SidDrell:BeyondtheBlackboard
PhysicsofNuclearWeapons
RaymondJeanlozUniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley
AdvisortoPresidents
…andmore
Thegovernmentneedsindependentexperts,andwearefortunatethatSidisboth…
Panofsky(1998)
Physics-BasedPolicyforNuclearWeapons
1)Stockpilestewardshipandnuclear-explosionban
2)Worldwithoutnuclearweapons“jointenterprise”
3)Nuclear-weaponssafety&security
JASON
• Foundingmember–Townescall1960Ipersonallythinkthebiggestimpacthasbeencreatingagenerationofscientists…whohavehadanimpactthroughtheirdirectinvolvement,eitherbecauseofthestudiestheydidwhichthencauseddefensescientistsorpartsoftheDefenseDepartmenttoseethingsbetter,orbecausewe'veenteredthepublicdebate…
Drell(1986)
“Stewardship”ofUSnuclearweaponsObjective:ProvidetechnicalbasisforUSadoptingComprehensiveNuclearTestBanTreaty(CTBT)
CTBT:ArticleI1. EachStatePartyundertakesnottocarryoutany
nuclearweapontestexplosionoranyothernuclearexplosion,andtoprohibitandpreventanysuchnuclearexplosionatanyplaceunderitsjurisdictionorcontrol.
2.EachStatePartyundertakes,furthermore,torefrainfromcausing,encouraging,orinanywayparticipatinginthecarryingoutofanynuclearweapontestexplosionoranyothernuclearexplosion.
StatusofStockpileStewardship
SuccessfulannualassessmentsofstockpileSuccessfullife-extensionprogramsRe-establishmentofpitproductiontechnologyRetentionofcorecapabilities– Advancesinunderstandingweaponperformance– Advancesinunderstandingmaterials– Developmentsatexperimentalfacilities
Studystarts2000Publication:2002
Studystarts2009Publication:2012
AvailableatNationalAcademiesPressnap.edu
SummaryofNationalAcademyofSciencesStudies
Objectives1) AssessmaintainingUSnuclearweaponscapabilities2) Assessnuclear-explosionmonitoring3) Assessconstraintsonnuclearproliferation
Conclusionsofstudies2000:Adequateplan2009:Provencapabilitiesbetterthanplanned
TreatyMonitoring
Kvaerna&Ringdal(2013)40ton
90%probabilityrecordedat3/41IMSstations
100ton
InternationalMonitoringSystem(IMS)
50primarystations120auxiliarystations
10/09/2006 ∼ 0.5kt05/25/2009 ∼ 202/12/2013 ∼ 1001/06/2016 ∼ 509/09/2016 ∼ 1209/03/2017 ∼ 250
NorthKorea
DigitalGlobe –CommercialSatelliteImagery
Test
Earthquake
Dreger(2016) Ford&Walter(2015)
05/2010event<0.0005kt
10/09/2006 ∼ 0.5kt05/25/2009 ∼ 202/12/2013 ∼ 1001/06/2016 ∼ 509/09/2016 ∼ 1209/03/2017 ∼ 250
~1000stationsChinaEarthquakeAdministration
Richards,2017
2)Worldwithoutnuclearweapons“jointenterprise”
“GangofFour”
“GangofFour”
“JointEnterprise”
• Reassertionofthevisionofaworldfreeofnuclearweaponsandpracticalmeasurestowardachievingthatgoal… aboldinitiativeconsistentwithAmerica'smoralheritage.
• Withouttheboldvision,theactionswillnotbeperceivedasfairorurgent.Withouttheactions,thevisionwillnotbeperceivedasrealisticorpossible.
• Weendorsesettingthegoalofaworldfreeofnuclearweaponsandworkingenergeticallyontheactionsrequiredtoachievethatgoal,beginningwiththemeasuresoutlinedabove.
Shultz,Perry,Kissinger&Nunn(2007)
Stepswouldinclude…• ChangingtheColdWarpostureofdeployednuclearweaponstoincreasewarningtimeand
therebyreducethedangerofanaccidentalorunauthorizeduseofanuclearweapon.• Continuingtoreducesubstantiallythesizeofnuclearforcesinallstatesthatpossessthem.• Eliminatingshort-rangenuclearweaponsdesignedtobeforward-deployed.• InitiatingabipartisanprocesswiththeSenate,includingunderstandingstoincrease
confidenceandprovideforperiodicreview,toachieveratificationoftheComprehensiveTestBanTreaty,takingadvantageofrecenttechnicaladvances,andworkingtosecureratificationbyotherkeystates.
• Providingthehighestpossiblestandardsofsecurityforallstocksofweapons,weapons-usableplutonium,andhighlyenricheduraniumeverywhereintheworld.
