Social and Ethic Tensions in Al Andalus Cases of Ishbiliya and Ilbirah the Role of Umar Ibn Hafsun

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SOCIAL AND ETHNIC TENSIONS IN AL-ANDALUS: CASES OF ISHBĪLIYAH (SEVILLA)

276/889—302/914 AND ILBĪRAH (ELVIRA) 276/889—284/897— THE ROLE OF 'UMAR IBNḤAFṢŪNAuthor(s): ROBERTO MARÍN-GUZMÁNReviewed work(s):Source: Islamic Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 279-318Published by: Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, IslamabadStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20840132 .

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SOCIALANDETHNIC TENSIONS INAL-ANDALUS:CASES OF ISHBILIYAH (SEVBLLA) 76/889-302/914AND ILBIRAH (ELVIRA) 276/889-284/897

THE ROLE OF <UMARBNfl[AF?UN

ROBERTO MARlN-GUZMAN*

The renowned historian IbnHayyan has quoted several authors who devoted

a greater artof their ffortso thecomposition fpoetry astigatingheir

ethnic enemies. Several poems reflect the social tensions relating to theevents surrounding the rivalries between Arabs and Muwalladun in southern

al-Andalus towards the end of the ninth century. The muwallad poet 'Abd

al-Rahman ibnAhmad al-'Abliwrote thefollowingoem inArabic whichshows the hatred towards the Arabs instilled by various rivalries:

Their houses are deserted and empty;In it(thefortress) hirl and blowThe violent storm winds.

In the fortress ofAlhambra,Where they have taken refuge,

They plot their new deviations and errors.

Fatal misfortunes soon theywill suffer,As did their parents,When our spears and swords

Struck them.1

This poem had a tremendoussychologicalmpact n theArabs inthe Granadian fortress ofAlhambra, who thought itcarried a real curse and

a negative augury. The Arab poet Muhammad ibn Said Mukhariq al-Asadl

responded ith thefollowingoem:

*I am indebted tomy friendPatrick Engelking forhis superb editing of thisessay, and toDr Abraham

Marcus of The University of Texas at Austin, and tomy collegue and friendDr Rachel Ari of the

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, for their advice.



280 Islamic Studies, 32:3 (1993)

Yes! come closer, approach us;

From her (theAlhambra)will be bornA battlewhichwill makeYour sons and your women grow gray-haired.2

The muwollad poet al-'Abll wrote other powerful verses expressinghatred for the enemies:

We have broken their spears,

Theyhavebeen humiliated;

TheirprideandpowerWe have (again) demolished.How long thas beenThat theblood of their eadHas remained in the bottom of a well,Far from heir wn (kind)and underour control!3

Arabs, furious at these offensive verses answered al-'Abll with other

poems, inthe traditionalrab way,which also added violentmeans to thewar that

brokeout

immediatelyhereafter.

rabs appealedto their wn

ethnicgroup, to theHoly City, to theProphetand to all their ommontraditions inorder to unite themselves as one strong group and combat their

infidel and impious enemies.4

These verses are relevant as part of the established Arab tradition?

present inmany other places?of showing scorn for the enemy through

poetry while portraying themselves as superior. Furthermore, these poems

may reveal part of theArabization process that themuwalladun experiencedin al-Andalus, in that that they communicated with, and defamed, their

Arab enemies in the enemy's language. The reasons for doing so, in lightof the need to convey meaning between the two enemies, are obvious.

In order to study nd comprehend ll of thepoliticalproblemsofthat ime, articularlyithregard o theimportancef therebellion f the

muwallad leader 'Umar Ibn Hafsun, it is necessary to pay close attentionto the fact thatmuch tension existed between Arabs and muwalladun in

Southern pain,mainly in thekurah of Ilbirah(Elvira) and in thekurahof Ishbfliyah Sevilla) during the emirates of 'AbdAllah and 'Abdal-Rahman III. The revolt of 'Umar Ibn Hafsun

represents

a

single episodewithin themajor framework of socio-economic tensions between Arabs and

muwalladun. The purpose of this essay is to explain the reasons behind thesesocial tensions and to analyse the unfolding of events which led to fightingbetweenthesetwogroups nparticular egions fSevilla (276/889-302/914)andElvira (276/889-284/897)uring he mirate f 'AbdAllah (888-912)



Islamic Studies, 32:3 (1993) 281

and thebeginning f the leadership f theamir 'Abd al-Rahman III in

al-Andalus.

This periodof social tensionsndrevolts ad itsbeginningnthe ityof Lablah (Niebla) in theyear 276/889,whence these social and ethnictensions spread to other regions and became increasingly radical and com

plex. InNiebla in276/889,'Uthmanbn 'Amrun,nArab leader,revolted

against the central uthorityf the amir 'AbdAllah, winningnumerous

followers nd even gainingthesupport f themuwalladunof theregion,which led to successfulppositionto theUmayyad government.5

Revolt brokeoutwhen rebels ttackedtherepresentativef the mirinNiebla, 'Amr bnSaid, and expelled himfrom thecity.This initial

victory onvincedmany othersto join the leaderofNiebla indefianceofthe central government. In response, amir 'Abd Allah immediately dis

patched 'Uthman bn 'Abdal-Ghafir, memberof theclanofKhalid, to

regaincontrolof theregionand to reestablish mayyad authority. he

promises f 'AbdAllah's emissary onvinced Uthman bn Amrun ndhis

followers oacceptpeace and toproclaimtheir bedience to the amir nce

more. As explained by IbnHayy&n, however, this trucewas temporary. As

soon as circumstances were again appropriate, 'Uthman ibn 'Amrun revolted

again. Itwas at thispointthat he thnic ensionsetween rabs andmuwal

ladunerupted n the outhernegions fal-Andalus, s rivalparties ttackedone another.

'Uthman bn 'Amrun as forced oretire ith his followers, akingrefuge in his fortress ofQurqubah. At this time the confusion was extraor

dinary.6hemuwalladunattackedtheArabs withinQurqubah, despitetheinitial alliance and common interests between the two groups at the onset

of the revolt. The military assistance lent by the commander 'Uthman ibn'Abd al-GhSfir o Ibn 'Amrun nQurqubah, however,tippedthebalancein favour of theArabs and compelled the muwalladun to retreat from then

attacksto their ortresses.7ighting ontinued hroughoutheperiod that

the amir's representative remained in the area. As soon as he departed,numerous other revolts erupted in other parts of the Niebla region. Ibn

KMsib, forexample, started a new movement in themountains of al-'Uyun,

while Ibn 'Afirraiseda similarmovementof oppositiontoUmayyad ad

ministration. These uprisings extended to vast areas of theNiebla province.In the eastern

partsof the

kurah, instabilityreached the frontier lands

neighbouringhe rovince f IshbiliyahSevilla),and inthewest it xtendedto Priego. The sources indicate that these insurrections were of enormous

proportions.8s the itnahspreadtootherprovinces, tacquiredpoliticaland socialdimensions, ainly nthekuwar f IshbiliyahSevilla)and Ilbirah

(Elvira).




SOCIAL AND ETHNIC TENSIONS IN ISHBELIYAH (SEVILLA)

The province fSevillahad a diverseethnic nd socialstructureonsistingofArabs and Muwalladun, Jews and Christians, leaders and subordinates,

rich and poor. These ethnic and social differences were the principal basis

for the tensions which eventually led to major conflicts in the kurah of

Sevilla. Antagonisms between Arabs and muwalladun were sparked off byeconomic interests; richmuwalladun such as the Banu Angelino and the

Banu Sabarico, for example, wanted to defend their properties and their

economic status. The social discrimination practised by theArabs against

themuwalladun, as well as theirmonopoly on themost valuable lands alsoacted as contributing factors. This process was, obviously, detrimental to

the interests of the new converts to Islam.

According to the various Arabic sources, the Arabs of Sevilla and

the surrounding regions were themajor landholders, with all the privilegesthat land ownership generated. It is plaussible to infer for the particularcase ofSevilla thatthose npositionofeconomicstrength,ho had undertheir control most of the local wealth, also monopolized the social and

politicalprivilegesf the

city.9

Taxation, tributesnda varietyfboth legal ontributionsnd illegalimpositions, such as fines and special fees imposed on muwalladun inSevilla

and elsewhere, became important privileges and sources of wealth for the

Arabs at the expense of themuwalladun. Added to the various antagonismsbetweenrival rab groupswhich tribal ivisions, lan,familyndpoliticalparty differences had caused, was the complexity of social tension between

Arabs and muwalladun.

For a clear understanding of the origins of the Asab-Muwalladunconflictnd theevents nthekurahof Ishbfliyah,t sextremelymportantto discuss the origins of the regional Arab tribes and provide some explanation regarding theirprocess of settlement. The Banu Hajjaj were of southern

origin, having come from theHadramawt, inYemen, and were descendants

of Sara al-QutiyyahlaGoda), thedaughter fOlmundo.One of themajorsourcesof theirhistory sTa'rikh Iftitah l-Andalus,writtenby Ibn al

Qutiyyah, who was also a descendant of this family.10

Witiza, the enultimate isigothicking, ad several onswho, accordingtovariousArabic andLatin sources, pparentlyent ignificantupportto the Arabs in the conquest of al-Andalus. Inspired by political rivalries

withotherVisigothicgroups,they ssistedtheArab invaders nthebattleof theGuadalete againstRodrigo, the last f theVisigothickings.One ofthese sons was Olmundo (also named in theLatin sources as Olmondo and




Alamundo)whoserightsfpropertyossession ndretention,s established

inthe nheritanceecisions f thelong itiza,were recognisedythecaliphal-Walid (705-715). TheUmayyadcaliph lso recognised he ights f theother sons ofWitiza?Ardabasto (orArtob&s) and R6mulo?-for their similar

contributionsothe uslim causeduring he ecisive attle f the uadalete.

Accordingtothe ources, lmundokeptthepropertiesnthewestern

partsofwhat is todayAndalucia, in the southernregions f the IberianPeninsula. He settled in Sevilla.11 It is possible to infer from the several

Arabic sources thatOlmundo also had vast properties in al-Sharaf (Spanish

Aljarafe), since theymention his one thousand diya* in an area locatedbetween Sevilla and Niebla.

When Olmundo died he was succedeedby his daughter, ara al

Qutiyyah (Sara laGoda), and two young sons. Artob&s, Olmundo's brother,was grantedtheproperties hathis father itiza had heldnearCdrdoba,possessions which the caliph al-Walid I recognised aswell. Taking advantageof thedeathofhisbrother, rtobis also appropriated he andsnearSevilla,whichhad beenheld andadministeredySara al-Qutiyyahfter lmundo'sdeath.

Followingthe

ccupationf these

ands,which sheand her brothers

had inheritedrom lmundo,Sara al-Qutiyyahailedwithher twobrotherstoDamascus, in order to complain to the caliph about her uncle's abuses

of power and influence.

The caliphHisham ibn 'Abd al-Malik (724-743),12 listened tten

tively oSara laGoda's complaints. he explainedtohim that l-Walid Ihad granted er father lmundo thetasjil registration,uthentication,rofficial ct recognisinghe territorialenefits or particular erson)of the

properties she had inherited. As a result, the caliph Hisham dispatched a

specialdocument othewdtt f Ifriqiyyhordering imtosendstrictrdersto thewdli of al-Andalus, at that timeAbu'l-Khattar, that he supervise the

restitution of the lands and all possessions to Sara laGoda and her brothers.

According to theArabic sources these orders were followed, and Olmundo's

descendants reassumed possession of theirholdings in the region of Sevilla.13

While in thecourt f thecaliphHisham ibn 'Abd al-Malik,Sara laGoda had theopportunityfmeeting Abdal-Rahman bnMu'awiyah,wholater in timewas to be known as al-Dakhil, when he arrived and conquered

for his Umayyad family the lands of al-Andalus. Once in al-Andalus 'Abdal-Rahman I gave her special treatment and provided her with innumerable

attentions.

Also while Sara la Goda was at Hisham's court inDamascus, the

caliph married her to Tsa IbnMuzahim, with whom she returned to al-An




dalus. This 'Isa IbnMuzahim, about whom theArabic sources provide scarce

information,as thentheancestor f theBanu Qutiyyahof thekiirahofSevilla,mainlythroughissons brahimnd Ishaq.14 fter Isa IbnMuzahimdied, the amir 'Abd al-Rahman I advised that Sara marry again. This time

she wed 'Umayr ibn Sa'id, from the famous and prestigious Arab tribe of

Lakhm.15 Their one son,Hablb, received respect and special considerations,

due, obviously, to the importance of his father's tribe, but even more becauseof the importancefhismother's familynd thespecialprivilegeswhichshe had been granted. Other sons of 'Umayr born by other wives did not

receive similar treatment. This shows the undoubtable importance and pre

stige

of Sara laGoda'sfamily.

Habib was the ancestor of four aristocratic families of Sevilla who,in addition to lands in Sevilla, owned vast properties in Sidonia and

Algeciras.16One of thesefour important amilieswas theBanu Hajjaj.During thesepolitical nd socially urbulentears n evilla, the anuHajjajsucceeded in challenging he amir 'AbdAllah's centralauthoritynd in

controllingevilla and thesurroundingreaswith almosttotalautonomy.The BanuHajjaj were thus neof themostprominentnd influentialamiliesinSevilla and, byextension, nvast areas of

today'sndalucia aswell.

The social tensionsnd thepoliticaland economicproblems mongArabs of different tribes were not new in southern Spain; rather, theserivalriesmongvariouspoliticalpartiespredated thetime f 'AbdAllah.Since theverybeginning f theMuslim conquestof al-Andalus, in thesouthern parts of the Peninsula and particularly in Sevilla, there had alsobeen clashes between Christians and Muslims. These various conflicts indicate the social and ethnic tensions in al-Andalus as well as the politicaldynamics of the region. According to the various Arabic sources, such as

Ibn 'Idhlri'sal-Baydn l-MughribtAkhbdral-Andaluswa'l-Afaghrib,hefirst hristian ebellionagainstMuslim dominationf the berian eninsulastarted in Sevilla, almost as soon as the conquest had been completed andtheMuslim armies moved on to conquer new regions. After the departureof the uslim armiesfor heconquest fMfrida, the dministration,ontrolandprotection f thiscitywas givenover to itsJewish nhabitants. greatnumberof the localVisigothicpopulationfled thecity ndwent toBejaandNiebla However, almostimmediatelyfter he uslimarmies ithdrew,a number f the hristians ho had remained n evillarebelledagainstthe

Muslim rule. IbnTdhariexplainsthese vents nthefollowing ords:

q\a\ u\a\\ IjJjflfl i4_2kLj A-Ll^ Tnl* qa îatm\\y\j




.LiaJ Ifkâ ^jlji.ol cJjâj!j .l^jdfili

While Musa ibnNusayrwas occupied in laying iege to thecity fM6rida, theChristians('ajam) ofSevilla rebelled ndwentback ontheirwnsteps ndfoughtheMuslimswhowere in evilla andkilled

nearly ighty en.WhenMusi ibnNusayr learned f these vents,and as soon as he had completed the conquest ofM6rida, he sent his

son'Abd al-'Aziz with

anarmy to Sevilla. He conquered the city andkilled ts nhabitants.fter this eheaded towards iebla, conquered

it and returned to Sevilla.17

These are thought-provokingiews. First of all it isnecessaryto

highlightbn 'Idhart's eport hat Abd al-'Aziz killed?as it isunderstoodin theArabic text?all the inhabitantsfSevilla (shouldbe understood s

onlythosewho hadparticipatednrebellion)mustbe taken arefully,incethere sevidencein therparts f hiswork,aswell as inmanyotherArabicsources,thattheChristianpopulationofSevillawas not exterminated.

