad and you inflict a strategic blow on Iran." (Sullivan,

2012).

5.1.1.5 The application of appropriate means in order to achieve desired

objectives.

In the early stages of the civil dispute in May 2011, before its escalation into civil war, Tehran

supplied the Syrian government with weapons and surveillance tools. Furthermore, it was

reported that some Iranian forces where involved in silencing protests. A number of

revolutionary guards from the Quds Force where also reported in Syria in order to train Syrian

forces. “On May 18, the U.S. Treasury Department mentioned the role of the Quds Force

directly, asserting that Mohsen Chizari, the Quds Force's third-in-command, was training the

security services to fight against the protestors” (Abdo, 2011).

The other main reason for why the situation in Syria started deteriorating in mid-2012 was in

large due to Saudi Arabia and its Sunni allies in the region, Qatar and Turkey, started to

30

funnel in vas number of arms and money to defectors from the Syrian Army. Not to mention

the other armed Sunni Islamist from abroad who’s infiltration into Syria to actively fight the

Syrian regime was encouraged particularly through Turkey (Gupta, 2016).

According to the Defense and Security committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly “It

is believed that there are as many as 1,200 armed opposition groups in Syria, with

approximately 100,000 fighters […] Rebel forces have a diverse range of funding and arms

suppliers from the principal state supporters of Qatar and Saudi Arabia” (Szewinski, 2014).

According to the Syrian opposition, Riyadh was supplying the opposition with weapons on an

ad hoc basis through Sunni allies in Iraq and Lebanon as early as in the beginning of 2012

(Schanzer, 2012). However, while the Saudis have supplied weapons to the opposition, they

have had strong inclination to not support the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, in comparison to

Qatar, another Sunni state which initially was heavily invested in the Syrian opposition

(Abouzeid, 2012).

Riyadh´s role has not been only to been focused on providing material and financial

assistance to the opposition, but also to boost the status and capabilities of the political

opposition, especially the National Council for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.

However, Saudi funding at the time had not only been directed exclusively towards the

National Council and the FSA, money from Saudi Arabia in particular, has been channeled to

virtually all main opposition forces it regarded suitable for the anti-Assad cause within the

Syrian opposition (Berti and Guzansky, 2014).

Tehran confirmed in September 2012 that elements from its Revolutionary Guards where in

fact present in Syria and actively supporting the Syrian government in its fight against the

uprising. Furthermore, it warned the region that it would become actively involved militarily

would its ally come under attack (Black, 2012).

It was not until October 2012 that reports regarding Saudi officials paying the salaries to the

Free Syria Army to encouraging mass defections from the military and thereby increasing

pressures on the Syrian government surfaced. This development which had been discussed

between the Saudis, the US and their Sunni allies in the region started gaining momentum

because of the flush of weapons sent to opposition forces by Saudi Arabia started to make an

impact on the battle fields in Syria. However, the Saudis could not supply the opposition

31

without their Sunni allies in the region, namely Turkey which allowed the establishment of a

command center in Istanbul which coordinated the supply lines together with the Free Syrian

Army in Syria (Chulov and MacAskill, 2012).

Around the same time, it became clear that most of the arms supplied to the Syrian opposition

by Saudi Arabia and Qatar was landing in the hands of hard-liner Islamic jihadist rather than

the more secular opposition groups the West wanted to support (Sang, 2012). However, it was

not until early 2013 that Saudi Arabia edged Qatar as the main supplier of arms to the Syrian

opposition. According to a senior opposition commander "Saudi Arabia is now formally in

charge of the Syria issue," (Karouny, 2013). Furthermore, according to a Saudi official; "The

goal is to be effective and avoid arms getting into the wrong hands like before, […] Saudi and

Qatar share the same goal. We want to see an end to Bashar's rule and stop the bloodshed of

the innocent Syrian people." (senior Saudi official in Karouny, 2013).

However, it was not until March 2014 that Saudi Arabia designated both Jabhat al-Nusra

(now known as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as

terrorist organizations. In comparison to the US which designated these organizations terrorist

in March 2012 and December 2004, respectively (Berti and Guzansky, 2014; U.S.

Department of State).

In the beginning of 2013, Iran started to significantly increase its military support to the

Syrian government. Thereby solidifying its position as the governments regional lifeline. The

increased support to Damascus suggested that the war was entering a new phase where Iran

was trying to end the stalemate on the ground by doubling down on their commitment to the

Syrian government. Consequently, they were offering the increasingly isolated government a

crucial lifeline. Furthermore, according to diplomats, it also highlighted the growing sectarian

nature of the conflict. Iranian support continued to flow to Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shia militia

which was at the time becoming increasingly involved on the ground in support of the Syrian

government (Charbonneau, 2013).

Around the same time, in January 2013 a Saudi memo leaked showing Saudi officials

commuting 1200 death row inmates under the condition of Jihad against the Syrian

government. The inmates where, according to the memo, from, Yemen, Palestine, Saudi

32

Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Jordan, Somalia, Afghanistan, Egypt, Pakistan, Iraq and Kuwait

(Ingersoll, 2013; AINA News, 2013).

“We have reached an agreement with them that they will be exempted from the

death sentence and given a monthly salary to their families and loved ones, who

will be prevented from traveling outside Saudi Arabia in return for rehabilitation

of the accused and their training in order to send them to Jihad in Syria”

(Ingersoll, 2013; AINA News, 2013).

