Social Engineering Fundamentals, Part I: Hacker TacticsSarah Granger 2001-12-18Social Engineering Fundamentals, Part I: Hacker Tactics by Sarah Granger last updated December 18, 2001

A True Story

One morning a few years back, a group of strangers walked into a large shipping firm and

walked out with access to the firm’s entire corporate network. How did they do it? By obtaining

small amounts of access, bit by bit, from a number of different employees in that firm. First, they

did research about the company for two days before even attempting to set foot on the

premises. For example, they learned key employees’ names by calling HR. Next, they pretended

to lose their key to the front door, and a man let them in. Then they "lost" their identity badges

when entering the third floor secured area, smiled, and a friendly employee opened the door for

them.

The strangers knew the CFO was out of town, so they were able to enter his office and obtain

financial data off his unlocked computer. They dug through the corporate trash, finding all kinds

of useful documents. They asked a janitor for a garbage pail in which to place their contents and

carried all of this data out of the building in their hands. The strangers had studied the CFO's

voice, so they were able to phone, pretending to be the CFO, in a rush, desperately in need of his

network password. From there, they used regular technical hacking tools to gain super-user

access into the system.

In this case, the strangers were network consultants performing a security audit for the CFO

without any other employees' knowledge. They were never given any privileged information

from the CFO but were able to obtain all the access they wanted through social engineering.

(This story was recounted by Kapil Raina, currently a security expert at Verisign and co-author of

mCommerce Security: A Beginner's Guide, based on an actual workplace experience with a

previous employer.)

Definitions

Most articles I’ve read on the topic of social engineering begin with some sort of definition like

“the art and science of getting people to comply to your wishes” (Bernz 2), “an outside hacker’s

use of psychological tricks on legitimate users of a computer system, in order to obtain

information he needs to gain access to the system” (Palumbo), or “getting needed information

(for example, a password) from a person rather than breaking into a system” (Berg). In reality,

social engineering can be any and all of these things, depending upon where you sit. The one

thing that everyone seems to agree upon is that social engineering is generally a hacker’s clever

manipulation of the natural human tendency to trust. The hacker’s goal is to obtain information

that will allow him/her to gain unauthorized access to a valued system and the information that

resides on that system.

Security is all about trust. Trust in protection and authenticity. Generally agreed upon as the

weakest link in the security chain, the natural human willingness to accept someone at his or her

word leaves many of us vulnerable to attack. Many experienced security experts emphasize this

fact. No matter how many articles are published about network holes, patches, and firewalls, we

can only reduce the threat so much... and then it’s up to Maggie in accounting or her friend, Will,

dialing in from a remote site, to keep the corporate network secured.

Target and Attack

The basic goals of social engineering are the same as hacking in general: to gain unauthorized

access to systems or information in order to commit fraud, network intrusion, industrial

espionage, identity theft, or simply to disrupt the system or network. Typical targets include

telephone companies and answering services, big-name corporations and financial institutions,

military and government agencies, and hospitals. The Internet boom had its share of industrial

engineering attacks in start-ups as well, but attacks generally focus on larger entities.

Finding good, real-life examples of social engineering attacks is difficult. Target organizations

either do not want to admit that they have been victimized (after all, to admit a fundamental

security breach is not only embarrassing, it may damaging to the organization’s reputation)

and/or the attack was not well documented so that nobody is really sure whether there was a

social engineering attack or not.

As for why organizations are targeted through social engineering – well, it’s often an easier way

to gain illicit access than are many forms of technical hacking. Even for technical people, it’s

often much simpler to just pick up the phone and ask someone for his password. And most often,

that’s just what a hacker will do.

Social engineering attacks take place on two levels: the physical and the psychological. First,

we'll focus on the physical setting for these attacks: the workplace, the phone, your trash, and

even on-line. In the workplace, the hacker can simply walk in the door, like in the movies, and

pretend to be a maintenance worker or consultant who has access to the organization. Then the

intruder struts through the office until he or she finds a few passwords lying around and emerges

from the building with ample information to exploit the network from home later that night.

Another technique to gain authentication information is to just stand there and watch an

oblivious employee type in his password.

