Smith, Michael - The Moral Problem, Chapters 3,6

7/29/2019 Smith, Michael - The Moral Problem, Chapters 3,6

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The ExternalistChallenge

3. I INTERNAI- ISM VS. EXTL,RNALISMSuppose we debate the pros and cons of g iv inu to faminc re l ie fan d yotr convince me that I shotrlcl give. Flowever rvhen the oc-casiorr arises or me to hancl over my rnonev l szrr'Bu t wait! I know| .shoulrl iv e to famine rel ief . But yo u haven't convinced n're ha tI l ravc ny reeson o do so! 'And so I don' t .I strtlsestedearl ier that suclt an cltrtblrrstwould occirsion sericlr.rspuzzlenrr:nt. Having convinced mer that I shciulcl give to fanrinere ie 'v


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62 'l'he Extemalist ChallrngeIf i t is rieht irr asents to Q in circumstatrcesO, thcn there is areas()n ir r those agents o Q in O.

In othcr w()rds, rnoral cts are cts about ()Llr easons fo r action:ttre!' ar e l l 'remselvessirnply reqrrire rn ent s () f rati()nal i t! ' rl r reAson.-rhis last nternalist clairn rnigl 'rt bc oIred as an explanation .fth e previous ()ne, br i t p lausib lv ent i r i ls th c previous cla i rn. Th eproof o ' th is rv i l l be spel led out in sornc dcta i l la ter (chaptcr I ' r ) ,brr t in general terms the idea ca n be prr t l ike th is. I t is a prat i t r rc lethat an agent ha s a reason to act in a c:crtir in wav.just ir-r as e sh ewould be motivated to act in that wa y i' shc werc rational(Korsgaarcl , 986). An d i t is a conseqrence . l ' th is p lat i tucle thatan agent who.judges herself to have a reason t( ) act in a certain wa y- who.judges that she would be so rnotivated if sh e were rational- is practical lv irrational if she is not motivated to ac t accordingl l ' .Fo r if she is not motivated accordingly then she fai ls to be rationarbv her ow n l ights (Srni th, 1992). But i f th is is r isht then i t is c learthat the thircl i rrrn o' internal ism entai ls th e seconcl. For. accord-in g to thc th i rd brm, th e judgement that i t is r isht ro acr in ace ta in rvay s si rnply equivalent ro the. judgement that there is areason to act in that way.The reverse does not hold, however. Th e sec


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64 'fhe lixtentalist Challcngei t is Mackic 's appreciat ion o ' th is cl is t inct ion that a l lows him roargue br his 'crror theorv': the view that al l moral thought andta lk is in fcted wi th an error o-prcsupposi t ion; the presupposi -tion that the world cotrtains obje


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'I'he llxtem rr'listChullense 6766 'l'he Lxlenrctlist ChallengeIt is thus ratiorral ism as a conceptrral claim that is to be at issuein the present chapterr , not rat ional ism as a substant ive cla im.Rationalism as a substantive clairn wil l come up fcrr discussion inl irtcr ctrapters, brrt fral considerat ions and remains unmoved.' I 'hc . . . I r lendcr of the pract ical i ty requirement] . . . must dis-rn i ss hc arr ror-u l i s t ha l lenge as incoherent . . . We ma y th ink thatthe arr roru l i s t< 'hu l l t ' r rge s coherent , but th i s can on ly be becauserv c coni rse rnor:rl s t 'nseso ' terrns and ' inverted commas' sensesof 't h o s e s a n re c rn l s . . . Th r rs . . . a l )p a re n t a m c l ra l i s t s . . . e m a i n u n -moved, not by n'hat they regard as moral considerat ions, but onlyb1 'what ot l lers regard as rnori r l considerat ions.T h e p r o b l e n r . . . i s t h a t . . . f t h i s ] . . . d o e s n o t t a k e t h earnoral is t 's chal lenge seriously enough . . . We ca n imagine some-one who regards certain demands as moral demands - an d no ts imply ' as conventional moral demands - and yet remainstrnrnoved . . . [ I f ] . . . we are to take the amoral is t chal lenge seri -ouslv, we nrust attempt to explain why the amoral is t should careabour moral i ty . (1986: 30 )

Brink's argument s simpleenough.According to defenders of the practicality requirement, it issupposed o be a conceptual truth that agentswho make moraljudgementsare motivatedaccordingly,at Ieastabsentweakncss ) 'wi l l ancl he ike. But ar iom this being a conceptual rtr th, t isn't

any sort of truth at all. FOramoralists ls enroral tel'nrs o pit'k otttt h e v e r y s a m e p r o p e r t i c s w c p i c k < l u t w h e n w e t t s e n l < l r l r l t c t . l l l s 'Their tisecr fmoral terms lt)ay ht : cforc be reliablyguidecl lv tht'nroral facts in tlre sanrt' \\,i l\,as ()lrr tlses of thtlse terrns. [Jttlarnoralists lier iom trs n ttrat thcv see no reas()nat al l to rl rwhat thel- thtrs uke to llc trrtlrallv required' In ottrer lvorcls'amoralists nake moral itrclucrrlertts ithout being motivated ac -cordinglr', ancl withotrt sttIrins ionl anv sort of practical ir -rationaityeither. Th e prac'ticalit ' equirement is thus false.As Brink notes,cleftl.clers 'the requirentetlt ha'e gerreralll 'no t responcleclo this challengebv boldly denying that am


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68 TheExtemalist Chaltcngethe requirement. For the requirement tells us that those wh ojudge it right to Q are motivatedaccordingly,absenrweakness fwill, no t that thosewhojudge is right' to q u. " motivatedaccord-ingly,absentweakness f will.No w Brink thinks that this i.vcrtecr commas responsedoesn'ttake he amoralistchallenge scri'usly' enough. An d I must con-fess hat I share his misgivings, at least as regards the details ofHare's version of the response.For, as Brink points out, thereseems o be nothing incoherent abo.t th e ide of an amoralistwho claims to have special nsight inro what is reailv ight an dwrong; an amoralistwhose udgements abour what it is ,igt t arrawrong to do are therefore,evenby her own rights,ou t of li lre withth e udgements of orhers.Bur if this s right, i 'ren he ucrgemenrsof amoralisrs an hardly be thought of ai judge-e.,ts-ubJut whatother people udge to be right and wrong.Despite these misgivings, however, I itrlnt< that the invertedcommas esponse o the amoralist challenge s along exactly heright lines. n what follows wanr rherefore o givea ri o part replyto Brink. First I will saywhat the inverted o-L., ."rpo.,r" ."ilyamounts to; how it differs from what Hare says.And second I willsa ywhy defendersof th e requirement are right to think that th erequirement is a conceptual truth.