In addition to directly assisting the opposition, Saudi Arabia called on greater international

pressure and encouraging the U.S. to take an active role. The first example of this is when

Saudi Arabian intelligence presented the U.S. with alleged evidence in February 2013 that the

Syrian government had resorted to the use of chemical weapons, hence breaking President

Obamas first red line set in August 2012. Another example of this is august of 2013 when the

Syrian government reportedly used chemical weapons. Saudi Arabia tried to pressure

Washington to become directly involved through military intervention because the Syrian

government crossed Obamas second red line which was set in March 2013 (Berti and

Guzansky, 2014).

Iran responded by stating that any attacks or military interventions would engulf the whole

region. The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman said "There will definitely be perilous

consequences for the region," (Abbas Araqchi in AlJazeera, 2013).

5.1.2 Yemen:


Protests in Yemen begun in January 2011 in the capital Sanaa. The protests where organized

by a coalition of opposition parties in the Yemeni parliament. A key figure in the early days

of the uprising was Tawakul Kirman, the future Nobel Peace Prize winner, called for protests

and was therefore briefly detained by security forces. Upon her release, she called on “a day

of rage” to be held across the country on the 3 February (Rabi, 2015).

On that day 20000 protesters gathered on the streets of Sanaa. Small protests could also be

observed in Aden and Taízz. The protests called for president to step down immediately

despite the regimes attempts to appease the crowds. By 18 March protests in Sanaa had

swelled up to 100,000 and the events on that day eliminated any legitimacy Salih had. It also

33

provided his rivals with the opportunity to call for the President’s resignation. The president

denied all responsibility and sacked the entire cabinet. The Houthis initially actively

participated in the street protests while coordination with other opposition groups (Janeau,

2016)

President Saleh signed an initiative on 23 November 2011 which endorsed a two-phase

transitional period proposed by the GCC. The first phase resulted in the power transfer to then

vice-president Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi. The election of Hadi on 2 February 2012 marked

the beginning of phase two. Phase two was a two-year timeframe during which a Conference

for National Dialogue (NDC) and general elections would be held in early 2014.

After the final closure of the NDC, a small committee which was handpicked by president

Hadi decided that Yemen would become a six-region federation. Outraged by that prospect

that states structure, the Houthi movement, belong to the Ziad Shia Muslim minority, barked

upon a successful territorial expansion. They captured Sanaa in September 2014, president

Hadi resigned on 22 January and later fled Houthi imposed house arrest to the southern city of

Aden on 21 Febuary 2015. Hadi declared Aden the temporary capital. The Houtis continued

their territorial expiation south and in March 2015 Hadi fled to Saudi Arabia.


On the 2 February Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh made offers to the protesters which

fell short of satisfying the protesters demands. Saleh pledged that he would not seek another

term in office, just two months after attempting to change the constitution to remove

presidential term limits. Furthermore, he pledged that Ahmad Abdullah Saleh, the president’s

son which long was believed to be groomed by his father do succeed him, would not do so

(Rabi, 2015).

When it became clear that the movement would not be silenced or appeased by the

governments pledges, more means where used by the government. The first casualties of the

Arab Spring in Yemen took place on the 23 February and claimed the lives of two students

who were shot dead with another 21 wounded by pro-government gunmen dressed as civilians

(Rabi, 2015).

The President proposed at the end of February the formation of a national unity government in

accordance with Yemeni law and constitution. The aim of the proposal was to prevent the

34

country from deteriorating into chaos. However, when the march 18th protests, security

personnel opened fire on the protesters killing 52 and wounding hundreds, the government

and military officials started defecting.

5.1.2.3 Conflict between groups within the political system

President Saleh’s rule in Yemen seems in hindsight destined to expire before he abdicated.

Before the Arab spring arrived in Yemen, the government was facing challenges to its

legitimacy and was forced to face the Houthi rebellion in the north, a secessionist movement

in the south as well as Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula in the east of the country.

The Houthi movement also referred to as Ansar Allah has its roots in the protection of the

minority Zaydi Shias against political exclusion and marginalization. Furthermore, their initial

aims were to end the proselytizing by Saudi-backed Salafi/Wahhabi (an extreme branch of

Sunni Islam) institutes in their stronghold in the northern province of Saada. Even though

there are fundamental differences between Zaydi Shias and Iranians Twelver Shiism, their

ideational proximity is still greater to that of Sunni Islam (Juneau, 2016; Ruys and Ferro,

2016).

Furthermore, AQAP (al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula) and the Houthi rebels did clash on

occasions leading to battlefield setbacks and the hands of Houthi forces. The Houthis fast

advancement led some Sunni tribes to align with the AQAP against what was observed as a

common threat. This common threat was due to clashes which the Sunni tribes had

encountered with the Houthis. The violence in Yemen continued to spiral out of control when

ISIL gruesomely announced its presence in Yemen and attacked two Shiite mosques in Sanaa

(Laub, 2015).


In April 2011, the GCC, which Saudi Arabia is a member, initiated efforts to negotiate a

peaceful transition of power in Yemen. The opposition and President Saleh meet in Riyadh

and signed a deal which was to become known as the Gulf initiative. The outcome of that deal

lead to Houthi expansionism.

Houthi success heavily frustrated Saudi Arabia which has been blaming the Iranians to be

behind the Houthis success, going as far as referring to them as Iranian proxies. Iran have

35

been denying these claims but the US has been accusing Iran smuggling weapons to the

Houthis since before 2011. To stop the increased influence, into what Saudi Arabia claims to

be its back yard and when the adding the fear of the Shia crescent and encirclement which it

was facing. Therefore, Riyadh felt compelled to act, while Tehran´s reaction publicly

welcomed the Houthi victory (Juneau, 2016; Bayoumy and Ghobari, 2014; Zweiri, 2016).

