Situating the Mortar in the Future of the British Army: Vision for 2020+

Colonel John Musgrave

Assistant Director Offensive Support Combat Support Capability Directorate

HQ Army

Context behind Artillery Involvement in this Conference

If Mortars are operated in the British ORBAT by the Infantry so why should a Royal Artillery Officer be talking to you?

My response is:

We need to look at Joint Fires support to the manoeuvre battle in its totality

Hence given that it is the total effect that is required we need to recognise that their may be balance of investment decisions between components

The artillery have lead the way in technology fields which may be applicable to mortars

The British artillery has a formal responsibility to certify mortars before operational deployment

I will contend that greater synergy is required

Scope

Historical context

Strengths and weaknesses of the Mortar as part of the Joint Fires support of the Manoeuvre Battle

Possible Capability Enhancement:

Defining the Spectrum of Precision

Addressing the Accuracy of Unguided Shells/Bombs

Balance Between ‘True Precision’, Course Corrected and Unguided Bombs, Shells and Rockets

Opportunities for Longer Range

Universal Observers?

Summary

Historical Context

Direct support ‘battalion’ guns (usually a pair of 3 or 4 Pounders) have been attached to infantry units since the 17th Century

In addition Field artillery has been largely been used in direct support of infantry until longer range small arm fire forced the indirect fire revolution and the resultant deep battle

Hence, for most armies, the close support role switched in WW1 to mortars; weapons that had hither to been restricted to siege warfare

Why the Mortar is an Ideal Infantry Support Weapon?

Low velocity, and for fin-stabilised, no requirement to withstand the rotational forces allows the bomb to have greater explosive yield than a similarly sized artillery shell

Together with a high rate of fire this equals high lethality in return for a small crew:

WW2 Operational Analysis determined that the 3” Mortar caused twice the casualties as similarly crewed Vickers Medium Machine Gun

Easy to operate

Ability to engage targets in cover with plunging fire

Ease of concealing and protecting

Transportability over almost any terrain

It is not as burdened by the logistical support needed for artillery

Resultant Disadvantages

Low velocity = short range = cannot adequately support armoured manoeuvre

Fin stabilised = reduced accuracy

Plunging fire = high trajectory = instant WLR detection and thus counter fire

Easy to operate = reluctance to increase technology

All terrain mobility = man-portable = slow into and out of action

Light logistics = inability to sustain high rate of fire

Challenges for the Mortar

Capability Areas to Address:

Greater accuracy and consistency

Range

Increased agility to avoid counter fire

Deductions:

Recognition that the current compromises in a single general purpose mortar (81mm) whilst providing excellent support in dismounted operations is inadequate for armoured CAM

Requirement to embrace technological enhancements whilst keeping the system simple

Greater Accuracy and Consistency

Defining the Spectrum of Artillery Precision

‘True’ Precision Cat 1 Target

Location Error

Unregistered Fire

Either guided weapons or precision weapons

using mensurate target coordination

Near Precision Modern Artillery

Some Post 1917 Artillery

Artillery Problem not adequately understood or

addressed

Spectrum of Precision: Artillery Balance of Investment

‘True’ Precision Cat 1 Target

Location Error

Unregistered Fire

Either guided weapons or precision weapons

using mensurate target coordination

Near Precision Modern Artillery

Some Post 1917 Artillery

Artillery Problem not adequately understood or

addressed

Balance of Investment Area for

Modern Artillery

Indirect Fire

Inefficient

Spectrum of Mortar Precision

‘True’ Precision Cat 1 Target

Location Error (TLE)

Unregistered Fire

Either guided weapons or precision weapons

using mensurate target coordination

Near Precision Modern Artillery

Some Post 1917 Artillery

Artillery Problem not adequately understood or

addressed

Mortars with Course

Corrected Fuses & Cat 1

TLE

Mortars systematically

addressing accuracy

Most Mortars reliant on

‘shooting out the error’

Addressing the Accuracy of Unguided Shells

Met: 300 – 350m

Survey:

Fixation: 100m

Survey Orientation: 5mils

Gun Laying: 2mils

MV Calibration (including ballistics)

Wear / AMV error 3 m/s

Occasion to Occasion 3 m/s

(during Fire Missions)

Charge Temperature 4 degrees

Addressing the Accuracy of Unguided Shells

Met: 300–350m 100–150m

Survey:

Fixation: 100m 10m

Survey Orientation: 5mils 0.5mils

Gun Laying: 2mils 1mils

MV Calibration (including ballistics)

Wear / AMV error 3 m/s 2 m/s

Occasion to Occasion 3 m/s 3 m/s

(during Fire Missions)

Charge Temperature 4 degrees 1 degree

Error Budget Breakdown

Met 60%

Calibration, MV 25%

Survey 15%

Where does the RA stand in addressing its error budget?