3. 4 REPLY TO BRINK'S CLAIM THATAMORALISTS REALI-Y MAKE MORALJUDGEMENTS

As I see t, defendersof the practicaliry equiremenr are right tosay that amoralisrs do nor reaily make mral judgementsl trreysimplygo wrong in trying ro sa ymore rhan ttris. n1 point is no tthat amoralists eallymake udgements of someother Lind: aboutwhatother people udge to be right and wrong, fo r example.Thepoint is rather that the uerybestwean sayabout amoralisis s thatthey try to make moral judgements but fail. In orcler to seewhythis is not ad oc, onsider an analogy.There is a familiar problem aboui th e conditions .ncler whi


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70 'l'lp lixtr,ntntist Chalkngc()nc sic l t s: ivs ha t a subject h:rs nrastery o 'co lour terms (moralterrns), ancl thtrs real l t ' makes colorrr . j t rc lgernents moral judge_rrr .nts) , .n lv i , r r 'der cert :r i . r ' . . r l i t i ' .s , being in the psycotogi -cal_state ha t we cxpress rvhe r wt ' rr 'rke cor'u..1.,crger.rntslmorar. i r rc luerrre.ts) nta i ls tra ' i r rq ^. l lppr()pr- ia te isual exper ience (mo-t i ' i r t i .n) . Th e othc'r s ic lc cr . ' i t 's th is holc l ing insiead that theabi l in ' to .s e a terrn whrse rrse s rr . l iabh 'cxpla ined bv the relevantpr.pe.t ies of ' .b jects is crr . t rsh r. r r . r 'c l i the r wi th masten, o 'c,lorrr tcrrns (r'.ral ternrs) .'cl thc: abi l i tv real l l , to make ..,io,.,.. j r rdecrncnts (rnora l jucleerncnts) I lavi r rq th e appropr iate visualexpe. ience (rn.t i 'a t i r . ) ' .der appr.pr ia tc co.c l i t ions is an en -t i re lv c.. t i .sent, an d optic lnar,cxtra. Th e clebate s a real o.e, sohorv itre rv e to decicle lvho wins?Ir 'asi re so 'co.e objcct i ru that th .se wh's.y that the capaci tyto have ccrt:rin visuarlexperiences is partial lv consti tutive of mas-tcn o col . t r r tern ls d. no t take 'ser i . t rs ly ' encl trgh he chal lengep


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'f he Extentalist Challznge l-heExtunalist ChalbngeMoreover, and importantly, note that defenders o-the reqtrire-ment ar e in a position to insist that what an agent is thus tn


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74 The Extentalist Challenge 7'he Extentalist Challen ge 75ment - since t wasjus_twholly contingent ancl ationallyoptionalextra - so the mere fact that I have ound reason to change myj_.dgementgivesme no reasor . change hi s motive. may there-bre quite rationally contintre to be have a desire to vote fo r thelibcrtarians; hough of course I wourd have to juctge that in sodoing I arn modvated to do something that t nwj"udgewrong.Having a nonderivative concern . r liberatarian"vaes while.iudging t right ro vote fo r the libertarians s thus nor whar makesme a good person.Fo r it cannot explai. wh ' I cha.ge my motiva-tion when I change my udgement-what this forces he strong externalist . admit is that, on theirwa vof seeing hings, the motive in virtue of which I am to countas a good person must have a content capable f explaining norjust why I am motivated to vote fo r the libertarianswhen I judgeit right to vote fo r the ribertarians,bur arso whv I stop beigmotivated o vore fo r the liberraria.s when I give up udgi.rg ttatit is right ro do so.And th e onry motivationaiconttit cJpaue orplaying this role, ir seems o me, is a rnotivation to do tire rightthing, where this s now read de dictoandno t de e. Atbottom, th estrong externalist will have o say,having this selconciouslymoralnrotive s rvhatmakesme a good p"rro.'N


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/l ) I'he Exte.ntalis Chalkngepartial values ike love ancl i ienclship. For the objection in thiscase s simply that, in taking it that a good person s motivated odo what she believes ight, whcrc this s readdedictoand.no t de e,externalists to o providc th(' nrorally good person with 'onethought too man)". Thcv alit:nate her from the ends at whichmorality properly airns..|uslas it is consrirutiveof being a goodlover that you havedirt'r't ('()nccrn br th e personyou love,so t isconstitutiveof being a rn


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/ 'l'he lixtemalist Challengepla ins th is cl is t i .cr i . . lr ' t 'xunrp le ( lg7z: 159). Suppose a ma nwarl ts o go honre and i r r o l r i r . r to


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80 The ixtematist Chaltzngenecessarilynvolveany such thing' (lgz2:162). According to Foot,we should therefore re.ject he rationalists'claim that noral re -quirements hemselves rovide us with reasons or action.Bu t what should we say nsteacl? oo t suggestsha t th e analogywith etiquettegoes all th c way clown. n her view moral factsare,like facts about what ctiqtrette requires of us , institutionalfacts(Foot, 1977). This explai.s why both sorts of requiremenr arecategoricaln th e unc()ntr()versialense. or someone allswithinthe scopeof an instituti ' 'al n()rn simply n virtue of the circum-stancesn which she fincls rcrs.lf; he r falling within th e scopeofthe institutional norm is in .' way conditional .pon th e desiresthat she happens,conringenrly, . incl herselfwith in those cir-cumstances.And it thereirrc als. cxplains why neither sort ofrequirement is a requirement .'re:rs.n or rationaliry.For some-one who al lswi th in hc sc.pc , l r . i r rs t i tu t ionalo rm requi r ingher to act n a certairrwaymayor nlay .t havea desire ha t woulcrbc satisf ied y he r acting n that way.In what follows want to begin by nraki.g some remarksaboutFoot'sown positiveviewabout the nature ''moral req.irements,her view hat there is a substantialancl ilurninating unulogy o b.found between moral requirements on the one-hand, ncl .e _quirementsof etiquette on the other. In my view, once we spellou t the analogy t becomesevident that it breaksdown in cerrainfundamental respects.The upshot is that we must reject Foot'sview that moral facrsar e a kind of institurional fact. I will thenconsider in some detail he r argument against th e rationalists'conceptualclaim.