These incidents, as explained in the Arabic sources, are extremely

important as proof of the resistance of the Christian population toMuslim

conquests. As inter-faith, and thus also inter-ethnic events, they can be

placedwithinthemajorframeworkf thehistory f theMuslim presencein the Iberian Peninsula, especially in the South. Many other revolts and

movements of resistance took place throughout the centuries of Muslim

presence in al-Andalus: Christians against Muslims, Muslims, against them

selves?Arab, Berber orMuwalladun. Within this broader context we can

also include the study of 'Umar Ibn Hafsun's revolt and its impact.

The renowned and useful Arabic source, the anonymously authored

Akhbtir Majmu'ah, provides valuable information about the clashes between

differentrab tribesrom lmostthe ery eginningf theMuslimpresenceinal-Andalus,putting pecialemphasison thoserivalries nthe southern

parts of that region. An important story contained in theAkhbar Majmu'ah

proves the early beginning of social tensions and clashes between rival fac

tions. The story relates the arrival of 'Abd al-Rahman I, al-Dakhil, atElvira,whichYusuf and

al-Sumayl,hom 'Abdal-Rahmanwas then

persecuting,had managed to seize. In return for their surrender, theypromised to accept'Abdal-Rahman s theamir,with thesole condition hat ewould protecttheirproperties and possessions, terms forwhich theAkhbar Majmu'ah uses

the general words amwal and manazil.1* Subtle interpretation implies that

'Abd al-Rahmanwould also protecttheir ives,even though uch isnot




clearly expressed in this story.As the new amir, he would in addition end

thedisturbancesndbring eace to thepeople ofElvira.

In thisrespect heAkhbdrMajmu'ah19 says:

(['Abd al-Rahman IbnMu'awiyah walked] until he arrived at one of

the villages of the meadow of Elvira named Armillah. There were

messages from both parties and Yusuf and al-Sumayl offered to rec

ognise ['Abd al-Rahman Ibn Mu'awiyah as the amir] if he would

protect theirwealth and houses and bring peace to the people.)

This passage is important evidence of the social unrest prevalent in

al-Andalus, and inparticular in the southern parts of the Iberian Peninsula,

longbeforethe time f the mir AbdAllah. Careful interpretationf this

passage shows that the reason for this social unrest was undoubtedlyeconomic. The major concern of Yusuf and al-Sumayl was that the amdn

would provide security for their properties and other possessions. Despite

this, some other Arabic sources insist that in fact themajor reason for these

struggles was the state of rivalry between the various Arab tribes.

It is important to remember that the Yemenites were, ingeneral, the

most important Arab tribe in al-Andalus, particularly in the south, in the

important cityof Sevilla.20 The Yemenites were not only themost numerous

of all theArab tribes in the region arround Sevilla, but also themost pros

perous and prominent economically. They controlled the best lands, and

even though hey id notwork themwith their wnhands, they njoyedthe usufruct of those diya\ or cultivated parcels (iqta'). Social tensionsbetween Arabs started in this region when theNorthern Arab tribes,mem

bers of the Mudar confederation of tribes and traditional enemies of the

Qahtan, moved to al-Andalusandwere givenprivileges s jund inHims

(Emesa), Sevilla and Niebla, around the year 740.21 This furtheraggravatedthe already existing social friction in the southern provinces of the Penin

sula.22

Social tensions etweendifferentrab tribes ad existed hroughout

the Iberian Peninsula, since the first decades of theArab presence in al-Andalus. Itwas notuntilthe time f the mir 'AbdAllah thattheuprisings,struggles and rivalries reached their climax. Among themajor inter-tribal

antagonisms in the time of 'Abd Allah, was thatwhich occurred inal-Jazirah

al-Khadra9 (Algeciras). According to IbnHayyan, fightingbroke out because

of disputes between Qahtan (Yemenites) and the Mudar (Northerners).




These disputes grew so violent and bloody that they became reminiscent of

those of the times of the Jahiliyyah, the savage pre-Islamic period.23

The muwalladun constituted another important element in these social

tensions in southern al-Andalus. As ithas been proven, theArab leadershipextracted greater part of the revenues from the muwalladun, frequently

taxing them heavily. Some other Arabs also took advantage of this situation

to discriminate against the muwalladun hindering their social progress and,from timeto time,persecuting hem.The muwalladunopposed all this

through revolts, the only means available to them. Their participation in

these uprisings brought a new dimension to the social and ethnic tensionsof the region.

Serious problems between Arabs and muwalladun in Sevilla started

in theyear276/889 henKurayb IbnKhaldun, anArab ofSouthern rigin,fromtheHadramawt,whose familyelonged to the ahtan confederationof tribes, attacked themuwalladun. Kurayb Ibn Khaldun's properties were

located in the al-Sharaf Aljarafe), around theBur] IbnKhaldun, as hisfarm and properties were known, which was in the diya' of al-Balat. His

Yemenite followers ndhisBerber clients ssistedhim inhisattacks gainstthemuwalladun. Kurayb IbnKhaldun sponsored Berbers' criminal activities,

encouraging them to act as bandits against the muwalladun. To further

complicate these matters, the Berber followers ofKurayb Ibn Khaldun be

longed o theBaranis (Branes) tribe edbyJunaydbnWahb al-Qarmuni24which had been a bitter enemy of the Berber Butr tribe formany centuries.

Attacks by Kurayb Ibn Khaldun were carried out in various placesin the southern regions of thePeninsula, where he had the support of follow

ers inSidonia, Niebla and Carmona. He allied with Sulayman ibnMuhammad

Ibn'Abd al-Malik,then hemajor rebel nthecity fSidonia;with 'UthmanIbn 'Amrun, the qa'id of the rebels ofNiebla; and with theBerber JunaydIbnWahb of Carmona.25 Itwas not surprising, therefore, that themuwalla

dun, theMudar Arab tribes, enemies of theQahtan, and the Butr Berber

tribal enemies of the Baranis, mainly located in the kurah of Mawrur

(Mor6n), joinedtooppose the ttacks ndpillaging ctivities fKurayb IbnKhaldun. The different interests represented by each group are clearly ob

vious: Kurayb Ibn Khaldun defended the cause of theYemenite Arabs from

theHadramawt; Sulayman Ibn 'Abd al-Malik protected the interests of the

Lakhm tribe; and 'Uthman Ibn 'Amrun sponsored the interests of theKhashim.26

Because of these problems combined with the presence of bandits on

the roads and ingeneral throughout the region between Sevilla and Cordoba,most ofwhom were sponsored by thedevastating Berber leader al-Tamashik



288 Islamic Studios, 32:3 (1993)

kah of Carmona, the muwalladun sent an emissary to the amir 'Abd Allah

requesting his permission to restore order in the area. They planned tocontrol the region from the castle of Siete Torres (San Tirso), located between

Ecija and Sevilla.27 Shortly thereafter, under the direction ofMuhammad

Ibn Ghalib of Ecija, the muwalladun restored peace on the roads. The

account of these events by al-'Udhri, differs, however, in that he claims that

themuwallad Muhammad Ibn Ghalib did not request permission fromC6r

doba, but ratherwent to see the son of the amir 'Abd Allah who was still

in Sevilla, allegedly to give him presents and assist the amir's representativein the administration of the city and its surrounding areas. Once inSevilla,he

contacted othermuwalladun elements and, having made several alliances,felt strong enough to return to the fortress of Siete Torres and declare the

start f rebellion gainstthe mir 'AbdAllah.28

It is importantobear inmind thatthese pinions, swell as thosewrittenby thosewho followed l-'Udhri, re tobe takencarefully.hereisevidence that t theend of thefirst eriodof theseturbulentonflicts,the amir 'AbdAllah allowedMuhammad IbnGh&lib to remaininSieteTorres andkeep theroad securefrom evilla toCordoba. The amirwouldnothave allowed this fMuhammad IbnGhalibwere involved nrebellion

against him. One could still argue, however, that themuwallad leader had

infact iezedSieteTorres, and that AbdAllah, far romallowinghim tocontrol the fortresswas simply unable to remove him. Despite the fact that

'AbdAllah didnot fully ecognise uhammad IbnGhalib's authority,hemuwallad remained inhis position for some time.

As a furthercomplicating actor, here as another roup inSevillawho remained oyalto the amir 'AbdAllah andwho claimedneutralitynthis inter-ethnic and inter-tribal conflict in southern al-Andalus. IbnHayyan

affirmed that this group, among whom therewere some Quraysh members,set aside their local interests, feelings and blood ties, to remain loyal to the

amir.29his influentialroupcriticised he ocaluprisingsnd rejectedthecause ofKurayb Ibn Khaldun.According to IbnHayyan, thisrejectionspurred Kurayb to leave Sevilla and move into the al-Sharaf, where, from

hisownproperties, urayb IbnKhaldun tried ocontactndgainthe upportof thepeople ofNiebla and Sidonia.30

Kurayb IbnKhaldun eventually onvinced heBanuHajjaj tounite

theirforces and attackMuhammad IbnGhalib, with theobjective ofcontrolling thewhole area and the fortresses, for their own benefit. AmongthesupportersfMuhammad IbnGhalib (also knownas 'AbdAllah Ibn

Ghalib in other Arabic sources) were influential muwalladun from rich

families fSevilla,addingfurtherivisions othe nter-tribalnd inter-ethnic

rivalry. Among these influential muwalladun were Muhammad IbnKhattab,




Walid IbnAsh'ath, andMuhammad Ibn al-Jurayj.t isdifficulto identify

all of them, saveMuhammad Ibn Khattab, who was Muhammad ibn 'UmaribnKhattab ibnAngelino,head ofa prominent uwallad familynSevilla.It isalso plausibleto infer hat he thermuwallad leaders nthese onflictswere probably lso from nfluentialamilies f thatcity, uchas theBanu

Angelino and the Banu Sabarico.

However, these problems became more complicated when amember

ofthe anuHajjaj was killed n nArab attack onductedagainst uhammadIbnGhalib atSieteTorres.31 heArabs complained othe mir AbdAllahthat n aristocrat rab had been killed

bya vilemuladi.

The amirtriedo

finda peaceful solutionto theproblemand senthis sonMuhammad toSevilla to investigatehe situationnd formulate proposal.The amir lsosent newwill toSevilla,his cousinUmayyah bn Abdal-Ghafirl-Khftlidi,to replaceMuhammad Ibn Khftlid l-Khftlidi,nownas al-mu'wajj (thehunchback)who had in turnreplacedHasan IbnMuhammad al-MQri.32Muhammad Ibn 'AbdAllfth ndUmayyah Ibn 'Abdal-Gh&firl-Khftlidi,under thepressureof thecircumstances,llowedMuhammad IbnGhilibto remain nhis fortressndmaintain thesecurityf theroad toCdrdoba.These events would appear to suggest that either themuwalladun were no

longer n rebellionagainstthe mir fC6rdoba, or 'AbdAllah was unableto stop them.

These decisions, apparently in support of themuwalladun, caused

resentment among the Arabs. In response, Kurayb Ibn Khaldun seized the

castleofCoria delRio, while 'AbdAllah IbnHajjaj did thesamewith thefortressfCarmona, expellingthe 'amilMuhammad ibn 'AbdAllah ibnBazi4. Kurayb also attacked, with the help of al-Mahdi, one of his cousins,and then with the assistance of another local group led by a rebel from

Lebrija, an island in theGuadalquivir (WadPl-Kablr)river wnedby theUmayyadal-Mundhirbn 'Abdal-Rahman, ncle of the mir AbdAllah.33There were 100 mares and 200 cows with calves on the island, which the

rebelspillaged.Theywithdrew ith their ichbootyto thecastleofCoria,which lay in one of the extremes of the al-Sharaf approximately tenmiles

from the capital of the kurah of IshbHiyah.34

Despite attemptsfamir AbdAllah toresolve hese roblems eacefully, e hadno otheroptionbut toadopt the olution ecommendedyhis

advisers: namely, to have Muhammad Ibn Ghalib killed. Muhammad IbnGhalibwas killed in secretplotwhichwas sufficientosatisfyhe ffendedBanuHajjaj.35 IbnHajjaj returned hefortressfCarmona totheUmayyadauthorities,ndKurayb IbnKhaldun returnedhe tolen oodsand livestockto the amir's uncle al-Mundhir, much to the satisfaction of 'Abd Allah.36

However, thiswas only a partial solution which obviously did not satisfy




the muwalladun. As a result, social tensions and struggles continued in the

city f Sevilla, as thatwithinonlya fewyearstheBanuHajjaj were againable to gain control of the fortess of Carmona. The seizure constituted yet

another important threat to the central administration of al-Andalus.

In addition, he rabic sourcesreport hat he ity eaders fSevilla,

especially Kurayb Ibn Khaldun, suggested that Berbers from various partsof M6rida and MedelKn carried out attacks on the lands of themuwalladun

around Sevilla, where a rich booty could be obtained. Kurayb Ibn Khaldun

foundhimself ithinthereachof theforays f his Berber allies,because

Umayyad securityontrolswere almost

non-existent,nd the

dynastyn

power at the timewas extremely weak. The Berbers took advantage of this

situation and pillaged the area, to their own benefit, for several days. Theysackedthecity fTablada, and killedmanypeople throughoutheregion.These eventstookplace with theapprovalofKurayb IbnKhaldun,who

hoped therebyocause a generalrebellion gainsttheUmayyad dynastynal-Andalus.37

In fact,Kurayb also aimed at profiting from the general oppositionto the central government and accompanying chaos. According to Ibn

Hayyan, theBerber attacks caused the ruin ofmany local inhabitants, who

thereafter fell into poverty. As soon as the Berbers withdrew from Sevilla,

the rebel 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Marwan al-JilEqi arrived at the kurah of

IshbHiyah,ampedfewmiles from hecity f Sevilla and sackedboth the

countrysidend thecity tself. is attacks,whichno one had thecapacityto resist, created furtherproblems for the local inhabitants of Sevilla. Ibn

Marwan al-Jilfiql thus pillaged the entire region at his pleasure, and then

he retired to Badajoz.38

The muwalladun, rather than oppose the centralgovernment,

decided

to appeal to both ethnic rivals and tribal enemies of the Banu Hajjaj, to

defend themselves first against this group and then against the other attacks

ledby theBanu IbnKhaldun.With thisobjectiveinmind, themuwalladun

appealed to various members of the Southern confederation of tribes; the

Northern ribes,rMudar, and the erberButr,enemies f the ranes andallies ofBanu Hajjaj. They hoped to rouseArab-Berber and inter-tribal

feelings f rivalry, eavingKurayb and his allies too busy to attack themuwalladun. Conflicts did indeed start as soon as the tribal and ethnic rivalsof theQahtan arrived t Sevilla, or rather hestruggle ookon an added

dimension. The troubles sparked off a demonstration by the various discontented roupsofSevilla in ront f thepalace of thesonof the mir 'Abd

Allah.

