Slum and shanty upgrading in Colombo: a help for the urban poor?

Slum and shanty upgrading in Colombo: a help for the urban poor?

by Florian Steinberg

Since the early 1970s the housing problems of underdeveloped countries have become a topic of international interest and debate - especially since the 1976 United Nations HABITAT Conference in Vancouver declared that housing is an important aspect of basic human needs to be fulfdled by forthcoming development efforts.

Although the cultural characteristics of housing (architectural forms, use of building materials, modes of the building process, etc.) vary from country to country, nevertheless the phenomena of housing shortage, high densities and rapid dere- liction are to be found in all underdeveloped countries with a capitalist orientation.

Poor living conditions in the rural areas and increasing impoverishment have made rural-urban migration (seemingly) the only solution for the rural population, so urban housing problems are increasing as a consequence of population growth as well as of the new social problems (such as unemployment) which follow migration to cities in which no immediate absorption into ‘modern’ life can be expected.

The physical expressions of this uncontrolled rapid urban growth are ‘spontaneous’ unauthorized ‘squatter’ or ‘shanty’ settlements which mushroom on empty plots within the old quarters of the cities or surround whole cities in ever widening rings.

The reason for the creation of slums and squatter settlements is the malfunction- ing of the urban housing market in which a huge share of the urban poor cannot participate. Those who cannot count on a regular income above the ‘poverty line’ because of the prevailing lack of employment opportunities, or because of their very low incomes as casual labourers, street hawkers or small artisans, do not have the slightest chance to compete on the ‘free’ housing market and cannot rent a flat or a house. The only way out is to rent rooms in old slum quarters or in squatter houses that are sublet, or build one’s own squatter shack (with the possible addition of wage labour as well as using the unpaid work of family members).

Current housing policies’ - which we aim to investigate by examining the slum

‘The term ‘housing policy’ comprises all state measures which are necessary in the context of state control over the process of production and reproduction. Therefore ‘environmental policies’ are part of the rationality of the socioeconomic system and cannot be treated or viewed separately.

Any policy is thus a definition of a general line of action which attempts to take the best advantage of the resources withwhich a society is endowed, in order to fulfii the economic and social goals of the ruling sector (Mabogunje ef ol., 1978,37).

Florian Steinberg 313

and shanty upgrading in Colombo - have to be seen in the context of the failure of the housing market to fulfd existing housing needs, of the increasing impoverishment of the urban population and of the state’s obligation to care for the reproduction of the urban poor. State intervention in the housing sector in favour of the poor should not be seen as a simple welfare measure but should be seen as an im- perative strategy for social conflict management and as a contribution to the general improvement of living conditions and thus a valuable contribution to increasing the productivity of the urban workforce?

Growing industrialization and integration of underdeveloped countries into the world market poses increasing demands for skills from that part of the urban labour force which is integrated into the highly developed sectors of state or private capital production. The requirements of this labour force encompass not only improved sanitation and medical services, better nutrition and recreation but also and especially housing3 where the ‘modern’ workers need improved conditions for their individual reproduction.

At the same time the ‘industrial reserve army’4 - that part of the urban labour force which has to sell its own labour in the economic sectors of small artisanship, petty-commodity production, petty trade, housework and casual labour - continues t o live in bad housingconditions. Their number is so great that there is no economic reason to assume that these parts of the workforce will soon be integrated in the modern, capitalist sectors of the economy. So there is on this basis no reason why the state should or could invest in the housing of those of the poor who are economically marginal and inessential for any investment which is oriented to social and economic modernization.

As long as the housing problem of the urban poor does not conflict with the dominant social interests, it does not exist in the eyes of the ruling elite (Payne, 1977, 216). Thus such housing measures as there are will only be casual welfare programmes with very limited effects or resettlements of squatter dwellings which relocate the housing problem in other urban areas. With obvious cynicism the severity of the housing problem for the poor is often questioned, as apparently the poor manage to house themselves through self-help in the slums and shanties.

The object of this article is to describe the policy of slum and shanty upgrading in Colombo as an example of a new trend in housing policies for the urban poor

* Ahluwalia and Chenery speak of the necessity of investing in the poor! In Chenery el al. (1974). The most complex definitions of ‘housing’ are given in UN publications: ‘the residential en-

vironment, neighbourhood, microdistrict or the physical structure including all necessary services, facilities, equipment and devices needed for the physical health and social well being of the family and the individual‘ (United Nations, 1976, 1). Hence ‘housing’ is not only ‘shelter’ but the ensemble of services, environment, etc., of the single housing unit and their relations to other houses and families. ‘In the fulfilment of social needs, housing plays both a direct and indirect role and both roles are decisive. In its direct role housing serves as the area where the individual becomes capable of experiencing community and privacy, social well being and shelter and protection against hostile physical forces and disturbances . . .’ (United Nations, 1971,13). ‘See for an explanation of the terms ‘industrial reserve army’ and ‘relative overpopulation’ Marx (edn 1954, chapter xxiii); Quijano (1974).

374

now being implemented. Sri Lanka seems to be following the type of housing policies recommended by the HABITAT Conference and by international institutions like the World Bank (Jaycox, 1978; 1980; Grimes, 1976; Dwyer, 1975; Yeh and Laquian, 1979; Fleury, 1979; United Nations, 1975). These ‘new’ housing policies involve self-help methods and the upgrading of slum and squatter settlements and are seen as the way eventually to solve the housing problems of the urban poor.

This article criticizes this type of housing policy. The key questions posed are: Is the policy of slum and shanty upgrading an effective policy for the urban poor in Colombo? Do these projects provide the basis for the solution of the housing question - or are they simply another limited welfare measure?

The concentrations of housing problems in Sri Lanka are found: 1 in the slums and shanties in Colombo, where 60% of the urban population in-

habit this type of settlements; 2 in decaying rural houses, lacking elementary services and infrastructure, amount-

ing to 27% of all rural houses; 3 in the overcrowded and unhealthy houses of the cooli-lines in Sri Lanca’s hillside

plantations. We will concentrate on the slums and shanties (of Colombo) and neglect the rural and estate sector as well as the housing problems (shortage and very rapid price increases) which affect the urban middle classes as a consequence of the inflation of rents and strong competition from foreign settlers.’

Slum and shanty upgrading in Colombo

I Review of Srilankan housing policy

In the first years after political independence (1948-54) the housing problems of the poor were completely ignored, there were no public programmes for the direct construction of housing - only a few houses for those employed by the state were built. In 1954 a declaration of future housing policy initiated a discussion of methods to improve the housing situation (Ministry of Industries, Housing and Social Services, 1954).

