Sizewell Off Site Emergency Plan - Suffolk Resilience · Sizewell Off Site Emergency Plan Issue 3.6...

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Sizewell Off Site Emergency Plan Issue 3.6 dated Oct 18

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Sizewell Off Site Emergency Plan

Author: Suffolk Joint Emergency Planning Unit on behalf of Suffolk County Council/Suffolk Resilience Forum

Date of Implementation: 31 Oct 2018

Review: 3 Yearly – Next Major Review due when REPPIR 19 comes into force

Version Issue 3.6


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GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATIONS 2016/679 AND DATA PROTECTION ACT 2018

This plan does not include personal, sensitive or special category data as defined under the General Data Protection Regulations. It does include data/information relevant to achieve planning arrangements and identifies how more specific personal data will be used during any emergency.

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000

This document will be made publicly available through the SRF website. Where content has been redacted under the freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOI) in the publicly available version, the paragraph number will be highlighted to show there has been a redaction and the relevant section of FOI referenced.

ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION REGULATIONS 2004 (IF REQUIRED)

This plan presumes disclosure of all environmental information, under Environment Information Regulations. Where exemptions are claimed under Environment Information Regulation 12 (5)a, this will only be where one of the responder agencies has judged that the information may adversely affect either international relations, defence, national security or public safety. Where such content has been identified, the paragraph number will be highlighted and the paragraph text removed from public versions of the plan.

PROTECTIVE MARKING

This plan uses the Government Protective Marking System to ensure that any sensitive information within this document is protected according to its degree of sensitivity.

STATEMENT OF COPYRIGHT

This document is subject to copyright legislation and no part or parts thereof shall be copied by any means without the approval of the Head of Emergency Planning, Suffolk Joint Emergency Planning Unit, Endeavour House, 8 Russell Road, Ipswich IP1 2BX.

REVIEW This plan will be reviewed by the Suffolk Joint Emergency Planning Unit on behalf of Suffolk County Council and in conjunction with the Sizewell Emergency Planning Consultative Committee at least every 3 years. Earlier reviews will take place if there is a change in ionising work carried out by either Sizewell operator, if there is a change in legislation or if information from other radiation emergencies and exercises where lessons are identified Any amendments will be issued by way of replacement page(s). Should significant changes be required, a complete re-issue of the plan will take place.


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CONTENTS

Document Management Contents Distribution Glossary Amendment Record References INTRODUCTION 1. Legal Requirement 2. Plan Aim & Objectives 3. Public Consultation 4. Wider civil emergency arrangements

BACKGROUND 5. Licensed Nuclear Site Information 6. Nuclear Operator Emergency Arrangements Summary 7. Hazard Assessment 8. Response Planning Assumptions 9. Emergency Planning Zones 10. Concurrent Risks ALERTING

11. Declaration States 12. Cancellation of Declaration 13. Emergency Responder Alerting/Notification Process 14. Plan Activation PUBLIC WARNING AND INFORMING 15. Public Information Zone 16. Sizewell beach and campsites 17. Wider Public Information 18 Vulnerable Groups 19. Alerting the Public 20. Information during emergencies NUCLEAR EMERGENCY RESPONSE 21. Response Actions 22. Coordination of response and recovery 23. STAC 24. Public Countermeasures 25. Security Incidents 26. Public Health 27. Humanitarian Assistance


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28. Radiation Monitoring 29. Capability Requirement 30. Generation of National Support and Mutual Aid NUCLEAR EMERGENCY RESPONSE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITES 31. Role and Responsibilities COMMUNICATIONS 32. Media Coordination 33. Communications Systems 34 Key Contact Numbers TRAINING AND EXERCISE 35. Training 36. Exercise 37 Lessons Identified RECOVERY 38. Recovery APPENDICES: A. Sizewell Hazard And Risk Overview B. Detailed Emergency Planning Zone C. Extended Emergency Planning Zone D. Advice for Schools E. Advice for Children Centres F. Advice for Care Homes G SCG Response Timeline Guide H. Command, Control and Coordination Diagram I. Key Emergency Services Locations J Standard Countermeasure Advice Template K. Evacuation L. Security Incidents M. Environmental Monitoring Locations N Capability Requirements O. Recovery Arrangements This document is hyperlinked to navigate when viewed online to: APPENDICES Weblinks Material linked by website can also be found on the www.suffolkresilience.com website

http://www.suffolkresilience.com/


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DISTRIBUTION

Organisation

National Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy - Nuclear Emergency Planning

Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government - RED Advisor

Ministry of Defence (MoD) - Joint Regional Liaison Officer

Maritime & Coastguard Agency

Food Standards Agency

Environment Agency – Nuclear Regulation Group (South) and Incidents & Emergencies Business Partner

Office for Nuclear Regulation – EP&R

Civil Nuclear Constabulary – Contingency Planning Department

Public Health England (PHE) - Centre for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards (CRCE)

Magnox Ltd: - Emergency Planning Group. - Sizewell A - EHSS&Q Manager

EDF Energy- Nuclear Generation: - Head of Emergency Preparedness Emergency Planning Group, - Sizewell B - T&SS Manager

Essex & Suffolk Water

Anglian Water

UKPN

RIMNET

Regional NHS England – Midlands and East - East (Head of Emergency Preparedness, Resilience and Response)

Public Health England – East of England

East of England Ambulance Service – Resilience Manager (Suffolk)

Local

Suffolk Constabulary - Contingency Planning Manager

Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service - Resilience Manager

Ipswich & East Suffolk Clinical Commissioning Group - Emergency Planning Manager

Suffolk County Council - Director of Public Health - AD Integrated Services, CYP (redacted) - AD Schools Organisation & Infrastructure (redacted) - AD Highways & Transport (redacted) - Head of Communications (redacted)

Suffolk Coastal and Waveney DCs (Redacted Version) - Head of Strategic Housing & Tenant Services

JEPU (via Suffolk Resilience Forum (SRF) Website): - Deputy Head of Emergency Planning (for Suffolk CC) - District Emergency Planning Officer (for Suffolk Coastal DC)

Suffolk Resilience Website (Redacted Version)


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GLOSSARY

ABBREVIATION/TERM DESCRIPTION

ACP Access Control Point - on site

ACPO Association of Chief Police Officers

ALARP As low as reasonably possible

‘beyond design basis’ a very low frequency, high consequence radiation emergency which is not reasonably foreseeable (as defined in REPPIR para 206)

BEIS Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy

CCA Civil Contingencies Act 2004

CCR Contact and Control Room - Police

CESC Central Emergency Support Centre - operator national response

CNC Civil Nuclear Constabulary

COBR Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms - national response

CRCE Centre for Radiation, Chemicals and Environmental Hazards

CTA Company Technical Advisor

DEPZ Detailed Emergency Planning Zone – area set by ONR where detailed and immediate off site emergency arrangements are required to protect the public from the effects of a reasonably foreseeable radiation emergency.

‘deterministic effect’ are those which the severity of the effect varies with radiation dose and there is a threshold below which the effect does not occur.

‘dose’ the amount of radiation energy imparted to the human body

DPH Director of Public Health

EA Environment Agency

ECC Emergency Control Centre

EEPZ Extended Emergency Planning Zone - area agreed by SRF where a pre-planning has been completed to allow prompt public protection from the effects of a beyond design basis/reasonable worst case radiation emergency.

‘effective dose’ the sum of dose to whole body from external radiation and from internal radiation.

EHO Environmental Health Officer

‘emergency exposures’ a justified and formally authorised dis-application of dose limits under IRR99 for the purpose of allowing emergency response by pre-identified people to a radiation emergency under REPPIR for the purpose of life-saving or plant intervention tasks

ERL Emergency Reference Levels - used to plan which countermeasure actions would be most suitable in particular circumstances by means of an upper and lower level of avertable dose

ERC Emergency Response Centre – Sizewell B

FCP Forward Command Post - Agreed location where emergency service Operational Commanders (BRONZE) will work from to


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perform the functions of command, control and co-ordination, face to face. Other responders may work from this location to manage operational support provided to the emergency services.

FOB Forward Operating Base

FRSNCC Fire & Rescue Service National Coordination Centre

FSA Food Standards Agency

GLO Government Liaison Officer

GOLD The strategic command and control role which sets emergency response policy and strategy for individual responder agencies.

Gray (Gy) unit of dose - most applicable when expose is likely to lead to deterministic effects (i.e. emergency exposures)

HIRE Hazard and Risk Identification Evaluation

HO Home Office

HSE Health & Safety Executive

IAEA International Atomic Energy Authority

iaw in accordance with

IMG Impact Management Group - part of COBR

‘intervention personnel’ are pre-identified people who respond to prevent or decrease the exposure of persons to radiation from a radiation emergency or from an event which could lead to a radiation emergency.

IRR 99 Ionising Radiations Regulations

JDRA Joint Dynamic Risk Assessment

JEPU Joint Emergency Planning Unit - Local Authorities

JESIP Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Procedure

JRLO Joint Regional Liaison Officer

LGD Lead Government Department

MACA Military Aid to the Civil Authority

MCA Martine & Coastguard Agency

‘major incident’ any emergency that requires implementation of special arrangements by one or all of the emergency services, the NHS or local authorities to: rescue or treat large numbers of casualties, that directly or indirectly involves large numbers of people, that is likely to generate a large number of enquiries by the public or media or which requires the mobilisation of additional emergency services or supporting services.

MCC Media Communications Cell - part of StratCC (can also be referred to as Strategic Media Advice Cell - SMAC)

‘member of the public’ any person not on either Sizewell site, including contractors, or emergency responders.

MHCLG Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government

MOD Ministry of Defence

MRCC Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre

NACC National Ambulance Coordination Centre


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NCAF National Co-ordination and Advisory Framework (Fire)

NCC News Coordination Cell (part of COBR)

NII Nuclear Industry Inspectorate (previous name for ONR)

NNEP&R National Nuclear Emergency Planning & Response

NPoCC National Police Coordination Centre

NRA National Risk Assessment

ONR Office for Nuclear Regulation

OSNE Off Site Nuclear Emergency

PHE Public Health England

PIZ Public Information Zone

PWA Principle Weather Advisor (Met Office)

PWR Pressurised Water Reactor

‘radiation accident’ an accident where immediate action would be needed to prevent or reduce exposure to ionising radiation

‘radiation emergency’ an event which is likely to result in any member of the public being exposed to ionising radiation leading to an effective dose of more than 5mSv per year as defined in REPPIR

RCG Recovery Coordinating Group - part of StratCC, takes over from SCG once response phase ends

‘reasonably foreseeable’

An event which is less than likely but realistically possible (as defined in REPPIR para 50).

‘reasonable worst case’ Designed to exclude theoretically possible scenarios which have so little probability of occurring that planning for them would be likely to lead to disproportionate use of resources (as defined in National Risk Assessment). This results in a challenging scenario after highly implausible scenarios are excluded (National Risk Register)

RED Resilience Emergency Division (part of MHCLG)

REPPIR The Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001

‘REPPIR guidance’ Non-statutory guidance on REPPIR - 1st Edition dated 2002

ResCG Response Coordinating Group

RIMNET Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network

RMU Radiation Monitoring Unit

RVP Rendezvous Point

SAGE Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies - part of COBR

SCG Strategic Coordinating Group - part of StratCC. This where individual agency GOLD’s work together.

SRF Suffolk Resilience Forum – statutory civil contingencies partnership comprising emergency services, local authorities, local health agencies, EA and MCA.

SFRS Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service

stable iodine Non-radioactive (stable) iodine can be used as a countermeasure to greatly reduce the uptake of radioactive iodine to the thyroid. It


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is usually provided in the form of potassium iodate (KIO3) or potassium iodide (KI) tablets

STAC Scientific and Technical Advice Cell - part of StratCC

StratCC Strategic Coordination Centre - local response

TCG Tactical Coordinating Group - local response

UTM Universal Transverse Mercator

Explanation of terms from REPPIR Guidance

Hyperlink to National Resilience Lexicon

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/128797/LEXICON_v2_1_1-Feb-2013.xls


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AMENDMENT RECORD

Amendment No. Date Amended by Reason Issue 3

29 November 2013

Andy Osman

To replace Issue 2.3 dated June 2010.

Issue 3.1

5 May 2014

Andy Osman

Incorporate changes to DEPZ and immediate public countermeasures. Minor change to Public Emergency helpline made on 30 Oct 14.

Issue 3.2 September 2015

Andy Osman Implement Ex EAGLE lessons, including revised OSNE notification form. Change to Suffolk Emergency Helpline number, change to concurrency of on and off site exercises, change to ONR response role, updated Key Emergency Contact Numbers, updated Appendix A risk and Appendix M radiological monitoring map. Updated EDF risk information.

Issue 3.3 January 2016 Andy Osman Update to EEPZ Vulnerability info Appendix C, addition of Galloper ESGT Appendix P, reference to NNEP&R and CBRN decontamination guidance in plan.

Issue 3.4 June 2016 Andy Osman Update to Appendix P only

Issue 3.5 February 2017 Andy Osman Update to Sizewell A and B risk content, change DECC to BEIS and addition of SZB ERC & security – see sideline for changes

Issue 3.6 Xx 2018 Andy Osman Update to Notification/Alerting arrangements (para 13) and Key Contacts (para 34). Removal of Galloper Windfarm arrangements (App P) – see sidelines for changes. Inclusion of GDPR.

Latest amendments are side-lined.

GENERAL REFERENCES

Application of Emergency Reference Levels of Dose in Emergency Planning and Response - Vol 8 No 1 - National Radiological Protection Board 1997. Board Statement on Emergency Reference Levels - Vol 1 No 4 - National Radiological Protection Board 1990. Emergency Preparedness –Guidance on Part 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act - Cabinet Office.

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/423879/NRPB_Vol_1_No_4_1990_-_for_website.pdf

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-preparedness


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Emergency Response & Recovery - Non Statutory Guidance Accompanying the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 - Cabinet Office dated October 2013. Enhanced SAGE Guidance - A strategic framework for the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) - Cabinet Office dated October 2012 Provision of Scientific and Technical Advice in the Strategic Co-ordination Centre: Guidance to Local Responders – Cabinet Office dated April 2007 International Atomic Energy Authority Safety Guide No. GS-G-2.1 - Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency dated 2007. Japanese earthquake and tsunami: Implications for the UK nuclear industry - Final Report - Office for Nuclear Regulation dated September 2011 National Nuclear Emergency Planning & Response Guidance - Department for Energy and Climate Change dated October 2015 Office for Nuclear Regulation Project Assessment Report – ONR-COP-PAR-14-001 dated 23 April 2014 Proposals for changes to Sizewell emergency arrangements: Off Site Emergency Response - Report on the January to April 2013 Public Consultation - Suffolk Resilience Forum dated 2 May 2013 Responding to Emergencies - The UK Central Government Response - Concept of Operations - Cabinet Office dated April 2013. The Lead Government Department and its role – Guidance and Best Practice - Cabinet Office dated March 2004. Strategic National Guidance: The decontamination of buildings, infrastructure and open environment exposed to CBRN materials – Government Decontamination Service dated January 2015

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/emergency-response-and-recovery

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/scientific-advisory-group-for-emergencies-sage

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/provision-of-scientific-and-technical-advice-in-the-strategic-co-ordination-centre-guidance-to-local-responders

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/provision-of-scientific-and-technical-advice-in-the-strategic-co-ordination-centre-guidance-to-local-responders

http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1265web.pdf

http://www.onr.org.uk/fukushima/final-report.pdf

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-nuclear-emergency-planning-and-response-guidance

http://www.onr.org.uk/pars/2014/sizewell-a-14-001.pdf

http://www.suffolkresilience.com/assets/Sizewell-Workshop-Documents/Sizewell-EP-Consultation-SRF-Consutlation-Report-Final-May-13.pdf

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-central-government-s-concept-of-operations

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-central-government-s-concept-of-operations

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61355/lead-government-departments-role.pdf

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/402645/Strategic_National_Guidance_4th_Edition.pdf

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/402645/Strategic_National_Guidance_4th_Edition.pdf


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INTRODUCTION 1. Legal Requirement

1.1 This plan is written in accordance with Regulations 9, 10 and 17 of the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations (2001) REPPIR) which requires Suffolk County Council to:

• Regulation 9 - Prepare an offsite emergency plan for reasonably foreseeable emergencies at Sizewell.

• Regulation 10 - Review and test the Sizewell off site emergency plan at least every 3 years.

• Regulation 17 - Provide information to the public in the event of a radiation emergency.

1.2 This plan also includes information and arrangements in accordance with Regulations 4, 7, 16 of REPPIR that requires the Sizewell operators to:

• Regulation 4 - Identify hazards and evaluate the risks from work with ionising radiation.

• Regulation 7 - Prepare an on site emergency plan for reasonably foreseeable emergencies at Sizewell.

• Regulation 16 - Provide prior information to identifiable population groups that could reasonably be affected by a radiation emergency, this should include information about the risk assessment completed under Regulation 4.

1.3 This plan also covers arrangements for extended nuclear emergency response that is beyond the current legal minimum requirement, but which aligns with international safety standards and national best practice. The approach is called ‘extendibility’ and has been formalised within this plan. 1.4 The National Risk Assessment Planning Assumptions provide a baseline for Local Resilience Forums to plan for risks that are included within the National Risk Assessment. 1.5 This plan sets out the arrangements for managing a security initiated nuclear emergency at Sizewell. 1.6 A response to any radiation emergency is likely to involve multi agency coordination; this plan has been developed and issued under the auspices of the Suffolk Resilience Forum (SRF) partnership. This plan also dovetails with the Operator Emergency Plans and associated Emergency Handbooks for Sizewell A and Sizewell B produced by Magnox Ltd and EDF Energy respectively produced under REPPIR Regulation 7 and LC11. Collectively, the on and off site emergency plans, supported by national plans, provide the integrated emergency arrangements for Sizewell



1.7 Where this plan refers to ‘Sizewell’, it relates to Sizewell B Power Station.

2. Plan Aim & Objectives

2.1 The aim of the Sizewell Off Site Emergency Plan is to provide timely and effective emergency response and recovery activities to restrict the off site exposure to ionising radiation from any radiation emergency at Sizewell in order to protect the public and to manage the spread of radioactive material within the environment.

2.2 The objectives of this plan are to:

• Identify the hazards that the plan will need to cover and the assumptions used to plan the emergency response.

• Identify wider civil emergency plans that will be used during a response to a radiation emergency.

• Specify how the plan will be activated.

• Identify the notification arrangements for responding agencies.

• Indicate how agencies need to initially respond.

• Specify multi-agency emergency management arrangements for a radiation emergency.

• Identify arrangements for managing security incidents at Sizewell.

• Identify radiation emergency response specific roles and responsibilities of responding agencies.

• Confirm radiation exposure limits for emergency responders.

• Pre-identify public health countermeasures and when and how these will be implemented.

• Identify who will receive prior information, how this will be provided and what it will cover.

• Identify media coordination arrangements.

• Identify the key on-site emergency response arrangements.

• Describe how the response phase will transfer to the recovery phase.

• Identify training and exercise requirements and how lessons identified will influence the review of this plan.

3. Public Consultation The core elements of this plan were developed following a public consultation conducted between January and April 2013 on proposals to improve emergency arrangements post the Fukushima accident in 2011. Consultation with local Sizewell communities regarding the revised plan including the Sizewell A & B Stakeholder Group was undertaken in August 2013. The issue of the major revised plan, Issue 3, was noted by the Suffolk Resilience Forum Executive on 23 January 2014. Consultation on subsequent amendments has been conducted through the Sizewell Emergency Planning Consultative Committee/Suffolk Resilience Forum.



4. Wider Civil Emergency Arrangements This plan details nuclear emergency response specific arrangements for Sizewell. Any response to an incident or emergency at Sizewell may also use SRF emergency plans developed for wider civil emergencies. Publicly available plans can be found on the SRF website: https://www.suffolkresilience.com/multi-agency-plans. Full versions of SRF plans can be found on the SRF resilience direct website. The likely plans to be used are:

4.1 SRF Generic Response Plan. This plan provides detail of key terminology used for incidents classified as ‘emergency’ and ‘major incident’, the standing Suffolk emergency management command and control arrangements (including reporting to COBR), generic roles and responsibilities for Suffolk responding agencies, humanitarian assistance arrangements, telecommunications and mutual aid arrangements. This plan also covers the arrangements for a Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC), Media Coordination Cell (MCC) and Logistics Cell. The SRF Generic Response Plan is publicly available. 4.2 SRF Communications Plan. This plan details how Suffolk responder agencies, including Sizewell operators, will provide information to the public during emergencies. It complements the details of what information will be passed in relation to a Sizewell emergency contained within this plan. A public version of the SRF Communications Plan is available on the SRF website. 4.3 SRF Recovery Plan. This plan details the multi-agency structures, high level processes and procedures required for the coordinated recovery from any major emergency in Suffolk, including an incident at Sizewell. A public version of the SRF Recovery Plan is available on the SRF. 4.4 SRF Strategic Guidance for Evacuation. This plan provides outline guidance for large scale evacuation within Suffolk. It complements the detailed evacuation arrangements included within this plan for a reasonably foreseeable Sizewell radiation emergency and provides the start point for evacuation beyond that covered within this plan. A public version of the SRF Strategic Guidance for Evacuation. 4.5 SRF Mass Casualty Plan. This plan details the multi-agency arrangements for a mass casualty incident within Suffolk, where casualty numbers exceed the capacity of normal NHS Major Incident plans A public version of the SRF Mass Casualty Plan. 4.6 SRF Mass Fatalities Plan. This plan details the multi-agency arrangements for dealing with mass fatalities from a major incident within Suffolk, where fatalities exceed the capacity of normal coroner arrangements.

https://www.suffolkresilience.com/multi-agency-plans



A public version of the SRF Mass Fatalities Plan. 4.7 SRF Flood Plan. This plan details the multi-agency arrangements for managing flooding within Suffolk from either coastal, river or flash flooding events. It will form the basis for a concurrent response to a radiation emergency that occurs at the same time as a flood event. A public version of the SRF Flood Plan is available on the SRF website. 4.8 SRF Severe Weather Plan. This plan details the multi-agency arrangements for managing severe weather, hot or cold, events within Suffolk. It will form the basis for a concurrent response to a radiation emergency that occurs at the same time as a severe weather event. A public version of the SRF Severe Weather Plan is available on the SRF website. 4.9 SRF Multi-Agency Strategic Holding Area Plans. These plans detail the arrangements for receiving and managing resources that may be required from beyond the county to respond to an emergency that has significant or wide area impact. They form the basis for how mutual aid will be received into the county for any emergency to allow this to be deployed in a controlled manner to assist with any response. These plans are classified OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE. 4.10 SRF Strategic Coordination Centre Guidance. This plan covers the activation of the Strategic Coordination Centre (StratCC) to provide a location for the multi-agency coordination of any emergency. This plan is protective marked OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE 4.11 SRF Tactical Coordination Centre Guide. This plan covers the activation of the Tactical Coordination Centre (TCC) to provide a location for the multi-agency coordination of any emergency. This plan is protective marked OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE



BACKGROUND 5. Licensed Nuclear Site Information

5.1. Sizewell A Site is owned by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, and operated by Magnox Ltd. Sizewell A ceased generating electricity in late 2006, was declared nuclear fuel free in 2015 and is currently being de-commissioned. Routine Contact Sizewell A Site reception: 01728 633300 5.2 Sizewell B Power Station is owned and operated by EDF Energy – Nuclear Generation. Sizewell B generates electricity for supply to the ‘National Grid’ using one water-cooled nuclear reactor of the ‘Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) design rated at 1191MW output. The station was commissioned in 1995 and it currently has a 35-year operational lifetime. Routine Contact Sizewell B Power Station reception: 01728 653653

6. Nuclear Operator Emergency Arrangements Summary.

6.1 On Site Emergency Plans. Each Sizewell site maintains an On Site Emergency Plan to cover detailed arrangements that each site would take to respond to any emergency to quickly control any incident in order to limit any release of radioactive material, where appropriate, while preventing significant exposure to radiation by staff and visitors at either site.