Saudi Arabia and its main allies justified their actions in Yemen through a letter to the

Security Council on the 26 March 2015. The first argument is that President Hadi requested

the support to protect Yemen and its people from Houthi aggression. Second, refers to the

Houthi movement as puppets and their resent actions as foreign-instigated against Yemen and

therefore constitute a threat to regional and international security and peace. Third, Riyadh

argued that the presence of heavy weaponry beyond the control of the legitimate Yemeni

authorities, the build-up of a military presence on its southern border and former attacks

against Saudi Arabia in 2009 when considering all the factors together, qualified as a severe

threat to the region in general and Saudi Arabia in particular (Ruys and Ferro, 2016).

The strongest reaction regarding the legality of Saudi actions came unsurprisingly from

Tehran. Iran condemned the air raids on Yemen saying it was in flagrant defiance against the

most basic principles of international law referring to the purpose and principles of the

Charter of the United Nations. The obligation to refrain from the use of treat or violence in

international relations. Furthermore, Ayatollah Khamenei called the intervention ‘a genocide

that can be prosecuted in [international] courts’ (Ayatollah Khamenei in Ruys and Ferro,

2016:68).


objectives.

Riyadh summoned a coalition of Sunni states including; UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain,

Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, and Sudan to intervene in Yemen. The intervention came

on the request of the President Hadi two days before fleeing the country to Riyadh (Zweiri,

2016). However, this was not Saudi Arabia’s first intervention against the Houthis, back in

November 2009, Riyadh intervened militarily due to alarming instability on its southern flank

and at the prospect of a possible Iran-backed movement taking root in northern Yemen. Saudi

Arabia fired on Houthi positions with artillery and fighter aircraft which was followed by a

36

naval blockade to prevent weapons from reaching the Houthis in the north-western coast of

Yemen (Janeau, 2016).

Before the intervention in December 2014, Riyadh suspended aid to Yemen, because ot was

angered by the Houthi success and growing power. On 26 of March 2015 Saudi Arabia

together with its regional (predominantly Sunni) allies launched Operation Decisive Storm.

The operation formally lasted until 22 April 2015 when military objectives where allegedly

fulfilled after which Operation Renewal of Hope began. The second operation was not

fundamentally different from the first on terms of the continues bombardment of Houthi

strongholds, however it was different in its focus on the political process which would restore

Yemen from a state of chaos to stability and security (Ruys and Ferro, 2016).

Evidence which supports the allegation that Iran has ties with the Houthi movement are

limited. For example, on the 23 January 2013 Yemeni authorities apprehended an arms vessel,

“Jihan 1” which allegedly was bound for the Houthis. The shipment contained Iranian

weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, ammunition Katyusha rockets, heat-seeking surface-to-

air missiles as well as artillery systems. Tehran has denied any connection with the arms

found on the vessel (Bayoumy and Ghobari, 2014).

The Houthis also signed an agreement with Iran after capturing Sanaa which permitted 14

flights per week between the two states. Furthermore, there are indications that the IRGC

personnel trained Houthis. Not to mention that the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen in their

findings noted that after the Houthis took control of Sanaa they immediately released Iranian

prisoners which indicated to the depth of the relationship. As well as evidence, which

suggests that the Houthis are firing rockets on Saudi Arabia using Iranian targeting systems.

(Bayoumy and Ghobari, 2014, Ruys and Ferro, 2016).

5.1.3 Bahrain

5.1.3.1 Civil strife or political instability

Protests erupted in Bahrain following the uprising which saw the departure of longtime

Egyptian dictator Hosni Mubarak on 11 February 2011. On 14 February 2011, the major

uprising began. The major protests found their way to the “Pearl Roundabout” which like,

Tahirih square in Egypt, became the center of the uprising. The initial demands of the

protesters where many but centered on political reform which included the altering of the

37

constitution, expansion of the powers of the Council of Representatives (COR), ending of

gerrymandering which prevented Shia population from winning a majority in the COR,

greater economic opportunities, and the resignation of hard-liner Prime Minister Khalifa

(Katzman in Buck and McPherson, 2012).

Following the events on the 17 and 18 February, protesters re-entered the Peal Roundabout

and head large demonstrations. 22 February 2011, and three days later two of the largest

demonstrations in Bahraini history took place. The governments concessions; offers of dialog;

sacking of cabinet members; and pulling back security forces did not appease the

demonstrators which lead to maximalist demands (ibid).

Anger with the government and their initial use of force lead one of the main opposition

groups to demand the outright resignation of the monarchy. While other opposition groups

were willing to accept the formation of a constitutional monarchy. With no initiated dialog,

protests started to escalate and on 1 March 2011, protesters blocked the entrance to the

parliament building. Moreover, on 13 March 2011, protesters blocked the financial district in

the capital Manama which feed in to the governments fears that the unrest would suffocate its

financial sector (ibid).

5.1.3.2 Coerciveness of political regimes

Early morning 17 February 2011, the unrest took on a new dimension when security forces

surrounded the protesters and used force and teargas to drive the protesters out of the Pearl

roundabout. Consequently, four demonstrators were killed while others subsequently died due

to injuries suffered. The government claimed that they had warned protesters of the imminent

move. Despite the presence of security forces protests resumed on 18 February 2011 and

security forces shot several demonstrators (Katzman in Buck and McPherson, 2012).

On 19 February 2011 Bahrain chose to withdraw its security forces from the Pearl roundabout

due to increased pressures from its western allies. A week later, King Hamad Al Khalifa

sacked several posts in the cabinet, included two family members, which could influence

economic opportunities, hoping to appease protesters. Moreover, King Hamad visited Saudi

Arabia on February 23 in order to consult his ally on how to handle the protests in Bahrain

(ibid).