3. 7 REPLY TO FOOT'S CLAIM THATMORALITY AND ETIQUETTE AREANALOGOUS

Foot does no t tell us how exactlywe should work ou t the insti-tttti.nal account of morality in detair, but it is reasonabie r< rassurneha t it should be worked ou t along th e l ines o. I . L. A.l lart 's acc().nt .f legal rules ( l96l). Fo r H:rrt 's s group included - whether or not she s motivated to act in:r tc'ordancewith her beliefsabout what the norms require.It bllows that it is therefore possible or someone to believetlurt tht 'rc existsan insitut ionalnorm requir ing he r to act in a

8 l


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82 'l'heLxtnnalist Challengecert i r in wa v wi t l rout bc' ing r)rot ivated o act acr:ord inely. NO t onlythat, i t is a ls. p.ssib lc t l rar hcr lack of mor ivat ion signals no tpract ica l i r rat ional i t \ ' , brrr pr in


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84 'l-\rclixtemati.st Chatbngejudgements as subjecr r() rhe pracricaliry requirement. Bu t ifthis is right then it foll.ws thar we must rejecr the institutionalaccountof moral requirement.s. oot'sown favoured orm of anti-rationalisnr s thus a n()n-starter. here is no illuminating analogyto be found betwet'n rtoral i tv nd etiquette.

3. 8 RH,PLY 1' O FOOT'S OBJECTION TOTH E RAT'IONAI,IS-I 'S' CONCEPTUAL CI-AIMso ar I have ilctrscd


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U6 'fhe lixtentatist ChallengeFo r th e argument to work, th e premise ha s to be interprt'tecl inthe former wav; but, i t mighr be saic l , or th e prern ise to be tr-r re rha s to be interpretecl in thc: l irtter way. However I think that thisis just a mistake. Th c prcrn ise is tnre when we interpret th ecla im that we expecr rat i ' t l r t , i rj rrclgen-rentss true. An d that means, in turn, that rve takc it thlrt rvt'can ul t at leaston e of A's ancl B's judgements ionr tht ' r . l r r iorr ;r lpo in t o l ' r ' i ew , i r r i t i s fa l se .B u t i f t h i s s r i gh r r l r cn i r i r l l o r rs l r r r r .i t r s t rs l r t ' a rg r r rnen t ays , c d o i n a c t e x [ ) ( ' ( ' t r t l i t t t t r t l . , r g < ' l r r s( ) l ( )

'l'he Exteruralist Challenge 87rvhat they are moral ly required to do, no t just what thev juclgethernselves o be nroral lv reqtrire d to do. Fo r we can and do expectlational agents to judge tntly;we expect them to conae'rgen theirj r rdeements about what i t is r ight to c lo. Ou r concept of a moralrequirement thus tu'ns ()ut to be th e concept of a categoricalrequi rement of rat i< lnal i tyater a l l .

Incleecl , o the extcnt that we do not expect an agent to do ther ght th ing, btr t perhaps onlv what sh e bel ieves o be r ight, i t ca nrrow be seen that otu ' l t 'sscr expectat ion ref lects our v iew of thelrlentas to some exter)t irrational; as someone who fai ls to l ive upto the reqtr i rements o ' reason t


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BB The Extentalist Challengewho clo the wrong thing. But, as I wil l now go on to argue, suchatti tudes themselves preslrppose th c legitimacy o ou r expectationthat rational people wil l act rightl l ' , and so, in turn, presupposeth e t ru th o f the rat ional ists ' c()nceptual c la i r r t .In order to seewhy this is so, we need to remind ourselves of th edifference between approval and cl isapproval on th e on e l-rand,and mere l ik ing ancld is l ik ing ( )n th e other. Foot hersel f rnakes hefol lowing remarks about th e dircnce.

What anyone can want or l ikc is t)()t cstricted. ogical lyspeaking,by factsabout hi s relationship o ()th('rpt'ople,as br instance hathe is a fi- iendor a parent of onc, arrtlcngaged n a.joint ent e prisewith another. Such facts can, howcver, create possibi l i t ies f'ap-prt>vingand disapprovir.rghat worrld otl tcrwise not exist. (Foot,1977:194)In other words, whereas we can l ike ancl disl ike more or less whatwe please, we cannot jtrst approvc atrd disapprove o what weplease. Certain relationships tretween those wh o approve or disap-pro\/e on th e on e hand, and those who are approved or disap-proved of on the other, are presupposed by th e atti tudes ofapproval ancl disapproval.

[T ] he atti tudes of approval irnd disapprovalwould nol be whatthey are without th e existenceof tacit agreementon the questionof wh o l istens o whom and about what. (Foot, 1977:198)[A]pproval and disapprovalcan, logical ly speaking,exist onlyagainst a backgrotrnd of agreement about the part that otherpeople'sviews hall be given n decisionnraking. (Foot, 1977:199)Thus, according to Foot, i t makes sense o say hat I disapprove ofyour behaviour clnly if we presuppose that you are to take accountof that fact in deciding what to do . But in order fo r i t to makesense hat I merely disl ike your behaviour, we need to presupposeno such thing. Consider an example by way of i l lustration.Suppose you eat peppermint ice-cream, and that I just can'tstand i t when people clo that. What would i t be appropriate f


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90 'l'lte lixtentalist Chattenge'i .ttre of what a. c tht'* ' c'mrrr'.1\., ackn'wleclgecl standards bywhich thei r c lecis i ( )nsl r ( , to bc. j r rc lgecl?. N . te ho w irnplarrs i l l r t ' t w.rr rcrbe t ' s trppose ha t what groundsthe lesi t imacy o ' t l r is ( 'x l ) ( . ( ' t . t i ( ) r r s th e faci that rat ional . . .n , . , . " ,ha 'e each enter( :d i . t . l r r r aur-( 'er lent to ac t morai ly , an agree-rnc.t on : r pa r wi th {ht ' l rgr '< '< ' ' t ' . ( he chessplayer ei thcr taci t ly orexp l i c i t l y en te rs n t< lb ' l r t ' < ' r . r i ' r s : r m e r n b e r . f a c h e s s l 'b . Forn< l suclt arrccrl lents lr:rvt' 'r,t,r ' cc n rnacle perhaps we should sa vinslead that what gr. l r r r