The key elements to on site emergency plans are as follows:

• Activation of site emergency arrangements.

• Warning and safe withdrawal of staff and visitors to pre-arranged assembly points.

• Rapid notification of emergency services and other agencies needed to assist with bringing the incident under control and protecting the public from significant exposure to radiation.

• Deployment of specialist emergency teams to assess and minimise the consequences of any nuclear emergency.

• Assess the risk and extent of any potentially hazardous situation.

• Implement measures to protect staff and visitors.

• Take steps to protect the environment through emergency intervention activities.

• Minimise and then terminate any release of radioactive material.

• Provide specialist advice to local emergency responders on immediate actions to protect the public.

• Provide information to Suffolk County Council to help to inform the public.

• Maintain a record of events.

• Ensure the safety of unaffected plant.

These emergency arrangements also include specific security response actions to counter the threat of terrorist related activity. Site security arrangements are supported by operational response procedures maintained by CNC and are aligned



with counter terrorist response arrangements maintained by Suffolk Constabulary to ensure that a timely and integrated response is delivered to any threat. This operational response will be managed within the command, control and coordination structure outlined further in Appendix L. 6.2 Sizewell B Emergency Response Centre. The role of the Sizewell Emergency Response Centre (ERC) is to:

• Provide an alternate ECC

• Allow storage of deployable back up equipment for use on site.

• Support environmental monitoring.

• Provide additional ACP equipment.

• Provide a staging post for additional backup equipment from wider EDF fleet that would be automatically deployed in an OSNE.

The ERC may be activated by EDF for both Site Incidents or OSNE; when activated the site will automatically deploy response teams to ERC. When activated, EDF will share information on major equipment or people moves with local responders to allow coordination with an off site response. Further information on the ERC is contained within the SZB Emergency Handbook.

7. Hazard Assessment

7.1 The assessment of any radiation risk at the Sizewell sites requires the operations of each licensed nuclear site to be reviewed and the implications of the greater hazard potential to be used to inform emergency preparedness arrangements. 7.2 Each operator at Sizewell is required under REPPIR to provide an assessment of any potential radiation emergency related to the use of radioactive substances. This assessment must be reviewed every 3 years or if any material change occurs, e.g. change to radioactive substances or change in operating technology. 7.3 Each Report of Assessment is sent to the ONR to allow them to confirm the outcome of the operator assessment. Where the assessment shows that a nuclear emergency is reasonably foreseeable, an emergency plan must be produced and the Report of Assessment made public. ONR use hazard information to set the size of the DEPZ, further information is at: http://www.onr.org.uk/depz-onr-principles.htm 7.4 The current Report of Assessments for Sizewell licensed sites are publicly available as follows: Sizewell A Station - owned by Magnox Ltd: Sizewell A HIRE Report of Assessment TR/SE/221 Issue 3, dated April 2015. Link to document: https://www.suffolkresilience.com/uploads/TR-SE-221-Issue-3-Rev2-REDACTED.PDF

http://www.onr.org.uk/depz-onr-principles.htm

https://www.suffolkresilience.com/uploads/TR-SE-221-Issue-3-Rev2-REDACTED.PDF

https://www.suffolkresilience.com/uploads/TR-SE-221-Issue-3-Rev2-REDACTED.PDF



Sizewell B Station - owned by EDF Energy Ltd - Existing Nuclear: Hazard Identification and Risk Evaluation Report for Sizewell B Power Station SZB/TZR/015 Revision 7 dated 21 April 2017. Link to document: https://www.suffolkresilience.com/uploads/NPM_-_Sizewell_RoA_2017_21_Apr_2017.pdf 7.5 It is important to understand the risk of nuclear emergency alongside all other risks that might occur within Suffolk. All risks from natural and man-made hazards are assessed by the Suffolk Resilience Forum and a public Community Risk Register is produced and reviewed annually. The current Suffolk Community Risk Register can be found at the following link: https://www.suffolkresilience.com/community-risk-register Currently the highest risks within Suffolk are from:

• Severe weather.

• Flooding.

• Pandemic Flu. 7.6 While nuclear emergencies have the potential to cause significant impacts, the likelihood of an emergency occurring is very low. The design of nuclear power stations is based upon the fundamental requirement of safety. The safety case for licensed nuclear operations is independently verified by the ONR; this must demonstrate that the plant is safe in normal operation and that any non-standard operations do not immediately lead to nuclear emergencies. 7.7 Nuclear power plant designs utilise a defence in depth philosophy making use of redundant systems to provide back up if one system fails, diversity of systems to avoid a common failure in one affecting many, and segregated systems to avoid damage due to external events such as fire. This approach is the first line of mitigating any risk of nuclear emergency at Sizewell and is led by each operator and regulated by the ONR. 7.8 The risk of radioactive substance release from a nuclear reactor is an assessed risk (H10) within the National Risk Assessment (NRA). Further detail on this risk can be found in the OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE Annex of the National Risk Assessment available on Resilience Direct 7.9 Further detail on the radioactive and other hazardous substances on each Sizewell site and potential hazard scenarios are at APPENDIX A.

8. Response Planning Assumptions. The hazard and risk assessments for each site are used to determine the planning assumptions for nuclear emergency response arrangements within this plan. This plan is based upon a tiered response strategy that allows a range of response actions to be delivered for different scenarios. REPPIR requires that as a minimum this plan covers detailed arrangements for a ‘reasonably foreseeable’ accident scenario. In addition, the Suffolk Resilience Forum have agreed that the learning from the Fukushima accident indicates that further, proportionate arrangements should be put into place to provide an effective platform to effectively respond to a scenario that is even less probable but which might lead to potentially more

https://www.suffolkresilience.com/uploads/NPM_-_Sizewell_RoA_2017_21_Apr_2017.pdf

https://www.suffolkresilience.com/uploads/NPM_-_Sizewell_RoA_2017_21_Apr_2017.pdf

https://www.suffolkresilience.com/community-risk-register



significant consequences; this is sometimes called ‘a reasonable worst case scenario’. This approach is recognised within REPPIR guidance as extendibility. Planning assumptions used within this plan are as follows:

8.1. Reasonably Foreseeable. The Sizewell B risk assessment indicates that radiation from a reasonably foreseeable accident may require countermeasures to protect the public to be applied with minimal warning as follows:

• Evacuation - out to 200m (219 yds)

• Shelter - out to 1km (0.6 mile)

• Stable Iodine - out to 1km (Sizewell B emergency only).

• Food monitoring out to 35km (21.7 miles).

The Sizewell A risk assessment indicates there are no reasonably foreseeable events associated with on-going operations at Sizewell A that could lead to a dose to the public of 5 mSv or greater in the year following the event. The ONR revised the Sizewell Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ) in April 2014. The revised area is a land component based primarily on 6 figure postcodes located around a circular radius of approximately 2.4km with an extended boundary that includes the town of Leiston and part of the village of Aldringham. A rectangular seaward component commences at the points where the land component reaches the coast and extends 2km out to sea1. Countermeasures within the DEPZ are pre-arranged/issued for immediate implementation for certain identifiable groups within 1km from the site. All identifiable groups within the DEPZ are provided with prior information.

8.2 Reasonable Worst Case. The background risk information within the NRA indicates a range of severe accident scenarios that might require public protection countermeasures to be extended beyond the DEPZ following notification of a radiation emergency. EDF Energy advise that a warning period of 10-12 hours is likely to be available for emergencies that are beyond reasonably foreseeable. Planning assumptions for extending countermeasures are as follows:

• Extended Evacuation - out to 4km

• Extended Shelter - out to 15km (shelter and stable iodine are implemented together)

• Extended Stable Iodine - out to 15km (Sizewell B emergency only).

The Suffolk Resilience Forum has agreed to introduce an EEPZ out to 15km based upon the Sizewell B power station to help facilitate extended emergency planning. Countermeasures within the EEPZ will be pre-planned but not deployed and public within this wider area will be able to access information on outline emergency planning arrangements.

1 ONR Project Assessment Report – ONR-COP-PAR-14-001 dated 23 April 2014.



9. Emergency Planning Zones. To enable emergency arrangements for Sizewell to be proportionately planned and prepared, a number of emergency planning zones related to the range of risk scenarios have been directed or agreed around Sizewell. These are:

9.1 Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ). This zone is defined by the ONR and relates to the area within which detailed and immediate off site emergency arrangements are required to protect the public from the effects of a reasonably foreseeable radiation emergency. Further detail on the DEPZ is at APPENDIX B. 9.2 Extended Emergency Planning Zone (EEPZ). This zone has been defined by the Suffolk Resilience Forum based upon the national extendibility guidance and relates to an area where a degree of pre-planning has been completed to allow prompt public protection from the effects of a beyond design basis/reasonable worst case radiation emergency. This zone completes the Sizewell extendibility arrangements. Further detail on the EEPZ is at APPENDIX C. 9.3 Public Information Zone. This is an area defined by the ONR within which prior information is required to be provided by the Sizewell operators to any identifiable population group. This area is currently the same as the DEPZ. 9.4 Food Restriction Area. This is an area within which restrictions on food might be applied for a reasonably foreseeable accident. 9.5 Sizewell Licenced Nuclear Sites. The licenced nuclear sites at Sizewell are the first line of protection during any radiation emergency. Response to any radiation emergency begins with the operators on site whose aim is to quickly control any incident to limit release of any radiation. Local emergency services will support this on site intervention activity. Each Sizewell Site has an On Site Emergency Plan issued by the respective site operator.



An overview of Sizewell Emergency Planning Zones can be seen on the following map:

10. Concurrent Risks. The Suffolk Community Risk Register identifies the following risks that may affect the implementation of this plan if they occur at the same time as any nuclear emergency:

10.1 Flooding. Certain weather patterns, in particular low pressure systems in the North Sea, can exacerbate the effect of high tides by generating a tidal surge on top of the predicted high tide level. The Sizewell site is located above the



Flood Zone 2 threshold (0.1% probability of annual event). However, the site access road by the Vulcan Arms is within Flood Zone 3 (0.5% probability of annual event and is liable to flooding. There flood waters may restrict access to the site during a tidal event. This specific risk to the access to Sizewell is mitigated by each operator maintaining business continuity arrangements to ensure critical staff availability and by the SRF maintaining flood response arrangements that cover warning to the site and deployment of emergency response capability. When severe flooding is expected, the emergency services may consider pre-deploying capability on site during any period of heightened risk and may make arrangements for this to be supported by all-terrain vehicles or by helicopter if necessary. 10.2 Severe Weather - Snow and Ice. Winter weather can cause access roads to the Site to become blocked due to snow or to icy surfaces. Access roads to the Sizewell site are on the Priority 1 gritting route managed by Suffolk County Council to ensure these remain open in snow or ice conditions. SRF severe weather response plans allow for warning of severe weather to be passed to the sites and for highways clearance operations to be further adjusted dependent upon the actual weather conditions and any risk to communities. These arrangements also exist to utilise all-terrain vehicles to sustain emergency response. Site business continuity arrangements for loss of staff are also maintained by each operator to ensure availability of critical staff. 10.3 Pandemic Flu. The risk of a new human influenza pandemic is considered by the World Health Organisation (WHO) to have increased over the last few years, based largely on the risk posed by the H5N1 avian influenza virus, currently circulating in poultry in South East Asia and elsewhere. Much will depend on the characteristics of the virus, such as its clinical attack rate, the severity of the illness it causes and the resulting case fatality rate. These parameters will not be known until the pandemic virus emerges. Implications for responders and operators are likely to be seen in reduced staffing levels due to sickness. The SRF maintains a Pandemic Flu response plan that sets out how the public will be alerted to any increased risk and how any medical response, including any prophylaxis or vaccination arrangements. Site business continuity arrangements for loss of staff are also maintained by each operator to ensure availability of critical staff.

10.4 Domino Sites. The two Sizewell sites are located next to each other and thus an assessment has been made as to the potential for a domino effect during any radiation emergency. The assessments of both sites have not indicated any emergency scenario that could trigger a domino effect on the licensed nuclear activities of the other site. Clearly if the wind direction during any emergency passed over the neighbouring site, there will be a requirement for this site to take appropriate action to protect its staff and visitors from significant radiation exposure and to maintain safe operation of licensed nuclear activity. 10.5 Business Continuity. During any radiation emergency, many public sector organisations will be required by the CCA to maintain critical services. It is essential that these agencies consider the implications of this plan, including the operators of both sites, and adapt their own individual business continuity arrangements accordingly to enable them to sustain identified critical services



within the county. Coordination of business continuity activity during any radiation emergency should be conducted as detailed in agency Business Continuity Plans.

11. National Infrastructure Sites

This plan accommodates the following national infrastructure construction sites to ensure that additional people and transportation associated with the sites can be accommodated within existing emergency arrangements.



ALERTING & ACTIVATION 12. Declaration States. The following declaration states have been agreed with EDF

Energy and Magnox:

12.1 Non-nuclear incident – 999 Response. A low level incident on site that requires the emergency services but which does not involve any nuclear facilities and does not pose a risk of off site impacts. 12.2 Site Incident. A site incident is a hazardous condition which is confined in its effect within the boundary of the site security fence. 12.3 Off Site Nuclear Emergency – EDF only An off site nuclear emergency is a hazardous condition which results, or is likely to result, in the need to consider urgent countermeasures to protect the public outside the site security fence from a radiological hazard.

The operator will aim to make a declaration within 15 minutes of symptoms being detected and assessed. Any declaration applies to both sites.

It has been agreed by the SRF that a declaration of an Off Site Nuclear Emergency (OSNE) will automatically be declared at MAJOR INCIDENT. A declaration of a Site Incident will be considered by a SCG meeting, either virtual or physical, as to whether a Major Incident needs to be declared. Note: If Sizewell B power station declares an Off Site Nuclear Emergency, Sizewell A site has agreed to declare a Site Incident. 13. Cancellation of Declaration The process to cancel any declaration state once the conditions of the site have been brought under control is as follows:

13.1 Site Incident. The Site Emergency Controller may cancel the declaration; consulting with the Central Emergency Support Centre (CESC) if operational. This decision will be relayed to the Police to allow local responders to be briefed. 13.2 Off Site Nuclear Emergency. The Site Emergency Controller, in consultation with the CESC and ONR may cancel the declaration. The SCG is to be informed of the decision through the Company Technical Advisor (CTA) to allow the wider response strategy to be updated. The SCG will agree to cancel any Major Incident declaration.



14. Emergency Responder Alerting/Notification Process Alerting of emergency services will be made by phone. 14.1 Non Nuclear Incident - 999 Response 14.2 Site Incident

SITE

999 Suffolk Constabulary Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service East of England Ambulance

Suffolk CC Comms East Suffolk Comms

JEPU (EPDO)

Follow up call after 999

SITE


JEPU (EPDO)

Suffolk CC Comms & Duty Director East Suffolk Comms & Activating

Officer JRLO

MHCLG RED

PHE Centre NHSE

SZA

In order

Barnwood Alert

Centre

ONR EA

BEIS

In order

In order



14.3. Off Site Nuclear Emergency

14.4 Alerting Information. The information in the table below will be passed via FAX and email to all 3 emergency services for a site incident or off site nuclear emergency once the initial 999 call is made.

PHE CRCE ONR EA

UKPN BEIS MCA FSA

Met Office DEFRA

SITE


JEPU (EPDO)

Suffolk CC Comms & Duty Director East Suffolk Comms & Activating

Officer JRLO

MHCLG RED

PHE Centre NHSE

SZA Essex & Suffolk Anglian

In order In order

Barnwood Alert

Centre

In order



M

Major Incident

Who Declared major incident

Name:……………………………………

Time of Declaration

.......... : ..........

Wind Direction / Wind Speed

Draw Arrow for Direction Speed: m/s

E

Exact Location

Exact Location (Where is the event taking

place)

Conventional Plant.................................. Reactor..................................................... Other.......................................................

T

Type of Incident

What type of Incident is it?

Off-Site Nuclear Emergency Site Incident Secuirty Alert Fire Chemical Medical

H

Hazards

What hazards or potential hazards can be identified?

Hazards are……………………………….. Advised public protection measures: ………………………………………………

A

Access

Access to Site (Which RVP will be used)

Main Gatehouse Offsite ERC

N Number of Casualties

Number, types and severity of casualties

E

Emergency Services

Emergency Services present and those required

Police on scene Required Fire on scene Required Ambulance on scene Required Other (e.g. EOD):

15. Plan Activation

15.1 Plan Activation Process



The reactor and associated plant systems at Sizewell B power station is fully equipped with automatic protection safety systems. Reactor and plant data indicators are displayed in the permanently staffed site Central Control Room and provide detailed information to operator staff. These indication systems also include a perimeter fence radiation monitoring system.

In the event of any information indicating abnormal conditions, the Shift Charge Engineer will carry out an immediate investigation and assessment. If the circumstances demand, the Shift Charge Engineer will initiate actions in accordance with the conditions for declaring a Site Incident or an Off Site Nuclear Emergency (OSNE), as detailed in the operator’s On Site Emergency Plan.

15.2 Responsibility for Off Site Plan Activation

• Site Incident. On receipt of a Site Incident declaration by the operator, the Duty Inspector in the Suffolk Constabulary Contact and Control Room (CCR) will confirm declaration with the site and that this declaration has been received by Combined Fire Control and East of England Ambulance Control. Combined Fire Control and East of England Ambulance Control will make further alerting actions as set out in para 14.2. The JEPU Duty Officer will initiate a SRF teleconference to consider the Site Incident event and to confirm multi-agency action beyond any emergency services support that may have attended the site following a 999 call. The Sizewell Off Site Emergency Plan will not be implemented automatically at a Site Incident declaration but elements of the plan may be brought to a higher readiness following the SRF teleconference. Teleconference invitees:

- Police

- Fire

- Ambulance

- County Council

- Suffolk Coastal DC

- EA

- Operator

- ONR

- BEIS

• Off Site Nuclear Emergency. On receipt of an Off Site Nuclear Emergency declaration by the operator, the Duty Inspector in the Suffolk Constabulary CCR will:

- Confirm the declaration by call back and confirm receipt by Fire and Ambulance.

- Declare a Major Incident.

- Initiate the activation of the Strategic Coordination Centre (StratCC) - [SRF StratCC Guidance].



- When Alerting Information received, check this has also been received at Combined Fire Control and East of England Ambulance Control. Pass copy of alerting information to nominated Police SCG Chair and to SCG Coord Officer.



PUBLIC WARNING AND INFORMING

16. Public Information Zone

A Public Information Zone (PIZ) has been set by ONR around Sizewell to allow people who might be affected by a reasonably foreseeable radiation emergency to be provided with prior information. The Sizewell PIZ covers the same area as the DEPZ. The operators are responsible for providing ‘prior Information’ to the public within the PIZ and this is achieved in partnership with Suffolk JEPU which is contracted to distribute an annually updated ‘emergency arrangements’ pack in the form of a calendar and associated information. The prior information distributed within the PIZ is intended to give householders and others a sufficiently clear understanding of the actions that they might be asked to take in a radiation emergency so that, should an event occur, the necessary measures can be implemented smoothly and speedily. This information includes:

• Basic facts about radiation and its effect on persons and the environment.

• The various types of radiation emergency and their consequences for the general public and the environment.

• Emergency measures to alert, protect and assist the general public in the event of a radiation emergency.

• How the public will be kept informed during any emergency, including Suffolk Emergency Helpline number 0345 6032814.

• Appropriate information on actions to be taken by the public in the event of a radiation emergency to cover:

o sheltering and associated actions. o distribution and taking of stable iodine tablets. o evacuation arrangements. o longer term advice on consumption of food and drink.

• Agencies responsible for implementing emergency measures.

• A map of the emergency planning zones and public information zone.

• Sources of additional and more detailed information from other public sources. 17. Sizewell Beach Visitors & Campsites

In order to ensure that transient groups are given prior information as far as reasonably possible, the operators have signs placed at the approaches to Sizewell Beach car park, which is the focal point for walkers and holidaymakers.

In addition, similar information, but in laminated card format, is provided by the operators and is distributed to the Beach View caravan site, Sizewell Hall camping site and the Vulcan Arms public house by the Suffolk JEPU. 18. Wider Public Information The public consultation completed in 2013 highlighted a demand for prior information beyond that provided within the PIZ to ensure that communities were aware of the emergency arrangements that might be put into place and which may cause indirect consequences beyond areas likely to be affected by a reasonably foreseeable radiation emergency.



The Suffolk Resilience Forum in conjunction with the operators has developed a shorter information pack that will be available in an electronic form to people beyond the DEPZ and in hard copy form free on a request basis to the Suffolk JEPU. It will be updated if emergency arrangements within this plan change in the future. This wider information includes:

• Basic facts about radiation and its effect on persons and the environment.

• The various types of radiation emergency and their consequences for the general public and the environment.

• How the public will be kept informed during any emergency, including Suffolk Emergency Helpline number 0345 6032814.

• Summary of actions that might be taken by the public closer to Sizewell in the event of a radiation emergency to cover:

o sheltering and associated actions. o distribution and taking of stable iodine tablets. o evacuation arrangements. o longer term advice on consumption of food and drink.

• Summary of arrangements for protecting public for beyond reasonably foreseeable emergencies

• Agencies responsible for implementing emergency measures.

• A map of the emergency planning zones and public information zone.

• Sources of additional and more detailed information from other public sources.

All information provided to the public within the PIZ and beyond is also available online at the SRF website - www.suffolkresilience.com. 19. Vulnerable Groups.

19.1 Schools. Prior information for schools has been produced by the County Council, which details the actions to be taken in the event of an Off Site Nuclear Emergency at Sizewell. It has been sent to the Head Teachers of the schools in Leiston. A copy of information can be found at APPENDIX D. 19.2 Children Centres. A copy of the information can be found at APPENDIX E. 19.3 Care Homes, Sheltered Housing and Community Care. A copy of the information can be found at APPENDIX F.

19.4 Vulnerable Individuals. There is an established method of assessing individual vulnerabilities during emergencies within the SRF Generic Response Plan. This ‘list of list’ process will be used to inform the Community Impact Assessment that is completed as part of SCG activity.