Social Engineering by Phone

The most prevalent type of social engineering attack is conducted by phone. A hacker will call up

and imitate someone in a position of authority or relevance and gradually pull information out of

the user. Help desks are particularly prone to this type of attack. Hackers are able to pretend

they are calling from inside the corporation by playing tricks on the PBX or the company

operator, so caller-ID is not always the best defense. Here’s a classic PBX trick, care of the

Computer Security Institute: “’Hi, I’m your AT&T rep, I’m stuck on a pole. I need you to punch a

bunch of buttons for me.’”

And here’s an even better one: “They’ll call you in the middle of the night: ‘Have you been

calling Egypt for the last six hours?’ ‘No.’ And they’ll say, ‘well, we have a call that’s actually

active right now, it’s on your calling card and it’s to Egypt and as a matter of fact, you’ve got

about $2,000 worth of charges from somebody using your card. You’re responsible for the

$2,000, you have to pay that...’ They’ll say, ‘I’m putting my job on the line by getting rid of this

$2,000 charge for you. But you need to read off that AT&T card number and PIN and then I’ll get

rid of the charge for you.’ People fall for it.” (Computer Security Institute).

Help desks are particularly vulnerable because they are in place specifically to help, a fact that

may be exploited by people who are trying to gain illicit information. Help desk employees are

trained to be friendly and give out information, so this is a gold mine for social engineering. Most

help desk employees are minimally educated in the area of security and get paid peanuts, so

they tend to just answer questions and go on to the next phone call. This can create a huge

security hole.

The facilitator of a live Computer Security Institute demonstration, neatly illustrated the

vulnerability of help desks when he “dialed up a phone company, got transferred around, and

reached the help desk. ‘Who’s the supervisor on duty tonight?’ ‘Oh, it’s Betty.’ ‘Let me talk to

Betty.’ [He’s transferred.] ‘Hi Betty, having a bad day?’ ‘No, why?...Your systems are down.’ She

said, ‘my systems aren’t down, we’re running fine.’ He said, ‘you better sign off.’ She signed off.

He said, ‘now sign on again.’ She signed on again. He said, ‘we didn’t even show a blip, we show

no change.’ He said, ‘sign off again.’ She did. ‘Betty, I’m going to have to sign on as you here to

figure out what’s happening with your ID. Let me have your user ID and password.’ So this senior

supervisor at the Help Desk tells him her user ID and password.” Brilliant.

A variation on the phone theme is the pay phone or ATM. Hackers really do shoulder surf and

obtain credit card numbers and PINs this way. (It happened to a friend of mine in a large US

airport.) People always stand around phone booths at airports, so this is a place to be extra

cautious.

Dumpster Diving

Dumpster diving, also known as trashing, is another popular method of social engineering. A

huge amount of information can be collected through company dumpsters. The LAN Times listed

the following items as potential security leaks in our trash: “company phone books,

organizational charts, memos, company policy manuals, calendars of meetings, events and

vacations, system manuals, printouts of sensitive data or login names and passwords, printouts

of source code, disks and tapes, company letterhead and memo forms, and outdated hardware.”

These sources can provide a rich vein of information for the hacker. Phone books can give the

hackers names and numbers of people to target and impersonate. Organizational charts contain

information about people who are in positions of authority within the organization. Memos

provide small tidbits of useful information for creating authenticity. Policy manuals show hackers

how secure (or insecure) the company really is. Calendars are great – they may tell attackers

which employees are out of town at a particular time. System manuals, sensitive data, and other

sources of technical information may give hackers the exact keys they need to unlock the

network. Finally, outdated hardware, particularly hard drives, can be restored to provide all sorts

of useful information. (We’ll discuss how to dispose of all of this in the second installment in this

series; suffice it to say, the shredder is a good place to start.)

On-Line Social Engineering

The Internet is fertile ground for social engineers looking to harvest passwords. The primary

weakness is that many users often repeat the use of one simple password on every account:

Yahoo, Travelocity, Gap.com, whatever. So once the hacker has one password, he or she can

probably get into multiple accounts. One way in which hackers have been known to obtain this

kind of password is through an on-line form: they can send out some sort of sweepstakes

information and ask the user to put in a name (including e-mail address – that way, she might

even get that person’s corporate account password as well) and password. These forms can be

sent by e-mail or through US Mail. US Mail provides a better appearance that the sweepstakes

might be a legitimate enterprise.