A close reading of themajor sources, mainly Ibn Hayyan's al-Muq

tabis, howsthat hemajority f thepeople in this emonstrationbelonged



Islamic Studios, 32:3 (1993) 291

to the lowest social stratum, themajority being artisans or common workers,

along with some fewmerchants. Eager to voice their social and economicgrievances, they demanded better conditions and a greater share of the

wealth of thecityand country. hese various social groupshad suffered

enormously uring he nter-ethnicnd inter-tribalfighting,s they ependedon thecity conomy or heir ivelihood.he demonstrationurned iolent.39When fightingrokeoutbetween theguardand thepeople, Umayyah, thewali of Sevilla, ordered his troops to resist the attacks and regain control of

the difficult situation. However, his army was unsuccessful. Restoration of

order required the participation of Umayyah's brother Ja'd, who entered

Sevillato

assisthisbrotherUmayyahandMuhammad, theson

of the mir'Abd Allah. Ja'dferociouslyttacked hemuwalladunkilling anyofthem.After thisstrongmilitaryreprisal, hemuwalladundispersed.40he amir'AbdAllah granted hemmnestyn rdertopreserve eace in heregion.

Once peace was reestablished, 'Abd Allah's sonMuhammad returned

toC6rdoba. Ja'd accompanied him to the capital, then returned to Sevilla.

On theway, however, Ja'dwas attacked by themuwallad leader ofBobastro,'Umar bnHafsun,who wanted thehead ofJa'dforhisparticipationnthe

plotto kill themuwalladMuhammad IbnGhalib. Ja'dwas killed in the

surprise attack along with two of his brothers.

It is important to point out that the same source, al-Muqtabis, au

thored by the renowed historian Ibn Hayyan, has various interpretations of

these historical events, according to the different traditions and authors hefollows. As normally expected when different interpretations are provided,contradictions and conflicts of ideas do appear. For example, Ibn Hayyan

explains that, according to some traditions and other sources which he doesnot clearly cite, itwas theBerber al-Tamashikkah who attacked Ja'd, killinghim and his two brothers. In this theBerber leader was assisted by theBanu

Ghalib, who also desired to avenge themurder of themember of their tribeMuhammad Ibn Ghalib.41

Whatever the case may be, Umayyah, the wali of Sevilla, becamefurious at the killings and gave permission to theArab tribes, both BanuKhaldun and Banu Hajjaj, to act as they chose against themuwalladun and

theChristians. There was, as a result, a terriblemassacre of Christians and

thousands ofmuwalladun were killed in the city of Sevilla and in the coun

tryside.The Banu Angelino and the Banu Sabarico were probably the chiefvictims and themost heavily persecuted, because theywere rich and influential, leading to the expectation of obtaining much booty in their defeat.42

To further complicate these social and political problems, in the year891one of themajor leaders fSevilla, 'AbdAllah IbnHajjaj, was killed.




Arabic sources affirmed that his death was the result of a plot engineered

by Umayyad, thewattof thecity f Sevilla. IbnHayyan describes theseeventsand assertsthat oth theBanu Hajjaj and theBanu Khaldun hadbeen quietandpeaceful inSevilla,despitethewaifs conspiracies. fter the

killing f 'AbdAllah IbnHajjaj, however,thetwogroupsrevolted gain.The Banu Hajjaj regained armona,while theBanu Khaldun, ledby Ibn

Khaldun, returned to their castle of Coria.43 The watt attempted to break

the resistance of both Arab clans; he was unsuccessful, however. Both groupsattackedUmayyah repeatedly nd unmercifully.hen Umayyahfinallyrealised that itwas impossible to resist, he made a last and dramatic decision:

He killedhiswomen and hishorses,burnedhis valuableobjects and leftthepalace toconfront is enemies.He was quickly efeatedandkilled.44

In themeantime,the amir AbdAllah, at leastoutwardly,cceptedtheversion f these ventswhich hewas given;namely,that mayyah,hisw&llof Ishblliyah, as killedforconspiringgainstthe mir nd the entraladministration.45AbdAllah thenappointedhis uncleHish&mas thewiltofSevilla.However, therealcontrol nd administrationf thecity as bythen in the hands of bothBanu Hajjaj andBanu Khaldun.46 espite his

prestigend

kinshipwith the

amir,Hisham Ibn 'Abd al-Rahmandid not

have any real power. The amir 'Abd Allah, however, aware of this situation,sent n army o evilla under the ommand f 'Abdal-Malik bn AbdAllahibnUmayyah and his son al-Mutarrif. This expedition, suppossedly ordered

to pacify the regions of theAlgarve, arrived at Sevilla without prior notice.

The leaders f Ishbiliyah, urayb IbnKhaldun and IbrahimbnHajjaj, hadno other option but to allow the armies to enter the city. They were forced

to comply with the commands of the powerful army, but not before theyhad exhausted all diplomatic channels available to them. Promises were

exchanged on both sides and hostages were sent by Banu Hajjaj and Banu

Khaldun to theUmayyad authorities inCordoba, as guarantee of obedienceto the dynasty and as well as to protect their own interests.47

Despite thesepromises, owever, herealleaders fthecity fSevilla

grewconcerned bout their ositionafter he ttack f theUmayyad armyon castles controlled y the rebels inJerez,Arcos andMedina Sidonia.Other events lso tookplace inthisregion hichforced he eaders fSevillato accept submission and obedience toCordoba. To furthercomplicate this

situation, the royal armies captured several members of the leading families

ofSevilla and tookthem s hostagestoCdrdoba. This left heBanuHajjajand theBanu Ibn Khaldun with no other choice but to submit to the central

administration.

As partof their ubmission, heArab leadersof Sevilla agreed to

pay the taxes which were due to the capital of the emirate. The issue of




taxation acted perhaps as one of themost important underlying reasons for

the social upheavals and revolts of the period against the central administration. On the other hand, the restoration of taxation represented for the amir

one of theprimemotives fororganizing heroyal rmiestoparticipate nthese campaigns.48

As soon as some of the Sevillian leaders returned to their respectivedomains, and once theUmayyad armies had left evilla forC6rdoba, sedition

appeared again in the area. The Banu Hajjaj and the Banu Khaldun re

pudiated the authority of amir 'Abd Allah, and Kurayb Ibn Khaldun and

Ibrahim bnHajjaj agreed to sharetheir nfluencever thewhole area ofSevilla. The amir this time did not attempt to counter them directly, but

rather intensified the differences which had traditionally existed between

them by further encouraging rivalries between theQahtan and theMudar

confederations of tribes. To these traditional struggles were added the particular roblemsbetweenBanuHajjaj andBanu Khaldun overdivision f

power in Sevilla.49

As' AbdAllah hadplanned,problems etween anuHajjaj andBanuKhaldun resurfaced

quickly.brahim bn

Hajjajhad

KuraybIbn

Khaldunand hisbrother halid IbnKhaldunkilledduring suppertowhichhehadinvited hem. brahim bnHajjaj thusbecame theonly true eaderof thekurah of Sevilla.50 He even had the courage to request fromCdrdoba the

title of tasjll,which granted him recognition as themaster of the territoriesunder his possesion, and as the ruler of the region between Sevilla and

Carmona.51 Because of the profusion of political problems, amir 'Abd Allah

was then facing all over al-Andalus at that time, he could not refuse the

demandof Ibrahim bnHajjaj forrecognitions theruler nSevilla. In thisway the amir would at least have in him a loyal subordinate, rather than an

enemy.

A passage in al-'Udhrf s Tar$? al-Akhbar reflects the real nature of

theseeventsaswell as amir 'AbdAllah's inability ooppose theruler fSevilla.Rather, 'AbdAllah bestowedhonouron IbrahimbnHajjaj duringthelatter's isittoCordoba. The amirlethimgo freelynd appointedhimwall of the kurah of Sevilla. According to al-'Udhri:52

ûvi filial .l$j (jiO^j ^lajS 4j îSj i <j^ft

(He [IbrahimbnHajjaj] was received bythe mir]whenhe arrived

atCordoba.He was also [immediately]mprisoned.he imam Abd

Allah then reed imandappointed im[asgovernor]f the rovinceof Sevilla.)




As scholars have pointed out in the past, here was at a distance of

only fiftykilometers from the capital of al-Andalus a different state, almosttotally independent, with an organized army of some five hundred soldiers.

IbrahimbnHajjaj leviedhisown taxes nd retained relationshipiththeamir imilar othat f thevassal-feudalsystem.53brahim bnHajjaj himself

appointed the qddl of his kurah, the sahib al-madinah, and the sahib al

shurtah, chief of the city police. He also had sufficient power and courageto ally himself with other enemies of his lord, the amir, if circumstances

presented hemselves.e did thisprobablytoavoidanyfurtherobligationsto 'AbdAllah inCdrdoba.54He didnotmint hisowncoins,buthe had his

own tiraz industrieswhich he used to inscribe his name on silk textiles,muchin the same way as was practised inEgypt, Iraq and Cdrdoba. Nevertheless,he did pay his contributions to the central authority on time.55

Ibrahim bnHajjaj was determined o administer is kurah in themost efficientmanner possible, and provisioned itas best he could. He also

had a keen interest in the arts, literature and music, attracting to his court

theBaghdad! female singerQamar, Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad al-Kalfat,thephilologistfrom heHijaz, andmany others. Individuals uchas thefamous author Ahmad ibnMuhammad ibn 'Abd

RabbiM,as well as

manypoets and writers like Abu Muhammad al-'Udhri, lent his court a great

prestige.56

This interestn the rts,themusic and theliteratureas notnew in

Sevilla, for his ity ad been famousduring isigothictimes or ts ulturalattainments. It had also been themajor cultural centre of al-Andalus at the

time of theMuslim conquest and had been, before Cordoba, thefirst capitalof the region. This interest in cultural developments continued later in time

in thiscity,reaching tszenithunder the 'Abbadidynasty n the time fthe Ta'ifahs during the eleventh century, about which period there existssome excellent and successful research.57

When circumstances were favourable for Ibrahim IbnHajjaj toopposeanur 'AbdAllah, hewent so far s toallyhimself ith themuwallad leaderof Bobastro, 'Umar Ibn Hafsun, who was themost intransigent and most

dangerous of all the rebels during the timeof amir 'AbdAllah. From accounts

intheArabic sources, t spossible to infer hat he eaderofSevilla had a

great admiration for themuwallad 'Umar IbnHafsun because of his courage

and for his predisposition to oppose theUmayyad dynasty. The muwallad'Umar Ibn Hafsun had been in rebellion even before 'Abd Allah's rule,

having begun his revolt in 880. He had become, by that time, one of the

major threats to theUmayyad administration of al-Andalus, and a serious

challengeto theArab domination f thePeninsula.The leaderof Sevillawas well-informed in this regard. Ibrahim Ibn Hajjaj knew of 'Umar Ibn




Hafsun's occupation of Ecija, as well as the threat that the rebellion in fact

posed to the authority in the capital of the emirate.

As so often thecase duringtheMiddle Ages inEurope and in theMiddle East, alliances between rebels were common, but the rupture of

alliances through betrayal was also frequent. In the case of the particularsocial tensions in southern al-Andalus one can easily observe frequent con

tradictions in the political alliances which were formed. These alliances were

theresult f changing onditions, ndwere influencedy the interestsfthe various groups involved. Only a few years prior to the above events,

theBanuHajjajhad

persecutedheChristians

ndthe

muwalladun,killingmany of themwith theacquiescenceof theUmayyad ruler f Sevilla.TheBanu Hajjaj evenblamed thenew converts oMam forthekilling foneof their ribalmemberswhen they ttackedMuhammad IbnGhalib. In the

year 900, when the circumstances seemed propitious, the Banu Hajjaj, as

directedby Ibrahim bnHajjaj, forged n alliancewith 'Umar bnHafsunin order to defy and attack theUmayyad authority inCordoba. 'Umar Ibn

Hafsun, despite his resentment at thepersecution and murder ofmuwalladun

inneighbouring areas of Sevilla, accepted the alliance. The mutual support

provided political and strategic incentives for both

parties.58

The son of Ibrahim Ibn Hajjaj, 'Abd al-Rahman, remained hostageinC6rdoba during that time. Ibrahim tried all means to free him and to

convince the amir that his actions with respect to the Banu Khaldun were

in fact a reaction to their conspiracy against the central authority. Althoughhe offered to send tribute regularly to the capital of the emirate in addition

to an annual payment of 7,000 dinars, the amir 'Abd Allah always distrusted

him and did not accept or believe his explanations. The amir refused to free

Ibrahim's son to return to Sevilla. Concerned about his son's fate in the

capital ndwithhopesof liberatingim, brahim bnHajjaj sought hehelpof the muwallad leader 'Umar Ibn Hafsun. It is impossible to determine

whether thiswas an excuse or the real reason for the alliance between 'Umar

Ibn Hafsun and the leader of Sevilla. Arab sources affirm that itwas the

need of Ibrahim IbnHajjaj for certain assistance in the liberation of his son

which led to the forging of an alliance.59 However the case may be, both

leaders joined forces to pressure amir 'Abd Allah, who was already facingserious problems. This alliance became another threat to theUmayyad ad

ministration of al-Andalus.

In the opinion of many contemporaries, amir 'Abd Allah showed

weakeness innotkilling hesonof Ibrahim bnHajjaj. This did not stemfrom any particular benevolence; 'Abd Allah had, without remorse, killed

several of his relatives, brothers and sons in the past, whom he had accused

of rebellion and conspiracy against him. Instead, 'Abd Allah himself tried




to enter into pactwith 'UmarIbnHafsun,major threat orhim in the

areas of Ronda and Sevilla. This led to a truce between the amir and themuwallad leader of Bobastro. 'Umar Ibn Hafsun compromised, sending four

hostages?among them his former ally IbnMastanah, leader of Priego and

Luque. However, a few months later, in 902, 'Umar Ibn Hafsun broke the

truce and resumed hostilities against the central administration of al-Andalus.

'Umar Ibn Hafsun and Ibrahim IbnHajjaj afterwardsmet inCarmona

and agreed that the leader of Sevilla would form a strong army of his best

soldiers, iththe ltimate oalofattackinghe mir nhiscity fGSrdoba.60

This was an extremely ambitious and dangerous plan. Even though the amirwas in a weak position and his power had weakened through the years, he

still had the best of his army stationed in the capital of the emirate.