38

As protests escalated in March 2011 Bahrain invited direct security assistance from its allies

in the GCC which it is a member of on the March. Following the invitation, a three months

long state of emergency was declared by the Bahraini government which was followed by

forceful suppression of demonstrators together with its allies and saw the arrests of dissident

leaders (ibid).

5.1.3.3 Conflict between groups within the political system:

The demonstrations expressed Shia grievance regarding the distribution of power and

economic opportunities that where not satisfied by limited efforts to include the Shia majority

in governance. Much of the Sunnis minority, which make up 30-40 percent of the Bahraini

citizens, believe that the Shia majority will not be satisfied by nothing less than absolute rule

(Katzman in Buck and McPherson, 2012).

Amongst the Shia protesters, a consistent theme was the end of a sense that they were “second

class citizen” or “not trusted” as Bahraini citizens. Following the events on 17 February 2011,

Foreign Minister, Khalid Al Khalifa claimed that event at Pearl Roundabout was necessary to

avoid “sectarian abyss”, a civil conflict between Shia and Sunnis. The protests in the

beginning of March 2011 saw an increase in clashes between Sunnis and Shia which some

believed would evolve into outright sectarian conflict (ibid).

The involvement of external forces the crackdown by Bahraini and allied forces lead to seven

Shia leaders being arrested as well as the demolishment of unlicensed Shia religious structures

and according to Shia clerics, the destruction of 38 mosques. This and the invited crackdown

lead to the resignation of several Shia ministers in the cabinet, the Shura Council and in senior

posts in the judiciary (ibid; Mabon, 2012).


Before the Bahraini intervention several GCC states began to fear what impact the Bahraini

unrest would have on the Persian Gulf. There was expressed fear that Iran might be able to

exploit the unrest for its gain. Bahrain is the only GCC member with a Shia majority, however

other countries including Saudi Arabia have a minority present. The 16 February 2011, GCC

foreign ministers met and expressed solidarity with the Bahraini government (Katzman in

Buck and McPherson, 2012).

39

According to the GCC mission the aim was “to support the government against its domestic

challengers and deter Iran from becoming embroiled in the conflict […] the warning was

clear: desist or be made to desist” (Mabon, 2012: 3).

On 21 March 2011 King Hamad of Bahrain indirectly accused Iran of being involved in the

unrest and referring to it as a “foreign plot” which had been foiled by GCC assistance. On 17

April 2011, “the Bahraini government sent a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon

formally alleging that the pro-Bahrain Shiite faction Hezbollah is seeking to destabilize

Bahrain with “logistical help” from unnamed countries (but clearly referring to Iran)”

(Katzman in Buck and McPherson, 2012:30). Furthermore, the two states withdrew their

ambassadors in mid-March.


objectives.

Following Bahraini King Hamad´s visit to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia together with UAE pledged

aid which according to reports amounted up to 20 billion USD. Saudi Arabia answered the

Bahraini governments call for additional security forces. Saudi Arabia answered on the 14

March 2011, by sending 1200 security forces with 20 tanks and other armored vehicles. Saudi

forces and police from the UAE took up positions around key infrastructure in and around

Manama. Furthermore, Kuwait committed naval forces so that Bahrain could secure its

maritime borders (Katzman in Buck and McPherson, 2012).

Former U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain testified on 21 September 2011 of the issue of Iranian

involvement in Bahrain. Former Ambassador Krajeski “saw no evidence of Iranian

instigation” (Krajeski in Buck and McPherson, 2012:30) of unrests but continued to say that

the U.S. is concerned “about Iranian exploitation” (Krajeski in Buck and McPherson,

2012:30) of the situation.

U.S. officials reportedly believed that Iran had urged hardline Shia opposition in Bahrain not

to compromise. Moreover, on 14 April 2011, similar reports surfaced regarding Tehran’s

internal debate in regards to how much aid, if any, to supply to the Bahraini opposition. On 16

May 2011, Iranian war vessels began an effort to transport 150 pro-Bahrain opposition Shia to

Bahrain but ultimately turned around due to fears of provoking clashes with GCC ships.

40

5.1.4 Egypt


Inspired by events in Tunisia, Egyptians realized that meaningful political change was

accomplishable through demonstrations. Eleven days after the departure of the Tunisian

President to Saudi Arabia, on 25 January 2011 tens of thousands of Egyptians gathered in

Cairo´s Tahrir Square to protest the economic conditions, police brutality, political repression,

and corruption. Furthermore, they called for President Hosni Mubarak’s resignation (Erickson

Nepstad, 2013)

By 7 February 2011 protests had increased to 1.5 million in Cairo and demanded regime

change. The government responded to the protests by making conceptions including promises

for re-election. Protesters not being discouraged buy these promises the protest persisted. By

11 February it had become clear that the military had completely jumped ship, realizing this

Mubarak resigned and fled to Sharm Sharm el-Sheikh (ibid).

Following the departure of Mubarak, the military took over in the form of the Supreme

Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the committee consisted of twenty senior generals and

assumed all legislative and executive power. SCAF immediately suspended the consistent and

dispended the parliament and announced plans to supervise elections for parliament and

presided as well as the drafting of a new constitution which it presided over (Rutherford in

Haas and Lesch, 2013).

The 30 June 2013 marked the one year anniversary of President Morsi´s inauguration, it also

marked the largest protest in Egypt since those in January and February 2011. In the prelude

to those demonstrations there where sporadic outbursts of violence. One of these where the

attack by anti-government activists on the offices of the ruling Muslim Brotherhood party in

eastern Cairo (Housden, 2013).