Another way hackers may obtain information on-line is by pretending to be the network

administrator, sending e-mail through the network and asking for a user’s password. This type of

social engineering attack doesn’t generally work, because users are generally more aware of

hackers when online, but it is something of which to take note. Furthermore, pop-up windows

can be installed by hackers to look like part of the network and request that the user reenter his

username and password to fix some sort of problem. At this point in time, most users should

know not to send passwords in clear text (if at all), but it never hurts to have an occasional

reminder of this simple security measure from the System Administrator. Even better, sys

admins might want to warn their users against disclosing their passwords in any fashion other

than a face-to-face conversation with a staff member who is known to be authorized and trusted.

E-mail can also be used for more direct means of gaining access to a system. For instance, mail

attachments sent from someone of authenticity can carry viruses, worms and Trojan horses. A

good example of this was an AOL hack, documented by VIGILANTe: “In that case, the hacker

called AOL’s tech support and spoke with the support person for an hour. During the

conversation, the hacker mentioned that his car was for sale cheaply. The tech supporter was

interested, so the hacker sent an e-mail attachment ‘with a picture of the car’. Instead of a car

photo, the mail executed a backdoor exploit that opened a connection out from AOL through the

firewall.”

Persuasion

The hackers themselves teach social engineering from a psychological point-of-view,

emphasizing how to create the perfect psychological environment for the attack. Basic methods

of persuasion include: impersonation, ingratiation, conformity, diffusion of responsibility, and

plain old friendliness. Regardless of the method used, the main objective is to convince the

person disclosing the information that the social engineer is in fact a person that they can trust

with that sensitive information. The other important key is to never ask for too much information

at a time, but to ask for a little from each person in order to maintain the appearance of a

comfortable relationship.

Impersonation generally means creating some sort of character and playing out the role. The

simpler the role, the better. Sometimes this could mean just calling up, saying: “Hi, I’m Joe in MIS

and I need your password,” but that doesn’t always work. Other times, the hacker will study a

real individual in an organization and wait until that person is out of town to impersonate him

over the phone. According to Bernz, a hacker who has written extensively on the subject, they

use little boxes to disguise their voices and study speech patterns and org charts. I’d say it’s the

least likely type of impersonation attack because it takes the most preparation, but it does

happen.

Some common roles that may be played in impersonation attacks include: a repairman, IT

support, a manager, a trusted third party (for example, the President’s executive assistant who

is calling to say that the President okayed her requesting certain information), or a fellow

employee. In a huge company, this is not that hard to do. There is no way to know everyone - IDs

can be faked. Most of these roles fall under the category of someone with authority, which leads

us to ingratiation. Most employees want to impress the boss, so they will bend over backwards to

provide required information to anyone in power.

Conformity is a group-based behavior, but can be used occasionally in the individual setting by

convincing the user that everyone else has been giving the hacker the same information now

requested, such as if the hacker is impersonating an IT manager. When hackers attack in such a

way as to diffuse the responsibility of the employee giving the password away, that alleviates

the stress on the employee.

When in doubt, the best way to obtain information in a social engineering attack is just to be

friendly. The idea here is that the average user wants to believe the colleague on the phone and

wants to help, so the hacker really only needs to be basically believable. Beyond that, most

employees respond in kind, especially to women. Slight flattery or flirtation might even help

soften up the target employee to co-operate further, but the smart hacker knows when to stop

pulling out information, just before the employee suspects anything odd. A smile, if in person, or

a simple “thank you” clenches the deal. And if that’s not enough, the new user routine often

works too: “I’m confused, (batting eyelashes) can you help me?”

Reverse Social Engineering

A final, more advanced method of gaining illicit information is known as “reverse social

engineering”. This is when the hacker creates a persona that appears to be in a position of

authority so that employees will ask him for information, rather than the other way around. If

researched, planned and executed well, reverse social engineering attacks may offer the hacker

an even better chance of obtaining valuable data from the employees; however, this requires a

great deal of preparation, research, and pre-hacking to pull off.

According to Methods of Hacking: Social Engineering, a paper by Rick Nelson, the three parts of

reverse social engineering attacks are sabotage, advertising, and assisting. The hacker

sabotages a network, causing a problem arise. That hacker then advertises that he is the

appropriate contact to fix the problem, and then, when he comes to fix the network problem, he

requests certain bits of information from the employees and gets what he really came for. They

never know it was a hacker, because their network problem goes away and everyone is happy.