As a consequence of the populist policy of the first Bandaranaike government from 1956 considerable financial resources were allocated to urban housing schemes. In line with the character of the then existing financial, economic and administra- tive institutions of the housing sector these public housing schemes showed a middle- class orientation. The housing problems of the lowest income groups could not be solved - although the Ten Year Plan (1958) said that these housing schemes were

’ For a discussion on the rent increases in Colombo, see the following newspaper articles: ‘We live here - but foreigners get houses’,Sun 13 October 1979; ‘Suitable for foreigners only’, Sun 23 October 1979; ‘Housing strategy’, Ceylon Daily News 13 October 1919; ‘We are getting rooked too!’, Weekend 11 November 1979.


for such groups. In fact it was mostly the high and middle state officials, office clerks and highly qualified industrial workers who enjoyed the benefits of the highly subsidized housing units for which they paid a ‘symbolic’ rent-fee.

Hasty and ignorant attempts to ‘resettle’ slum dwellers often involved the burning down of their units and their expulsion, but not their proper resettlement - they were left to house themselves somewhere else. So they had to crowd into other slum and shanty areas while the freshly emptied inner-city plots were used for further ’modern’ housing development for the middle classes (Marga Institute,

Since the 1970s - a period in which housing was under the communist minister Keuneman - the trend in policy has been to include consideration of low-income needs by means of:

1 Measures to affect physical and tenurial conditions. The objective was the optimal use of available financial resources and to make at least a contribution to the policy of income redistribution. Rent control was introduced, tenants’ rights were increased while house-owners and speculators were restricted. A policy of giving small-scale construction loans was introduced to promote private low-cost housing; a Common Amenities Board was created which had the objective of improving the infrastructure in slums and shanties - as well as in Colombo as a whole.

2 The direct construction ofhouses, financed and executed through state agencies. The two main programmes were the Direct Construction Programme and the Aided Self-Help Housing Programme. The Direct Construction Programme aimed at middle and low-income groups consisted of: a) low-cost flats for low-income families in urban areas, b) flats for middle-income households, c) emergency house construction in the Colombo Metropolitan Area.

The Aided Self Help Housing Programme, introduced in 1973 in the face of increasing housing shortage, was meant to alleviate the housing problems of middle and low-income groups. The projects were located in semi-urban and rural areas. The state paid the costs of land development and services while the dwellers built the houses themselves, guided and aided by officials from the state housing auth- orities. Via rent-purchase schemes the houses became the property of their users within 20 years.

Although these programmes represented a considerable expenditure of public resources on the housing of low-income groups (for the first time in Sri Lanka’s history), nevertheless it was only those parts of the urban population who were regularly employed, so having a relatively high income (a group comprising less than 50% of Colombo’s workforce), who could benefit from the new housing policy. The mass of casual labourers, the unemployed/underemployed and the petty producers and traders remained unaffected, i.e. were excluded. These housing schemes only scratched at the surface of the housing problems of the poor, the essential social basis of the housing question remained untouched (Rodell, 1978, 25-33;Tissera and Ganesan, 1978,21-24).

1976,33-66,163-82).

376 Slum and shanty upgrading in Colombo

Since 1978, a huge public housing programme of 100 000 units (costing Rs 1772 million) has started; it is to be completed by 1982, before the next election (Joachim, 1978). The components of this programme are: a) 36 000 units of directly constructed flats for the urban middle classes (costs:

Rs 3 1 669/unit), b) 14 000 building loans for luxury and middle-income housing (costs: Rs 22 43 1 /

unit), c) 50 000 units of the Aided Self Help Programme for low-income groups (costs:

Rs 6352/unit) (Ministry of Local Government, Housing and Construction, 1978).6

To stimulate private house construction in line with the objective of creating a ‘home-owning society’, earlier prohibitive housing legislation (banning luxury construction, limitation of housing property, rent control, tenant’s protection, etc.) is to be altered step by step and new guidelines aimed at encouraging investment are to be set up. This housing policy is based on the optimistic expectation that the rate of private construction will be four times as high as public construction thus bringing total construction output during the years 1978-82 to 500 000 units (Ministry of Local Government, Housing and Construction, 1978, 11). The actual need for this period had been estimated as 690 000 units.

Since 1977 the public involvement in housing has become one of the three most popular and important national development projects (the others are the accelera- ted Mahaveli Programme and the promotion of the Free Trade Zones or Export Processing Zones near Colombo) (Hill and Kahawita, 1979; Ponnambalam, 1980; Balakrishnan, 1980). This solution to the slum and shanty problem should be, according to government announcements, a self-financing one, a policy which incurs few public costs and is financed by the slum and shanty dwellers themselves (CDN 5 August 1977, Ministry of Local Government, Housing and Con- struction, 1978). Confusingly the government also says that the slum and shanty upgrading in Colombo should only be viewed as a short-term solution, which will give way to a policy of rehousing in modern and more expensive flats when the country has attained a more stable and prosperous economic situation (Ministry of Local Government, Housing and Construction, 1978, 16; Joachim, 1978).

I1 Pilot projects for the upgrading of slums and shanties in Colombo

In contrast to the inefficient low cost’ housing policy described above, which only helped the better-off and had no impact on the housing problems of the poor (Econ- omic Review, 1978, 10; Marga Institute, 1976, 228-29), the pilot projects for upgrading slums and shanties in Colombo are meant to be of direct benefit to the poor.

6Cost increases during 1979 and 1980 make it doubtful whether the programme will be fully realized. In the latest discussions about Srilankan development a revision of governmental investment programmes is demanded with the aim of giving less priority to housing. See ‘Progress and development’, Ceylon Daily News 30 January 1981.


The Colombo Master Plan Project (CMPP) has pioneered slum upgrading and shanty improvement.’ This CMPP of the new Urban Development Authority (UDA), established in 1978, regards the standards of the former ‘low-cost’ housing schemes as too high and expensive and sees the upgrading of existing dwellings of the urban poor in the slums and shanties through ‘sites and services’ and self-help schemes as the most important new element of future housing strategy for the poor (Urban Development Authority, 1979a).*

To understand the CMPP/UDA concept one has to analyse the overall situation of the slums and shanties in Colombo. After making such an analysis, we will describe the upgrading schemes and evaluate them. The population of the city of Colombo (Colombo Municipal Council = CMC) increased from 100 000 in 1891 to 250 000 in 1921 and to 500 000 in 1963. In 1971 at the last census the CMC had reached 560 000 and its growth rate of 1.77% was rather low. But if the growth trend of metropolitan Colombo (Colombo Urban Area = CUA) is con- sidered, a much higher annual growth of 3.4% is found (1946-540 000; 1971- 1 240 000; and the projection for the year 2000 reaches nearly 5 000 000; Kingsley, 1979).