20. Alerting the Public

• Within 1km. Residents within 1km of the site, including owners of the Vulcan Arms Public House, are asked on an annual basis to register for an automated telephone warning system managed by the operators (PETIS). The system allows the operators from the CESC to send a pre-recorded message to alert people who have registered to provide a warning of an incident or emergency at




Sizewell within 1 hour of an OSNE declaration. The recorded messages are as follows:

On Site Incident Message: I AM INFORMING YOU OF A SITE INCIDENT AT SIZEWELL 'A’/’B' POWER STATION. NO ACTION IS TO BE TAKEN. KEEP LISTENING TO LOCAL RADIO AND TV FOR FURTHER INFORMATION Off Site Nuclear Emergency message: THIS IS A SIZEWELL B POWER STATION MESSAGE. AN OFF-SITE NUCLEAR EMERGENCY HAS OCCURRED AT SIZEWELL B POWER STATION, EDF ENERGY. PLEASE STAY INDOORS, SHUT ALL DOORS AND WINDOWS. TAKE YOUR STABLE IODINE TABLETS AS DIRECTED IN THE SIZEWELL LEAFLET. TUNE INTO LOCAL RADIO AND TELEVISION FOR INFORMATION. THE EMERGENCY SERVICES HAVE BEEN CALLED AND ARE RESPONDING. PRESS THE HASH KEY TO REPEAT THIS MESSAGE

The Police will confirm with the operator that this automated warning has been provided and the message given. The public alert following a declaration of an OSNE by the site will be reinforced by the Media Coordination Cell (MCC) via local radio and TV, and by social media.

• 1km Transient. Suffolk Constabulary will make arrangements to inform people on Sizewell Beach that they need to leave the area. Contact will also be made with Beach View Holiday Park owners advising them of the necessity to leave the area.

• Wider DEPZ and EEPZ. The Media Coordination Cell (MCC) will provide information and advice to people within the wider DEPZ beyond 1km and the EEPZ following any declaration from the site. This will reinforce the message that no immediate actions are needed by people in these areas but to stay tuned in to local TV and radio for further information.

21. Information during Emergencies.

21.1 The County Council, in conjunction with other local and national responders, will provide information to any member of public within Suffolk to ensure that they are informed of the facts of the radiation emergency and the measures to be taken for public health. The information will be aimed at those directly affected by the emergency; this is likely to include people who have been advised to shelter and take stable iodine tablets, to evacuate, or to refrain from eating or selling foodstuffs they have grown themselves. 21.2 The information will be provided:

• On the Suffolk Resilience Forum website: www.suffolkresilience.com and linked on local responder services websites by Suffolk Constabulary, Suffolk County Council and Suffolk Coastal District Council.

• By TV (BBC East and ITV Anglia).

• By Radio (BBC Radio Suffolk, Heart FM and Beach FM radio).




• To the National Farmers Union for communications with local farmers.

• Once the radiation emergency has been brought under control, a ‘community information point’ may be established by Suffolk Coastal DC with the support of Leiston Town Council, the Police, PHE and site operators. The purpose of this will be to provide a place for local communities to visit to find out information or to identify community concerns. This would be established at the King Georges Community Centre, Leiston unless the risk indicates that this is not appropriate.

• At Evacuation Centres opened by Suffolk Coastal DC to assist people who have been evacuated or who have self-evacuated.

21.3 The County Council in conjunction with the Media Coordination Cell at the StratCC are responsible for updating information and for maintaining consistency of information provided through the channels identified above. The information provided will cover:

• The type of emergency - Site Incident or Off Site Nuclear Emergency.

• The characteristics of the hazard; e.g. its origin, its extent, the risk to public health and the likely development of the risk. This information will be displayed in both map and text format.

• Advice on public health protection: o Confirmations of any shelter, evacuation or taking of stable iodine

requirements. This will be explained in both map and text format. o Restrictions on consumption of foodstuffs and water supply o Basic rules on hygiene and personal decontamination. o Special warnings for particular groups at increased risk.

• Requests by local responders for public protection or environmental protection actions.

• Where an incident does not lead directly to a release of radiation but there is an increased risk of such, precautionary advice may be given to: o Tune in to local TV and radio and monitor the SRF website. o Be alert and prepared to take action. o Vulnerable groups on water and food consumption. o Farmers regarding stock and crops.

21.4 If the assessment of the hazard leads to the implementation of public protection measures that extend beyond Suffolk, the County Council Emergency Control Centre will contact the relevant neighbouring County Council emergency planning team and advise them of the requirement to provide information to the public relevant to any incident at Sizewell. 21.5 A telephone helpline may be established by EDF Energy during any incident to provide basic information via automated message on 01728 653653. 21.6 The Suffolk Emergency Helpline may be activated during any emergency to provide advice and information. When activated this can be called on 0345 603 2814.



NUCLEAR EMERGENCY RESPONSE 22. Response Actions A strategic decision timeline has been produced based upon IAEA Response Time Objectives included within IAEA Safety Standards. This timeline can be used as a guide for the SCG Chair to ensure that key response activities are taken in a timely manner to guide the effective and timely response to a radiation emergency. The guide can be found at APPENDIX G. Police will maintain a policy log for the SCG to record strategic decisions made during the response phase. The County Council will maintain a policy log for the Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG) to record strategic decisions made during the recovery phase 23. Coordination of Response and Recovery

23.1 Integrated Emergency Response. In order to achieve a combined and coordinated response to a radiation emergency at Sizewell by all relevant organisations/agencies, the existing national emergency management framework will be used. This allows local responders to coordinate response actions and to establish links with national emergency management structures to provide information and to manage any support provided. The command and control diagram for a Sizewell radiation emergency is at APPENDIX H. Local multi-agency coordination for any Sizewell radiation emergency will be led as follows:

• A local Senior Police officer will Chair the SCG.

• A Suffolk County Council executive officer will Chair the Recovery Coordinating Group

• Public Health England will Chair the STAC with the support of ONR who will provide independent technical advice.

• Suffolk Constabulary or Suffolk County Council will lead the MCC.

• Suffolk Constabulary will Chair the TCG.

• Emergency services Bronze on scene commanders will produce and agree a multi-agency response plan to provide a coordinated operational response.

23.2 Local Response. The SRF Generic Response Plan sets out the Suffolk emergency management structure to be used for a Sizewell emergency at 3 levels: Strategic, Tactical and at the Operational Scene. Locations for local emergency response are as follows:

Multi Agency Strategic Coordination - Strategic Coordination Centre, Police HQ, Martlesham Heath

o SCG o RCG o MCC o STAC o Logistics Cell (if required - Endeavour House, Ipswich) o Information Cell (if required - Police HQ, Martlesham Heath)

Agencies required at the Suffolk StratCC are listed in the SRF Generic Response Plan



Multi-Agency Tactical Coordination

o TCG - Landmark House, Ipswich Operational Scene

o Multi Agency Bronze Command at scene of operations.

Individual Agency Control

o Suffolk Constabulary - Police HQ, Martlesham Heath, Suffolk. o Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service - Combined Fire Control, Huntingdon, Cambs. - Major Incident Suite, Suffolk County Council, Ipswich, Suffolk. o East of England Ambulance - Control Room & Incident Suite, Hellesdon,

Norfolk. o Suffolk County Council - Emergency Control Centre (ECC), Ipswich, Suffolk. o Suffolk Coastal District Council - Emergency Control Centre, Woodbridge,

Suffolk. o Environment Agency – Area Incident Room, Ipswich, Suffolk. o Public Health England – Incident Coordination Centre, Thetford, Norfolk. o NHS England - Incident Coordination Room, Fulborn, Cambs. o Maritime & Coastguard Agency - MRCC Humber.

Arrangements for individual agency control rooms can be found in respective agency Major Incident Plans.

23.3 Support to On Site Response. The local emergency services will deploy a predetermined attendance to a declaration at Sizewell. This response will include initial emergency services response capability and liaison officers for the site ECC. Emergency services will access the site via the main site entrance, unless informed otherwise by the site, and will be met by site staff that will:

• Provide a brief on the incident to the emergency services ground commander.

• Confirm radiation protection requirements.

• Facilitate access to the site for uniformed emergency services personnel with issued ID.

• Provide a safe route to the incident scene where intervention action is taking place by site personnel.

23.4 Key Emergency Services Locations. The key emergency services locations that have been agreed for a nuclear emergency response are shown on the map at APPENDIX I.

23.5 National Response. The national response to a UK radiation emergency is covered in national guidance issued by BEIS. Central government coordination will be led as follows:

• A senior official or Minister from BEIS will Chair the COBR Strategy Group. If the emergency is caused by terrorism, the Home Office will Chair.

• A senior official from the Cabinet Office will normally Chair the Impact Management Group (IMG).



• The Chief Scientific Advisor or BEIS’s Chief Scientist will normally Chair Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE).

Locations for national response coordination:

Central Government Coordination - COBR, London

o COBR Strategy Group o Impact Management Group (IMG) o Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE)

Multi-County Coordination

o Response Co-ordinating Group (ResCG) - virtual via teleconference. Set up by MHCLG RED.

Individual Department or Agency Control

o ONR Redgrave Court Incident Suite - Bootle o BEIS EOC - London o EDF Energy/Magnox CESC, Gloucester o EA National Incident Room, Bristol o PHE CRCE Emergency Operations Centre – Chilton, Oxon.

23.6 Regional Coordination. If the radiation emergency is likely to affect a neighbouring LRF area, a Response Co-ordinating Group (ResCG) may be convened to assist with co-ordination and facilitate support at a cross-SCG level. In such circumstances, or in the event of a potential emergency or escalating incident, MHCLG may, on its own initiative or at the request of local responders or the Lead Government Department in consultation with the Cabinet Office, convene a ResCG in order to bring together appropriate representatives from LRFs or SCGs (e.g. the Chair or Chief of Staff) where activated. ResCGs are most likely via a teleconference.

24. Scientific and Technical Advice

24.1 STAC. A STAC will be formed at the StratCC to provide scientific and technical advice on any radiation emergency using the template at APPENDIX J. This advice will guide strategic decisions made by the SCG and information provided by the MCC. For radiation emergencies, the site operator will initially provide advice to the SCG, STAC and MCC in the very early stages before this role is taken over by the CESC. The ONR, once deployed, will provide independent technical advice to the SCG in conjunction with STAC. Detailed arrangements for the STAC are in Part 3 of StratCC Guide. 24.2 SAGE. A SAGE will be formed as part of COBR to provide coordinated scientific and technical advice to the central government response. Detailed arrangements for SAGE are at Annex D to the UK Central Government Response - Concept of Operations.



25. Public Countermeasures.

25.1. Principles. Countermeasures used within this plan to protect the public in the event of a radiation emergency follow 3 principles:

Justification - The countermeasure should be used if it is expected to achieve more good than harm. Optimisation - The quantities criteria used for introducing and withdrawing countermeasures optimises public protection. Avoid Deterministic Effects - Use countermeasures to keep doses to levels below thresholds for deterministic effects.

Public Health England has recommended Emergency Reference Levels (ERL) of doses for the justification of countermeasures to protect the public; these are used to plan which actions would be most suitable in particular circumstances. For each countermeasure, there is a lower and upper reference level of dose averted by the countermeasure. Below the lower level, the countermeasure is unlikely to be worthwhile; above the upper level, it would be worthwhile in most circumstances.

Dose Averted (mSv)

Countermeasure Organ Lower Upper

Sheltering Whole body 3 30

Evacuation Whole body 30 300

Stable Iodine Thyroid 30 300

Table 1. Recommended ERLs for countermeasures.

25.2 Countermeasure Advice. Immediate countermeasure advice on the declaration of an Off Site Nuclear Emergency is provided by the relevant Site Controller to Suffolk Constabulary. This will include advice to take pre-issued stable iodine tablets within 1km if the emergency was at the Sizewell B power station. Subsequent information is provided in a standard format at APPENDIX J. Prior to the arrival of the CTA, the CESC will provide countermeasure advice to the SCG using the standard format at APPENDIX J. Countermeasure advice may also be provided by PHE CRCE over the telephone while a local STAC is forming. Once the STAC forms, countermeasure advice will be provided and reviewed to inform the SCG. 25.3. Countermeasures. The following countermeasures are used in this plan:

25.3.1 Prevention of further release. The operators and the emergency services will work to ensure that the release of radioactive material is stopped or reduced as soon as possible. This is an essential activity



aimed at controlling any release of radioactive material and limiting the hazard to public health and environmental impact.

25.3.2 Shelter. Sheltering refers to staying indoors, with doors and windows closed and ventilation systems turned off. Sheltering in any structure offers some degree of protection from airborne and deposited radioactive material but the level of protection depends upon the nature of the structure; the more open a structure, the more susceptible people are to inhaling radioactive contamination. The effectiveness of sheltering reduces over time as no building is completely airtight and low levels of radioactive material may accumulate. It is unlikely that sheltering will be used for more than 48hrs in any Sizewell radiation emergency. After any period of sheltering in relation to a Sizewell radiation emergency with a confirmed release off site, people may be advised to ventilate buildings once any airborne contamination has passed or has been terminated.

• Within 1km - On declaration of an Off Site Nuclear Emergency, sheltering will be automatically advised by the operator to people within 1km of the site via automated telephone calling system and reinforced by public information messages by the MCC. The need for sheltering will be reviewed by the STAC and any adjustments to add or remove areas that need to shelter will be decided by the SCG and communicated by the MCC. Areas advised to shelter will normally be identified by post codes.

• Beyond 1km - As there is likely to be a warning period for any beyond design basis/reasonable worst case radiation emergency that is likely to pose a risk beyond 1km, it is unlikely that shelter will be used as a countermeasure in the wider DEPZ and EEPZ for these more severe scenarios and more likely that evacuation will be advised.

25.3.3 Evacuation. Where the risk to public health posed by an off site release of radioactive contamination is predicted or has been identified through radiation monitoring to be beyond the short term protection which sheltering affords, the SCG on advice from the STAC may decide to evacuate areas around the site. Detailed evacuation arrangements for the DEPZ are at APPENDIX K and the Police will take the lead in implementing any evacuation action. Areas advised to evacuate will be identified by post codes. The MCC will lead on communicating evacuation arrangements to affected people.

• Evacuation is not automatic on declaration of an Off Site Nuclear Emergency and will only be used where radiation monitoring and modelling has identified a potential risk to public health that requires people to be moved in order to avert effective dose of at least 30mSv. However, people using the beach and occupying the Beach View Holiday Park will be advised to immediately evacuate by the Police due to being afforded less protection than more substantial dwellings.

• DEPZ - Where evacuation is required in the DEPZ, this will be communicated via TV and radio and will make use of the



evacuation arrangements provided in prior information. Further detail on evacuation arrangements is at APPENDIX K.

• EEPZ - Where a risk to people beyond the DEPZ is predicted, the STAC may advise the SCG to evacuate certain sectors to avert dose. This advice will be passed via radio and TV.

25.3.4 Stable Iodine Tablets. Stable Iodine tablets, or potassium iodate as previously referred to, can significantly reduce the exposure from radioactive iodine that may be released in the event of an Off Site Nuclear Emergency involving the Sizewell B power station. There is no radioactive iodine risk from the Sizewell A site. In order to maximise effectiveness, the tablets must be administered promptly, ideally within 6 hours of any exposure. In order to facilitate prompt access to stable iodine tablets, these are offered to people with 1km of the site as part of a pre-distribution approach. The pre-issue of tablets is authorised by the Suffolk Director of Public Health and the distribution of tablets is administered by NHS England in conjunction with the Ipswich & East Suffolk Clinical Commissioning Group.

• DEPZ - On declaration of an Off Site Nuclear Emergency for Sizewell B only, the taking of stable iodine tablets may be automatically advised by the operator to people within 1km only via automated telephone calling system and reinforced by public information messages by the MCC. Authority to give immediate advice to the public to take stable iodine tablets has been given by the Suffolk Director of Public Health. The need for taking of stable iodine tablets will be reviewed by the STAC and any adjustments to add or remove areas will be decided by the SCG and communicated by the MCC. Areas advised to take stable iodine tablets will normally be identified by post codes.

• EEPZ - People within the wider DEPZ and EEPZ will not be pre-issued with stable iodine tablets. Where a risk to people beyond the 1km is predicted, the STAC may advise the SCG to make available stable iodine tablets for people who have been advised to evacuate via Evacuation Centres. Instructions for the issue and collection of stable iodine tablets will be passed via radio and TV. Additional stocks of stable iodine tablets are held within the county and nationally.

• Stable iodine stocks in county provided through EDF Energy are as follows: [each pack holds 10 tablets or 5 adult doses]

Location Quantity

DEPZ - pre-issue 23 packs

Leiston Police Station 200 packs

Leiston Fire Station 10 packs

Saxmundham Fire Station 10 packs

East of England Ambulance Trust 30 packs

Ipswich Hospital 10 packs

Aldeburgh Hospital 30 packs



StratCC - stock for DEPZ transient population

80 packs

Magnox Sizewell A stn 750 packs

In County Total

1243 packs

Wider DEPZ and EEPZ requirement – From National Stockpile (worst case EEPZ arcs L and M - 7,313 packs for resident households, 301 packs for schools, 500 packs for transient population)

13315 packs

Table 2. Planning figures for Stable Iodine Stocks

• Delivery of tablets to Evacuation centre/s will be co-ordinated by PHE. PHE may provide advice on the distribution of tablets and NHS England may be asked to provide the resources for distribution, under the assurance of the Director of Public Health, if radiological monitoring of the area indicates that these countermeasures are required.

• If the circumstances of an Off Site Nuclear Emergency require the issue of stable iodine tablets beyond 1km, this will be agreed by the SCG in conjunction with advice from the STAC. PHE would be responsible for coordinating the delivery of additional tablets and NHS England would be responsible for arranging distribution to the public. If additional stocks of tablets are required, these are available from the bulk stock held at Police HQ and the national stockpile managed by PHE. The planning time for the deployment of national stable iodine stocks is 5hrs from notification to delivery in county.

25.3.5 Contaminated Food and Water. The control of the management and consumption of foodstuffs and water is the responsibility of the Food Standards Agency, Drinking Water Inspectorate and the relevant water companies. Control of private water supplies around Sizewell is managed by Suffolk Coastal District Council. A primary role of the EA in the initial response is to provide advice to Drinking Water Inspectorate / local authority on the impact of radioactivity to water in the environment which may be used for drinking water. Restrictions on consumption and use may be introduced as a countermeasure over a wider area and for an extended period. This decision will be made between the FSA and the STAC. Communication of any food or water restrictions and advice will be managed through the MCC in conjunction with the FSA, Drinking Water Inspectorate, local authority EHOs, and Anglian Water or Essex and Suffolk Water.

25.3.6 Air Exclusion Zone. The airspace around Sizewell is restricted to aircraft by The Air Navigation (Restriction of Flying) (Nuclear Installations) Regulations 2007 - SI 2007/1929. This restricts flight over Sizewell within 2km of the site and below 2000ft, except for landing at or taking off from the helicopter landing area at the site with the permission of the Site Director. During any radiation emergency, the SCG may



request Department of Transport to increase this restriction under Section 96 of the Civil Aviation - Air Navigation Order 2005 if it is in the public interest. 25.3.7 Maritime Exclusion Zone. There are no routine restrictions in place at sea near to Sizewell. Restrictions on marine activity at sea during any radiation emergency will be managed by the MCA.

26. Security Incidents

Specific guidance has been developed by BEIS in consultation with the Home Office, the lead government department for security related events or acts, in relation to managing the integrated response to a terrorist action that results in a radiation emergency at a civil nuclear site. The outline approach to managing such an incident is to build upon the existing nuclear emergency response arrangements and provide specialist capabilities to manage any terrorist activity. In particular single points of coordination at a national level, i.e. COBR, and at a local level, i.e. the SCG, remain fundamental to effective response. Further details on additional arrangements that will be employed during any terrorist initiated nuclear emergency at Sizewell are at APPENDIX L.

27. Public Health

27.1 Casualty Arrangements. The designated receiving hospital for casualties from a Sizewell radiation emergency is Ipswich Hospital. Ipswich Hospital will be prepared to receive and treat contaminated casualties. Other hospitals may be used for the treatment of casualties according to clinical need. 27.2 Worried Well/NHS 111. It is anticipated that members of the public unaffected by any offsite emergency may seek information or advice in relation to their own wellbeing. Unless actually ill or injured, they should be discouraged from dialling 999 or self-presenting at any medical facility. Health related non-emergency calls should be directed to the 111 system. The Director on Call for Ipswich & East Suffolk and West Suffolk Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) has access to the 24/7 111 supervisor number. A script providing Sizewell radiation emergency related information to public callers can be supplied to the 111 call centre by PHE and updated as needed, via the CCG Director on Call, in order to address any queries received.

28. Humanitarian Assistance

28.1 Evacuation Centres. Suffolk Coastal DC will establish evacuation centres to provide a place of safety in the event of a radiation emergency for up to 25% of evacuated population. These will be located outside of any area that could be potentially asked to adopt a shelter posture; as a result, a range of evacuation centre options have been developed as follows:

• Reasonably Foreseeable Accident - DEPZ. Two evacuation centres have been pre-identified at:

- High Lodge, Hinton, IP17 3QT, (Suffolk Coastal DC area) - 200 seated



- Riverside Centre, Stratford St Andrew, IP17 1LL, (Suffolk Coastal DC) - 300 seated

• Reasonable Worst Case Accident -EEPZ. A number of additional evacuation centres are available as follows:

- Kessingland Sports & Social Club, NR33 7PU (Waveney DC) - 300 seated - Carlton Colville Community Centre, NR33 8BT (Waveney DC) - 300 seated - Kesgrave Community Conference Centre IP5 1JF, (Suffolk Coastal DC) - 1445 seated - Stowmarket Leisure Centre, IP14 1LH (Mid Suffolk DC) - 690 seated

Location of People Monitoring Facilities will be confirmed at the first SCG meeting.

Unless advised otherwise, the public will be pre-warned to use High Lodge or Riverside centre during any radiation emergency. The decision to change evacuation centre locations will be taken by the SCG based upon hazard advice from the STAC. Any change to evacuation centres will be communicated via the MCC. Further evacuation centres are available within Suffolk should they be required.

28.2 Temporary Accommodation. Longer term accommodation, beyond 12hrs, for evacuated people will be coordinated by Suffolk Coastal DC. This is likely to make use of commercial accommodation providers at least 30km from the site. 28.3 Welfare Support. NHS England, PHE, local authority social care services will provide welfare support to evacuation centres and manage any longer term health requirements using unaffected health facilities within Suffolk. 28.4 Information. As part of the County Council’s responsibility to provide information to the public in the event of a radiation emergency, staff will be located at evacuation centres to provide information and advice to evacuees on the emergency and its prognosis.

29. Radiation Monitoring Radiation monitoring2 will be carried out after any Sizewell radiation emergency for the following purposes:

• Activities associated with the immediate safety of people, including determination and confirmation of immediate public protection countermeasures, and provision of public reassurance monitoring.

• Establish environmental impact.

2 NEPLG Guidance Chapter 15 - Radiation Monitoring Coordination



• Determine food countermeasures.

PHE CRCE will coordinate overall radiation monitoring activities in conjunction with other national agencies that provide capabilities to deliver specific aspects. Agencies with specific responsibility for radiation monitoring are:

• Environment Agency: Adapt standing monitoring processes to an incident, including: o Monitoring of radioactivity in the environment in the vicinity of nuclear sites –

including dose rate monitoring and sampling and radiochemical analysis of environmental materials.

o Radiochemical analysis of raw water sources including those which are used for drinking water supplies

o Monitoring of radioactive fallout in air and rain.

• Public Health England o Provide specialist capability for the monitoring of the public in support of local

resources.