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How to Solve the Moral Problem

6.1 AN ANAI,YSIS OF' RIGHTNESS INTERMS OF FACTS ABOUT OUR

NORMATIVE REASONSWe saic l ha t an analysis of ' r ightness nrust captrrrc var i


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184 How to Solue heMmaI Probbmthe moral. These are platitudes like 'Right acts are often con-cerned o promote or sustainor contribute in someway o humanflourishing', 'Right acts are in some wayexpressive f equal con-cern and respect',and the like (chapter2) . Theseplatitudesneednot and should no t be thotrght of as fixing a unique content orsubstance or moral reasonsall by themselves,ather they simplyserve o tell us when we are in the ballpark of moral reasons,asopposed o the ballpark of non-moral reasons Dreier 1990). t istheseplatitudes about substance ha t need to be added in andcaptured f we are to turn our analysis f normative reasons uitegenerally nto an analysis f rightness n particular.My suggestion hen, in schematic orm at least, s that our Q-ingin circumstancesC is right if and only if we would desire hat weQ in C, if we were fully rational, whereQ-ing in C is an act of theaffropriate substantiae ind: that is, it is an act of the kind pickedout in the platitudes about substance.There is clearly furtherwork to be done here in il l ing out this idea of an 'appropriatesubstantive ind' in detail, but th e schematic orm of the analysiswill sufice for our purposes.

6.2 THE SOLUTION TO THEMORAL PROBLEM

We no w have a solution to the moral problem at hand. That is , wecan now explain why the fol lowing three propositions:I Moral udgements of the form 'I t is right that I $' expressa subject'sbeliefs about an objective matter of fact, a fact about what it is right

for her to do.2 If someone udges that it is right that she Qs then, cetnis aibut sheis motivated to Q.3 An agent is motivated tr-r ct in a certain wayjust in case she has anapprut ar r r>bject ivematter of fact. For ou r moraljudgernents ar c ('xprcssior.tso['our bel iefs about what we h:rvenormative rc l rs() n () rkr , r+l t t ' resuch rcasons are in tr r r l l categor i -

ca l requi renlents o ' ra t ional i ty . (1 ) is thus true. Moreover, aswe have seen, srrch bt' l i r ' .s clo indeed connect with motivationin the manner ol (2) . And, again as we have seen, thei r doingso does not in any wav r'orrtponrise the claim that motivation is tobe expla ined in [{ r r r r )e2rn crn)s; that is, in terms of bel ie ' ancldesi re, wherc bcl ic 'an


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18 6 Hout to Solae the Moral ProbkmAnd this argument is, in turn, broadlv naturalistic in tw


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lB8 How to Solae he Moral Probl"emAnd don't such disagreements onstituteprofound obstacleso aconvergence n our desires n fact emeruing?This is true, but itdoes not count against he force of the argument. ndeed, oncewe remember the following three points, suchdisaereements anbe seen o add to the force of the argurnent.Fi;X, we must remember that alongsidesuch entrenchecldisa-grements as we in f,act ind we also incl massiveareasof en-trenchedagreement.As I see t, this s the real significanceof thefact that we have and us e the so-called thick' moral concepts,concepts that at once both describe some naturalistic state ofaffairsan d positivelyor negativelyevaluate t: c


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1 90 Hou to .Sohrehe Lloral ProhlentHume's Objection

Perhaps th e most fmorrs 'bjec'tion to rationirl ism is t< l bc ounclin the fol lowing passagc iorn Ilrrrne's 'l 'rertti .se.In everysystem f rnoral i tv vhich I lr irvchitlrt 'rto rnet rvith, lravealwavs emarked ha t thc aut l l ( ) r pr ' 'cee


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192 How lo Solae the Mmal ProblrmFor, again,since he secondpremise s a necessaryruth it too ca nbc 'omitted without affecting th e argument's validity. Bu t in thatcase t follows that the first premise entails the conclusionall byitself. For the first premise cannot be true an d the conclusionfalse.We have herefore derived an 'ought' from an 'is'.There is , of course, a point of disanalogybetween the rwoarguments us t given, and it is worthwhile making this explicit.Whereas, n th e moral case, he secondpremise of the argumentis not just necessary, ut also knowable a priori, the secondpremise of the argument in the colour case though necessary,sitself only knowable a posterimi.However this feature of disanalogyshould not hide the more striking features of analogy alreaclymentioned. For in neither case s the second premisea matter ofdefinitional equivalence.Knowledgeof the secondpremiseof theargument in the moral case equiressubstantivework in the formof reflection on which of our desireswould sunrivea processofreflectiveequilibrium, and even f this s a relativelya priorienrer-prise, unlike the attempt to discover a posteioriwhich surfacereflectanceproperties of objects cause he appropriate visual ex-periences, t is arguablyjustas difficult and problematic, perhapseven nore so .This is why the truth of the entailment clairncomesassur:h rstrrprisen both cases.Not everyorre villbe entirely h^ppy with this explanationof thetransition from 'is' to 'ought'. Barry Stroud, fo r example, ells usthat Hume's real concern in the famous is-ought' passages thatthough we

. . . undoubteclly o make transitions rom beliefsabout the waythingsare to th e udgement hat thingsought to be a certainway . . f we understandhe peculiar atureof theseconclusions'- i f we recognize heir'active' or motivational force - we see hatthe transitionsby which they are reached ar e no t ones hat reasondetermines us to make. Once we come to have certain belief s aboutthe way things are, then, because of natural human dispositionswe come to feel certain sentiments which we express in moraljudgernents. 1977:187)Bu t th e previous discussion suffices to show why, if this wa sHume's concern, i t too can be laid to rest.