Table 1 City and town population growth trends

Area Town population

(thousands) Annual growth

(%)

1946 1971

Sri Lanka Old Urban Areas Colombo District Colombo Urban Area Colombo City

1420 2330 1020 1970 720 1470 510 1 240 360 560

2.81 2.66 2.91 3.42 1.77

Source: Rodell (1978, l l )

In 1978 the housing needs in Colombo were estimated to be 76 000 units, con- sisting o f

substitute and new construction of formerly temporary or semi-temporary structures (24 000 units) new construction for families who shared an overcrowded unit with other families (24 000 units) destruction and new construction of dwellings more than 60 years old (28 000 units) (International Technical Assistance, 1978,3; Dousa et al., 1976). On the basis of these estimates 300 000 persons within the CMC live in slums

and shanties, about 60% of Colombo’s (CMC) population.

‘The original scheme for a shanty resettlement has been stopped because of high costs involved in the required reclamation of marshy land. ‘The Colombo Master Plan Project referred to older policy proposals of the Marga Institute. See Marga Institute, 1976,16342,225ff.


A shanty survey in 1973 enumerated: Shanties 16 251 units Slum tenement houses 8 207 units Slum tenement gardens 20 507 units

Total 40 965 units (International Technical Assistance,

Beyond this the UDA assumes that there are a further 25 000 shanty units outside the CMC - within the Colombo Urban Area.

The biggest share of slums within Colombo are in the so-called ‘tenement gardens’.’’ These structures were built during the first half of this century by private investors and firms to serve as simple and cheap accommodation for harbour, transport and dock workers. Mostly they were ‘back to back’ houses enclosing a small path through a ‘garden’. The communal services provided, water, toilets, washing places, drainage, street lighting, are poor and nowadays in a very bad state. As since 1941 there has been tenant protection by housing legislation, profitable renting of these tenements has been restricted and has resulted in the continuous decay of such units. When in 1973 private property in housing was severely restricted through the Ceiling on Housing Property Law most slum tenement gardens fell into the hands of the state. The state planned to transfer the slum units to the ownership of their present users but did not begin this until 1980. So slum dwellers live rent-free in their units if their rent had been below Rs 25 and this includes the majority (Marga Institute, 1976,780.

The problem of shanties (squats on private or state-owned land) first emerged after independence in 1948. The increasing population and higher migration rates created a considerable housing need which could not be satisfied as there were too few housing units on the market and very few families could pay for these. Thus the lowest income groups had only one alternative, to construct or rent shanties which were built out of cadjan, wooden planks, old tins, etc. (Marga Institute, 1976, 67f, 87).” Today we find many of these shanties being registered and provided with minimal services (Marga Institute, 1976,79ff). Shanties are to be found all over the city on sidewalks, on banks of rivers and canals, along railtracks, on empty plots even in middle-class housing areas and often on marshy, low-lying land which is subject to flooding. Many of these plots occupied by shanties were ideal for squatting as they were not subject to speculation and had no real use-value for other purposes. Also the proximity to possible working places in the city made such squatting attractive for the poor.

gThe Marga Institute (1976, 80) gave the following figures: tenement slums 19 576, old houses 8272, shanties 25 000, total: 42 748 units with 350 953 inhabitants. l001d slum houses are not so widespread as to be really important. They are the houses of merchants formerly used for trading and presidential purposes, and they are mostly centrally located, for example in the Pettah. Because of bad maintenance they became slums after the owners had moved and rented out these houses.

According to the commonly used categories of housing standards in Colombo Urban Area out of 205 000 units there are 66.5% ‘permanent’, 27.9% ‘semi-permanent’ and 5.6% ‘temporary’ structures (International Technical Assistance, 1978,7).

1978,3).’


In contrast to the slum dwellers the shanty inhabitants do not have any formal right to use their land (CDN 16 July 1979) and their existence is only tolerated, half-officially acknowledged through the act of house registration and the provision of some services. Most shanty dwellers own their houses - another difference from slum dwellers.

Socioeconomic surveys have shown that 75% of the shanty population and 55% of the slum dwellers earn their income as casual labourers, as street hawkers, as petty-commodity producers, etc. Generally the income of slum dwellers is slightly higher than that of those in the shanties. For both groups it is of vital importance to live near their (potential) working place, as long bus or train journeys would cost too much time and money. Statistics reveal that the majority of slum and shanty households have an income below the ‘poverty line’ of Rs 400/per month (Table 2) - which represents a higher than usual poverty rate for Colombo (Table 3).

Table 2 Slum and shanty households’ monthly income? (1975-77)

Median or % of households average** (Rupees) Below 101 101-200 201-300 301-400 401-500 501-600 Above 600

Rupees Rupees Rupees Rupees Rupees Rupees Rupees ~ ~~

1 230 18.3 24.4 23.7 14.5 6.9 6.1 6.1

above 500

2 220 (av) 21 .I 36.0 29.4 8.3 2.0 3.3 170 Imed)

UP t O 400 above 400

3 n.a. 4* n.a. 5* 320

(medl 6* 350

(med) 7 220 (av)

68.1 47.4 72.5

65.2

n.a.

31.9 52.6 27.5

34.8

n.a. ~ ~ ~ ~

* 4, 5 and 6 show results of surveys in the same part of the city, Gintupitaya, which contains slum gardens and shanties; 4 refers to a survey that focused on a slum garden, 5 to a survey on a group of shanties, ** The averages shown are reported in the sources, while medians have been estimated from information on the distributions,

t Respondents’ answers to questions phrased variously as ‘income last month?’, or ‘average monthly income?’; answers do not reflect the full value of food subsidies or value of owner occupied housing services; moreover, data collectedon household budgets in some of the surveys indicate families tend slightly to underreport money income.

Sources: Line 1 : Colombo Master Plan Team, Slum Upgrading, Annex; line 2: Colombo Master Plan Team, Shanty Resettlement, Appendix Ill, lines3 and 4: Department of Town and Country Planning, University of Sri Lanka, unpublished surveys; lines 5 and 6: Radampola and Selvarajah (1977, 51ff); line 7: Colombo Master Plan Team, Shanty Improvement, Appendix 3.