• Food Standards Agency o Monitoring and sampling of food.

• Suffolk County Council: o Screening potentially contaminated non-food goods.

• Suffolk Coastal District Council o Monitoring food in the retail chain.

• Essex and Suffolk Water and Anglian Water o Safety of drinking water – including its radioactive content. o Identifying potentially contaminated water supplies.

• EDF Energy o Maintain site fence radiation detection monitors to detect gamma

radiation leaving the site. o Provide vehicle borne radiation survey teams to:

▪ Initially survey the area around the site in the event of a radiation emergency.

▪ Subsequently support radiation monitoring out to 15km.

• RIMNET o Maintain automated gamma detection monitors locally out to 12km from

the site to provide real time information during any radiation emergency. 29.1 Environment Monitoring

This plan uses a layered approach to monitoring the environment following a radiation emergency. The approach uses a range of fixed, mobile, automated and manually read detection systems. This will be achieved as follows:



Immediately - Confirm the release of radiation from the site. Prime source of information is the site Emergency Plume Gamma Monitoring System which automatically provides information to the Site Operator. This information can be used to confirm an Off Site Nuclear Emergency if not already declared from assessment of the plant condition. From Declaration - Automated monitoring the wider environment to provide indication of the spread of radiation. Prime source of information is the automated radiation monitors located at fixed sites up to 12km from the site. This information is accessed via RIMNET and also via [public website to be confirmed]. The information will be used by PHE CRCE to assess the spread of contamination and to allow advice on countermeasures to be reviewed, including whether extended emergency arrangements are required. Within 4hrs - Confirm the extent of radiation contamination around the site. Initial data is provided by two off-site survey vehicles controlled by the site. Once the Central Emergency Support Centre (CESC) is operational the coordination of the vehicles and the analysis and onward communication of the information is transferred to the CESC. Additional off-site survey vehicles may travel from the other nuclear sites to provide more monitoring resource. Within 24hrs - Confirm the extent of radiation contamination within 15km of the site. The prime source of information is vehicle survey teams coordinated by PHE CRCE. Information gathered by PHE CRCE and from those agencies coordinated by PHE will place data onto RIMNET to allow this to be used to inform decisions on public protection countermeasures. Baseline/Within 24hrs - A range of fixed radiation detectors is established around the site to provide historical data on radiation activity around the site and to identify specific nuclides during any radiation emergency. These detection systems require manual interpretation and the information will be used to assess the scale of radioactive release compared with background levels and to confirm the specific types of radioactive material that has been released. A map showing the locations of environmental monitoring locations is at APPENDIX M. 29.2 People Monitoring. Monitoring people for radioactive contamination can be undertaken for people who may, or think they may, have been contaminated by radioactivity. People monitoring is coordinated by PHE and may involve the following facilitates:

• Dedicated People Monitoring Facilities. Facilities have been identified in conjunction with PHE CRCE to allow evacuated people to be monitored for radiation:

o Gainsborough Sports Centre, Ipswich IP3 0SP. o Beccles Sports Centre, Beccles NR34 9PG.

The initial radiation monitoring capability will be provided by PHE CRCE within 24hrs of an Off Site Nuclear Emergency to manage up to 25% of evacuated people. Waveney DC and Ipswich BC will maintain plans to augment people monitoring centres with temporary structures within



which a People Monitoring Facility can be set up. Longer term monitoring capability will be coordinated by PHE and will utilise wider industry and health radiation monitoring resources. Operation of a People Monitoring Facility will follow the PHE CRCE guidance3.

• Hospital A&E. A&E departments in local hospitals may receive people who think that they might have been contaminated by radioactivity. In these cases, hospitals will follow existing arrangements for managing contaminated people. IT IS NOT THE INTENTION TO DIRECT PEOPLE TO HOSPITALS.

• NHS Facilities. People may present at any NHS facility concerned about radioactive contamination. Where possible these people should be directed to evacuation centres.

People monitoring may be conducted as follows:

• External Contamination Monitoring. Direct measurements for external contamination can be carried out using hand held or portal type monitoring equipment. Hand held equipment can be used on people and on physical items such as bags or cars. Such equipment can detect gamma, beta and alpha radiation. Where external contamination is found, decontamination and internal monitoring may be advised by PHE.

• Internal Monitoring. Internal contamination of radionuclides which emit penetrating radiation can be measured by placing a detector close to the body. If the radionuclides do not emit radiation that can be detected through the skin then samples of excreta can be taken to measure concentration; this indirect measurement is conducted at a laboratory.

• Blood Cell Count. Where people may have received high levels of ionising radiation, various techniques can be used to assess any dose by the analysis of blood samples.

29.3 Decontamination. Before decontamination takes place, any contaminated people must be removed from the contaminated zone first; this will usually be upwind of any contamination. Decontamination arrangements can be put into place as follows:

• Casualty. The East of England Ambulance Service may undertake casualty decontamination to reduce radiation levels before taking to hospital. Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service may support this level of decontamination.

• Mass Decontamination. Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service can provide mass decontamination capability at the request of the East of England Ambulance Service. Initial capability is based within the county (300 people per hour at one Evacuation Centre). Further capability can be

3 HPA-CRCE-017 - Radiation monitoring Units: Planning and Operational Guidance dated 2011.



drawn from neighbouring Fire & Rescue Services in line with national mutual aid arrangements within 60 mins to 120 mins.

• Vehicles. There is no current decontamination process for vehicles that are found to be contaminated. In such cases, the vehicle will be deemed contaminated for insurance purposes and subsequent loss action. The contaminated vehicle will be set aside at the decontamination centre and subsequently removed as contaminated waste.

Further guidance on decontamination of buildings and open environment issued by GDS: Strategic National Guidance: The decontamination of buildings, infrastructure

and open environment exposed to CBRN materials

29.4 Radiation Protection. This plan uses the following approach to radiation protection for the public and for intervention personnel:

• Public. In this instance the IRR 99 limits are suspended by REPPIR and the emphasis of urgent radiation protection actions by the emergency services and public health authorities is to minimise exposures as far as reasonably practicable (ALARP) in keeping with the Emergency Reference Levels published by Public Health England and to avoid any immediate health effects from radiation exposure or the proposed countermeasures.

• Emergency Services and other Intervention Personnel. Arrangements for the provision of radiation protection advice and the control of exposure to radiation of employees at Sizewell are the responsibility of the relevant site operator. The management of emergency exposure during any radiation emergency for identified site intervention personnel is detailed in the relevant On Site Emergency Plan and follows ALARP principles.

Emergency services attending any incident involving radiation, but not a radiation emergency, are classed as radiation workers under IRR 99 when operating and are limited to a maximum annual dose of:

Police4: 5mSv Fire5: 20mSv. Single incident maximum dose of 5mSv Ambulance6: 20mSv CNC3 5mSv

During any radiation emergency at Sizewell, occupational radiation protection advice will be provided to the emergency services as follows:

Suffolk Constabulary - Atomic Weapons Establishment

4 ACPO Guidelines on the Police Service Response to Operations and Incidents involving Radiation dated Oct 2012 5 Fire & Rescue Service Operational Guidance - GRA 5.5 Incidents Involving Radiation dated Jan 2011. 6 NHS Emergency Planning Guidance - The ambulance service guidance on dealing with radiological incidents and emergencies dated 23 March 2010.

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/strategic-national-guidance-the-decontamination-of-buildings-infrastructure-and-open-environment-exposed-to-chemical-biological-radiological-or-nuclear-materials

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/strategic-national-guidance-the-decontamination-of-buildings-infrastructure-and-open-environment-exposed-to-chemical-biological-radiological-or-nuclear-materials



Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service - PHE CRCE East of England Ambulance Service - PHE CRCE

CNC - Nuvia

Radiation protection advice for staff from PHE CRCE will be provided by this organisations own Radiation Protection Advisors. PHE CRCE will also share occupational risks assessments with those organisations providing support under monitoring coordination arrangements to inform their own risk assessments. Emergency exposures are exposures to ionising radiation of intervention personnel which may be necessary to put emergency plans into effect. The management framework to be used by agencies with staff identified as being likely to deploy in the event of a radiation emergency is as follows:

Pre-Planning. The emergency services will: 1. Identify people who can receive emergency exposures. 2. Train and equip people to conduct likely intervention tasks.

3. Have arrangements for medical surveillance and dosimetry. 4. Name those responsible for managing emergency exposures. 5. Specify limits of emergency exposures. Implementation. The emergency services will:

1. Check the fitness of people who will receive emergency exposure. 2. Check properly equipped and instructed for intervention task. 3. Manage emergency exposures by limiting dose levels except in extreme circumstances to save life. 4. Assess the dose received during emergency exposure Record Keeping

1. Ensure dose records are kept by approved dosimetry services. 2. Provide copy of dose record to employee. 3. Report any emergency exposure and resulting action to ONR.

• Emergency Exposure Levels. The following emergency exposure levels have been nationally agreed:

Police Up to 100mSv for plant intervention, simple rescue and future

dose saving activities. Up to 500mGy for life saving intervention only. This includes intervention to save critical infrastructure which if not attended, may yet threaten public and/or responder life. Authorised by appropriately trained police officer. Other restrictions are in place for pregnant and breast feeding police officers. Fire Up to 100mSv to save life or maintain critical infrastructure. Authorised by an appropriately trained fire officer. Other restrictions are in place for pregnant fire-fighters.



Ambulance Up to 100mSv for life saving operations where the casualty cannot be immediately removed from the area of high dose rate. Authorised by an appropriately trained ambulance officer. Other restrictions are in place for pregnant ambulance officers. CNC Up to 100mSv for plant intervention, simple rescue and future

dose saving activities. Up to 500mGy for life saving intervention only. This includes intervention to save critical infrastructure which if not attended, may yet threaten public and/or responder life. Authorised by appropriately trained CNC officer. Other restrictions are in place for pregnant CNC officers.

30. Capability Requirements This plan uses principles of emergency response that are common to wider civil emergencies, namely that it is integrated across responding agencies and that it is built upon local arrangements supported where needed by regional and national Government Departments and organisations. As this is a graduated response plan with a number of emergency planning zones linked to different hazard scenarios and warning times, there is a requirement to ensure that any capabilities beyond those owned by Suffolk responders are identified to allow regional and national capabilities to be effectively generated and deployed to support local response activities when needed. Capabilities within this plan are described in terms of the need for people, equipment, infrastructure, training and plans/procedures. Capabilities have been identified based upon the assumptions for reasonably foreseeable and reasonable worst case accident scenarios covered in para 8. The detailed capability requirements to support local response capabilities are detailed in APPENDIX N and are for emergency planning use by respective regional and national agencies. Capability requirements are divided into 3 categories:

Always Needed - to support immediate and detailed response arrangements for a reasonably foreseeable accident. Potentially Needed - to support a timely response to reasonable worst case accident. Others - to provide a start point for extended emergency response beyond a reasonable worst case accident.

31. Generation of National Support and Mutual Aid This plan uses existing arrangements for requesting additional support from the following agencies:

• Police - National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC). Request generated by Suffolk Constabulary.

• Fire - Fire and Rescue Service National Coordination Centre (FRSNCC). Request generated by Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service.

• Ambulance - National Ambulance Coordination Centre (NAAC). Request generated by East of England Ambulance Service.



• NHS - NHS Mutual Aid Arrangements. Request generated by NHS England, Midlands and East - East Team.

• Local Authorities - MoU for Suffolk Local Authorities Mutual Aid. Request generated by requiring local authority.

• Search & Rescue - Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre. Request generated by Suffolk Constabulary if on land and MCA if at sea.

• UK Military - Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA). Request generated by SCG and passed via JRLO.

• US Military - USAF Department of Defense Directive 5100.46. Request generated by SCG and passed via USAFE executive officer at the StratCC or JRLO if no USAF presence.



NUCLEAR EMERGENCY RESPONSE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITES 32. Roles and Responsibilities. The SRF Generic Response Plan details the core civil emergency roles and responsibilities for responders. Sizewell nuclear emergency response specific roles responsibilities are as follows: 32.1 Local

• EDF Energy & Magnox Ltd (for Sizewell A & B site respectively)

o Implement On Site Emergency Plan. o Notify local responders of any Site Incident (either site) or Off Site

Nuclear Emergency (EDF only) - see paras 11 and 13. o Provide immediate advice on countermeasures to protect the public (EDF

only). o Notify people within the DEPZ via automated telephone warning (EDF). o Deploy a Company Technical Advisor to the StratCC to (EDF):

▪ Provide initial advice on the hazard and public countermeasures to the SCG until the CESC stands up and PHE CRCE arrive.

▪ Provide updates to the SCG on progress with containing any release.

o Identify a company communications officer to work with the MCC. o Deploy a company health physicist to the STAC (EDF). o Deploy vehicle survey teams to initially conduct radiation survey in the

immediate vicinity of the site and then subsequently downwind along any plume out to 35km to confirm and quantify the extent of any release (EDF).

o Participate in the RCG (EDF). o Update On Site Emergency Response plans to dovetail with this Off Site

Emergency Plan. o Notify Suffolk County Council of changes to On Site Emergency Plans

and of changes to site hazards and risks to allow changes to this Off Site Emergency Plan to be considered.

• Suffolk Constabulary

o Implement Police Major Incident Plan for Sizewell. o Notify local responders of any Site Incident or Off Site Nuclear

Emergency - see notification flowchart at para 13. o Declare a MAJOR INCIDENT. o Activate the StratCC for an Off Site Nuclear Emergency using StratCC

Guide – Part 1. o Identify a SCG Chair and deploy to StratCC. o Identify a TCG Chair and deploy to Landmark House. o Identify a Police Strategic Commander. o Identify a Police Tactical Commander. o Collation of information and records relating to the incident, including

policy log at SCG during response phase. o Deploy a Police communications officer to the MCC. o Deploy Police Liaison Officer to the Site ECC. o Activate a TCG facility at Landmark House, Ipswich for an Off Site

Nuclear Emergency.



o Deploy police officers to evacuate people from Sizewell beach and Beach View Holiday Park.

o Prepare to coordinate the evacuation of the DEPZ. o In conjunction with Suffolk Highways manage movement into and out of

the DEPZ to control the risk to the public. o Arrange with DfT any further flight restrictions in the Sizewell area if the

hazard assessment indicates a greater risk area. o Notify the MCGA to establish a sea exclusion zone of at least 1km and

be prepared to increase this distance if the hazard assessment indicates a greater risk area.

o Consider establishing a Casualty Bureau. o Prepare to investigate the incident to establish any criminal activity; if no

criminal activity supports ONR investigation. o Provide victim identification in support of the Suffolk Coroner. o Prepare the Assembly Hall at Police HQ to act as a MBC. o Manage radiation exposure of officers deployed to incident scene. o Identify and initiate Police mutual aid to deliver an effective response. o Alert neighbouring Police Forces of an incident at Sizewell. o Maintain Police emergency service cover within the county. o Participate in the RCG

• Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service

o Implement Fire& Rescue Service Major Incident Plan for Sizewell. o Deploy a Fire Strategic Commander with Command Support to the

StratCC. o Deploy a Fire Tactical Commander and TacAD to the TCG. o Deploy a Fire & Rescue Service Liaison Officer to the Site ECC. o Deploy mass decontamination capability to nominated RMU to support

the ambulance service with decontamination where advised by PHE. o Coordinate firefighting, search and rescue and other preventative

measures identified by Joint Dynamic Risk Assessment (JDRA) in order to contain or prevent escalation of the incident.

o Request CHEMET forecast from the Met Office o Support site emergency response in managing hazardous material

issues and mitigate environmental impacts. o Manage radiation exposure of fire-fighters deployed to incident scene. o Support investigations where fire has been involved. o Initiate necessary mutual aid and national support through National Co-

ordination and Advisory Framework (NCAF) for an effective response and maintenance of mission critical activities across Suffolk’

o Support the RCG

• East of England Ambulance Service

o Implement East of England Ambulance Service Major Incident Plan for Sizewell.

o Deploy an Ambulance Strategic Commander and advisor to the StratCC. o Deploy an Ambulance Tactical Commander to the TCG. o Deploy an Ambulance Service Liaison Officer to the Site ECC. o Provide on scene direction on casualty extraction, triage, stabilisation,

initial treatment and transport from site to hospital.



o Coordinate on site operational response of the NHS o Prepare to support any investigation where casualties are involved. o Identify and initiate Ambulance Service mutual aid to deliver an effective

response’ o Maintain Ambulance emergency service cover within the county.

• Suffolk County Council

o Implement Local Authorities Joint Emergency Response Plan for Sizewell. o Deploy a County Council Strategic Manager and advisor to the StratCC. o Deploy a Public Health senior manager to provide public health assurance to

the SCG. o Deploy a communications officer to Chair the MCC.

o Lead the provision of information to the public. o Deploy a liaison officer to the TCG. o Activate the County Council ECC. o Notify schools around the DEPZ of the incident and provide updated

information for staff and parents if during school day. o Prepare to evacuate schools around the DEPZ. o Collation of information and records relating to the incident, including policy

log at RCG during recovery phase. o Prepare to deploy transport to evacuate people from the DEPZ. o Notify neighbouring County Councils of an incident at Sizewell. o Identify voluntary organisation support for Evacuation Centres in conjunction

with Suffolk Coastal ECC. o Prepare to provide catering support for Evacuation Centres. o Prepare to provide social care support for evacuated people at Evacuation

Centres. o Confirm location of Emergency Mortuary. o Prepare to support the Police in managing traffic around the DEPZ. o Activate Public Emergency Call Centre number and facility. o Identify and initiate mutual aid from neighbouring County Councils to deliver

an effective response. o Coordinate the collection and disposal of waste in conjunction with the EA

and Suffolk Coastal DC. o Maintain county council critical services within the county. o Prevent County Council staff from entering any contaminated area. County

Council staffs are not classed as radiation workers nor are they cleared for emergency radiation exposures.

o Update Off Site Emergency Response plan to dovetail with On Site Emergency Plans.

o Notify Sizewell operators of changes to Off Site Emergency Plans to allow changes to On Site Emergency Plans to be considered.

o Ensure that agreed emergency arrangements in the Sizewell Off Site Plan have been implemented via the SCG

• Suffolk Coastal District Council

o Implement Local Authorities Joint Emergency Response Plan for Sizewell. o Deploy a District Council Strategic Manager to the StratCC.

o Assume the role of RCG Chair at the StratCC. o Deploy a liaison officer to the TCG



o Deploy an Environmental Health Officer to the STAC o Activate one Evacuation Centre on direction from SCG. o Prepare to coordinate the activation of a further 4 Evacuation Centres. o Identify and initiate mutual aid from neighbouring district and borough

councils using the Suffolk Mutual Aid Agreement to deliver an effective response.

o Be prepared to support food and water restrictions directed by the FSA, EA or Public Health England.

o Be prepared to provide advice on dangerous buildings and structures. o Be prepared to collect uncontaminated waste. o Be prepared to provide longer term accommodation for evacuated people. o Maintain Suffolk Coastal DC critical services. o Prevent District Council staff from entering any contaminated area. District

Council staffs are not classed as radiation workers nor are they cleared for emergency exposures.

o Participate in the RCG.

• Suffolk Joint Emergency Planning Unit o Support local authority implementation of Joint Emergency Response Plan

for Sizewell o Deploy a local authority advisor to the StratCC. o Deploy a Tactical Manager to the County Council and Suffolk Coastal District

Council ECCs. o Deploy a local authority liaison officer to the TCG.

• Environment Agency

o Provide advice on radiological aspects of environmental contamination to all relevant participating organisations during the course of the incident.

o Provide Agency representatives at the StratCC and national centres, including DEFRA Environment Operations Centre and SAGE.

o Advise on appropriate disposal of radioactive waste o Advise DEFRA Divisions on technical and regulatory aspects of the

response o Provide information to the public and the media, in consultation with the

Lead Department and the strategic command at the Media Coordination Centre.

o Manage flows of regulated waters if appropriate, to minimise impact. o Ensure safety of any Agency staff who may be involved. o Check for breach of site operator’s authorisation, where relevant. o Pursue relevant regulatory investigations in accordance with the Agency’s

statutory duties. o During the Recovery Phase, the Environment Agency will specifically:

o Support the work of the Recovery Coordinating Group to assist the community in returning to normality

o Advise on the impact of radioactive contamination in the environment. o Work with partner organisations to identify feasible remediation

options and support the development of a Recovery Strategy o Advise on the management and disposal of wastes contaminated with

radioactivity.



o Advise DEFRA on the regulatory matters relating to the management and disposal of radioactive wastes.

o The Agency’s broader responsibilities including fisheries, conservation, water resources, waste regulation and water quality could come into play at some stage during the early response or during the short to long-term remediation. More extensive statutory powers could be involved if an incident also involved significant chemical contamination.

o The Agency does not have a specific statutory duty to monitor controlled waters for radioactive contamination. But in the event of an environmental incident involving a release of radioactive substances to controlled waters, the Agency would arrange sampling and radiochemical analysis with a view to protecting the environment and advising downstream users and abstractors.

• NHS England, Midlands and East - East.

o Deploy a NHS England Strategic Manager to the StratCC. o Coordinate the NHS capability needed to support the local health response

to a radiation emergency. o Identify and initiate NHS mutual aid to deliver an effective health response. o Participate in the RCG

• Public Health England

o Deploy specialist staff from the CRCE to the StratCC. o Provide support to the STAC.

o Deploy a PHE Strategic Manager from PHE Thetford Health Protection. o Coordinate PHE capability needed to support a public health response to a

radiation emergency. o Provide advice on public countermeasures to the SCG. o Provide interpretation of the public health implications of hazard

assessments and predications to the SCG. o Be prepared to participate in media briefings at the MBC. o Activate the radiation monitoring resources require for people monitoring at

one Evacuation Centre. o Participate in the RCG

• Maritime & Coastguard Agency

o Coordinate the exclusion of maritime traffic during an Off Site Nuclear Emergency.

o Be prepared to support the police in evacuating people by sea in extreme circumstances.

o Be prepared to deploy a MCA Strategic Manager to the StratCC. Normally coordination during an emergency will be done virtually from the SCG to Humber MRCC.

• DEFRA

o Deploy a liaison officer to the StratCC o Provide advice to the SCG on animal welfare issues.



o Coordinate activity to minimise the impact of radiation on food production, farming and fisheries.

o Coordinate activity with water companies to preserve safe drinking water supply to the public.

o Participate in the RCG

• Food Standards Agency

o Deploy a liaison officer to the StratCC. o Determine level of radioactive contamination within the food chain. o Take action to ensure that contaminated food does not enter the food chain

via CFIL restriction order. o Provide public advice and information on food restrictions in conjunction with

the MCC. o In conjunction with the EA, ensure contaminated foodstuffs are disposed of

safely. o Participate in the RCG

• MHCLG RED

o Deploy to the StratCC to act as the GLO until BEIS arrive at the SCG o Support the BEIS GLT in the delivery of their duties o Where necessary, assist in the co-ordination between Government, and

local bodies by facilitating discussions and contact and by acting as a liaison point

o Compile a situation reporting on local consequence management ensuring MHCLG and BEIS EOC (and HO if appropriate) are fully briefed.

o Participate in the RCG.