The intervention of Badr, the Slav, was crucial to peaceful solution

to these difficult problems. He convinced the amir to avoid any further

complications and allow 'Abd al-Rahman ibn Ibrahim Ibn Hajjaj to return

to Sevilla. Badr explained to the amir that the execution of the son of

Ibrahim bnHajjaj couldonlyhave increased he olitical ifficulties,urther

fragmentingheMuslim communitynal-Andalus.The execution f 'Abd

al-Rahman IbnHajjaj could conceivablyhave made possible a powerfulalliance between the opponents?Ibrahim IbnHajjaj and 'Umar IbnHafsun.

'AbdAllah played his skillfuldiplomatic ard and decided to free Abdal-Rahman, allowing him to return to Sevilla. After the liberation of his

son, Ibrahim bnHajjaj had no furthereason topersist nhisoppositionto the amir and the central authority.Without relinquishing his alliance with

the muwallad 'Umar Ibn Hafsun, Ibrahim Ibn Hajjaj allied himself more

closely to the amir of C6rdoba, towhom he regularly sent the tribute.61

Because themuwallad leaderhad brokenthetruce,mir AbdAllahexecuted ll thehostages 'Umar bnHafsun had sent toCdrdoba,with thesole exception f IbnMastanah.62 It ispossible to infer hatthe amirdidnot want to further complicate his difficult situation with the execution of

IbnMastanah, who had been a strong soldier and who still had followers,

prestigeand influential ontacts.Most significantmong themwas themuwallad leader 'Umar Ibn Hafsun himself. His execution could have cer

tainly ad consequencesforthepolitical situationby increasing opularopposition to the amir over and above the almost certain rebellion of theinhabitants of the

Qal'ah Yahsib, where IbnMastanah had concentrated hispolitical activities in the past.

Al-'Udhriwrites that brahim bnHajjaj, who had been themaUk,orkingofSevilla,died inthemonth ofMuharram intheyearh 298 (September-October, 910).63 He was succeeded by his two sons, 'Abd al




Rahman inSevilla andMuhammad inCarmona. These citiesended their

rebellion gainst mir 'AbdAllah, and the tributes ere paid regularly oCordoba. The sources in fact provide very few details about the administra

tion fSevillaby 'Abdal-Rahman r ofCarmona byMuhammad.

According to al-'Udhri, Abd al-Rahmanreceivedthe tosjttf the

city f Sevillawhile his father brahim as still live, in theyear292/905.Al-'Udhri64 wrote the following lines:

('Abd al-Rahmanreceivedthetosjttf theprovince fSevilla intheyear292whenhis father as stillalive.)

The datehas alsobeen provided y thehistorian bnHayyan inhisaUMuqtabis.65However, the governorship of 'Abd al-Rahman in Sevilla come to

an endwithhisdeathonlytwoyears fter he eathofhis father.Accordingto theArabic sources, it seems thatMuhammad lived longer and remained

in thefortressfCarmona until his death. IbnAbu al-Fayyad d. 1066)reports thatMuhammad had been the ruler of the fortress of Carmona for

fourteen years, since he arrived there, as representative of his father IbrahimIbnHajjaj, before Ibrahim n fact ied.66 his would seemto indicate hat

Muhammad lived omewhatlonger han isbrother, emainingn hefortress

ofCarmona untilhis death.

'Abd al-Rahman ibn brahim bnHajjaj, according o theCrdnica

Andnimadied intheMuslim year f 301 (913-914). The anonymousuthor

of this source points out that his death was at the beginning of Muharram

(7, 913). In this respect this important source says:67

(In the year 301 the city of Sevilla was conquered. The city was

weakened by the death of its leader 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Hajjaj, at

the beginning of Muharram of that year.)

After thedeathofhisbrother Abdal-Rahman,Muhammad sought ecog

nition as the leader of Sevilla. However, as a further complication of thepolitical situation, and for reasons still difficult to ascertain, Muhammad ibn

IbrahimbnHajjaj was notacceptedbythe nhabitantsf Sevilla.Accordingto theCrdnicaAndnima, thepeople of thiscitydid not accepthim andinstead they transfered power toAhmad ibn Muhammad Ibn Maslamah.

Muhammad ibn brahim bnHajjaj didnot recognise hisappointmentnd




declaredhis oppositionto his cousin IbnMaslamah, thenew recognised

ruler of Sevilla.68

Whatwas thereasonfor his ejection? hat ledthe eopleofSevillato react in thismanner to his attempted seizure of power? Arabic sources

do not provide adequate information for a clear and specific answer to these

questions. Indeed past historians have done littlemore than to speculate as

to a possible explanation. Some of this speculation seems quite convincing.The lateSpanishhistorian nd renowned rabist Jacinto oschVila, for

example, asserts that themajor reason for the popular rejection ofMuham

mad ibn brahimbnHajjaj in evillawas probably heopposition yAhmadIbnMaslamah, who also had interests in the region.

Ahmad IbnMaslamah was also closelytiedto theamir inC6rdobaand offered okeep thekurahof Sevilla subordinate ohis authority.norder to gain recognition, Ahmad IbnMaslamah sent a considerable amount,from the taxes on the local population, to the amir in tribute.He expectedto be granted the tasjil for the city in return. However, the new amir in

Cordoba, Abd al-Rahman II,was reluctantoacceptthese onditions,nd

even considereddeployingmilitary orcetocontrol heregion.69ince hisascension to power, 'Abd al-Rahman III, who was the grandson of 'Abd

Allah, had shown more signs of strength and better organization than his

predecesor. After receiving a strong rejection tohis assertion of direct inheri

tancerights o Sevilla by a considerablenumber f the local inhabitants,many of whom had followed his cousin Ahmad IbnMaslamah,70 Muhammad

ibn Ibrahim Ibn Hajjaj decided to appeal to the amir inC6rdoba. He re

quested that he be granted administration of the city and the countrysideof Sevilla.

The amir 'Abd al-Rahman III, however, saw an excellent opportunityforthecentral dministrationoregain ontrol f theregion yexploitingthe political feud between the two cousins in the kurah of Sevilla. 4Abd

al-Rahman III grantedtheprivileges f theadministrationf Sevilla toMuhammad ibn Ibrahim bnHajjaj, knowing hatAhmad IbnMaslamahheldmilitary ontrol f thecity t that ime. n a veryskillful ove, 'Abdal-Rahman III convinced Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Ibn Hajjaj tomove to

Sevilla as the new governor of the kurah. The amir also sent Qasim Ibn

Walld al-Kalbi alongwithMuhammad ibn brahim bnHajjaj as his chief

of police.71

Muhammad ibnIbrahim bnHajjaj andQasim IbnWalid al-Kalbi

planned a complicated military campaign to gain control of Sevilla. Theyfirstoccupied thefortressfLora, and latermoved tothe mportantegionofAljarafe where, according to IbnHayyan, they established a new fortress




(namedCabra insomesources).72here they btainedsubstantialupport

from the people of the surrounding areas, particularly fromNiebla andSidonia. Furthermore, they secured control of those important regions

uponwhichthe ity ependedforagriculturalroducts. incewithoutthese

products Sevilla was weak and unable to resist a siege, whoever gained the

districts f theAljarafe, controlled hefoodsupplies o thecity.With these

reinforcements,uhammad ibn brahim ndQasim IbnWalid werepoisedto attackSevilla.Burdenedby theseproblemsstemmingrom herefusalof the amir 'Abd al-Rahman II togranthimthe tosjttf Sevilla,AhmadIbnMaslamah appealed forhelp tothemuwollod leader fBobastro, 'UmarIbn

Hafsun,whowas

always agerto

participaten

nypotentially rofitablecampaign against the central authority.

According to IbnHayyan's al-Muqtobis, s well as theTarst alAkhbar wa Tanwf al-Athar wa'LBustan ftGhard'ib al-Bulddn wa'l-Masdlik

ild Jami' aUMamdlik by Ahmad Ibn 'Umar al-'Udhri, 'Umar Ibn Hafsun

haddirect nvolvementnthese onflictsndevenwent to thecity f Sevillato arrangehisparticipation nd to discuss strategy ith allyAhmad Ibn

Maslamah.73As al-'Udhriexplains,he also journeyed ith his allyAhmadIbnMaslamah to the fortress ofQTrah: "wa taqaddama 'Umarma 'aAhmad

ibnMaslamah ild isn Qtrah. "74However, themulddiwas ultimately unsuc

cessful nhis support fAhmad IbnMaslamah.75While laying iege to thefortressfCabra, 'UmarIbnHafsunwas defeatedbyMuhammad ibn brahim bnHajjaj, losingmany of his followers. Umar IbnHafsun thenabandoned Ahmad IbnMaslamah, "wa raja' a maflulan 'anhu", accordingto al-'Udhri.76'

After these tragic ventsAhmad IbnMaslamah triedto obtain a

pardon from the new amir, whose position appeared increasingly stable.

'Abd al-Rahman III sent his hdjib Badr to receive the city of Sevilla, to

grant the amdn, to obtain the surrender of Ahmad Ibn Maslamah and,

finally, to prevent any outside military intervention in the city, particularlyanywhichMuhammad ibn brahim bnHajjaj mightdirect.Badr enteredthe citadel in Sevilla, where Ahmad IbnMaslamah had taken refuge, and

ordered him to leave it immediately. Thereupon the hdjib announced the

concession of an amdn, a security, and general amnesty for all the peopleofSevilla.This amdn included hesoldierswho had sidedwithAhmad IbnMaslamah during thefighting.According to some sources, Badr even ordered

the gates of the city left open, so that those who desired to do so couldreturn home at any time, day or night.77

The entiremilitarycampaignproved successful or amir 'Abd alRahman III; bothAhmad IbnMaslamah andMuhammad ibn brahim bn

Hajjaj had been skillfulyefeated and expelled from hecityof Sevilla.




However, Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Ibn Hajjaj still retained control of Car

mona, where he had taken refuge. No longer a recognised subordinate oftheUmayyad amir, he continued to assert his claim to Sevilla. In order to

unify theMuslim territories of al-Andalus, itwas necessary to return control

of Carmona to the central authority.

On February 1, 914Muhammad ibn Ibrahim bnHajjaj attackedSevilla ina last ttempt oconquerthecity. e was soundly efeatedwithtremendous losses. Following this rout, he promised to submit to the central

authority, asking certain conditions which the amir in fact accepted. Muham

mad ibnIbrahimbnHajjaj moved toCordoba andwaswell received.Asa part of his welcome, 'Abd al-Rahman III even granted him the title and

position of warn. However, when the representative whom Muhammad ibn

Ibrahim bnHajjaj had left nCarmona startedacting ninsubordinationothe entralauthority,Abdal-Rahman II imprisoneduhammad, strippinghimof all hisprivileges nd concessions.Muhammad ibn brahim ied in

prison in914, inobscure circumstances.78 Shortly afterwards, at the end of

that year, Badr was sent to Carmona with a strong army. He entered the

fortresswithout resistance. Badr appointed Sa'id Ibn al-Mundhir al-Ourashi,

then also thewall of thecity

ofSevilla,

asgovernor

of the fortress.

It is importantounderscore the skillfulnessf thehajibBadr in

organizing and administering of the cities and fortresses re-conquered bythe central authority, binding them closely together under the amir of C6r

doba. He was undoubtedly one of themajor contributors to the stability of

the government of amir 'Abd al-Rahman III. In Sevilla, where he had already

appointed Sa'id Ibn al-Mundhir al-Qurashi governor, he introduced significant reforms which had a tremendous impact on the central administration

of the city. The amdn of securitymaintained the quiescence and loyalty of

the population to the amirwithout strict and repressive measures. Secondly,he incorporated all armed people into the amir's army, which was loyal to

the Umayyad dynasty. Those who had a horse were especially welcome.

This was an important decision, because incorporation into the central armymeant a more widespread inclusion in the diwan and the provision of those

privileges and prerogatives granted to the other members of the central

armed forces. Furthermore, the incorporation of armed citizens into the

central administration reduced the possibility of furtherpopular dissent. In

the long run, this step proved to have a tremendous impact on the unity of

these provinces and their allegiance to the central authority.79

Thereafter adr returned oCordoba accompaniedbyAhmad Ibn

Maslamah, who was received by 'Abd al-Rahman III. The amir appointedhim, the last of the Banu Hajjaj of Sevilla, sahib al-shurtah al-'uliyya, a

position he kept almost until his death on November 14, 938.80




As a result f thesweeping dministrativeeorganizationy 'Abd

al-Rahman II, the amirhad from hat ointon theability oappointprovincialgovernors irectlyndkeep them nder his strictsupervisiont alltimes. This consolidation ofpower was essential for theproper administration

and efficient control of the emirate, later tobecome the caliphate ofCordoba.

SOCIALANDETHNIC ENSIONSN LBIRAHELVIRA)

Just as in the province of IshblUyah, the social tensions between Arabs and

muwalladun in thekurahof Ilbirah(Elvira) gained significantomentum

during the emirate of 'Abd Allah.81 The persistent and violent attacks bythe rab communitynmuwalladunfinally ed thesenewconverts oIslamtoappeal to 'AbdAllah for ntervention.he amir,however, as ultimatelyunsuccessful in controlling the violence, which stemmed from the generaltrend of uprisings and ethnic conflict which characterized his emirate. The

reason for this deterioration seems to have had itsbasis in the various forms

of revoltagainstthe increasinglyeakUmayyaddynasty.

Arabs constantly displayed discrimination against the new Muslims,

which provoked the rapid spread ofmajor social conflict. Arabs also attackedthe muwalladun. In self-defense, the new converts in turn attacked Arabs.

These actions generated increase in violence, sparking off new resentment

and new disputes and rivalries in the area.

The histortian Ibn Hayyan, who follows and quotes several sources

includingIsa IbnAhmad al-Raziand the oet4 bbadah, provides concise

descriptionf theorigins f the nrest. he Arab leader ahya IbnSuqalah,from heQays tribe, oughttodefend theArab cause againstChristiansand muwalladun. He, therefore, established himself in the fortress ofMon

tejicar (orMontesacro, according to other sources), which until then had

been under Berber control. After repairing the fortifications, he called uponthe local Arab populations to support his cause.82 However, amuwallad bythe name of Nabll and later another named al-Shumays, both probably

fearing the increased Arab strength in the region, attacked theArabs led

byYahya IbnSuqalah inhis fortressfMontejfcarwitha strongndwell

equipped army. The muwalladun conquered the fortresskillingmany Arabs.