Th e act ive or rrro( iva l ional force of an 'ought ' - l t r t lg t 'n t( ' t l t lscapturecl by tht ' PI 'a( ' ( i ( ' i t l i tyequi remcnt on moral j t tc lgerrr t ' r l t : an agentjuclges iSrr t ur) 2r( ' ts r igSt then ei ther sh e is nrot iv^ t t ' r l rto.t u"...r.i.gly .r - s5t' is 'r irti


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t9.1 Hozu to Sohte \he LIorul ProblemF()( ) t 's ob jec t i< t r t herc i s , i n e c t , th : r t there is n< l rv i ry o ' l -a r i ( )n -i r l l v c r i t i c i z inq the c les i rcs o ' thosc rvh cjc r : t mr>ra l i t l ' , so thera t iona l i s t who so l t t t i s rn ' - in a s inr i l i r r vc in .

I f ] h c re a r e p c o p l e , s t r c h : r s t l r t ' s r r c i r r : r t i ona l oL rrnrcasonab le . t tccausc s t rch acor ts i c l c r ' : r t i on i rnp lv i s s r rch a re i l s ( )n a t rd indeec l i s : rn o l l ' i o r rsr ' ( '1 rs ( )n , bas i t l 'eas ()n ,no t ( )ne t l t : r t has to l tc c ler i vcd in s r l r r rccor t tP lcx \ \ 'a l t l ) f ( )ugh ar ' ( i r r )c easorr i r r t t .B t r t therr it rnus t be ir -l l t t i ona l ( ) l 'a t l ( ' i rs t rnreAson: rb le i r r - ht : r ' r i rn in i r l l ) ( ) t t ( ) < ' i r l es rr - i c i t ' r r t l v u l to r r t o th t ' r -s , s in t '< ' l te c r i rn in : r l ' s l ack o ' concern i r ro t l t t ' r -s s uh l r t is r t 'sPons i l r l t ' i r r t t r t ' c r i r r r i na l 's r t ( ) t tak in t r th el i ke l ihooc l o l t i t tn t t ( ) an () r r ts i ( l ( ' r ' t ( ,) ( ' l r ( ' : l s ( )n rga i r rs t : r1 l r -o1t , rs t 'd( ( ) l l l s ( ' o l t t l i t l t t . . .The r-r ' la t iv ist 'st '1r lv () su( l i ln :r r 'u l l rncnts that, on un v plarrs-ib le chrtractcr iz l t t ior t ' r 'easonablcrrcssrr t l rnreasorrablcnerssorrat ional i tv rnr l i r r ' : r t iorra l i t t ' ) s l t ( ) t i ( ) l rs h i t t can bc pat ' t o thescierr t i ic () l l ( ' l ) t i ( ) l ) th t ' wor ld, lr eabsol rr t is t 'sla i rn s rrst u lse.Sonreorrc ar r >t ' ornplete l r a t ion:r l i t l rorr t el i r rg onccr-nrrr( lr ( 'spect i r r orr ts ic lers.1985:39-40)

In c ct, the n, b


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lgt i Hou to Sohte t.heL4oral Probkmtive reason to do. The successfirl crirninal thus seems to me tostrffer fiom the nll too comlnon vice of intellzctual rrroganrc. Heii ierefore does indeed strffer fronr a 'ai lure to consider or appre-ciate certa in argul rents ' , f i r r he doesn' t feel the force of argu-ments that cclnte frr [ I t r r r r t 'an, ( ' ( )n( 'cpt ion cl f pract ica l rat ional i ty . He hastwo fundarrr t 'n t :r l < ' i t i< ' isrns l' (h e rat ional ist 's concept ion. F i rst ,he objects th l r t t l r t ' r 'u t ional ist nrakes a l l the sante assumptionsabout prncti


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lgfl Hou to SoLuehe LIorol Probleman d anti - rat ional ist can agree abott t sonteth ing ftrndat lcnta l ,while yet sti l l cl isagreeing abortt sonethin{ fttndarncntal. Thcy'can both aJrceh:r t pract ica l rat ional i tv is to be def incd in termsof the uncontrovcrsia l procechrrcs ia which we- just i$ 'our desi re ;t l ' ra tonl ,v so ca n we charactcr ize rvhat f tr l l r i l t ional in 'cc insist s in .Each rnay therebre be said to accept a ' ref lect ivc equi l ibr ium'concep[ ion of pract ica l rat ional i t l ' . Rut thev st i l l d isagree abott tsomething fundamental becatrse hev r l isagree abott t the scopefor reasoned change in our desires r.' ia he process of relectiveeqtr i l ibr ium. The rat ional ist th inks that the existencc o ' reasonspresupposes that under concli tions of ful l rationali tv we wotrld al lhar,'e he same desires about what. we are to clo irt th e l 'aricl trscircumstances wc might ace; that absetrt such a c()nvergencc weshould say hat there are no reasons at al l . Arrd the anti-rationalistcl e ie s th is, c la inr ing instead that reasons n)ay exist even i f whatan)' particular agent would desire ttnder conditions of tr l l ration-a l i tv c lepcndscrucia l ly upon lvhat her actual desi reswere to beginwitlr. The rationalist thus accepts a non-relal iue eflective eqtri l i l>ri trrn conception of practical ratiotral i tr ' , whereas the anti-t 'ational-ist acccpts tr relatiue eflective equil ibrium conception of practicalrationalir '-. ()auther is there


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20 0 How to Sohte he Mornl ProblernBu t can Mackie real l l ' la y a charge o-strangeness against r ieht-ness, at least as that feature of acts ha s been analysed here? Itseems not.To s l t r tha t p e r f r r r n t i r t gan a t l o l a c t ' t ' t a i t ts ( ) r l i n ce r ta incircumstances is risht is, I have argtted, to sa y ntetal iu, that thereis a normative reason to perform it . An d this, in turn, is simply tosa y th:rt ful lv rational creatures would clesire that such an ac tbe perfcrrnrecl in such circuntst2ltlces,whet'e such a desire is ofth e zrppropriate substantive kind. () n this Accoltnt, moral aturesl ike r ightness thus simplv are no t 'ent i t ies or qual i t ies or re lat iouso 'a very strange s()r t ' ; no 'specia l facul ty