• BEIS GLT

o Deploy a GLT to the StratCC and be part of the wider Government Liaison Team (which includes MHCLG and Home Office in a CT incident).

o Act as a link to RIMNET to share hazard data with the SCG. o Participate in the RCG

• ONR

o Deploy to the StratCC to provide independent advice, where appropriate, on all matters relating to:

o technical advice on the course of the emergency on site; o prognosis for the development of the incident and implications off site; o the source term for the emergency; o the end of the on-site emergency;

o To ensure Government (principally through BEIS) is kept fully informed on all matters relating to advice provided above.

o To participate as a member of the STAC, where the primary role will be to provide advice on all matters relating to advice provided above.



• Met Office

o Provide PACRAM forecast to Fire & Rescue Service and site o Deploy PWS to the StratCC if available o Provide long distance predication information from NAME to SCG via PWS if

deployed.

• UK Military (JRLO)

o Deploy to Strat CC to support the GLO / GLT and to provide situational awareness to MoD through the military chain of command.

o Provide advice on military capabilities. o Be prepared to define military capability required in the event of civil

capability gaps, and to facilitate request(s) for military aid accordingly, in order to augment the emergency response

• UK Power Networks

o Provide virtual advice to the SCG on the implications for local electricity supply following a radiation emergency.

o Be prepared to deploy a GOLD officer if there is an impact or a potential impact on local electricity supply.

• Water Companies (Anglian Water and Essex & Suffolk Water)

o Deploy a liaison officer to the StratCC. o In conjunction with DEFRA provide advice to the SCG on public water supply

and sewage.

• Government Decontamination Service o Deploy a Liaison Officer to the STAC. o Provide advice, guidance, management support and access to specialist

suppliers able to carry out decontamination operations.

32.2 Regional

• MHCLG (ResCG)

o Develop a shared understanding of the evolving situation, including horizon scanning to provide early warning of emerging major challenges.

o Assess the emergency’s actual and/or potential impact. o Review the steps being taken to manage the situation, and any assistance

that may be needed/offered, including through facilitating mutual aid arrangements between SCG responders if required.

o Ensuring an effective flow of communication between and across local and national levels, including reports to the national level on the response effort, to ensure a complementary approach.

o Support co-ordination of a coherent and consistent public message in conjunction with the MCC and NCC.



o Identify any issues which cannot be resolved at local level and need to be raised at national level, including advising on priorities and guiding the deployment of scarce resources across the area.

32.3 National

• Cabinet Office (COBR)

o In conjunction with LGD, agree which elements of COBR need to be activated.

o Establish single, authoritative overview of situation. o Coordinate CRIP process with government departments and Res

CG/MHCLG RED GLO. o Prioritise central government impact management activity. o Provide generic updates to national responders. o Provide central government recovery coordination activity. o Activate the NCC to provide public information in conjunction with the MCC. o Activate SAGE to provide coordinated scientific and technical advice to

impact management activity. o Consider activation of a Logistical Operations Cell to coordinate cross

government sourcing and distribution of resources.

• BEIS

o Capture and maintain situational awareness to inform cross-government response activity: what has happened on-site and what this means to the risk offsite. This is done through BEIS GLO at the SCG.

o Capture and maintain awareness of the technical, on-site response, determining how effective it is, and any knock-on implications for the future risk. This is done in conjunction with the CESC.

o Understand the immediate, medium, and longer term policy implications for civil Nuclear.

o Understand the impacts of the incident on the wider energy sectors for which BEIS have responsibility.

o Contribute to public messaging: monitoring and influencing conventional and social media in assistance to the News Coordination Centre in the Cabinet Office.

o Provide accurate and timely briefing for BEIS Ministers, and supporting them at COBR and other key meetings.

o Meet international radiation incident early notification obligations, in line with international agreements.

o Liaise with nuclear agencies and counterparts in other countries. o Leading on liaison and messaging with industry in BEIS’s sectors. o Assist with secretariat support to Cabinet Office and GO Science. o Provide, if appropriate, BEIS Chief Scientific Advisor (CSA) representation at

SAGE.

• Sizewell Operators (CESC)

o Activate CESC. o Coordinate provision of resources and supplies to sustain the company

response on site.



o Coordinate off site environmental monitoring and provide interpreted information to the STAC on the nature of the radiation hazard.

o Align operator media response with the MCC.



COMMUNICATIONS 33. Media Coordination

33.1 Purpose. The SRF maintains a Warning and Informing Plan to provide the framework with which to ensure clear and timely information is delivered by the appropriate means to members of the public of Suffolk during any incident and for dealing with the media effectively to ensure they assist in the delivery of accurate and timely information to the public. The SRF plan forms the basis for the media coordination arrangements for a radiation emergency. 33.2 Coordination A key element of media coordination is to ensure that a consistent understanding of the local, national and international communications related to any Sizewell radiation emergency is established. The key elements to this are:

• Suffolk Media Coordination Cell (MCC). This cell will be established at the Suffolk StratCC for any Off Site Nuclear Emergency by Suffolk Constabulary. The cell will be staffed by communications officers from Suffolk Constabulary, Suffolk County Council, the EA, BEIS and NHS England. The MCC will be chaired by either Suffolk Constabulary or Suffolk County Council. The cell will establish contact with communications officers from the operator and PHE, if not deployed to the StratCC to work virtually with these organisations. The MCC will:

o Consolidate immediate alerting of people within the DEPZ, some of which

may have received alerting message from the operator via automated telephone warning, of the incident and on countermeasure actions to take.

o Provide wider information to people likely to be affected by actions taken to manage any radiation emergency, including FAQs.

o Monitor local media channels. o Clear media messages and other public information with the STAC Chair

and SCG Chair. o Attend the SCG to update on media and public information activity. o Establish a Media Briefing Facility at Police HQ and manage activity

within the facility. o Establish contact with the NCC to share understanding of local media

activity and coordinate public information messages. o Coordinate local media messages during the response phase and into

the initial recovery phase. o Coordinate visits by VIPs to Suffolk during any radiation emergency. o Establish a Public Call Centre to handle non-emergency calls related to

any radiation emergency, including provision of basic advance and information.

• Media Briefing Centre. A facility to allow media to work from and be centrally briefed via press conferences may be established by Suffolk Constabulary in Assembly hall at Suffolk Constabulary HQ. Press conferences will normally be led by senior officers from Suffolk Constabulary, the operator, additional senior



officers from Suffolk County Council Public Health, NHS England or PHE may also be required to participate in press conferences.

• Media Liaison Point. A location for media to film and interview close to Sizewell may be established by the MCC in conjunction with the emergency services who might be maintaining a cordon during any radiation emergency. A communications officer may be deployed to the media liaison point by the MCC if requested by the TCG or Ground Commander. Any media deployed to the incident scene will be treated as members of the public for the purposes of countermeasures. Where shelter or evacuation is advised, media will be advised not to enter these areas.

• Suffolk Emergency Helpline. A public helpline may be established by Suffolk County Council during any off site nuclear emergency to act as a focal point for general advice and information. This capability will take a number of hours to fully establish and during this period, normal non-emergency numbers used by responder agencies and the operators will continue to be used. A call centre to operate the helpline will be staffed primarily by Suffolk County Council officers and augmented by specialist staff if needed. The call centre will use pre-prepared scripts to provide advice to the public and will be supported by the MCC to allow it to provide information as events unfold during any incident. A call centre will operate the Suffolk Emergency Helpline 0345 603 2814.

• BEIS Emergency Operations Centre. During any radiation emergency, BEIS as the lead government department will:

o Take overall responsibility for ensuring that Ministers are briefed. o Take overall responsibility for handling national media and parliamentary

interest. o Act as a focal point for media coordination at the national level in

conjunction with the NCC. o Act as the focal point for coordinating media messages between central

government and the Suffolk MCC. o Coordinate and disseminate information on recovery for the public and

the media at national level. o Notify the European Community, the International Atomic Energy Agency

and countries with which the UK has bilateral agreements about the emergency and its likely course and effects.

• Cabinet Office News Coordination Cell (NCC). During any radiation emergency, the cabinet Office may establish a NCC as part of COBR to:

o Check the consistency of messaging across government departments and agencies ensuring that they are not contradictory and are being released from limited sources.

o Ensure that messages and speeches from Ministers and senior officials are not being made at the same time.

33.3 Communication Channels During any radiation emergency, a range of communications channels will be used depending upon the audience for messages by the MCC, and BEIS/NCC. Potential audiences are:



• Casualties and other possible victims

o Group A: Survivors – those in the immediate vicinity and directly affected, possibly as casualties. Initially survivors will get information from emergency responders at the scene. They can also be a source of information for the media, through eye witness accounts etc.

o Group B: Those close by who may need to take further action to avoid further harm. All sections of the community should be considered when choosing communications channels. Local knowledge will be important.

• Local people, friends and relatives

o Group C: Those in the area who may be disrupted by the consequences of the emergency and the clear up process. The numbers of people are likely to be greatest here, and it may be that groups emerge who need targeted information.

o Group D: Those who are not affected directly but know or are related to those who might be. These people need two way communications to get specific information in the short term – i.e. they will want to ask questions about friends and relatives as well as being provided with information on the situation.

• The wider audience

o Group E: Those who are not affected but are concerned, or alarmed about wider implications, or simply interested. This group will get its information through the broadcast media and by visiting websites, and by word of mouth.

o Group F: The news media. Plays an important role in getting information out to the public, but also have own public interest agendas.

• Vulnerable Groups There may be some groups of people who will require emergency communications to be produced in a different way in order for communications to be effective. For example, some communities in Suffolk do not have English as their first language. Therefore, in order to ensure that communications in an emergency are easily and quickly understood, information may need to be produced in different languages. Currently, the most common community languages in Suffolk are: Arabic, Bengali, Chinese, Gujarati, Kurdish, Polish and Portuguese. Translations can be organised through Language Line (via Suffolk CC Customer Services 03456 066 067) and the Translation and Interpreting Service in Ipswich (Tel: 01473 400082, email: [email protected]).

mailto:[email protected]



Potential communications channels to be used are:

33.4 Pre-Prepared Statements. A pre-prepared statement will be used as follows immediately after any radiation emergency: MEDIA HOLDING STATEMENT FOR AN INCIDENT AT SIZEWELL B NUCLEAR POWER STATION At xxxAM/PM today, an incident occurred at Sizewell B Power Station in Suffolk. Emergency services are currently at the scene, assessing the situation with staff from the station. More information will be issued promptly to the public by the authorities, once this assessment is completed. Residents are advised to tune into local radio, television or monitor local news websites for further information in relation to this incident. ENDS



34. Communication Systems. During any radiation emergency, it is vital that information is passed effectively in voice and data formats to allow effective management of the incident. Communications systems likely to be used are as follows:

Ground (Incident Scene) AIRWAVE Mobile Phone Tactical AIRWAVE Resilience Direct – Information sharing between Suffolk responders Mobile Phone Fixed telephone E-mail - up to OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE Strategic Resilience Direct – information sharing between all responding agencies Mobile Phone Fixed telephone E-mail - up to OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE Access to TiMMS via operator Access to NAME via Met Office Cross Border Mobile Phone Fixed telephone E-mail - up to OFFICIAL-SENSITVE Resilience Direct - for information sharing Regional Mobile Phone Fixed telephone E-mail - up to OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE TiMMS Resilience Direct National Mobile Phone Fixed telephone E-mail - up to SECRET RIMNET Resilience Direct

35. Key Contact Numbers.

35. 1 SRF Alerting Directory. A SRF alerting directory is maintained to allow alerting of Suffolk emergency responders for any incident or emergency and supplements the alerting flowcharts in para 14. This protectively marked directory can be accessed via the SRF RD website.



This next table is removed from the public version of the plan. FOI Section 36 - Prejudice to effective conduct of public affairs and FOI Section 41 – information provided in confidence

Key Contact Numbers During Response Phase:

Location Contact Number

FAX Satellite EMail

Initial Notification Only – Site Incident or Off Site Nuclear Emergency

Suffolk Police – Contact and Control Room (CCR)

Suffolk Fire Combined Control

East of England Ambulance Control Room

To Be Used After Declaration of Off Site Nuclear Emergency or Site Incident requiring coordinated response

Suffolk Strategic Coordination Centre (SCG)

Suffolk STAC

Suffolk Media Coord Cell

Suffolk TCG

Site ECC ES Liaison Officers

CESC (EDF)

Central Support Cell (Magnox)



DIRECT NUMBERS FOR BOTH SITES EMERGENCY CONTROL ROOMS ARE HELD BY SUFFOLK POLICE CCR IN CASE OF LOSS OF COMMS WITH THE CESC

BEIS Emergency Operations Centre

ONR RCIS

FSA Incident Room

PHE Emergency Operations Centre Chiltern

35.2 Suffolk Emergency Helpline. A public emergency helpline will be established by Suffolk County Council with the support of Suffolk Constabulary and local public health officers to act as a non-emergency point of contact for advice and information during any Sizewell emergency. The Suffolk emergency helpline is not active routinely and a telephone answer message reflects this. The Helpline will be used by the MCC to assist with public information distribution.

Suffolk Emergency Helpline 0345 603 2814

35.3 Site Helpline Number. EDF Energy maintains a public helpline for use during emergencies. This can be called on 01728 653378 and will provide basic information on any incident at Sizewell B Power Station via automated message.



TRAINING AND EXERCISE 36. Training.

36.1 Training Requirement. REPPIR Regulation 9(14) requires all agencies identified within this plan to ensure that people who are identified to implement any aspect of this plan are suitably briefed and trained in order to carry out the required role. This plan sets out the multi-agency response arrangements and requires that each agency ensures that individual operational plans or procedures cover agency specific responsibilities. All staff who are liable to respond to a Sizewell radiation emergency, and thus support the implementation of this plan must be aware of its content and of the agency specific operational plans and procedures to enable them to undertake their role safely and effectively. To assist with the distribution of this plan, an unclassified version is available on the SRF website. 36.2 Training Delivery. This plan acknowledges the use of a tiered approach to training staff with a response role:

• Individual Training - Specific to individual role, conducted by individual agency. Training standards in accordance with individual agency policies.

• Team Training - Specific to team role, conducted by individual agency. Training standards in accordance with individual agency polices.

• Multi-Agency Training - Collective training between more than one agency in relation to a response role or capability. Overseen by the SRF as part of the wider CCA training and exercise programme. Standards as set out in national policy or guidance or as mutually agreed between agencies.

37 Exercise . REPPIR Regulation 10(1)b requires that this plan is tested through exercise at least every 3 years. The purpose of the 3 yearly tests is to demonstrate to the ONR the adequacy of off site emergency arrangements. This requirement is discharged as follows:

37.1 Exercise Planning. Suffolk County Council in conjunction with the site operator and local emergency services agree a date for the 3 yearly exercises between 12-18 months before the 3 year anniversary of the last test. An exercise planning group is established to develop an Exercise Order that follows national guidance.

37.2. Exercise Type. The type of exercise run every 3 years is agreed as part of the exercise planning. As a minimum this will normally test Strategic coordination, including media coordination and STAC capabilities, plus notification and countermeasure advice processes with the site operators. Some exercises will be chosen to test additional response capabilities or to validate arrangements for extended emergency arrangements or concurrent risks. The 3 yearly exercise is usually a command post type exercise and additional live play element to test certain function may be agreed during the exercise planning stage.



37.3 Exercise Cycle. This plan will be tested every 3 years through an assessed exercise that will normally align with the 3 yearly test of the Sizewell B Power Station on site plan. 37.4. Exercise Assessment Exercises are assessed using the national guidance on exercise assessment. The quantitative assessment criteria used to measure response arrangements are derived from this plan. Subjective assessment is used by umpires, in particular ONR, based upon experience gained from other exercises or learning from similar events. Finally, the 3 yearly exercise is measured on successful achievement of lessons identified from previous Sizewell exercises.

38. Lessons Identified. After each off site emergency exercise, a formal debrief process takes place overseen by the SRF. Lessons from the exercise to improve performance or to record better practice are captured on a standard form set out in to national guidance on testing off site preparedness. RECOVERY 39. Arrangements for the recovery from any radiation emergency at Sizewell will follow the SRF Recovery Plan. The specific arrangements for recovery from a radiation emergency are at APPENDIX O.


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APPENDIX A

SIZEWELL HAZARD AND RISK OVERVIEW References: A. Magnox Ltd Sizewell A HIRE Report of Assessment TR/SE/221 Issue 3 Revision 2

dated April 2015. B. EDF Energy Hazard Identification and Risk Evaluation Report for Sizewell B Power

Station SZB/TZR/015 Revision 007 dated 21 April 2017. C. Impact of Postulated Radiological Releases from Selected Nuclear Facilities on the

UK - CRCE-RA-1-2015 dated June 2015 – UK SECRET. D. National Risk Assessment 2016 – UK SECRET. E. IAEA Safety Guide No. GS-G-2.1 - Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or

Radiological Emergency dated 2007. 1. Radioactive Substances on Site

1.1 Sizewell A Station. Historically, the majority of the radioactivity present on site was contained in the irradiated nuclear fuel. However, all the nuclear fuel has now been removed from the site which has formally been declared fuel free. Other radioactive material in the form of waste still remains on site, although the amount of radioactivity it contains is very much less than was present in the nuclear fuel. Radioactive waste can be categorised according to its level of radioactivity. There is both Intermediate Level Waste (ILW) and Low Level Waste (LLW) on site, potentially important inventories (accurate as at December 2014) include:

• solid and wet radioactive LLW (approximately 3,500 m3)

• solid and wet radioactive ILW (approximately 750 m3) In addition to these sources, radioactivity will also be present by activation of structural materials. Structures that contain sufficient radioactivity to exceed the levels specified in Schedule 2 of the REPPIR Regulations include:

• graphite moderator (approximately 3,600 m3 total, ILW).

• reactor vessel and internals – including insulation, diagrid, core restraint and

• support, gas and instrument ducts and nozzles, standpipes and charge pans,

• control rods, burst can detection pipework and thermocouples (approximately

• 1000 m3 total, LLW & ILW).

• other structural materials – (approximately 31,500 m3 total, LLW) However, the activity is fixed in the structures and would be unlikely to contribute significantly to any release to the environment, even in the case of a severe accident. 1.2 Sizewell B Station. A greater part of the radioactive substances present on site are contained within the irradiated nuclear fuel. In its un-irradiated state (i.e. as brought onto site) the fuel contains very little radioactivity. The radioactivity of fuel increases with irradiation in the reactor but decays when removed from it. After the fuel, the most significant inventory will be in the reactor Pressure Vessel and associated core structure and components. Structures that contain sufficient radioactivity to exceed levels specified in REPPIR include:


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• Primary circuit pipe work

• Reactor pressure vessel and internal reactor structures

• Primary circuit supporting systems Other radioactive material on site although with much less radioactivity than present in reactor fuel is:

• Reactor primary circuit coolant water

• Fuel storage pond water

• Solid radioactive waste

• Liquid radioactive waste 2. Other Hazardous Substances on Site

A range of hazardous substances are held at both Sizewell A and B stations and are used for the routine operation of the sites. These substances include:

• Hydrocarbon fuels and lubricating oils for the operation of steam raising boilers, gas turbines and generators for on-site power and thermal heat generation.

• Bulk chemicals including concentrated acids and alkalis, and also gaseous/liquid hydrogen stocks.

• Small quantities of specialist chemicals and gases. Emergencies involving these hazardous substances are not likely to result in any hazard outside of the site.

3. Nature of Radiological Hazard

The main risk to the public relates to harmful exposure to radioactive substances carried in a gaseous cloud which has been released from the effected site. A range of radioactive substances may be released from such an emergency. A radioactive substance of particular concern is Iodine 131 which may be discharged as a gas in any cloud from Sizewell B Power Station only. The substance can be readily absorbed by the human body and concentrates in the thyroid resulting in radiation dose to the exposed person. Particulate material deposited on the ground or other surfaces can also present a contact hazard to the skin or can be ingested through contaminated food or water. Further information on the effects of radiation is available via: http://www.suffolkresilience.com/assets/InfoAdvice/Sizewell/HPA-Basic-Concepts-of-Radiation.pdf 4. Potential Hazard Scenario - Reasonably Foreseeable

REPPIR requires that detailed emergency arrangements are in place to manage a reasonably foreseeable event that results in a radiation emergency being declared due to the likelihood that a member of the public will be exposed to radiation doses in excess of 5mSv in a year immediately following any emergency. Such an event may be classed a Level 4 or 5 on the International Nuclear Event Scale. The most credible nuclear emergency scenarios for each site are as follows:

4.1 Sizewell A Site. Since the site has been declared fuel free, any faults that might have resulted in a radiological dose as a result of damage to, or exposure of,

http://www.suffolkresilience.com/assets/InfoAdvice/Sizewell/HPA-Basic-Concepts-of-Radiation.pdf

http://www.suffolkresilience.com/assets/InfoAdvice/Sizewell/HPA-Basic-Concepts-of-Radiation.pdf



irradiated fuel can no longer occur. In addition, now that the reactor vessels are devoid of heat-producing materials, in an air atmosphere at no more than 5 psi above atmospheric pressure and close to ambient temperature, depressurisation faults with significant collateral damage and release of activity are no longer credible. Therefore it is concluded that there are no reasonably foreseeable events associated with on-going operations at Sizewell „A‟ that could lead to a dose to the public of 5 mSv or greater in the year following the event. There is no reasonable foreseeable hazard scenario for the Sizewell A site. Further detail can be found in the Sizewell A Station Report of Assessment on the SRF website.

4.2 Sizewell B Power Station. Two candidate fault sequences with similar scales of potential offsite radiological consequences were identified from among the many faults analysed within the extensive safety case for Sizewell B. Of these the fault sequence which is shown to lead to the largest offsite contour applying the REPPIR effective dose criteria involves a major leak from a system containing reactor coolant, following a reactor shutdown, and the release of all radioactivity within the primary coolant in the space of one hour. An assessment has been made of the maximum distance to which the lower ERL of dose for sheltering or stable iodine tablet issue could be exceeded in the event either of these two faults were ever to occur. The maximum distance is estimated to be between 320 metres and 527 meters (lower ERL for sheltering). The difference between the distances reflects the different proportions of particular radioactive materials within the release. Further detail can be found in the Sizewell B Power Station Report of Assessment on the SRF website – Information and Advice pages.

5 Potential Hazard Scenario - Reasonable Worst Case - Sizewell B Power Station Only. REPPIR does not cover radiation emergency’s that are considered beyond reasonably foreseeable and for which ‘extendibility’ arrangements are advised. In order to provide planning assumptions for a more severe nuclear emergency scenario that results in consequences beyond reasonably foreseeable, the Suffolk Resilience Forum has chosen to draw upon information generated by the National Risk Assessment process. The National Risk Assessment (NRA) identifies and assesses civil emergency scenarios and includes scenarios that experts agree represent reasonable worst case manifestations of these risks and the full range of expected consequences. The National Risk Planning Assumptions provide background data about risks identified within the NRA and provides assumptions to be used by planners on the maximum expected scale, duration and severity of common consequences or how consequences could vary and in which challenging circumstances they could occur. The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 requires category 1 responders to assess the risk of emergencies occurring and to maintain emergency plans to control or mitigate the effects of an emergency; these duties apply in risk scenarios not covered by REPPIR.