Yahya Ibn Suqalah managed to escape, however, and with a limited number

of his followers ookrefuge n thecity fElvira, even though hiscitywas

at that time a bastion of the muwalladun. He was allowed to enter Elviraon the asisofapacthemade directly ith thewallofthe ity, hopromisedtoprotect ahya IbnSuqalahwhilehe remained here.83espite this, ow

ever, the sources that IbnHayyan follows claim that themuwalladun betrayedtheArabs and in theyear276/889 illedYahya IbnSuqalah.84




These killings vastly increased tensions between the two groups. The

Arabs appointed a new leader, theQaysT Sawwar Ibn Hamdun al-Muharibi,who had also survived the killings in Elvira. Sawwar is characterized as

having been a brave and courageous soldier determined to avenge the loss

of membersofhis tribe, speciallythe. eaderYahya Ibn Suqalah. In this

light, is firstgoalwas toregainthe fortressfMontejicar andpunishthemuwalladun.85 Ibn Hayyan reports that Sawwar was the first revolutionaryin the province of Elvira to raise arms against themuwalladun. Ibn Hayyanwrote inthisrespect hefollowingines:

Sawwar,faithful riendf IbnSuqalah,managed toescapewith therest f hispeople and fled heprovince fElvira,whichhad a devas

tatinglimate. n theway they ecided toproclaim hatthey ouldrather ie ifthey houldnotfind heir ellow-membersell disposedto help them and save their lives. After making this tragic resolution,

they entrusted the leadership to Sawwar who, without delay, sent

them to the fortress ofGranada, which was in ruins. He ordered the

immediate reconstruction of itsmost vulnerable parts, and made it

the base for his military actions.86

Sawwar Ibn Hamdun al-Muharibf appealed to the Arab populationof the region to rally under his banner against themuwalladun. He wrote

letters to the leaders of Jaen and other provinces, appealing for their supportforhis cause. As a result of his da'wah, Arabs volunteered ingreat numbersto his service, primarily to avenge the killing of Yahya Ibn Suqalah. The

mutual hatred between Arabs and muwalladun, as well as the crucial importance of relations among tribes and their solidarity to the call for revengeisobservable from the various Arabic sources.87 Sawwar IbnHamdun started

the revolt in the al-Barajilah region, in the province of Elvira; however, he

drew support fromArab groups in several other provinces in the surroundingarea. Such as those from Jayyan (Ja6n) and Rayyah (Malaga).88 The armyof Sawwar IbnHamdun was composed entirely ofArabs, demonstrating yet

again the profound ethnic divisions existing in al-Andalus at that time, as

well as the importance of tribal solidarity.89

Having organizedhis army,he attackedthefortressfMontejicar,thencontrolledby themuwalladun followers f the rebelsNabfl and al

Shumays. n theensuing onflict,abfl fled he astle ndthe rabs regainedit, killing large numbers of muwalladun and appropriating the propertiesand wealth ofmany others. Arabs proceeded to capture several castles undermuwalladun control. As might be expected, this led to an excess of vengeanceand the abuse of power. Both muwalladun and Christians alike in the regionsuffered persecution and tremendous violence at the hands of Sawwar's

Arab soldiers.90




Horrified by these events, the new converts to Islam appealed first

to thewall of thekurahofElvira, Ja'd Ibn 'Abdal-Ghafir l-Khalidi,forprotection against the increasing violence.91 The wall attacked Sawwar Ibn

Hamdun al-Muharib! with the intention of defeating him and to preventfurther crimes against themuwalladun. However, to further complicate the

politicalsituation, awwar IbnHamdun al-Muharib! efeatedthewall Ja'dIbn 'Abd al-Ghafir l-Khalidi na bloodybattle inwhich,according o thesources quoted by IbnHayyan, 7,000 of his soldiers died. Sawwar's victorious

armies even succeeded in imprisoning Ja'd Ibn 'Abd al-Ghafir al-Khalidi.

He was later released through the efforts of his followers92 in exchange for

a number fprisoners apturedduringtheencounterbyhis own army.93Following this tremendous success, Sawwar contacted other Arabs in other

cities ndfortressesearElvira, includingalaga (Rayyah),Ja6n ndCalatrava. The Arab population of the surrounding areas reacted to the victoryofSawwar IbnHamdun over theMuwalladun withoverwhelmingupport,many announcing heir nconditional olidarity ith themovementof theArab leader. His reputation, in fact, spread beyond the local level and

received significant notice in distant regions.94

Meanwhile, KhayrIbn

Shakir,who was also

engagedin

openrebellion

against amir 'Abd Allah, favoured themuwalladun and the 'Ajam residingin Shudhar (Jodar) and the areas surrounding it in the province of Jaen.

IbnShakir ollaborated nd alliedwith 'Umar bnHqfsun, the hiefmuwallad leader, ntheyear277/890.95hayr IbnShakir ttackedfortressesndcastlesheldbythe rabs inthat rovince nddevastated heregion, eadingto heavy Arab casualties.96 Fighting between Khayr Ibn Shakir and Sawwar

IbnHamdun in thekurah fElvira intensifiedhe ocialandethnic ensionsin the region and caused thenumbers of bothmuwalladun andArabs involved

in the conflict to increase.

Because of the dimensions and rapid intensification of these social

and ethnic wars, amir 'Abd Allah found the region of Elvira, like the kurah

of IshbHiyah, almost uncontrolable. The inability to collect taxes in these

turbulent provinces had almost depleted the treasury. However, as he did

in the case of Sevilla, the amir opted to take advantage of the profoundlydivisive ivalrieswhich existed mongthe rebels. 'AbdAllah originallyntendedtoavoid thehugeexpenseofdefeating hayr ibnShakirhimselfbyusing 'Umar Ibn Hafsun, who was Ibn Shakir's own ally, against him. In

theyear 276-277/889-890 'Abd Allah signed a peace agreement with 'UmarIbnHafsun,who had agreed topledgehis loyalty o theamir.This cameas a result of a letterwhich amir 'Abd Allah wrote to 'Umar Ibn Hafsun.

This letter warned 'Umar Ibn Hafsun of the potential treachery of KhayrIbn Shakir who was then allied with Daysam Ibn Ishaq, a former ally of

'Umar Ibn Hafsun who had since become a serious rival. The amir advised




'Umar IbnHafsun not to collaborate with Khayr and to suspect the sincerity

of his promises.97 These convincing words cleverly conceived to pit onemuwallad leader against another, strongly influenced 'Umar Ibn Hafsun to

seek an opportunityo ridhimself fKhayr Ibn Shakir.This opportunitycame when Khayr Ibn Shakir requested reinforcements from 'Umar Ibn

Hafsun,apparentlyo that hey ighttogether uccessfullyefeat common

enemy. 'Umar Ibn Hafsun agreed to send soldiers under the command of

al-Ufraymir, towhom he secretly assigned the task of assassinating KhayrIbn Shakir.Al-Ufraymiras successfulnd he sentthehead ofKhayr IbnShakirto 'Umar bnHafsun,who immediatelyorwardedtto 'AbdAllah

hoping togain theamir's sympathiesnd support. he ruler nC6rdobacordially thanked 'Umar Ibn Hafsun and congratulated him on having elimi

nated a strong opponent to the government.98

Because of the ntense ightingndviolencebetweenArabs and thenew converts inElvira, the muwalladun in the end had no other option but

to appeal to amir 'Abd Allah forprotection. The amir agreed to intervene

and attempt to restore peace between the two groups. The muwalladun had

two reasons to seek this royal intervention: On the one hand, themuwallad

communityad realizedthe

nabilityfJa'd Ibn 'Abdal-Ghafir oconfront,

let alone defeat, Sawwar. However, themuwalladun were also motivated

by the desire to avenge those killed in the previous war.99 The amir sent

his cousin 'Umar Ibn 'Abd Allah Ibn Khalid to restore order in Elvira,in spite of his original stategy of favouring Sawwar Ibn Hamdun to foster

peace. The muwalladunaccepted theconditions orpeace offered y theamir, theywere obedient and even swore their respect for and loyalty to

his administration.100 This ended the conflicts in the region.

Some sources mention thatduring thisperiod of time, theamir granted

Sawwar Ibn Hamdun al-Muharibl several special privileges. This isnot sur

prising since it is quite reasonable that 'Abd Allah should favour theArabs

involved in any inter-ethnic conflict. However, for reasons which are not

entirely clear in the sources, Sawwar Ibn Hamdun al-Muharibi attacked the

muwalladun again after the arrangements for peace had been concluded.

The muwalladun had allied fortresses with 'Umar IbnHafsun in the regionnear Elvira. The sources report that thesemuwalladun, enraged by Sawwar's

attacks, reacted violently against theArabs, who were forced to retreat to

their fortress.

Ibn Hayyan, however, has a different account of these events. He

explains that as 'Umar ibn 'Abd Allah Ibn Khalid arrived inElvira, the

muwalladun forged an alliance with him and formed an army of approxi

mately20,000 soldiers,which they edagainsttheArabs inthefortressfAlhambra in Granada. Yet despite their inferior numbers, theArabs de




feated themuwalladun. Nevertheless, all sources agree in reporting that

theArabs under the command of Sawwar went out of theAlhambra andkilled half of those who had besieged thegarrison.102 Sawwar even persecutedthem. IbnHayyan gives a number ofmore than ten thousand muwalladun

casualties,103 although thisfigure appears exaggerated.

Sawwar Ibn Hamdun al-Muharibi also had special incentive to attack

the hristians nd othermuwalladun intheregion f Pechina (Bajjanahof

Almeria), a prosperous port very active incommerce. His goal was to acquiresome booty in this region.104 Pechina was extremely prosperous and one of

themajor bastionsof theUmayyaddynasty nal-Andalus.The people ofthecoast,mainly seamen,who had built thecity fBajjanah (Pechina) inthetime fMuhammad I, thefatherf 'AbdAllah, had successfullyefendeditformany years.People of thisregionwere loyaltoamir AbdAllah and

appealed to him for assistance in defending the port, as they claimed, for

the glory of Islam in the Iberian Peninsula. IbnHayyan lists that therewere

othertwentyities uiltby these eople aswell, includingad! (Guadix?),al-Hammah Aljama), al-Habiah (Aljabia),Burshanah (Purchena),Ablah

(Abla), Banu Tariq (Bentarique),thefortressfNashar (Nijar),althoughtherewere many others which this historian does not

explicitlymention.105

By seeking plunder in this area, however, Sawwar spread the inter-ethnic,social tensions and hatred to other provinces.

After their efeatat theAlhambra, themuwalladunwere left ithno alternativeut toappeal to 'Umar bnHafsun formilitary id, althoughforgingn alliancewith 'Umar bnHafsun placed them, y extension, n

open rebellion against 'Abd Allah. 'Umar Ibn Hafsun had lost several for

tresses his allies held in the region to Sawwar Ibn Hamdun and wanted to

regain them. The muwalladun of Elvira provided him with the opportunityto do so.106

The muwallad leader 'Umar Ibn Hafsun arrived in Elvira to assist

themuwalladunat thefirstopportunity.e camped there ith thebestofhis army, reinforcing the nearby fortresses and solidifying his absolute milit

ary control over them. He then departed with his army to face the Arab

Sawwar IbnHamdun inGranada, who was already prepared for the assault.

Sawwarpossesseda large ndpowerful rmywhichhe had assembledwiththe ssistance nd loyaltyf the rabs inthethree uwar fElvira,Rayyah

(Malaga) and Ja6n.

Although the battle at first appeared an even match, themuwalladun

could not, for long, resist the overpowering strength and resolve of their

Arab enemies and were defeated.107 Ibn Hafsun was injured in the metee

and when he observedtheextent f thecasualtieson thebattlefield, oth




from is infantrynd from iscavalry, e chose tofleeforhis life. his left

his armywithout any other strong leadership to command the resistance orplan strategy inhis absence. As a result, his forceswere totallydefeated.108

This defeat enfuriated 'Umar Ibn Hafsun, who blamed themuwalla

dun of theprovinceof Elvira for themilitaryfiasco.According to Ibn

Hayyan, 'Umar Ibn Hafsun denounced them as cowards. As punishmentfortheir ole inhisdefeat, 'Umar bnHafsun imposed heavytributenthe local inhabitants of Elvira.

These eventseasily

lead one to infer that 'Umar Ibn Hafsun'spartici

pation inthis ampaign nd support fthemuwalladuningeneral temmedfor a variety of reasons such as diplomatic, strategic, political and economic

factors. To these motives must also be added his personal interest to pursuethe riches tobe gained throughwar. Having failed in thismilitary expedition,

however, he obtained those benefits from the defeated muwallad army by

forcing them topay for his fiasco. The sources portray him as an opportunist,a military rebel leader eager to exploit any advantage, whether from his

enemies or from his defeated allies.

After thisstunningefeat,he entrusted hedefence of thecity fElvira and command of the cavalry to his lieutenient, Hafs elMoro, and

retiredwith the remnants of his army toBobastro.109 Hafs meanwhile, soughtan appropriate opportunity to take revenge on Sawwar Ibn Hamdun and,if ossible,killhim.110bnHayyan pointsout that afswas probably lso

motivated by the desire for the reward which 'Umar IbnHafsun would likely

give him ifhe were successful.111 'Umar Ibn Hafsun made it a policy to

reward his soldiers for extraordinary service, both as a means of placating

them, as well as to provide an incentive for others to excel in his military

campaigns to gain similar rewards. These rewards for services renderedwould almost undoubtedly have had a strong psychological appeal formany

people.

Hafs accordinglyrepared trap or awwar bnHamdun,provokinghimwithan attackby a smallnumber f soldiers nGranada,while he hidhis cavalry. Sawwar taking the bait rode out with a few of his best soldiers

to confront what he considered a relatively unthreatening assault. As plan

ned, the muwalladun soldiers fled before him, leading him some distance

away from Granada. Suddenly, Hafs' cavalry appeared at this point andattacked Sawwar IbnHamdun from all sides, preventing him from retreatingtohis fortresslhambra.He was quickly illed.Hafs brought is dead bodyback toElvira as a war trophy,where itspeople rejoiced at the victory and

the death of theirArab enemy. Women who had lost husbands, brothers

and sons in the Arab raids and thus had particular reason to hate Sawwar




IbnHamdun, cut his dead body to pieces. Some, according to IbnHayyan,

even ate of his flesh.112

These eventswhich tookplace in theyear277/890, remendouslyweakened the Arab population of the region ofElvira. In order to preservetheir racial unity, they appointed Sa'Id ibn Sulayman Ibn Judi as their leader,

whom they trusted as most qualified to lead the Arab cause.113 Sa'Id ibn

Sulayman Ibn Judi did manage to achieve some degree of consensus with

regard odecisions. IbnHayyan characterizesaTd ibnSulayman bnJudias the archetype of the Arab traditional leader?courageous, an ac

complished warrior andan

excellent equestrian,he was also a

good poetwho wrote qasTdahs well, and was a master rhetorician. However, he was

notas skillfuls hispredecessor. e was unable tobridgethegap leftbythe death of Sawwar Ibn Hamdun, despite his almost constant attacks on

the muwalladun in general and 'Umar Ibn Hafsun in particular.