Table 3 Projected income distribution in the Colombo Urban Area

Household income per month (Rs) 1973 1986 200 1

20 1-400 42.3 33.8 21 .o 401 -600 18.7 24.9 23.7 601-1000 10.1 16.8 28.2

1001 -1 500 2.5 2.1 11.6 over 1501 2.1 3.6 8.2

0-200 24.3% 15.8% 7.3%

Nevertheless, even with these optimistic projections of economic advance, half of the urban households would have incomes of less than Rs 600 per month a t the end of the century. Source: Ministry of Local Government, Housing and Construction (1978.9)

According to the 1973 shanty survey 13% of the working population have regular wage labour, 28% have irregular employment and 9% are engaged in petty trading activities while 50% are employed in petty-commodity producing sectors. (Perera, 1973). The monthly expenditure of these households shows that the available household resources are sufficient only for the most basic consumer goods. The share of monthly expenditure for housing is around 10% of income (Marga Insti- tute, 1976,21) (Table 4).

Table 4 Structure of expenditure

Items of expenditure under Rs 200

Food, drink, liquor, tobacco Clothing, textiles, footwear Housing (rents. rates, etc.) Fuel for cooking and lighting Non-durable household goods Personal care and health expenses Transport and communications Education and recreation Consumer durables Others

66.01 7.28 9.96 4.65 2.73 1.86 3.1 1 2.58 0.1 3 1.69

Income groups RS 200-399 RS 400-600

61.03 55.97 7.42 8.13 9.32 11.19 4.1 1 2.98 2.1 4 2.13 2.1 7 3.18 4.16 7.05 3.1 4 6.07 0.30 0.99 6.21 2.31

over Rs 600

53.88

12.44 4.65 2.26 1.03 0.75 7.70 2.61 6.81

7.87

Total in % 100.0 100.0 1 00 .o 100.0

Total in Rs 183.61 291.1 3 419.05 681.64

Source: Municipal Welfare Report (1974)

This review of trends in Srilankan housing policy, as well as the brief illustration of the social and economic situation of the poor in Colombo, have shown us that much of Colombo’s population is not in a position to fulfil its basic needs for housing via the housing market, where rents for flats range from Rs 50 to several hundreds per month.

The UDA regards these social circumstances as the most convincing argument for


its concept of sites and services and self-help programmes as ways of bringing cheap improvements t o slums and shanties (Urban Development Authority, 1979a, 3).12 To keep the costs for this upgrading to a minimum, the improvement of the houses themselves should - according to the UDA - be postponed in favour of an environmental approach which involves firstly an improvement in services such as water, toilets, drainage, streets, street lighting, etc. As many of the slums and some of the shanties are located close t o the city centre this raises the first conflict of interests. This city land is the area for possible future extension of business and commercial activities so the upgrading concept will not be implemented in these areas.13 Instead the UDA proposes to rehouse the inhabitants somewhere else. In other less central locations upgrading seems to be less problematic - although there are still in fact a number of problems and conflicts t o be expected.

The pilot projects for slum and shanty upgrading (adopting Koenigsberger’s (1963) term ‘action planning’, they are called action projects) assume that 50% of the slums and shanties can be made habitable.14 And, according t o UDA estimates, 10 slum or shanty units can be upgraded for the same cost as building a single flat. The ’action project’ of tenement garden number 35 in Steuart Street in Slave Island involves the upgrading of 103 slum houses, containing 131 families, about 900 people. The average size of a house is 27 square metres (460 square feet) and on average there are two rooms per unit. Examination of the physical condition of these tenement houses often reveals that only the repair of floors, the replastering of walls and the renewal of roofs are necessary. Nearly half the houses need better ventilation and more light through the provision of additional skylights. 22 houses have to be rebuilt, 65 need t o be repaired and 27 new units will be erected (Colombo Master Plan Project, 1977, 8). 14 new street lights, 20 toilets, 8 baths or showers and about 2000 metres of gravel road provide the new infrastructure component. The housing density is being slightly reduced whilst overall space standards are going to increase and free space will be created.

According t o the 1978 estimates the costs of the project are Rs 480 000 (repairs Rs 295 000, new construction Rs 137 000 plus other costs) and the average cost per unit is Rs 4200 (which is free of interest charges - subsidies are a general aspect

”It is interesting to note that even today, after the HABITAT Conference and the long-ranging academic debate on low-cost housing certain forces among the Ministry of Local Government, Housing and Construction and the National Housing Development Authority do not wish such a cheap slum and shanty upgrading to become a generally applied concept. They still follow a policy of high cost construction which correlates better with certain illusions of social modernization and progress.

Thus in his progress report for the year 1979 the Minister of Housing did not even mention these slum and shanty upgrading schemes - obviously they are not regarded as a part of the ‘development’ progress.

For a discussion of landownership in urban areas and related politics and problems, see Evers (1975). I4In June 1979, the Urban Development Authority (1979b) published a list of forthcoming slum and shanty upgrading areas: 1) Steuart Street 2) Kolonnawa 3) Forbes Road 4) Demata- goda Passage 5 ) Henamulla 6) =pone 7) Ratnam Road 8) Abdul Hameed Street 9) Bandaranaike Mawatha 10) Palligawatte (Maradana).


of policy in the low-cost housing ~ec to r ) . ’~ The National Housing Development Authority regards this slum upgrading scheme as economically viable if within 30 years the costs of the upgrading are repaid.

In order t o experiment with a different mode of slum upgrading the UDA, in collaboration with the Common Amenities Board, wants to implement a second, cheaper slum upgrading programme in Abdul Hameed Street. This project will mainly consist of the provision of services while the upgrading and rebuilding of houses will be executed by the inhabitants themselves through ‘aided’ self-help. By guaranteeing their tenurial rights it is expected that private investment and self-help activities will be easily mobilized (International Technical Assistance, 1978, 14).

The ‘action project’ for the improvement of a shanty area in Aluwalakumbura in Kolonnawa, an eastern suburb of the CMC, affects 1800 people in 278 shanty units. Most of these units are in a very bad state; they lack toilets and drinking water. During the planning phase the shanty dwellers voted for an improvement scheme in three phases: the first and second phases consist of an improvement of the infrastructure (public water provision for 50 families per tap, drainage, toilets, street lighting, etc.) and subdivision of the land.16 The third phase includes the improvement of the houses which will be renovated or rebuilt by ‘aided’ self-help.