The protests in Tahir Square on the 30 June 2013 shifted the army’s position towards the

government. On 1 July 2013, the army presented President Morsi with an ultimatum. Either

address the porters demands within 48 hours or it would create a new road for the country.

Despite a defiant speech by Morsi, on 2 July 2011 General el-Sisi announced the dissolution

of the government and the establishment of an interim administration which was to mandated

41

to amend the constitution and eventually hold fresh parliamentary and presidential elections

(ibid).


The government responded by sending the military to put down the protests. However, instead

of cracking down on the civil resistance, the military defended them from aggressive police

and paramilitary groups. On 29 January 2011, the military once again openly refused to open

fire on the civil resistance and proclaiming that it was siding with the movement (Erickson

Nepstad, 2013).

In the lead up to 30 June 2013 protests, Morsi had warned opposition protesters and referred

to them as “thugs” and labeled them as a threat to the revolution. The army initially declared

that it would interfere in behalf of the government of the protests would spiral out of control.

On the 23 of June Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, head of SCAF, called on all sides to settle their

differences (Housden, 2013).

5.1.4.3 Conflict between groups within the political system

Egypt is one of the countries during the Arab spring where the military sided with the

protesters, it also happens to be one of the more homogeneous societies in MENA. Being over

whelming Sunni Muslim with a Coptic Christian minority which plays an important social

role but not political. The military in Egypt is relatively professional and is not ethically or

religiously polarized. Furthermore, it does not serve as a personal instrument of the ruler

(Gause III, 2011).

Violence against Coptic Christians spiked following the revolution that overthrew Hosni

Mubarak. The Egyptian state has done little to remedy the situation and has at times enabled

the conflict between Muslims and Christians. When Copts are physically attacked, the army

and police frequently do not intervene to ensure public safety, enabling the spread of assaults.

Assailants from the northern Sinai to southern Egypt have besieged churches and slain Coptic

clergy and laypersons (Brownlee, 2013).


The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s initial expressed stance towards the Egyptian government

called for stability rather than revolution (Khatib, 2013). Furthermore, Saudi Arabia

42

discredited protesters in Egypt on Saturday, referring to them as "infiltrators" who sole aim is

to destabilize the country. On the other side an Iranian official called on the Egyptian

government to abide to the demands of the protesters and avoid a violent reaction.

Furthermore, the Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast called on the

Egyptian government to respect the demonstrators (CNN, 2011). “Iran expects Egyptian

officials to listen to the voice of their Muslim people, respond to their rightful demands and

refrain from exerting violence by security forces and police against an Islamic wave of

awareness that has spread through the country in form of a popular movement” (Ramin

Mehmanparast in CNN, 2011).

After the revolution in Egypt, then Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said “In spite of

all the (West's) complicated and satanic designs ... a new Middle East is emerging without the

Zionist regime and US interference, a place where the arrogant powers will have no place”

(Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Henderson, 2011).

Saudi leaders offered no official statement in response to Mubarak´s exit. However, the

previous statements indicate the full support to the longtime Egyptian dictator which has

served as an important regional partner for Riyadh. Saudi Arabia´s then long serving foreign

minister referred to the events as interference in Egyptian affairs and interpreted it as a rare

attack on U.S. policy in the region (Mcdowall, 2011).

“We are astonished at what we see as interference in the internal

affairs of Egypt by some countries, […] We are shocked to see

that there are countries pre-empting even the will of the

Egyptian people” (Saud Al Faisal in Mcdowall, 2011).


objectives.

After the resignation of President Mubarak, a competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran

began which aim was to carry favor with the Egyptian state. A major source of concern to the

Saudis where moves of post-Mubarak leaders in Egypt in attempts to improve their relations

with Iran. Therefore, the house of Saud announced a 4 billion USD aid package to Egypt. It

served as a reminder to officials that patronage is readerly and if future Egyptian policies

where to stray away from the status quo, the support withdrawn as easily as it was offered

(Kamrava, 2012; Marashi and Parsi in Haas and Lesch, 2013).

43

Tehran views various decisions made by post-Mubarak government as an improvement in

comparison to the Mubarak-era relations. The allowing of Iranian warships to pass through

the Suez Canal on their way to Syria, working towards improved Iranian-Egyptian relations

and enabling an increased presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt´s parliament where

policy which to Iran demonstrated less isolation to the west. Even though Egypt has status as

a beacon for the Arab world, its instability prevents it from exerting its influence in the

region. Furthermore, Iran benefits from any degree of Egyptian foreign policy independence.

Therefore, Iran tried to foster relations with the new political actors, however, comparison to

their Saudi rivals they did not commit extensive resources to achieve the desired influence

(ibid).

During that period, there was a diplomatic crisis between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In April

2012, Riyadh recalled its ambassador in Cairo and closed its embassy for several days after

protests erupted in Egypt against the arrest of an Egyptian lawyer and activists in Saudi

Arabia (AlJazeera, 2012).

After the election of President Muhammad Morsi, the competition between Saudi Arabia and

Iran continued for influence in the Egyptian state. Tehran had mounted a diplomatic offensive

to improve relations with Cairo. Therefore, when President Morsi arrived in Riyadh it dealt a

blow to Iran´s post-Mobarak Egyptian strategy. It instead marked a recent wave of

reconciliation with its old regional ally. Furthermore, the trip signaled that Egypt was not

seeking to tip the regional balance towards Iran (ibid, Knickmeyer and Bradley, 2012).