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909 How to Solae the Moral ProblzmFirst, the analysisallows us to solve the moral problem. For itgivesus a way of thinking about our moral beliefs as beliefs aboutan objective matter of fact, and it explains why these beliefs con-nect with motivation,bu t it does each of these hings while all thewhile taking it for granted that Hume was right that ourmotivations are to be explained in terms of beliefs and desires,where beliefs and desires are distinct existences.Second, theanalysisallows us to square morality with a broader naturalism.For it allowsus to seewhy the rightnessof an act us t is a naturalfeature that that act possesses.nd third, and finally, n conjunc-tion with some plausible assumptions about the p otential t hatmoral argument ha s to bring about agreernent, he analysis lsoallows us to think that our moral talk is in fact legitimate. For it isplausible to suppose hat through moral argument we can in factdiscover what the reasons hat we all share really are.At the beginning of this book I said hat, as see hings,debatein normative ethics is crucial for the final resolution o' meta-ethical questions. t should now be clear why I said his.For,given

the analysisof rightness argued for here, the -justifiability of ourcommitment to morality s tselfa hostage o the fortune of debatein normative ethics.As I see t we ar e ustified in thinking thatthere are moral facts, and so in engaging in ordinary moral de-bate,bu t ou r justification is defeasible, nd nray tself be defeatedby the outcome of thosevery debates. f we are interested n thefinal resolution of meta-ethical questions - in whether or notthere really are any moral facts - then it seems to me that wetherefore have ittle alternative but to engage n normative ethicaldebate and to see where the arguments tha t we give ultimatelylead us.

Notes

NO'I '},S 'T 0 (]HAPTER I WHAT IS THEMORAL PROBLEM?Crispin \A'right 11)92) nd Paul Horwich (1992) haveboth recentlyirrgued hut or r a rninimal theory of truth, we have no choice but toreg:rrtl rnorirl t ' l rr irns s apt for assessmentn terms of truth andfalsehood. they wcre right then, on the minimal theory of truth,we worrld havr: t


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204 ,\'ote^rsrrbj t 'c t rnntter o a nertural or a social s< ence. And seconcl ,note t t latrvhen 'n : r t r r ra l ' i s d t : f i ned in t l r i s wat ' , i t t r l rns ()u t tha t a n t r t r l ra lfezrture of th e world rnav () r rnav n()t be a ph1's ical eattrre (. fackson,1992: l f l l ) . A poss ib le wor ld in rvh ich there i r re c reaturcs rv i thccrtain psvc ings: rngels, i rr cxarnplc.A nat r r ra l i s t n e th ics thrrs n t ' t '< ln ( ) t l) c a phvs ica l i s t .2 Moore cxpresses hi s rc l r rc tarrce t ( ) p()s i t a pc rccptu r l acu lq ' ofrnr i ra l n t t r i i on in these terrns : l worr ld rv i sh t obscned that . whenI cal l r i t rch proposi t ions "lntui t ions". I me:rn nterc lv t() assert thatt l rev are i rrc 'apablc of proof; I inIh noth, inguthnln,n as to thr ,nunn?ror origin of ou r cowti t iort l them' (1903, x) .3 tor r l i .scrrss ion ' thc gencr' :r l r lucst i t>n vhcther rnoral f i 'atrrr-cs ar. 'elu n t 'xpl :rrratorl ' role see f{arrnan, 1977; Strrr.seon, l98l-r, 1986;Hartnar t , l 9 f |6 ; arrd , espc r . ' i a l l r ' , av rc - \ {c ( 'o rd , 1988.4 Note that though, i rccolding t() this st()n'. we know whic l t n ' . t turi t l{t 'at trrt ' .s r 'r ' iavt '()ur pr()- arrrl con-att i l rrdcs tt>rvards rr t}re basis o 'rnel t ' ref lcct ion, :rnd thotrgh lve ar c thcrcbv able to cxplai rr holv wcec l s ir n exprcss i ' , ' i s t , i sv i c r r 's rc i r r ac t ra t l l c r co tnp l i ca tcc l ( l 9 l l ). Ir r l t i s v i c r r rnora l . j t r r l ge-rnents have both z rn 'xpr t 'ss i r . ' t ' r rnc t io r r . vh ich i s ; r r i r l a r r ' , anc l a< lcsc r ip t i ve i r r rc t ion , wh ich i s sccondary . { l ren sorn t one. jud{cs an2r( l () be right she is both describing i t as having th c rri rtrrr:r l eat l l resthat . o r her , rnak t :s presc r ib ing it appropr ia te , arr r l s l re i s a lsoprescribing i t or expressir-rghc r pro-i rt t i t rrde towarcls i t . In Hare'sr, i t ' rv , hc prescript ivc or cxpressive urrct iorr of rnolzrl . iuc lgcrnents sbest c:rpturct l semantical lv by ascri tr ins to tht 'rn t l re l inerris t ic i rrrno an i rnperi rt ive.(i Notc that thc c l isposi t ional ar-ralvs is as hcre becn i rrrnrrluteri so :r sto rrrake i t t rarrsparcnt that wc ('an irlcnt i f ' r ' a c l isposi t iorr rv i t l r i tst 'a t t 'sor i cu l t rasc (Evans . l9U0). Thot rg l r th i s v i c rv i s r 'o r t t ro r r ' rs iu l( s t ' t ' . i r r < ' x ru t t l t l r ' , < ( i i r r r r , 1 ) l l 2 ) , l : r r l o p t i t i r r o r r l t ' r . o rn : r k c h t '