According to 1978 estimates the costs of this project (Rs 1 926 000) consist of three components: first phase = Rs 231 000, second phase = Rs 143 000, third phase = Rs 1 550 000. A four-year postponement of the first repayments will contribute to the ability to pay of the project participants who have to pay for the three phases over two, four and ten years respectively.17 The first two phases will cost the shanty dwellers Rs 14 per month while construction of the aided self-help houses during the third phase will involve a considerably higher monthly repayment ranging from Rs 25 to Rs 30 in addition t o the payment for the infrastructure and the ground rent.

Following the advice of a short-term UN consultant and of the Dutch Inter- national Technical Assistance, which part-finances the slum and shanty upgrading, two options were proposed for further shanty improvements: the implementation of a sites and services scheme which would involve complete self-help construction and the adoption of the core-house concept which involves partial construction by state agencies and completion by aided self-help. To test these new concepts 90 sites

l 5 Following the slum upgrading the households have to pay each month: Rs 4 for water, Rs 10 for lease, and the house building costs of Rs 3000 to be repaid in 10,20 or 30 years - according to paying ability (International Technical Assistance, 1978, 19). 16The effect of the shanty upgrading in figures (Colombo Master Plan Project, 1978,6):

Water provision pers./tap 257 50 Drainage pers./toil. 128 16.5 Street lighting lamps/ha. 2 16.5 Housing density pers./ha. 450 450

‘Following the shanty upgrading the households have to pay every month: Rs 4 for water, Rs 10 for lease, and the costs for the house to be built through aided self-help (International Technical Assistance, 1978, 17).

before after improvement


and services units will be prepared in Kolonnawa and 100 core-houses will be built on the old army camp of Henamulla." The allocation of the sites and services in plots will favour those who agree to move from slum or shanty areas.

It is not easy to evaluate definitively the results and future prospects of slum and shanty upgrading, especially as these projects have only recently started and are still in a pilot stage (the Department of Town and Country Planning, University of Sri LankaKatubedde, is still evaluating them). But we will attempt a critical evaluation on the basis of what is already known, examining the objective of these projects which is to allow a quick and cheap solution to the urban low-income housing problem. l9

It is clear that both types of project make a valuable contribution to the improvement of existing housing stock and will help to increase the number of new houses constructed. But will the slum and shanty population really benefit? What assurance can be given that these low-income households are not simply expelled in the course of the upgrading programmes and have to settle somewhere else?

Regarding the costs of the slum upgrading in Steuart Street it is notable that the building costs have jumped from Rs 4200 per unit in 1978 to Rs 10-12 000 by the end of 1979 and might have increased in 1980 by a further 30-60%. Although the financing of this pilot scheme is secured through Dutch aid and the slum dwellers benefit from a high subsidy (as they do not pay interest on the loans), with the present rate of inflation of building costs (30-60%) and the fact that incomes lag behind this price development, it becomes unclear how other slum inhabitants would be able to pay for their upgraded housing. What was initially calculated as a repayable amount of money - Rs 20-30 monthly for the owner-purchase of upgraded slum units - now has to be increased nearly threefold if the UDA wants to keep the schemes economically viable. Even on the basis of the rather optimistic estimates of future increases in income, as we have seen, future increases in households' ability to pay considerably more for housing cannot be expected.

So how will the slum upgrading be financed? Will it be any real solution for the Dutch aid giving organization to increase its financial support to bring this pilot scheme to a successful end? Could slum upgrading be executed under the same conditions, i.e. with even higher subsidies? The present trend which is to reduce public consumer subsidies2' implies that highly subsidized slum upgrading will only reach a few and so will not result in a massive programme to improve all the slums in Colombo (or in other Srilankan towns). Additional problems arise from

"The costs for a 'core-house' were estimated at Rs 5000 and could be repaid over 10, 20 or 30 years (International Technical Assistance, 1978, 17). l9 A recent study of 'realistic' housing policy measures for underdeveloped countries was very optimistic about housing projects such as the upgrading of slums and shanties: 'many countries coming to realistic approaches and with further continuous efforts, at least in some and perhaps in most countries, a managable housing situation fulfilling basic standards for al l the people can be realized within 30 to 50 years. In some countries such a goal might even be reached in about 20 years. Such targets are attainable only if adequate efforts are made now and are not postponed.' (United Nations, 1976b, 194). loSee 'Welfare systems under attack', Financial Times 31 May 1978; 'Government subsidy', Economic Review 6 (March).


the fact that the tenurial situation of slum dwellers is not yet clearly defined by the granting of long-term rights of occupancy, leaseholds, ownership, etc. If there is no positive decision giving the slum dwellers’ long-term security no real commitment and private initiative in the form of investment and/or self-help activities can be expected. The Dutch aid organization demanded the guarantee of tenure during the upgrading process and the period of repayment, and at the same time proposed to prohibit subletting in upgraded units if the house owners live somewhere else in order to restrict landlordism (International Technical Assistance, 1978, 13). Accord- ing to the Dutch proposals the plots should be leased for 30 years and there should be a guarantee of compensation (or another plot) if the process of urban expansion and change demands the removal of these former slums. But these constructive proposals have not been adopted and the politicians regard the upgrading measures as no more than short-term actions.

Slum upgrading in the CUA is not a permanent solution to the housing problem. I t is a medium-term solution which is based on the socioeconomic level of the population and of the island as a whole. With economic growth it would be expected that the aspirations of the people would increase. Hence, the upgrading of a slum should serve the given population for a period of not more than 30 years (Colombo Master Plan Project, 1977, 3).

Considering the financial weakness and the instability of the social situation of low-income groups in Colombo, the second approach to slum upgrading, which relies heavily on self-help, seems to be more realistic and appropriate. As the Dutch consultants suggest it would be more positive socially to leave the decision to upgrade or not to upgrade to the slum dwellers themselves as they know best what they can pay. Blanket programmes of modernization and upgrading will only result in an expulsion of population and its shift to the next slum or shanty area. Thus a limitation of programmes to essential infrastructural improvements would keep costs low and have more significant effects on the housing conditions of the poor.

The uncertainty over tenure will probably be a real constraint on an effective private investment, as the life expectation of the houses cannot be calculated - and might be very short. The highly political nature of this land question has its origin in the interest of private and state urban landowners in having land available for a more profitable use, especially if it is land near the centre of the city. Since the liberalization of the economy has occurred, new demands for office space, warehouses, shopping facilities, etc. have resulted in spiralling ground rents on the ‘free’ land market. So it is clear why the guarantee of long-term leases for slum dwellers in Slave Island, Kotahena, Modera and other centrally located areas is not easy to achieve in times when development has become synonymous with private profit, the enrichment of the rich and impoverishment of the poor.