• Gettingcontroloftheuraniumenrichmentprocess,combinedwiththeguaranteethaturaniumfornuclearpowerreactorscouldbeobtainedatareasonableprice,firstfromtheNuclearSuppliersGroupandthenfromtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)orothercontrolledinternationalreserves.Itwillalsobenecessarytodealwithproliferationissuespresentedbyspentfuelfromreactorsproducingelectricity.
• Haltingtheproductionoffissilematerialforweaponsglobally;phasingouttheuseofhighlyenricheduraniumincivilcommerceandremovingweapons-usableuraniumfromresearchfacilitiesaroundtheworldandrenderingthematerialssafe.
• Redoublingoureffortstoresolveregionalconfrontationsandconflictsthatgiverisetonewnuclearpowers.
Shultz,Perry,Kissinger&Nunn(2007)
Bundy,Crowe&Drell(1993)
Drell&Goodby(2007)
Drell&Goodby(2003)
Drell&Peurifoy(1994) Wikipedia
NuclearArsenals
SEPTEMBER20,2017DozensofstatessignnuclearweaponsbantreatyatUnitedNationsReuters
3)Nuclear-weaponssafety&security
Safetyrelatedtechnologiesneedtoberobust–Goldsboro,NCAccident
Jan.23,1961
Everysafetymechanismhadfailed,exceptone:theready/safeswitchinthecockpit.TheswitchwasintheSAFEpositionwhenthebombdropped.HadtheswitchbeensettoGROUNDorAIR,theX-unitwould’vecharged,thedetonatorswould’vetriggered,andathermonuclearweaponwouldhaveexplodedinafieldnearFaro,NorthCarolina.WhenAirForcepersonnelfoundtheMark39laterthatmorning,thebombwasharmlesslystuckintheground,nosefirst,itsparachutedrapedinthebranchesofatree.“Itwouldhavebeenbadnews—inspades,”ParkerF.Jones,asafetyengineeratSandia,wroteinamemoabouttheaccident.“Onesimple,dynamo-technology,low-voltageswitchstoodbetweentheUnitedStatesandamajorcatastrophe!”EricSchlosser,CommandandControl(2013)
Drell,2012
19
121
Eventsper
decade
1990Drell,Foster,TownesSafetyPanelfindingsreinforcedpreviousstudiesofsafetyneeds
ConcernsaboutthesafetyofseveralofthenuclearweaponssystemsintheU.S.arsenalhaveledthegovernmenttotakeimmediatestepstoreducetheriskofunintended,accidentaldetonationsthatcouldresultindispersingplutoniumintotheenvironmentinpotentiallydangerousamountsorevengenerateanuclearyield.Thesestepsincludetemporarilyremovingtheshort-rangeair-togroundattackmissiles,SRAM-A,fromthealertbombersoftheStrategicAirCommandandmodifyingsomeoftheartillery-firedatomicprojectiles(AFAPs)deployedwithU.S.Forces.Modernizationandimprovementprogramsgaveprioritytomilitaryrequirements...Safetyingeneralwasnotviewedwiththesameurgency.Specifically,safety,securityandusecontrolshouldbetreatedtogetherbecauseoftheircriticalimportanceandtheirinterdependence.Amajorconsequenceoftheseresultsisarealizationthatunintendednucleardetonationspresentagreaterriskthanpreviouslyestimated(andbelieved)forsomeofthewarheadsinthestockpile.
Surety:Safety&Security
NuclearWeaponDesignSafetyThefollowingaresafetycriteriadesignrequirementsforallU.S.nuclearweapons:
• Normalenvironment—Priortoreceiptoftheenablinginputsignalsandthearmingsignal,theprobabilityofaprematurenucleardetonationmustnotexceedoneinabillionpernuclearweaponlifetime. 1:109
• Abnormalenvironment—Priortoreceiptoftheenablinginputsignals,theprobabilityofaprematurenucleardetonationmustnotexceedoneinamillionpercrediblenuclearweaponaccidentorexposuretoabnormalenvironments. 1:106
• One-pointsafety—TheprobabilityofachievinganuclearyieldgreaterthanfourpoundsofTNTequivalent,intheeventofaone-pointinitiationoftheweapon’shighexplosive,mustnotexceedoneinamillion. 1:106
DoDNuclearMattersHandbook2016
Publicdisclosureshelpedtofocusgovernmentattentiononaddressingconcerns
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb498/Always/Never (5hourhistory)
https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/NMHB/chapters/chapter_7.htm
UQS=uniquesignal
stronglink weaklink
enhancednucleardetonationsafetyENDS
NuclearWeaponsSurety(Safety&Security)
1)Pathtoacatastrophicevent
2)Potentialfornuclearcrisis
3)Difficulttodiscuss