Conclusion

Of course, no social engineering article is complete without mention of Kevin Mitnick, so I’ll

conclude with a quote from him from an article in Security Focus: “You could spend a fortune

purchasing technology and services...and your network infrastructure could still remain

vulnerable to old-fashioned manipulation.” Stay tuned for Part II: Combat Strategies, which will

look at ways of combatting attacks by identifying attacks, and by using preventative technology,

training, and policies.

To read Social Engineering, Part Two: Combat Strategies, click here.

References

Ameritech Consumer Information “Social Engineering Fraud,”

http://www.ameritech.com/content/0,3086,92,00.html

Anonymous “Social engineering: examples and countermeasures from the real-world,” Computer

Security Institute

http://www.gocsi.com/soceng.htm

Arthurs, Wendy: “A Proactive Defence to Social Engineering,” SANS Institute, August 2, 2001.

http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/social/defence.htm

Berg, Al: “Al Berg Cracking a Social Engineer,” by, LAN Times Nov. 6, 1995.

http://packetstorm.decepticons.org/docs/social-engineering/soc_eng2.html

Bernz 1: “Bernz’s Social Engineering Intro Page”

http://packetstorm.decepticons.org/docs/social-engineering/socintro.html

Bernz 2: “The complete Social Engineering FAQ!”

http://packetstorm.decepticons.org/docs/social-engineering/socialen.txt

Harl “People Hacking: The Psychology of Social Engineering” Text of Harl’s Talk at Access All

Areas III, March 7, 1997.

http://packetstorm.decepticons.org/docs/social-engineering/aaatalk.html

Mitnick, Kevin: “My first RSA Conference,” SecurityFocus, April 30, 2001

http://www.securityfocus.com/news/199

Orr, Chris “Social Engineering: A Backdoor to the Vault,”, SANS Institute, September 5, 2000

http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/social/backdoor.htm

Palumbo, John “Social Engineering: What is it, why is so little said about it and what can be

done?”, SANS Institute, July 26, 2000

http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/social/social.htm

Stevens, George: “Enhancing Defenses Against Social Engineering” SANS Institute, March 26,

2001

http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/social/defense_social.htm

Tims, Rick “Social Engineering: Policies and Education a Must” SANS Institute, February 16, 2001

http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/social/policies.htm

Verizon “PBX Social Engineering Scam” 2000

http://www.bellatlantic.com/security/fraud/pbx_scam.htm

VIGILANTe “Social Engineering” 2001

http://www.vigilante.com/inetsecurity/socialengineering.htm

Privacy StatementCopyright 2006, SecurityFocus

http://www.securityfocus.com/print/infocus/1527

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Social engineering (security)From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: navigation, searchThis article is about manipulation of individuals. For social engineering in terms of influencing popular behavior, see Social engineering (political science).

Social engineering is the act of manipulating people into performing actions or divulging confidential information. While similar to a confidence trick or simple fraud, the term typically applies to trickery or deception for the purpose of information gathering, fraud, or computer system access; in most cases the attacker never comes face-to-face with the victim.

Contents

[hide] 1 Social engineering techniques and terms

o 1.1 Pretextingo 1.2 Phishing

1.2.1 IVR or phone phishing 1.2.2 Baiting

o 1.3 Quid pro quoo 1.4 Other types

2 Notable social engineers o 2.1 Kevin Mitnicko 2.2 The Badir Brotherso 2.3 Others

3 United States law o 3.1 Pretexting of telephone recordso 3.2 Federal legislationo 3.3 1st Source Information Specialistso 3.4 Hewlett Packard

4 In popular culture 5 See also 6 References

o 6.1 Noteso 6.2 Further reading

7 External links

[edit] Social engineering techniques and terms

All social engineering techniques are based on specific attributes of human decision-making known as cognitive biases.[1] These biases, sometimes called "bugs in the human hardware," are exploited in various combinations to create attack techniques, some of which are listed here:

[edit] Pretexting

Pretexting' is the act of creating and using an invented scenario (the pretext) to persuade a targeted victim to release information or perform an action and is typically done over the telephone. It is more than a simple lie as it most often involves some prior research or set up and the use of pieces of known information (e.g. for impersonation: date of birth, Social Security Number, last bill amount) to establish legitimacy in the mind of the target. [2]

This technique is often used to trick a business into disclosing customer information, and is used by private investigators to obtain telephone records, utility records, banking records and other information directly from junior company service representatives. The information can then be used to establish even greater legitimacy under tougher questioning with a manager (e.g., to make account changes, get specific balances, etc).