If we look at shanty improvement, very similar factors and mechanisms can be identified. The costs that were originally estimated for the third phase of the Kolonnawa shanty improvement have increased sharply from Rs 6000 for an aided self-help house and Rs 5000 for a ‘core-house’ to double this sum. So the building of houses that would, according to the project proposal in 1978, have been a very


heavy financial burden on these shanty families has now become an impossibility. And attempts to apply new, cheap building technologies have not brought major reductions in building costs?l This trend in building costs coupled with the unlike- lihood of any fundamental change in the incomes of shanty dwellers make it un- realistic to expect a future massive programme for the improvement of all the shanties in Colombo.

In the case of the shanties that are squatted the problem of landownership is even more critical. In Colombo approximately 50% of the shanties are on squatted state-owned land that could easily be leased, but the rest of the shanties are on private land which the state would probably not be willing to buy or expropriate for secure use by shanty dwellers. Realistically it is more likely that property owners will tolerate shanties only as long as the land is not needed for any other purpose. Fortunately, in the case of the Kolonnawa improvement scheme the land is owned by the state and so no conflict with a private owner is to be expected, but nevertheless a guarantee of long-term use rights has not yet been given. The Dutch consultants suggested that the third phase of the Kolonnawa scheme should not be realized because the economic situation of these shanty dwellers is too poor to secure implementation of the objective of building new houses. Instead they urged the granting of long-term leaseholds which would enable the present shanty dwellers to improve their houses step by step as their family budgets allowed. They said that forced ‘self-help’ measures would result in the expulsion of the very poorest and their displacement into other shanty areas.

The experiments with sites and services and core-housing in Kolonnawa and Henamulla will contribute to the cheaper provision of housing. But the success of this type of housing provision depends on the (regular) income of the inhabitants and the proportion that they can spend on purchasing their unit. And there have been surveys which revealed that the shanty dwellers themselves felt that the self- financed improvement of their housing was not possible within the near future (Colombo Master Plan Project, 1978,7ff).

Moreover slum and shanty dwellers placed highest emphasis on the need for work, to provide a higher and more secure income, followed by better nutrition, then better health, then better schooling and only after these did they express a wish for improved housing (Radampolah and Selverajah, 1977). So better housing seems a less important factor in the life of the poor than other basic needs.

I11 Is there a quick solution to the housing question?

We have to ask whether these schemes have opened up new perspectives for improving the living and housing conditions of the poor. On the one hand the upgrading projects are stiU in an experimental stage, but on the other hand there are

See the latest experiments of the UDA/USSave the Children shanty improvement scheme at the KiriUapone Bridge where new technologies are being tested.


economic factors such as increased construction costs and the low purchasing power of the poor which suggest that the early improvement of housing is unlikely.

The present situation and the concept of the slum and shanty upgrading schemes suggest only two future development possibilities: 1 A social regrouping within upgraded slum or shanty areas, i.e. the outmovement

of the poor and a retention or influx of the better-off who can pay for the upgrading, or

2 A substantial government subsidy to enable the improvement of all slums and shanties without displacement of the poorest people.

Unfortunately the first alternative is the most probable, given the general socio- political orientation of the present Srilankan government. Hence, we can only conclude that these new housing policies will not bring a substantial change in the housing situation.

Latest UDA proposals for further upgrading projects in Colombo have increased (to 9000) the number of units to be improved; the financing of these is not yet clear although it is likely that further aid for these schemes will be provided. The draft plans for this new upgrading show that in future fewer shanties and more slum areas will be upgraded. This shift underlines the significance of the ‘land question’ for shanty improvement as well as doubts over there being a sufficient increase in shanty dwellers’ incomes.

Few housing units are to be upgraded before 1983 (the next election date) and so the effects on the Colombo housing situation in general and on the housing of the poor in particular will be slight. As we explained earlier the state is unwilling to provide all the funds needed for the improvement of the housing situation of the urban poor. This lack of funds is the main reason for the necessity for slum and shanty dwellers to practise self-help housing construction and to raise their own funds for the purchase of their improved dwellings.

It is interesting to compare the cost estimates for the upgrading of the 76 000 slums and shanties in Colombo and the costs for the new parliamentary complex in Kotte as well as the government’s budget for the whole housing sector:

Slum upgrading in Colombo Municipal Council Rs 80 million

Total Rs 230million (Urban Development Authority, 1979,7)

Construction of new parliamentary building (financed through a Japanese grant) Rs 450million

Additional costs for infrastructure, for reclamation of swampy land, creation of artificial lakes, etc.

(Source: Urban Development Authority)

Budget for housing for 1978-82: varying between Rs 338 million and Rs 373.4 million per annum (Ministry of Local Government, Housing and Construction,

Rs 1500 million

Rs 1950 million


1978).” These figures show that there are funds which could be used for the planned upgrading of housing for the urban poor! But instead of such a policy of income distribution in favour of the poor, astronomical sums of money will be used for the luxurious housing of parliament and one has to doubt whether the use-value of the new parliament complex justifies these costs.

Our sceptical evaluation of these developments also raises some general questions. Can it really be expected that the path of capitalist development adopted by Sri Lanka will create more and improved job opportunities with higher incomes for the poor thus allowing an increased fulfilment of basic needs? Will not the present development according to the principles of market economy lead to further mar- ginalization and impoverishment of the urban population? (Centre for Society and Religion, 1979; Ponnambalam, 1980, Balakrishnan, 1980).

In any case the housing question is closely connected to the social situation of the population and its position within the process of production and reproduction as a whole. In a market economy the fulfilment of all basic needs is only possible if unemployment is very low and the workers have incomes which cover all the costs of reproduction (i.e. nutrition, clothing, housing, health, etc.). Examples of the perfect functioning of such market mechanisms are not even found in highly developed countries.

Hence, state intervention to overcome social problems becomes ever more urgent as market forces fail. The social position of the poor means that a sector in which housing units are produced and consumed as commodities cannot meet their needs. The necessity for a redistribution of society’s wealth and the creation of better conditions for work and individual reproduction is evident.

The Marga Institute in Colombo has concluded that all the people of Sri Lanka could be housed at a reasonable basic standard if funds within the housing sector were redistributed:

The aggregate volume of resources that has flowed into the housing sector approximates to the estimated outlay required for a desirable housing programme. On a very tentative estimate the prevailing pattern of housing investment has to be altered by diverting approximately Rs 190 million from upper-income housing to low-income housing (Marga Institute, 1976,249).