One of themajor politicalgoalsofSa'Td ibnSulayman bnJudiwasto sack the city of Bajjanah, a feat which his predecessor had attemptedwithoutsuccess.At that ime heregion fBajjanahwas ruledin thename

of amir 'Abd Allah by the wall 'Abd al-Razzaq Ibn 'Isa, who had gainedfame forhis strict administration. He controlled thieves and other outsiders

so forcefully that, according to the sources, citizens could leave theirmer

chandiseunattended nanyplace with little earof theft. his ledmanymerchants from surrounding areas to relocate to Pechina because of its

security, which rapidly increased its economic prosperity. This growingwealth quickly caught the attention of not so rich or prosperous neighbours,however. The Ghassanid Arabs, moved by their desire to acquire a consid

erable booty, thus forged an alliance with the Arab leaders inGranada,who had similar interests. First allied with Sawwar IbnHamdun al-Muharibi,

they renewed this relationship with his successor Sa'Id ibn Sulayman IbnJudi.Probablyhopingfor shareof the localwealth,Sa'Id ibnSulaymanIbn Judi ttackedtheportofBajjanahwith his soldiers n theyear276/890,shortly after Sawwar Ibn Hamdun's dissapearance. Despite their efforts,and a siege that lasted several days, the Arabs led by Sa'Id ibn SulaymanIbn Judiwere unable to force the city to surrender. Unexpectedly, however,

fifteen Catalonian warships, commanded by Sunier II arrived at Almeria,themajor port of the region of Pechina, with intentions similar to theArabs.

Sa'Id ibnSulayman bnJudi,thinkinghat theCatalonianshad arrived o

assist the local inhabitants against theArabs, fled from the area. In fact,the Catalonians were successfully repulsed by the residents of Almeria and

decidedtonegotiate. hey lefthe ort tthe ametime sSaid ibn ulaymanIbn Judi.

Sa'Id ibnSulayman bnJudi as betrayed ndkilled inthemonthof




Dhu'l-Qa'adah, 284/897.114 The Arabs were then led byMuhammad ibn

Adha Ibn 4Abd al-Latif al-Hamadanl, who had had a personal rivalrywithSaid ibn Sulayman Ibn Judi for some time. The two had disagreed about

the relationship that their people and cities were to have with the central

government.115

As a factor furthercomplicating the inter-ethnic rivalries and political

problems of southern al-Andalus at that time, themuwalladun revolted

against the central authority. In their eyes, the government had shown itself

unable toprotect hemfrom erious conomic nd social tensionsthey ad

to face. Arabs revolted simultaneously in several places against theUmayyadauthority for similar reasons. Berbers, meanwhile, aggravated the already

prevalent traditional and political rivalry between Arabs and muwalladun

with their upport f 'Umar bnHafsun.Thiswas undoubtedly reflectionof themajor framework of inter-ethnic conflict in al-Andalus, as well as the

political and social problems between Arabs and Berbers.

However, not all Berbers supported themuwalladun cause. Both Ibn

Hayyan and IbnTdhariexplain that ome, includingheBanuMuhallab,

fought against 'Umar Ibn Hafsun. These Berbers were represented mainlyby the twobrothers halfland Said, membersof a notableBerber familyin he urah fElvira.They stronglypposed 'Umar bnHafsunandsuccessfullyccupied importantortressesntheregion, ithKhalflcontrollinghefortress ofQardhirah and Said that ofAshbarghirah. Despite their strategically important location, these fortresses occupied by the Banu Muhallabremained loyal to amir 4AbdAllah.116

Amir 'Abd Allah never stopped combatting 'Umar IbnHafsun. Con

stantly, on an almost annual basis, he

organized

a

campaignto attack either

'Umar IbnHafsun or any of his numerous allies in the provinces ofRayyah,Murcia, Sevilla, Ja6n, the Kurah of C6rdoba, or elsewhere. Amir 'AbdAllah was greatly concerned by thismajor revolt which exemplified thesocial unrest, ethnic tensions and political upheavals in al-Andalus duringhis reign. On many occasions the royal campaigns met with less success thanthe mirhad expected. he royal rmiesused all themilitary echniquesfthe time to subdue rebel fortresses (husun) or cities?diplomatic channels,intrigues, repression and executions. Frequently the royal army burned

crops, cut trees and devastated extensive regions to force a rebel to surrender

and keep insurgents under the tightest possible control. The muwalladun,however, remained successful for some time in resisting the attacks of theamir. Bobastro, which remained the unquestioned centre of operations for'Umar Ibn Hafsun throughout thisperiod, is a prime example.




CONCLUSION

In the time of 'Abd Allah, the social and ethnic tensions, rivalries

and conflicts reached the peak of their momentum in the province of

Ishbfliyahn theyear276/889-302/914nd in Ilblrahbetween theyears276/889 and 284/897. The discrimination, confrontationalism, assassinations,

intrigues and ultimately, open war, portrayed in the literature and in the

poetry f thetime, ccurredfor variety f reasons.The hatredderived

from various economic, political, ethnic, social and religious interests, and

motivated the numerous conflicts analysed in thispaper. The many confron

tations, alliances and frequent rebellions by both Arabs and Muwalladunagainst the central authority and against themselves caused severe politicaland economictroubles othe mir4bdAllah.His loss f control n outhern

al-Andalus, combined with his frequent campaigns tokeep under his author

itythe al-Thaghr al-A'ld where theBanu Qasi and other groups had revolted,

his need to secure the frontiers of al-Andalus from theChristian kingdomsof theNorth, and his inabilityo levytaxes,made 'AbdAllah devotehisentire rule to the preservation of governmental unity. To do so, he used all

possiblemeans, includingiddinghimself f thosewho would oppose him.

Amir 'AbdAllah thusskilfully

othmaintainedorder inal-Andalusandsustained theUmayyad dynasty in the Iberian Peninsula.lt was 'Abd Allah's

grandson, Abd al-Rahman III, who finallydefeated and subjugated ll

rebels inal-Andalus. He also secured the frontiersof his emirate; he defeated

theNorthern hristianKingdomsand imposedtributesn them. e also

reorganized a strong fleet for the vigilance of the coasts and preservationof territorial unity against any international attacks. 'Abd al-Rahman III

even declared inh 317/929 a caliphate which attained the highest economic,

political and cultural splendour of Islam in al-Andalus.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Abu Marwan Ibn Hayyan, Kitdo al-Muqtabis fi Akhbdr RijOl al-Andalus, edited byMelchor

Martinez Antuna, Chronique du regne du calife umaiyade 'Abd Allah a Cordoue (Paris:Librairie Orientaliste, 1937, vol. HI, p. 63). IbnHayyan affirms that thispoet met a tragicend because of the poetry he wrote. For more details about theway he was captured and

killed see: IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, p. 66. His dead body was dumped in an abandoned

ditch as a punishment for his poem (see, p. 66).2. IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, p. 63.

3. Ibid. Ill, p. 64.

4. Ibid. pp. 64-66. At thispoint it is important to bring up the importance of poetry and what

itmeant to the Arabs and the muwalladun of that time. According to the various Arabic

sources, poetry was extremely important. The rulers always had good poets in their courts

to praise them and to extol the successes of the dynasty. Poetry especially described the

military triumphs over the enemies. The enemies of theUmayyad dynasty and the central

authorityrequentlyountered iththepresence f somegood poetswho described he

courage and themilitary activities of the leaders. For example, Muhammad ibn IsmiH Ibn



310 slamic Studies, 32:3 (1993)

Qalfat al-Maghribi, who composed good poems inhonour of amir 'Abd Allah as well as in

honour of some of the rebelleaders,

asexplained by

IbnHayyan (see:

IbnHayyan, al-Muq

tabis, III, p. 48). Ibn Hayyan wrote:

J&j AiSI^ j^VI(Both his prose and his poetry were beautiful. He had high praise for the amir

'Abd Allah as well as for a great number of other rulers of the insurrection.)

Amir 'Abd Allah had several poets in his court. This was common at that time. The same

is also true of many other Umayyad leaders. Among themwas 'Abd Allah's famous poetAhmad ibn Ibrahim Ibn Qalzam, who was also one of his advisers. He was a renowned poet

highlyadmired and

respectedin

al-Andalus. Because of his other activitiesas

adviser of theamir, he had to join several military expeditions which, according to IbnHayyan, he stronglydisliked. The military commander Ahmad ibnMuhammad Ibn Abu' Abdah made the poet's

expeditions a little less difficult and painful by providing him with servants and assistants.

In return, the poet frequently wrote verses praising the hospitality, generosity and good

military qualities of the commander Ahmad ibnMuhammad Ibn Abu 'Abdah, as is also

explained in detail by Ibn Hayyan (see: Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, p. 47). For the

importance of poetry during 'AbdAllah's emirate see, IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, passim.5. Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp. 66-67.

6. Ibid. p. 67.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ahmad Ibn 'Umar Anas al-'Udhri, Kitdb TarsV al-Akhbdr wa TanwV al-Athdr wa I-Bus tan

ftGhard'ib al-Buldan wa'l-Masdlik ila Jamt al-Mamalik, edited by 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Ahwani

(Madrid: Ma'had al-Dirasat al-Islamiyyah bi Madrid, 1965), pp. 101-102. Jacinto Bosch

Vila, Sevilla Isldmica, 712-1248 (Sevilla: Universidad de Sevilla, 1988), p. 28, and also pp.

53-54. The renowned Spanish scholar Jacinto Bosch Vila in his book on Islamic Sevilla,

wrote about these events the following convincing lines:

La rebelidn de aquellos muladfes sin duda tenfaque ver con la conducta displicente

de las familias senoriales arabes y no era otra cosa que la primera y grave manifes

taci6n de una contenida rivalidad entre hispanomusulmanes, de viejas y arraigadastradiciones en suelo sevillano, y arabes, los nuevos "senores", propietarios de

grandes tineas rusticas que pretendfan ejercer y de hecho ejerdan su hegemoniaen la ciudad y en el campo. Era tambien la expresi6n de una progresiva descomposi

ci6n social y polftica, cuyo detonante era la administraci6n Omeya de C6rdoba, o

si se prefiere, el propio emir. (Sevilla, pp. 53-54)See also Evariste Ldvi-Provencal, "Espana Musulmana 711-1031", inRam6n Menendez

Pidal, Historia de Espana (Madrid: Espasa Calpe S.A., 1950), pp. 230-31.

10. Ibn al-Qutiyyah, Ta'rikh lftitahal-Andalus, edited and Spanish translation by Julian Ribera

(Madrid: Tipografia de la Revista de Archivos, 1926), passim, especially pp. 36-40. See

also the detailed analysis of this source and its importance inMaria Isabel Fierro, "La obra

hist6rica de Ibn al-Qutiyyah", inAl-Qantara, 10 (1989), 2, pp. 485-512.

11. Bosch Vila, Sevilla, pp. 61 ff.For more details see also, Ibn al-Khatib, al-Ihatah fi Akhbdr

Gharndtah, fragment edited and French translation byReinhart Dozy, Recherches sur I'his

toire et la litteraturede I'Espagne pendant leMoyen Age (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1881), vol. II,

pp. 79-83, especially pp. 79-80. For theArabic textof this fragment see, Dozy, Recherches,II, pp. vii-x, Appendix number II.

12. For more information about theUmayyad caliph Hisham ibn 'Abd al-Malik see, al-Hafiz

Jalal al-Dfn 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn Abu Bakr al-Suyuti, Ta'rikh al-Khulafd', edited byMuhammad MuhyTal-Din 'Abd al-Hamid (Cairo: Matba'ah al-Madani, 1964), pp. 247-250.

Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad ibnYazid IbnMajah, Ta'rikh al-Khulafd', edited byMuhammad

Muti al-Hafiz (Damascus: Matbu'at Majma al-Lughat al-'Arabiyyah bi-Dimashq, 1979), pp.




33-34. Muhammad Ibn Jarir al-Tabari, Ta'rikh al-Rusul wa'l-Muluk, edited byM.J. de

Goeje (Leiden: E.J. BriU, 1879-1901), passim, especially II, pp. 1466-1471. Abu'l-Hasan

'AH ibn al-Husayn ibn 'All al-Mas'ucfi, Muruj al-Dhahab wa Ma'ddin al-Jawhar, edited byC. Barbier de Meynard and Pavet de Courteille (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1917), V, pp.

465-481. Ahmad ibn Abu Ya'qub al-Ya'qubi, Ta'rikh al-Ya'qubi, edited by Th. Houtsma

(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1883; reprint Beirut: Dar Sadr and Dar Bay rut, 1960), vol. II, pp.

316-319. See also: Ahmad Ibn4Abd Allah al-Baghdadi, Kitdb Uyun Akbar al-A'ydn mim

man Mada fi Sdlif al-'Usur wa'l-Azman, manuscript number 2411 (Mixt. 1608) in theOster

reichischen Nationalbibliothek, Vienna, pp. 37 ff., and also p. 40, where this author also

explains the death of the caliph al-Walid I. Yasin Ibn Khayr Allah al-'Umari al-Mawsill,

al-Durr al-Maknun fi'l-Ma'athir al-Mddiyyah min al-Qurun, manuscript number 2412 (Mixt.

1607) in the Osterreichischen Nationalbibliothek, Vienna, passim, especially pp. 26-27. See

also, al-Malik al-Mawid Abu'l-Fida', Mukhtasar min Ta'rikh al-Bashr, manuscript number

1641 n theReal Bibliotecade El Escorial,passim, specially . 123,where this uthoraffirms that Sulayman received the news of the death of al-Walid I inRamalah, seven dayslater. For this reason he rushed toDamascus to seize power. In this respect Abu'l-Fida'

wrote the following lines:

(When the aliph] l-Walid ied in the ity fRamallah, Sulayman]eceived hisnews seven days later and he hastened toDamascus, where he entered [to seize

power as the new caliph].)

See also: Muhammad al-Shatibi, Kitdb al-Jumdnfi Mukhtasar fi Akhbar al-Zamdn, manus

cript number 4998, inBiblioteca National deMadrid, passim, especially pp. 143 ff. See also

the anonymous manuscript number 5391 inBiblioteca National de Madrid. A close studyof thismanuscript reveals that it is based entirely on al-ShatibTs Kitdb al-JumdnfiMukhtasar

fi Akhbdr al-Zamdn, with the only difference that it isupdated till the later times. This could

mean that a copyist added thenew information thatwas not contained in theKitdb al-Jumdn,

but changed fewwords along the text, slightly modifying the style. This manuscript does

not provide either the name of the new author or the title of the text. The reason for this

could have been that the firstpage of themanuscript ismissing. Besides, it is also extremelly

difficulto eterminef his anuscriptas intendedo e consideredswritteny different

author, under a new title. It contains the updated information. However, there is no men

tioningof al-Shatibfs name. For more details about this

Umayyad caliph

see also: Roberto

Marin-Guzman, Popular dimensions of theAbbasid Revolution. A Case Study ofMedieval

Islamic social History (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Fulbright-LASPAU, 1990), passim, espe

cially . 21;p. 33;p. 67;p. 101.G.R. Hawting,TheFirst ynasty f Islam London nd

Sydney: Croom Helm Ltd., 1986), passim. Francesco Gabrieti, "Hisham", inEncyclopaedia

of Islam (2) (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971), vol. Ill, pp. 493-4%. Hugh Kennedy, The Prophetand the age of theCaliphates. The Islamic Near East from the Sixth to theEleventh Century

(New York and London: Longman, 1986), passim, especially pp. 120 ff.