The NRA 2016 identifies the likelihood of a radioactive substance release from a nuclear reactor (H10) as a LOW but that the overall impact would be MEDIUM and provides background risk information that is relevant to Sizewell B The reasonable worst case scenario within the UK, whilst still having a significant impact, is not currently assessed to be on the same scale as Fukushima or Chernobyl. Further detail can be found in the classified NRA 2016 and associated National Risk planning Assumptions available to Category 1 responders through the SRF Partnership Manager.

6. Planning Assumptions for Emergency Arrangements. REPPIR requires that an Off Site Emergency Plan is prepared to provide detailed emergency arrangements to secure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the restriction of exposure to ionising radiation and the health and safety of persons who may be affected by such reasonably foreseeable emergencies. Such a plan is based upon emergency planning zones that cover the area that in the opinion of the ONR any member of the public is likely to be affected by such radiation emergencies, this is called the DEPZ. National Nuclear Emergency Planning and response guidance issued by BEIS indicates that nuclear emergency plans should be extendible to cover more severe accident scenarios that are beyond reasonably foreseeable. This plan uses a tiered approach analogous with International Atomic Energy Authority guidance to planning for emergencies at Sizewell based upon risk information for reasonably foreseeable and reasonable worst case accidents scenarios to guide where emergency arrangements should be planned and to what degree. The resultant planning assumptions are as follows:

6.1. Reasonably Foreseeable. The Sizewell B Power Station Report of Assessment (Reference B) indicates that radiation from a reasonably foreseeable accident may require countermeasures to protect the public to be applied with minimal warning. Planning assumptions as follows:

• Evacuation - out to 200m

• Shelter - out to 1km

• Stable Iodine - out to 1km.

• Food monitoring out to 36km. The ONR revised the Sizewell DEPZ in April 2014. The revised area is a land component based primarily on 6 figure postcodes located around a circular radius of approximately 2.4km with an extended boundary that includes the town of Leiston and part of the village of Aldringham. A rectangular seaward component commences at the points where the land component reaches the coast and extends 2km out to sea7. Certain public protection countermeasures within the DEPZ are pre-arranged/issued for immediate implementation for identifiable groups within 1km from the site. All identifiable groups within the DEPZ are provided with prior information and are people living and working within the DEPZ covered by detailed emergency arrangements8.

7 ONR Project Assessment Report – ONR-COP-PAR-14-001 dated 23 April 2014. 8 As required by REPPIR Schedule 7 Part III.



6.2 Reasonable Worst Case. The background risk information within the NRA (Reference D) indicates a range of severe accident scenarios that might require public protection countermeasures to be extended beyond the DEPZ following notification of a radiation emergency. EDF Energy advise that a warning period of 10-12 hours is likely to be available for emergencies that are beyond reasonably foreseeable. Planning assumptions for extending countermeasures are as follows:

• Extended Evacuation - out to 4km

• Extended Shelter - out to 15km (shelter and stable iodine are implemented together)

• Extended Stable Iodine - out to 15km. The Suffolk Resilience Forum has agreed to introduce an EEPZ out to 15km based upon the Sizewell B power station to help facilitate extended emergency planning. Countermeasures within the EEPZ will be pre-planned but not deployed and public within this wider area will be able to access information on outline emergency planning arrangements.

back to contents

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Sizewell Off Site Emergency Plan

Issue 3.6 dated Oct 18

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APPENDIX B DETAILED EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE 1. Map of DEPZ.

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED Sizewell Off Site Emergency Plan

Issue 3.6 dated Oct 18

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2. Sectors To aid the identification of areas where countermeasures might be applied during a radiation emergency, the DEPZ has been split into sectors that are based upon 22 1/2 degree radials divided by 1km. The sectors are centred upon the operating Sizewell B power station. 3. Assessment of DEPZ An assessment of the DEPZ has been conducted to identify:

• Population - permanent and transitory

• Commercial properties

• Potential vulnerable groups - schools, child care provision, care homes, camping/caravan sites

• Local critical infrastructure

• Post codes linked to each individual sector This assessment is used before any emergency to identify resources needed for prior information and pre-issued stable iodine tablets and to be able to implement countermeasures immediately during any emergency - either by entire emergency planning zone or by specific sectors that can be published in the form of post code areas. 4. DEPZ Summary:

• Permanent Population: 7,618

• Transient population: 970 - 1070 (inc up to 150 mentally or physically disabled)

• Total Private Properties: 3,260

• Total Commercial Properties: 154

• Vulnerable Groups:

- Schools: 3

- Children Centres: 1

- Care Homes: 8

- Camping/Caravan Sites: 3

• Critical infrastructure: Police 1 Fire 1 NHS 1 Water 2 BT 1


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5. DEPZ Assessment (including post code areas)

Sector Post Codes covered by

sector

Total Permanent population

Total Private

Properties

Transient Population

Commercial Properties

Vulnerability/Critical Infrastructure

Within 1km

5 23 12 290 - 370 4 Nil

A1 IP16 4UR Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil

B1 IP16 4UR Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil

C1 IP16 4UR Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil

D1 IP16 4UR Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil

E1 IP16 4UR Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil

F1 IP16 4UR Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil

G1 IP16 4UH IP16 4UR

Nil Nil Nil Nil

H1 IP16 4UD IP16 4UH IP16 4UR

17 10 SZA - 270 VA C/S - 20

4 Nil

I1 IP16 4UE IP16 4UH IP16 4UJ IP16 4UR

Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil

J1 IP16 4UE IP16 4UJ IP16 4UR

6 2 Nil Nil Nil

K1 IP16 4UJ IP16 4UR

Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil

L1 IP16 4UR Nil Nil SWM RPW

Nil Nil

M1 IP16 4UR Nil Nil SWM RPW

Nil Nil

VA C/S - Vulcan Arms Campsite SWM - Sizewell Marshes (Suffolk Wildlife Trust) RPW- Reckham Pitts Wood (Suffolk Wildlife Trust)




sector


Total Private

Properties




N1 IP16 4UR Nil Nil SWM Nil Nil

O1 IP16 4UR Nil Nil SWM Nil Nil

P1 IP16 4UR Nil Nil SWM Nil Nil

Within 2km

19 96 47 500 - 650 6 3 x camping/caravan sites

A2 IP16 4SP

Nil Nil MNR 400-500

Nil Nil

B2 - G2 over sea

Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil

H2 IP16 4UH IP16 4TU IP16 4TT IP16 4TX IP16 4UB IP16 4UD

8 4 SH up to 123 residents

1 3 x camping/caravan sites

I2 IP16 4TT IP16 4TU IP16 4TX IP16 4TY IP16 4UA IP16 4UD IP16 4UJ

26 12 Nil Nil Nil

J2 IP16 4LS IP16 4TS IP16 4TT IP16 4TY

14 7 Nil 1 Nil

SWM - Sizewell Marshes (Suffolk Wildlife Trust) SH - Sizewell Hall SWM - Sizewell Marshes (Suffolk Wildlife Trust)




sector


Total Private

Properties




K2 IP16 4UL IP16 4TP IP16 4TR IP16 4TS

12 4 Nil 2 Nil

L2 IP16 4UL IP16 4UN IP16 4UW IP16 4UP

27 14 SWM RPW

2 Nil

M2 IP16 4UL IP16 4 UP IP16 4RQ IP16 4SR

9 6 SWM RPW

Nil Nil

N2 IP16 4RQ IP16 4SR IP16 4UL IP16 4UP

Nil Nil SWM Nil Nil

O2 IP16 4SP Nil Nil MNR 400-500

Nil Nil

P2 IP16 4SP Nil Nil MNR 400-500

Nil Nil

Within 3km

See below 2962 1245 Up to 150 121 2 x schools 1 x child care

5 x care homes 1 x fire stn

1 x water pumping stn 1 x sewage works

A3 IP16 4SP

Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil

H3 IP16 4UB 12 7 NHWT up to 150 Nil 1 x Care Home

I3 IP16 4PG IP16 4UB

12 7 Nil Nil Nil

RPW - Reckham Pitts Wood (Suffolk Wildlife Trust) NHWT - Ness House Wardens Trust (Mentally & physically handicapped centre) SWM - Sizewell Marshes (Suffolk Wildlife Trust)




sector


Total Private

Properties




J3 IP16 4LU IP16 4LS IP16 4LT IP16 4TR IP16 4TS

15 8 Aldringham Common

Nil Nil

K3 Multiple 1773 700 Open market Youth club

106 2 x schools 1 x child care

3 x care homes 1 x fire stn

L3 Multiple 1126 516 1 x nursery 1 x holiday let 1 x caravan

13 1 x water pumping stn 1 x sewage works

M3 IP16 4RQ IP16 4RF IP16 4RG IP16 4TA

16 3 NIL Nil 1 x care home

N3 IP16 4RH IP16 4RQ IP16 4SR

3 1 NIL 1 Nil

O3 IP16 4SP 5 3 Nil 1 Nil

P3 IP16 4SP Nil Nil NIL Nil Nil

Within 4km

See below 4334 1858 See below 22 1 x school 3 x care homes 1 x Police stn

1 x GP surgery 1 x BT exchange 1 x water tower

I4 IP16 4PG

J4 IP16 4LT 33 21 Nil Nil Nil

K4 Multiple 2144 882 1 x B&B 2 x holiday let

16 2 x care homes 1 x water tower 1 x Police stn




sector


Total Private

Properties




L4 Multiple 2157 955 2 x Caravan 1 x Youth Club

1 x B&B 2 x holiday let

6 1 x school 1 x care home 1 x GP surgery

1 x BT exchange

M4 IP16 4TA Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil

A4, O4 & P4

IP16 4SP Nil Nil Sizewell Marshes Nil Nil

Within 5km

5 203 98 Nil 1 1 x water works

K5 IP17 4DZ IP17 1UH

133 57 Nil 1 1 x water works

L5 IP16 4HN IP16 4TW IP16 4JE

80 41 Nil Nil Nil

6. DEPZ Vulnerable Groups

Sector Type Premises & Use Tel Number Location (GRID Ref)

Number of People

Within 2 km

H2 Camping/Caravan Site

Beach View Holiday Park, Sizewell, IP16 4TU

01728 830724 TM 475623

67 static caravans, 60 touring caravans (Mar – Oct)

Hard accn – 12 people


Sizewell Hall Christian conference and camping centre, Sizewell, IP16 4TX

01728 830715 TM 474619 Hard accn – 84 people, 60 – 80 tents (Jul – Aug)




Number of People


Vulcan Arms Public house, Sizewell, IP16 4TX

01728 830748 TM 474627 5 caravans

Within 3 km

H3 Care Homes / sheltered housing

Ness House Wardens Trust for disabled people, Sizewell, IP16 4UB

01728 830007 TM 475611 Hard accn 15 people, 20 tents (Apr – Sep) Hall can hold 150 people

K3 School Alde Valley School, IP16 4BG

01728 830570 TM 451621 150 staff + 670 students

K3 School Leiston Primary, IP16 4JQ


K3 Care Homes / sheltered housing

Charles Adam Close, Leiston, IP16 4LP

Flagship properties – 0808 1684555

TM 449625 86 (43 Bungalows)

K3 Children Centre

Leiston Children’s Centre and Shining Stars Day Care Centre, IP16 4JG



Paxton, Chadwick Close, Leiston, IP16 4BJ




Charles Adam Close, Leiston, IP16 4LP



M3 Care Homes / sheltered housing

Old Abbey Residential Home, Theberton Road, Leiston, IP16 4RF

01728 830944 TM 450640 Residential and dementia 40 residents

Within 4 km


Smyth House, High St, Leiston IP16 4DY

01728831373 TM 444623 18


Daneway House, Haylings Road, Leiston, IP16 4DY

01728 832482 TM 442618 9 (Learning disabilities)




Number of People

L4 School Summerhill, IP16 4HY Head (out of hours)

01728 830540 Head (out of hours) Zoe Neill Readhead 01728 830030 07903 938188

TM 443630 25 staff + 70 students

L4 Care Homes / sheltered housing

Charles Miller Court, Leiston, IP16 4BY

0370 192910 TM 444624 60 (30 flats)

7. DEPZ – Transient Population Within the DEPZ there are a number of listed addresses providing accommodation, the table below lists only those which have 5 or more rooms or can accommodate 10 or more people.


No of rooms / more than 10 persons

K4 B&B Field End, Leiston 01728 833527 TM 444622 5 rooms

8. DEPZ - Critical Infrastructure

Agency

Infrastructure

Location/Sector

Impact of Loss

Agreed Mitigation

Point of Contact

Police Leiston Police Station

TM 444622 K4

Initial Police response location Contingency Planning Officer Suffolk Constabulary

Fire Leiston Fire Station

TM 448625 K3

On call Fire Station • Firefighters are classified as radiation workers under IRR99 for dose limits.

• Pre-identified informed volunteer firefighters can operate under REPPIR for higher emergency exposure dose limits.

Resilience Manager Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service



• Radiation protection procedures in Fire MiP.

• RPA provided by AWE.

NHS Leiston GP Surgery (Main Street)

TM 4444626 L4

Community healthcare (6601 registered patients)

Patients to be directed to alternative GP surgery if closed through shelter or evacuation.

Emergency Planning & Resilience Manager Suffolk CCGs

Anglian Water [OFFICIAL - provided in commercial confidence]

Essex & Suffolk Water [OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE - provided in commercial confidence]

BT [OFFICIAL - provided in commercial confidence]

Information in highlighted rows above is removed from the public version of this plan . FOI Section 36 - Prejudice to effective conduct of public affairs and Section 43 - Commercial interests. back to contents


C-1 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

APPENDIX C EXTENDED EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE 1. Map of EEPZ. Area shown in orange on map below.


C - 2 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

2. Sectors To aid the identification of areas where countermeasures might be applied during a radiation emergency, the EEPZ has been split into sectors that are based upon 22 ½ degree radials divided by 1km out to 5km and then divided by 2km out to 15km.

3. Assessment of EEPZ An assessment of the EEPZ has been conducted to identify:

• Population – permanent and transitory

• Commercial properties

• Potential vulnerable groups – schools, child care provision, care homes, camping/caravan sites

• Local critical infrastructure

• Post codes linked to each individual sector This assessment is used before any emergency to identify potential capabilities needed to respond to a worst case accident. 4. EEPZ Summary:

• Permanent Population: 25,182

• Total Private Properties: 12,145

• Total Commercial Properties: 1,782

• Vulnerable Groups:

- Schools: 17

- Children Centres: 15

- Care Home/Sheltered Homes: 17

- Camping/Caravan Sites: 30

• Critical Infrastructure:

- Police 3

- Fire 4

- Ambulance 1

- NHS Primary Care 5

- Water supply 61

- Electricity supply 5

- Flood warning 8



5. EEPZ Demographics

Sector Total Permanent population

Total Private

Properties


Within 3km

27 9 5

A3 Nil Nil Nil

M3 22 6 4

N3 5 3 1

O3 Nil Nil Nil

Within 4km

669 334 81

H4 50 27 7

I4 222 114 50

J4 73 29 3

L4 38 21 Nil

M4 95 50 4

N4 93 43 3

O4 82 43 9

P4 16 7 5

Within 5km

1444 618 55

A5 17 9 2

I5 69 37 10

J5 312 134 9

K5 779 319 20

L5 21 12 Nil

M5 21 8 2

N5 175 77 12

O5 42 18 Nil

P5 8 4 Nil

Within 6-7 km

3651 1821 232

A6-7 64 38 5

I6-7 2053 1056 111

J6-7 239 111 6

K6-7 278 115 15

L6-7 78 35 6

M6-7 109 47 7

N6-7 304 154 33

O6-7 475 235 36

P6-7 51 30 3



Sector Total Permanent population

Total Private

Properties


Within 8-9 km

3440 1710 522

A8-9 32 19 7

I8-9 619 349 235

J8-9 10 3 Nil

K8-9 339 146 44

L8-9 1203 623 157

M8-9 783 366 34

N8-9 153 70 13

O8-9 244 108 15

P8-9 57 26 17

Within 10-11

km 5049 2555 237

A10-11 67 37 Nil

I10-11 34 14 3

J10-11 159 66 23

K10-11 623 295 66

L10-11 2596 1144 50

M10-11 583 260 38

N10-11 736 341 42

O10-11 178 66 10

P10-11 73 32 5

Within 12-13

km 3631 1702 300

A12-13 598 337 134

I12-13 23 9 3

J12-13 246 114 7

K12-13 172 89 14

L12-13 471 207 34

M12-13 427 196 18

N12-13 362 164 30

O12-13 664 277 32

P12-13 668 309 28

Within 14-15

km 7271 3396 344

A14-15 3545 1754 83

I14-15 674 326 73

J14-15 178 76 24

K14-15 642 264 49

L14-15 431 184 34

M14-15 386 171 23

N14-15 573 254 40

O14-15 487 191 Nil

P14-15 355 176 18



6. EEPZ Vulnerable Groups


Number of People

Within 4 km

I 4

Care Homes / sheltered housing

Margaret Ogilvie Almshouse, Thorpeness, IP16 4LY

Orwell Housing 01473 218818

TM 471599 Sheltered

J4


Ogilvie Almshouses, Church Lane, Aldringham, IP16 4QT

01728 830535 TM 452602 Sheltered 36 (18 houses)

M4 / M5

Camping/ Caravan Site

Cakes and Ale Caravan Park, Abbey Lane. Theberton, IP16 4TE

01728 831655 TM 432639 75 Pitches (Apr – Oct)

O4


East Bridge Farm Certified Site, Eastbridge, IP16 4SN

01728 830729 TM 452659 5 Pitches (Apr – Sep)

O4


The Eels Foot Inn, East bridge, IP16 4SN


Within 5km

A 5 and A 6 / 7


Cliff House Holiday Park, Minsmere Road, Dunwich, IP17 3DQ

01728 648282 TM 476689 120 Pitches (Mar – Oct)

J5


Aldringham Court Care Home, Aldeburgh Road, Aldringham, IP16 4QF

01728 832191 TM 445605 Nursing care 45 residents

K5 School

Coldfair Green Primary School, Knodishall, IP17 1UY

01728 830649 TM 436606 29 staff 140 students

K5

Children Centre

Knodishall and District Playgroup, School Road, Knodishall, IP17 1UD

01728 831328 TM 433511 staff 20 children

K5


Broad Acres Residential Home, Leiston Road, Knodishall, IP17 1UQ

01728 830562 TM 435610 Nursing, residential, special needs, high dependency care 48 residents

Within 6-7 km

I 6 / 7


The Plantation, Aldeburgh, IP15 5GQ

Flagship 0808 1684555

TM 459573 Sheltered 40 residents

I 6 / 7


Garrett House Residential Home, 43 Park Road, Aldeburgh, IP15 5EN

01728 453249 TM 460567 42 residents




Number of People

I 6 / 7


Church Farm Holiday Park, Church Farm Road, Aldeburgh, IP15 5DW

01728 453433 TM 462574 62 touring pitches, 295 Static pitches (Apr – Oct)

N 6 / 7

School

Middleton Community Primary School, IP17 3NW


N 6 / 7 Children

Centre

Sunflower Montessori Nursery School, Causeway Farm, The Causeway, Middleton, IP17 3NH

01728 648352 TM 426679 5 staff 24 children

N 6 / 7


The Bell Inn, The Green, Middleton, IP17 3NN

01728 648286 TM 429678 5 Pitches (Apr – Sep)

N 6 / 7


Golden Acres Certified Site, Leiston Yoxford Road, Middleton, IP17 3LY

01728 648680 TM 423672 5 Pitches 10 tents (Apr – Oct)

Within 8-9 km

I 8 / 9

School Aldeburgh Primary School, IP15 5EU


I 8 / 9

Children Centre

Aldeburgh Pre-school Playgroup, Crescent Road, Aldeburgh, IP15 5HW


L 8 / 9 Care Homes

/ sheltered housing

Chantry House Residential Home, Chantry Road, Saxmundham, IP17 1DJ


L 8 / 9


Wardspring Farm Certified Location, Leiston Road, Saxmundham, IP17 1TG

01728 602266 TM 402630 5 Pitches (Easter – Oct)

M 8 / 9

School Kelsale Primary School, IP17 2NP


M 8 / 9 and M 10 / 11


Carlton Park Camping and Caravan Site, Carlton, Saxmundham, IP17 1AT

07716884322 TM 384638 75 Pitches (Apr – Oct)

N 8 / 9


Norwood House Care Home, Little Moor Road, Middleton, IP17 3JZ

01728 668600 TM 414677 Residential 33 residents

O 8 / 9


Priory Paddocks Nursing Home, Priory Lane, Darsham, IP17 3QD


O 8 /9


Mill Hill Farm Caravan and Camping Park, Westleton Road, Darsham, IP17 3BS


P 8 / 9


Potton Hall Certified Site, Blythburgh Road, Westleton, IP17 3EF

01728 648265 TM 453709 5 Pitches




Number of People

Within 10-11 km

J 10 / 11


Tumbleweed Certified Location, Iken, IP12 2EU

01728 688141 TM 418554 5 Pitches

K 10 / 11

School Snape Community Primary School, IP17 1QG


L10 / 11

School Saxmundham Free School, IP17 1DZ


L 10 / 11

School St Mary’s Primary School, Benhall, IP17 1HE


Within 5km

L 10 / 11

School Saxmundham Primary School, IP17 1QX


L 10 / 11

Children Centre

Benhall Pre-school, School Lane, Benhall, IP17 1HE


L 10 / 11

Children Centre

Meadow Brook Playcare, Seaman Avenue, Saxmundham, IP17 1DZ


L 10 / 11

Adult care provider

Saxmundham Centre, Seaman Avenue, IP17 1DZ

01728 603148 TM 380631 65 Adult learning difficulties day centre

L 10 / 11


By ways Care Home, 55 Rendlesham Road, Saxmundham, IP17 1EJ

01728 603495 TM 378632 Learning disabilities 18 residents

L 10 / 11


Swan House Sheltered Housing, Saxon Road, Saxmundham, IP17 1EE

01728 603916 TM 380635 Very sheltered housing 26 residents

L 10 / 11


Marsh Farm Caravan Site, Sternfield, Saxmundham, IP17 1HW

01728 602168 TM 386607 45 Pitches

L 10 / 11


Whitearch Touring Caravan Park, Main Road, Benhall, IP17 1NA


M 10 / 11 Camping/

Caravan Site

Mill Farm Leisure Camping and Caravanning Site, Rosemary Lane, Carlton, IP17 2QS

01728 603006 TM 379648 5 Pitches 10 Tents (Mar – Nov)

M 10 / 11


Lonely Farm Camping and Caravan Site, Carlton, IP17 2QP

01728 663416 TM 365654 25 Pitches (Easter – Oct)

M 10 / 11


Carlton Meres Country Park, Rendham Road, Carlton, IP17 2QP

01728 603344 TM 366652 300 Pitches

N 10 / 11

School Yoxford Primary School, IP17 3EU


O 10 / 11


Haw Wood Farm Caravan and Camping Park, Hinton, IP17 3QT

01986 784248 TM 422717 60 Pitches (1 Mar – 14 Jan)




Number of People

Within 12 – 13 km

A 12 / 13


St Barnabus Care Home, Godyll Road, Southwold, IP18 6AJ


A 12 / 13


Southwold Camping and Caravan Site, Ferry Road, Southwold, IP18 6ND

01502 722468 TM 503750 100 Pitches (Mar – Nov)