Met : RA have addressed most of the savings

Calibration, MV : greater accuracy can be delivered (adopting MVs round to round)

Survey: greater accuracy can be delivered in target location during mobile operations

Utility of Course-Corrected Fuzes

Status. Several contenders including the European Course Corrected Fuse (ECF) and Precision Guidance Kits (PGK) which is currently deployed with US 120mm Mortars

Limitations. Needs an accurate grid and most of the mortars error accounted for

Analysis:

Delivers significantly improved accuracy at least c30M CEP over all ranges

Separating accuracy and consistency from range therefore makes Base Bleed and RAP effective

Pointless for Smoke and Illumination

Deductions on the Utility of Course-Correction

Will allow increase in range through countering the inaccuracy of Base Bleed or RAP

Will allow effective first round fire

Impact of a ‘circular’ as opposed to a ‘cigar’ distribution of fire on close support tactics

However. Requires all the other elements of the error budget to be addressed increasing the overall complexity of the mortar system

True Precision

Static Target. accurately and consistently hitting a point (usually described as a grid reference)

Base Assembly

Warhead Assembly

CAS GNU

GNC

Fins Canards

HOB Sensor

Radome

Increment IB

•Mobile Target: •either a Man-in-Loop to guided the projectile to the target (usually indirectly through designating with a laser or directly ‘flying’ the projectile); or • the projectile having its own target seeking capability

Excalibur

What is Criteria to Judge the Correct Balance between Precision and Guided Projectiles

The RA believes that posing a choice between ‘precision’ and ‘suppression’ is false and divisive, principally because:

Modern artillery area fires are precise

Suppression is an effect on the target

The true choice is between:

the level of accuracy and consistency required to effectively engage a target;

recognising that the nature of the target and its environment (own troop safety and avoidance of collateral damage) will dictate the level of precision

‘Just as the machine gun is a valid choice to engage an area target in the direct fire battle so are, in many circumstances,

unguided shells’

Integrating Joint Fires: Fire Support Team (FST)

FST Commander Arty Controller

Signaller Driver

Forward Air Controller

Mortar Fire Controller

Attack Helicopter Controller

Arty Controller

Fire Support Team (FST)

MORTAR FST COMD ARTY

ATTACK HEL

FAC

• Precision Fire (Cat 1 TLE) through: • FIRESTORM differential GPS and laser range finder • Mensuration applications

• Long range location and identification • Communications

• Ground to Ground • Ground to Air • Data transfer

• Down load of full motion video

Merging of Artillery and Mortar Observers?

Option 1: Separate capabilities with limited effective integration

Option 2: Building on the FST concept look at further integration of the two separate capabilities

Option 3: Universal observer trained to cover all aspects of the Joint Fires system

Wireless Ridge – Falklands 1982

‘In contrast to their battle at Goose Green, this time 2 Para could call on massive fire support. The support units included two Batteries of artillery, or five in total if the situation became desperate, HMS Ambuscade, 3 Para's mortars as well as their own and they had

two Scorpion and two Scimitar tanks’

Summary

In the British inventory the 60mm mortar is hugely effective in its role, as is the 81mm mortar on current operations, however this capability has not embraced enhancements possible due to the revolution in the Joint Fires capability

The role of the mortar in support of dismounted infantry remains at least as important as previously, but the current 81mm:

Unmodified its role in armoured operations is problematic;

it can be greatly enhanced through addressing the Met/Survey/calibration error budget;

Course Corrected Bombs offer a further significant accuracy enhancement; and

with base bleed/RAP a real increase in range

Further integration into the Joint Fires capability are possible

Questions?