Despite this, Saudi Arabia chose to openly backed the military coup d’état which ousted

President Morsi. Reportedly, Saudi head of intelligence, Prince Bandar bin Sultan had worked

to achieve the desired outcome. Saudi Arabia backed its verbal support for the coup d’état

with an aid package reportedly worth 12 billion USD together with its regional allies, UAE,

and Kuwait (Hearst, 2013).

5.2 Explanatory analysis

Hypothesis: When states observe an offensive opportunity, they lend support to ideational

proximate domestic actors to increase ideational proximity through regime change, therefore

increasing their sphere of influence and power while minimizing costs.

44

It is possible to observe that the duration and intensity of these conflicts is in large part due to

the intervention. In Syria and Yemen, the interventions are on both sides of the conflict, while

in Bahrain it is only one-sided. In the ‘Bahraini case’ foreign intervention crushes the civil

dispute. That is why there was no significant escalation of violence. In that case, third party

intervention lead to the de-escalation of the civil dispute. However, in the Yemeni and Syrian

case, the window of opportunity is larger, therefore enabling interested parties to become

involved. This resulted in two-sided third party intervention on both the behalf of the

opposition and the government leading to the escalation of the civil dispute into a civil war.

The beginning of the Arab Spring saw civil strife and/or political instability spread across the

four presented cases. In Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen the civil strife and/or political instability

was meet by coerciveness from the political regimes. In these same cases, it was possible to

observe third-party interventions. However, in the Egyptian case, the military sided with the

protesters, refusing to open fire which lead to regime change in the ideationally homogeneous

Arab State without third-party intervention.

The Bahraini government´s coerciveness coupled external actions which resulted in the

subjection of the domestic Shia majorities uprising against the Sunni ruling elite. The

transnational ideational polarization which grew out of this destabilization became identified

as a Sunni-Shia rivalry on a regional level. The transnational ideational polarization continued

to spread across the region. This eventually lead to the destabilization of the regimes in Syria

and Yemen which gave the interested parties the opportunity to become involved to affect the

desired outcome; regime change to decrease the ideational distance between the governments,

hence increasing their security, power and influence in the region.

Both Iran and Saudi Arabia observed offensive opportunities to intervene in each other’s

spheres of interest at one another’s expense. The destabilization of regimes in the region

presented governments with the incentive to intervene. However, they did not intervene

directly with their own military capabilities. The reason that states intervene in domestic

conflicts is a mix of multiple factors. The desire to see a regime change is only limited by the

cost, which will only be removed when an observed opportunity to ‘maximize gain’ presents

itself in the form of a civil dispute. When states intervene in one another’s spheres of interest

it is never with ‘boots on the ground’ due to cost concerns. Instead, oppositions aligned with

either Tehran’s or Riyadh´s preferred ideational factors are supported with arms and financial

45

support which is enough to escalate a civil dispute into an armed conflict which aims to

achieve regime change.

In the Syrian case, it was mainly a Sunni opposition which experienced Alawite spearheaded

crackdowns. Following those events, it is possible to observe extensive Saudi financial and

military support to achieve regime change as expressed by the Saudi regime. Moreover, it is

possible to observe Iranian arms transport to the Houthi rebels. Even though the Iranian

government denied these allegations, their actions prove otherwise. Moreover, Iran’s verbal

foreign policy towards the Saudi-led intervention has been hardline, going as far as referring

to it as a ‘genocide’.

When states intervene directly with their own militarily it is predominantly to support their

ally when they are threatened. It is therefore possible to observe that Iran and Saudi Arabia

intervene directly with their own military capacities when their direct ally - and therefore

interests - are under attack from domestic actors which could potentially receive external

support. This could be observed in the way Saudi Arabia acted in both Yemen and Bahrain.

In comparison to how Iran acted in Syria.

In Yemen, the turmoil and instability which followed the Arab Spring presented Iran with an

observed opportunity to increase its power by supporting the Shia group in Yemen. The

Houthi rebels became angered by the proposed post-Arab Spring state structure backed by

Saudis and President Hadi. They seized this opportunity to take power with weapons supplied

by Iran. Saudi Arabia and its Sunni allies in the region reacted to President Hadi´s invitation

to save the government in Yemen. However, ‘no boots on the ground’ where deployed. The

Saudi-led intervention conducted instead aerial bombardment to limit costs.

In Syria, the Saudi government was one of the main actors and supporters of the opposition at

an early stage. However, the situation in Syria did not start to deteriorate significantly until

mid-2012. At that time, Saudi Arabia started to funnel in vast number of arms and money to

defectors from the Syrian Army. There is a correlation between increased defections amongst

Sunni soldiers in the Syrian army and increased arms and money to those defectors. This in

turn affected the situation on the ground but not enough to achieve their goal: regime change.

Moreover, it is possible to observe Riyadh´s unwillingness to become directly involved by

46

observing its interaction with the U.S. in the wake of the Syrian government’s use of chemical

weapons.

Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Syria is due to ideational distance between the regime and an

observed opportunity. Ideational distance between the two governments is observable in their

interactions. Saudi Arabia became frustrated with the Syrian government after its refusal to

engage in Saudi attempts to mediate. Ideational distance between governments make them

suspicious or threatened by one another´s actions, making mediation between them more

difficult. However, if the ideational gap between these states was to diminish then mediation

and other forms of negotiations would not involve high levels of suspicion.

Hence, regime change in State A (capital S since it is a (nick)name) manages to increase the

influence of State B (in this case Saudi Arabia) in it. While at the same time significantly

decreasing State C (Iran) influence. The attempt at regime change in Syria, by Saudi Arabia,

was carried out by limiting the costs because it was not directly engaged with its own military

against the Assad regime. While at the same time trying to pressure the U.S. to become

involved.