A 12 / 13


Walberswick Campsite, The Street, Walberswick, IP18 6UB

01502 478019 TM 4974 (4 fig grid)

Summer holidays only 15 tents 21 caravans

I 12 / 13


High House Fruit Farm, Sudbourne, IP12 2BL

01394 450263 TM 430527 5 Pitches (May – Sep)

K 12 / 13


The Forge Certified Site, Church Road, Blaxhall, IP12 2DH

01728 688346 TM 364572 5 Pitches

L12/13 Camping/

Caravan Site

Mollett’s Farm Certificated Location, Mollett’s Farm, Main Road, Benhall, Saxmundham IP17 1JY

01728 604547 TM 366602 5 Pitches

M 12 / 13 Camping/

Caravan Site

Alde Garden, Low Road, Sweffling, Saxmundham, IP17 2BB

01728 664178 TM 344642 12 Pitches 1 Cottage (Easter – Oct)

M 12 / 13


White House Farm Certified Location, Peasenhall, Sibton, IP17 2NE


N12 / 13

Children Centre

Sibton Nursery School, Yoxford Road, Sibton, IP17 2LU


O 12 / 13

School Bramfield Primary School 01986 784205 TM 401737 31 staff

84 students

O 12 / 13

Children Centre

Bramfield Stepping Stones, Village Hall, Bridge Street, Bramfield, IP19 9HZ


O 12 / 13


Heathside Caravans, Blackheath Road, Wenhaston, IP19 9EU

01502 478747 TM 421746 16 Pitches

O 12 / 13


Heathside Farm Certified Location, Blackheath, Wenhaston, IP19 9ES

01502 478252 TM 42 74 ( 4 fig grid)

5 Pitches

P 12 / 13

School Wenhaston Primary School, IP19 9EP


P 12 / 13

Children Centre

Wenhaston Acorns Pre-school, Wenhaston Primary School, IP19 9EP


P 12 / 13

Children Centre

Wenhaston Community Play Scheme, Wenhaston Primary School, IP19 9EP


P 12 / 13


Brook Farm Certified Location, Wenhaston, IP19 9HE

01502 478279 TM 432745 5 Pitches (Easter to Sep)



P 12 / 13


Pine Lodge Certified Site, Hazels Lane, Hinton, IP17 3RF

01502 478922 TM 435741 15 Pitches


Number of People

Within 14–15 km

A 14 / 15

School Reydon Primary School, IP18 6BQ


A 14 / 15 School

St Felix School, Reydon, IP18 6SD (day and boarding school)

01502 722175 TM 490770 staff students

A 14 / 15

School Southwold Primary School, IP18 6JP


A 14 / 15

Children Centre

Rosebuds Pre-school, Southwold Primary School, IP18 6JP


A 14 / 15 Children

Centre

Dragoons Nursey, St Felix School, Reydon, IP18 6SD


A 14 / 15

Children Centre

Brambles Nursery, Jermyn’s Road, Reydon, IP18 6QB


A 14 / 15

Children Centre

Klub Group Adventure, St Felix School, Reydon, IP18 6SD

07889 353285 Neil Marchent, H&S manager. 0774 7037503 Rob Biuckland, Ops Director

TM 490770 30 staff 100 children (residential and boarding) Holiday scheme

A 14 / 15


Oaklands House Care Home, Blackwater Covert, Reydon, IP18 5RD


A 14 / 15


Pitches View Sheltered Housing, Wangford Road, Reydon, IP18 6PA


A 14 / 15


Crick Court, Station Road, Southwold, IP18 6DE

07796187764 TM 504765 Sheltered housing 40 residents

A 14 / 15


Jubilee Certified Site, Green Lane Reydon, IP18 6PG

01502 722395 TM 499779 5 Pitches

I 14 / 15

School Orford Primary School, IP12 2LU


I 14 / 15

Children Centre

Orford Shrimps Playgroup, Orford Primary School, IP12 2LU


I 14 / 15


Esmond House, Barron’s Meadow, Orford, IP12 2TY


K 14 / 15

Children Centre

Mulberry Kindergarden, The Old School House, School Road, Tunstall, IP12 2JQ




M 14 / 15


Sibton White Horse Inn Certified Location, Sibton, IP17 2JJ

01728 660337 TM 357702 5 Pitches

N 14 / 15

School Peasenhall Primary School, IP17 2HS


O 14 / 15

School

Bramfield House School, IP19 9AB (weekly boarding school for boys with emotional, behavioural and social difficulties)


7. EEPZ – Transient Population Within the EEPZ are up to 400 listed addresses providing accommodation, the table below lists only those which have 5 or more rooms or can accommodate 10 or more people.



Within 4km

I 4 SC The Whinlands, Thorpeness TM 471597 5 rooms

I 4, I 5 & H4 SC Aldeburgh Bay Holidays, Thorpeness

01728 452176 TM 472596 37 units

I 4 SC House in the Clouds, Thorpeness

TM 469597 5 rooms

I 4 Hotel Thorpeness Hotel, Golf and Country Club

01728 452176 TM 466598 36 rooms

Within 5km

I 5 SC 2 The Dunes, Thorpeness TM 472595 5 rooms

J 5 B&B Tirah Guest House, Aldringham

01728 452972 TM 448597 5 rooms

Within 6-7 ms

A 6 / 7 Hotel The Ship, Dunwich 01728 648219 TM 477705 15 rooms

I 6 / 7 B&B The Toll House, Aldeburgh 01728 453239 TM 458570 7 rooms

I 6 - 7 Hotel Wentworth Hotel, Aldeburgh 01728 452312 TM 465570 35 rooms

I 6 / 7 Hotel The White Lion, Aldeburgh 01728 452720 TM 465569 38 rooms

M 6 / 7 SC East Green Farm Cottages, Kelsale

01728 602316 TM 404655 4 units

O 6 / 7 Hotel The Westleton Crown 01728 648777 TM 440690 34 rooms

Within 8-9km

I 8 / 9 SC The Gables, Aldeburgh TM 462562 7 rooms



I 8 / 9 Hotel Brundenell Hotel, Aldeburgh 01728 452071 TM 464560 44 rooms

I 8 / 9 SC Orlando, Aldeburgh 01394 382126 TM 464564 7 rooms



I 8 / 9 SC Moorings, Aldeburgh TM 462565 5 rooms

Within 10-11km

N 10 / 11 Hotel Satis House Hotel, Yoxford 01728 668418 TM 397687 9 rooms

Within 12 – 13 km

K 12 / 13 Youth Hostel

Blaxhall YHA 01728 688206 TM 369570 8 bunk rooms

L 12 / 13 SC Mollett’s Farm, Main Road, Benhall, Saxmundham IP17 1JY

01728 604547 TM 366602 6 Units

N 12 / 13 SC Park Farm, Sibton 01728 668324 TM 379699 4 units

O 12 / 13 SC The Old Mill House, Wenhaston

01502 724033 TM 425746 5 rooms

Within 14–15 km

A 14 / 15 Hotel The Swan Hotel, Southwold 01502 722186 TM 505765 40 rooms

A 14 / 15 Hotel The Crown, Southwold 01502 722186 TM 505765 13 rooms

A 14 / 15 SC Marram House, Reydon 01502 722717 TM 500773 6 rooms

A 14 / 15 SC The Creek House, Reydon 07949 657119 TM 501769 5 rooms

A 14 / 15 SC Hightide, Southwold 01502 722717 TM 510767 5 rooms

A 14 / 15 Hotel The Blyth Hotel, Southwold 01502 722632 TM 505765 12 rooms

A 14 / 15 SC Elkhorn, Southwold 01502 725409 TM 509763 6 rooms

A 14 / 15 SC 54 Stadbroke Road, Southwold

01502 725400 TM 509764 6 rooms

A 14 / 15 SC Seacroft, Southwold 01502 722717 TM 509761 6 rooms

A 14 / 15 SC 3 Centre Cliff, Southwold 01502 724033 TM 507762 6 rooms

A 14 / 15 SC The Shelduck, Southwold 01728 638962 TM 505764 4 rooms

A 14 / 15 SC Palm House, Southwold 01502 722717 TM 507765 5 rooms

A 14 / 15 SC Pier Lodge, Southwold 01502 722717 TM 510767 5 rooms



A 14 / 15 B&B Newland County House, Reydon

01502 722164 TM 495771

7 rooms – accom for elderly and less mobile guests

A 14 / 15 Hotel The Randolph, Reydon 01502 723603 TM 497773 10 rooms



I 14 / 15 Hotel The Crown and Castle, Orford

01394 450205 TM 420498 21 rooms

M 14 / 15 SC Bruisyard Hall, Bruisyard 01728 639000 TM 334662 12 rooms

N 14 / 15 Inn Sibton White Horse 01728 660337 TM 357702 6 rooms

8. EEPZ - Critical Infrastructure

Agency Infrastructure Location/ Sector

Impact of Loss Agreed Mitigation

Point of Contact for Information

Police Aldeburgh Police Station

TM 458572 I6/7

Initial Police Response Location

Contingency Planning Officer Suffolk Constabulary

Saxmundham Police Station

TM 385631 L8/9


Southwold Police Station

TM 504766 A14/15


Fire Aldeburgh Fire Station

TM 458569 I6/7

On Call Fire Station

o Firefighters are classified as radiation workers under IRR99 for dose limits.

o Pre-identified informed volunteer firefighters can operate under REPPIR for higher emergency exposure dose limits.

o Radiation protection procedures in Fire MiP.

Resilience Manager Suffolk Fire & Rescue Service

Orford Fire Station

TM 419502 I14/15


Saxmundham Fire Station

TM 379630 L10/11


Reydon Fire Station

TM 504766 A14/15




o RPA provided by AWE.

Ambulance Saxmundham Ambulance Station

TM 380629 L10/11

o Ambulance station

Resilience Manager, Suffolk East of England Ambulance Service

NHS Aldeburgh Hospital

TM 460565 I8/9

o 29 beds - rehabilitation and palliative care.

o Outpatient Clinics

o Day Centre for Elderly

Emergency Planning & Resilience Manager, Suffolk CCGs

Southwold Hospital

TM 508765 A14/15

o 15 beds - Admission from home for acute medical conditions that do not require the services of a district general hospital, palliative and terminal care, and post operative rehabilitation and recuperation

o Minor Injuries Clinic

Aldeburgh GP Surgery (Victoria Road)

TM 459571 I6/7


Patients directed to alternative GP surgery if closed – shelter or evacuation

Saxmundham GP Surgery (Lambsale Meadow)

TM 385635 L8/9


Southwold GP Surgery (York Road)

TM 505763 A14/15


Environment Agency

Knodishal GS TM 425618 L6/7

Critical Gauge - 17 properties

Incidents & Emergencies Business Partner, EA

Saxmundham GS

TM 386634 L8/9

Critical Gauge

Middleton GS TM 430679 N6/7

Info site - 23 properties



Beversham GS

TM 360582 K12/13


Bramfield GS TM 400737 O12/13

Issuing site - 28 properties

Sibton GS TM 359699 N14/15

Issuing gauge - 23 properties

Holton GS TM 406768 O14/15


Benhall Raingauge

TM 381606 L10/11

Raingauge

Anglian Water [OFFICIAL - provided in commercial confidence]

Essex and Suffolk Water [OFFICIAL - SENSITIVE - provided in commercial confidence]

UK Power Networks [OFFICIAL - provided in commercial confidence]

Information in highlighted rows above is removed from the public version of this plan . FOI Section 36 - Prejudice to effective conduct of public affair sand Section 43 - Commercial interests.


D-1 NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

APPENDIX D

PRIOR INFORMATION FOR SCHOOLS The responsibility for keeping all schools likely to be affected by a Sizewell Off-site Nuclear Emergency of any actions to take resides with Suffolk County Council. Staff within the Directorate for Health Wellbeing and Children’s Services will be the principle contacts and will undertake to review and reissue the advice on an annual basis to ensure continuity and accuracy. School governing bodies must ensure arrangements exist in school to communicate this information to pupils, staff and to parents. It is suggested that this would be through the normal critical incident management processes and business continuity plans. A review of the school’s critical incident plan is strongly recommended to take into account the need for plans related to the Sizewell stations. 1. Action To Be Taken By Schools in Leiston If you hear of an incident at the Sizewell B Nuclear Power Station which is likely to affect people outside the power station site, the following actions should be taken while waiting for any other instructions from the Police (either directly or via local radio or TV), or from the County Council Directorate for Children and Young People.

1.1 If the incident occurs during school hours

• All staff and pupils are to go indoors, external windows and doors should be closed and ventilation fans switched off.

• Switch on local radio and / or TV and wait for any special instructions.

• Ensure that the telephone switchboard is staffed and ready to receive any special instructions. Outgoing calls should be limited.

• Staff and pupils are not to go outside, not even for a break or to go home at the end of the school day until advised that it is safe to do so by Suffolk County Council.

• Uncovered food and drink should not to be consumed until the Food Standards Agency has provided advice on safety.

• Parents should be advised not to collect their children and to listen to local radio/TV.

1.2. If the incident occurs out of school hours

• The Directorate for Health Wellbeing and Children’s Services will arrange for local radio / TV stations to broadcast a message advising pupils of Leiston schools only to remain at home until further notice. The Suffolk County Council schools closure website will be updated.


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• Schools must arrange for sufficient staff to be instructed to report to school to receive pupils who arrive in spite of the advice.

2. Action To Be Taken By Schools Outside Leiston If you hear of an incident at the Sizewell B Nuclear Power Station which is likely to affect people outside the power station site, the following actions should be taken while waiting for any other instructions from the Police (either directly or via local radio or TV), or from the Director for Health Wellbeing and Children’s Services (or representative).

• Continue with normal school routine.

• Ensure that the school switchboard is staffed and that someone listens to local radio and / or TV for any special instructions.

3. General Information

3.1 Evacuation In the unlikely event of a more extensive evacuation programme being necessary, during school hours the Police will arrange for schools to be evacuated as complete units, and staff and pupils will be taken to another school or hall where they will be accommodated until pupils can be reunited with their parents. 3.2 Stable Iodine Tablets. As a precaution it may be necessary for people living near the power station site to take stable iodine tablets. The contents of these tablets top-up the thyroid gland with stable iodine. This reduces the uptake of any radioactive iodine that might have been released into the environment. Stable iodine tablets are not pre-issued to schools. In the unlikely event of tablets being needed for children and staff at a school, instructions for such countermeasures will be issued by the Director of Public Health. These instructions will include how tablets will be made available and how they should be taken. Where schools are provided with stable iodine tablets, public health staff may be deployed to assist with any administration. 3.3 Information Requests for information in respect of schools should, where possible, be channelled through the Assistant Director Education and Learning who will be kept informed of events by the County Council Emergency Control Centre. Information or action requests by school staff will be dealt with through the same channel. Head teachers should endeavour to keep one of the Strategic Managers (Learning Improvement Service) informed of events in their own localities.


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4. GO IN, STAY IN, TUNE IN There is a national campaign to publicise what the public should do during emergencies, the Go In, Stay In and Tune In campaign. This will be used during any Off Site Nuclear Emergency at Sizewell and is included in the information provided to residents close to the power stations. A ‘Go In, Stay In, Tune In’ awareness video aimed at younger school children is available via the Suffolk Joint Emergency Planning Unit.

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APPENDIX E PRIOR INFORMATION FOR CHILDREN CENTRES The responsibility resides with Suffolk County Council for advising managers of children centres of any actions to take if they are likely to be affected by a Sizewell Off site Nuclear Emergency. Staff within the Directorate for Health Wellbeing and Children’s Services will be the principle contacts and will undertake to review and reissue the advice on an annual basis to ensure continuity and accuracy. Children Centres must have arrangements to communicate this information to staff and to parents/carers. It is suggested that this would be through the normal incident management processes/ business continuity plans. 1. Action To Be Taken for Children Centres within Leiston If you hear of an incident at the Sizewell B Nuclear Power Station which is likely to affect people outside the power station site, the following actions should be taken while waiting for any other instructions from the Police (either directly or via local radio or TV), or from the County Council Directorate for Children and Young People.

1.1 If the incident occurs during the normal working hours

• All staff and children are to go indoors, external windows and doors should be closed and ventilation fans switched off.


• Staff and children are not to go outside, not even for a break or to go home at the end of the day until advised that it is safe to do so by Suffolk County Council.


• Parents should be advised not to collect their children.

• Parents should be advised to listen to local radio/TV. 1.2. If the incident occurs out of hours

• The Directorate for Health Wellbeing and Children’s Services will arrange for local radio / TV stations to broadcast a message advising children centres not to open and for children to stay at home until further notice. The Suffolk County Council schools closure website will be updated.

2. Action To Be Taken By Children Centres Outside Leiston If you hear of an incident at the Sizewell B Nuclear Power Station which is likely to affect people outside the power station site, the following actions should be taken while waiting for any other instructions from the Police (either directly or via local radio or TV), or from the Director for Health Wellbeing and Children’s Services (or representative).


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• Continue with normal routine.

• Ensure that someone listens to local radio and / or TV for any special instructions.

• Contact the Directorate for Health Wellbeing and Children’s Services, Suffolk County Council if you require further advice.

3. General Information

3.1 Evacuation In the unlikely event of a severe radiation emergency, an evacuation programme may be necessary. During working hours the Police will arrange for children centres to be evacuated as complete units, and staff and children will be taken to another school or hall where they will be accommodated until children can be reunited with their parents. 3.2 Stable Iodine Tablets. As a precaution it may be necessary for people living near the power station site to take stable iodine tablets. The contents of these tablets top-up the thyroid gland with stable iodine. This reduces the uptake of any radioactive iodine that might have been released into the environment. Stable iodine tablets are not pre-issued for children’s centres In the unlikely event of tablets being needed for children and staff at a children’s centre, instructions for such countermeasures will be issued by the Director of Public Health. These instructions will include how tablets will be made available and how they should be taken. Where Children’s Centres are provided with stable iodine tablets, public health staff may be deployed to assist with any administration. 3.3 Information Requests for information in respect of children’s centres should, where possible, be channelled through the Assistant Director Education and Services who will be kept informed of events by the County Council Emergency Control Centre. Information or action requests by school staff will be dealt with through the same channel. Children’s Centre managers should endeavour to keep their Integrated Service Manager informed of events in their own localities.

4. GO IN, STAY IN, TUNE IN There is a national campaign to publicise what the public should do during emergencies, the Go In, Stay In and Tune In campaign. This will be used during any Off Site Nuclear Emergency at Sizewell and is included in the information provided to residents close to the power stations. A ‘Go In, Stay In, Tune In’ awareness video aimed at younger school children is available via the Suffolk Joint Emergency Planning Unit.

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APPENDIX F ADVICE FOR CARE HOMES, SHELTERED HOUSING AND COMMUNITY CARE 1. The responsibility for keeping all care homes, sheltered housing and people in community care likely to be affected by a Sizewell Off site Nuclear Emergency informed of any actions to take resides with Suffolk local authorities. County Council staff within the Directorate for Adult and Community Services will be the principle contact for care homes and staff within Suffolk Coastal District Council will be the principle contacts for sheltered housing. Each will undertake to review this advice on an annual basis to ensure continuity and accuracy; changes will be made through the Suffolk JEPU. Care Homes and Sheltered Housing schemes in Leiston must ensure arrangements exist to communicate this information to staff and to residents. It is suggested that this would be through the normal incident management processes/ business continuity plans. 2. Action To Be Taken Care Homes and Sheltered Housing within Leiston If you hear of an incident at the Sizewell B Nuclear Power Station which is likely to affect people outside the power station site, the following actions should be taken while waiting for any other instructions from the Police (either directly or via local radio or TV), or from the County Council Directorate for Adult and Community Services.

• All staff and residents are to go indoors, external windows and doors should be closed and ventilation fans switched off.


• Staff and residents are not to go outside, not even for a break or to go home at the end of the day until advised that it is safe to do so by Suffolk County Council.


• Advise County Council Adult and Community Services or housing staff in Suffolk Coastal District Council of any care support that may be needed for sheltering up to 48hrs.

3. Action To Be Taken By Care Homes and Sheltered Housing Outside Leiston If you hear of an incident at the Sizewell B Nuclear Power Station which is likely to affect people outside the power station site, the following actions should be taken while waiting for any other instructions from the Police (either directly or via local radio or TV), or from the County Council Director for Adult Community Services (or representative) or the Assistant Chief Executive/ Head of Strategic Housing & Tenant Services, Suffolk Coastal District Council Suffolk.

• Continue with normal routine.

• Ensure that someone listens to local radio and / or TV for any special instructions.

• Contact Adult and Community Services, Suffolk County Council if you require further advice.


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4. Community Care. Adult and Community Services, Suffolk County Council will provide information to community care providers on actions to take in the event of a Sizewell emergency. This will follow the principles within paragraphs 2 and 3 for Leiston and areas beyond Leiston. It is likely that people living within the DEPZ will have been pre-issued with stable iodine as an immediate countermeasure and instructions when to use this will be provided by automated telephone warning as per the general public within these areas. Where there is a known restriction on the ability of people being cared in the community to either receive this automated warning or to take stable iodine tablets, community care providers may be asked to assist if safe to do so. As a last resort, where people in community care cannot be protected along with the general public, ACS will consider evacuating these people to ensure their continued safety. 5. General Information

5.1 Evacuation In the unlikely event of an evacuation being necessary, the Police in conjunction with Suffolk County Council or Suffolk Coastal District Council will arrange for Care Homes or Sheltered Homes to be evacuated as complete units, and staff and residents will be taken to other care homes, sheltered homes or temporary accommodation where they will be looked after until longer term arrangements are be resolved. 5.2 Stable Iodine Tablets. As a precaution it may be necessary for people living near the power station site to take stable iodine tablets. The contents of these tablets top-up the thyroid gland with stable iodine. This reduces the uptake of any radioactive iodine that might have been released into the environment. Stable iodine tablets are not pre-issued to care homes, sheltered housing or community care outside of the Detailed Emergency Planning Zone. In the unlikely event of tablets being needed, instructions for such countermeasures will be issued by the Director of Public Health. These instructions will include how tablets will be made available and how they should be taken. Where stable iodine tablets are provided to care homes, sheltered housing or people in community care, public health staff may be deployed to assist with any administration. 5.3 Information Requests for information in respect of care homes should, where possible, be channelled through Adult and Community Services who will be kept informed of events by the County Council Emergency Control Centre. Requests for information in respect of sheltered housing should, where possible, be channelled through the Head of Strategic Housing & Tenant Services who will be kept informed of events by the Suffolk Coastal Emergency Control Centre.


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6. GO IN, STAY IN, TUNE IN There is a national campaign to publicise what the public should do during emergencies, the Go In, Stay In and Tune In campaign. This will be used during any Off Site Nuclear Emergency at Sizewell and is included in the information provided to residents close to the power stations.