I

Nolc.s 205poin ts th i r t l i r l l o rv t ' : rs i t ' r '1o t l i { ( ' . l ver f . ' th ing hat f i r l l c lws o t r ld s t i l lbc sa i r l . l to r rg l r t l rc r worr l r l hav t ' to be sa id sonr t 'wh: r td i f fe r - t 'n th ' , fwe took i r rs l c l r< llr c v i< . l v lu t t c l i spos i t i ons re cons t i tu ted by , b t r t nc l ti d t 'n t i t i r l r r i t l r . t l r t ' i l c r r t t 'gor . i< 'a lases .A n a ru r l o g v r r i s l r t r t ' l r t ' 1 1 ; i r l . f h e v i e w t h a t ' r i s h t ' r e f e rs t o t h ecar ts t 'o ( )ur u \ ( 's o t l r< 'worc l r i eh t ' n r igh t t rse i r l l v e conrparec l t ' another cornmuni ty wh ic l r uses a u 'orc l ,' rv : r l t ' r ' t "s : r ' r . r wo l r l r r 'h i ch p l : r ,vs ro le in the i r langt ragc . j r rs tik c th ero l t ' 'n l r t t ' r ' p l l rvs rr o rr r l an t l r rage thcy r r )ayuse it to r e fer to thcs t r r l i t l r : r l ( ) rn ( 's r ' r>r l i vc l s , l akesund s t rea l t rs , s gor)d t .< l r i r rk . an ds( ) )n - l l rt r l l rost ' r ' t ' t ' r t 'nce di f rrs f iom th e rerence of orrr rvord' \4 i l l ( ' r ' ' .I ;o r r r ' l t t ' r ( ' l rs l ) ( ' c i l l l s : r l l i s t ( )11 'o f < tu l rvor t l 'u 'a ter ' ' ,g i verrth : r t t i s : r r r : r t r r l l l k in r l t t ' r 'n r , r )s r l res hat i t rc rs to F{"O, he czurs i r lh i s ton ol t l r< ' i r uo l '< l 'wat t ' r * ' , g i ven that it i s a nat r r ru l k i r i d tc r r r r ,cns l l r ' ( ' s l ) l r t t r ( ' ( ' rs o X \7- . - fhus , even though or r r words 'water ': r r r< l r r ' r r ( t ' r ' '1 "p lav t l i t ' sarnc ro l c - thev arc ea< 'h rscc l o rc r ' to t l renatur-ul ki rrocl


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20 6 Notesencc. The second stagewould be to show how these analysesrl lowus to identi fr colour experienceswith, say, tates 'the brain. I, asseemsplausible,our concept of a colour experielrce s th e conceptof a state o'a subject hat, in conjunction with a relevant desire,causally xplainsour bodily nrovements fb r exarnple,ou r pickingou t red objects rom objects of other colours - then i t should beclear enough how the attempt at vindicatiou would go , and why itshould be deerned ikely to be successfi tl cornpare ,ewis, 1972).

NOTES TO CHAPTF]R 3 TH EEXTERNAI,IST CHAI,I-ENGE

To my kr.rowledgehis point is never admitted by the externaliststhemselves,arp;ely ecause he problem to which admitting thispoint is the solution s never explici tly addressed: hat is, the prol>lern of explaining the rel iabi l i ty of the connection betweenmoraljudgernent and motivation in the good and strong-wil ledpersotr.Indeed, both Brink and Foot seem o think that externalism orsa better xplanation of the connection between moral judgementand rnotivation than that offered by defenders of the practical i tyrequirement (Brink, 1989: 49; Foot, 1972: 165-7). Whether theywould sti l l think so if they were to think about th e point currentlyunder discussion do Irot know.For this reas()n am not convinced ha t Hart's irrsitutionalaccountof law adequately captlrres the normativity of la w either. For -absenta defenceof the claim that al l those whcl ive inside a legalsystem ave acitly agreed to obey the la w - on [{art's insti tutionalaccount, here can be no legitimate expectation hat al l those whoar e nside a legal systemwil l act n accordancewith i t; no legitimatesrounds for disapprovingof their acts of disobedience;no reasonfbr rejecting the image of 'us' versus them'. If incleed he law hasnormative content, then it seems o me that tve have no alternativebut to derive that content from the normativiry of rnorality, and soto reject the very fundamentals of positivism.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 TH E HUMEANTHEORY OF MOTIVATION

Normative reasons re the subjectmatter of what Phil ip Pe ti t anclelsewhere cal l t he theory of 'oreground' rationali ty (Petti t anrl

Notes 207Snr i th , i r r th t 'o r t t i r tg ) . '\ thcory . r fo regror t t rd ra t iona l i ty wi l l spe l l( )u t th t : < 'o r rs i r l t ' r ' r r t i onsha t ra t iona l l y . j t rs t i f y c t io r . r . u t no te tha t wer :an, r r rc l c l l r t ' r r : r r r r t 'o u ' thcory o ' ra t iona l i ty ' , desc r ib t 's ( ) lne th ingclse as rvt ' l l . \ ' t ' r ' rrrr


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20u Notesclesi res s that there may be no phenonrenolosical ground for their:rscript ion. I c l isctrss his idea towards the encl of this chapter.Tl rtrs , I contend that a subject 's fake bel ie ' that she desires to $ isno t a state that is pote nt ial ly explanatory o 'her behaviour. Even-davexperient:e supp()rts this c


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210 Notesit seems plain enough that, for example, the modus onens abit ofinference must itself be intemal to the dispositions of belieling thatp, believing that p --r q, and the like, not, as Pettit's way of serringthings up seems o suggest,a separatedisposition hat combinesiththe dispositions constitutive of these beliefs to produce other be-liefs. After all, what would the dispositions constitutive of believingp be i f t hey did not already nclude dispositions ike the dispositionto bel ieveq when yo u believep -- >q, anclother similar dispsitions?Indeed, i t seemsplain enough that habits of inference must bethought of in this way, because hey are themselves ri ticizable fthey do not fi t t he world. Someone who has the gambler's al lacyhabit of inference, for example, should ge t ri d of that habit andacquire a different habit instead;a habit that better al lows her toderive truths from truths. And this seems o me best understood asa claim about the dispositions onsti tutiveof being a believerat al l .Someone who has the gambler's fal lacy habit of inferencc is adefective belieuer.When I talk of stateshaving directions of fit, I thereft ' l i t ' s(Smi th , l1 ) f t f i u ) .Davirl l , t 'wis :r l l {u('s t l tat th e concept of an instrumental bt 's i rtis i r rco l r t ' r ' t 'n t x ' ( : l l l s r : i ncons is tent wi th the tenets o f ' Ba1t 's iu l rdecis iorr lht 'orr ' (11)t lU).A vers ion of Lewis 's argumert i rr non-quant i ta t i \ ' ( ' r l t ' t i s io r t theory i s deve loped byJohn Col l i ns ( lgUU).Flowcvt 'r ' , t ' r ' t ' rr l , t 'wis and (lol l i r-rsar e right about this (see Hu wPric t "s r t 'ph (11) tJ1)) ) ,ha t wou ldn ' t be enough to show that therear c n( ) l r t 's i r t 's : r t a l l . For in order to argue for tha t conc lus ion wereqrri rt ' : rrr a