As most U.S. companies still authenticate a client by asking only for a Social Security Number, date of birth, or mother's maiden name, the method is effective in many situations and will likely continue to be a security problem in the future.

Pretexting can also be used to impersonate co-workers, police, bank, tax authorities, or insurance investigators — or any other individual who could have perceived authority or right-to-know in the mind of the targeted victim. The pretexter must simply prepare answers to questions that might be asked by the victim. In some cases all that is needed is a voice that sounds authoritative, an earnest tone, and an ability to think on one's feet.

[edit] Phishing

Main article: Phishing

Phishing is a technique of fraudulently obtaining private information. Typically, the phisher sends an e-mail that appears to come from a legitimate business—a bank, or credit card company—requesting "verification" of information and warning of some dire consequence if it is not provided. The e-mail usually contains a link to a fraudulent web page that seems legitimate—with company logos and content—and has a form requesting everything from a home address to an ATM card's PIN.

For example, 2003 saw the proliferation of a phishing scam in which users received e-mails supposedly from eBay claiming that the user’s account was about to be suspended unless a link provided was clicked to update a credit card (information that the genuine eBay already had). Because it is relatively simple to make a Web site resemble a legitimate organization's site by mimicking the HTML code, the scam counted on people being tricked into thinking they were being contacted by eBay and subsequently, were going to eBay’s site to update their account information. By spamming large groups of people, the “phisher” counted on the e-mail being read by a percentage of people who already had listed credit card numbers with eBay legitimately, who might respond.

[edit] IVR or phone phishing

This technique uses a rogue Interactive voice response (IVR) system to recreate a legitimate sounding copy of a bank or other institution's IVR system. The victim is prompted (typically via a phishing e-mail) to call in to the "bank" via a (ideally toll free) number provided in order to "verify" information. A typical system will reject log-ins continually, ensuring the victim enters PINs or passwords multiple times, often disclosing several different passwords. More advanced systems transfer the victim to the attacker posing as a customer service agent for further questioning.

One could even record the typical commands ("Press one to change your password, press two to speak to customer service" ...) and play back the direction manually in real time, giving the appearance of being an IVR without the expense.

The technical name for phone phishing, is vishing.

[edit] Baiting

Baiting is like the real-world Trojan Horse that uses physical media and relies on the curiosity or greed of the victim.[3]

In this attack, the attacker leaves a malware infected floppy disk, CD ROM, or USB flash drive in a location sure to be found (bathroom, elevator, sidewalk, parking lot), gives it a legitimate looking and curiosity-piquing label, and simply waits for the victim to use the device.

For example, an attacker might create a disk featuring a corporate logo, readily available off the target's web site, and write "Executive Salary Summary Q2 2009" on the front. The attacker would then leave the disk on the floor of an elevator or somewhere in the lobby of the targeted company. An unknowing employee might find it and subsequently insert the disk into a computer to satisfy their curiosity, or a good samaritan might find it and turn it in to the company.

In either case as a consequence of merely inserting the disk into a computer to see the contents, the user would unknowingly install malware on it, likely giving an attacker unfettered access to the victim's PC and perhaps, the targeted company's internal computer network.

Unless computer controls block the infection, PCs set to "auto-run" inserted media may be compromised as soon as a rogue disk is inserted.

[edit] Quid pro quo

Quid pro quo means something for something:

An attacker calls random numbers at a company claiming to be calling back from technical support. Eventually they will hit someone with a legitimate problem, grateful that someone is calling back to help them. The attacker will "help" solve the problem and in the process have the user type commands that give the attacker access or launch malware.

In a 2003 information security survey, 90% of office workers gave researchers what they claimed was their password in answer to a survey question in exchange for a cheap pen.[4] Similar surveys in later years obtained similar results using chocolates and other cheap lures, although they made no attempt to validate the passwords.[5]

[edit] Other types

Common confidence tricksters or fraudsters also could be considered "social engineers" in the wider sense, in that they deliberately deceive and manipulate people, exploiting

human weaknesses to obtain personal benefit. They may, for example, use social engineering techniques as part of an IT fraud.

The latest type of social engineering techniques include spoofing or hacking IDs of people having popular e-mail IDs such as Yahoo, Gmail, Hotmail, etc. Among the many motivations for deception are:

Phishing credit-card account numbers and their passwords. Hacking private e-mails and chat histories, and manipulating them by using

common editing techniques before using them to extort money and creating distrust among individuals.