13. For more details about Sara laGoda and Olmundo's descendants, aswell as theirpropertiessee, Ibn al-Qutiyyah, Ta'rikh Iftitdhal-Andalus, passim, especially pp. 36-40. See also,

Bosch Vila, SevWa, passim, especially pp. 60-63.

14. Bosch Vila, Sevilla, p. 62.

15. For more information about theLakhm tribe and their original settlement in al-Hirah see,Abu Muhammad 'Abd Allah IbnQutaybah, al-Ma'drif, edited byTharwat 'Ukashah (Cairo,

1969), p. 645-650.Abu 'Umar hmad ibn uhammad bn Abd abbihi, l-Iqd al-Farid

(Cairo,1948-1953), I,p. 85.AbuMuhammad d-Hasanhmad ibnYa'qub ibn usuf ibnDa'ud al-Hamadani, Kitdb Sifdh Jazirat al-'Arab, edited by Heinrich Mttller (Leiden: E.J.

Brill, 1968), pp. 129-131; pp. 205-206. Abu'l-Hasan Ahmad ibnYahyft al-Baladhuri, Futuh

al-Buld&n, edited byM.J. de Goeje (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1866; second edition Leiden: E.J.




Brill, 1968), p. 59 and p. 136. Abu Hanifah Ahmad ibn Da'ud al-DInawari, al-Akhbar

al-Tiwal, editedby

A.M. Amir and G.al-Shayyal (Cairo, 1960), pp.

54-55. Mas'udi,Muruj

al-Dhahab, IV, p. 353. Ya'qubi, Ta'rikh al-Ya'qubi, I, p. 229 and p. 264. Tabari, Ta'rikh

al-Rusul wa'l-Muluk, passim, especially I, p. 1102,1, pp. 1555-1556 and I, pp. 1604-1605.

Naji Hasan, al-Qabd'il al-Arabiyyah fi'l-Mashriq, Khilal al-'Asr al-Umawi (Beirut: Al

Matba'ah al-Hadithah, 1980), passim, especially pp. 36-37. Marin-Guzman, Popular, 11-12.

Roberto Marin-Guzman, "Las causas de la expansi6n islamica y los fundamentos del Imperio

Musulman, inRevista Estudios, 5 (1984), pp. 39-67. Roberto Marin-Guzman, El Islam:

ideologia eHistoria (San Jose\Costa Rica: Editorial Alma Mater, Cooperativa Universitaria

de Libros de laUniversidad de Costa Rica, 1986), p. 136. Roberto Marin-Guzman, "Algunasnotas sobre el origen, expansi6n y desarrollo del Islam", inTiempo Actual, 8 (1984), 32,

pp. 71-79. Carl Brockelmann, History of the Islamic Peoples, English translation by Joel

Carmichael and Moshe Perlman (New York: Capricorn Books, 1960), pp. 8-10. G. Roths

tein,Die Dynastie der Lakhmiden in al-Hira (Berlin, 1899), passim.16. EHas Teres, "Linajes arabes en al-Andalus. Segun laYamhara' de IbnHazm", inAl-Andalus,

22 (1957), 1, pp. 55-111. EHas Ter6s, "Linajes arabes en al-Andalus. Segun la 'Yamhara'

de Ibn Hazm", inAl-Andalus, 22 (1957), 2, pp. 337-376. See also Bosch Vila, Sevilla,

p. 62. For more details about the various Arab families, especially theMarwaniyyah in

al-Andalus, see EHas Ter6s, "Dos familias Marwames de al-Andalus", inAl-Andalus, 35

(1970), 1, pp. 93-117. For more details about theMarwaniyyah in al-Mashriq, seeMarin

Guzman, Popular, passim, especially pp. 24-33.

17. Ibn 'Idhari al-Marrakushi, al-Bayan al-Mughrib fi Akhbar al-Andalus wa'l-Maghrib, edited

by Reinhart Dozy, and G.S. Colin and E. L6vi-Provencal (Beirut: Dar al-Thaqafah, n.d.),

II, p. 15. See also Bosch Vila, Sevilla, pp. 17-19. There is discussion and controversy in

theArabic sources about the Muslim leader whoconquered Sevilla. Most

sourcesaffirmthat itwas Musa Ibn Nusayr, for example, Ibn 'Idhari, al-Bayan al-Mughrib, II, p. 14.

Akhbar Majmu'ah fi Fath al-Andalus, edited and Spanish translation by Emilio Lafuente y

Alcantara (Madrid: Imprenta M. Rivadeneyra, 1867), p. 16. IbnHayyan, al-Maqtabis, III,

passim. 'Izz al-Din Ibn al-Athfr, al-Kamilfi'l-Ta'rikh, edited byC.J. Tornberg (Leiden: E.J.

Brill, 1869, reprintBeirut, 1965), IV, p. 564. Abu'l-'Abbas Ahmad ibnMuhammad al-Maq

qari, Kitab Nafh al-Tib, edited by Reinhart Dozy and Gustave Dugat (Leiden: E.J. Brill,

1855-1861, reprint Amsterdam: Oriental Press, 1967) I, p. 269-270. However, Ibn al

Shabbat affirms that itwas Tariq. For this he provides a different itineraryof theMuslim

conquest. See Bosch Vila", Sevilla, pp. 16-17. See also Emilio de Santiago Sim6n, "Los

itinerarios de la conquista musulmana de al-Andalus a la luz de una nueva fuente: Ibn

al-Shabbat, inCuadernos de Historia del Islam, 3 (1971), pp. 7-49.

18. Akhbar Majmu'ah, pp. 93-94.19. Ibid. p. 93.

20. See Siraj al-Din Abu Hafe 'Umar ibn al-Muzaffar Ibn al-Wardi, Kharidat al-'Aja'ib wa

Faridat al-Ghara'ib, manuscript number 2406 (Mixt. 825), in theOsterreichischen National

bibliothek, Vienna, passim, especially pp. 43 ff.Abu 'Ubayd 'Abd Allah Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz

al-Bakri al-Qurtubi, Kitab al-Mamalik wa'l-Masalik (Kitab al-Mas&lik wa'l-Mamalik), man

uscript number 2404 (Mixt. 779) in theOsterreichischen Nationalbibliothek, pp. 27 ff. For

more details about the origins of theYemenites, or theQahtan confederation of the Southern

tribes. For more information about the expansion of theArab tribes and their settlements

in al-Andalus see Bakri, Kitab al-Mamalik wa'l-Masalik (Kitab al-Masdlik wa'l-Mamalik)

pp. 50 ff.; pp. 128-136, and p. 142, of the manuscript. Baghdad!, Kitab 'Uyun Akbar

al-A'yan, pp. 6-18,for a detailed

explanationof the

originsand

settlements of the variousSouthern Arab tribes. See also Abu'l-Fawaz Muhammad Amin al-Sawaydl, Saba'ik al

Dhahab fiMa'rifat Qab&'ilal-Arab, manuscript number 2420 (Mixt. 1378) in theOsterreichis

chen Nationalbibliothek, Vienna, passim, especially pp. 8-52; and formore details about

their rivalries and fighting, pp. 64-65. See also Ibn al-Khatib, al-Lamhah al-Badriyyahah

fi Dawlat al-Nasriyyah, manuscript number 4997 in the Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid,

passim. Ibn al-Khatib mentions the names of several of theArab tribes; themost important




21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

ones being the following: Qays 'Aylan, 'Abs ibnB&'id, Bahilah, Kilab, RabTah, Ka*b, Hilal,

Ghassan, Azd, Kindah, Ja'afi, Sa'd,Kalb. For more details about the Arab tribes in Sevilla

see also Bosch Vila, Sevilla, pp. 24-34; Maqqari, Nafh al-TTb, II, p. 24; Abu*l-Qasim 4Abd

al-Rahman ibn 'Abd Allah Ibn' Abd al-Hakam, FutuhMisr wa Akhbdruha, edited byDiaries

C. Torrey (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1920), passim, especially pp. 55-84; pp. 151-156; pp.

158-161; Hasan, al-Qabd'Ual-'Arabiyyah, pp. 39-60; Maru-Guzman, Popular, pp. 13-15.

Joaquin allve\ Espanaenel siglo III: Ejercitoy sociedad", nAl-Andalus, 3 (1978),pp. 51-112.

Bosch, Sevilla, pp. 24-34; Levi-Provencal, Espana Musulmana, pp. 228-234.

IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp. 51-52.

'Udhri, Tarst al-Akhbdr, pp. 101 ff. See also Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, p. 67.

IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, p. 68.

For more details about all these tribal divisions see IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, p. 68.

Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp. 70-73. See also Levi-Provencal, Espana Musulmana,

pp. 230-231.

See: 'Udhri, TarsV al-Akhbdr, pp. 101-102. Bosch Vila follows this interpretation and

understanding of these issues. He also relies on al-'Udhri, source that in his opinion is in

this respect more accurate than Ibn Hayy&n's al-Muqtabis. Since Levi-Provencal did not

know al-'Udhri, his understanding of these issues ismore limited. This is,what the Spanish

scholar Bosch ViU wrote:

Ibn Ghalib acudid a \y le ofreci6 un regalo, dando muetras de adhesion hacia su

persona, pero como tantas veces ha ocurrido en la historia, aquel gesto suyo no

fuemas que un ardid para que no sospechara de 61, y de su entrada en la ciudad.

Secretamente se puso en contacto con los principales muladles sevillanos y entr6

en tratos con ellospara,

una vez deregreso

a su castilloy

surtido deprovisiones,

declararse rebelde a la autoridad de Cordoba. (Bosch Vila, Sevilla, p. 53).IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, p. 68.

Ibid. p. 68-69. Ibn Hayyan wrote the following lines (p. 69):

(He [KuraybbnKhaldun] eft[fromevilla] ndsettledn village n he l-Sharafnamed al-Balat [fromwhere] he started inciting the people of the al-Sharaf. Most

of these peoplewere

supporters of thecause

of theHadramawt and many of themresponded to his call. [Kurayb Ibn Khaldun] then dispatched emissaries toNiebla

and Sidonia.)

For a good description of the importance and rich area of al-Sharaf, near Sevilla, see the

anonymous Dhikr Bildd al-Andalus, edited and Spanish translation byLuis Molina (Madrid:

Consejo Superior de Investigations Cientificas, 1983), I, pp. 60-61 and II, p. 67. For more

information about the agricultural production of Sevilla and the surrounding areas see also:

Ibn Ghalib. Kitdb Farhat al-Anfus, edited by Lutfi 'Abd al-BadT, inMajallah Ma'had al

Makhtutat al-'Arabiyyah, 1 (1955), 2, pp. 292-293. Abu 'Abd Allah Muhammad al-Idrisf,

al-Maghrib wa Ard al-Suddn wa Misr wa'l-Andalus, min KM Nuzhat al-Mushtdq fl Ikhtirdq

al-Af&qDescriptione I 'AfriquetdeVEspagne)dited ndFrench ranslationyReinhart

Dozy and M.J. de Goeje (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1866, reprint, Amsterdam: Oriental Press,

1969), passim, especially p. 174 (pp. 208-209 of the French translation). See also: Shams

al-Din Abu'l-Barakat Muhammad ibnAhmad Ibn Iyas al-Hanafi, Kitdb Nashq al-Azhdrfi

'AjS'ib l-AqUhr,anuscriptumber407 Mixt. 228) nthe sterreichischenationalbib

liothek, Vienna, passim, especially pp. 218 ff.Siraj al-DIn Abu Hafs 'Umar ibn al-Muzaffar

Ibn al-WarcH, Kharidat al-'Aj&'ib wa Faridat al-Ghar&'ib, manuscript number 2406 (Mat.

825), in theOsterreichischen Nationalbibliothek, Vienna, passim, especially pp. 12 fl. See



314 slamic Studios, 32:3 (1993)

also M'hammad Benaboud, al-Ta'rikh al-Siydsi wa'l-Ijtimd'i li-Ishbiliyah fi 'AndDuwal al

Tawd'if (Tertian:Matabi

al-Shiyukh, 1983), passim.E.

Fagnan;Extraits intdits

relatifsau

Maghrib (Argel,1924),p. 85; pp. 137-138.Joaqufhallve\ a Divisidnterritoriale la

Espana Musulmana (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones CientiTicas, 1986), pp.322-323. Rachel Arid, Espana Musulmana, inManuel Tunon de Lara, Historia de Espana

(Barcelona: Editorial Labor S.A., 1987), pp. 220-235.

31. IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp. 71-73. See also Bosch Vila, Sevilla, p. 56; Levi-Provencal,

Espana Musulmana, p. 231. .

32. Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, p. 71.

33. Ibid., p. 72. IbnHayyan wrote the following lines (p. 72):

.0jjJalaJI ^j-a (JLi-alJ*ic îc

(They attacked an island that belonged to al-Mundhir Ibn 'Abd al-Rahman, uncle

of the amir 'Abd Allah, who was known as al-Asliyah. In the island there were

100mares and 200 cows with calves. There was a trustee named Far as, who was

killed by the attackers. They pillaged the island and went with a rich booty to the

fortress ofCoria (del Rio) at the far end of the al-Sharaf, tenmiles from the capital

[Sevilla, the capital of the province].)


35. See IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp. 83-84. See also Levi-Provencal, Espana Musulmana,

p. 231; Bosch Vila, Sevilla, p. 56.


37. For more information about these events see IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp. 67-85. See

also Bosch Vila, Sevilla, p. 55; and Levi-Provencal, Espana Musulmana, pp. 228-234.

38. IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, HI, p. 69.

39. Ibid, p 73.

40. Ibn Hayyan describes in detail the events concerning Ja'd's war and hismilitary success to

save his brother Umayyah and theUmayyad prince Muhammad. They were in danger in

the castle. They had been besieged by the people who probably wanted to kill them. This

Andalusian historian also informs about the injuries thatUmayyah received, during thewar,

in his face and in his chest. For more details about thewar and the related events see Ibn

Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp. 70-75, mainly p. 75.

41. For more details about all these various interpretations see Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, III,

pp. 71- 73.

42. Ibn Hayyan (al-Muqtabis, III, p. 75) affirms that theirproperties were confiscated.

43. For more information about these events as well as the detailed explanations about the

complot between Umayyah and Ibn Wahb see IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp. 75-76.