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2r2 Notesdeny Pl. Motivations may be constituted by besires; they are notonly constituted by desires.So saysNagel. And our reply to Nagel isthe same as our reply to McDowell in the text.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 AN ANTI-FIUMEAN THEORY OF NORMATIVE REASONSMichael Stockerputs the point this way. It is often held that some-thing's being goocl or believed good - its being rational, given theagent's values and beliefs - makes intel l igible (explains) why aperson seeksor desires t. If what I have said . . . is correct, then thisis mistaken. . . U]ust as he person ma y well not seekor desire he(believed) good, so, were that person to do what would produce(believed) good, that fact might well not make intelligible why theperson so acted. f I am known to be sunk deeply into despair orsome other depression or to have long ago ceased caring aboutsomeone'swelfare, hen citing the (believed)goodnessof my actwil l not make intel l igible my act which benefits hat other person'(Stocker,1979:.746). nd again ater: Thus rationali ty n the senseof value maximization against the background of an agent's beliefsis not the form of al l action, no r even al l intel l igible action. Nor isth e correspondingly rational person the form of al l people, no revenall intel l igible people.Tryt.g to understand people as f theywere such rational beings nvolves nadequate moral psychologies'(Stocker,1979: crotnote 2).Is this argument consistent with the earl ier argument againstJohnston? t is. ndeed, t helps o explainwhy a theory ike the selinterest theory may be self-effacing(Parfit, 1984:23-4). Suppose tis rational for me to do just one thing: promote my long-term selinterest.And suppose urther that it is not rational for me to desireto promote my long-term selirrterest; that my long-term self-interest would be best served by *y desiring to act fo r the sake offamily and friends, write books, advance humanity and so on, with-out having any direct concern whatever for my own long-term self-interest.What it is desirable hat I do is, n this case,not what i t isdesirablethat I desire that I do. But now suppose I come to believethe selinterest theory. I come to believe that it is desirable topromote my long-term selinterest and undesirable to desire toprornote my long-term selinterest. rom the argument us t given,having these beliefs makes it rational for me to desire to promotemy long-termself-interest nd to desireno t to desire () pr()m()tcnr y

Notes 2 : tow n long-term selinterest. ince he reason have ht '< l t 's i r t ' t r rpromote my long-term self-interest, omething we know irrrl t 'pcrr-dently that I rationally shouldn't desire, s that I bcl ievc th


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214 l,trotesto bc confl icted. He believed hat i t would be wrong for him to ki l lhis orvn son, but he also believed n God's perfect goodness; harGocl rvould not ask hi m to do something wrong. Yet how couldAbraharn ationallymaintain his bel ief n God's perfect goodness fhc genuinely bel ieves ot h that i t would be wrong for him to ki l lIsaacand that this s what Go d is asking him to do? Th e point thatth e storydriveshome is that there is no escaping orming your ownn.ror:rl el ief! - in Abraham's case,beliefs about the rightnessorwrongnessof ki l l ing Isaac,and beliet about the perfect or imper-fect goodnessof Gocl.Th e only question s whether you wil l formthesebeliefsvia an exerciseof your ow n rational capacities, n thel ight of the evidence or whether you wil l form them without exer-cisingyour rational capacities, imply n response o the directives fan authority.I thus find myself n substantial greementwith Derek Parfi t whenhe writes at the end of Reasonsnd Pnsons.'There could clearlybehigher achievements in the struggle for a wholly just world-widecommunity. And there could be higher achievements n all of theArts and Sciences. ut the progress ould be greatest n what s nowthe leastaclvanced f theseArts or Sciences. his, I haveclaimed, sNon-ReligiousEthics.Belief n God, or in many gods,prevented hefree development of moral reasoning. Disbelief in God, openlyadmitted by a majoriry, s a very recent event, no t ye t completed.Because his event s so recent, Non-Religious Ethics s at a very earlystage.We cannot ye t predict whether, as n Mathematics,we wil l al lreach rgreement.Sincewe cannot know how Ethicswil l develop, tis not irrational to havehigh hopes.' (1984:454)For an explanationof wh y we should use actually'in this definition,and how that helps to facillitate the entailment claim, see Daviesan d Humberstone, 1980. The point is also discussed n Smith1986b;Wiggins,1987;Wright, 1988;Lewis,1989;Johnston, 1989.Strppose hat we discover hat our desiresare out of l ine with ourevaluativebeliefswhen we deliberate, and that we are not rational.Our evaluativebeliefs do not causeus to have the desires hat theycan and should causeus to have. What happens then? The answeris: many different things might happen (Petti t an d Smith, 1993a,1993b;Kennett an d Smith, forthcoming). We might employ sometechr.riqueof selcontrol we have at our disposal and thereby getourselves o do what we believe desirable none the less: hat is, wemight manage to be continent. Alternatively, though we have somctechniqtreof self-controlat our disposal,we might not exercisc t:

Notes 215that is , we might strf fer from weakness of wi l l . Or al tcrnat ivc ly,we might have tro techrrique of sel f-control at otrr disposal , and.sogo on to act () n a desire that we have, but a desire that causcs rrs


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Index3-26.of Philosophy

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A b r a h a r n , 2 l 3 n 2abso lu t is rn , 19 4act ion exp lanat ion, 9 , l0 l -4 , 139-40,208n6causal vs. teleological cr>nception of,l 0 l - 4 , l l 3 - 1 . 1 , 3 l . 1 3 9 - 4 0i r r tcn( io r ra l s . c le l ibcrar ivep( r \p( , ( t r \ ( ,so n . l 3 l - 3 , 1 3 6 - 7 , 1 3 9 - 4 0 , 1 7 9 - U 0 ,2 l 2 naddic t ion , 134. I .15 , 143-4. I .16, 4u,15.1-5advice, l5 lagcnt relat ive vs. agent ne ural reasons,I 68-70A l t h a n r , . l .E . J . , l l 8 , 2 l l n l { )amora l ism. 66-71A n s c o m b e , G . E . M . , l l l , ll 7analysis,o f co lour concepts , 29, 3 l -2 , 49-53o normat ive reasons, 5 l -77

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Smith, Michael - The Moral Problem, Chapters 3,6

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