This proposal for an effective and radical ‘basic needs’ strategy would involve a change in character and function of the SriLankan state and its housing policy. It also shows that the ‘housing question’ is not a question of lack of funds or of national wealth but of unequal distribution in capitalist societies, especially in underdeveloped countries with their wide social disparities.

But without changes in the social conditions of work and in the modes of consumption of social wealth an ‘equalizing’ housing policy cannot be created. The improved organization of the present housing projects for the poor, the introduc- tion of cheaper, more appropriate technologies, etc. will not create the solution by themselves.

22 For new figures on the costs of the latest city developments in Colombo see Silva (1980, 14).


As long as the capitalist mode of production continues to exist, it is folly to hope for an isolated settlement of the housing question affecting the lot of the workers. The solution lies in the abolition of the capitalist mode of production and the appropriation of the means of subsistence and the instruments of labour by the working class itself (Engels, edn 1975,74).

But the future prospects for the poor in Colombo will not be the collective fulfd- ment of basic needs via the collective consumption of all goods and services produced but rather the lowest income groups and marginalized workers will continue to be forced to rely on the market forces which generated their poverty and are responsible for their bad housing. Work and income will continue to determine the qualities and quantities of clothing, nutrition and housing consumed. So the employment situation, the position of wage labour, of self-employment in the petty- commodity producing sectors or in petty trade, will characterize and define the housing situation of the poor.

Present conceptions of slum and shanty upgrading do not question these social conditions, but are embedded in them. The upgrading programmes, as we saw, will mainly help relatively better-off families, those which are in core sectors of the urban labour force. The hoped for ‘better’ housing policy and cheaper housing schemes, the attempts to reform the instruments of housing policy, to mobilize new private resources (through self-help construction and increased investment and saving) are shattered by the social reality of Sri Lanka - by the poor prospects for the urban labour force in particular. And the solution to the housing question has come no nearer.

IV Postscript

Government land in selected areas is to be given on lease to shanty dwellers who have already built their dwellings on them.

Prime Minister R. Premadasa, the Minister of Local Government, Housing and Con- struction, in making this recommendation to Cabinet, said studies had revealed that shanty dwellers did not wish to make improvements 10 their dwellings even when they could because they had no right to the lands. This held up the development and the provision of sanitation to the dwellings.

He said it was believed that if shanty d.wellers could be given lease agreements to the lands on which their dwellings were built the majority of them would invest in improving their shanties.

The projects selected for such lease agreements to be given were: Kolonnawa - 310 families; Henamulla - 656 families; Wanathamulla - 658 families; Summit Pura - 526 families; Kirillapone - 343 families; Aluthmawatha - 125 families and Vystwyke Road - 52 families (‘Leases for shanty dwellers’, Ceylon Daily News, Colombo, 19 March 1981).

On 18 March 1981 the Cabinet made the above quoted decision, increasing the prospects for more successful shanty upgrading. This decision to give leases to the bulk of the shanty dwellers who are involved in the upgrading schemes is a positive step. But before malung any fmal judgement we must wait to see the real impact it makes on the upgrading process. As the land to be leased is state or municipal land it was a r.,ther ‘easy’ political decision which will not create heavy costs or losses


(only in as much as these lands can no longer be put to more profitable uses!). As time goes by we will see whether this positive decision was a single, isolated and non-repeatable act to boost ‘showcase’ upgrading programmes which are receiving special recognition from several aid givers.

It is also unclear what the public reaction will be. The shanty population affected will praise the government for its generosity. Other shanty dwellers or would-be squatters might be encouraged to demand similar benefits or might start new squats with the objective of gaining such leases. The landed property owners of Colombo might oppose these ‘shanty crooks’ receiving such recognition and object to further decisions of this kind. What is surprising is that the cabinet agreed to this Urban Development Authority proposal very quickly (only two months after it was re- quested) but perhaps such a decision could also be withdrawn just as quickly.

V References

Balakrishnan, N. 1980: Economic policies and trends in Sri Lanka. The Asian Suwey 20 (9), 89 1-902. Berkeley.

Bulankulame, P. S. W., Dias, E. and Joachim, M. E. 1978: City of Colombo, Sri Lanka: the integration of squatters into the mainstream of urban life. In The role of housing in promoting social integration, New York: United Nations.

Centre for Society and Religion, editor, 1979: Employment policy and labour relations. Present trends in Sri Lanka, supplement 5, dossier 60. Colombo.

Chenery, H. et al. 1974: Redistribution with growth. Oxford. Colombo Master Plan Project 1977: Slum upgrading. Colombo.

1978a: Shanty upgrading. Colombo. 1978b: A summary of the proposed development plan. Colombo.

Dousa, J., Lankatillake, L., Rote, R. and Sandhofer, K. 1976: Housing policy paper

Dwyer, D. J. 1975: People and housing in the third world cities. London and New

Economic Review 1976: Flats as a ‘solution’ to the housing problem. Economic

Engels, F. edn 1975 : The housing question. Moscow. Eyers, €I. -D. 1975: Urban expansion andlandownership in underdeveloped societies.

Urban Affairs Quarter& 11, 117-29. Fleury, J. -M 1979: The poor create tomorrow’s cities. The IDRCReporrs 8,3-6.

Ottawa. Grimes, 0. F. Jr 1976: Housing for low income urban families. Baltimore, Mary-

land: World Bank. Hill, M. and Kahawita,E. 1979: Sri Lanka -Neokolonialer Stuetzpunkt im Indischen

Ozean. In Bkzetter des iz3w no. 75, p. 19ff. Freiburg. International Technical Assistance (Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

of the Netherlands) 1978: Slum upgradingand shanty improvement. The Hague.

(with emphasis on slums and shanties). Colombo: CMPP.

York.

Review 2 (August) Colombo.


Jaycox, E. 1980: The bank and urban poverty. In The WorldBankand the world’s poorest, Washington: World Bank, 7-10. Also in Economic Review (1978) 4 (Sept/October), 8-10. Colombo.

Joachim, M. E. 1978: Wanted: 100 000 houses annually. In Housing - a Daily Mirror survey to mark the first anniversary of the government, Daily Mirror, Colombo, 22 July 1978.

Kingsley, G. T. 1978: A review of Sri Lanka’s housing problems and policies. Colombo, CMPP.

Koenigsberger, 0. 1963 : Action planning. Architectural Association Journal. London.