Hacking websites of companies or organizations and destroying their reputation.

[edit] Notable social engineers

[edit] Kevin Mitnick

Reformed computer criminal and later, security consultant Kevin Mitnick popularized the term 'social engineering', pointing out that it is much easier to trick someone into giving a password for a system than to spend the effort to hack into the system.[6] He claims it was the single most effective method in his arsenal.

[edit] The Badir Brothers

Ramy, Muzher, and Shadde Badir - brothers, all of whom were blind from birth, managed to set up an extensive phone and computer fraud scheme in Israel in the 1990s using social engineering, voice impersonation, and Braille-display computers.[7]

[edit] Others

Other noted social engineers include Frank Abagnale, Dave Buchwald, David Bannon, Peter Foster, Stanley Mark Rifkin and Steven Jay Russell.

[edit] United States law

The examples and perspective in this article deal primarily with the United States and do not represent a worldwide view of the subject. Please improve this article and discuss the issue on the talk page.

In common law, pretexting is an invasion of privacy tort of appropriation.[8]

[edit] Pretexting of telephone records

In December 2006, United States Congress approved a Senate sponsored bill making the pretexting of telephone records a federal felony with fines of up to $250,000 and ten years in prison for individuals (or fines of up to $500,000 for companies). It was signed by president George W. Bush on January 12, 2007.[9]

[edit] Federal legislation

The 1999 "GLBA" is a U.S. Federal law that specifically addresses pretexting of banking records as an illegal act punishable under federal statutes. When a business entity such as a private investigator, SIU insurance investigator, or an adjuster conducts any type of deception, it falls under the authority of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). This federal agency has the obligation and authority to ensure that consumers are not subjected to any unfair or deceptive business practices. US Federal Trade Commission Act, Section 5 of the FTCA states, in part: "Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any such person, partnership, or corporation has been or is using any unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce, and if it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public, it shall issue and serve upon such person, partnership, or corporation a complaint stating its charges in that respect."

The statute states that when someone obtains any personal, non-public information from a financial institution or the consumer, their action is subject to the statute. It relates to the consumer's relationship with the financial institution. For example, a pretexter using false pretenses either to get a consumer's address from the consumer's bank, or to get a consumer to disclose the name of his or her bank, would be covered. The determining principle is that pretexting only occurs when information is obtained through false pretenses.

While the sale of cell telephone records has gained significant media attention, and telecommunications records are the focus of the two bills currently before the United States Senate, many other types of private records are being bought and sold in the public market. Alongside many advertisements for cell phone records, wireline records and the records associated with calling cards are advertised. As individuals shift to VoIP telephones, it is safe to assume that those records will be offered for sale as well. Currently, it is legal to sell telephone records, but illegal to obtain them.[10]

[edit] 1st Source Information Specialists

U.S. Rep. Fred Upton (R-Kalamazoo, Michigan), chairman of the Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, expressed concern over the easy access to personal cell phone records on the Internet during Wednesday's E&C Committee hearing on "Phone Records For Sale: Why Aren't Phone Records Safe From Pretexting?" Illinois became the first state to sue an online records broker when Attorney General Lisa Madigan sued 1st Source Information Specialists, Inc., on 20 January, a spokeswoman for Madigan's office said. The Florida-based company operates several Web sites that sell cell telephone records, according to a copy of the suit. The attorneys

general of Florida and Missouri quickly followed Madigan's lead, filing suit on 24 January and 30 January, respectively, against 1st Source Information Specialists and, in Missouri's case, one other records broker - First Data Solutions, Inc.

Several wireless providers, including T-Mobile, Verizon, and Cingular filed earlier lawsuits against records brokers, with Cingular winning an injunction against First Data Solutions and 1st Source Information Specialists on January 13. U.S. Senator Charles Schumer (D-New York) introduced legislation in February 2006 aimed at curbing the practice. The Consumer Telephone Records Protection Act of 2006 would create felony criminal penalties for stealing and selling the records of mobile phone, landline, and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) subscribers.

[edit] Hewlett Packard

Patricia Dunn, former chairman of Hewlett Packard, reported that the HP board hired a private investigation company to delve into who was responsible for leaks within the board. Dunn acknowledged that this company used the practice of pretexting to solicit the telephone records of board members and journalists. Chairman Dunn later apologized for this act and offered to step down from the board if it was desired by board members.[11] Unlike Federal law, California law specifically forbids such pretexting. The four felony charges brought on Dunn were dismissed[12].