In all three cases, which witnessed interventions, there where ideational tensions within

domestic sphere. In both Bahrain and Syria religious minorities where in power. This had left

the majority marginalized in the political sphere. In Yemen, the Shia minority had witnessed

marginalization in Yemeni politics and therefore, the Houthis where established to prevent

that in the future. When the opportunity presented, all three marginalized groups revolted

against their suppressors. The Syrian and Yemeni oppositions came to be aided by foreign

states seeking to intervene and aiming to achieve regime change. However, this was not the

case in Bahrain.

Remove any of the key variables and a complete observation becomes difficult to achieve. If

it is only offensive opportunity which states act upon, then it becomes impossible to explain

the conflicts sectarian nature. Moreover, if it is only ideational distance, we should be

observing more hostile interactions between competing states. The inherit offensive realist

assumption within transnational ideational polarization enables states to support ideationally

proximate actors to decrease ideational distance between the intervener and the intervened.

Consequently, enabling a complete observation.

47

The key to external support is not only the offensive opportunity which transnational

ideational polarization presents but also the window of that opportunity. In both Syria and

Yemen, the window of opportunity is extensive. From the time of initial protests and ensuing

instability until full-fledged civil war is a period of almost a year in the Syrian case. In

comparison to Yemen where the window of opportunity is from the beginning of the

instability in 2011, the ensuing instability during the National dialoged supported by the

Saudi-led GCC initiative and was fulfilled by September 2014 when the Houthis captured

Sanaa.

The window of opportunity which states observe is in both the Yemeni and Syrian cases a

longer period. In comparison to when a state intervenes on behalf of its ally. As soon as Saudi

Arabia observed a potential threat to Bahrain it intervened together with its Sunni allies in the

Gulf to put down the potential uprising. Furthermore, reports regarding the presence of

Iranian republican guards in Syria were as early as the summer of 2011 and were not

confirmed by the Iranian government until later in 2012.

This indicates that the costs of losing an ally surpasses the costs of taking military action to

secure an ally. The interventions by allies have been based on invitation for the states

suffering for a popular uprising. That is why the international norms for costs of intervening

without a U.N. Security Council resolution are absent.

In comparison to Bahrain, where the window of opportunity was very short lived, there was

no time to mobilize the necessary support to the Shia majority to affect the outcome.

Furthermore, it is possible to observe that the support would have arrived after the Saudi-led

GCC intervention and therefore would risk direct confrontation with the Gulf States. The risk

and possible cost of a direct confrontation was too high and therefore Tehran did not proceed

with the intended plan.

The events in Egypt and Bahrain did not become violent enough to warrant a legitimate

outside support against the government. The revolutions in Syria and Yemen on the other

hand, were violent enough to legitimate outside support to opposition fighters which

portrayed them as fighters against tyrants. Furthermore, Iran did not have an ideationally

proximate ally in Egypt. The Muslim brotherhood, although believing in an Islamic republic

is still a Sunni political organization and therefore at odds with the Shia rhetoric of the Islamic

48

republic of Iran. So, the non-action of Iran in Egypt is two folded, whereas Tehran’s non-

action in Bahrain was in large part due to a short-lived window of opportunity.

Even if these states are on the different side of the ideational spectrum their behaviour is still

similar in their regional context. They arm oppositions where they observe an opportunity to

do so. They intervene on behalf of an ally in order to protect it against outside medaling in

domestic affairs. Moreover, their rhetoric is similar; referring to protests in their allied states

as ìnfiltrators´ and òutside medaling in domestic affairs´. This further highlights the high

level of suspicion which exists between Iran and Saud Arabia.

Within the Sunni block there are fundamental ideological and theological divisions which can

be observed in the inter-Sunni state relations. However, when threatened by a Shia state, Iran

and their regional state allies or actors, those differences are put to the side for the time being

until the more urgent threat is dealt with. An example of this is Qatari and Saudi relations and

preferences of actors to support in Egypt and Syria. However, these differences were put to

the side, and Saudi Arabia resumed the mantel as main actor in those cases, and in the GCC.

5.3 Alternative explanations

The geostrategic explanation is an alternative to the one presented in this paper. It argues that

Saudi Arabia’s stance in regards to the Arab Spring was shaped by its geopolitical objectives;

protect the kingdom against the sweeping uprisings, insure the survival of monarchial regimes

in the region, and undermining Iran’s regional power. To achieve these objectives, it used its

military power, financial access, and political power to contain the effects of the uprisings in

Bahrain and Yemen. Simultaneously, it used appropriate means to battle the Syrian regime. In

this argument sectarianism is used as a regional policy instrument to shore up support for its

regional allies and isolate Iran (Salloukh, 2013). Similarly, Iran´s objective is to replace the

current Saudi-led order in the Middle East and therefore acted similar. Using its power to try

to contain the uprising in Syria while supporting the Houthis in Yemen after the missed

opportunity in Bahrain.

Another alternative explanation which potentially could explain why there was no escalation

of violence in Bahrain is related to the presence of the U.S. Navy´s fifth fleet. The

international community remained relatively silent in regards to the Bahraini uprising and the

Saudi-led counterrevolution. The U.S. reluctance to condemn or sanction the Bahraini

49

government was in large part due to the presence of the U.S. Navy´s fifth fleet. The U.S. does

not want to jeopardize one of its key strategic military bases in the Middle East. Additionally,

the presence of Saudi-led counterrevolutionary force in Bahrain further complicated the

situation. Any actions against Bahrain could strain U.S.-Saudi relations because the Saudis

had already sided with the Khalifa family (Erickson Nepstad, 2013). The power of Saudi

Arabia in its alliance with the U.S. and liberal democracies seems to limit cost related

international norms when it acts. This could be observed in both Bahrain and Yemen. The

U.S. and its allies did not react to the same extent as in Syria. In Syria, the presence of the

Russian naval facility in Tartus seemed to affect the norms for cost negatively when Moscow

intervened. Moreover, the presence of the Russian naval facility did not prevent the escalation

or downplay the intervention of Syrian allies.