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APPENDIX G SCG DECISION RESPONSE TIMELINE - GUIDE

Derived from IAEA Safety Standard - GS-G-2.1 Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency - Table 12 Response Time Objectives

THESE ARE GUIDELINES ONLY AND ARE NOT A LEGAL REQUIREMENT

Event Decision Point - Action Lead Timing

Incident occurs - clock starts

Nuclear Emergency Declaration

Classify emergency - Site operator

Incident + 15mins

Declaration

Notify local responders Site operator Declaration +15mins

Notification of Nuclear Emergency Received - FAX, email and Phone by Operator

Declare Major Incident - CCR Open StratCC - CCR Initial Call Out - CCR

Declaration +15mins

Provide urgent public protection advice - Operator By FAX and e-mail

Agree countermeasures to be applied - Police Cdr/ SCG Chair if arrived Confirm RAPIDREACH message sent to DEPZ - CCR

Declaration +30mins

StratCC & Media Coord Declared Operational

When Emergency Services, local NHS and Local Authorities executives in attendance plus core Media staff (Police, LA)

Declaration + 60mins

Issue of Initial public information/media release covering urgent protective actions

SCG Chair Media Coord


Before 1st SCG Meeting:

• Confirm information in Notification FAX with Site and /or CESC.

• Confirm Site Emergency Services Liaison in place.

• Confirm TCG location being activated

• Confirm RV location activated

• Confirm which rest centre and that being activated.

• Requirement for Media Briefing Centre

SCG Chair Police, Fire and Amb Exec Police Fire SCDC Media Coord


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• Beach and camp sites being evacuated

• Information on Casualties

• Confirm people monitoring location

• Confirm whether incident security related.

Police Ambulance DPH/Suffolk Coastal DC SCG Chair

Receive initial radiation monitoring results at site fence/near site from operator

SCG Chair STAC Chair


Consider virtual STAC teleconference

STAC Chair Declaration + 60mins

1st SCG Meeting SCG Chair Within 90mins

- Confirm prediction of off site hazard - does this fit a reasonable or worst case scenario?

- 1st SCG Meeting- based upon information from Site (via FAX and e-mail) and/or CESC (via Phone)

- Evacuation? - Extendibility needed? - Caused by security

incident?

- Declaration + 90mins

- Confirmation of countermeasures - where and what

- 1st SCG Meeting- based upon advice from Site (via FAX and e-mail) and/or CESC (via Phone)


- Confirm other C2 locations

- 1st SCG meeting - SILVER - BRONZE - ONR - BEIS - CESC


- Confirmation of RCG Chair

- 1st SCG Meeting - either SCDC or SCC lead depending upon predicted hazard

- - Declaration + 90mins

- Media Briefing Centre

- 1st SCG Meeting - location. nominated Talking Head

- - Declaration + 90mins

StratCC fully functional When all organisations with a response role in Off Site Plan are present or have established effective communications to discharge their strategic coordination role

Declaration +2hrs


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Issue of 1st public information/media release

After 1st SCG Meeting - based upon advice from Site and on prepared statement in SRF Comms Plan

Declaration + 2hrs

1st SITREP to COBR SCG Chair/StratCC Coord - AIMS and NRE for COBR

Declaration + 2hrs

STAC Fully Operational STAC Chair

Declaration + 3hrs

ONR and National attendees

StratCC Coord - Each needs to be briefed on current SITREP on arrival

Declaration + 3hrs

Before 2nd SCG Meeting:

• Confirm vulnerable groups at risk

• Confirm of actual off site contamination area from survey activity

• Confirm advice to schools

• Confirm advice to Child care Settings

• Confirm advice to Care Homes

• Confirm transport availability for evacuation

Police, Health, Local Authorities Company Technical Advisor & PHE CRCE SCC SCC SCC SCC

2nd SCG Meeting SCG Chair Declaration + 3hrs

2nd Public Information/ Media release

Media Coord lead Declaration + 4hrs

Media Briefing Centre established

Media Coord lead Declaration + 4hrs

Implement radiation monitoring strategy within DEPZ

SCG Chair STAC Chair ONR PHE CRCE Operator

Declaration + 4hrs

Implement radiation monitoring strategy within EEPZ, if appropriate

SCG Chair STAC Chair ONR PHE CRCE Operator

Declaration + 12hrs

Establish people monitoring facility

PHE CRCE/Suffolk Coastal DC

Declaration + 24hrs

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APPENDIX H

COMMAND, CONTROL AND COORDINATION DIAGRAM - CIVIL NUCLEAR EMERGENCY

HSE Bootle Redgrave Court Incident Suite

(RCIS)

Site Emergency Control Centre

Home Office

MOD Defence Crisis Management

Centre (DCMC)

Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC)

Central Emergency Support Centre (CESC)

(EDF, Magnox)

Response Coordinating

Group (ResCG) (if regional coordination

required)

MCC

RCG

STAC (SCG

Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR)

Scientific Advisory Group for

Emergencies (SAGE)

Impact Management/

Recovery Group COBR Strategy Group

OGD Emergency

Rooms

Nuclear Site

BEIS Nuclear Emergency Operations

Centre

News Coordination Centre (NCC)

TCG

Forward Control

Point

Police Counterterrorism

Network

Key

= Facility/Centre/Site

= Group/Committee

= Cell = Command, control or coordination linkage = Information sharing linkage


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APPENDIX I

KEY EMERGENCY SERVICES LOCATIONS

1. On Site Response. Detailed operational arrangements for emergency services response to support on site intervention activities are covered by each service operational response plans. The response can be summarised as follows:

1.1 Site Incident: Police: No attendance Fire: Fire Officer and predetermined Fire attendance to site. Ambulance: Predetermined Ambulance response to site 1.2 Off Site Nuclear Emergency - Site Liaison Police: Police Officer to site to act as Liaison Officer in Site ECC and consider Police response to site. Fire: Fire Officer to site to act as Liaison Officer and some predetermined Fire attendance to site with additional Fire resources deployed to Forward Operating Base (FOB). Ambulance: Ambulance Officer to site to act as Liaison Officer and predetermined Ambulance response to site with additional incident support capability deployed to RV location. 1.3 Site Access. Emergency services will report to the relevant Site Security Lodge. 1.4 Forward Command Post A multi-agency Forward Command Post (FCP) will be established at the relevant site Access Control Point (ACP) to coordinate emergency services support to on site intervention activity for an OSNE. A Fire SILVER Incident Commander may operate at the ACP or from the Site ECC.

2. Off Site Coordination

2.1 RV. A RV location will be established at Saxmundham Fire and Ambulance Stations for an OSNE. Secondary RV locations may be established at a Multi-Agency Strategic Holding Area (MASHA) site. 2.2 Tactical Coordination. A TCG will be established for an OSNE at Landmark House Ipswich. Police and Ambulance SILVER’s and Fire Tactical Commanders will operate from this location. 2.3 Evacuation FCP. A multi-agency FCP may be established at Halesworth Police Station to manage any evacuation. This FCP will be supported by Police, Ambulance, NHS and County Council (Highways). 2.4 Multi-Agency Strategic Holding Area. In the event of an OSNE requiring national support to support an effective local response, a MASHA may be set up to act as a deployment base for support coming into the county. The SRF MASHA Plan provides further detail on location options and activation. The SCG


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would be responsible for deciding to activate a MASHA and the TCG will for confirm where it should be set up. 2.5 Community Information Point. For an OSNE that has not or is unlikely to affect Leiston, a Community Information Point may be established at Leiston Community Centre to provide an information point for local residents. This will be established by Suffolk Coastal DC and supported by Suffolk Constabulary (SNT), Suffolk CC (public health) and PHE.


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APPENDIX J STANDARD COUNTERMEASURE ADVICE TEMPLATE

OFF SITE COUNTERMEASURE ADVICE - SIZEWELL A/B

Incident Type

SITE INCIDENT*/OFF SITE NUCLEAR EMERGENCY*

Operator

Magnox Ltd/EDF Energy*

Site

Sizewell B*

Declared at

___:___ - 24 hour clock format

Declared on

__/__/__ - dd/mm/yyyy format

Emergency Location

Advice Issued by

Operator/STAC*

Current Release

• There has not been any radioactivity released from the site. The public are not at any risk and do not need to take precautions*.

• There has been radioactivity released from site*.

Meteorological Situation (current/forecast)

• The current wind direction is FROM _____ degree towards sectors________________ DRY/RAIN/SLEET/HAIL/ SNOW Depth_______mm

_____________________________________________________________________________

• The Forecast wind direction is FROM _______ degrees towards sectors ______________ This change is forecast to occur at __:__(mm:hh) on dd/mm/yyyy

DRY/RAIN/SLEET/HAIL/ SNOW Depth_______mm


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Urgent Countermeasures recommended Delete those not recommended

*Evacuation in sectors __________________ out to _____km *Sheltering in sectors __________________ out to _____km *Take stable iodine tablets in sectors__________ out to ____km. This advice is based upon precautionary basis/plant status & symptoms/perimeter monitoring/off site monitoring

Prognosis for next 2 to 3 hours (from the time of this advice being issued)

Countermeasure advice issued at ___________mm:hh on _____________ dd/mm/yyyy By: (Name, block capitals): __________________ Signed: ____________________ Position: _________________________ Contact Number: ____________________

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APPENDIX K EVACUATION 1. Introduction. Evacuation arrangements have been considered in detail for the DEPZ and in outline for the 15km EEPZ. A detailed technical assessment9 of traffic management aspects was undertaken in June 2013 to provide objective information to guide evacuation routes and to provide planning timelines for a range of potential evacuation scenarios. 2. Approach to Evacuation. The Sizewell evacuation plan recognises that there are 3 core routes away from the site and that any combination of these routes may be available during any radiation emergency. As a minimum, evacuation planning assumes that only 2 core routes are available to account for any potential off site contamination effecting one core route area. The map below shows the core areas for evacuation planning and which areas may not be available according to wind direction.

9 Vectos Transport Technical Report dated August 2013



3. Evacuation Assumptions

3.1 National Work. National work on evacuation planning conducted by the Cabinet Office indicates that many people will elect to self-evacuate when faced with a perceived risk to life. The Sizewell evacuation plan uses the following assumptions based upon national work:

▪ Up to 75% of people in the DEPZ will self-evacuate on declaration of an Off

Site Nuclear Emergency rather than adopt the automated countermeasure of shelter and take stable iodine tablets.

• Up to 25% of people within the DEPZ will remain, of which up to 15% may require support to evacuate.

3.2 Time of Day. The technical report used to inform the evacuation arrangements took into account the different traffic conditions, road capacities, population distribution and school times to provide a day and night assessment of evacuation by road. 3.3 Timelines. Evacuation times for existing population plus consented development in Leiston are as follows:

There are 7,244 permanent residents in 3187 properties within the DEPZ, including a range of vulnerable groups (schools, care homes and child care providers) and transient groups (camp sites, hotels and B&Bs) within Leiston. There can be up to 650 people visiting the Minsmere Reserve to the North of the DEPZ and up to 150 people at times at Sizewell Hall, some of whom are classed as disabled. An evacuation of the DEPZ only will not cause traffic issues and can be conducted quickly, assuming people leave promptly when advised. Support to evacuate the DEPZ will be provided by Suffolk Constabulary and Suffolk County Council with east of England Ambulance Service providing support for any people with medical conditions. Indicative timings to complete an evacuation of the DEPZ for day or night for a range of wind directions are as follows:

Time of Day Wind Direction Evacuation Planning Time

Day Northerly 1hr 33 mins

Easterly 1hr 33mins

Southerly 2hrs 17mins

Westerly 2hrs 34mins

Night Northerly 1hr 2mins

Easterly 1hr 2mins

Southerly 1hr 32 mins

Westerly 1hr 41mins



4. Evacuation Routes - DEPZ and Leiston

4.1 For a Southerly wind towards Lowestoft. Key roads likely to be used: B1122 through Theberton to Yoxford/A12 B1119 to Saxmundham/A12 B1069 or B1122 to A1094 to A12 Roads potentially to be avoided: B1125 through Westleton to Blythburgh/A12 Yoxford Road/Westleton Rd to A12 Darsham Rd, Wash Lane, The Street to A12 4.2 For an easterly wind towards Saxmundham Key roads likely to be used: B1125 through Westleton to Blythburgh/A12 Darsham Rd, Wash Lane, The Street to A12 B1069 or B1122 to A1094 to A12 Roads potentially to be avoided: B1122 (Yoxford Road); B1119 to Saxmundham/A12 4.3 For a Northerly wind towards Orford Ness Key roads likely to be used: B1122 through Theberton to Yoxford/A12 Yoxford Road/Westleton Rd to A12 Darsham Rd, Wash Lane, The Street to A12 B1119 to Saxmundham/A12 Roads potentially to be avoided: B1069 or B1122 to A1094 to A12

5. Coordination. Evacuation will be a multi-agency coordinated task with a Police lead. Specific evacuation coordination elements are as follows:

5.1 Evacuation FCP. An evacuation FCP will be established at Halesworth Police station to coordinate the operational elements of the evacuation. Suffolk Constabulary will lead this coordination with the support of East of England Ambulance Service, Suffolk County Council and Suffolk Coastal District Council; NHS England/Ipswich and East Suffolk CCG may also be required to support the coordination or any evacuation.



5.2 Muster Point. Leiston Leisure Centre, IP16 4LS, is identified as the evacuation muster point for people who do not have their own transport but are mobile. Transport operations will operate to/from the car park at this facility. 5.3 Collection of Vulnerable. Vulnerable people already under care by Suffolk County Council, Suffolk Coastal District Council, GP practices or NHS community services will be contacted by their care provider to confirm collection arrangements. Other residents who are unable to move the evacuation muster point or to self-evacuate, will be asked to contact the Suffolk Emergency Helpline to seek assistance; these people will be collected by local responders. 5.4 Transport. Suffolk County Council will take the lead in providing transport to move people from the Evacuation Muster Point and from homes if requested. East of England Ambulance will transport people with a confirmed clinical need.

6. Traffic Management. Suffolk Constabulary and Suffolk County Council Highways will provide traffic management for any evacuation under the direction of the Evacuation BRONZE. 7. EEPZ. It is unlikely that the whole of the EEPZ would need to be evacuated in any extreme radiation emergency as any radiation carried into this area is likely to be wind dependent. The worst case sectors covering a 45 degree from the site are sectors L and M. In these sectors there is a potential permanent population of approx 7,400 beyond the DEPZ with a range of vulnerable and transient groups as identified in APPENDIX C. The detailed evacuation arrangements for any EEPZ evacuation will be agreed at the SCG, at the time that the hazard assessment indicates that such action is appropriate, and would not be implemented until at least 10 to 12 hours after any declaration of an Off Site Nuclear Emergency. Evacuation routes will follow the same concept as for the DEPZ , ie to avoid areas where contamination might be present and to direct people onto the A12 to head North or South. Traffic management for an extended evacuation will be provided by Suffolk Constabulary and Suffolk County Council Highways. 8. Future Development. The technical assessment for evacuation also looked at potential future development around Leiston taking into account sites where planning had been applied for and also where Suffolk Coastal DC had identified sites for future development as part of its Strategic Housing Land Availability Assessment. The indicative effect of these developments is to add 2-4mins to the times in the table above. An evacuation modelling tool is available to Suffolk Constabulary and Suffolk County Council to allow further modelling of evacuation times to take place for developments such as the proposed Sizewell C development. This will allow the SRF to consider the implications of such future developments on the evacuation arrangements within the Sizewell off Site Emergency Plan.


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APPENDIX L SECURITY INCIDENTS This entire appendix is removed from the public version of the plan. FOI Section 23 - Information supplied by, or relating to, bodies dealing with security matters.


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APPENDIX M ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING LOCATIONS

Passive Shade Collector - collects particulate matter - not remotely interrogated

RIMNET gamma monitoring Site - remotely interrogated. TLD site - gamma detection - not remotely interrogated.

Routine Vehicle Survey Site - gamma detection and air sample.


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This entire table is removed from the public version of the plan. FOI Section 36 - Prejudice to effective conduct of public affairs.

SIZEWELL OFF-SITE SURVEY POINTS 2015

Survey Point

Location

Grid Reference

Radial Distance from Site

GRID Bearing from Site


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APPENDIX N

CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS – to be updated post EPIMETHEUS 1. Reasonably Foreseeable Capability Requirement - DEPZ - Always Needed. This entire appendix is removed from the public version of the plan. FOI Section 36 - Prejudice to effective conduct of public affairs.

Capability People Equipment Infrastructure Training/Exercise Plans

2. Beyond Design Basis/Reasonable Worst Case Capability Requirement - EEPZ - Potentially Needed.


3. Extended Emergency Response - Standby.


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APPENDIX O

RECOVERY ARRANGEMENTS FOR A SIZEWELL RADIATION EMERGENCY

1. Introduction

The SRF Recovery Plan details generic recovery arrangements that will be used during any Sizewell emergency. This appendix is designed to enhance and clarify the hazard dependent issues for recovery from a radiation emergency.

2. Planning For Recovery

Planning for recovery from a Sizewell emergency will start shortly after the immediate response with the formation of a Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG) at the StratCC. This will be led by an executive officer from Suffolk County Council. The initial focus of recovery planning while the response to a radiation emergency is still happening will be to consider the potential challenges in the longer term and ensure that these are not made worst by response actions. 3. Timing. It is highly likely that the conditions for transition from response to recovery will take many days or weeks. There is likely to be a scaling back of response actions while recovery activity escalates. At the tipping point where there is more recovery action planned than response action, handover from response to recovery phases will be considered.

4. Handover To ensure that all agencies understand the implications and issues of the change in both the command and control and to mark the change in direction from response to recovery, transition from response to recovery will be decided at a SCG meeting. The criteria to be used to consider a move from response to recovery are as follows:

• Emergency service response on-site is terminated (does not include investigative actions);

• Power station is returned to a safe condition as identified by the ONR and fully implemented by the operator;

• Urgent countermeasures advice has been withdrawn (longer-term evacuation/ relocation may still be in place);

• Robust communications with the public are in place.

Once the handover criteria have been met, the SCG Chair will invite the RCG Chair to take over coordination of activity. The SCG will become the RCG and a formal handover certificate signed [see SRF Recovery plan]. A handover checklist and certificate is at Annex A to the SRF Recovery Plan.


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5. Recovery Structure

The initial recovery structure will be confirmed early into any response by the RCG Chair at an SCG meeting. This will ensure that the right organisations are invited to participate. The initial recovery structure is shown in the following diagram

6. Recovery Locations, Chairs and Meeting Formats RCG - StratCC and then Suffolk County Council HQ. Chair Suffolk County Council executive officer. Initially formal minuted meetings and then minuted teleconferences Communications - MCC (in StratCC). Chair Suffolk County Council Senior Communications Officer. Initially formal minuted meetings and then minuted teleconferences. Business & Economic Recovery - Location agreed at SCG - LA premises. Chair senior manager Suffolk County Council Economic & Development. Health & Wellbeing - Suffolk County Council HQ. Chair agreed at 1st meeting. Finance & Legal - Chair senior manager Suffolk County Council strategic finance or Head of Legal Services. Meetings via teleconference.

Science & Technical

Advisory Cell

Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG)

Media/ Communications

Environment

Business & Economic Recovery

Health & Wellbeing

Infrastructure

Community Recovery

Finance &

Legal

Health and Wellbeing


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Environment - Location agreed at SCG - LA or EA premises. Chair agreed at 1st meeting. Infrastructure - StratCC overflow meeting room at Police HQ. Initially formal minuted meetings and then minuted teleconferences. STAC - StratCC and then hand over to Health & Wellbeing and Environment WGs

Community - Location agreed at SCG - LA premises. Chair agreed at 1st meeting. 7. RCG Membership. Membership for each RCG is identified in the relevant Terms of Reference within the SRF Recovery Plan 8. Environmental Monitoring. The monitoring of radioactivity present in the environment as a result of a radiation emergency will continue throughout the Recovery Phase coordinated by the Environment WG. Key considerations for environmental monitoring are:

• The PHE CRCE will take the initial lead in coordinating the off-site environmental monitoring activities;

• Supporting additional monitoring units from the UK nuclear industry will be used to provide comprehensive coverage (Operator’s other sites, other operators, MoD etc);

• RIMNET will be used as the agreed channel to bring together monitoring results, and managed by DEFRA.

9. Recovery Options.

The fundamental principles applying to any recovery activities necessary as a result of an Off-site Nuclear Emergency should follow the international principles applying to ‘intervention’ following nuclear emergencies as drawn up by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and recommended for use by PHE.

PHE set out three categories of recovery and effectiveness and the possible countermeasures required, which are reproduced in the table below:

Option Description Likely example

A Moderately dose-effective, relatively low disruption/ resource requirement, prompt implementation, completed within about a month.

- Ploughing large areas of grass - Extended evacuation/ short-term relocation (short-lived radionuclides) - Vacuum sweeping/high pressure washing all metalled surfaces - Grass cutting

B Dose-effective, relatively high disruption/ resource requirement, long duration/ lasting impact

Turf/ soil removal and replacement Double digging of all soil/ grass areas Road planning Prolonged or permanent relocation


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C Either: poorly dose-effective Or: moderately dose-effective, but high disruption/ resource requirement etc.

High pressure washing buildings Sandblasting walls Roof replacement Cleaning indoor surfaces

When implementing these recovery options, it is important, as it is for urgent response countermeasures, to balance the benefit of implementing the options against the disadvantages. The PHE recommend a table of the circumstances in which the options should be considered and is based on the magnitude of the event – this is similar in application to the interpretation of the ERLs used for urgent countermeasures. (See table below)

Circumstance Recovery Options

To consider Unlikely to be justified

Any off-site contamination

Category A Category B, Category C

Dose>10mSv/year Category A, Category B

Category C

Lifetime dose>1Sv All None

The PHE - CRCE representative on the RCG will provide detailed advice and guidance on the justification of recovery options. However, it is important to match the level of disruption and resource that would arise against the expected benefits of the strategy selected in terms of averted dose. In particular, strategies involving major disruption and/ or resources should not be considered effective for averted doses that are less than 10mSv in the first year following a nuclear emergency.

10. Radioactive Waste Disposal

10.1 Environment Agency Role

o Advise on the management and disposal of wastes contaminated with radioactivity.

o Advise DEFRA on the regulatory matters relating to the management and disposal of radioactive wastes.

10.2 Food Standards Agency Role The Food Standards Agency (FSA) can also advise on the disposal of contaminated foodstuffs. In the event of a significant beyond design basis accident, the FSA would propose an appropriate disposal strategy. This strategy would be finalised in conjunction with the food and farming industries, interested Government departments and other response agencies, the speed of such decisions would be based on their needs.


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11. Financial Liability

The Government agreed in March 2012 to implement changes to the Paris Convention on nuclear third party liability. The changes will extend the scope of the damage for which compensation can be claimed, in addition to personal injury and loss of life ("personal injury") and property damage, to include:

• economic loss arising from property damage

• the costs of measures of reinstatement of the impaired environment.

• loss of income deriving from a direct economic interest in any use or enjoyment of the environment.

• the costs of preventive measures

Claims will be considered and compensated on a first come-first served basis. There will be a limit of 10 years from the date of an occurrence (or event) for claims against an operator for property damage and the new categories of damage. Claims against an operator for personal injury will be extended to 30 years. Radiation-induced personal injury arising from preventive measures will benefit from the longer 30 years limitation period but the 10 year limitation period will apply to claims for ‘ordinary’ personal injury caused by preventive measures.

Operator liability for claims will be €1200 million; this will be introduced at €700 million and will rise annually by €100 million per year over 5 years. Operators are required to have insurance or other financial security to cover their third party liabilities under the Paris Convention.

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Date post:	03-Jun-2020
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