44. For a detailed description of these issues see IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp. 84-85. See

also Levi-Provencal, Espana Musulmana, p. 232, who understands that the w&ti of Sevilla

faced his enemies outside his palace, where he was killed. He wrote: "Tras de degollar a

susmujeres, desjarretar

a sus caballosy quemar

susobjetos preciosos,

sali6 de supalacio

para buscar y encontrar una muerte her6ica." A different understanding of these details is

in al-'Udhri, and inBosch Vila's Sevilla Isldmica. Bosch Vil& follows al-'Udhri. Accordingto this author, afterUmayyah noted that his position was weak and unbearable, he killed

his concubines, forsake his wives, burned his belongings and then killed himself. Bosch Vila

wrote:

El error de Umayya, una venganza personal, iba a tener graves consecuencias para




Sevilla y, sobre todo, para la autoridad omeya que se vio rechazada de piano. Tal

era la intenci6n de las grandes familias arabes sevillanas. La suerte del vengativoe iluso gobernador Umayya no fuemejor que la de losmuladfes. Rebasado porlos acontecimientos, sus planes para contener la aristocracia arabe enardecida

fracasaron y, acosado y perdido, mat6 a sus favoritas, entreg6 a las llamas cuanto

poseia, abandonb a su esposa y semat6 hundilndose la espada en el pecho. (Bosch

Vila, Sevilla, p. 59)

45. Bosch Vila, Sevilla, p. 59-60.

46. This is also the opinion of the historian IbnHayyan. See Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp.77-78 formore details about the ways the amir's emissary was treated by the rulers of

Sevilla. They gave him only a small piece of bread and a small piece of meat. The amir's

emissary also received the minimum food forhis horse. He was confined in Sevilla and he

could not do anything without the authorization and consent of the Banu Hajjaj and the

Banu Khaldun (pp. 77-78).47. For more details about these events and the complex political situation of hostages, armies

and agreements, see IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp. 77-80.

48. Levi-Provencal, Espana Musulmana, p. 233.

49. For more details see al-'Udhri, Tarst al-Akhb&r, p. 103.

50. 'Udhri, Tarst al-Akhbar, p. 103. According to 'Ali ibnAhmad ibn Said Ibn Hazm in his

Kitab Naqt al-Arus fi Taw&rif al-Khulafd' bi'l-Andalus, edited by C.f. Seybold, in Revista

del Centro de Estudios Histdricos de Granada, 3 (1911), pp. 160-180,4 (1911), pp. 237-248.

(Reprintalencia:AnubarEdiciones,1974) p. 167), brahimbnHajjaj dideverythingehad to do in order to accomplish his objectives, even to kill his own brother Sulayman, as

is related by IbnHazm,

(Ibrahim IbnHajjaj, the sovereign of Sevilla, strangled his brother Sulayman.)

For more details about these events see also Bosch Vitt, Sevilla, p. 65.

51. IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp. 11-13, where IbnHayyan provides detailed information

about this rebel and his relations with theUmayyad government and with other rebels in

the time of the amir 'Abd Allah. According to al-'Udhri, he also attacked, with his followers,

the city and fortress of Shadhunah (Sidonia). (See 'Udhri, Tarst al-Akhbar, p. 103). For

more details about the province of Shadhunah see also Gamal 'Abd al-Karim, "La Espana

Musulmana en la obra de Yaqut (Siglos XII-XIII)", inCuadernos de Historia del Islam, 6

(1974), 13-354, especially pp. 194-195.

52. 'Udhri, Tarst al-Akhb&r, p. 103.53. Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, p. 11. For more details see also pp. 12-13. For further

information see also 'Udhri, Tarst al-Akhb&r, pp. 103-104.

54. See al-'Udhri, Tarst al-Akhbar, pp. 103-104. See also Levi-Provencal, Espana Musulmana,

p. 233.

55. IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, HI, pp. 11-12. Seealso: 'Udhri, Tarst al-Akhb&r, pp. 103-104.

56. 'Udhri, Tarst al-Akhb&r, p. 103-104. Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp. 131-132. Bosch

Vila, Sevilla, p. 68. Levi-Provencal, Espana Musulmana, p. 233.

57. M'hammad Benaboud, al-Ta'rikh al-Siy&si wa'l-Ijtim&'i li Ishbiliyah, passim. See also my

review of this book inEstudios de Asia yAfrica, number 90, January-April, 1993.

58. 'Udhri, Tarst al-Akhbar, p. 103.

59: About Ibrahim Ibn Hajjaj's son kept as hostage in the capital of the emirate of al-Andalus

see IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, passim, especially pp. 55-57. See also Bosch Vila, Sevilla,

passim, pp. 66-69.

60. For more details about this alliance between Ibrahim Ibn Hajjaj and themuwallad leader

of Bobastro, 'Umar Ibn Hafsun, see 'Udhri, Tarst al-Akhbar, pp. 103-104.

61. 'Udhri, Tarst al-Akhb&r, p. 103. Bosch Vila, Sevilla, p. 68.

62. L?vi-Provencal, Espana Musulmana, p. 239.

63. 'Udhri, Tarst al-Akhb&r, p. 103. See also Bosch Vila\ Sevilla, p. 69.




64.

65.

66.

67.

68.

69.

70.

71.

72.

73.

74.

75.

76.

77.

78.

79.

80.

'Udhri, Tarst al-Akhbdr, pp. 103-104.

'Udhri,Tarst

al-Akhbdr} p.104. See also Abu Marwan Ibn

Hayyan, al-Muqtabis,edited

by Pedro Chalmeta, Federico Corriente andM. Subh (Madrid: InstituteHispano-Arabe de

Cultura, 1979), V, pp. 69-70 (Crdnica del califa 'Abdarrahman 111, an-Nasir entre los anos

912 y 942, Spanish translation byMaria Jesus Viguera and Federico Corriente, Zaragoza:Anubar Ediciones, 1981), p. 63 of the Spanish translation. Bosch Vila, Sevilla, p. 70.

Bosch Vila, Sevilla, p. 70-71. Camilo Alvarez de Morales,"Approximation a la figura de

Ibn Abi '1-Fayyad y su obra histbrica", in Cuadernos de Historia del Islam, 9 (1978-79),

pp. 29-128. See also Bosch Vila, Sevilla, p. 70.

See the anonymous Una Crdnica Andnima de 'Abd al-Rahmdn HI al-Ndsir, edited and

Spanish translation byE. Levi-Provencal and Emilio Garcia Gomez (Madrid-Granada: Con

sejoSuperior e Investigacionesienrificas,nstitutoMiguelAsm, 1950), . 41 (p. 106 fthe Spanish translation). See also Ibn 'Idhari, al-Baydn al-Mughrib, U, p. 133.

Una Crdnica Andnima, p. 41 (p. 106 of the Spanish translation). See also Ibn Idhari,

al-Baydn al-Mughrib, II, p. 133.

For more information about the amir 'Abd al-Rahman III, and his reforms and strongadministration of al-Andalus see IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, V, passim; Maqqari, Nafh al-TTb,

passim; Una Crdnica Andnima, passim.See Una Crdnica Andnima, p. 41 (p. 106 of the Spanish translation).IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, V, pp. 70-71 (pp. 63-64 of the Spanish translation). Bosch Vila,

Sevilla, pp. 72-73.

For more details see Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp. 128-132.

For more information see 'Udhri, Tarst al-Akhbdr, p. 104.

'Udhri , arst al-Akhbdr, p. 104.

IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, V, pp. 73-76 and pp. 84-85. See also Bosch Vila, Sevilla, p. 74.

'Udhri ,Tarst al-Akhbdr, p. 104.

Bosch Vila, Sevilla, p. 75. In this respect he wrote the following lines:

Badr entr6 en la capital sevillana haciendo pregonar la concesi6n del amdn, es decir

dio seguridad de respetar sus vidas a toda la poblaci6n, tranquilizd los animos delas gentes y anunci6 que quienes hubieran sufrido algun dano o perjuicio, serian

debidamente resarcidos del mismo. Tambien concedi6 el amdn, lamisma tarde desu entrada en la ciudad, a los caballeros del ejercito sevillano, unos mil dice la

crdnica, que habian quedado fuera, retirados en un cerro al sur de la capital, yordenti dejar las puertas de la muralla abiertas toda la noche del lunes al martes

para que pudieran discretamente entrar yvolver a sus hogares. Las medidas tomadas

por Badr permitieron que cada uno se reintegrara a su sitio, y acabar con las

presuntuosas veleidades senoriales de los Banu Hayyay sevillanos, sin derramamiento alguno de sangre. (Sevilla, p. 75)

Bosch Vila, Sevilla, p. 76. IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, V, p. 83 (p. 74 of theSpanish translation).Bosch Vila, Sevilla, p. 76.

For more information in this respect see 'Udhri, Tarst al-Akhbdr, p. 104, who wrote the

following lines:

([Badr] attacked Ishbiliyah and called forobedience. [After his victory] he returned

toCordoba[accompanied by

Ahmad IbnMaslamah whocomplied

with the condi

tions]. [Ahmad IbnMaslamah was well received inCordoba] where he was ap

pointed supreme chief of police.)

For more details about his death see also 'Udhri, Tarst al-Akhbdr, p. 104.Al-'Udhri wrote:




(He died in Cordoba inMuharram in the year 327.)

81. Levi-Provencal, Espana Musulmana, pp. 219-223.

82. IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, passim, especially III, pp. 51-52 and pp. 61-62. For more details

see also Vallve\ Divisidn, p. 270.

83. IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp. 61-62. See also Levi-Provencal: Espana Musulmana, p.

220.

'

84. Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, m, p. 62.

85. For more details see Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp. 61-62.

86. Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, HI, pp. 61-62.

87. Ibid. p. 61. For more details about these events in Elvira see also Ibid. pp. 56-57.


89. For more details about Sawwar's call for theArab 'asabiyyah see IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis,

HI, pp. 55-57.90. Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, HI, pp. 54-55.

91. Ibid. p. 55. Some sources affirm that the killings were so numerous that theArabs extermi

nated all their enemies, which seems to be an exaggeration. However, this is important

because it shows the hatred and the social tensions and problems in these regions of today's

Andaluda. See Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, in, pp. 54-67. These events are also portrayedin the poetry written by some Arabs of that time. The poetry depicts the rejection and scorn

for theirmuwaUad enemies. The muwalladun are called infidels, enemies ofAllah, apostates

and heretics. See IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp. 64-65 for the descriptions of theArabs

being noble and superior to the muwalladun.

92. Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, HI, pp. 55-56. For more details about these issues Ibn Hayyan

wrote the following lines: "Sawwar led Ja'd as his prisoner toGranada, where he was keptuntil he was rescued."

93. IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, p. 56.

94. Ibid.'

95. Ibid. p. 24. See also Ibn 'Idhari, al-Bayan al-Mughrib, II, p. 136.

96. IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, p. 24. See also Ibn 4Idhari,al-Bayan al-Mughrib, II, p. 136.

97. Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, HI, p. 24. The other major Arabic sources have only vague

references about these issues. For theunderstanding of these events, al-Muqtabis has probably

themost detailed accounts.

98. Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, p. 24. Ibn Hayyan explains, with the following lines, the

events after the killing of Khayr Ibn Shakir,

([Al-Uhaymir] sent to Ibn Hafsun the head ofKhayr Ibn Shakir. Ibn Hafsun sent

ittoCordoba to theamir 'AbdAllah. [The amir] thanked him greatly for his action.)

99. IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, p. 55-56.

100. Ibid.'p. 56.

101. Ibid. pp. 55-56 and pp. 60-61.

102. Ibid. p. 56. This historian explains that the battle was equally bloody for both armies: but

when the people of Elvira saw the courage of Sawwar's soldiers, and their furious resistance

in thebattle, they fled and started running in theopen field, fleeing inaway that IbnHayyan

characterizes as shameful. For more details see also Levi-Provencal, Espana Musulmana,

p. 222.

103. IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp. 56-62.

104. IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp. 87-89. See also Levi-Provencal, Espana Musulmana, pp.

225 ff.,where there is a detailed analysis of these events.

105. For more details see Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, p. 53, and III, pp. 87-89. See also

Vallve*, Divisidn, pp. 266-267.



318slamic Studies, 32:3 (1993)

106. IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, passim, especially III, pp. 54-66.

107. Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp. 60-61.108. Ibid. p. 61. See also Ibn 'Idhari, al-Bayan al-Mughrib, II, p. 134.

109. IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp. 60-61. For more details and for complementary informa

tion see Ibn 'Idhari, al-Bayan al-Mughrib, II, p. 134.

110. IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp. 60-61. For more information about these events and the

killing of Sawwar Ibn Hamdun see Ibn Idhari, al-Bayan al-Mughrib, II, p. 134, who givesthename of a different person responsible for thekilling of Sawwar IbnHamdun. Ibn 'Idhari

wrote the following lines:

(Ja'd, the sovereign of Elvira, sent to Ibn Hafsun the head of Sawwar.)


112. Ibid. This practice of revenge and themutilation of a dead body was not new in the Islamic

empire. This was practised by theMakkans at the time of the Prophet Muhammad in the

battle fUhud. After he akkanvictoryn hud,Hindandother omen rom he akkan

leadership revenged the deaths at Badr. They cut pieces of the dead Muslims and made

rings out of their noses and ears, as it ismentioned in the sources. See also Francesco

Gabrieli, Mahoma y las conquistas del Islam (Madrid: Guadarrama, 1967), pp. 113-114.

Maxime Rodinson, Mahoma, El nacimiento del Islam (Mexico: Era, 1974), pp. 192-193.

Brockelmann, History, pp. 25-26. Mann-Guzman, El Islam: Ideologta eHistoria, passim,

especially pp. 139-141. Marin-Guzman, "Las causas" passim, especially pp. 29-67. Marin

Guzman, "Algunas notas", pp. 71-79.113. Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, p. 61.

114. IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, p. 61, see also pp. 123-125, where the famous historian Ibn

Hayyan provides examples of his poetry, and gives more specific information about his

character and activities as a leader of the Arabs. Still Ibn Hayyan provides details and

abundant information about this Arab leader in several places in his al-Muqtabis (see pp.

29-31).He alsoexplains hatnthe arsandrivalriesetweenaid ibn ulaymanbnJudiand 'Umar Ibn Hafsun, theArab challenged the muwallad leader to face him in a combat

person to person*. IbnHayyan explains the circumstances inwhich these events took place.

He affirms that Sa'id ibn Sulayman Ibn Judi defeated 'Umar Ibn Hafsun in the personal

combat. However, when he was just about to kill 'Umar IbnHafsun, themuwallad leader's

followers arrived on time to intervene and todefend theirqa'id. See IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis,

III, pp. 29-30.115. See Ibn 'Idhari, al-Bayan al-Mughrib, II, p. 134. See also IbnHayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, p.

31, and III, pp. 87-89 for a good description of the events that took place in the region of

Bajjanah and the participation of the Catalonians in the time of theArab attacks led by

Said ibn Sulayman Ibn Judi. See also Vallve, Divisidn, pp. 266-267.

116. See: Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, III, pp. 31-32. See also Ibn 'Idhari, al-Bayan al-Mughrib,

II, p. 137, where he mentions these Berber enemies of themuwallad 'Umar Ibn Hafsun,

but notwith the detailed explanations provided by IbnHayyan. For more information about

the other various revolts against the amir 'Abd Allah see Ibn Hayyan, al-Muqtabis, III,

passim, and Ibn 'Idhari, al-Bayan al-Mughrib, II, passim, especially II, pp. 137-140.

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Social and Ethic Tensions in Al Andalus Cases of Ishbiliya and Ilbirah the Role of Umar Ibn Hafsun

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