Another explanation is the failure of the global powers to act and stop the carnage in Syria

and Yemen. This prompted regional actors to support local opposition groups to prevent the

slaughter of innocents. Therefore, making the interventions in these two cases strictly

humanitarian with no alternative motivations. In Syria, the inability or unwillingness of global

powers to intervene similarly to how they intervened in Libya motivated and enabled Saudi

Arabia’s intervention to stop the slaughter brought about by the regime. Similarly, the

argument follows that Riyadh intervened on behalf of the Yemeni government when the

Houthi rebels acted aggressively and therefore threatened the civilian population. Moreover,

Iran went as far as calling the Saudi intervention in Yemen a ‘genocide’ thereby legitimizing

their humanitarian intervention in support of the Houthis. The interests of great powers

constrain or enable regional powers to act even when ideational conflicts are evident. The

unwillingness or inability of great powers to act enables regional powers to act. Likewise,

great power intervention makes regional action obsolete because the desired outcome, regime

change to increase ideational proximity, is achieved at a minimal cost for the regional power.

Discussion

There is empirical support for the offensive realist constructivist hypothesis proposed in this

research paper. The descriptive analysis manages to present an adequate account of the events

in each case which lead foreign states to intervene and therefore manages to answer the

50

research questions. If any of the variables where to be eliminated, a complete observational

explanation of the outcomes in the cases would be difficult to achieve.

This paper would have benefited from including multiple Sunni states in the region rather

than just Saudi Arabia. Even if Riyadh is one of the main actors in the region it is not the only

one. In Syria for example, there are multiple Sunni states invested in the opposition, including

Turkey and Qatar. Without the former the opposition would not have had a place to organize

and operate from. The latter is together with Saudi Arabia one of the main suppliers of arms

and funding. Furthermore, the paper would have benefited from elaboration in the Sunni

divide between mainly Qatar and Saudi Arabia and their power struggle for domination in the

GCC. Today, we know that Saudi Arabia managed to remain as the leading state. However,

this division did lead to fractioned support to multiple actors in Syria.

In the Yemeni and Bahraini case the intervention, even though it is Saudi-led, is still a GCC

indicative. Therefore, this paper would greatly have benefited from the expansion to observe

the GCC and Iran. What would have complicated that study is the rivalries which exist within

the GCC, namely the Saudi-Qatari rivalry. However, it would possibly become too large to

conduct that study and therefore it is suggested for future research.

This paper would have benefited from multiple hypotheses to demonstrate how the presented

hypothesis is best suited to explain third party interventions in civil disputes. By testing

multiple hypotheses on the empirical record, it would have become clearer that the formulated

hypothesis provides most explanatory value. The other hypotheses could have been

formulated from only an offensive realist position or constructivist to demonstrate how the

merger of the two would achieve a complete observation. Even though this paper has been

able to demonstrate that the merger is not only possible but should be encouraged, multiple

hypotheses would have made this contribution clearer.

Formulating multiple hypotheses could have been possible to do if another method would

have been used. An alternative method could have been structured focused on comparison.

More specifically; theory testing within that method, because it enables the researcher to

determine which of the two or more theories is best suited to explain a general phenomenon

(George and Bennett, 2005).

51

The limitations of this paper are in accordance with the purpose; to examine third-party

interventions, specifically, Saudi Arabia, Iran´s interventions in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen,

and the non-intervention in Egypt with the Arab Spring as a back drop and therefore a point of

departure. Therefore, the paper has utilized the Arab Spring as a point of departure,

specifically from 2011 which saw the revolution in Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen. It has

been limited to the end of 2015 because of Saudi intervention during that year.

Furthermore, ignoring deviant or non-cases would have been dangerous for a paper if it is to

achieve reliability and validity. If they were to be ignored it is reasonable to question all the

findings in the paper.

Conclusion

The aim of this paper has been to examine foreign interventions in domestic conflicts and

does so by answering the question; under what conditions are states more likely to intervene

in domestic disputes to promote regime change? The paper manages to answer the research

question by asking; ‘What made Saudi Arabia intervene in Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen?’, and;

‘What made Iran intervene in Syria and Yemen?’. To answer the research question

comparative historical analysis method has been utilized. Four cases have been chosen to

examine; both sided intervention in Yemen and Syria, single sided intervention in Bahrain

and the non-intervention in Egypt. One hypothesis has been formalized utilizing offensive

realist constructivist theory and the empirical material has been presented, tested, and

discussed accordingly to assess its explanatory value. Consequently, there is strong empirical

support for the presented hypothesis which utilized a merger of offensive realism and

constructivism to achieve a complete observation of Iran and Saudi Arabia´s actions after the

beginning of the Arab Spring. For future research, it would be interesting to expand the

observations made in this paper to include global actors such as the U.S. and Russia rather

than just regional actors of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, it would be interesting to expand

on the offensive realist constructivist theory and make it a system level theory to explain

interventions beyond MENA.

52

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Stockholm University

SE-106 91 Stockholm

Phone: 08 – 16 20 00

www.su.se

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http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm

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Simon Tawaifi 2016-Independet research project- International Masters programme in Political Science

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