Mabogunje, A. L., Hardoy, J . E. and Misra, R. P. 1978: Shelterprovision indevelop ing countries. Chichester and New York: Wiley.

Marga Institute 1976: Housing in Sri Lanka. Colombo. Marx, K. edn 1954: Capital, volume I. Moscow. Ministry of Industries, Housing and Social Services 1954: Housing policy of the

Ministry of Housing (Ceylon). Colombo. Ministry of Local Government, Housing and Construction 1978: Sector paper (final

draft), Housing, water supply, local government, construction. Colombo, 10 February 1978.

National Science Council 1976: Colombo shanty housing. Seminar Papers, Katu- bedda/Moratuwa, 8 May 1976.

Payne, G. K. 1977: Urban housing in the third world. London and Boston. Perera, N. B. 1973: Report of the survey of shanties in the City o f Colombo.

Ponnambalam, S. 1980: Sri Lanka: the economics of capitulation. Race and Class

Quijano, A. 1974: The marginal pole of the economy and the marginalized labour

Radampola, J. and Selvarajah, E. 1977: A community redevelopment programme

Rodell, M. J. 1978: Slums and shanties: a study of housing and policy in Sr i Lanka

SchulteSasse, J . and Steinberg, F. 1977: Verstaedterung und Wohnungsbau in Sri

Silva, G. K. K. S. de 1980: Financing city development. Economic Development

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22(2), 120-28.

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6(2). Colombo.

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1976b: Housing policy guidelines for developing countries. New York. Urban Development Authority 1979a: Policy paper, slum and shanty upgrading.

Colombo Municipal Council, 18 September 1979. 1979b: Shelteringmy future. Colombo, June 1979.

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L‘auteur de cet article analyse l’hypothkse selon laquelle les programmes du genre ‘sites et services’, ceux de ‘self-help’ assist&s, etc., vont pouvoir satisfaire les besoins en logements de la population pauvre des villes dans un proche avenk. Aprks un aperqu des tendances de la politique du logement au Sri Lanka, l’auteur se lance dans une description critique des premiers programmes d’amknagement des taudis et des bidonvilles. Les conclusions de cette premi$re bvaluation des programmes-pilotes d’ambnagement des taudis et des bidonvilles de Colombo sont que les programmes sont plutbt coQtex et ont pour cons6quences a) l’expulsion des habitants de ces taudis et bidonvilles, une fois ceuxci arnhnaghs, k cause de l’augmentation des paiements mensuels, b) le besoin de subventions trks importantes pour l’exbcution de ces programmes et c) l’impossibilit6 de les rbp6ter sur une plus grande envergure et avec une grande participation financikre de la part des habitants.

L’amklioration des taudis et des bidonvilles ne permet pas de changer le milieu social du secteur du logement ni d’bliminer les forces du march6 qui dbfinissent la qualit6 de vie des pauvres. L’Etat doit intervenir et redistribuer les ressources en logement existantes afin d’offrir la possibilit6 d’un logement de quanit6 minimale pour tous. Les ressources qui permettraient de mettre sur pied un tel programme existent mais sont consacrbes h des constructions trop coliteuses.

On est encore loin d’une solution au problhme du logement. Les spectres de la pauvretb et de l’insbcurit6 continuent de hanter la main d’oeuvre urbaine et plus particuli6rement les pauvres des villes.

Der Artikel behandelt die Hypothese, da5 politische Programme wie ‘Baustellen und Dien- stleistungen’, unterstiizte Selbsthilfeprogramme usw. den Wohnanforderungen der armeren Stadtbevolkerung in der nahen Zukunft geniigen werden. Nach einem kurzen Uberblick der Wohnpolitiktendenzen in Sri Lanka, richtet der Artikel sein Hauptaugenmerk auf eine kritische Betrachtung der ersten Slumverbesserungsplane. Die Schldfolgerungen dieser ersten Bewertung des Slumverbesserungspilotprojekts fur Colombo zeigen, da5 die Plane verhaltnismaig teuer sind und zu a) einer Vertreibung vormaliger Slumbewohner aufgnmd erhohter Monatsmieten, b) der Verwirklichung dieser P l h e mit extrem hohen Subventionen und c) einem Mange1 an Wiederholung der Aktionen auf breiterer Basis und mit grol3erer finazieller Teilnahme der Bewohner fiihren. Slumverbesserungen andern nicht den sozialen Hintergrund des Wohnung- ssektors oder schaffen KrSte, die die Lebensqualitat der a m e n Bevolkerung bestimmen. Der Staat m d intervenieren und vorhandene Wohnungen umverteilen, um einer Minimal- behausung fur alle eine Chance zu geben. Die Quellen zur Etablierung eines solchen Programmes existieren, werden aber in kostspielige Konstruktionen gesteckt.

Man ist einer Losung des Wohnungsproblems noch nicht nfiergekommen. Die Aussichten fiir die stiidtischen Arbeiter und besonders fur die stadtischen Armen sind immer noch Armut und Unsicherheit.


El artfculo trata de la hipdtesis que politicas como las de proyectos de ‘emplazamietos y servicios’, programas de esfuerzos propios con ayuda, etc. satisfardn las necesidades de vivienda de 10s probres urbanos en un futuro prdximo. Despuks de un breve examen de la tendencia de la politica sobre viviendas en Sri Lanka, el artfculo se dedica a una descripcidn crftica de 10s primeros programas de mejoras de 10s barrios pobres y casuchas. Las primeras conclusiones de esta primera evaluacdn de un proyecto piloto para mejorar 10s barrios pobres de Colombo son que 10s programas son algo caros de manera que tienen como resultado a) la expulsidn de 10s antiguos habitantes del barrio, debido al aumento en 10s pagos mensuales, b) la realizacidn de proyectos con extremadamente elevadas subvenciones, c) la falta de replicabilidad a una escala mayor y con una amplia participacidn econdmica por parte de 10s habitantes.

La mejora de 10s barrios pobres no cambiard el fondo social del sector de la vivienda ni eliminard las fuerzas del mercado que determinan la calidad de la vida de 10s pobres. El estado tiene que intervenir para redistribuir 10s recursos de vivienda existentes y proveer la oporrunidad de una vivienda minima para todo el mundo. Los recursos para establecer tal programa existen, per0 se gastan en construccidn de elevado costo.

No se estd mils cerca a una solucidn de la cuestidn de la vivienda. Las perspectivas para la mano de obra urbana y especialmente para 10s pobres urbanos a h son las de la pobreza y falta de seguridad.

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Slum and shanty upgrading in Colombo: a help for the urban poor?

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