[edit] In popular culture

In the film Hackers, the protagonist used a form of social engineering, where the main character accessed a TV network's control system by telephoning the security guard for the telephone number to the station's modem, posing as an important executive. Although the film is not highly accurate, the particular method demonstrates the power of social engineering when applied to criminal behavior.

In Jeffrey Deaver's book The Blue Nowhere, social engineering to obtain confidential information is one of the methods used by the killer, Phate, to get close to his victims.

In the movie Live Free or Die Hard, Justin Long is seen pretexting that his father is dying from a heart attack to have a BMW Assist representative start what will become a stolen car.

In the movie Sneakers, one of the characters poses as a low level security guard's superior in order to convince him that a security breach is just a false alarm.

In the movie The Thomas Crown Affair, one of the characters poses over the telephone as a museum guard's superior in order to move the guard away from his post.

In the James Bond movie Diamonds Are Forever, Bond is seen gaining entry to the Whyte laboratory with a then-state-of-the-art card-access lock system by "tailgating". He merely waits for an employee to come to open the door, then posing himself as a rookie at the lab, fakes inserting a non-existent card while the door is unlocked for him by the employee.

[edit] See also

Phishing Confidence trick Certified Social Engineering Prevention Specialist (CSEPS) Media pranks, which often use similar tactics (though usually not for criminal

purposes) Physical information security Vishing SMiShing

[edit] References

[edit] Notes

1. ^ Mitnick, K: "CSEPS Course Workbook" (2004), unit 3, Mitnick Security Publishing.2. ^ "Pretexting: Your Personal Information Revealed," Federal Trade Commission3. ^ http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=95556&WT.svl=column1_14. ^ Office workers give away passwords5. ^ Passwords revealed by sweet deal6. ^ Mitnick, K: "CSEPS Course Workbook" (2004), p. 4, Mitnick Security Publishing.7. ^ http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.02/phreaks.html8. ^ Restatement 2d of Torts § 652C.9. ^ Congress outlaws pretexting, Eric Bangeman, 12/11/2006 11:01:01, Ars Technica10. ^ Mitnick, K (2002): "The Art of Deception", p. 103 Wiley Publishing Ltd: Indianapolis,

Indiana; United States of America. ISBN 0-471-23712-411. ^ HP chairman: Use of pretexting 'embarrassing' Stephen Shankland, 2006-09-08 1:08

PM PDT CNET News.com12. ^ Calif. court drops charges against Dunn

[edit] Further reading

Boyington, Gregory. (1990). Baa Baa Black Sheep Published by Bantam Books ISBN 0-553-26350-1

Leyden, John. April 18, 2003. Office workers give away passwords for a cheap pen. The Register. Retrieved 2004-09-09.

Long, Johnny. (2008). No Tech Hacking - A Guide to Social Engeering, Dumpster Diving, and Shoulder Surfing Published by Syngress Publishing Inc. ISBN 978-1-59749-215-7

Mann, Ian. (2008). Hacking the Human: Social Engineering Techniques and Security Countermeasures Published by Gower Publishing Ltd. ISBN 0566087731 or ISBN 978-0-566-08773-8

Mitnick, Kevin, Kasperavičius, Alexis. (2004). CSEPS Course Workbook. Mitnick Security Publishing.

Mitnick, Kevin, Simon, William L., Wozniak, Steve,. (2002). The Art of Deception: Controlling the Human Element of Security Published by Wiley. ISBN 0-471-23712-4 or ISBN 0-764-54280-X

[edit] External links

Social Engineering Fundamentals - Securityfocus.com. Retrieved on August 3rd, 2009.

Social Engineering, the USB Way - DarkReading.com. Retrieved on July 7th, 2006.

Should Social Engineering be a part of Penetration Testing? - Darknet.org.uk. Retrieved on August 3rd, 2009.

"Protecting Consumers' Phone Records" - US Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Retrieved on February 8th, 2006.

Plotkin, Hal. Memo to the Press: Pretexting is Already Illegal. Retrived on September 9th, 2006.

Striptease for passwords - MSNBC.MSN.com. Retrieved on November 1st, 2007.

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_engineering_(security)"Categories: Social engineering (computer security)Hidden categories: Articles with limited geographic scope | USA-centric

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